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CHATHAM HOUSE, WHITEHALL, AND FAR EASTERN ISSUES: 1941–45*

Christopher Thorne

IN one of its aspects, the essay that follows is a brief exploration of a little-known side of reactions within Britain to the war against Japan between 1941 and 1945, and to Anglo-American relations in the context of that conflict. At the same time, however, it seeks to raise certain questions concerning the degree of independence that the Royal Institute of International Affairs was able to preserve within the special circumstances of the war years, and to ask whether, with particular regard to the Far East, the Institute can be said to have had any significant influence on the policies of the British government. Finally, it is hoped that, in the process of pursuing both these lines of inquiry, some indication will emerge of ways in which documentary material existing in the archives of Chatham House (especially when used in conjunction with papers in the Public Record Office in London and in official and private collections abroad) provides an insight into various ideas about aspects of international affairs that were being discussed at some time in the past among members of the 'attentive' and 'opinion-forming' publics,[1] both within and outside Britain.

From the founding of the British Institute of International Affairs in 1920 (it became the Royal Institute six years later) great emphasis was placed upon its status as 'an unofficial and non-political body', and upon its refusal, spelt out in the preliminaries of all the books published under its aegis, to express a collective opinion on any international issue. As set out in its Royal Charter, the object of the Institute was rather to 'advance the sciences of international politics, economics and jurisprudence', to 'provide and maintain means of information upon inter-

* The preparation of this article was greatly facilitated by a grant given to the Royal Institute of International Affairs by the Leverhulme Trust, which enabled the Institute to put its archives in an order more readily accessible to researchers. With the exception of papers dealing with the internal affairs of the Institute, those archives more than thirty years old are now open to bona fide research workers. The writer would like to express his own thanks to the archivist involved in that project, Stephen Brooks. He is especially grateful to Miss Dorothy Hamerton (Librarian and Archivist), Miss Elisabeth Campbell (former Press Librarian), and A. S. Olver (who in 1943 became Assistant to the Secretary of Chatham House and secretary to, *inter alia*, its Pacific Affairs Committee) who all provided him with valuable background information and read the article in draft—though the responsibility for its contents remains, of course, his alone.

[1] See, e.g., J. N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1961, chs. 4 and 5). Some of what follows is also of interest in connection with what Rosenau has termed 'linkage groups'. See his *Linkage Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

national questions', and to 'promote the study and investigation of [such] questions . . .'

Not surprisingly, however, the Institute did not escape criticism for its policies—or what were alleged to be its policies—both before and after the Second World War.[2] In 1925, for example, the charge was made that it had become a vehicle for foreign propaganda; yet it was the contrary notion that was probably more widespread: that is, that its connections with individuals in Westminster and Whitehall gave the Institute some kind of quasi-official standing—rather as the *Times* was assumed by a good many people outside Britain to be the mouthpiece of the government of the day.[3] This was not, in fact, the case, although politicians and officials did come to Chatham House to speak or to take part in discussions, thus, incidentally, underlining the need for such occasions to remain private. (In the first year of the Institute's existence, for example, Sir Maurice Hankey, the Secretary of the Cabinet and the Committee of Imperial Defence, was asked to read a paper on 'Diplomacy by Conference', with Arthur Balfour being invited to preside over the meeting.)[4] Even an episode—it appears to have been a rare occurrence—when someone in an official position sought to exert influence over one of the Institute's publications serves in retrospect to emphasise the independence possessed by those who were working in St. James's Square. For although, when Elizabeth Wiskemann was preparing her timely history of *Czechs and Germans* in 1937–38, Arnold Toynbee, as Director of Studies at the Institute, did endeavour, on his own private admission, 'to correct [its] pro-Czech leaning' (he believed he had succeeded in doing so 'very substantially'), he nevertheless declined to delay the publication of the book when that course was suggested to him by a member of the Foreign Office, who feared that the appearance of the volume in the summer of 1938 would mean 'a set-back to the very real effort . . . which is being made to bring M. Benes to a sense of the "realities" of the situation and so to direct negotiations with Henlein [the leader of the Sudeten German extremists]'.[5]

[2] Material on Criticisms of Chatham House Policy, Chatham House archives (hereafter, 'CHA'), sections 2 and 8.

[3] It can of course be argued that in 1938 the *Times* under Dawson did, indeed, compromise its independence where foreign policy was concerned. See, e.g., K. Middlemas, *Diplomacy of Illusion* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp. 102, 289, 323.

[4] Council minutes, CHA/1, vol. 1.

[5] Hadow to Toynbee, May 16, 1938; Toynbee to Macadam, May 17, 1938; Toynbee to Hadow, May 19, 1938, CHA/16/23. It is interesting to read Toynbee's strong personal views on various international issues during the 1930s, especially in the light of what was appearing from his pen or under his guidance in the annual *Survey of International Affairs* at the time. Thus, for example, he wrote privately from his home in York to Miss Margaret Cleeve at Chatham House on July 18, 1931: 'I sit here considering the philosophy of history and then the paper comes and I start boiling over at the latest enormity of the French. I suppose my feelings against them go back to the peace conference. They are now at white heat! It looks as if we were assisting now at the

It is not to be wondered at that the special circumstances of the wartime years between 1939 and 1945 did, however, blur the dividing line between Chatham House and the official world. Even so, the evidence now available suggests that in certain respects this process went much further than many realised at the time—far enough, indeed, for the very independence of the Institute to be compromised at least in one specific connection, even if that independence was to be re-established once peace had returned. The aspect of Chatham House's work that was involved was its role as the body representing Britain within the Institute of Pacific Relations, but this can usefully be set alongside other ways in which the Institute was concerned with Far Eastern issues during the war. At this point, obviously, the wider context of international, and particularly Anglo-American, relations regarding that part of the world also becomes relevant. Given the size of that subject, however, the most that can be done here is to refer readers who wish to examine the inter-governmental side of things to a more lengthy and forthcoming study by the present writer.[6]

* * * * * *

Between 1939 and 1945, as will emerge below, the staff of Chatham House tended to find themselves engaged in new duties. However, many of the normal activities of the Institute continued during these war years, under the guidance of a small band of administrators (notably Miss Margaret Cleeve) who had not become involved in government work. Various study groups went on meeting, for example, and among them was one that devoted its attention to Far Eastern affairs. Its members included Sir Frederick Whyte, a former Liberal Member of Parliament who had also been President of the Indian Legislative Assembly and Political Adviser to the Chinese government, and had written books on *Asia in the Twentieth Century* and *The Future of East and West*; Sir Andrew McFadyean, a former Treasury official and President of the Liberal Party, and at the time a director of the British North Borneo Company; and Sir John Pratt, a retired senior official of the Consular Service in China who, while on attachment to the Foreign Office during

grand dénouement of the last dozen years. Do you think the next chapter—beginning after the Disarmament Conference—will end in another war, with France playing Germany's part this time? In my antigallicism I am almost in danger of becoming patriotic.' CHA/4/Toynbee.

In 1942, however, on his return from a visit to the United States, where he had been struck by the far greater margin of security enjoyed by that country than by Britain, he was to confess to a Chatham House audience: 'Again and again when I was in America I said to myself: Now I know how the French have felt and how very good it is for me to know that. Now I understand what they could never make me and my fellow-countrymen understand until it was too late.' Address of Dec. 7, 1942, CHA/4/Toynbee.

[6] *Allies of a Kind. The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945* (to be published by Hamish Hamilton in Feb. 1978).

the 1930s, had played a significant part in helping to shape Britain's Far Eastern policies.[7]

It is not proposed to examine in detail the proceedings of the Far Eastern Group, but it is worth noting a few of the speakers and topics that were involved, together with some of the more interesting ideas that emerged.[8] Certain visitors, for example, raised the question of whether China, for the time being Britain's ally, might not make trouble for it after the war. Sir Muhammed Zafrullah Khan for one, who had for a short while been India's Agent General in Chungking, suggested at a meeting of the Group early in 1943 that China's desire to recover what it regarded as integral parts of its historic territory might well extend beyond Manchuria and Tibet to include parts of Indochina and upper Burma as well. A sharp disagreement over this same issue arose during a session later in the same year when the speaker was Sir Olaf Caroe, the Indian government's Secretary for External Affairs, who emphasised that 'history had shown there was such a thing as Chinese imperialism', and that therefore care must be taken to maintain a number of buffer states between China and India. To this, Sir John Pratt fiercely retorted that 'there was no danger to India from China', and that Britain itself 'had called Chinese imperialism into existence by [its] own follies—as in the case of Tibet'. Britain's true interest in the Far East, he asserted, was 'always identical to that of China', with the 'real danger' being represented by Japan and with the Soviet Union also being likely to extend its influence in the area.

Meanwhile on a number of occasions the Group had also discussed the related topic of likely postwar political developments within China. Several visiting speakers referred, for example, to the growing strength of the Communists in Yenan and to what a former Financial Counsellor of the British Embassy in Chungking described as their 'popular appeal'; Zafrullah Khan, too, suggested that, although inferior in numbers to the armies of the Kuomintang, 'the Communists might be a more efficient fighting force'. A speaker with a rather different background, Victor Farmer, who was a director of ICI (China) and who in 1944 had recently returned from a visit to the Far East, offered for his part a misunderstanding that was already fairly widespread in both London and Washington at the time[9]:

[7] For material on Pratt's role during the Far Eastern crisis of 1931–33, and his subsequent public criticisms of the version of the crisis put forward in book form by Henry Stimson, who had been the American Secretary of State at the time, see C. Thorne, *The Limits of Foreign Policy* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972), *passim*. Pratt was an Anglo-Indian.

[8] Far Eastern Group proceedings, CHA/8, *passim*.

[9] On Western misperceptions of the nature of the Chinese Communist Party before 1945, see, e.g., Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China 1941–50* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), and K. E. Shewmaker, *Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927–1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971).

> I have met some [Chinese] Communists and their ideas are not as Communistic as one would imagine. In fact they are very open-minded. If you could get rid of this ultra-nationalistic clique in the saddle at present in Chungking, and many Government officials [there] are extremely broad-minded, I think that the way would be open for a compromise with the Communists; and an effective compromise.

In addition to the Far Eastern Group, there also existed at Chatham House, from 1942 onwards, a private members' study group on War Strategy, which was set up by Lt. Colonel Oliver Garsia [10] and contained among its members Lord Hankey (as he had become) and Major-General F. S. G. Piggott, Military Attaché in Tokyo in the later 1930s, whose strong views on the ease with which Britain could avoid clashing with Japan had set him apart from officials in London.[11] Indeed, Piggott, even after Pearl Harbour, maintained this line of argument (together with his reputation for being somewhat bizarre) during the meetings of the War Strategy Group, submitting in September 1942, for example, that 'it was a fact that at the outbreak of war with Germany, Japan was more pro-British than pro-German'.[12] At the same time—and in this he was in accord with the official view adamantly held in Washington—he agreed with other members, such as Field Marshal Lord Milne (a former Chief of the Imperial General Staff), that if Japan were ever to be defeated, greater attention would have to be paid to the vital contribution that China could make.

One of the last papers submitted to the War Strategy Group came in June 1945 from Sir Josiah Crosby, formerly Britain's Minister in Bangkok, under the heading of 'The Shape of Things to Come in the Far East'. Sir Josiah described Chinese immigration and economic penetration into South-east Asia as 'alarming', and attacked suggestions that the European colonial powers in the area should hand over their territories to an international body; he recognised, nevertheless, that Japan's dramatic military victories in 1941–42 had put an end to what had remained of the prestige of the white man in the Far East, and argued that the only future for Western people there lay in returning 'as friends and mentors bent upon showing [Orientals] the road to progress and to government by themselves within the shortest possible space of time'.

10 War Strategy Group papers, CHA/9.

11 See, e.g., B. A. Lee, *Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 115.

12 The large degree of oversimplification involved in this assertion is revealed in, e.g., D. Borg and S. Okamoto, eds., *Pearl Harbor as History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), and J. Morley, ed., *Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

Even this modified, paternalist approach was of course by then quite unacceptable to some of the rapidly-developing nationalist movements in South-east Asia.[13] And in this connection, a lecture which Crosby had delivered at Chatham House earlier, in 1943, had given rise to some disquiet within the Foreign Office, for not only had the speaker proposed that Siam—already an independent state—might require a period of Western tutelage after the war, but in the opinion of a member of the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department, the whole tone of the ensuing discussion had been 'very reactionary'. The Head of the Department, Ashley (later Sir Ashley) Clarke, agreed that any mention of what had been said at the meeting 'should be suppressed', and that an article which Crosby proposed to write for *International Affairs* ought to be postponed lest its tone should offend the Chinese.[14] In the event, an essay by Crosby was published in *International Affairs* in July 1944, whereupon his reference to a possible period of tutelage for Siam was taken by American officials as clear evidence of sinister intentions on the part of the British government towards that country in particular and South-east Asia generally. There was some irony in this, in that Crosby's private view, as expressed in conversation with former colleagues in the Foreign Office, was that tutelage over Siam should be exercised, not by Britain, but by the United States.[15] Regardless of the facts of the case, however, the episode remains of interest as an example of how discussions and publications centred upon Chatham House, especially where officials or former officials were involved, could have repercussions in the wider field of international relations at the time.

* * * * * *

While an examination of Far Eastern issues continued to take place at Chatham House during the war years, various individuals connected with the Institute were contributing to a similar process in an official capacity of one kind or another. In some cases, the person concerned had been in the service of the government before the war. Sir George Sansom, a member of the Institute from 1931 onwards (though not closely involved in its work), was an outstanding example in a Far

[13] Nevertheless, A. S. Olver's comment on Crosby's remarks is important. The latter, he recalls, 'was an amusingly old-fashioned character from an age when the British Minister in Bangkok was indeed a power in the land. The quotation from him therefore suggests a striking change in attitude in Britain to the future of South-east Asia since before the war, when the prospect of self-government was hardly considered as compared with the discussions which went on about India'. (Letter to the author, Oct. 16, 1977.) On the extent of the change that took place during the war years, see, e.g., V. Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, 2nd edn. (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1965), p. 551.

[14] FO 371, F6050/1953/61 (35927), Public Record Office, London.

[15] *Ibid.*, F606/169/40 (35977) and F696/222/40 (35979); R. Harris Smith, *OSS* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 303.

Eastern context. Having long been recognised as a leading scholar in the field of Japanese studies, he was also Commercial Counsellor in the Embassy in Tokyo before 1941. After Pearl Harbour, he eventually took up a senior post in the Washington Embassy with special responsibility for Far Eastern affairs, also contributing to discussions within the Foreign Office—on such issues as the future of the Throne in Japan—views that were accorded great weight.[16] For other individuals, meanwhile, entry into the world of officialdom had come about only recently, as a consequence of the special circumstances created by the war. Thus G. E. Hubbard, who had been the co-ordinator of Far Eastern research at Chatham House, was seconded in 1939 to the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, where he developed the argument, for example, that in 1942 'nothing in the Far East mattered so much as keeping China in the war'.[17] Not surprisingly, when, as we shall see below, he returned to his post at Chatham House in 1943, Hubbard kept in fairly close touch with his former colleagues in Whitehall.[18]

At the same time, the Institute also found itself involved during the war in a more wholesale new relationship with the official world when, with the aid of a government grant and under Toynbee's direction, it set up the Foreign Research and Press Service at Oxford in 1939, and even more so in 1943 when the FRPS was transformed, still under Toynbee, into the Foreign Office Research Department. The work undertaken by the FRPS for a large number of government agencies (seventeen of them used the press-cuttings library) deserves an article to itself, but it can be summarised here as having involved studying the foreign press, responding to inquiries from government departments and carrying out research initiated from within.[19] Two points of wider interest need to be empha-

16 Interview with Sir Ashley Clarke. For examples of Sansom's contribution to official policy discussions, see FO 371, F4052/584/61 (46346) and F3768/364/23 (46447). Sansom had a poor opinion of the Foreign Office, however, suggesting privately in 1945 that it needed 'the most drastic overhaul, physically and morally', and that 'the whole machine is slow, cumbrous and obsolete, [with] still too much of the annointment with holy oil. . . .' K. Sansom, *Sir George Sansom and Japan: A Memoir* (Tallahassee, Florida: Diplomatic Press, 1972), p. 145.

17 FO 371, F2754/289/61 (31760). Some of Hubbard's personal correspondence was, alas, among the archive material that was 'weeded out' before the survey and re-ordering of the Chatham House archives.

18 E.g. FO 371, F4767 and 5163/1935/61 (35927).

19 FRPS Committee papers, CHA/2. One example of a specific contribution by a member of the FRPS outside Far Eastern matters involved Professor Charles Webster, who was not averse to intervening in Whitehall debates in magisterial fashion when the opportunity arose. On this occasion, in May and June 1944, an argument on paper had developed between the Head of the Foreign Office's Reconstruction Department, Gladwyn Jebb, and the Head of the North American Department, Nevile Butler, following comments by Jebb on statements made by Walter Lippmann about the need for realism in American postwar foreign policy. Emphasising the importance of a continuing 'balancing of power', Jebb had observed: 'all this talk of morals in international politics is beside the point. . . .' This shocked Butler, who responded that the question of morals was 'really the whole point', adding that when Hitler's Germany had become

sised as well, however, in connection with the establishment of the FRPS/FORD. The first is that the employment of the Institute's resources in an official capacity of this kind was not undertaken on the initiative of Whitehall alone and against the wishes of those responsible for the conduct of its affairs. Toynbee had been envisaging some such development a year before war broke out, writing to a member of the staff in St. James's Square as the Czech crisis of 1938 approached its climax: 'We shall have to put in some strenuous work persuading H.M.G. *to use Chatham House* instead of breaking us up.'[20]

Nevertheless—and this is the second aspect of general interest—the ensuing establishment of the FRPS did raise substantial questions concerning the status of Chatham House and of its staff (even though many non-Institute people also became involved in the work of the new organisation), as well as the general issue of relations between government and intellectuals in wartime.[21] There is not room in this article to examine the discussions that went on before members of the staff of the Institute were transformed in 1943 into temporary civil servants under the aegis of the Foreign Office. It can be suggested, however, that while the long-term independence of Chatham House was not compromised, its new role, though temporary, probably helped to reinforce the belief held by some foreign observers that it was in any case some kind of quasi-official organisation. Indeed, in 1942 Lord Hailey was already asking his fellow members of the Institute's Committee 'whether any action could be taken to dispose of the confusion which existed in the minds of a number of people, government officials and others, that Chatham House and the FRPS were one and that accordingly Chatham House was now an official body.'[22]

aggressive 'we pursued a Police policy [and] did not intentionally seek anything as precarious or nicely calculated as a Balance of Power.' Webster, invited to comment, thereupon dismissed Lippmann as a slovenly and confused thinker and suggested that both Jebb and Butler were oversimplifying their own views. The balance of power, he asserted, had never been the *object* of British policy. The object, rather, had been to prevent an aggressive power dominating Europe and threatening British interests; if a dominant power were peacefully inclined, as Germany had been for the most part between 1871 and 1890, then Britain was ready to accept the situation. FO 371, AN2320/34/45 (38556).

[20] Toynbee to Cleeve, Sept. 6, 1938, CHA/4/Toynbee. Emphasis added. See material on plans for Chatham House in wartime, CHA/2.

[21] Toynbee memo., March 30, 1942, and Council minutes, Nov. 18, 1942, CHA/1. There is probably room for a study of the contribution made to British wartime diplomacy and foreign policy making by the 'outsiders', who included Isaiah Berlin, R. H. Tawney and Professor T. N. Whitehead.

[22] Council minutes, May 13, 1942, CHA/1, vol. 21. It is interesting to note that in 1942, when the Foreign Office proposed to bring the FRPS under its direct control, many members of the Committee of Chatham House were extremely unhappy at the prospect, a subcommittee reporting that it was 'not convinced that an organisation which owes its acknowledged success to the fact that its members were recruited from outside the Civil Service is not more likely to prove effective if its management is left to those who in normal times were directly and primarily concerned with the conduct of research into International Affairs, namely the Council of the . . . Institute'. The Foreign Office,

Meanwhile the contribution to policy debates on Far Eastern affairs that was made by the FRPS and later the FORD consisted in the main in the provision of raw material in the form of historical background studies and surveys of factors that might come to play a part in the future. For example, the Foreign Office was presented with memoranda dealing with Chinese attitudes to the status of Tibet, with those aspects of the Chinese scene likely to affect the fate of Manchuria and Korea (special FORD committees, their members including Toynbee and Professor C. K. Webster, were set up to study the future of these last two territories), and with the circumstances Britain itself was likely to encounter in that part of the world after Japan had been defeated.[23] That is not to say, of course, that such material was or could be somehow selected and presented in a 'neutral' form, and indeed on some occasions Toynbee in particular put forward very definite views of his own that involved an interpretation of an aspect of the international scene—for instance, British public opinion regarding colonial issues.[24] The FORD also went on record in 1944 on the subject of Chinese domestic politics with two opinions that were by no means accepted throughout Whitehall: that Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues were, indeed, the Communists that they claimed to be, and that, despite hopes of a compromise arrangement being reached between them and the Chungking government of Chiang Kai-shek, anything more than a temporary 'papering over of the cracks' was improbable.[25]

Among the staff of the FRPS/FORD, two individuals in particular stand out in retrospect for the contributions they made to the study of Far Eastern affairs in Whitehall during the war. One was F. C. Jones, the author of such books as *Japan* and *Extraterritoriality in Japan*, formerly of Harvard and subsequently of Bristol University.[26]

for its part, emphasised the need to incorporate the FRPS now that work was beginning on possible aspects of the peace settlement, the way in which an official label would make the FRPS more readily trusted by other government departments, and, as Richard Law (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State) put it to Lord Astor, that if the FRPS remained under Chatham House control, 'there might be criticism in Parliament of the Government's policy being dictated by what might be termed "long-haired" people.' Toynbee supported the Foreign Office argument, and threatened, within the Institute's Committee, that if he were not given this opportunity to watch the development of the peace settlement from within the official machine, he would not continue to write the Institute's annual *Survey* after the war. In this connection, A. S. Olver's recollection is of interest. 'I was always told', he writes, 'that Toynbee was amongst those who had wanted the rump of Chatham House, after FRPS had been formed, to be wound up, and that the chief resistance to this had come from Margaret Cleeve, who had a vision of the Institute as an essential source for un-officials, as well as officials, if they were to be able to develop informed views of international relations. Is it possible that Toynbee and Miss Cleeve saw "Chatham House" as two different things?' (Letter to the author, Oct. 16, 1977.)

23 Respectively FO 371, F7546/2768/10 (31760); F2664/2426/10 (46271); F6012/102/23 (41801); F2330/1394/23 (46468); F5661 and 5742/623/61 (31774).

24 *Ibid.*, U947/191/70 (50807). 25 *Ibid.*, F2375/159/10 (41613).

26 See, e.g., *ibid.*, file 31702; F4049/877/61 (35917); F399/34/10 (41579).

Undoubtedly, however, the greatest single contribution on Far Eastern affairs made by a member of the FRPS was that of Geoffrey Hudson, whose book on *The Far East in World Politics* had been published in 1939 and remains of value to this day. It was not simply that Hudson was responsible for the Far Eastern section of the FRPS, but that the Far Eastern Department in the Foreign Office was ready to include him in the circulation of a growing number of official despatches and policy papers, and to give some weight to both his minutes and his memoranda. One consequence, of course, was that the Department was able to make use of Hudson's extensive knowledge of, say, the background to Sino-Soviet tension over Sinkiang, which manifested itself in fighting for a brief while.[27] But Hudson was no mere source of information: he was prepared to express his own views on current policy issues in a forceful manner, and in a direction that tended towards conservatism and *realpolitik*. Thus, where the future of Siam was concerned, he saw no reason why Britain should be 'timid' in claiming for itself after the war a base on the Kra Isthmus ('The Siamese', he wrote, 'ought to be made to feel so frightened at the prospect of retribution for what they have done in joining the Japs that the demands we have to make on them will come as a relief.')[28] As for President Roosevelt's notion of taking Indochina away from France and placing it under international trusteeship, it evoked Hudson's scorn,[29] while although, where the future of Hongkong was concerned, he believed that London should inform Chiang Kai-shek's government that it would be prepared to discuss the matter, his overriding aim was to find means of preventing China from presenting Britain with a fait accompli by taking over the colony from the Japanese.[30] In addition, he was at one with most of those in Whitehall who examined the subject in envisaging a vital role for a fully-committed India in postwar imperial defence schemes, and especially where a counter to pressure from China was required.[31]

Hudson did not limit his advice to specific territorial issues, warning, for example, of the likelihood that 'the racial equality question will come up again in some form in the post-war settlements.'[32] His most substantial and important contributions, however, centred upon the interrelationship between likely political developments inside China and the positions and policies of the great powers in the Far East. In this connection he was blunt in his rejection of the notion, fashionable in

[27] E.g., *ibid.*, F6732/11/10 (35710); F4681/62/10 (46187).
[28] *Ibid.*, F5550/1599/40 (41848).
[29] *Ibid.*, F417/295/10 (41627). On the issue in general, see C. Thorne, 'Indochina and Anglo-American Relations, 1942–1945', *Pacific Historical Review*, Feb. 1976.
[30] FO 371, F2172/1505/10 (41657).
[31] *Ibid.*, U4136/1970/70 (35445).
[32] *Ibid.*, F1106/91/61 (46324).

the United States at the time and also quite widespread in Britain, that Chiang Kai-shek's regime was essentially democratic. 'It is possible', he wrote in 1943, 'that most of the Kuomintang leaders view the downfall of Italian Fascism with regret rather than with enthusiasm', and he described Chungking's promises of a transition to constitutional, democratic rule as virtually certain to prove 'a fake, mainly designed to impress Anglo-Saxon opinion'. All such talk, he repeated in the following year, was 'hocus-pocus'.[33] At the same time, however, Hudson was equally scornful of the idea put forward in parts of the American press in 1944 and 1945, especially, that Chungking, as distinct from Yenan, had contributed little or nothing to the fight against Japan, suggesting in April 1945 that it was 'surely about time that someone pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek did *not* capitulate in 1938—or in 1942, that, apart from guerilla activity, the only real fighting against the Japanese has been done by the Central Army troops, and that in 1939–40 the Chinese Communists duly denounced the "imperialist war" then being waged by Britain and France against Nazi Germany'.[34]

Indeed, as the prospect of widespread conflict between opposing parties in China increased, so Hudson's strongly anti-communist stance became all the more evident. In one important respect he did supply a much-needed corrective within the Foreign Office to the opinions encouraged there by individuals like Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador to China until 1942 and then to the Soviet Union, who repeatedly insisted that the men who ruled in Yenan represented no more than a 'mild radicalism'.[35] Mao Tse-tung's book, *The New Democracy*, Hudson emphasised in May 1943, made it clear that 'he at any rate regards Chinese Communism as part of a world proletarian revolution'. Hudson also pointed out on several occasions that 'the Communists do not, any more than the Kuomintang, think of "democracy" as a system which gives a chance to opposition parties', adding that 'what is really meant by the "democracy" of the Communists is that they are strongly supported by the poorer peasantry, who are the "masses" in rural China'.[36] As for the belief being put forward by certain American diplomats in the Far East at that time, such as John Paton Davies, that Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues might be drawn closer to the United States than to the Soviet Union,[37] that, too, was based in Hudson's eyes on a complete misreading of the nature of the Yenan regime. 'It is extremely unlikely',

33 *Ibid.*, F4480/10/10 (35689); F1441/159/10 (41611).
34 *Ibid.*, F2251/35/10 (46167).
35 E.g., Clark Kerr to Eden, Feb. 3, 1942, FO 800/300.
36 FO 371, F2315/1893/10 (35838); F1546/159/10 (41612).
37 For a convenient summary, see John P. Davies's own valuable book, *Dragon by the Tail* (New York: Norton, 1972; London: Robson, 1974), and J. W. Esherick, ed., *Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service* (New York: Vintage, 1975).

he argued in June 1945, 'that a Communist China would be any more pro-American than Tito's Yugoslavia is pro-British. The Moderator of the Church of Scotland *might* have more influence over the Catholic clergy than the Pope, but probably not.'[38]

In the same context, however, Hudson himself derived some comfort from a forecast based on a false reading on his part of the strengths and weaknesses of the two main contending parties in China. Unless they received more assistance from the Soviet Union than did the Kuomintang forces from the United States, 'the odds', he believed, 'would probably be heavily against the Communist troops . . . , in spite of [their] fervour and fighting quality, in a renewed civil war'. Again making a comparison with Tito and Yugoslavia, he argued that in China circumstances were less favourable to the Communists, in that the areas over which they had already obtained control were accessible 'only through the Kuomintang territory', while Chungking, on the other hand, could utilise American-built airfields if it came to a showdown.[39] Nevertheless, he saw a great danger of 'a repetition of the Spanish Civil War, with the legal government on the right', should the Soviet Union step in to aid Yenan.[40] Moreover, this alarming prospect was linked, in his mind, with the belief that in Japan, too, 'Communism would probably thrive on the conditions [there] produced by defeat'.[41] Overall, indeed, he envisaged the possibility that so blatant would be 'Soviet . . . southward expansionism' that the United States might 'be driven to favour' a course whereby Japan, although deprived of its naval forces, would be 'allowed to retain military power on the mainland of Asia'. (He added that any suggestion of this kind would be 'political dynamite' and that 'in any case it should never be urged by Britain because Americans already have an ineradicable suspicion that we stand for a soft peace with Japan and are lukewarm about the Pacific War'.)[42]

Hudson thus acted as something of a gadfly, as well as an area expert, in wartime Foreign Office discussions about the Far East. Yet whether one's focus is upon the role after 1939 of an individual or on the indirect contribution made by the Institute itself in the shape of the FRPS/FORD, the involvement in the official world in each case was essentially a straightforward one; and if it could at times give rise to questions concerning the independent status of the Institute, the problem was at least there for all to see. In another field, however, there was developing meanwhile a threat to that independence which, even if again a tempor-

[38] FO 371, F3065/36/10 (46170).
[39] *Ibid.*, F2431/254/10 (35799); F4023/159/10 (41613).
[40] *Ibid.*, F4852/74/10 (35778).
[41] *Ibid.*, F8119/205/23 (31827): and see F459 and 931/94/23 (41793).
[42] *Ibid.*, F1334/127/61 (46325). Oddly enough Hudson, though long involved in the affairs of the RIIA, did not become a member until 1947.

ary wartime one, was more shadowy and hence, perhaps, more dangerous —especially since it involved the direct relations between Chatham House and a number of foreign affairs organisations in other countries. This other threat arose from the position held by Chatham House as the British unit within an international body, the Institute of Pacific Relations.

* * * * * *

The Institute of Pacific Relations, founded in 1925 at a gathering in Honolulu of various scholars, religious leaders and businessmen concerned with the affairs of East Asia and the Pacific, had not attracted widespread attention before the Second World War. In its attempts to create an awareness of the problems of the area in question, it had probably been preaching to the converted for the most part, and certainly the significance of its work and the size of its organisation were far smaller than might have been imagined subsequently by those who read of the accusations brought against it after the war.[43]

The IPR was a confederation made up from a number of national societies (there were separate councils in Australia, Canada, France, India, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States), being financed mainly by contributions from those national bodies and by grants from American foundations such as Rockefeller and Carnegie. Its governing board was known as the Pacific Council, the chairmen of which included at various times Ray Lyman Wilbur (a former US Secretary of the Interior), Newton D. Baker (a former Secretary of War) and, between 1939 and 1942, Philip C. Jessup, Professor of International Law at Columbia University. In addition to developing programmes of research and convening a number of international conferences composed of delegates from the constituent national councils, the IPR also produced books and journals, the best known of the latter being the quarterly *Pacific Affairs*, whose editor for most of the 1930s was Owen Lattimore. Meanwhile Chatham House, as the national council for Britain, set up its own IPR Committee,[44] whose members included Whyte and McFadyean, both mentioned above, and A. V. Alexander, the Labour Party politician who subsequently served in the wartime National government as First Lord of the Admiralty.

Later, in the early 1950s, during the McCarthy years in the United States, the IPR and some of its American members were of course to

[43] For a useful, if not entirely satisfactory, history, see J. N. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974). The present writer is indebted to Dr. Dorothy Borg of Columbia University's East Asian Institute, who was formerly a member of the IPR Secretariat, and who assisted him in finding a way through the files of IPR papers, still in the tangled state left by the rude hands of the McCarran Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security. Professors Owen Lattimore and John K. Fairbank have also kindlv discussed aspects of the IPR's history with the writer.

[44] IPR committee files, CHA/6.

become the subject of fierce accusations to the effect that the organisation had been one of the centres of a communist conspiracy aimed at thwarting America's true interests in the Far East, and in particular at bringing about a victory for Mao Tse-tung and his Party in China, thus causing that country to be 'lost' to the United States. A Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, under the chairmanship of Senator Pat McCarran, devoted a vast amount of time to investigating the IPR; the tenor and level of the subcommittee's proceedings, as well as their direction, were reflected in McCarran's own assertion that 'but for the machinations of a small group that controlled and activated the I.P.R., China today would be free . . .'.[45] Similar conclusions appeared subsequently in the writings of right-wing authors such as Anthony Kubek.[46]

This is not the place to examine such charges in any detail, for not only were they pungently dismissed by a number of commentators at the time,[47] but they have been well assessed by various recent historians.[48] It is worth noting in the context of the present article, however, that members of Chatham House, notwithstanding their past exasperation with some of the Americans involved in the IPR's activities, were prepared to write on behalf of that Institute when it came under attack. Thus McFadyean declared in a letter of May 23, 1952: 'The fact that I have criticised certain activities and certain officers of the [IPR] entitles me to say with greater emphasis, firstly that it would have been a useless body if it had not represented a wide variety of political views, and secondly that throughout my acquaintance with the Institute its governing body, while respecting the rights of free expression, has never encouraged or countenanced subversive views.' And Toynbee himself wrote in June 1952 to describe the IPR as 'an indispensable [and] impartial forum in which controversial questions . . . can be discussed objectively in a dispassionate atmosphere'.[49]

[45] US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Institute of Pacific Relations Hearings*, 15 vols. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1951–52). See also the American IPR's own *Commentary on the McCarran Report* (New York, 1953).

[46] A. Kubek, *How the Far East was Lost* (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1963), ch. XV.

[47] Eric Sevareid of CBS described McCarran's assertion about China as 'Hollywood history in glorious technicolour; dime store history in who-done-it form, strongly similar to the methods of Stalin's commissars purging deviationist intellectuals; double-think redoubled'. The *Washington Post* (July 4, 1952) concluded: 'The McCarran subcommittee has given us not a report but a revision of history—a revision compounded out of McCarthian bigotry, McCarranesque spleen and MacArthurian legend. It is an attempt to perpetuate another fraud and hoax on the American people.'

[48] See, e.g., Shewmaker, *op. cit.*, ch. 18.

[49] These and other letters are reprinted in the American IPR's *Commentary on the McCarran Report*, p. 34f. Sansom's private opinion, on the other hand, expressed in a letter of Dec. 14, 1957 to Ivison Macadam of Chatham House, was that, although the McCarran Committee's 'methods and purposes [had been] deplorable', he 'could not escape the conclusion that the American IPR had been used by subversive people'. CHA/4/Sansom.

As we shall see below, the IPR's wartime conferences had in fact scarcely been notable for their 'dispassionate atmosphere', and there had been a good deal of resentment within Chatham House against what were seen as the unbalanced and unbridled attacks launched on British colonial policies by individuals serving in the IPR's New York headquarters and/or its American branch. Sansom, too, in his Washington post, found many of the IPR people in New York 'a smug lot',[50] while an article which appeared in the December 1942 issue of *Pacific Affairs*, in which W. L. Holland, the New Zealander serving as the IPR's International Research Secretary, attacked aspects of Britain's policies over China, aroused considerable anger in St. James's Square (even though Holland was generally more favourably regarded than his New York colleagues). Members of the IPR from other European colonial powers were also tending to react in this way, a senior Dutch member of the Institute, for example, writing in 1945 that 'the International Secretariat has developed its own principles of Far Eastern policy to pure American principles, and propagates them in the name of the IPR'.[51]

Strong anti-colonial inclinations, often coupled with a belief that British attitudes towards China were dangerously anachronistic and of a 'treaty-port' variety, were, indeed, to be found among members of the IPR's International and American Secretariats, which were housed side by side in a somewhat dilapidated building in New York. 'We cannot fight imperialism in the Pacific by tripping along behind and challenging every imperialist proposal', ran one fairly typical internal memorandum of 1943. 'We ought to be there first with our democratic proposals . . . as the carpet of Japanese occupation is rolled back.'[52] In addition, there were one or two people who had been involved in the IPR's affairs in the United States, such as the wealthy Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who may have been Communists at the time, but this was far from the case where the Institute's principal officers were concerned. Neither Holland (who became a naturalised American citizen in 1944) nor his Secretary-General, the patently ambitious Edward C. Carter, were anywhere near the left wing of the political spectrum, while among others who were prominent in the American branch were such non-conspiratorial individuals as Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, a former C-in-C of the US Asiatic Fleet, Henry Luce, publisher of *Time* and *Life* magazines, and Ralph Bunche, a subsequent winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and senior UN official. As for the role played by the American IPR during the war years, it did, it is true, become a substantially

[50] Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[51] Material on Holland article, 'War Aims and Peace Aims in the Pacific', and Dr. Boeke's letter of Sept. 27, 1945, Pacific Council papers, CHA/6.

[52] B. L(asker) to M. F(arley), March 14, 1943, IPR Papers, box 392 (Columbia University).

enlarged one, including, for example, the preparation of pamphlets on various Far Eastern subjects for official distribution to members of the American armed forces. (Leading State Department officials, such as Sumner Welles and Joseph Grew, paid tribute to the value of this work.)[53] On the other hand, even the strongly anti-communist Stanley K. Hornbeck, Political Adviser in the State Department during the war, together with Joseph Ballantine, who had been Director of the Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs, subsequently testified that in their experience the IPR had not sought to influence American policies over Asia.[54]

This brief indication of the controversy that came to surround the IPR in the United States is one necessary preliminary to an examination of the wartime association of Chatham House with that organisation. Another is the reminder of the extent to which the anti-colonial inclinations of the Institute's Secretariat, mentioned above, were only a local manifestation of a much wider movement of opinion, for herein lies the reason why, between 1941 and 1945, the involvement of Chatham House in the IPR's affairs suddenly took on an increased degree of significance and attracted the attention of the Foreign Office. In essence what occurred was that the international conferences convened by the IPR became a forum for the debating of Allied war aims in Asia, with representatives of several of the constituent national bodies showing themselves eager to attack the colonial record and policies of Britain in particular (France and the Netherlands were sometimes placed in the dock as well). And in doing so they had behind them a substantial body of public opinion in the United States, as well as in Asian countries.

For despite Churchill's refusal to accept that the Atlantic Charter, and in particular its third article (in which the Prime Minister and President declared that their countries respected 'the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live'), applied to Africa and Asia, and not simply to those European territories occupied by the Nazis, Roosevelt had massive support for his insistence that the document was of universal relevance. Books like Wendell Wilkie's *One World* pushed home the same, anti-imperialist message, while in a poll conducted in June 1942, for example, 56 per cent of those Americans questioned agreed that the British could rightly be described as 'oppressors . . . because of the unfair advantage . . . they have taken of their colonial possessions'. In an open letter to the British people, Henry Luce's *Life* urged them to 'stop fighting for the British Empire and fight for victory', warning that 'if you cling to the Empire at the expense

[53] Welles to Carter, March 17, 1942, IPR Papers, box 376; Grew to Cabot, June 7, 1944, Grew papers, vol. 118 (Houghton Library, Harvard University).
[54] Thomas, *op. cit.*, pp. 83, 96.

of a United Nations victory you will lose the war because you will lose us'. A sense of urgency over the need to prevent Britain from tarnishing the image of the West as a whole was also heightened in official circles in Washington by the evidence that was coming in of the extent to which the triumphant Japanese were fostering anti-white nationalist movements in the territories they had overrun, and by indications, such as the Great East Asia Conference held in Tokyo in 1943, that something in the nature of a pan-Asian movement might be developing.[55]

Here, then, is one reason why the two IPR wartime international conferences, the first at Mont Tremblant in Canada in December 1942 and the second at Hot Springs, Virginia, in January 1945, were of some significance at the time and remain of interest to the historian of Far Eastern aspects of the war years. In addition, these gatherings are all the more deserving of attention in that they were attended by officials from both sides of the Atlantic who, under their conference guise of private citizens, felt able to address one another with a forthrightness not usually indulged in within the confines of formal diplomacy. Moreover, both during the preparation of papers beforehand and at the conferences themselves, attention was paid to long-term issues and ideas were put forward in that respect to an extent that was unusual among those whose official positions subjected them in the ordinary course of events to the day-to-day demands of the war.

An idea of the subjects covered and ideas raised at Mont Tremblant and Hot Springs can be obtained from the two post-conference volumes that were published by the IPR.[56] What neither book conveys, however, is the atmosphere in which the debates were held. (Delegates were divided up into a number of 'round tables', each of which focused on a particular area or theme, making use of papers prepared beforehand by various national councils.) In this respect it is interesting to read the comments of some of those who were not usually in the front line of the exchanges —that is, who were attending on behalf of councils other than those of Britain and the United States. The Netherlands delegation, for example, in its private report on the Mont Tremblant meeting, described the two main areas of controversy as having centred around American, Chinese and in some cases Dominion distrust of Britain's interpretation of the

[55] See, e.g., W. H. Elsbree, *Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940 to 1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press for the IPR, 1953), and Ba Maw, *Breakthrough in Burma* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Western fears of a wartime pan-Asian movement will be explored in the present writer's *Allies of a Kind*.

[56] *War and Peace in the Pacific* (New York: IPR; London: RIIA, 1943); *Security in the Pacific* (New York: IPR; London: RIIA, 1945). Papers prepared in Chatham House in 1942 and 1944 will also be found in the files of the Anglo-American Pacific Study Group, the Pacific Collective Security Study Group (both CHA/9) and the Pacific Council (CHA/6).

Atlantic Charter, and around British and Dutch criticisms of the United States for preaching to others while declining to assume its share of responsibility in the field of international affairs, leaving its degree of future involvement uncertain and ignoring its own domestic inter-racial failings.[57] ' British colonial rule was severely criticised ', wrote an Australian observer (later to be his country's Governor General), while he himself questioned the assumptions that he felt had lain behind the views on this issue held by the majority of delegates, ' that all dependent peoples of South-east Asia are capable of self-government at an early date, that Japan is the only possible Pacific aggressor now and for all time, . . . and that balanced economic development can be taken for granted '.[58]

Two years later, after the Hot Springs conference, another Australian diplomat, the Counsellor of the Legation in Washington, Alan (later Sir Alan) Watt, was reporting that:

> It was clear at once that the old feeling between the American and British delegations on the subject of Dependent Areas was still strong. The pattern was the same as usual. The Americans, who were often not very well informed of the facts, . . . were critical of British " complacency " and failure to adopt a " progressive policy " . . . , [while] showing much greater tolerance towards . . . French and Dutch dependent areas than towards the British [ones] . . . The United Kingdom representatives tended to be stiff and resentful of the American attitude . . .[59]

The Australian Minister himself, Sir George Eggleston, who was a keen student of Far Eastern affairs, likewise noted: ' There was much more controversy than Sir George Sansom admits ',[60] while the Dutch representatives, who found their British colleagues ' solid and determined, . . . a team that knew what it was speaking about ', observed that the ' unwieldy ' American delegation was aided in its attacks on the European colonial powers by members of the IPR's International Secretariat who were helping to run the conference.[61]

One of the Americans who attended the Mont Tremblant meeting was an official who had long been the leading Far Eastern specialist within the State Department, the pedantic and often maladroit Stanley Hornbeck.

[57] Draft report, Dec. 20, 1942, files of the Netherlands Embassy in Washington. PI 8/41.9, Netherlands Foreign Ministry Archives, The Hague.

[58] Hasluck report, in Washington Legation to Canberra, Dec. 22, 1942, Department of External Affairs files, A989/43/735/321, Australian National Archives, Canberra.

[59] Watt to Hood, Jan. 23, 1945, Australian Department of External Affairs, A1066/145/153/2, part I.

[60] Washington notes, Jan. 22, 1945, Eggleston Papers, Australian National Library, Canberra.

[61] Report of March 31, 1945, Netherlands Foreign Ministry Archives, DZ/D12.

And in his own post-conference report to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, he touched upon a background issue which points us towards the heart of the matter we are considering in relation to Chatham House. The proceedings at Mont Tremblant, wrote Hornbeck, had amounted in large part to 'Britain against the field'. (In saying this he was unwittingly echoing Roosevelt himself, who a fortnight earlier had remarked to his Vice President, Henry Wallace, that he supposed that at the conference 'the Britishers [had taken] their typical [imperialist] slant', and that their overall position among the Allies was that of the odd man out in a game of poker.)[62] Hornbeck added:

> It needs to be kept in mind . . . that whereas, as a rule, the Groups from most countries, including the British countries, attend and function as "delegations" (with a certain amount of guidance if not definite instructions from their Governments), the members of the American Group attend and function as individuals (without express guidance and with no instructions from their Government). From this it results that the American Group listen to and participate in discussions with greater openness of mind, less inhibition, and more attention to the merits of questions under consideration. . . .[63]

Now, Hornbeck's views, leaving aside their self-righteous naïvety as regards the American approach to Far Eastern issues, were not shared by all the non-British people present at the IPR conferences. For example, what struck Sir Frederick Eggleston at both Mont Tremblant and Hot Springs was the very extent to which delegates from London were more positive in their attitude towards the notion of an international organisation playing a significant part in the postwar affairs of dependent areas than was the British government at the time.[64] Moreover, although it was true that the American delegations did not receive prior instructions from Washington, the presence within them of, for example, Hornbeck himself at Mont Tremblant, and at Hot Springs a substantial number of men in official positions, resulted in an awareness of governmental attitudes and policies that could not somehow be suspended during the proceedings of the conferences. (The Hot Springs meeting was attended by, among other officials, Harry Dexter White of the Treasury; John Carter Vincent, Chief of the China Section of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs; Owen Lattimore, Director of Pacific Operations for the Office of War Information; Laughlin Currie, whose various functions had included that of special assistant

[62] J. M. Blum, ed., *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946* (Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1973), entry for Dec. 16, 1942.

[63] Hornbeck to Hull, Dec. 31, 1942, Hornbeck Papers, box 218 (Hoover Institution, Stanford University).

[64] Washington diary, 423/10/1669, Eggleston Papers.

to the President; and Major General Clayton Bissell, one of the Army's Assistant Chiefs of Staff.)[65] It is also worth noting that W. L. Holland himself, the IPR's Research Secretary, went to work for the Office of War Information and Office of Strategic Services in 1944, and between February and October 1945 was to be Acting Director of the OWI's China Division in Chungking.

Even so, there did exist within the International Secretariat and American headquarters of the IPR a considerable degree of suspicion regarding the composition of the British delegations to the two wartime conferences. Holland, for example, wrote to the Secretary-General, Carter, in August 1942: 'Perhaps someone ought to suggest tactfully to Chatham House that they include at least one person who would be a little more representative of the "lower classes"', while Carter in turn was to observe in December 1944 that the British team setting out for Hot Springs contained 'several big-shot business representatives', including McFadyean, Farmer of ICI and John Keswick of Jardine Matheson (who was attached to the British Embassy in Chungking at the time), besides government officials such as Sansom.[66] In 1942 the nature of the delegation from India, which in effect was chosen by the government in New Delhi, also led to its being dismissed in advance by Carter as likely to be 'more British than the British', despite his own endeavours to find within its ranks someone 'who would take an entirely different line from Lord Hailey and Sir Frederick Whyte'.[67] All in all, the evidence appeared to many of the Americans concerned to reinforce their existing belief that Churchill's government, having set its face against any radical developments in the field of imperial policies, was ensuring that, even at private gatherings such as those of the IPR, those who represented Britain would not stray from the line laid down in Whitehall.[68]

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[65] See the remarks of the chairman of the American delegation during a private, pre-conference meeting on Oct. 28, 1944. IPR Papers, box 358.

[66] Holland to Carter, Aug. 21, 1942, IPR Papers, box 62; Carter to Dennett, Dec. 27, 1942, *ibid.*, box 363. A. S. Olver comments: 'Curiously enough, Chatham House had a tradition of trying to achieve just what Holland had in mind for its groups for conferences. The classic example was sending Ernest Bevin to a Commonwealth Relations Conference before the war, which was sometimes claimed to be the origin of his interest in foreign affairs.' (Letter to the author, Oct. 16, 1977.)

[67] Carter to Jessup, Nov. 17, 1942, *ibid.*, box 379. The composition of delegations from India and the nature of the Indian Institute of International Affairs also troubled some members of Chatham House. See various references in the Council's minutes for 1944, CHA/1, vol. 25.

[68] This belief also accorded with the widespread American assumption that, whilst their country was fighting only for the speediest possible victory over Germany and Japan, in an essentially 'a-political' manner, Britain on the other hand, steeped as it was in the evils of 'power-politics', was fighting a 'political' war, and was subordinating strategic considerations to selfish, political ones. The validity or otherwise of this belief will be examined in detail in *Allies of a Kind.*

Leaving aside the question of whether or not colonial policies were, in fact, being re-thought within official circles in London—and a brief, simplified answer would be that, to a far larger extent than was realised at the time, such a process was taking place, but that those involved repeatedly ran into the reactionary stance adopted by the Prime Minister—what truth was there in the belief that the delegations from Chatham House which arrived at the two IPR conferences had in some sense been 'tampered with' by Whitehall?

The Foreign Office was aware, even before Mont Tremblant, of discussions that were taking place under the auspices of the American branch of the Institute, their informant being Sansom, who was welcomed at such gatherings as a scholar of world renown.[69] As for the preparations being made for the conference of December 1942, papers drafted by groups based on Chatham House were shown to Ashley Clarke and other members of the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department by some of those involved, such as Hudson and Victor Farmer, and were commented on in detail before being returned.[70] The India Office, too, saw, for example, a Chatham House briefing paper on 'A Post-war System for the Indian Ocean' that had been drawn up by H. V. Hodson, finding its proposals (they included encouraging, rather than resisting, China in its interest in Malaya and Burma, thus obtaining its endorsement of an 'Indian Ocean system') highly controversial, to say the least.[71]

Like those responsible for directing the affairs of Chatham House itself,[72] Foreign Office officials were convinced of the need for Britain to be represented at Mont Tremblant lest the case for its colonial policies, especially, went by default and lest the conferences became 'dominated by Chinese and Sino-American influences to our great detriment', as Sir Maurice Peterson put it. (He was the Assistant Under Secretary of State responsible for the Far Eastern Department.) The Colonial Office, too, were in favour of sending a strong British team 'so that it may be made plain in America and the rest of the world that we have faith in our future in the Far East'.[73]

There was thus already considerable interest in the forthcoming IPR conference within government departments when a development took place which substantially increased the extent to which those departments became involved in the matter, and which, by the same token, diminished the degree of independence remaining to Chatham House in terms of its IPR activities. What occurred was that at the beginning of

[69] E.g., Sansom to Clarke, Nov. 2, 1942, FO 371, F7827/3806/61 (31803).
[70] E.g., *ibid.*, F5874/3806/61 (31801); F6224, 6469 and 7190/3806/61 (31802).
[71] *Ibid.*, F8028/3806/61 (31803).
[72] Council and IPR Committee material (especially IPR Committee report of May 11), summer 1942. Council minutes, CHA/1, vol. 21 and CHA/6 respectively.
[73] FO 371, F3814 and 4108/3806/61 (31801).

July 1942 Ivison Macadam, the Secretary of Chatham House, dropped what Ashley Clarke described as 'a bombshell' when, in conversation with the latter at the Foreign Office, he revealed that the Institute did not have the funds to pay for sending a delegation to Mont Tremblant. The surprise was all the greater in that Richard Law, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (subsequently Minister of State) at the Foreign Office, had earlier received from the already-nominated leader of the delegation, Lord Hailey, the impression that Chatham House could find the money to cover six representatives. Law himself decided that, in the new circumstances, government finance would have to be supplied; he added the rider, however, that since that was to be the case, the selection of members of the delegation should not be left to the Institute and should include, for example, an invitation to someone from the Labour Party. 'The Foreign Office and the Treasury', the Council of Chatham House were told, 'would want to examine very carefully the precise qualifications of the Group whose expenses they would have to meet.' (In the event, the India Office and Colonial Office were also consulted.[74])

These conditions were accepted by the Institute's officials, it seems without demur or hesitation. Indeed, in its first response to the idea of such a conference, the Chatham House IPR Committee had itself clearly pointed the way towards close contact with the official world, suggesting that 'the full support of the Foreign Office, the Dominions Office, the Colonial Office and the India Office' would be essential in ensuring 'that the Group [from the Institute] was adequately informed on the subjects to be discussed'.[75] Macadam, who had been seconded to the Ministry of Information between 1939 and 1941, liked to keep close to the centres of power and influence, while an important linking role was played by Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, who sat on Chatham House's Council while still serving as an Assistant Under Secretary at the Foreign Office. Hailey, too, a former Governor of the United Provinces in India, a member of the League of Nations Mandates Commission, author of *An African Survey* and a member of the Council of Chatham House, liked the idea of including someone from the Labour Party and welcomed Attlee's suggestion that it should be Arthur Creech-Jones, MP, who was to become Colonial Secretary after the war. (Significantly, Hailey remarked

[74] *Ibid.*, F5151, 5158 and 1559/3806/61 (31801); Council minutes, July 8, 1942, CHA/1, vol. 21. The financial arrangements ultimately arrived at involved a temporary alteration in the funding of the FRPS. Council minutes, July 29, 1942, CHA/1, vol. 22; Ashton-Gwatkin/Macadam telephone record, June 1, 1942, Mont Tremblant file, Pacific Council papers, CHA/6. On Law's reference to the need to involve a member of the Labour Party, A. S. Olver comments: 'This suggests a lack of knowledge of the Institute's policy of achieving a political balance within Chatham House itself and on delegations. In my time, Labour Members of Parliament seemed more active within the Institute than the Tories.' (Letter to the author, Oct. 16, 1977.)

[75] IPR Committee report, May 11, 1942, Council minutes, CHA/1, vol. 21.

to Ashley Clarke that 'he thought he could keep him within bounds'.) Eventually a list was agreed which included, in addition to Hailey and Creech-Jones, Sir Frederick Whyte, Sir John Pratt and Ivison Macadam, together with various individuals such as Sansom who were already on the other side of the Atlantic, where they were serving in official capacities. At the same time the question arose of whether, and if so to what extent, the delegates should be given something in the way of guidance from Whitehall. For those involved on the official side of the fence, there was one major difficulty in this connection that can be given only a passing mention here: that is the lack of anything approaching a clear Cabinet policy in respect of, say, the postwar treatment of Burma and other territories in South-east Asia.[76] Nevertheless, Ashley Clarke made it plain through Hudson that 'guidance as to [Britain's] "aims" must come from H.M.G.'.

This decision was qualified to some extent as the result of a letter written by Sansom from Washington, in which he advised that 'if the unofficial nature of the delegation were to be sustained' its members should not speak with a single voice at Mont Tremblant. It was therefore accepted within the Foreign Office that guidance should be 'given in an informal manner to Lord Hailey only . . . , leaving him to keep the delegation more or less within bounds'. Even so, Pratt, as well as Hailey, was shown relevant official documents, while a summary of Britain's postwar aims, prepared for the delegation's benefit by Hudson, was written only after its author had discussed the subject with Ashley Clarke. Finally, Clarke and his colleague Nevile Butler, Head of the North American Department, came to Chatham House on November 17 to meet and answer questions from the entire Mont Tremblant party.[77]

Thus, although it remained true that the British representatives at the December 1942 conference were not obliged to follow instructions laid down by Whitehall, the unofficial and independent nature of their utterances, like their Chatham House label, was not entirely what it seemed. Moreover, the violent and often ill-informed attacks on Britain's record at Mont Tremblant had the effect of reducing any divergencies that might otherwise have emerged, and of drawing together the members of the team (Creech-Jones included, for all his criticisms of government policies back at Westminster)[78] in a defence of their country's colonial achievements and intentions.

A similar process was to occur at Hot Springs in January 1945. Before the conference Macadam, on behalf of Chatham House, again

[76] See, e.g., the minute by Sir John Brenan in FO 371, F4369/3806/61 (31801).
[77] *Ibid.*, F5874/3806/61 (31801); F6584 and 7398/3806/61 (31802).
[78] On Creech-Jones's angry defence of Britain's colonial record, see MacDougall to Sabine, Dec. 22 and 30, 1942, FO 371, F457/186/61 (35905).

sought government money to meet the cost of sending a delegation, as well as asking the Foreign Office to help obtain permission for a number of civilian officials and senior members of the armed services to attend. As in 1942, in other words, the quasi-official aspect of the group attending the IPR conference in the Institute's name was by no means forced by Whitehall upon a reluctant Chatham House.[79] The upshot was that of the twenty people who represented Britain at Hot Springs under the leadership of Sir Andrew McFadyean, over half were officials or serving officers. (They included Sansom, Harold Butler, Hudson, Keswick, and from New Delhi Sir Frederick Puckle.) Indeed, to such an extent had the business of selection become a matter for arrangement between Macadam and McFadyean on the one hand and the Foreign, India and Colonial Offices on the other, that those within Chatham House who were charged with the conduct of the Institute's relations with the IPR were not even consulted.[80]

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To the British delegations thus assembled, the proceedings at the two IPR conferences were scarcely a pleasant experience. Those who arrived at Mont Tremblant were met by what Macadam described as ' sustained criticisms of British policy . . . at practically all the Round Tables', with the Americans being joined in their onslaught not only by the Chinese but also, Macadam recorded, by the Australians and New Zealanders. In response, Hailey, whose own extensive studies in the field of colonial affairs fitted him for the task, presented a powerful defence of Britain's imperial record; in addition, as ' an answer to those who demanded some recognition of the principle of accountability in colonial administration ', and also, as he put it later, ' because we felt that it had merits of its own ', he suggested that after the war a Pacific Zone Council might be established in order to link the colonial administrations of individual territories to one another and to an international organisation. Meanwhile at the round table on China, Pratt, in the face of what he subsequently described as ' silly charges pressed not by the Chinese but by their rather ill-advised American friends, . . . a rather unpleasant clique of young, highbrow, left-wing intellectuals . . .', insisted that Britain's dealings with that country in modern times, culminating in its agreement to surrender its extraterritorial privileges there, were nothing to be ashamed of.[81]

[79] Material in FO 371, file 41769.

[80] Council minutes, Dec. 13, 1944 and Jan. 10, 1945, CHA/1, vol. 25.

[81] Council minutes, Feb. 10, and Macadam report, Feb. 24, 1943, CHA/1, vol. 22; Whyte record of Anglo-Canadian meeting, Feb. 1943, CHA/4/Whyte; Pratt talk, March 3, 1943, Far Eastern Group, CHA/8; Hailey to Hubbard, March 16, 1944, IPR Committee papers, CHA/6. Unfortunately, files originally located in the Chatham House archives containing correspondence of Hailey's before 1949 were lost before the reorganisation of the archive material.

So great, indeed, was the resentment among the British delegation against the tone and style of the proceedings at Mont Tremblant, and against the role played by the IPR Secretariat there, that some time later, in 1944, Hailey raised the question of whether Chatham House should withdraw from the IPR altogether. At the special meeting of the Council called to discuss the issue, however, A. V. Alexander, then First Lord of the Admiralty and a former chairman of the Institute's IPR committee, urged that ' we must not think of withdrawing [as] . . . it would be greatly misunderstood in New Zealand and also in American circles '. Hailey himself then decided that, much as he disliked the way in which, ' either through conviction or expediency, [the IPR] had developed into an organisation which was perpetually critical of Great Britain and her policy ', Alexander's advice was probably correct in the long-term view. It was agreed, therefore, that Chatham House would continue to act as the British national council for the IPR, while at the same time ' vigorous and robust ' efforts would be made ' to alter the present trend of much IPR activity so that it is objective, scholarly and informed in its approach to the study of Far Eastern affairs '.[82]

Even before this decision was taken—in fact, during the immediate aftermath of Mont Tremblant—various moves had been proposed with a view to correcting the IPR's wayward tendencies. It had been agreed that Chatham House's own work on Far Eastern questions should be increased, with E. M. Gull, for example, for many years the Secretary of the China Association, undertaking to explore China's likely postwar economic problems, and with Hubbard returning from Whitehall to the Institute in August 1943 in order to resume his work as Far Eastern Research Secretary. At the same time, and pending a permanent British appointment to the IPR's International Secretariat, a special eye was to be kept on the affairs of that body by Sansom. It was also suggested that it would be excellent if the editorship of *Pacific Affairs* could be obtained for Hugh Byas, a British journalist and the author of books on Japan such as *Government By Assassination*. Byas, who had been a member of the Mont Tremblant delegation, was well known in the United States for his articles in the *New York Times*, and was well thought of by Joseph Grew of the State Department among others. In the event, however, he was unable to become a candidate for the post.[83]

The Foreign Office, already informed by Sansom of what had transpired at Mont Tremblant,[84] was consulted about the above proposals,

[82] Council minutes, March 8 and 15, 1944, CHA/1, vol. 24.

[83] Council minutes, Feb. 10, 1943, CHA/1, vol. 23; Macadam to Sansom, March 16 and May 25, 1943, CHA/4/Sansom; Grew to Byas, Oct. 16, 1943, Grew Papers, vol. 118. Byas became a member of Chatham House in 1943.

[84] FO 371, F674/186/61 (35905). Sansom described the conference proceedings as having been ' a vicious circle [in which] the British said: " We can go ahead with a

and gave its agreement to the moves involving Hubbard and Sansom. 'As Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin pointed out to me', minuted Ashley Clarke, 'there has always been fairly close liaison between Chatham House and the Foreign Office in Far Eastern affairs, and if the studies of Chatham House are really to serve a useful purpose, it is in our interest that they should be on the right lines.' [85] Members of the Foreign Office were all the more anxious to keep a hand on the wheel in that one or two individual members of the Mont Tremblant delegation, despite their informal briefing, had entertained ideas that could have proved embarrassing had they been publicised. In the case of Sansom there was no great problem, it is true, in that, as a serving official, he could be instructed as to what he could and could not reveal. And although it was decided that he should not publish his opinion that, despite its 'discreditable record . . . in many important respects', Japan would respond better after the war if it were 'invited to join the club and observe the rules instead of being blackballed', there was sympathy in London for the belief itself; the fear was simply that if it became known it would serve only to reinforce the widespread American conviction that Britain was 'soft' towards Japan.[86] More alarming was the way in which Pratt was fiercely arguing that in its own interest Britain should return Hongkong to China with all speed—thus leading Sir Maurice Peterson and the Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Alexander Cadogan, to conclude that it had been a mistake to include him in the delegation in the first place.[87]

In a more positive vein, the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office reacted favourably to another consequence of the brawling at Mont Tremblant: the establishment of parallel study groups in Chatham House (under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Whyte and including Pratt and Creech-Jones) and in Washington (where the convener was Professor William C. Johnstone of George Washington University) which were to exchange papers on various aspects of Far Eastern affairs.[88] Those involved in the project at the London end did not find the ensuing dialogue a particularly satisfactory one, largely because the Americans still

sudden and drastic change in the political status of British or other dependencies in the Pacific area . . . if we are confident that the United States will bind itself to an international policy." The Americans said: "The American people will not agree to an internationalist policy unless the British Government promises to go ahead" '. As for the troublemakers, it was, declared Sansom, 'the professors of International Relations and suchlike amorphous studies who displayed an irritating combination of ignorance and prejudice'.

[85] FO 371, F3430 and 5059/186/61 (35907).

[86] *Ibid.*, F186/186/61 (35905).

[87] *Ibid.*, F232 and 233/186/61 (35905). Pratt developed his Hongkong argument at length to the Chatham House Far Eastern Group on March 3, 1943. CHA/8.

[88] The papers from Chatham House were despatched to Washington via the Foreign Office and Sansom. FO 371, F4767 and 5163/1953/61 (35927). On the other hand the Foreign Office declined to allow Hudson to participate in the work of the London group.

seemed reluctant to explore in a precise way the nature of the disagreements between the two countries over, say, colonial policy. (' The issue as presented by them ', commented Whyte privately, ' lies mainly in American feeling and not in the merits of the questions themselves.') Conversely, although the Chatham House group was able to put forward detailed studies of a particular territory, such as Malaya, it was burdened, as was the Foreign Office itself, by the need to explain away the public remarks on imperial affairs made by Churchill. ('Neither the British Government nor we as a group ', wrote Whyte to Johnstone, 'use the word " restoration " in any reactionary sense. It is limited to the resumption of British responsibility for territories temporarily wrested from us by the Japanese, which, when restored to their place in the British Empire, will continue at an accelerated pace towards the goal of real autonomy.' As an interpretation it was, indeed, accurate so far as not only Whyte and his colleagues but also many members of the British government and its departments were concerned. It was far removed, however, from the approach of the Prime Minister, who would certainly not have allowed that Chatham House members were in any position to speak for Britain on such matters.[89])

Nevertheless, the existence of the Anglo-American Pacific Study Groups, as they were called, seems to have helped create a somewhat warmer atmosphere when the time came for the national delegations of the IPR to assemble at Hot Springs in January 1945. McFadyean, making the opening speech for Britain, tried to improve matters further still by emphasising that the vast majority of his fellow countrymen stood by the Atlantic Charter as being universally applicable, and he even ventured to assure his listeners that some of the suggestions that had been put forward during the Mont Tremblant conference had ' certainly influenced British policy and [had] led to certain notable reforms and a certain reorientation of policy '. (Again, one would have liked to hear Churchill's reaction to such statements.) In turn, McFadyean was able to write back to Macadam in London to say that ' the general atmosphere here is very much better than it must have been at Mont Tremblant. . . . There is much less disposition to twist British tails just for the fun of seeing how the animal reacts.'

Yet a week later McFadyean was describing the tone of proceedings at Hot Springs as ' unpleasant ', blaming this once more on the IPR's Secretariat and Secretary-General. ' It has been catch-as-catch-can, with no holds barred,' he declared in his closing speech, ' and occasionally, when the referee was not looking, I think there was some biting.' He added a defiant conclusion: ' The great ideals which animate the

[89] For a list of topics and papers, together with related correspondence, see the files of the Anglo-American Pacific Study Group, CHA/9.

American people are shared by the British people . . . , but we shall not permit ourselves to be hustled out of evolution into revolution.' As for the reaction within the Foreign Office to these Hot Springs exchanges and their public reverberations,[90] the new Head of the Far Eastern Department, J. C. Sterndale Bennett, had by now come to 'doubt the wisdom of these conferences and of the participation in them of British officials'.[91]

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It is not difficult in retrospect to see what had led to a disillusioned verdict being pronounced by officials in London on the international gatherings organised during the war by the IPR. Nor does a detailed examination of the development of Britain's colonial policies between 1942 and 1945 sustain McFadyean's assertion at Hot Springs that the debates at Mont Tremblant had led directly to changes in the relevant plans that were being prepared in Whitehall.[92] At the same time, as we have seen, the considerable degree to which both individual officials and government departments in London became involved in the Chatham House side of the IPR's affairs created a situation in which, while on the one hand even delegation leaders like Hailey and McFadyean could not say with any authority or certainty what Churchill and his Cabinet colleagues would decide, on the other, foreign assumptions about the limited extent of the Royal Institute's independence for once had some validity. Appearing to speak for Britain—and language of the kind used by McFadyean encouraged such an interpretation—and yet unable to speak for the British government (whose members in any case included Churchill as well as Bevin and Beaverbrook as well as Cripps), the Chatham House delegations ended up in a thoroughly ambiguous position.

Even so, the IPR conferences did help to bring home to officials and influential members of the public on both sides of the Atlantic the extent of the mistrust and, in some degree, misunderstandings that surrounded such Far Eastern issues as the future of South-east Asian

[90] In particular, trouble had arisen over one of the papers provided for the conference by Chatham House (it had been drafted by a group under Sir Paul Butler), 'Japan in Defeat'. In this document, the suggestion was made that it would be found after the war that 'no alternative to a monarchical system under the present Emperor or some other member of his family will be likely to provide the focus of stability which will be essential if [Japan] is not to dissolve into chaos in the impending crises'. Similar views were held within the State Department by Grew among others; but when the columnist Drew Pearson got hold of and published the allegation that 'Britain' wanted to retain the Emperor, it produced an outcry among Americans whose suspicions of their Ally in a Far Eastern context were already high.

[91] McFadyean speeches enclosed in Council minutes, CHA/1, vol. 25; Pacific Council papers and IPR Committee papers CHA/6; FO 371, F514, 676, 714 and 831/327/23 (46444).

[92] On this aspect of Britain's wartime policies, see two forthcoming volumes: Professor W. Roger Louis' *Imperialism at Bay* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) and the present writer's *Allies of a Kind*.

colonial territories and the postwar international role of China. And although those two meetings did not lead directly to changes in London's attitude towards imperial affairs east of Suez, they did focus a general state of opinion on the subject that existed in the United States and elsewhere, that opinion being one factor (others included the pressure for change that was coming from various members of the British government, from officials like the Governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, from Members of Parliament and from writers such as Margery Perham) which helped to ensure that the reactionary attitude of Churchill was an increasingly isolated one. Conversely, the attempts made by Hailey, Whyte, and others to make foreign members of the IPR aware of the difficulties inherent in, say, the plural societies to be found in a single territory like Malaya may have played some part in bringing about the less simplistic approach to colonial problems that obtained in leading circles in the United States by 1945, as compared to 1942.[93]

As for the role played by Chatham House within the wartime scene in London, it clearly made a useful contribution to the amount of information available to Foreign Office and other officials through the FRPS/FORD, where G. F. Hudson in particular took part to a significant extent in the discussions on Far Eastern affairs that were going on in Whitehall. In both respects, however, the qualification has to be added that, not only did the views of permanent officials remain of far greater weight overall, but even *their* policy submissions were often of little consequence, given the manner in which the Prime Minister conducted the nation's wartime business and the very limited extent to which postwar foreign policy questions received attention, let alone answers, from the hard-pressed men who made up the Cabinet. As one Foreign Office official commented in connection with a FORD paper on the future of Korea and the discussion of that subject on a transatlantic basis: 'This is another example of exchanging ideas with the Americans on a low level when we have not the remotest idea of the policy upon which Ministers will decide.'[94]

It would be wrong, therefore, to suggest that newly available material in the Chatham House archives throws an important light on the formulation of British policies—certainly where the Far East was concerned—during the Second World War. At a different level, however, involving the climate of opinion and specific attitudes to be found in those areas in both Britain and the United States where officialdom overlapped with prominent outsiders who had an interest in international affairs, that material is of considerable value.

[93] See e.g., the writer's article in *Pacific Historical Review*, *op. cit.*
[94] FO 371, F6012/102/23 (41801).

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TO 1985

THE following two contributions continue *International Affairs*' series of articles prepared in connection with Chatham House's current programme on the external policy options facing Britain during the period up to 1985. They commit no one except their particular authors.

II: BRITAIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

Lawrence Freedman

IN a television interview conducted in October 1976, one of the darkest moments of the 1976 sterling crisis, the Prime Minister spoke of Britain's responsibility, through its Nato contribution, for the stability of Central Europe. He gave a warning about Britain being 'pushed into a position where we would have to make a choice between whether we carry on with these responsibilities or we have to say "sorry", our economic position demands that we put our own position first'. This comment was taken to mean that without assistance from its allies in the stabilisation of the economy Britain would be unable to sustain its current commitment to Nato and, in particular, the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The financial help came and the immediate crisis receded though not before yet another cut in the defence budget as part of the IMF-imposed reduction in public expenditure. Having drawn back from the brink, the government sought to reassure its allies that Britain's commitment to Nato was 'firm' and 'irreversible', and that the effects of the planned cuts on its front-line contribution to the Alliance would be kept to a minimum.

Nevertheless, one consequence of the series of cuts has been to erode confidence in Britain's reliability as an ally. After concluding consultations on the latest cuts, the Secretary-General of Nato, Dr. Joseph Luns, wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Fred Mulley, that 'Nato, faced with an increasing threat, cannot afford any lessening of its members' defence efforts; and that any further cuts by the United Kingdom would not be understood by its allies or find any measure of support on their part'. In a robust response Mr. Mulley promised that Britain will continue to make a 'full contribution to the Alliance', adding that this would need to be 'commensurate with the UK's economic capability and a fair sharing of defence burdens'.[1] The next week Mr. Mulley's deputy,

[1] *Proposed Reduction of United Kingdom Defence Expenditure for 1978/79*, Brussels, Sept. 16, 1977; Ministry of Defence Statement, London, Sept. 16, 1977.

Table 1

Summary of Reductions in Planned Defence Expenditure 1973 to end-1976

£m 1977 Survey Prices	1973–74	1974–75	1975–76	1976–77	1977–78	1978–79	1979–80	Annual Average 1980–81—1983–84
1. **Pre-Defence Review Programme**	6,884	6,970	7,093	7,216	7,436	7,692	7,878	8,040
2. **Cuts announced in:**								
(a) May/October 1973	58	146						
(b) December 1973		364						
(c) April 1974		98						
(d) Defence Review			534	477	634	883	1,106	1,208
(e) April 1975				195				
(f) 1975 Public Expenditure Survey					241	264	223	
(g) July 1976					116			
(h) December 1976					116	267		
3. **Total Reductions**	58	608	534	672	1,107	1,414	1,330	1,209
4. **Revised Defence Budget Totals**	6,826	6,362	6,519	6,544	6,329	6,278	6,549	6,833

Source: Adapted from the *Second Report from the Expenditure Committee* (1976–77).

Mr. John Gilbert, found it necessary to call a press conference to describe as 'highly irresponsible' a report by a Labour Party study group which advocated further cuts of some £1,800 million on the planned expenditure for the 1980s.[2] Meanwhile the Conservative opposition was pledging itself to restore the most recent cuts and thereafter to increase the defence budget.

One feature of this debate is that it has been over the level of expenditure appropriate to meeting Britain's commitment to Nato rather than over the commitment itself. All participants in the debate, including the Labour Party study group, take Nato for granted as the natural framework for national defence policy. In contrast to attitudes towards the European Communities, the British have not been prone to thinking aloud as to the worth of this commitment. In some ways they have been almost model allies, contributing to all Nato regions with all types of weapons at a high level of professional competence, and taking an active and innovatory role in the organisation of the Alliance. With the exception of the skirmish with Iceland, Britain has not been the cause of any serious political crisis and is unlikely to be so in the future. There are no reasons to expect Britain defecting to the 'other side', being governed by communists, entangling itself in prolonged military operations outside Europe, directing military planning against another member of Nato or withdrawing from the integrated military commands. There is little interest in the country in a fundamental reappraisal of security commitments; only in economic burdens.

Pressures on the defence budget

If Britain does pose any serious difficulties for Nato these are presumed to result from a steady decline over the years in the amount of resources allocated to defence. The current debate is seen to be over whether that trend should be accelerated or halted or reversed. Such a characterisation is, in fact, misleading, for the basic problems stem from the declining amount of military capabilities that can be purchased for a given financial outlay, at constant prices. One survey of the trends in British defence spending noted: 'In the mid-1970s the United Kingdom is making provision for defence on almost the same scale as in 1965 or 1955'.[3] However, in 1977 the same expenditure of defence pounds buys far less *quantitatively* than it would have done a decade ago because it must buy far more

[2] Report of the Labour Party Defence Study Group, *Sense About Defence* (London: Quartet Books, 1977).

[3] David Greenwood, 'Constraints and Choices in the Transformation of Britain's Defence Effort since 1945', *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 1976), p. 9.

qualitatively. The extra sophistication of modern armaments means they can be procured only in small numbers. Furthermore, the cost of maintaining highly-skilled volunteer forces, with competitive wages and salaries, has added to the pressure on the defence budget from within.

This pressure has created something of a predicament for British governments. On the one hand, they are reluctant to relinquish forces which perform important military roles, and upon which they and the rest of Nato have come to rely. On the other hand, they find it hard, especially in periods of economic difficulty, to justify the defence budget rising by some 4 per cent per annum in real terms merely in order to prevent a deterioration in the nation's military position. There is a danger of budgetary drift setting national priorities. Every now and again a critical point is reached between holding the budget steady and permitting a sharp rise. When these points are reached, for example, because of the costs of a new generation of aircraft carriers or the maintenance of overseas bases, it is usually the requirements of budgetary stability that prevail. With each contradiction of Britain's military effort the fond hope is expressed that defence expenditure will level off and that no hard choices will have to be taken for a few more years at least.

Thus the aim of the 1974 Defence Review was not so much to bring down defence spending from an excessively high level as to prevent the rise, at an accelerating rate of growth, that would have resulted from the pre-review programme. The new projections suggested by the review showed the defence budget steady at around £6,700 million at 1977 survey prices (£3,800 million in 1974 survey prices)[4] until 1984. As a result of technical readjustments this plateau has been brought down to £6,550 million. In practice, because of extra cuts, defence spending for the years 1977 to 1979 is running at around £6,300 million. Under the public expenditure plans current at the time of writing (October 1977), but which are due for revision, the budget will return to the Defence Review level in 1979–80. It is of greater significance that it is now not considered possible to hold this level during the 1980s. It is anticipated that during this period spending will average over £6,800 million per year, suggesting an average growth rate of 1·7 per cent and a 1983–84 budget over £7,000 million. This anticipated rise may already reflect expenditure on new equipment deferred as a result of the recent cuts. If this rescheduled spending has yet to be incorporated

[4] The survey price is that used in the public expenditure White Paper. It provides basis for comparison with other government spending and with previous years. It is taken from the prices current during the autumn of the previous year. Thus 1977 survey prices are those of September 1976.

fully in the new projections, or even if there are some unexpected costs with major programmes, it would not be surprising to find the growth rate creeping up to 3 per cent.

Such a growth rate enjoys something of a symbolic quality since Nato members agreed to increases in this 'region' in May 1977.[5] This was, however, only described as an 'aim' and it was recognised that 'for some individual countries economic circumstances will affect what can be achieved', a point the Labour government has been anxious to emphasise. The Conservative Party has, by contrast, taken this Nato guidance as the basis of its own policy. The point is that even if Britain does accept this growth rate from 1979–80 on, it will not result in any dramatic improvement in its military position. It may not even be the bare minimum necessary to maintain the current position.

All this indicates that, though there will be peaks and troughs, the pressure generated by the rising relative costs of defence goods and services will push the defence budget upwards. If, because of competing claims, defence expenditures must be kept *constant* at the current level of around £6,300 million or even the Defence Review level of £6,550 million, the actual defence effort must be *reduced.* It is of note that David Greenwood, who provided much of the analytical work for the Labour Party on the sort of programme cuts that would permit a drastic reduction in the budget, has recently written that 'the kind of programme change elucidated in my original analysis must now be regarded as the sort of thing which would be required to stabilise the defence budget in the early 1980s (rather than actually to reduce it)'.[6]

It has been the persistent weakness of the British economy that has made the rising costs of defence so unpalatable. In the past, British governments have often turned to optimistic forecasts of economic growth to help them avoid awkward decisions on defence policy. The last Defence Review assumed an economic growth rate averaging some 3 per cent. The hope was not that this would sustain rising defence spending, but that, if spending could be stabilised, defence would be assigned over time a lower national priority, expressed as a proportion of gross national product (from 5·5 to 4·5 per cent). Compared with other industrial countries, a 3 per cent growth rate appears as a modest enough aim, though it would represent an improvement in performance over the past two decades.

[5] *Ministerial Guidance—1977*, Annex to the Final Communiqué of the Nato Defence Planning Committee, May 18, 1977 (Brussels: Nato, 1977).

[6] David Greenwood, *Postscript to Defence Programme Options to 1981*, Appendix V of the Report of the Labour Party study group, mimeo (London: Labour Party, 1977), p. 42.

Since that assumption was adopted a severe recession and virtually no growth have put the government's objective of assigning defence spending a lower national priority into doubt. There are now signs of a measure of recovery. As the country starts to enjoy the benefits of North Sea oil there are many who believe that the economy will be able to expand, making it possible to relax some of the restraints on public expenditure. Dr. Luns, in his letter to Mr. Mulley, wrote of 'mounting indications of a brighter economic future for the United Kingdom'.

North Sea oil does provide a welcome boost to the British economy, but its value is best understood in terms of arresting a decline, recovering lost ground and allowing a modest advance rather than creating the conditions for a 1980s economic 'miracle'. One recent forecast suggests a steady acceleration in growth over the next few years, to reach a 3·5 per cent rate by 1980, and then a decline.[7] So a future growth rate of 3 per cent is possible but by no means assured. Furthermore, there can be no assurance that either a Conservative or Labour government will permit public expenditure to expand as fast as the economy as a whole. The Conservatives have made it clear that they are prepared to give defence a higher priority as against other expenditure but this is to be within a sharply reduced total budget. The Labour government's attitude can be discerned from comments made by Mr. Mulley to an American audience: 'The first priority is to use the benefits that North Sea oil will bring for the regeneration of British industry. . . . That is why economic factors will continue to act as a constraint on our defence expenditure'.[8] All this makes it quite possible that at some point during the early 1980s, difficult decisions will have to be made on whether to find the extra money to maintain all British forces at their current levels and standards or to permit a further diminution of this effort in order to stabilise the budget.

Cutting back on defence

The problem posed by economic pressure has resulted, up to now, in a contraction of Britain's non-European military effort. Army personnel deployed outside Nato have been reduced by some 75 per cent over the past ten years and the reduction continues. But future savings to be made from abandoning our old imperial outposts will

[7] London Business School Centre for Economic Forecasting, *Economic Outlook 1977–81* (Oct. 1977). The forecast for annual percentage change in gross domestic product was

1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
1·2	0·8	1·7	2·4	3·5	2·5

[8] *Financial Times*, Oct. 18, 1977.

be minimal. The 'burden' of our non-Nato military commitments now accounts for less than 1·5 per cent [9] of the defence budget while in the mid-1960s it was not much less than 20 per cent. There has, in addition, been some concentration within Nato. The Defence Review judged the areas where Britain could make significant contributions to Nato as the Central Region, the Eastern Atlantic and Channel Areas, the security of the United Kingdom and its immediate approaches, the Nato nuclear deterrent, plus some specialist reinforcement capabilities. Significant cuts were made in Britain's contributions to the Southern Region, including the provision of maritime forces in the Mediterranean. Reinforcement capabilities for the Northern Region have also been diminished.

There is therefore, geographically, not much room left for contraction. A decision *not* to replace the *Polaris* fleet would prevent an *extra* burden being placed on the budget. If a replacement for *Polaris* was being developed and procured during the 1980s, this would by itself require an annual growth of 1 or 2 per cent in the budget through the decade and require compensatory cuts elsewhere.[10] The current costs of the nuclear deterrent are small. Little would be saved by abandoning the *Polaris* force (only about a quarter of the scheduled cuts, announced in December 1976, could be found in this manner).

For future cuts there are therefore two choices. Either, one of the two *major* Nato roles—the contribution to the Central Front or the Eastern Atlantic and Channel—is severely cut, or the quality of the forces making those contributions is gradually weakened, through having to make do with less manpower, training, equipment and supplies than normally might be considered necessary to maintain full combat effectiveness and readiness. The government has apparently opted for this latter approach. Though it has insisted that it is not the 'teeth' but the 'tail' that is being reduced, it is generally agreed that the cumulative effect of recent cuts is now being felt by the front-line forces. The Ministry of Defence would therefore appear to be engaged in something of a holding operation—maintaining a major Nato role for which sufficient funds are not available at the moment while waiting, with other governmental departments, for some North Sea oil-induced bounty. As has been asserted in this paper, it is a moot point whether, even with a measure of real growth,

[9] At 1976 survey prices our remaining non-Nato commitments (including Hongkong) cost some £80 million a year (£93 million at 1977 survey prices). *Second Report from the Expenditure Committee*, HC 254 (1976–77) (London: HMSO, 1977), p. 44. The Northern Ireland emergency is currently costing the defence budget some £75 million per year. *Hansard*, July 20, 1977.

[10] See Ian Smart, *The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent: Technical, Economic and Strategic Issues* (London: RIIA, 1977).

current force levels and standards can be maintained throughout the 1980s. No doubt, there are still areas left for trimming and reductions but the search is becoming more difficult. Though equipment replacement can often be deferred, after a while this becomes dysfunctional as the operation, maintenance and modernisation of old and obsolete equipment become increasingly expensive.

Eventually the point will be reached when further substantial savings cannot be made without scaling-down Britain's Nato contribution. The question of how and where to make the necessary cuts is an extremely difficult and sensitive one. It will have to take account of a series of economic, industrial, political, military and diplomatic considerations, especially when major programmes or commitments are at risk. As most of the recent cuts, apart from the Defence Review, have been handled through budgetary juggling—postponing here, trimming there and revising somewhere else—it has been the amount of the cuts rather than their content that has caused the controversy.

The following case study concerns a major commitment—BAOR. It is offered for illustrative purposes, to demonstrate some of the problems connected with any cuts, particularly those with pronounced foreign-policy implications. It is not offered as the most likely candidate for such cuts, for there are still a number of options available to a government convinced of the need for reductions in the defence effort. It is, however, important to establish that substantial cuts in BAOR are by no means out of the question. It is not only Labour's left wing that has come to doubt the value of basing troops in Germany.[11] Furthermore, the peculiarities of the weapons innovation cycle may have ruled out certain other options for the time being. It may be that equipment decisions already taken have ensured that Britain will have a significant ocean-going navy and an air force capable of performing a wide variety of missions through the 1980s.[12] Meanwhile army expenditure is driven far more by manpower than equipment costs (land systems count for barely 20 per cent of the current equipment budget) and the main re-equipment decision, on a new main battle tank to follow *Chieftain*, has yet to be made.

[11] See, for example, *A New World Role for the Medium Power: The British Opportunity* (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1977) co-authored by the Conservative MP Geoffrey Pattie with James Bellini.

[12] It is for this reason that many of the recommendations for cuts contained in the Labour Party study group's report are irrelevant. The main analytical work for the report was undertaken in 1975, when there was an opportunity for specific cuts and for these to have effect by 1980. That opportunity has now passed.

The problem of BAOR

There are a number of other reasons why the attention of defence-budget cutters is liable to focus on BAOR. Basing large numbers of soldiers abroad, especially somewhere as expensive as Germany, imposes an added burden. Well over 10 per cent of the cost of BAOR (estimated for 1977–78 at £779 million) results from the extra expenses derived from being based in Germany. The major burden does not fall directly on the defence budget itself, but on the whole economy because of the outflow in foreign exchange. Table 2 shows

Table 2

Foreign Exchange Costs of UK Forces in Germany (including Berlin)

	Foreign Exchange Costs £m	Approximate Sterling Value of Offsets £m			Net Cost £m
		Direct Payment	Military Purchases	Total	
1958–59	55			12	43
1959–60	52			24	28
1960–61	58			12	46
1961–62	61			–	61
1962–63	68	} =		107	} = 33
1963–64	72				
1964–65	82	} =			} =
1965–66	84			175	75
1966–67	84				
1967–68	89			50	39
1968–69	94			77	17
1969–70	110	} =		172 [f]	} = 70
1970–71	132				
1971–72	172	12·5 [c]	22·5	35	137
1972–73	206	13 [c]	35	48	158
1973–74	283	17 [c]	38	55	228
1974–75	340	21·5 [c]	23·5	45	295
1975–76	403	23 [c]	17 [e]	40	363
1976–77	521 [a]				
1977–78	544 [b]	62·3 [d]			

a = Forecast.
b = Estimate.
c = Approximate value in sterling of DM110 million.
d = Approximate value in sterling of DM250 million.
e = Includes military equipment purchases up to December 1975 only.
f = Includes a government to government loan of US$125 million at an annual rate of interest of 3½ per cent and repayable after ten years.
Sources: *Hansard*, June 6, 1976; July 22, 1976; Annual Defence Estimates.

the growth in the foreign exchange costs of our defence commitments in Germany (including the RAF and the Berlin Brigade). With inflation compounded by the declining value of the pound against the deutschemark, the cost has been increasing at rates of between 20 and 35 per cent a year. As a consequence of the 1976 sterling crises the projected foreign exchange cost of £413 million, turned out to be in practice one of £521 million. The 1977 estimate was for £544 million.[13] One consequence of all this is that BAOR has been occupying a steadily increasing proportion of the defence budget. It took up 12 per cent of the planned defence budget in 1967, 14·4 per cent in 1972, and now takes up 17·2 per cent.

There have been attempts to reduce the costs of the forces in Germany, by cutting down on locally-employed civilians (by about 15 per cent over the past decade) and by diverting local consumer spending to British goods. There are the expedients of cutting back on military supplies and resources used during training. The overall troop numbers have remained constant around the 55,000 level, though there are usually gaps caused by tours of duty in Northern Ireland. The Berlin Brigade, involving 3,100 personnel at a cost of £22 million, is not assigned to Nato but constitutes the British contribution to the security of the Western sectors of the city.[14] RAF Germany has a personnel of around 9,000.

There do not seem to be many opportunities yet to be explored for substantial savings while BAOR is maintained at its current level. However, even cutting back the forces in Germany would not ensure short-term savings. Merely removing a brigade or two (or the new equivalents) to Britain while still keeping them assigned to BAOR, and expecting them to return for exercises, saves little, as was found when 6 Brigade was 'redeployed' to Catterick in 1968. (It returned in 1970/71.) There are grounds for believing that a severe cut in BAOR could involve a net loss on the defence account in the short term. If the troops were to be based at home, new accommodation might have to be built (there is little surplus capacity in the United Kingdom at the moment). If total manpower was to be reduced as a result of a move out of Germany, then there would be redundancy payments. Savings from a partial British withdrawal would therefore only accrue gradually.

[13] These costs represent the drawings on foreign exchange used to support British forces. They do not take into account the benefits to the balance of payments accruing from such things as the export of goods to British bases. It should also be borne in mind that the balance-of-payments benefits from the stationing of American forces in Britain are an estimated £137 million for 1977.

[14] Under the Allied Declaration on Berlin (May 26, 1952) expenditure on local supplies and services for British forces in Berlin is to be met without charge to the United Kingdom. This amounted to some £49·1 million in 1977–78.

An immediate decision to begin a phased run-down of BAOR to about 30,000, with appropriate adjustments in purchases of equipment, and cuts in the Home Forces to reflect the reduced associated requirements of a smaller Rhine Army, would not produce annual savings at the £300–400 million level for some five years.[15] As cuts in equipment expenditures started to have their effect, the rate of savings would continue to increase. A consequence of such a move would probably be a readiness to procure more land systems from abroad and a reluctance to engage in major new weapons development programmes. The reduced BAOR would probably have to make do with an improved *Chieftain* rather than a new main battle tank. Therefore a decision to halve BAOR would best be taken as part of a general policy review, rather than being prompted by an urgent desire to find quick savings in the midst of another economic crisis. It is a matter for long-term budgeting.

Offset agreements

As it is difficult to reduce costs unilaterally there might be ways of easing the burden through multilateral means. Significant relief has been found in the past by direct payments from West Germany to offset the foreign exchange costs of BAOR. Over the years the proportion of the costs met by offset agreements has declined substantially. The 1964–67 agreement took care of 70 per cent of the costs. Under the 1971–76 agreement, initially some 20 per cent of the costs were covered but this shrank to only 10 per cent by the end of the period covered. There were two elements to the 1971 agreement. First, there was a direct, annual, non-indexed payment of DM110 million. Second, the Germans agreed to use their 'best endeavours' to encourage the purchase of military equipment from Britain.

In the first three years of the agreement there was a significant growth in purchases of military equipment, but this tailed off rather sharply after 1974, especially if inflation is taken into account. There is little evidence to suggest that there have been any major purchases since December 1975. It is, of course, in any case difficult to know whether particular purchases have been made because of an agreement rather than in the natural course of events. In addition, the Germans are becoming more self-sufficient in the provision of their military equipment. Nevertheless, it is of note that the Germans have bought three times as much military equipment from the French as from the British. The French have become, in many ways, Germany's natural collaborators in the production of expensive military items and the

[15] This is based on the estimate used in *Sense About Defence*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

Germans have come to know and trust French industry.[16] Collaboration with Britain, with the major exception of *Tornado*, is minimal. The attempt to get agreement on collaboration on a future main battle tank has just been abandoned. Also, as the 'threat' of American troop withdrawals from Germany is considered to be far more potent than a British 'threat', the United States gets priority as an arms supplier. For example, an order for 12 gas turbine engines for German frigates worth some £18 million, which was expected to be won by the Rolls Royce *Olympus* engine, went to General Electric for no evident reasons and despite the fact that the *Olympus* is favoured by a number of other European navies.

In October 1977 a new offset agreement was reached between Britain and West Germany. It had taken a couple of years of hard negotiations. This was because of fierce German resistance to the whole concept of offsets, which is a reminder of occupation costs and suggests that the stationing of troops in Germany is a contribution purely to the security of Germany and not to the whole Alliance. The Germans have also pointed out that they provided the British with a £200 million subsidy through the EEC during 1976 and also helped with the IMF loan ($975 million) and the Basle Agreement on sterling reserves ($600 million). The British argue that these are temporary benefits; that though BAOR is a contribution to the security of all Europeans it does provide a bonus to the German economy. It is also the case that whatever the return subsidies made to the British economy, it is only direct offset payments that provide actual relief to the defence budget as these payments are passed on by the Treasury to the Ministry of Defence as a credit.

The new agreement involves a single payment of DM475 million, mainly towards expenditure incurred on the construction, modernisation and improvement of troop barracks and other facilities. There is no 'best endeavours' clause concerning purchases of military equipment. The payment will be made in instalments over three years: DM250 million for the period March 1977 to March 1978; DM150 million for 1978 to 1979; DM75 million for 1979 to 1980. These payments, at current exchange rates, are equivalent to £62·3 million, £37·4 million and £18·7 million respectively. This will cover over 11 per cent of the 1977–78 foreign exchange costs, but only a

[16] From 1955 to early 1975 the *Bundeswehr* procured DM6,300 million of French defence equipment as against DM2,200 million from Britain. Purchases from the United States amounted to more than DM20,000 million. Federal Republic of Germany, *1975/76 Defence White Paper* (Bonn: Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1976), p. 61. It has been suggested that French purchases are encouraged out of a desire to draw France into the bosom of the Alliance. If so, this would represent a serious misreading of French psychology. The French are in the process of reducing their forces in Germany by about a sixth.

much smaller proportion of the costs for the rest of this decade. After 1980 there will be no more payments, for this agreement is said to 'terminate' the 'bilateral offset arrangements'. The wording leaves open the possibility of some multilateral burden-sharing exercise in the future, but the presumption must be that no direct assistance can be expected from other governments in coping with the British defence burden during the 1980s.[17]

Table 3

Forces in Central Guidelines Area for MBFR

	Manpower (',000s)		Equipment	
	Ground	Air	Tanks	Aircraft
Nato				
United States	193	35	2,000	335
Britain	58	9	575	145
Canada	3	2	30	50
Belgium	62	19	300	145
Germany	341	110	3,000	509
Netherlands	75	18	500	160
	732	193	6,405	1,344
France [a]	50	-	325	-
TOTAL	782	193	6,730	1,344
Warsaw Pact				
Soviet Union	475	60	9,250	1,300
Czechoslovakia	135	46	2,500	550
East Germany	105	36	1,550	375
Poland	220	62	2,900	850
TOTAL	935	204	16,200	3,075

a French forces in Germany. France has taken no part in MBFR.

Source: *Military Balance 1977–78* (London: IISS).

[17] *Exchange of Notes for Offsetting the Foreign Exchange Expenditure on British Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Oct. 18, 1977). Treaty Series No. 101, Cmnd. 6970 (London: HMSO, 1977). The payment is subject to the level of British forces in Germany being maintained 'without any permanent substantial change'.

Arms control and detente

The government repeatedly says that it has no intention of reducing troop levels in Germany before a Nato agreement on mutual force reductions with the Warsaw Pact, as if to suggest that such reductions should be possible after an agreement. There are good reasons to doubt this assumption. First, despite occasional attempts to get the talks moving, agreement still seems some distance away. Second, even if there is an agreement it is unlikely to move far beyond a first stage reduction in American and Soviet troop levels. The problems surrounding any second stage reductions in indigenous forces seem intractable. Third, even if a second stage agreement is reached it will make only a marginal difference to British force levels. The Central Guidelines Area for the talks involves Benelux as well as Germany but not the United Kingdom. The British provide only 6·4 per cent of the total Nato manpower in the Guidelines Area (see Table 3). It is therefore hard to imagine that reductions in British air and ground forces above 5–7,000 men would result from any agreement.

For the moment there seems little reason to believe that a general relaxation of East-West tensions would create the climate for major force reductions. It should be noted that, in the past, force levels in Nato have not been particularly sensitive to changing perceptions of the threat. The main determinant of the current disposition and numbers of the British and American forces in Germany is still the positions occupied by the allies at the end of the last war.

Military considerations

The Soviet Union has been investing heavily in military forces over the past decade. This might constitute a justification for a *general* increase in military expenditure, but not for funding any *specific* Western activity. As the Soviet Union has improved its capabilities in a wide variety of areas it is possible to cite particular improvements in support of strengthening Nato's Central Front or either flank, of diverting resources to anti-submarine patrols, of looking to our air defences, of procuring a replacement for *Polaris*, or of preparing for jungle warfare. Since resources are scarce all these activities cannot be fully supported, so choices have to be made.

We must presume that few of our forces are performing inessential tasks so that any cuts must be regretted. If they have to be made, the military interest will be to contain their effects. The argument for sustaining BAOR derives from current strategic thinking which places considerable emphasis on the provision of ready and sturdy conventional forces on the front line. If conventional forces are weakened, more reliance would have to be placed on nuclear weapons. Further-

more, withdrawn British divisions would not necessarily be replaced by those of other allies. Against this, it could be argued that this is by no means the most cost-effective contribution Britain could make to the Alliance. BAOR provides only a limited number of the forces available to block a Soviet advance. Britain might have something more distinctive to offer as a maritime power, which is in keeping with its traditions, rather than as a land power. In addition, many feel that Britain could be of greater use doing more to assist in the defence of Nato's vulnerable Northern flank.

The above paragraph does no more than hint at a serious strategic debate. The point is that though there is nothing in recent Soviet activity to prompt a reduction in BAOR, this is not the only manner in which Britain can make a contribution to Nato, and alternative activities might well deserve greater support, even in the context of a rising defence budget.

Diplomatic considerations

It is in the sphere of foreign policy that the most imposing arguments for sustaining BAOR at its current level are to be found. The government describes BAOR as being maintained ' in fulfilment of our Brussels Treaty commitments '. The treaty, as revised in Paris in 1954, commits Britain to maintain on ' the mainland of Europe four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force '. This is now expressed in terms of numbers of men rather than divisions. It is of note that in 1954 77,000 men were attached to BAOR. This was reduced to 64,000 in 1957 and would have been reduced further, to 45,000, were it not for the intervention of the 1958 Berlin crisis during which BAOR was pegged at the current level of 55,000 men. So there is no reason to regard a particular figure as inviolable. The 1954 protocol mentions both overseas emergencies and a strain on external finances as providing reasons for reconsidering this commitment. Therefore, though the obligations are considerable, they are not totally binding. The let-out clauses in the protocol have been used in the past and could be used in the future.

Of greater significance are the implications of any reductions for our relationships with the other members of Nato. All these members have their own particular interests, and will view the shifts and turns of British defence policy accordingly. A redistribution of the British effort away from the Central Front to the flanks would win the support of some of the smaller allies but would cause dismay in West Germany. And, in the end, it is relations with West Germany that are of over-riding importance. Since close relations with the Federal Republic play a major part in all British diplomacy, it is doubtful

whether any government would put them at risk for the sake of troop withdrawals.

The Germans have come to see the forward basing of troops in their country as a vital gesture of solidarity. With the French outside the integrated military structure, it is left to the British to set an example to the smaller European allies and to reassure the Americans that the Europeans are pulling their weight. It is difficult to tell whether or not a ' domino effect ' would follow from a major reduction in British forces in Germany, with comparable cuts in the Belgian, Dutch and Canadian contingents, and perhaps that of the United States. It may be that the United Kingdom is in a position to signal a general retreat. The United States is, of course, in a far better position to do so, for it can set the terms of reference for all debates on alliance bases in Germany. For example, the British government has accepted the argument that the maintenance of current American force levels in Nato is essential for confidence in the American guarantee, and has become anxious lest unilateral British actions should encourage those in Washington who advocate American withdrawals. When the United States decided, as it did in 1976, that it no longer needed an offset arrangement, then it became harder for Britain to insist that it did need such an arrangement. If the United States did decide to cut back its forces in Europe, this would make it easier for Britain to consider doing likewise, though any hint of the Americans deserting Europe could lead to an increase in the indigenous resources devoted to defence. Even if the Nato climate became more conducive to reductions of troop levels on the Central Front, and this is unlikely in the foreseeable future, Britain would still have to pay special regard to its bilateral relations with Germany.

One indisputable consequence of a British withdrawal would be to emphasise the position of Germany as the pre-eminent European power. Since a resurgence of German leadership makes other Europeans, of both the East and West, nervous, it has been considered desirable for the British to act as a counterweight within the Alliance. Indeed, this was one of the reasons for the original British commitment permanently to base forces on the mainland. The question of the role of Germany in Europe is already with us—a consequence of that country's formidable economic performance. The difficulties of accepting a more overt German leadership in Europe are often exaggerated. It is still a sensitive issue, but is gradually becoming less so. The more German pre-eminence is acknowledged, however, the stronger becomes the case for formally passing Britain's ' second-in-command ' role within the Alliance structure over to the Germans.[18]

[18] At the May meeting of the Nato defence ministers, Herr Leber, the German

BAOR is far more of a foreign-policy issue than other aspects of British defence policy. If it were to be severely reduced, this would involve political costs, including a diminution of influence within Nato and strain in relations with Germany. It might well make our main creditors less disposed to help us in the future. It could lead to radical changes in Europe, with Nato increasingly taking on the character of an American-German alliance.

Conclusion

It is easier to take on an international commitment than to get out of it, and the amounts of money involved in maintaining the commitment are usually much greater than the amounts that could be saved by cutting back on it, at least in the short term. However desirable in themselves, radical departures in foreign policy for a country that is still caught in the middle of a complex set of international institutions and obligations are extremely awkward. If the analysis of the continuing economic pressures on the defence budget outlined in the early sections of this article is at all correct, the British government will face a real predicament. It could be escaped by allowing the defence budget to rise, but this would create problems of domestic economic (and political) management.

If it is any consolation, this predicament has also to be faced by other European governments, though perhaps not to the same extent as Britain, for most of these countries enjoy a higher rate of economic growth than Britain and have less diversified military commitments. In the long term, which is how this problem ought to be viewed, there must be a case for a greater division of labour within the Alliance. There has already been some talk of specialisation, with the Dutch particularly active in promoting the concept. At the end of 1976, for example, they made a rather vague offer for Britain to take over some Dutch maritime reconnaissance responsibilities in return for either financial assistance with the defence budget or, perhaps, greater Dutch activity in Europe. The Germans do not approve of specialisation because it undermines the integration of Nato's military forces. This is despite the fact that their own forces are highly specialised, with a small navy and large land forces concentrating wholly on the defence of their own borders.

There are real problems with specialisation, such as getting force planning in phase and ensuring that a redistribution of military tasks does not leave one nation with an excessive burden while another

minister, complained that whereas the British had 26 of the senior command positions, the Germans had only 10. Since then, the Germans have been placated by the appointment of one of their number as a second Deputy SACEUR.

gets off lightly. If large gaps are to be created, ways must be found of filling them. Specialisation also involves the unbalancing of individual force structures, with a loss of certain types of capabilities. Despite the objections, it seems likely that increased specialisation will be forced on all European Nato countries by the pressure of costs. For Britain, one result of increased specialisation would be to increase dependence upon allies and so tie it closer to Nato.

Budgetary restraints and military commitments are pulling in different directions with the services, in the middle, suffering the consequences of the resultant strain. The services find that their resources are declining while their responsibilities remain steady, with unexpected emergencies, such as the firemen's strike or riots in Bermuda, imposing additional demands. Complaints are being heard over pay, conditions and excessive working hours. It has been reported that the Chiefs of Staff are preparing a submission for a 3 per cent increase in the 1979–80 budget, merely to ease the 'over-stretch' on the manpower under their command. This submission will include a request for up to 2,500 extra men for BAOR. Even if this request gains a sympathetic response, the underlying problem will remain. In the long term it will not be possible to hold down defence budgets without revising commitments. Something will have to give.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TO 1985

III: DEPENDENCE ON NON-FUEL MINERALS*

Phillip Crowson

THE 1974–75 world economic recession and the structural changes caused by the OPEC oil price increases, following so soon on the 1972–73 price boom, have forced commodity questions to the centre of the international political stage. For most of the postwar period, the official British attitude to supplies of minerals appeared akin to considering the lilies of the field. British imports of many minerals gradually declined as their markets were captured by synthetic substitutes. The efficiency of scrap collection and recycling improved and better techniques lowered the amount of metal required in a given use. Britain's dismal economic growth performance was also a powerful factor. Traditional suppliers, supplemented by a sophisticated merchanting system centred in London, could meet Britain's needs. The economies of mainland Europe were, in contrast, less well placed and adopted more aggressive mineral procurement policies. But even France and Germany lacked the co-ordinated aggressive approach of Japan, which had to pre-empt a rapidly increasing share of world mineral production to satisfy its vigorously expanding industries.

The dramatic rise in the prices of non-fuel minerals during the 1972–74 boom, coinciding with, and partly caused by, the increase in oil prices, appeared to confirm dramatically the prevalent fears of the early 1970s that world supplies of mineral raw materials would soon run out. Between the last quarter of 1972 and the second quarter of 1974 the United Nations price index for non-ferrous base metals more than doubled. Resource-rich nations became far more assertive about the terms on which their mineral deposits could be developed and mined, even by domestic companies. There was mounting political pressure to reserve a much greater share of the so-called economic rent from mining for the community, through revised fiscal regimes, although these seldom recognised the cyclical nature of mineral prices and profits; and highly unrealistic expectations of permanently high prices were created.

These illusions were rudely shattered by the world recession. Prices

* This article summarises the conclusions of a detailed study entitled *Non-Fuel Minerals and Foreign Policy*. Copies of this, with a data base containing detailed notes and statistics on thirty-two non-fuel minerals (but including uranium), are available from Chatham House. Orders, with a remittance for £3·50, should be addressed to the Publications Officer at the Institute.

of non-ferrous metals and other minerals slumped, but, more important, there was a general cutback in demand. The world consumption of many non-fuel minerals has still not regained its pre-recession peak. Pressures for greater stability in commodity markets were added to the undercurrent of discontent over the division of the fruits of mineral development in the Group of 77's requests for a New International Economic Order. Unrest over the distribution of the world's economic cake greatly increased when the safety valve of economic growth was clamped down. OPEC's successful cartel action in oil provided a powerful rallying symbol to the producers of non-fuel minerals in developing countries, even though it raised their production costs. Meanwhile, political uncertainties, capital-cost inflation and the recession greatly reduced investment, not only in the construction of new mines, but more seriously in their prior exploration and development. The net result of these various trends has been to increase the vulnerability of raw material importing countries in the medium to long term when present surpluses and excess capacity will have been absorbed. At best market prices of most minerals will rise substantially, following the recent examples of tin and uranium, and at worst there will be shortages which could prematurely constrict the industrial countries' economic activity in the early 1980s. These shortages will arise not from the physical exhaustion of ore reserves, but from the failure or inability to mobilise economic resources to develop them soon enough, or from restricted access to the output of existing mines. In the latter case the restrictions could conceivably be self-imposed, if, for example, sanctions were placed on major suppliers.

Given Britain's membership of the European Community, mineral procurement policies should be examined on a European rather than a strictly national basis. The free flow of goods within the Community means that national measures to enhance the availability of raw materials would tend to benefit all members. Moreover, any national approaches to third-country suppliers would carry less political weight than a co-ordinated Community response. Similarly, an integrated European programme of research and exploration or stockpiling might achieve far more than individual national programmes costing the same amount. But even a Community context is sometimes too narrow when considering mineral policies. Continuous supplies at stable prices are essential to the economic well-being of all our trading partners. Even if Europe does not rely on a particular country for a given mineral, other major industrial nations may. Not only would an interruption to supplies of that mineral raise the costs and reduce the availability of imported manufactured goods into Europe, but Europe itself would be more directly threatened by increased pressure on the remaining suppliers.

In the field of mineral supply domestic and foreign policies are

inextricably intertwined. Action to achieve greater self-sufficiency through a programme of domestic exploration, or measures to encourage substitution, efficiency of use, or recycling of materials will react on the Community's import requirements, and hence on its external relations. Conversely, domestic measures may be the best means of overcoming an otherwise intractable problem of foreign policy in the raw material field. Close and continuing co-ordination is needed between all concerned to ensure that the domestic or international effects of specific policies are given due weight. Often such effects may be remote from an individual policy decision. Proposals to phase out the use of lead additives in petrol, for example, increase the strategic importance of imported platinum metals from the Soviet Union and South Africa. This inter-reaction between domestic and foreign policies should always be borne in mind in the remainder of this discussion, which concentrates on foreign-policy aspects of non-fuel minerals. Another caveat to what follows is that long-term forecasts in the field of non-fuel minerals are, as much as in energy markets, invariably wrong. That does not mean that they are valueless, but that they should be treated with great care.

The characteristics of mineral supplies

Although minerals share many common characteristics, the differences between them prevent all but the broadest generalisations. Even these may quickly be overtaken by events. Perceptions about the adequacy or security of supplies can alter dramatically as new uses develop, existing markets are captured by substitutes, major new reserves are proved and developed or existing mines wear out. Continuous monitoring is necessary to keep abreast of such developments.

The Limits to Growth debate of the early 1970s established that proved reserves of minerals are not static, but tend to rise in step with consumption, and that technological changes in response to price pressures defer the eventual depletion of non-renewable resources. Known resources of nearly all minerals are adequate to meet prospective consumption until well into the next century at least. The absolute physical scarcity of minerals need not cause any problems. The location of mineral resources is another matter; in many instances reserves are heavily concentrated in a fairly narrow range of countries. It is no use being assured that long-run supplies are sufficient, if industry is being squeezed to death by short-term scarcity, whatever the latter's cause. The extensive studies carried out in 1973–74 after OPEC had raised oil prices and restricted supplies to unfriendly nations indicated, however, that few, if any, non-fuel minerals are as amenable to cartelisation as is oil.

That does not mean that supplies of all minerals would be immune from short-term cartel action. But such activity would become decreas-

ingly effective the longer it continued. Most minerals have substitutes in nearly all uses, and with many minerals the consuming nations have access to a pool of scrap. Once minerals have been substituted, it is often very difficult and costly to switch back to the original material, so that a cartel might merely earn short-term profits at the expense of an eventual loss of markets. New sources of a mineral can very often be developed in the longer term to supply residual essential uses, so that the maximum effective life of a cartel is likely to be the gestation period of new facilities. Production of several minerals (for example, niobium, molybdenum) is today dominated by a few supplying companies/countries, but cartelisation is ruled out by the ease with which alternative materials can be substituted and the possibility of new entrants. In some materials such as phosphate rock, attempts to jack up the price prompt a vigorous buyers' resistance and demand plummets, at least temporarily, as Morocco found to its cost in 1974–75.

More likely than cartelisation is the possibility of interruptions to supply from several producing countries, or even from one dominant one. In some instances, this can be discounted as an acceptable risk, especially where world markets are chronically over supplied. In some, recent technical developments have greatly reduced the potential damage from such interruptions. Antimony, of which China, South Africa and Bolivia are the major suppliers, is one example; changing demands in the lead acid battery market have greatly reduced the need for imports of antimony. In some instances the present pattern of suppliers to Europe is based on historical relationships, and a temporary withdrawal of one important supplier would not necessarily be disastrous; nickel, in which Canada's pre-eminence has lessened, is one example, and zirconium, of which Australia is the leading exporter, is another. Several categories remain. Supplies of tin to the Western world come mainly from a small group of South-east Asian countries plus Bolivia. Known world reserves outside these countries are scarce, expansion within them is restrained by fiscal and legal obstacles, and demand has been reduced to a hard core of uses where substitution is increasingly difficult. Supplies of cobalt, and to a lesser extent copper, are similarly contingent, in the short term at least, on the stability of Central Africa; Zaïre and Zambia, between them, supply three fifths of world production, and of EEC imports, of cobalt, and one sixth of world production, but two fifths of Community imports, of copper. China is a major, but erratic supplier of tungsten to world markets, with half the world's production, but a much smaller share of EEC imports. Brazil is even more dominant in the production of niobium, with over four fifths of both world production and imports into the EEC. Canada (Quebec) supplies most of the balance. Supplies of asbestos are vulnerable, as strikes and plant closures in recent years

have illustrated. South Africa is the sole supplier of certain types, whilst the Soviet Union and Canada (Quebec) are the main producers of the more widely used types.

For the products listed so far, no single country figures prominently as a supplier of more than one or two. South Africa, however, is the world's pre-eminent producer of manganese, chrome, vanadium platinum group metals and gold. It is also an important producer of uranium. In all but the latter case, it shares its dominance with the Soviet Union. Deep sea mining offers a potential new source of manganese, and large vanadium resources are untapped in Caribbean oil deposits and Canadian oil sands. But South Africa's share of known world resources of chrome and the platinum group metals is greater than its share of the production of them. Furthermore, many deposits elsewhere are low grade and potentially high cost. A considerable period would elapse before viable mines could be created. Substitution is possible for all these minerals in some uses, and they could be withdrawn from less essential markets, such as platinum in jewelry. A hard core of key uses remains, however, where quick substitution or alternative sources are impossible.

Europe and Japan are especially vulnerable to interruptions to their mineral supplies, partly because of their dependence on sea transport, but mainly because they lack large indigenous mining industries. Europe relies entirely on imports for all ferro-alloying materials, including nickel and manganese, all its beach sand minerals such as titanium and zirconium, asbestos, phosphates and precious metals. In some cases there is a limited amount of recycling. In only three minerals—fluorspar, potash and mercury—does domestic production account for two thirds or more of total supply. Scrap recycling is important for the main non-ferrous metals, and also as feed to steel mills. European iron ore mines are, however, becoming depleted and are relatively low grade. Existing European deposits of bauxite and uranium will also be unable to sustain future growth in demand and the contribution of imports will increase. Of the major metals, Europe is best endowed with lead and zinc, largely because of large Irish deposits. Whilst more intensive exploration might enable the development of small mines (for example, copper in Brittany) Europe is never likely to increase its self-sufficiency in this manner. Measures to increase recycling and conserve materials will help but Europe will remain exposed to international developments. The United States is much more favourably placed, being self-sufficient or almost so, in many minerals, and having access to Canadian and Mexican reserves. Like Europe, the United States is least self-sufficient in alloying materials, especially in the South African minerals; chromium, manganese and platinum group metals are major mineral imports.

Strategic stockpiles

Interruptions to supplies are as likely to result from natural disasters, such as an earthquake or flooding at a major mine, from strikes or other labour disputes, or transport problems, as from political causes. The latter also come in a variety of guises. The control of exports has long been accepted as a legitimate function of governments, but there is a risk that controls might be imposed which would adversely affect the interests of consuming countries. The 'safeguards' and 'non-proliferation' embargoes on exports of uranium might be regarded as special cases, but minimum export price arrangements, and even export bans, have affected other minerals in the past. Maximum pressure should be applied through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for an effectively policed code on export restrictions.

The main political dangers are, of course, either civil unrest and disturbances or even war in supplying countries, or international sanctions on trade, with the latter especially relevant to Southern Africa. World dependence on South Africa for essential mineral supplies must of course be taken into account when considering trade sanctions. Perhaps the greatest risk would be a gradual rundown of the South African economy, with developing political and economic chaos causing intermittent interruptions to production and a gradual deterioration of existing mines. The Eastern bloc countries would probably not foment South African unrest to secure commercial advantage and a stranglehold on essential minerals. But their relatively inflexible and bureaucratic commercial policies may prevent them from quickly filling any breach in world supplies.

Given the growing interdependence of the world economy, there is a case for setting up European strategic stockpiles of essential minerals. These would explicitly not be used for market intervention purposes, and need not necessarily be directly held by governments. Any fiscal or other impediments to financing such stockpiles should, however, be removed. Strategic stockpiles would not be required for all minerals, and would not be amassed to cope with general war. Their purpose would be to tide over strictly temporary interruptions to supply, or sudden steep price rises, and to buy time whilst longer-term actions were taken, both domestically and internationally, to eke out existing supplies, find alternative sources, including recycling, and reduce consumption. The appropriate scale of stockpiles would depend on the specific supply/demand characteristics of each mineral. They would be built up gradually to prevent any undue disturbances to existing markets, as their immediate creation would, undoubtedly, push up prices. The capital cost for European stockpiles of strategically sensitive minerals

is not great, and could be regarded as an acceptable insurance premium. For example, a year's imports into the EEC of manganesese, chrome, vanadium (including ferro alloys of all three) and platinum group metals costs around $870 million. The rapid establishment of strategic stockpiles would greatly increase Europe's freedom of manoeuvre on the international political stage, allowing policies to be contemplated that might otherwise have to be ruled out.

The development of new supplies

The mobilisation of known resources to meet demand in the medium term is the greatest challenge to Europe's supplies of minerals. The effects of the world economic recession on supply/demand balances and market prices have masked the problems, but they have also provided a welcome respite to counter the challenge. Moreover mines and plants planned and started during the 1972–74 boom are still coming on stream. The probable persistence of over-capacity and excess stocks of many minerals into the early 1980s will, however, greatly increase the obstacles to new investment. This is a problem for the consuming countries rather than the producing nations and prospective host countries. The latter do not always unequivocally welcome large investments in mining. The benefits brought are not always considered as unmixed, especially if new mines increase the lop-sided imbalance of a developing economy. The main industrial nations have a strong interest in a stable and expanding supply of minerals. To counter prospective shortages, they must encourage host countries to accept new investment on reasonable terms. One requirement may be a much greater willingness on the part of consuming nations to accept a growing proportion of semi-manufactured and more highly processed products than in the past. The price of adequate supplies may be greater competition for existing European industries, as the developing nations link exploration of their mineral deposits with demands for more local processing.

A series of inter-related obstacles to investment in mines has arisen, including a marked rise in capital costs for a mine of an economic size, a considerable increase in non-commercial risks especially, but not exclusively, in less developed countries, and a reduction in the financeability of new projects. Uncertainties over future demand and weak prices are further factors which are considered later under the heading of stabilisation schemes.

Private companies' exploration activity has declined in the areas where non-commercial risks have increased. What are at issue are not the classical political risks, but the 'creeping expropriation' form of risks to which capital-intensive mining projects are particularly vulnerable. Frequently, the terms under which companies operate, often clearly

laid down in an agreement previously concluded with an unchanged government, are gradually eroded. The ensuing climate of uncertainty greatly inhibits exploration, and attention is diverted to more stable areas, which may have inferior and higher-cost mineral deposits. 'Creeping expropriation' is very difficult to define, but examples are widespread. It might be argued that private mining companies have outlived their usefulness, and that they can be replaced by international agencies, national companies and specialist contractors. The problem today, however, is not yet a lack of known mineral deposits—past exploration has created a large bank of potentially viable projects awaiting development—but the conversion of these into viable mines. Other arrangements will certainly supplement or even complement the mining companies, but nothing has yet effectively challenged the companies' ability to muster all the technical, marketing and financial skills needed to shepherd a project from initial discovery to successful commercial production.

The European mining companies have proposed framework treaties for mining investments between the Community, member states and host countries. These would protect the terms of mining agreements negotiated under their umbrella and provide an impartial arbitration procedure. Such treaties would also provide an assurance to the host countries that the companies would perform as promised. Secondly, a European political risk guarantee system should be established for mining investments, analogous to existing insurance schemes, but with the diplomatic weight of the full Community behind it. This would not remove non-commercial barriers to investment, but would alleviate them. The European Community should also take a small financial stake in mining projects, both to reduce the chances of expropriation and to ease a project's financing.

The last proposal can be widened to cover international or regional institutions such as the World Bank and its subordinate agencies. An international stake in a project, however small, increases its finance-ability and also offers some guarantee of good behaviour to the host country. Recent international economic developments, including floating exchange rates, rapid inflation and recession, have reduced the acceptability of long-term sales contracts as a security for loan finance. Commercial banks have scaled down the proportion of a project they are prepared to finance, and have called for completion and other guarantees from sponsoring companies, whilst capital cost escalation has placed greatly increased equity requirements beyond the financial reach of most individual companies. The governments of consuming countries can help bridge the consequent financing gap in several ways, apart from expanding the budgets of international agencies and endorsing their

involvement in privately-owned mining projects. If private ownership is a problem, the international finance could be dedicated to the necessary infrastructure rather than the mine or accompanying facilities. Aid funds might also be directed to the infrastructure or used to purchase a stake in a project for the host country. European governments might also encourage international consortia for mineral projects, and remove any otherwise unnecessary impediments to their creation.

The European Community should consider underpinning long-term purchase contracts in order to restore their attractiveness as a financing mechanism. One possibility would be a form of import guarantee agency to ensure that contracted tonnages would always be taken at a given floor price, even in recessions. Where individual purchasers were unable or unwilling to take their full contractual amount, they would off-load any excess to the agency which would then stockpile until conditions improved. The guarantees would be given in exchange for suitable premiums which would finance the agency's costs. Finally, one solution to burgeoning capital costs is to develop alternative, lower-cost techniques. Even though the EEC lacks a large indigenous mining industry, it should sponsor a co-ordinated research programme into the technology of mining and processing, possibly in association with developing countries. Such a programme could reap substantial dividends in the form of reduced costs of new facilities, and eventually in lower prices.

Price and income stabilisation

The developed nations' interest in securing stable supplies of mineral raw materials in the medium to long term should colour their attitudes to stabilisation proposals. Although supply has broadly kept pace with demand through most of the postwar period, even in the face of fluctuating prices and consumption, the underlying conditions affecting investment have altered, as already indicated. Moreover, no previous postwar recession has been as deep or as prolonged as that now affecting many minerals. If scarcities and price surges are to be avoided in the 1980s, a consciously contra-cyclical investment policy is needed. Mines with typical gestation periods need to be planned, and even started, now if they are to come on stream when they are needed. Yet market prices are far too low to justify new investment, and consequently finance is almost impossible to raise for many projects. Consuming nations have a more immediate interest too in the stability of mineral markets. They would benefit from more even import bills, and an end to the ratchet effect of commodity price fluctuations on their retail prices. Mineral price rises are quickly passed on to final consumers, and are rapidly built into the general cost structure, whilst price cuts do not have such pervasive effects. Moreover, countries supplying minerals are major

markets for European exporters. When demand is weak and mineral prices fall, many countries heavily dependent on minerals suffer marked reductions in their foreign exchange income and are forced to cut their imports quickly, defer debt repayments and accumulate new debts. This intensifies and extends the original fluctuations of demand in the industrial countries. Furthermore, straitened economic circumstances promote political instability in producing countries. At the extreme, governments might be replaced by regimes offering plausible panaceas, but inevitably the foreign investors are a convenient scapegoat. The impediments to new investment are further increased.

The strong pressures within the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for an integrated programme for commodities and a common fund are a response to the problems posed by market instability, and by the industrial nations' apparent failure to evolve effective solutions. Whatever the political and diplomatic pressures, however, Britain and the other EEC countries should be guided by a clear-headed awareness of their true long-term interests. The British government has rightly pressed for international study groups to improve and disseminate the available information about present and future trends in individual minerals. Better information reduces fluctuations arising from misunderstandings and market imperfections, and the establishment of study groups does not preclude more comprehensive measures. Circumstances do differ radically between minerals, however, and the most appropriate solution for one may compound the problems of another; a case-by-case approach is essential even if within a broadly agreed timetable and framework.

In the minerals' field attention has crystallised around copper, because it is the most important non-fuel mineral by value in world trade, because it is today in chronic oversupply, and because fluctuations in demand keenly affect the economic fortunes of a small but important group of developing countries. Problems of stabilisation are as relevant in other minerals, but international activity has been less frenetic. In some, the market has in the past been effectively stabilised by individual government or corporate action. A problem of recent years has been the spreading tentacles of the United States anti-trust legislation. The case for moderating price and demand fluctuations in commodity markets is internationally accepted, but practical measures can be severely restricted by American actions, based on an extremely broad conception of American interests. American companies are barred by the United States legislation from participating in stabilisation schemes that are widely conceived to be in the international interest; and non-American organisations are at risk from this legislation when they take part in these schemes. A clear distinction is needed between internationally acceptable

agreements, among producers/consumers, with or without government involvement, and unacceptable arrangements. The OECD or GATT are appropriate forums in which to draw up suitable guidelines and sanctions, based solely on the merits of individual cases rather than blanket prohibitions or acceptance. The United States should be strongly urged to confine its anti-trust activities within such guidelines.

The best general response to the instability of commodity markets is to even out demand, but the industrial countries are unable to fine tune their economies to the necessary extent. Given the inflexibility of supply in the face of sudden and unpredicted swings in demand, there is a respectable economic case for buffer stock arrangements. These would stabilise prices around their long-term trend, even though there are major problems in defining that trend and in setting the most appropriate size for the stock. Such arrangements might be made through an international agreement or through closely co-ordinated national stockpiles. If the former, they could be linked to some common fund system, but it must be one that takes full cognisance of the specific needs of individual commodities. An ineffective buffer stock scheme with too little finance would in time exacerbate market fluctuations rather than eliminate them. Moreover, buffer stocks are ill designed to cope with massive recurrent surpluses because sufficient finance is not available.

Effective stabilisation schemes need production/export quotas in reserve, especially where materials are chronically oversupplied. Such quotas are resisted by many producing countries and are of questionable economic value; they raise production costs and inhibit national planning. The burden of adjustment is thrown on producing countries, although consumers suffer because cutbacks can rarely be reversed quickly enough to defend price ceilings. As a general rule, imposed production or export controls should be avoided, save as a last resort. Many companies normally tend to reduce output as demand drops, and such cutbacks might be encouraged by an international incentive scheme.

A major objection to production cuts is that there is no guarantee that a country's cash flow will be improved as a result. This would be overcome if repayable loans on easy terms were given by an international agency in exchange for export or production cuts at the discretion of the producing countries. Compensation for production cuts is analogous to, but very different from, income stabilisation schemes such as Stabex, operated by the EEC. The Third World has tended to attack such schemes as being discretionary aid, but they do offer a viable alternative to price stabilisation measures. One key advantage is that such schemes do not directly interfere with market mechanisms.

If there were an easy panacea for price or demand instability, it would

have been introduced long since. The European governments have recognised the complexities and the dangers of quick answers. Some adopt too short-sighted and narrow a view of their interests, whilst others uncritically accept UNCTAD's proposed solutions. The framework of the international debate has been too rigidly drawn and needs broadening into a discussion of alternative means of achieving the same ends. There is a danger that, for vaguely defined political reasons, the European governments will succumb too easily to ill thought-out proposals.

Conclusion

The main message of this paper is that there is no immediate cause for alarm about Europe's mineral supplies, but there is equally no room for complacency. The past reliance solely on market mechanisms is no longer sufficient to satisfy Europe's needs in the 1980s, even though present surpluses are more than adequate for the next few years. Unless action is taken soon serious problems will arise in the 1980s. Such action requires a more conscious mineral procurement policy in which foreign-policy initiatives should be closely integrated with domestic policies. Britain can achieve far more in this field acting in concert with its Community partners than by pursuing an independent strategy.

CHINA'S FOOD AND FUEL UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT

W. Klatt

CARBOHYDRATES and hydrocarbons are the prime sources of life everywhere. Without the energies locked in these compounds and their chemical derivatives, there is no life. To translate these technical terms into plain language, they mean food and fuel in their various forms. The more modernised a society becomes, the larger in volume and the more varied in quality and composition are these basic ingredients of life, and the greater is the society's preoccupation with securing their ready supply. China is a case in point. Consciously or subconsciously, its leaders have recognised these facts by electing Tachai, the advanced agricultural commune, and Taching, the first major source of liquid energy, to serve as models in all spheres of development. For more than a decade, these two enterprises have been chosen as signposts to what modern China stands for. Tachai and Taching have also served as ideological symbols and as issues of practical politics. Where society is stagnant, the volume and composition of food and fuel can be treated as static. No such position exists where the population exceeds its resources, and where its growth exceeds past precedent. Here the search is on for ever new sources of carbohydrates and hydrocarbons and thus for the solution of existing food and fuel problems. This is as true of the post-Mao era as it was during the lifetime of the great helmsman, even if the political language in which the issues are to be presented in future undergoes certain verbal changes.

Politics in command

In China, more than elsewhere, 'politics are in command'. Even technical matters are decided at the highest political level. This has been so ever since the Communists seized power in 1949. Thus economic and social issues cannot be judged except within the wider political context. As the idolatry of the great leader gained momentum, so the confusion grew about the direction of his lead. Every one of his chosen heirs lost his position, if not his life, whilst sycophants were able to turn to their own advantage his growing physical and mental weakness. At times, loyal cadres were called names which elsewhere would be subject to prosecution under the laws of libel. As a protection against disgrace, decisions of any significance were supposedly based on one or another

of Mao's sayings—taken, if necessary, out of context. As the proceedings of last year's Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party show, this practice is likely to continue as long as the new leaders have doubts about being fully accepted as Mao's legitimate successors. The process of de-Maoisation is bound to be protracted.

In any modernising society, the problems to be considered by its elite are manifold. Even under conditions of one-party leadership, alternative options are bound to divide individuals, groups and factions, reflecting not only personal preferences, but also the interests of different sections of the populace, whose views are not normally sought and whose voices are usually heard only when expressing applause. Thus, not every deviation from the Party's accepted line need be evidence of disloyalty. Even so, in the last decade the disunity within the ranks became such that the 'struggle between two lines', though crudely oversimplified by the mass media, was a reflection of the growing polarisation of China's political elite. Personal recriminations often blurred genuine disagreements on matters of substance. Among controversial subjects were those related to technical and political training and mass mobilisation; the allocation of industrial goods and farm products; the choice of wage, price and incomes policies; the importance of national defence; the degree of self-reliance and the dependence on foreign capital and know-how. On some of these issues there were merely shades of difference in interpretation and thus alliances tended to shift within the elite. On others there was intense struggle between opposing lines. Of the regions, Shanghai, the birthplace of the Chinese Communist Party and traditionally a stronghold of radicalism, contributed more than others to the conflict. It produced some of the most militant national leaders of the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent struggle for political leadership, and it provided the ideological arguments in the radical journal *Study and Criticism*, which directed its attacks in turn at Teng Hsiao-ping, Chou En-lai and ultimately Hua Kuo-feng.

The consensus, which the country needed, eluded the warring factions. Their disagreements, which turned into open conflict during the Cultural Revolution, were neither terminated, as intended, at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969 nor at the Tenth Congress in August 1973, which was preoccupied with disposing of Lin Piao, 'the plotter, swindler, renegade and traitor' and, until his mysterious death, Chairman Mao's heir apparent. At the Tenth Congress, Chou En-lai, Premier for the previous 26 years and for almost twice as long a member of the Politburo, shared the platform with Wang Hung-wen, one of Madame Mao's collaborators. Like his associates of the Shanghai faction, Wang rose—as his enemies later put it—'like a helicopter' from the post of a local branch secretary to the position of Vice-Chairman of the Central Com-

mittee, and thus the third most important man in the hierarchy. Whilst Chou spoke in favour of political stability and economic modernisation, Wang defended the right 'to go against the tide'. Thus the balance between opposing factions remained precarious. Early in 1975, at the long-overdue Fourth National People's Congress—China's version of parliament—yet another attempt was made to balance opposing forces, but Teng Hsiao-ping, who, after six years in disgrace, had returned to public life in 1973, brought neither the political stability nor the economic advance which Chou had envisaged at the time of his last public appearance. Even so, in spite of growing uncertainties, the fourth five-year plan (1971–75) was completed more successfully than its ill-fated forerunner which was disrupted during the Cultural Revolution. By contrast, during the fourth plan the economy had done well. In particular, supplies of food and fuel had increased at high rates.

Seemingly, the year 1976 got off to a good start. However, instead of the prosperity and happiness expected in the Year of the Dragon, it brought a long series of natural disasters and human disturbances. As if to anticipate the impending change in the Mandate of Heaven, Chou's death early in 1976 was followed a few weeks later by the unexpected appointment of Hua Kuo-feng, instead of Teng Hsiao-ping, as acting Premier and thus as successor to Chou. As Minister of Public Security and member of the Politburo, Hua had been able to watch the organs of State and Party, as Beria had once done at the end of Stalin's reign. He was thus probably better informed than some of his rivals about the ambitions of individual personalities and of opposing factions. Beria, relying on enormously strong public security forces, was a danger to his rivals. By comparison Hua, who lacked a personal power base, had to rely on the support of the Peking garrison and on some of the other military commanders. Through a combination of political weakness and tactical skill, he was able to act as the man in the middle and thus survive, unlike Beria, the power struggle which lay ahead.

After two months of intense political controversy, early in April—on the occasion of the spring festival—fierce disturbances occurred during demonstrations in the centre of the capital. The Square of Heavenly Peace saw violence on a large scale. For the first time in more than a quarter of a century, large numbers of the public spontaneously displayed their discontent with the political state of the nation and with its leadership. In honouring the late Premier Chou, they showed that they preferred Teng to his opponents. Predictably, the revolt was suppressed, and Hua was appointed first Vice-Chairman of the Party Central Committee and Premier of the State Council. Teng, who only recently had been one of the most senior men after Mao, was dismissed from all his posts in the Party and government.

After Mao's death

Five months later, on September 9, 1976, Mao died. From now on, the faction which in the past had had the Chairman's support for its cause was on its own. It did not survive Mao's death for long. Six weeks later, with the support of some senior members of the military establishment and by the intervention of Wang Tung-hsing, who for many years had looked after the personal security of Mao and other leading personalities, Hua purged the 'gang of four' and many of their followers throughout the land.

In the meantime, Nature added its own contribution to the year's misfortunes. At the end of May, two earthquakes occurred in Yunnan. Two months later, Tangshan in Hopei was destroyed by a major earthquake which was felt as far as Peking and Tientsin and caused considerable damage to railway lines, mines, factories and oil installations throughout the province. In mid-August Szechuan was struck by yet another earthquake. In all, more than half a million people are believed to have been killed or injured, and some five per cent of vital industrial production may have been put out of action for some time. The uncertainties caused by these misfortunes gave vent to labour troubles in major industrial cities, such as Wuhan and Hangchow, and to a general decline in the rate of economic growth. This is now publicly admitted. It took the better part of a year to repair the damage caused by political and natural tremors, to break the influence of the militants and to prepare for the Eleventh Party Congress in August 1977.

At the Congress, Teng Hsiao-ping, having once again returned to public life, delivered a short closing speech in which he praised the 'wise leader' Hua but gave no signs of his ebullient self, though he allowed himself to give the brief advice: 'there must be less empty talk and more hard work'. In the preceding six days, there had been more than enough empty talk, and little was revealed of the policies to be pursued in future. Yen Chien-ying, the Minister of Defence, presented a new provision, in the amended Party constitution, for a one-year probation of all new members so as to keep the Party free from contamination. The main speech of over 20,000 words on the political situation was made by Hua, who as Chairman had also become the head of the Politburo and its Standing Committee.[1] He presented the losers not only as having been wrong, but as wrongdoers. Half his four-hour speech was devoted to this theme, revealing apparent treachery on a grandiose scale among Mao's most intimate circle, whose machinations were disclosed in lurid detail. By comparison, Hua and his associates seemed to have acted from pure concern for the unity of the Party. Some of the

[1] Hsinhua News Agency, Aug. 24, 1977.

1,500 or so delegates could be forgiven if the thought occurred to them *Qui s'excuse, s'accuse.* In any event, Mao's cultural revolution was a long last ' victoriously concluded '. As to the future, there was little tha was new. Hua's programme amounted to the implementation of wha Chou and Teng had planned for 1985 and beyond. Except for ar increased output of military hardware, the mixture was to be much the same as before: Chou's ' four modernisations ' were to determine the pattern of economic development, with agriculture ' the foundation ' anc industry ' the major sector ' and both national defence and science anc technology the chief beneficiaries. In the political arena, ' attaining grea order across the land ' was to take the place of any attempt to ' go agains the tide '.

In the Standing Committee, the governing body of the Party, and in the Politburo the new leadership has once again the strong bias in favour of the military which it had partly lost at the time of the Tenth Party Congress. The impact of the military element is bound to be felt throughout the country's economy, including sectors vital for defence, such as the oil and chemical industries. Besides the soldiers, old cadres have taken the places vacated by supporters of the ' gang of four '. Excluded are the representatives of those millions of intellectuals, students and young urban workers who, through *hsia-fang*, the process of rustication, had paid their price for the extravagances of the Cultural Revolution. Their demands are likely to be heard one day, even if the Eleventh Congress could be celebrated as one of victory and unity. To be sure, the ' gang of four ' has been defeated decisively, and the unity of the old establishment has been achieved at last. Its members are agreed on the implementation of a pragmatic programme of economic development, based on the exploitation of both domestic resources and foreign know-how. Just the same, a large number of issues remain unresolved: in agriculture, how to increase output faster than population without allowing capitalism to raise its ugly head; in industry, how to allocate scarce resources among conflicting interests, such as the armed forces and the consumers; in management, how to keep wages down without antagonising the workers; and in the universities and research establishments, how to overcome the shortcomings of the last ten years. None of these problems was so much as touched upon during the six days of the Eleventh Congress.

Planning for the future

A statement circulated by the Planning Commission after the Eleventh Party Congress [2] did little to clarify the new leadership's economic policies. The authors of this statement trod political, rather than

[2] Hsinhua News Agency, Sept. 12, 1977.

economic, ground. They criticised the 'out-and-out flunkeys of imperialism', branded as misdeeds the acts of 'bourgeois renegades' and 'revolutionary revisionists' and re-stated the principle of the 'three-in-one combination' of leading party cadres, workers and technicians. Beyond these well-worn doctrinal generalities, they dealt largely with such familiar economic issues as the replacement of capitalist and individual property by public and collective ownership; in agriculture the continued priority of grains as the 'key links'; in industry the simultaneous development of large and small units; and in general the supremacy of the central planning authorities over the executive organs at regional and local levels.

The views held by the State Planning Commission were spelled out in some detail by its head, Vice-Premier Yu Chiu-li, when he addressed the Standing Committee of the Fourth National People's Congress.[8] Once again, the statement was long on political intent but short on economic detail, though the overall economic goals have become a little clearer. Farm output, including private sideline production and fuel and power supplies, ranks high in the list of priorities. Similar importance is given to raw materials, to means of transport and to communications. Better use is to be made of existing manufacturing capacity, labour productivity is to be increased and the quality of finished consumer goods is to be improved. As to workers' rewards, from now onwards the ruling will be: more pay for more work, less pay for less work. Work discipline is expected to be matched by initiative at the local and central levels of government. Foreign equipment and know-how will be acceptable in future, though self-reliance is not abandoned as the ultimate goal. No targets in quantitative terms are yet available and there is no way of knowing whether the proceedings of the next National People's Congress, due to be held in the spring of 1978, will be more informative in this respect. In fact, for the past few years the national economy was run in such a ('semi-anarchical') fashion that planning for the current period (1976–80) will probably have to be done afresh.

In so far as any specific references to, say, wages and prices, work discipline and labour productivity, allocation of scarce resources or balanced and unbalanced growth are made, they are increasingly being attributed to Teng Hsiao-ping. During his short-lived return to office in 1975, he made several statements which, though published by organs of the Kuomintang in Taiwan, were not mentioned by the media of the Chinese Communist Party before, during or after the Eleventh Congress. Although they were referred to obliquely by the press in Peking in the summer of 1977, these statements were apparently not discussed by nor

[8] Hsinhua News Agency, Oct. 24, 1977.

endorsed at the Congress. Teng Hsiao-ping may well have preferred to keep out of the limelight so as to avoid yet another setback in his political career. However this may be, his views and his pragmatic approach still seem to be regarded as too controversial to be aired publicly at home and abroad. In this situation, individual measures, such as the recent reintroduction of educational standards and the modest wage increases for approximately half the industrial work force, have to serve as indications of changes to come. The new leadership's overall economic policy is likely to emerge only in stages. Thus, for the time being members of the political and economic elite will have to operate in a state of suspense.

To some extent, the path into the future had already been mapped out before the delegates assembled in the Great Hall of the People. During the months following Mao's death, special subjects, ranging from coal and steel production to capital construction, machine building and communications, were discussed at mass meetings at which delegates were briefed on the tasks for the future. The most important of these conferences were those concerned with 'Learning from Tachai' and 'Learning from Taching'. The first of these conferences, held for eighteen days in December 1976, was originally scheduled to take place in 1980. Instead, it followed an earlier Tachai conference within fifteen months. Its date was advanced so as to provide Chairman Hua with the opportunity of presenting his political post-Mao programme to an audience of 5,000 participants, including Party secretaries and delegates of the armed forces, the State administration and the agricultural communes. The second conference was opened at the Taching oilfield on April 20, 1977 and closed on May 13 in Peking. It was attended by 7,000 delegates and was thus the largest industrial conference ever held in China. It too gave Chairman Hua and some of his senior colleagues, including Yeh Chien-ying, the Minister of Defence, and Yu Chiu-li, the Minister of Planning, the opportunity of raising issues of policy.

The history of this particular form of involvement of large sections of the population goes back to the year 1964, when Mao Tse-tung learned of the achievements of Chen Yung-kuei's agricultural production brigade operating in stony fields at Tachei in Hsiying county, and of Wang Chin-hsi and his work-team drilling in the frozen ground of Taching in Heilungkiang. Thus were born the sagas of the agricultural model brigade and its industrial counterpart, providing the basis for mass emulation campaigns. These operations of social engineering and the conferences, which provided them with central directives, were not designed, like extension services, to disseminate technical information but to convey the message of the nation's leadership to agricultural and industrial labourers that they should work hard and be self-reliant.

Besides, Tachei and Taching provided the political battleground on which the struggles of warring factions were fought.

Progress in agriculture

In agriculture the ill-fated National Agricultural Development Programme, designed to double farm output within twelve years (1956–67), has been cited from time to time. This plan, conceived in 1956 and revised in 1957 and 1958, failed lamentably. In fact, even in 1977 farm output was nowhere near the 1967 target. Similarly, Hua's summary report, given towards the end of the 35-day conference on Tachai held in the autumn of 1975, lacked realism in that his main proposals were unattainable by 1980. He had asked for the assimilation of the Tachai model in at least one third of the 2,300 counties of China and for the mechanisation 'in the main' of Chinese agriculture within five years. These targets will not be within his grasp since they fail to take into account the widely differing farming conditions throughout some 750,000 brigades (villages) in a country of continental dimensions and diversity. Much of Tachai's success was in any case due to financial and material support provided from outside the borders of the community. What has been achieved in Tachai and elsewhere in agricultural communes is the spread of small-scale rural industrial enterprises, producing fertilisers and cement, and providing electricity, repair facilities and minor items of farm machinery. Though some of these activities have been inordinately expensive, their social benefit is likely to have been significant, in that supplementary work and income have accrued to the rural population.

During the second Tachai conference Mao's statement 'On the Ten Major Relationships', made twenty years earlier, was published for the first time. It served as a reminder that in 1976 as in 1956—the year of the Hundred Flowers—conditions might justify a temporary retreat from the hard political line of the past. The following spring, the Taching conference similarly provided a platform for some official pronouncements which implied a return to the rational policies associated with the names of Chou and Teng. In his report to the conference, Yu Chiu-li, the Planning Minister, visualised the creation of six administrative regions, like those in existence before the Cultural Revolution, which would aim at technical transformation along the lines of Chou's 'four modernisations' of agriculture, industry, defence, and science and technology, and would function as self-reliant units working, however, in close co-operation with each other. A programme of this kind makes sense in terms of national defence—a subject dear to Yeh, another prominent participant in the Taching conference. In his own contribution to the conference, Chairman Hua undertook to have set up, before the

end of the century, ten more Taching oilfields. As those involved in oil exploration know only too well, forecasts of this kind are hazardous in the extreme. Besides, the requirements of capital and of material and human resources for a programme of this magnitude are likely to come into conflict with those of farming, defence and consumption. Also open to doubt must be the plan to turn by 1980 one third of China's industrial enterprises into units operating on the Taching model. One aspect of this experiment deserves, however, to be commended: the combination of oil exploration with farming, though marginal in terms of economic returns, must be considered a social asset.

In the absence of firm data from official Chinese sources, it is difficult to say to what extent past policies have been successful and how far future policies will take China towards the goals outlined more than once by Mao Tse-tung in general terms and more specifically by Chou En-lai in his last public statement. Much work has been devoted outside China to the analysis of the country's economic performance, but the results have been presented with greater firmness than the available data warrant. At times, the findings seemed to have been coloured by the prevailing international climate of hostility or sympathy towards China. The third US Congressional Report on China showed inordinately large changes by comparison with the estimates contained in the previous report of the Joint Economic Committee. For example, the annual growth rates for 1958–71 were doubled for farm output and almost trebled for gross national product per caput.[4] Similar, though somewhat more modest, upward revisions were made by the late Professor Eckstein.[5] Robert Michael Field raised his index of industrial production (1957 = 100) from 155 to almost 200 for 1965 and from 215 to over 300 for 1970.[6] These changes are only in part due to improved coverage, such as the inclusion of small-scale rural production previously ignored. Undoubtedly Chinese documentation and foreign surveillance have improved, but a lot has remained unexplained. The claim, for instance, that—notwithstanding floods and droughts—fifteen excellent grain crops were harvested in fifteen consecutive years flies in the face of all international experience in this sphere. Similar reservations also seem justified in the case of claims regarding the output of small-scale rural enterprises. A distinction has to be made here between data related to small numbers of large plants and large numbers of small units. Measured

[4] US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), p 43.

[5] Alexander Eckstein, *China's Economic Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), n. 27, p. 328.

[6] US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 63; and *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

by this rod, output data for, say, oil or steel can on the whole be relied on, whilst those collected in thousands of rural fertiliser or cement plants or hundreds of thousands of agricultural production brigades, where deterioration, dilution and waste tend to be high, ought to be regarded with scepticism. The mere fact that grain harvest figures are quoted indiscriminately, irrespective of whether they include or exclude soya-beans, should give cause for concern. Fertiliser figures, which at times include natural manure of a low nutrient content, are similarly suspect. Other examples could be quoted.

Most analysts of the farm situation limit their enquiry to the output of grains. Indeed grains form the central part of the agricultural scene, but their performance is influenced by the importance attached to other farm products, including pulses, oilseeds, sugar, milk, meat and non-food items, such as cotton, tobacco and tea. The output of each of these products can be affected by government preference, by the availability of farm requisites, such as irrigation water or fertilisers, and by relative prices—of which little is known. The favourable effects of the low tax on farm incomes and of low prices for inputs have been reported extensively. By comparison, the detrimental effect of low prices paid by the State organs for obligatory deliveries has on the whole been ignored.[7] The same is true of the flow of foodstuffs from the primary producer to the ultimate consumer and of his food intake, which is chiefly determined by the financial means at his disposal. Calculated in terms of working time expended, food is dear in China. For instance, in Peking one kilo of rice costs the equivalent of the average wage for one hour, compared with less than half an hour for one kilo of rice bought in Tokyo or for one kilo of bread bought in Moscow. Similar disparities exist in the case of other items of the daily diet. At prices and wages prevailing at the time of the Eleventh Congress, the food basket of an 'average' urban family of 4·5 members absorbed almost three fifths of its 'average' urban income, with 1·7 working members compared with one half in Russia and one third in Japan.[8] This is high by international standards. (The recent wage increases are unlikely to have altered the picture greatly.) Although it is the ultimate purpose of food production to meet consumption requirements, little time has been devoted by analysts to calculating the food balance and the cost of the food basket, two indispensable tools in any overall analysis. By comparison, a disproportionate amount

[7] Communes are paid 18–20 yuan per 100 kilos of paddy; consumers pay 30–40 yuan per 100 kilos of milled rice.

[8] W. Klatt, 'The People's Republic of China: Economic Survey' in *The Far East and Australasia 1977–78* (London: Europa, 1977), p. 324. Apart from data on wages, prices and rations, which I have collected from published sources and during interviews, I am indebted to Professor Robert Scalapino (Univ. of California), Dr. James Nickum (San José State Univ.) and H. H. Hoehmann (Federal Institute, Cologne, West Germany) for information made available to me.

of effort has been devoted to estimating the output of grains. Although they still provide, together with pulses, about four fifths of the food intake of the nation, the items which supply the remainder are becoming increasingly important in a society in which agricultural working and eating habits are bound to give way to those of the industrial worker, whether he is an urban or rural dweller.

As humans and animals are the chief users of farm products, their numbers form an essential part of any assessment of this kind. Yet analysts, who hold that in the area of production Chinese data should be used in preference to estimates by outsiders,[9] are inclined to ignore Chinese population data, such as those given by the late Chou En-lai early in 1975 and by China's representative at the World Population Conference in the autumn of 1974. In the Congressional Report for 1975, four of its contributors used four different population estimates, ranging from 838 million to 920 million for 1974. Yet the Chinese Vice-Minister of Public Health had given the conference in Bucharest 'almost 800 million' as his government's estimate for that year. At the time of Mao's death in September 1976, the provincial authorities gave estimates which in the aggregate suggested a total population of 855 million. At the same time, the US Central Intelligence Agency based its economic analysis on a population estimate of 950 million. It hardly seems consistent to accept Chinese official claims, apparently without question, in most other spheres, whilst rejecting those given for population—though it is worth recalling that Li Hsien-nien once admitted that different ministries use different population figures.[10]

If careful consideration is given to widely differing data on population and on food production, consumption and expenditure, it appears that China's farm output has increased little beyond the needs of its increasing population; that grain imports become necessary whenever—as in 1976–77—floods or droughts cause partial crop failures or transport dislocations disrupt normal internal movements; and that the average intake of food provides approximately 2,200 calories, derived from 400 grammes of carbohydrates, 70 grammes of proteins and 35 grammes of fats per day. Considering the body weight, age composition and work-load of the Chinese population, this represents an adequate, though somewhat monotonous, diet. Whilst it is no greater than at the time of Japan's invasion of China, since the revolution its quality and composition have slowly improved. Also, thanks to rationing of cereals, vegetable oils and, at times, sugar, the distribution of the available resources is more equal than it was in the 1930s. Cases of under-nutrition are rare

[9] Dwight H. Perkins, 'Estimating China's Gross Domestic Product', *Current Scene*, Vol. XV, No. 3, March 1977.
[10] Kyodo (Tokyo), Aug. 23, 1972.

in China nowadays. However, because of the rather modest consumption of vegetables, meat and dairy produce, minerals and vitamins are likely to be deficient in some instances. On the other hand, though the supply of animal protein is limited, the essential ingredients of the protein intake are present in abundance in cereals and soyabeans. Of course, the bulk of the population lives and works in rural communities, where incomes are little more than half of those earned by urban dwellers, but where much of the diet is provided in the form of payments in kind. Thus their food intake is particularly heavily burdened with starchy substance.

As to the future, only rough guesses are possible. Unquestionably, China has untapped reserves. However, labour-intensive methods of farming have already in the past raised crop yields well above those of other countries in Asia (except for Japan and Taiwan). Therefore the recent increased use of high-yielding crop varieties, plant nutrients and means of irrigation and drainage has brought Chinese agriculture closer than elsewhere to the level of diminishing returns. New innovations and a new, composite package of inputs are likely to be required to obtain further progress. Here the lack of academic training and of basic research during and after the Cultural Revolution is bound to make itself felt. To be sure, every effort will be made to meet the additional needs of a rising population, but this will mean at least five million tons of grains and half a million tons of other foodstuffs every year. Many foreign observers judge the prospects without much knowledge of farming problems and on the basis of samples which are loaded rather than weighted. However, the American team of plant breeders spoke from great knowledge and deep concern when they recorded the lack of scientific research in their field.[11] There is no easy solution in a basically tight situation.

The prospect for oil

The record of China's fuel industry is markedly different from that of farming. It is true that at the outset there were certain similarities. As in agriculture, where the Soviet precedent served as a model for China's collectives—the forerunners of the communes—so in the fuel industry Russian technicians provided expertise and training in exploration, drilling and refining methods. After their departure, the legend grew that Taching had been developed purely through Chinese endurance and self-reliance. What has been achieved in the meantime, partly with American, Japanese and West European help, is impressive. Nevertheless, in terms of per caput consumption China still ranks low in the international league table.

11 American Plant Studies Delegation, *Plant Studies in the People's Republic of China* (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1975).

The oil industry has to be seen in the wider context of the overall fuel position. Coal, China's traditional source of fuel, still provides well over three fifths of the country's total needs. By comparison, mineral oil and natural gas account for about one third of the total hydrocarbon balance. Like the coal deposits, the oil and gas resources are located at considerable distances from the main centres of consumption. The North-East and North regions account for two thirds of the oil output, and natural gas is produced mainly in distant Szechuan. To overcome the spatial constraints, more than 3,000 kilometres of pipes have been laid to transport oil and natural gas. Also, the first tankers capable of carrying 50,000 and 100,000 tons of oil have recently been built. But here the shallow nature of the Chinese coast creates loading problems which other oil exporters do not have. So far, only the ports of Lüta (Dairen) and Chanchiang (Kwantung) can handle the new tankers. Therefore, most of the oil shipped to Japan in recent years had to be carried in small vessels—an enterprise which added haulage costs across the China Sea as high as those charged for shipment in large tankers from the Persian Gulf to Japan.

Of course, new discoveries could remove the present handicap, but that lies very much in the future. At the present rate of exploitation, proven and probable reserves of natural oil should last for forty years, but as output, consumption and exports increase, so the lifespan of existing reserves shortens unless new resources are discovered. Whilst the prospects are promising, the claim, made at the peak of the oil crisis, that China would become a second Saudi Arabia can be discounted on present evidence. As in other spheres, the authors of the third Congressional Report on China were more optimistic than other analysts. In a closely-reasoned study on China's overall energy balance, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated (as a 'medium' projection) that China might exceed 200 million tons of oil production in 1980, but that its exports are unlikely to be greatly in excess of 30 million tons (against 50 million tons forecast in the third Congressional Report published four months earlier).[12] Consumption may be taken to increase at a rate half as much again as the overall growth rate of the country's economy, but much will, of course, depend on the type and composition of different sources of fuel and the use made by different sectors of the economy. This is a subject about which little is known at present and about which estimates by different analysts vary widely.

More important than the numbers game are technical and economic matters, such as the constraints imposed on refining, transport and marketing, the availability of indigenous and foreign capital and know-

[12] *China: Energy Balance Projections* (Washington: CIA, 1975).

how, the composition of the product mix, the cost of production and the final price of the end product. At present, Taching supplies about one third of China's total oil output. It is thus not surprising that it is held up as a model not only within the oil industry but also within the context of industrial modernisation in general, although, of course, conditions vary greatly from sector to sector and no simplification can do much to hasten advance. It is possible that the oilfields at Sengli and Takang, which already produce more than half the country's oil, will surpass Taching, particularly when the exploitation of reserves adjacent to Sengli in the Gulf of Pohai is extended. Beyond the Gulf, in the East, Yellow and South China Seas, Chinese oil exploitation is bound to meet opposition from other claimants, including Korea, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines.

The rapid expansion of the oil industry during the last few years has brought to light certain difficulties. Some of the older fields have begun to give oil at reduced rates and to rely increasingly on the expensive injection of water which is not always available in sufficient quantities. A more important handicap lies in the high wax content which outweighs the advantage of a low sulphur content in that it makes expensive refining necessary. At present, China's refining capacities lag behind the steep increase in production so that large quantities have to be used as raw fuel, a rather wasteful form of a resource which, unlike food, cannot be reproduced year after year. Japanese refineries are not geared to dealing with oil of a high wax content. Large-scale investment will thus become necessary in either Japan as the importer of raw fuel or in China as the supplier of a refined rather than raw product.

In time, the wealth locked in China's hydrocarbons will make possible the development of large petrochemical industries. The path from energy in general to oil and eventually to petrochemicals is clearly marked out. Even today, separation methods, thermal and catalytic cracking, distillation, polymerisation and other processes are in use in China. However, the cost of developing fully a modern petrochemical industry can be prohibitive, and foreign participation will be even more essential here than in other sectors. At present, the rest of the industrial economy is hardly geared to matching an oil industry whose growth rate exceeds 10 per cent a year. In future, the oil and petrochemical industries may well require at least a quarter of the nation's capital investment—much of it in the form of foreign exchange. They will thus be in competition with the claims of farming and defence. The rivalry may become fierce at times and it may involve political personalities and factions at present bent on achieving internal order and party unity. Judging by the prominence given by the Chinese media to the need to continue the fight against the 'gang of four', major political conflicts over issues and

personalities have yet to be resolved. Only in a period of stability and balanced growth can decisions of momentous importance be reached coolly and rationally. There will thus be little room for struggles between opposing lines if the main sources of China's wealth, such as food and fuel, are to be developed side by side in a state of coexistence rather than a climate of antagonism such as the country has had to endure in recent years.

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FOREIGN POLICY MAKING, JAPANESE STYLE*

Akio Watanabe

TO the Japanese, politics means before anything else accommodation. What is most required of political leaders in their society is not the power to decide but the power to compromise, or rather, to make people compromise. Indeed, the notion of 'decision making' is quite foreign to them, in so far as it presupposes analytically-minded, rational individuals. There seem to be two reasons for this. First, it is difficult for an ordinary Japanese to think that one can achieve self-containment without belonging to a group, that is to say, to the social unit most relevant to him in a given situation. This unit is, in his eyes, 'individual' in the sense that it cannot be further divided into meaningful units. Secondly, given that, he tends to treat his social (and perhaps also physical) environment in its entirety rather than to regard it as something that can be analysed. In other words, he tries to achieve accommodation to his environment by lessening possible tension with it instead of attempting to control it, first by analysing it into components and then by bringing about a change in the arrangement of those components.

The notion of policy which is most natural to the Japanese is, therefore, something which simply flows or evolves rather than something that is made. It would then be extremely difficult to identify those individuals who are really responsible for having started and regulated the flow of policy. An excellent illustration of this was provided by the failure of the Tokyo International Military Tribunal to pin down precisely who were war criminals. Historians seem to be still suffering from similar difficulties, as shown by the recent inconclusive debate, between Professor Charles Sheldon, of Cambridge University, and Professor Kiyoshi Inoue, of Kyoto University, over the problem of the Emperor's responsibility for the war.[1]

To emphasise the group characteristics of Japanese social behaviour is not, however, to suggest that Japan's political system is monolithic in nature. On the contrary, it is thoroughly pluralistic. With the gradual decline of the hitherto dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the emergence of new political forces such as Mr. Kono's New Liberal Club, Mr. Eda's Socialist Union of Citizens and a rather obscure group called the Union of Progressive Liberals, it is becoming more

* This article is based on a paper read at a Chatham House Study Group on Foreign Policy Choices to 1980 on June 16, 1977.

[1] *Shokun*, March, April and May 1977.

pluralistic than ever before. As the following discussion will show, the political proliferation will have deeper implications for Japanese policy making in the future than the mere number of political parties may suggest. Given the traditional emphasis upon accommodation, the proliferation of political actors means a still heavier burden for Japanese leaders seeking 'accommodation' and 'consensus' (*hanashiai* and *ayumiyori*), which is an enormously painstaking and laborious process even under the rule of the dominant Liberal Democrats.

At this point it may be useful to give a brief account of Japanese economic and fiscal policies during 1976–77. Although not foreign policy issues in the traditional sense, these policies were debated in the knowledge that opinion abroad, especially in the United States and Western Europe, was urging Japan to fulfill its 'international responsibility' in the economic and financial field.[2] At the same time, domestic politics were becoming increasingly fluid because of the deep split in the ruling party made by the Lockheed scandal and also because of the disappointing—from the government's point of view—results of the general election held at the end of 1976. Moreover, the economy seemed to remain somewhat sluggish in spite of the rather optimistic official forecasts. These and other events helped to make the government more vulnerable to domestic pressures. It would therefore be worth finding out how all these factors, internal and external, were perceived and translated into policy decisions by the Japanese leaders.

The budget policy debate of 1976–77

A convenient starting point is the Cabinet meeting on July 30, 1976, which approved a report of the Advisory Council on the Financial System recommending that balanced financing should be the basic principle of the state budget for the coming fiscal year. (Government agencies have to submit their preliminary estimates by the end of August.) This report obviously reflected the strongly held views of the Ministry of Finance. But the budget finally passed by the Diet on March 9, 1977, included a cut in income tax of 653,000 million yen, an amount far greater than what the Finance Ministry officials regarded as tolerable. Furthermore, the government had to abandon its aim of a balanced budget and rely substantially on borrowing to expand public investment. This represented a significant victory for the opposition

[2] This is attested, for example, by the fact that a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Finance spared no pains to explain twice during this period to foreign audiences the government's position on economic and financial questions. Fujioka Masao, *Japan's Balance of Payments and Exchange Rate Problems* (pamphlet issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). 'Japan's Role in World Economy—Further Promotion of International Co-operation', Feb. 1977 (Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines, March 1977). The author is Director-General of the International Finance Bureau, Ministry of Finance.

parties, not only because their demand for a one billion yen tax cut was partially satisfied, but, what was even more important, because this was the first time since the Liberal Democrats came to power in 1955 that the Diet had successfully exercised its power to revise the government's budget proposals.

Some of the government's decisions during this period should be borne in mind, although not directly related to the budget debate. They include the adoption in November 1976 of the Seven-Point Measures for the Promotion of Business Recovery, some of which were later embodied in a supplementary budget (354,000 million yen) with public utility projects and housing as its major components; the decision on March 12, 1977, to reduce the official discount rate to 6 per cent, and then on April 19 to 5 per cent; and the apparent reluctance of the Bank of Japan to intervene in the Tokyo foreign exchange market to maintain the rate of the yen in the seeming crisis during the early months of 1977.

An outstanding characteristic of the domestic debates on these issues was that they were carried on under the pressure of foreign opinion. As a *Sankei* editorial put it on April 20: ' Recently, we keenly feel the strength of the wind from abroad against our country . . . it must be the first experience for many Japanese people to feel such increasing " external pressure " ' (translation by the American Embassy in Tokyo). In more concrete terms, this ' external pressure ' included the representations made on three prime ministerial visits abroad (Mr. Miki to Puerto Rico in June 1976, and Mr. Fukuda to Washington in March and to London in May 1977); allegations by some influential leaders of opinion abroad that the Japanese government was manipulating the exchange rate of the yen in order to improve Japan's balance of payments; repeated friction in the country's trade relations with the United States and the EEC countries, reports about which flooded into the country through the mass media; and some of the decisions and policy announcements made in Washington and Bonn ostensibly in order to boost the world economy.

One of the earliest signs of the Finance Ministry's defeat was a shift in balance between the Ministry of International Trade and Finance (MITI) and the Economic Planning Agency on the one hand, and the Finance Ministry and Bank of Japan on the other. The Finance Ministry held that in view of some healthy signs in the business world which coexisted with the slowing down of exports, the economy was recovering satisfactorily but was relying more on internal demand than on the expansion of exports; no positive measures to stimulate the economy were therefore necessary. The Bank of Japan, which regards itself as the custodian of commodity prices, also took a negative line on the reduction of the official discount rate, tax cuts and the floating of

government bonds. From about August, however, the tide began to turn in favour of the MITI, whose views naturally reflected the more gloomy outlook of domestic industry. The Economic Planning Agency originally adopted a half-way position, but gradually moved towards the MITI. The actual trends in the Japanese economy, at home and abroad, seemed to support the MITI's view that positive steps to expand demand were urgently necessary.

These bureaucratic politics were complicated by personal rivalry between the Finance Minister, Mr. Ohira, whose hostility to the Prime Minister, Mr. Miki, had become more noticeable, and Mr. Komoto, the Minister for International Trade and Industry, who was Mr. Miki's right-hand man. Mr. Fukuda, as Minister for the Economic Planning Agency and Chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy, was able virtually to oversee the whole of the government's economic policy. All these politicians were exercised by two issues: the forthcoming general election and the struggle within the LDP over the presidency of the party. On the country's economic problems they certainly did not lack informed advice. The Council of Economic Affairs, an advisory body for the Prime Minister, composed of economists, commentators and consumers' representatives with Mr. Kikawada of the influential *Keizai Doyukai* as chairman, strongly criticised, at a meeting attended by Mr. Fukuda, the ineptitude of the government's view of the economy. Academic economists also joined in the critical chorus. At the same time the mission of *Keidanren* (Federation of Economic Organisations) to Europe and the subsequent criticism of Japan's trade behaviour gave weight to the argument that it was necessary to expand effective demand by positive fiscal and monetary policies, not only from the point of view of domestic industry but also from that of international trade.

These various pressures began to force the government away from its original policy of tight money and a balanced budget. At a Cabinet meeting on October 22, Mr. Ohira, faced with the demands of election-minded colleagues, admitted that it was necessary to modify the government's (i.e. the Finance Ministry's) perception of the economic situation. Elsewhere, Mr. Fukuda hinted vaguely about the possibility of reducing the discount rate. (It was the reduction in discount rate made by the United States and some other countries that eventually made the Japanese follow suit in March 1977.) Then came the announcement on November 12 of the rather overdue Seven-Point Measures for the Promotion of Business Recovery. Particularly fatal to the Finance Ministry's cause was the fact that the Big Three of the ruling party (Chairman of the Executive Council, President of the Policy Research Council and Secretary-General of the party) all opposed it.

That, however, was only the end of Act One of the drama. During the interval the elections were held and the government gained only a bare majority in the House of Representatives. Mr. Miki handed over to Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Ohira became Secretary-General of the LDP. The dominant theme of Act Two was the question of tax cuts. With the majority in the pivotal House Budget Committee lost to a coalition of the opposition parties, the government was bound to fight a losing battle. (Both the untimely death of the former Finance Minister, Mr. Mizuta, and the inability of Mr. Hatoyama, the new Foreign Minister, to persuade his own son, who had recently been elected to the Diet, to join the LDP, contributed to this unprecedented situation.) Faced with the election results, the Finance Ministry brought itself to propose a 353,000 million yen cut in income tax. But although by no means an insignificant gesture, this was far from satisfying even the most moderate elements in the opposition camp.

While in the Diet the politicians engaged in debates of which nobody knew what the outcome would be, outside a number of groups were actively expounding their views. A wide range of economists seemed to favour a substantial cut in taxes, although on a variety of grounds. Business leaders were divided: Mr. Doko of *Keidanren*, for instance, was more interested in a low discount rate than in tax cuts, while Mr. Nagano of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, was unreserved in his support for significant tax cuts. The labour unions also played an interesting role in the debates. *Sohyo*, the largest of them, mindful of the criticism that the unions' traditional campaign for higher wages benefited primarily the organised workers in the larger firms, decided to make tax cuts a 'national' issue in the expectation that if successful this would bring far-reaching benefits to the public as a whole. Throughout the political debate on tax cuts, the unions continued to exert pressure on the government while trying to bring the disparate opposition groups into line with one another. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the unions' new emphasis on taxation policy was accompanied, consciously or unconsciously, by a more moderate position than ever before on the issue of higher wages.

Meanwhile on the political stage Mr. Ohira was busily engaged in painstaking *hanashiai* with his opposite numbers in the other parties. At the same time he had to deal not only with Finance Ministry officials, who could not forget that he had so recently been head of their own ministry, but also with officials in his own party, who were openly criticising his 'bureaucratic' doggedness which, they thought, was the real bottleneck blocking *ayumiyori*. Finally, after two days of terribly complicated and laborious negotiations on March 8 and 9, a compromise emerged and an additional 300,000 million yen was lopped

off the income tax, thus making a total cut in income tax of 653,000 million yen, as against the opposition's target of one billion yen.

Who gained what in this game of compromise? Apparently, Mr. Ohira intended to trade a substantial tax cut for the opposition's acquiescence in a face-saving arrangement which would allow the government to make the necessary adjustments without formally revising the budget. But these tactics did not fare very well because of the opposition groups' unanimous determination to give special priority to their right to revise the budget as well as to secure an additional tax cut. What really mattered to them was not so much an additional tax cut as whether they would at last manage to break 'an inviolable sanctuary' in budget policy making. Finally, it must be remembered that the government was in a vulnerable position because for diplomatic reasons it was considered essential to settle the matter before March 19, the date set for the Prime Minister's departure for Washington.

When, as in Japan, accommodation is a highly valued part of the political system, a crucial problem in policy making is to make sure that *all legitimate participants* are properly consulted. The more interested parties there are, the more time-consuming and complicated the process of reaching decisions becomes. This is perhaps the case with any government when issues are complex and have manifold ramifications.[3] In a society like Japan, however, the problem is made worse by the concurrent emphasis on consensus rather than majority rule. In other words, an ideal model of decision making for the Japanese is one in which (a) as many people as possible are duly consulted (*hanashiai*) and (b) not a single dissentient voice remains at the time of the final decision (*ayumiyori*).

Policy making over currency revaluations

It is of course impossible to meet these requirements completely. One of the devices which the Japanese have invented to solve (or mitigate) this problem is a dominant party system which has successfully, at least until recently, limited the 'ins' (i.e. the legitimate participants in policy making). In the first place, this system has relieved the Japanese leaders partly, if not completely, of the chronic question of legitimacy. In the prewar system no person or group was any more legitimate than any other because they were all supposed to be 'equal' before the theoretical supremacy of the Emperor who was, however, powerless in the practical world of politics. Nowadays the system provides a point of convergence in the person of the Prime Minister whose authority is ultimately based on the power of a party which

[3] P. A. Reynolds, *An Introduction to International Relations* (London: Longman, 1971; reprinted 1973), p. 164.

commands a majority in the popularly-elected parliament. The system also has the effect of shielding the bureaucracy, the pillar of the policy-making system, from the pressure of a variety of particular interests which might otherwise be almost insupportable. But even under this seemingly exclusive system it has not been easy for Japanese policy makers to reach consensus because all party politicians are inclined to regard themselves as 'legitimate participants' in the government's decision making. (Any item on the agenda of a Cabinet conference must be approved by the party's executive council before it goes to the Cabinet.) Moreover, even members of the opposition should, whenever appropriate, be consulted. A likely punishment for failing to do this is an uproar in the Diet and criticism by the media of 'the tyranny of the majority'.

The problems met with in this type of policy-making process can be made clearer by observing how it worked (or failed to work) in totally different circumstances from those described above—in the decision making over currency revaluations.[4] The technical and secret nature of the issue made it imperative to limit the number of those involved. In other words, to be effective a decision had to be both swift and secret.

Phase One—the failure of 'Operation Alpha' (November 1969 to June 1970)

In the autumn of 1969, a four-member working team was formed within the Ministry of Finance. Mr. Hayashi, a senior official in the Ministry's Secretariat and head of the team, had been able to observe West Germany's revaluation in March 1961 at first hand when serving in the Japanese Embassy in Bonn. Deeply impressed by the imaginative and decisive measures taken by the Germans, Hayashi had carried out a careful study of the subject on his return to Tokyo in anticipation of the day when Japan might find itself in a similar situation. The moment seemed to be approaching in September 1969 when he could foresee, on the basis of his own data, a continuing trend of increases in the favourable balance of payments, accompanied—unlike as in Japan's earlier experience—by some signs of excessive expansion of business at home. In this novel situation, the most appropriate measure, Hayashi thought, would be not a conventional policy of tight money but an imaginative policy of revaluation on the West German model. But in those days to speak of revaluation meant trying to break 'an inviolable sanctuary', i.e. the fixed rate of one dollar for 360 yen which for so

[4] The following description of this event is largely based on a personal account by Hayashi Daizo, which appeared in series in *Kinyu zaisei jijo*, Jan. 31–March 7, 1977. Mr. Hayashi is a former official of the Finance Ministry and was personally involved in the decision making over Japan's revaluation.

long had been the basic assumption of all Japan's economic and financial policy.

Thus the matter needed very careful and tactful handling. Hayashi's first task was to build a consensus within the Finance Ministry without arousing unnecessary suspicion and objections. With this in mind, he decided to set up the four-man working team with the permission of his direct superior, the Director of the Ministry's Secretariat. The process of consensus building began with a briefing for the Director himself on November 12. The next step was a similar briefing for another (unspecified) high-ranking official on the 22nd. Then on December 19 five top officials, including Hayashi, had a meeting. At each stage there was careful deliberation about who should be consulted next. The last meeting was not held in the Ministry, so as to secure greater secrecy.

No clear-cut decision, however, emerged from these meetings. The most interesting among the objections raised to revaluation was a political one. According to this view, in taking a decision on revaluation it would not be possible, for obvious reasons, for the Ministry to follow the ordinary procedure whereby it first feels the pulse of the public through the media and, if well received, proceeds to build a consensus among political and business leaders, finally concluding the matter through the formal channels of policy making. But if the government, that is, in this case, the Ministry of Finance, takes a decision without following this ' normal ' procedure—so the argument ran—then *the entire responsibility would inevitably fall on the government alone.* While the Finance Ministry was still undecided whether the rather shaky government leadership could afford such risks, the government's weakness was exposed to view by the obvious strains in the relationship between Mr. Sato, the Prime Minister, and Mr. Fukuda, the Finance Minister, over the problem of the succession. With this development, Hayashi concluded that any chance of success Operation Alpha might have had was gone.

Phase Two—the policy of drift and the floating of the yen (August 1971)

In the meantime, pressure for revaluation had been mounting outside Japan. It culminated in the shock administered by Nixon on August 15, 1971. When a handful of officials of the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Japan gathered to decide what response to make, Hayashi urged that Tokyo should close its foreign exchange market on condition that the markets in the European capitals also closed. But the meeting was dominated by the opinion of the foreign exchange ' experts ' who still hung firmly on to the sacred formula of one dollar for 360 yen. As a result, the Tokyo market alone remained open, and for the next eleven days the Bank of Japan was kept busy buying the dollars which flooded

in. It was only on August 28 that the failure of this policy was at last admitted and the yen was allowed to float. As Hayashi put it, 'Japan drifted towards revaluation at the mercy of the wind of external pressure as she once had drifted towards war in the 1930s. Only the grim reality of defeat could stop floating.'

One of the unfortunate aspects of this policy of drift was an eruption of anti-American feeling among the public who regarded revaluation as detrimental to the national interest simply because it was imposed on them by a foreign (particularly American) government. This, together with the unavoidable reaction of export-oriented industrialists, helped the old myth of a fixed rate to survive after it had ceased to be appropriate.

Phase Three—has Japan learned a lesson? (June 1972 to February 1973)

On June 24, 1972, the Tokyo foreign exchange market was closed. It was the first time Japan had ever taken such a step on its own independent judgment. The initiative was taken by Hayashi after learning that the British government was about to float sterling. He held back the news about sterling for about half an hour until the market had closed for the day. He then obtained the approval of the Permanent Secretary of the Finance Ministry (Mr. Hatoyama, the present Foreign Minister) who instructed him to call on the Finance Minister, Mr. Aichi, at his home. Hatoyama himself turned up at the meeting, and between them he and Hayashi successfully persuaded the Minister to agree to close the exchange market. Their decision was announced early the next morning. Five days later the market was reopened without much confusion. This experience established a precedent for closing the exchange market whenever the government deemed it expedient to do so.

About this time Hayashi was promoted to be Director-General of the International Finance Bureau. During his year's tenure of this post he dealt with a number of issues, such as the second floating of the yen (February 1973) and the completion of the liberalisation of foreign investment (April 1973) in close co-operation with Mr. Aichi and a small group of officials. According to Hayashi, the decision of February 10 on revaluation was taken personally by Mr. Aichi who overruled his permanent officials. Hayashi himself was in the awkward position of being told to brief his Minister on official views with which he did not agree. He solved this dilemma by vaguely hinting at his own different views in his brief to the Minister. If it had not been for the intimate relationship that had been established over the previous months between Aichi and Hayashi, it might have been very difficult for the Minister, although himself an expert on the subject, to take a

decision with reasonable confidence. This was probably a classic case of 'crisis management' made possible by overcoming bureaucratic inertia. (It is said that on more than one occasion Mr. Aichi told Hayashi that he would not mind being stabbed if only he could carry out a revaluation. One need not, of course, take this as more than a rhetorical expression of his resolution. But his anxiety over this issue may well have contributed to his sudden death on November 23, 1973.)

Problems of Japanese policy making

It would obviously be a mistake to draw any hasty conclusions from a limited number of examples, especially as the pattern of decision making is bound to vary from case to case according to such variables as the personal traits of the participants, the number and nature of the organisations involved, the type and salience of the issues and the degree of preparedness of the decision makers in terms both of time and information.[5] However, it may be not only permissible but also desirable to point out some of the important problems attending the policy-making process which arise mainly from the characteristics of Japanese society in general and the country's political system in particular.

1. *The nature of leadership.* It is almost a commonplace to say that Japanese organisations lack strong and dynamic leadership at the top. Hence arose the legend about Katsu Kaishu, a man of humble origin who was promoted by virtue of his ability to the secretaryship for the navy of the Tokugawa shogunate. On his return from the historic voyage across the Pacific to the United States, he appeared before senior officials at Edo castle and in reply to repeated questions about the differences between Japan and the United States, said that he had seen only one significant difference: 'In their country people at the top appear to be very clever'. It seems, however, that 'structural' rather than individual variables are responsible for this in the sense that the very nature of Japanese society, with its characteristic emphasis on consultation and accommodation, requires a certain type of leadership. A Japanese leader must be able to put the right man in the right place and then let him have free play without destroying harmonious and efficient teamwork. In other words, he is expected to be an educator (in the original sense of the word) and manager rather than a decision maker and ruler. Mr. Sato was a good example of this type of leadership, particularly in his handling of the Okinawa reversion. On the other hand, his lack of decisive leadership—the other side of the coin—was

[5] For an interesting case study on Japan's decision making during the oil crisis which may be regarded also as an 'informative crisis', see Kenneth I. Juster, 'Foreign Policy-Making during the Oil Crisis', *Japan Interpreter*, Winter 1977, pp. 293–312.

among the most crucial factors making the textile wrangle of 1969–71 with the United States an especially unhappy event. These examples show that Japanese-type leadership is most effective where there is no serious disagreement about the goals to be attained. But it will not work very well if goal-setting is itself a problem. In today's changing circumstances, both domestic and external, Japan has an increasing need for a different, bolder, type of leadership. The initial public enthusiasm for Mr. Tanaka can be partly explained by the longing for this kind of leadership, although it ended in a terrible disappointment.

2. *The role of the bureaucracy.* An indispensable complement to the type of leadership described above is 'good followership'. In practical terms that means a high quality bureaucracy. Within a Japanese bureaucratic organisation the senior-junior relationship is strongly determined by the Japanese concept of leadership, which results in increasing the importance of the 'middle echelon'.[6] So much so, indeed, that one Japanese political scientist once commented, albeit half jokingly, that in Japan there are as many governments as *kacho* (head of division), the lowest official at the administrative level. It would certainly be an over-simplification to say that the Japanese policy-making process is characterised by a bottom-to-upwards flow, while, say, in its American counterpart a top-to-downwards flow of communication is dominant. Related to this is the question whether *ringisei* is unique to Japanese organisations. One might argue that it is merely a Japanese variety of bureaucratic clearance system.[7] But without exaggeration one may safely say that in most Japanese organisations freer use is being made of 'initiatives from below' than in their counterparts in many other societies. I do not take the view that this practice means that Japan is backward in modernisation compared with Western institutions. Like most human institutions, it has both merits and demerits. One obvious merit is that once a decision is taken, its implementation is quick and smooth. It may also be useful in improving organisational morale. To its adverse side we will return.

3. *Political interference.* One frequent criticism of the Japanese political process is its 'closedness'. In my view, however, the opposite —'diffusedness'—is closer to the truth. By that I mean blurred distinctions between core decision makers (Cabinet ministers and

[6] This thesis is well developed in Chihiro Hosoya, 'Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making System in Japan', *World Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 3, April 1974, pp. 353–369.

[7] See, for an example of this line of argument, Albert Craig, 'Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects of Government Bureaucracy' in Ezra Vogel, ed., *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 3-32. *Ringisei* is the practice whereby opinions are siphoned off from lower officials who are actually dealing with particular questions. This is usually done by circulating a set form of papers (called *ringisho*) to all the officials involved, starting from the bottom and finally reaching the top.

government officials) on the one hand and proximate decision makers (party officials and back-benchers) on the other. Institutionally, this is reflected in the procedure by which policy issues are discussed at party meetings at various levels before they go to the Cabinet and finally the Diet. At every stage government officials must attend and explain their proposals. At the top Cabinet ministers and key party officials (the Big Three) are so closely linked that it is impossible to tell exactly which side is more influential. This is vividly demonstrated by the importance of the ruling party's Secretary-General who is invariably given priority over most Cabinet ministers. Party officials are also able to scrutinise bureaucratic policies in ad hoc (but not infrequent) meetings with officials. Of course MPs belonging to the ruling party have the easiest access to officials, but opposition MPs and leaders of non-governmental groups are not excluded. It is true enough that bureaucracy is the pillar of the Japanese policy-making system, but there are too many holes in it.

What are the implications of this? First, it is very likely that any issue, including foreign-policy issues, are politicised and discussed primarily in terms of domestic politics. Often one can see little difference between political parties and interest groups because both are mainly concerned with the articulation (not aggregation) of parochial or sectional interests. Consequently, government policy on, say, the import of Australian beef, could well be decisively influenced by the attitude of a powerful MP whose constituency is heavily dependent on stock breeding. There is no answer to this problem to be found in any abstract concept of the national interest. What is needed is a consistent food and agriculture policy. Another and more immediate consequence of political interference is the extraordinary pressure of work on ministers and officials, especially the latter. The situation is made worse by the convention which requires officials to help their ministers in parliamentary debates by preparing elaborate 'catechisms' for them, often having to work right through the night. It is said that when the Diet is in session officials are busy with this sort of work for as much as 60 to 70 per cent of their working hours. Not only is so much of their time used up in this way, but officials are discouraged from thinking out a long-term policy since so many of the questions raised by politicians are trivial rather than fundamental. What is very much needed is a redefinition of the respective roles of politicians and officials in public policy making.

4. *The passive, or reactive, nature of Japanese diplomacy.* 'The mediating, conciliatory style of British policy in the nineteenth century reflected, in part, the qualities encouraged during careers in Parliament and the values of a cohesive leadership group connected by ties of

family and common education'.[8] By the same token one may say that the reactive, passive style of Japanese foreign policy today is largely a reflection of the qualities highly valued in the politics of accommodation and consensus. More fundamentally, this attitude has its roots in an awareness of the limits of man's ability to control his environment or to make the world after his own design. The Japanese have never been great believers in a policy of rationalism. Their style of diplomacy has been useful and effective so long as the country's main concern was adjustment. But it will be powerless in the sort of conflict situation in which the world increasingly finds itself.

Two areas of practical problems seem particularly to need reconsideration. One is concerned with the method of persuasion. In the politics of accommodation persuasion is of great importance, but the methods used in Japan are rather different from those found in most Western societies. According to a recent study which, using a technique of content analysis, has compared the characteristic styles of persuasion of American presidents and Japanese prime ministers, Japanese leaders resort more to what may be termed the 'sincerity' and 'empathy' techniques than to the 'situation' and 'ends-and-means' types of argumentation preferred by Americans.[9] Obviously a Japanese leader cannot persuade foreign leaders and people so effectively in this way as he can his own people. Another problem of passive diplomacy is that of negotiating style. At an international conference a Japanese negotiator will more often than not defer his decisions simply because he is afraid they might be over-ruled at home for the precise reason that interested parties have not been consulted in advance. Japan's bargaining position is thus crucially curtailed. This brings us to the next and final issue.

5. *The problem of 'policy lag'*. With the proliferation of government agencies all more or less directly involved in foreign-policy decision making, the government of any developed country is now facing an increasingly difficult problem of central co-ordination. Compartmentalisation and procrastination—two of the major symptoms of the disease of over-bureaucratisation—seem universal. But the disease tends to be aggravated in Japan by the weakness of the counteracting forces in its policy-making system. Consequently, the disease may become fatal, especially when the country faces a crisis or when a particular

[8] Henry A. Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy', in James Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, rev. edn. (New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1969), p. 267.

[9] Usui Hisakazu, 'Settoku Komyunikeishon no nichi-bei hikaku' in Chihiro Hosoya and Joji Watanuki, eds., *Taigai seisaku kettei katei no nichi-bei hikaku* (Todai shuppankai, 1977), p. 349f. The sincerity type of persuasion is the one in which one emphasises the fact that he has taken it to be his duty to do something and tried his best in all sincerity to fulfill the duty, whatever results may have been in fact achieved.

policy needs thoroughly revising. The history of Japan's prewar diplomacy provides, unfortunately, plenty of examples of unsuccessful crisis management. One example will suffice. In 1939 it took the Japanese government eight months and more than seventy meetings of the Committee of Five Ministers to decide on its attitude towards the Axis alliance, and even then the final decision was by no means clear cut.[10] Although the recent experience of co-ordinating eight government departments to decide how to reply to the EEC's claim over the question of trade imbalance on the whole fared better, observers still have the impression that an element of timely response was missing. In order to improve crisis management as well as to encourage the habit of thinking out long-term and comprehensive policies, it is clear that Japan needs some powerful and independent machinery for central co-ordination, probably in the form of a policy staff directly responsible to the Prime Minister.

Policy-making systems in many countries are today becoming increasingly sensitive to domestic interests. This makes it harder to maintain a proper balance between considerations of foreign policy and domestic needs. All the evidence given in this paper goes to show that this problem is more difficult in Japan than in most other countries. There are some signs of an increased awareness of the need for reforms. But in view of the characteristically procedural nature of Japan's policy making, one should not indulge in the illusion that vast strides can be made quickly. As for the effects 'external pressure' might have on Japan's determination to improve its policy-making system, one is perhaps entitled to ask whether the cold wind is more productive than the warm sun.

[10] Hosoya, *op. cit.* p. 365.

REVIEWS

CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition 1953–1969. By J. D. B. Miller. *London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1974. 550 pp. £11·00.*

WHEN Professor Mansergh wrote the previous volume in this series covering the years 1939–52 [1] he was able to conclude that 'the Commonwealth, so it seemed to contemporaries, constituted an experiment in international cooperation that was supremely worth undertaking'. Because also it was 'an association of Britain with its former dependencies . . . in which the British element was strong, and in which the overseas members were glad to retain some formal connection with Britain', the experiment had a coherence and essential focus which in the years covered by the present volume it was gradually to lose. By the early 1960s, when official opinion first swung towards the EEC, the self-evident necessity of the Commonwealth to Britain had largely evaporated. In recent years the Commonwealth has often been described in terms either of cloying sentimentality or throwaway scepticism. Professor Miller has avoided both these dangers and provided a balanced and tightly organised analysis fully worthy of its predecessors. He cannot make the Commonwealth 'harder' than it is, since its growing incoherence is the subject of much of his analysis. But by paying as much attention to structure as to chronology he has provided an excellent portrait of the Commonwealth in metamorphosis.

His method is to identify five broad themes which characterised the development of the Commonwealth from a small group of eight members in 1953 to the large and inevitably more cumbersome membership of 28 in 1969. These are first, the dramatically changed, and more complex international environment in which Commonwealth relations now took place and which, whether considered from an economic, strategic or institutional point of view, offered members 'more opportunities for the exercise and diversification of national interest than ever before'; second, the loss of unity in the Commonwealth, the result of expanded membership and of the fact that 'there was more contention between Commonwealth members after 1953 than ever before'; third, the parallel and paradoxical growth in Commonwealth machinery, paradoxical because its use has depended on greater Commonwealth co-operation than in the past; fourth, the gradual and fitful shift in British opinion and policy away from the Commonwealth and towards Europe. Apart from the growth of institutional co-operation, the intertwining of these themes all give the Commonwealth story an unavoidable downbeat ending, and

[1] *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, Vol. IV (London: Oxford University for the RIIA, 1958). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1959, p. 227.

the enthusiasm for the expanded Commonwealth machinery becomes perplexing in the light of the fifth theme, namely the changing conceptions of what the Commonwealth stands for. For 'as the period wore on, it became harder for those who wished to explain the Commonwealth to say whether it stood for anything at all'. Yet, 'the idea that it ought to do so persisted'. Before 1953 what the Commonwealth had stood for had scarcely needed articulation since for the most part it could be subsumed within the informal family relationship and practice of parallel diplomacy; now it was in the tension between such principles as freedom, self-determination and racial equality and the national interests of individual states, and in the often uneasy compromise between them, that the new Commonwealth had to be forged.

This process is traced in sections which deal respectively with the impact of the Commonwealth on Asia, Africa and British policy, and with the development of Commonwealth machinery. The transformation began before this volume opens, in 1947, with the admission of India and Pakistan whose mutual antagonism and contrasting foreign policies rapidly undermined the conception of parallel diplomacy as one of the defining characteristics of the Commonwealth. At the same time, as Professor Miller shows in an excellent discussion of the three-cornered conflict between India, Pakistan and China, while antagonism had led both states to look outside the Commonwealth in their pursuit of international support, and therefore had complicated their relations with other Commonwealth countries, their continued membership was important in demonstrating that only some aspects of their policies were in conflict. 'The Commonwealth was thus a useful, because highly flexible, bridge building instrument at the level of the convenience of governments . . . it could be employed to maintain relations between states which had disagreed about joining an alternative body and could provide states which had joined such a body with a further link . . . between governments which wished to keep some of their options open.'

Such a minimalist conception of what the Commonwealth was good for summarises in a sense its development and dilution during the 1950s and 1960s. It enabled it to survive the trauma of Suez, which among other things split the Commonwealth and put paid to the theory of Commonwealth consultation and to any lingering British pretensions to an independent great-power capability. It allowed it to survive the divisions over Malaysian confrontation with Indonesia, over India's war with China and over the Vietnam War, and finally it allowed the organisation to survive Britain's long flirtation with, and eventual admission to, the EEC.

But if the structure and functions of the new Commonwealth were established by the post-imperial politics of Asia and the shrinking world view of the British themselves, it was Africa which dominated the Commonwealth agenda from 1960 onwards. Partly this was a result of numbers. Drawing on Ali Mazrui's *The Anglo-African Commonwealth*,[2] Professor Miller argues that by 1964 the Commonwealth had virtually become an Anglo-African association. 'There were two centres of influence, one British, the other African, to which the remaining members tended

[2] Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1968, p. 129.

to gravitate with the Asian members in particular finding themselves sometimes drawn to African anti-colonial militancy, and also sometimes towards Britain in urging moderation.' Such in effect was the African impact: for the African states, the withdrawal of South Africa was the minimum price of their own membership; thereafter they were primarily concerned to insure that the Commonwealth stood publicly for the principle of racial equality and to use the organisation to pressure Britain notably over Rhodesia. But apart from the fact that many African statesmen often revealed what Dennis Austin has called 'a fascinated attachment to Britain and a genuine liking for British ways of behaviour', which led them also to value the Commonwealth, however nebulous, for its own sake, there were as Professor Miller suggests, two further reasons influencing them in the direction of restraint. First, even when in the mid-1960s their numerical predominance was at its height, they never constituted the majority of members so that even when they were not split amongst themselves they had to 'sell' African positions to non-African members. Second, while in a sense Africa did challenge Britain's pivotal position, there was a cultural as well as a diplomatic risk to this challenge, namely, the dissipation of any Commonwealth sense of fellowship. The Africans might be the least anglicised members of the Commonwealth, but they were anglicised enough nevertheless, and if they wished to use the Commonwealth, as distinct from any other international organisation, to secure the support of Australia or the West Indies, it was inevitably the 'bonds of their shared Britishness' which they had to invoke.

The combined effect of the involvement of the Asian members in world politics beyond the Commonwealth, the African preoccupation with continental diplomacy and with the struggle against white minority rule, and what the author calls 'a slump in the imperial tradition' within Britain itself, inevitably weakened the Commonwealth viewed as a quasi-constitutional system, part of but still separate from the world of conventional diplomacy. In place of the metaphor of the wheel with Britain at its hub, the Commonwealth Secretariat under its first Secretary-General, Arnold Smith, set out to encourage 'a lattice work of mutual relations within the Commonwealth'. In part this depended on the active stimulation of functional co-operation, but in part also on the persistence of 'networks of association', at least partially proofed against political decay, the product of the imperial past and therefore all springing in a variety of different ways from the British connection.

It is to these networks that Professor Miller turns in the penultimate section of his survey, in particular tracing the economic connections and those 'within the ambit of the English language arising from education, religious, administrative and economic sources in the colonial period and tending towards awareness of a distinctive culture'. Not least of the merits of this book is the range of sources to which the author refers. In turning finally to the most difficult question of all, the distinctiveness of something that might be called a Commonwealth culture, he quotes with approval from V. S. Naipaul's novel *The Mimic Men*. 'The Empires of our time were short lived but they have altered the world forever; their passing away is their least significant feature.' Professor Miller's sober and deliberately ironical final conclusion is that the Commonwealth like, and indeed alongside, La Francophonie may continue to develop

primarily as a cultural body 'flourishing on what had been taught in the schools of Empire'.

London School of Economics JAMES MAYALL

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. By Hedley Bull. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 335 pp. £12·00. Pb: £4·95.*

THIS is a clear, succinct and judicious appraisal of the nature of order in world politics, how it is maintained, and how far a system of sovereign states—a recipe one would have supposed for anarchy—is compatible with world order.

Hedley Bull starts by drawing a careful distinction between a system of states ('where states are in regular contact with one another, and where . . . there is interaction between them sufficient to make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other' (p. 10)), and a society of states ('where a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another' (p. 13)). International order is seen as a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains the primary goals of the society of states, namely, the preservation of the system of sovereign states, of peace in the sense of the absence of war as a normal condition of interstate relations, and the limitation of violence. The common interest in these goals requires rules to provide precise guidance as to how they are to be pursued. These rules may have the status of law, of morality, of custom or etiquette, or may be simply generally accepted 'rules of the game'; institutions (for example, the balance of power, diplomacy, and the managerial role of the great powers) also are needed to make the rules effective.

Hedley Bull stresses throughout the study his belief that modern states form not only a system of states but also a society of states. He traces the different ideas of international society: the Hobbesian or realist, the Kantian or universalist, and the Grotian or internationalist. He identifies three historical epochs, the Christian, the European and the World (or contemporary), in which interstate relations clearly displayed an inter-societal dimension. He is indeed concerned to rebut Hobbesian (and Lowes Dickinson's) charges that sovereign states not subject to a common government necessarily constitute an international anarchy rather than a society. Nevertheless he recognises that that society is a fragile one and that it is not invariably the dominant element in interstate relations.

One of the most rewarding chapters is that on 'Order versus Justice in World Politics', where the potential tension between the two is well brought out as is the extent to which the idea of justice for the individual—human rights—is potentially subversive of states' rights over their citizens and so of an element of order in international society—as President Carter's initial stance on human rights in the Soviet Union illustrated. Whilst eschewing normative judgments, the author accepts that there is a sense in which order 'is prior to other goals, such as that of justice'.

Possibly he could have dwelt more on the extent to which issues of justice arise in the context of relations between two or more parties each of which appeals to the 'justice' of their own cause; that the 'injustice' of a human situation is usually more easily identifiable than a 'just' one; and that order must contain some approximation to commonly accepted notions of justice if it is to be regarded as legitimate and survive. 'Justice without order is anarchy, but order without justice is tyranny.'

Part 2 on 'Order in the Contemporary International Systems' covers more familiar ground. There is a subtle analysis of the balance of power and its modern version of mutual nuclear deterrence as underpinners of order, though a capacity to overkill hardly seems a very secure base for the pursuit of common interests. The strains on international law with the expansion of the international system are well brought out as is the folly of trying to extend its scope beyond what the system will bear. But the convenience of preserving a system of legal relationships which can inject an element of predictability and stability into interstate relations is generally accepted and its main 'achievement in our own times may be not to have brought about any strengthening of the element of order in international society, but rather to have helped to preserve the existing framework of order in international society in a period in which it has been subject to especially heavy strain' (p. 160). The chapter on diplomacy is informative though a trifle conventional. One does not have to be a Think Tank 'butterfly' to recognise that the context in which much diplomatic activity goes on has changed appreciably; G. Mattingly's *Renaissance Diplomacy* is a better guide than H. Nicolson here. The chapter on war as both a manifestation of disorder and an instrument of change is first rate, as is that on great-power management of the system: the 'Great Responsibles' as well as the 'Great Indispensables'—but how far have they shown themselves to be so? And how are new 'great powers' to be accommodated, when the past qualification of victory on the battlefield is, hopefully, denied them?

Part 3 on 'Alternative Paths to World Order' is a skilful but kindly dissection of alternative Utopian blueprints of, for example, the comprehensive disarmers, the advocates of world government and Professor Falk's transmogrification of the present system of sovereign states into a central authority of 'spaceship earth' with global planning powers to meet the ecological challenges. More serious challenges to the system of sovereign states, for example, transnational companies, functional decentralisation, revolutionary violence, Marxist and otherwise, are assessed in Chapters 11 and 12 and some proposals for the reform of the system are evaluated. It cannot be said that this Part is quite at the same level as the other two. Too many of the proposals considered are imaginative but too simplistic. What does emerge, however, is the author's concern whether the present international system will continue to form an international society with a degree of acceptance of common rules and institutions, given the extent to which its expansion has brought a shrinking of the area of consensus. If it does not, what then? He also convincingly argues that the interstate system now forms part of a wider world political system, with other political actors such as trade unions, multinational companies, international institutions, and so on, but he sees them as supplementing not replacing the interstate system.

The argument throughout, Bull concludes, 'is an implicit defence of the states system, and more particularly of that element in it that has been called international society. . . . International society today is in decline, but such prospects as there may be for order in world politics lie in attempts to arrest this decline rather than to hasten it' (p. 318).

This is indeed well said. Whatever minor reservations one may have about particular points in the argument or the occasional rather arbitrary historical judgment, this is a book to savour. The austerity and cool logic of the argument will not be to everyone's taste, but cumulatively the impact is immensely impressive.

London School of Economics GEOFFREY GOODWIN

Perception and Misperception in International Politics. By Robert Jervis. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press for the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1976. 445 pp. £15·70. Pb: £8·00.*

THE fallibility of human beings has become a matter of growing concern for students of international relations. We are reminded that those responsible for crucial decisions are subject to a variety of pressures: they have careers to promote; there are bureaucratic interests to be served; old habits and conventions persist; organisational routines have to be followed. One element of human fallibility that has been commented on for some time is the tendency to misperceive key features of the international environment, particularly the interests and behaviour patterns of potential enemies. A number of attempts have been made to explain the persistent folly of arms races or America's engagement in the Vietnam War by reference to this tendency.

Professor Jervis seeks to establish in this book that misperception is a significant factor in international relations. He demonstrates that our views of the world are influenced by past experiences, deep-rooted beliefs, attempts at cognitive consistency, as well as a desire for the truth. Jervis's method is to cite experimental evidence from the literature of psychology on cognitive processes and then to offer illustrations from the literature of diplomatic history to show these processes at work amongst decision makers. This is reinforced by a lucid presentation of the familiar argument, derived from the work of Thomas Kuhn, that even natural scientists cannot avoid the employment of paradigms, which may well diverge from reality, in making sense of the 'facts'.

So far so good. Jervis explains psychological theories for the layman with admirable clarity, picks his examples well and so manages to show that misperception is endemic. Unfortunately we do not get much further than that. The scope of the book is restricted in two ways. First, the sort of international relations under examination are those of the great powers, preoccupied with the fundamental issues of war and attempting to judge, from afar, each others' intentions. This problem of judging another's intentions to be malign or benign is a recurring theme. International relations on a less lofty plane, say within multinational negotiations or across the North-South divide, are barely discussed. Second, the only causes of misperception discussed in depth are those that are to be found in the personal histories of individual decision makers. To the surprise of this reviewer the book provides no discussions of whether certain

common situations in international affairs, say a crisis or a conference, appear to produce certain types of misperceptions, nor of whether alternative decision-making structures facilitate or hinder accurate perception. It is not enough to show that statesmen are but frail human beings who make mistakes. We need more on how particular mistakes can be related to particular circumstances. Jervis demonstrates how our 'perceptual predispositions' organise and assess incoming information, but only discusses life-experience as the source of these predispositions. There is just a hint at the role a bureaucratic culture might play through a discussion of the persistence of the belief in strategic bombardment amongst airmen. He explains the absence of a discussion of the importance of 'interests' by his belief that these do not tell us much about how statesmen perceive their environment. The foundation of this belief is not made clear.

To write on misperception assumes an ability to discern reality. This problem is recognised. Unlike similar books there are very few times when the author's own interpretation of the events he claims have been misperceived is controversial. However, it is frequently asserted, as a general proposition, that reality is a complex thing with the mistakes of the decision makers often stemming from their attempts to impose an artificial simplicity. To help minimise misperceptions, Jervis offers some guidelines: recognise common perceptual errors; encourage devil's advocacy; make assumptions and predictions explicit; try to see the world through the other side's eyes. No doubt some more critical and disciplined reasoning amongst decision makers would be of value, but it is by no means certain that decision makers who behaved like cautious social scientists, evaluating the evidence and taking nothing for granted, would be particularly good at their jobs. An attempt to appreciate the full complexity of reality can overwhelm, paralysing decision, especially in an atmosphere of stress, speed, minimal information and a cacophony of advice. Often it is important to concentrate firmly on the essentials, and avoid complicating distractions. Professor Jervis indicates in his introduction that this may be the only way to write a book; it may also be the only way to manage a country's foreign affairs.

Chatham House L. FREEDMAN

World Politics: An Introduction. Edited by James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson and Gavin Boyd. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1976. 754 pp. £8·95.*

Foreign Policy in World Politics. 5th edn. Edited by Roy C. Macridis. *Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1976. 398 pp. Pb: $7.95.*

The International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Analysis: Vol. 2. Edited by Peter Jones. *London: Croom Helm; New York: Crane, Russak. 1975. 266 pp. £7·95.*

CONSUMERS of textbooks on international politics on this side of the Atlantic, if publishers' strategies are any guide, generally prefer to rely upon a number of different books and readings, if possible short and in paperback, to provide the balance among contrasting views and issues desired. In the United States, however, the blockbuster text still holds a strong attraction, for the powerful reason that professors can rely

on students to buy a single and expensive volume, instead of hoping (as in Britain) that impulse may lead to their purchasing a paperback or two.

World Politics is a blockbuster in the grand tradition, the seventh large volume in which Professor Rosenau has been involved to reach this reviewer's bookshelves, and the second heaviest so far. His opening admission that 'the world's political processes are too complex and approaches to them too numerous to permit the writing of a short book entitled *How to Build Up a Working Knowledge of World Politics*' (p. 1) both justifies its length and suggests its encyclopaedic intentions. It is in effect four books within a single cover: one on the foreign policies of selected states, with ten chapters covering such countries as the United States, China, India and Indonesia; a second one on 'statecraft', with six chapters on aspects of diplomacy; a third with seven chapters on the 'Regional Systems' of international interaction; and a fourth containing five reflective essays on 'The Global System' as a whole. The determination of the editors to include as much information as possible within a single volume weighs down many of the contributions in sections one and three, and must leave even the most determined student baffled by the problem of absorption. We learn, for instance, that 'in Denmark the church plays no significant role in politics' (p. 419), while 'Bhutan's estimated 854,000 people are overwhelmingly Buddhist, as are the original inhabitants of Sikkim' (p. 508).

Sections two and four, however, contain some excellent attempts to synthesise the current debate on aspects of international relations, which deserve to be read more widely than by undergraduate students alone. I particularly enjoyed John Pinder's essay on 'Economic Diplomacy', with its application of the concepts of 'market integration', 'market separation', and 'policy integration' to the policies of countries in different parts of the globe. Edward Morse's chapter on 'Interdependence in World Affairs', and Charles Pentland's contribution on 'International Organizations', are also highly stimulating efforts to pull together the threads of research, argument and political developments in confused and contentious fields.

The problem of interdependence is, however, in a sense the problem of the book. We all now agree that the interaction of domestic politics and foreign policy has become at once so close and so intricate that it would be improper to study the international system without taking domestic factors into account. But once that principle is admitted, we have started down the slippery slope which leads to a demand for a detailed knowledge of comparative government and politics as well as a grasp of the broader perspectives of the international system as a whole—something clearly beyond the intellectual digestion of any single student, which demands the resources of a diplomatic service and a foreign ministry to pull together. On a modest scale, as Roger Morgan's comparative study of foreign policy in Britain, France and West Germany suggests, comparison is both possible and useful. But the broad generalisations of Professor Rosenau's own opening chapters, which try to cover the whole field from global interdependence to the impact of different party systems on patterns of foreign policy, demonstrate that even the advent of computers as a means of handling the mass of information has not yet succeeded in reducing the lively chaos of international politics to order.

The fifth edition [1] of Professor Macridis's standard textbook on foreign policy attempts to cover only one corner of this vast field. He has modified somewhat the state-centred approach of earlier editions so as to take into account the increasing attention paid to the policy-making process and to consider the impact of transnational actors and influences. The coverage is similar to earlier editions. Eight large countries are covered, all except India and China developed states. The underlying approach remains traditional, as befits a volume which numbered Hans Morgenthau among its original contributors. We are told that 'the interests of a nation are permanent in character' (p. 4); contributors are encouraged to consider 'the objective requirements of the national interests', and to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' decisions (p. 24). The chapters which follow provide historically-based introductions to the foreign policies of the states selected, updated to 1975, with brief bibliographies and short descriptions of the policy-making process.

The *Yearbook* [2] falls to some extent between these two stools: less determinedly limited in its coverage than Macridis, less all-embracing than Rosenau. As such it is to be read more for the quality of its individual contributions than for the volume as a whole, and will find its niche most readily as supplementary reading on library shelves. Its country essays relate to developments in American, Soviet and Chinese foreign policy during 1974, and to Israeli crisis management in 1973. It also contains some wider essays on developments in Africa (by James Mayall) and between the EEC and Comecon (by Peter Marsh) which range over a longer time-scale; and an oddly disappointing review of peace research as a movement by Karl Deutsch, which comes to the conclusion that we need more uncommitted experts providing authoritative advice from universities and independent institutes, to prevent governments from following their own self-interested perceptions to global perdition.

University of Manchester WILLIAM WALLACE

Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options. By Elmer Plischke. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1977. 153 pp. (AEI Studies 144.) Pb: $3.00.*

Mini-Nations and Macro-Cooperation: The Caribbean and the South Pacific. By Herbert Corkran. *Washington: North American International. 1976. 229 pp. $10.00.*

IT is said that, during a luncheon held in her honour in the United States, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was told that the top table represented personal fortunes of over $100 million. Her reply was that her appetite would not be affected by this. So with states, for no matter how small and poor some may be, all exhibit thoughts, values and patterns of behaviour that precisely characterise a state. In other words, ministates (defined as having a population under 300,000) and even microstates (a refinement by Plischke covering those with under 100,000) have an unquenchable propensity

[1] First publ. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1958. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1960, p. 73.

[2] Vol. 1 (London: Croom Helm, 1974). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1975, p. 387.

to be political entities within international and regional political systems. Both books deplore this, although for quite different reasons.

Some time has elapsed since the ministate controversy was last discussed but, despite the genuine concern expressed in these latest contributions, it is doubtful whether the question will be seriously reopened given the absence of any real will to do so by any state, or an admission that there is even a problem. But Plischke does provide valuable data on, inter alia, participation in treaties and conferences by all states, which generally show the ministates in a tolerably fair light. But this is to miss the point since the thrust of his analysis is really the effect that their proliferation will have on the United States and UN, and on the conduct of international diplomacy.

The key is the concept of legal equality among states and the right of statehood for these 'flyspecks of empire'. Some pertinent points are advanced, chief amongst them being that currently, nearly two thirds of the members of the UN pay the minimum 0.02 per cent of the budget, the total amounting to 1.50 per cent or one sixteenth that of the United States. Both political and financial irresponsibility, he argues, flow from this, leaving the West to pay the costs. Here, of course, he is confusing ministates with poor states. Additionally, while he regrets the decline of bilateral diplomacy between all states, he fails to mention that the use of the UN as a forum for multiple bilateral diplomacy long predates the emergence of ministates. He further spoils his case by bringing in the spectre of secession which, he predicts, could mean over 300 members. But, as the Anguilla crisis continues to show, secession is anathema to even the smallest territories.

What is the answer? Certainly any notion of de-establishing the principle of legal equality, or restricting statehood to those judged by others to be able to 'support' it is, he admits, 'visionary and even if widely endorsed, impracticable' (p. 120). The most pertinent answer, therefore, is associate membership of the UN and various forms of joint representation and/or association—in other words, policy options which were advocated a decade ago and which do not advance the discussion.

Corkran, on the other hand, has regional co-operation as his answer. He has written a sincere book in which he regrets that, despite the clearly apparent advantages of regional co-operation to ministates, the record is one of failure. He has also made a brave attempt to compare two very superficially similar areas, and while he does not lament the emergence of ministates, their assertion of sovereignty seems to come as rather a shocking surprise, and due, in his eyes, very largely to excessive metropolitan influence and local personalities. The result is that, despite the comprehensive amount of technical information about functional collaboration in the two areas, the degree of 'macro' co-operation implied in the title amounts to very little, particularly in the Caribbean with its far greater potential for integration.

The lessons seem clear. Not only does extreme smallness bring material disadvantage but the fact of undevelopment makes the potential assertion of sovereignty even more probable. Economic co-operation among such areas is for economic development and nothing else, and development brings competition for scarce resources and more political consciousness. It may well be that current integration theory is, as Corkran observes, too sophisticated to be of much use in analysing the patchy experience

of ministate integration. But does that mean that we need a body of thought tangential from 'orthodox' integration theory to cater for these states and territories? I doubt it: states will be states whatever their size and the strictures made by others.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TONY THORNDIKE

International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives. Edited by Yonah Alexander. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 390 pp. £12·60.*

Transnational Terror. By J. Bowyer Bell. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University. 1975. 89 pp. (AEI-Hoover Policy Study 17, Hoover Institution Studies 53.) Pb: $3.00.*

AIRCRAFT hijacking, bombing of property and the kidnapping of foreign businessmen and diplomats have recently become a regular feature of international life in certain parts of the world. These developments have stimulated academic interest in the phenomenon of terrorist acts conducted by dissidents for political purposes both within and outside a nation's territory. The basic problem with writing about terrorism is that the element which makes acts of terror comparable is the types of action performed by the terrorist, for example, the hijacking of aircraft. The reasons *why* an act may be carried out are explicable only in terms of the particular national or regional situation to which the action is seen by the terrorist organisation as a meaningful response. The only qualification to this proposition is the existence of a possible imitative linkage, when a particular tactic is used by one group successfully upon its target government, and terrorist groups in other countries adopt a similar tactic. It is possible to write a relatively pragmatic analysis of terrorist tactics and possible responses, but to understand why terror is resorted to in a particular case requires an analysis of a specific national situation.

Both the books under review concentrate on case studies of national conflicts in which terrorist tactics have been used, and ignore possible comparative or imitative elements. *Transnational Terror* looks briefly at Ireland, Africa, Latin America and Palestine, while *International Terrorism* offers more detailed analyses of the same areas. The overriding theme of this second book is national attitudes towards terrorism, and this is explored in chapters on the attitudes adopted by the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom (but not France), plus a chapter on the UN. In addition, the case studies are in theory centred around the perspectives of the parties involved in the conflict. One of the most obvious assymetries in this book is that while the Irish conflict is allegedly viewed from an Irish perspective in a chapter which dwells on the post-1969 troubles, the corresponding chapter on Britain starts in 1815 and looks in detail at the period up to 1921. The Peterloo Massacre may be of historical interest, but has it any connection with contemporary British attitudes towards terrorism?

Both books end by exploring governmental responses to terrorism, *International Terrorism* focusing on co-operative international actions and agreements, while *Transnational Terrorism* describes the United States government's strategy and tactics in dealing with terrorist acts. Both are

workmanlike, descriptive attempts to come to grips with the phenomenon of terrorism; what they both lack is any realisation that to advance our knowledge of this phenomenon, it is necessary to investigate the connections between terrorist acts carried out in differing national contexts. No detailed discussion occurs in either book of exchanges of personnel and ideas between individual terrorist organisations, or of the possible imitative element in terrorism. While readers may obtain some additional detailed information on specific conflicts from them, and the analyses are presented in an easily digestible form, the lack of any direct and detailed attempt to trace the transnational dimension of terrorism leads this reviewer to the conclusion that neither book significantly advances our understanding of this phenomenon.

University of Southampton JOHN SIMPSON

The Euro-American System: Economic and Political Relations between North America and Western Europe. Edited by Ernst-Otto Czempiel and Dankwart A. Rustow. *Frankfurt: Campus Verlag; Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1976. 236 pp. DM 48.00.*

READERS of this journal fall into two classes: those who relish conferences and those who do not. The second class, which includes the present reviewer, depends on bulletins from across the divide for a sense of the movements and agitations which regularly thrill the assemblies of the first class. This volume is such a bulletin and it reports a gathering of distinguished Euro-Americans at Arnoldshain near Frankfurt early in 1975. David Calleo provides the curtain-raiser, which claims that the origins of the Euro-American system lie in what he perceives to have been the postwar United States military and economic hegemony over Western Europe. This hegemony, he argues, has now been frustrated by the Europeans who have been too weak to replace it, 'hence the present disorder' (p. 23). Subsequent papers, none of which disagrees with Calleo's analysis, are arranged in three sections dealing respectively with the economy, security and with Euro-American society.

Susan Strange starts the economic section with a crisp though not entirely unfamiliar discourse on recent international monetary troubles. She sees three routes to order: first, greater cross-national control exercised by the United States; second, increasing national autonomy inspired by the example of the United States; third, the creation of a cross-national authority analogous to a central bank, though this, she thinks, is unlikely to be a consummation to be wished by governments before they experience general monetary disaster. Next, Wilhelm Hankel argues for a return to more rigorous monetary rules and relatively fixed exchange rates founded on an SDR standard administered by the IMF with the benefit of strong American leadership. A contribution by Steven Warnecke on trade policy sees imminent possibilities of deep Euro-American conflict resulting from divergent responses to pressures by primary producers on the industrialised states as a whole. But Professor Rustow in the next paper hopefully envisages Western Europe as a 'link or mediator between the United States and the Third World in the resources diplomacy of the next generation' (p. 107). The first section ends somewhat disconnectedly with two papers on technology. Roger Williams stresses the

need for a collective shift towards a conserving society, an impediment to which are the consumer expectations regularly stimulated by life in the Euro-American community. He perceives an obvious need for cross-national agencies for 'collecting, coordinating and publicly broadcasting factual information on technology's dysfunctional consequences' (p. 123). Cesare Merlini mediates on the ambivalent effects of technology in simultaneously increasing interdependence among Western countries while also accentuating the arms race and heightening consciousness of national sovereignty in the world at large.

The section on security contains only two papers. In the first Professor Alting von Geusau argues that nuclear deterrence cannot guarantee peace in the long run. There should therefore be increased emphasis on reducing the role of nuclear weapons in Nato strategy. Yet this must be accomplished in the context of diminishing Nato coherence, particularly on the southern flank. Pierre Hassner also concerns himself with the growing complexity of European security. Detente makes the Soviet Union vulnerable socially; strategic parity, among other factors, makes Western Europe vulnerable militarily. On the basis of this perception Hassner makes a strong case for a very highly specialised Nato, restricting itself wholly to military resistance to the Soviet Union and open to partial membership by countries with governments containing communists.

Werner Link begins the volume's final section ('The Euro-American Society') by identifying a common Euro-American structural problem in the contradiction inherent in the overall responsibilities of the state and the decentralised nature of the groups, individuals and organisations deploying politico-economic power. National approaches to this fundamental problem, in Link's view, require cross-national co-ordination on an Atlantic scale. On the other hand, John Herz plays on the role of open states as a kind of practical exercise in comparative government. They can instruct one another by their individual experiences, successful and otherwise. Additionally, they are sufficiently adaptable to pioneer particular cross-national rules and organisations. The proceedings are wound up by Ernst-Otto Czempiel who suggests that 'a strengthening of bilateral relations between the United States and the individual Western European countries can be expected in the military-political as well as the economic field' (p. 228). To accommodate this developing trend he recommends a flexible Euro-American organisational framework which might compensate 'for the weakness of the European Communities' (p. 229).

As a bulletin, not a book, this volume effectively conveys the kinds of concerns uppermost in the minds of informed Euro-Americans in 1975 and the kinds of practical suggestions being bruited about in these circles. Its concentration of printing errors (this reviewer has never experienced a more intense barrage), coupled with more usual discontinuities of style and conceptualisation between individual contributions, unfortunately make it extremely laborious to read. The return on the effort is inadequate. Contributors rarely take up one another's points. The group as a whole largely avoids the question of whether there is, or should be, a Euro-American *system*. Several contributors substantially repeat views better expressed elsewhere. And the apparent absence from the gathering of any moral point induces a certain sense of gloom best avoided by healthy

non-conferees. An interesting meeting to attend, but not vital to know about.

University College, Cardiff ROY E. JONES

East-West Relations: Detente and After. By F. S. Northedge. *Ife: University of Ife Press for the Institute of Administration. 1975. 118 pp. (Institute of Administration Monograph series 4.) Pb: £3·25.*

Probleme des Friedens, der Sicherheit und der Zusammenarbeit: Beiträge aus West- und Osteuropa. Edited by Stefan Doernberg *et al. Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein. 1975. 355 pp. (Kleine Bibliothek 56: Schriften des Internationalen Instituts für den Frieden, Vienna.) Pb: DM 17.80.*

THE Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has been preceded, accompanied and followed by an enormous profusion of detente literature. The two books reviewed here are not among the indispensable works, but they do present aspects of the development of detente in an interesting and readable way.

The monograph by Professor Northedge consists of five lectures delivered at the Institute of Administration of the University of Ife in Nigeria in March 1974. Designed for an African audience, these lectures serve as a broad introductory survey of the cold war, the reconstruction of Europe, the arms race, the Soviet-American thaw, the German *Ostpolitik* and the future of detente. The topics dealt with are, of course, so complex, that one cannot expect profound explanations in so short a book. The Berlin question, for instance, is disposed of in too summary and unconvincing a manner. One also misses footnotes (these are scarce) and a bibliography, which no doubt would have been useful for Nigerian students.

The second volume is a collection of twenty-four papers read at various East-West symposia held from 1972 to 1974 in Vienna, Prague, Warsaw and Moscow under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace. An attractive aspect of the book is the very broad spectrum of subjects discussed—all of which are to some extent relevant to the main theme of greater East-West co-operation. The quality of the contributions, however, is not uniform, ranging from a banal piece on the 'World Congress of the Forces of Peace' (Moscow, 1973), full of slogan-like formulas and embellished by quotations or references to the wisdom of Leonid Brezhnev, to a well-argued chapter by Grigorij Tunkin, doyen of Soviet international jurists, on national sovereignty and the shaping of a system of collective security in Europe. Tunkin's definition of sovereignty is valid outside the Soviet bloc, as is his insistence on the inviolability of frontiers and peaceful coexistence; his overall analysis is consistent with classical international law. Yet, he is not at liberty to apply his theories to concrete cases of violations of national sovereignty and of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, for example, to Czechoslovakia in 1968. Indeed, the Brezhnev doctrine, which subordinates the national sovereignty of communist states to the will of the Soviet Union, effectively nullifies Tunkin's conservative legal theory.

The chapter by Anatoli Gromyko, son of the present Soviet Foreign Minister, includes some interesting remarks on the economic and industrial growth of the Comecon countries and on the desirability of intensifying scientific and technical contacts with Western Europe. Totally non-partisan

is the contribution by George Fuchs, President of the International Institute for Peace in Vienna, on the meaning of the test-ban treaty of August 5, 1963. This is a good scientific article written in language that laymen can understand. Gerhard Kade describes environmental protection in the capitalist countries and criticises—quite validly—America's excessive consumption and waste. The last word is given to Alexander Kaljadin, who expounds rather long-windedly the Soviet view on disarmament.

Unfortunately, most of these articles remain on the theoretical level and fail to take into account the current political situation in Europe. Moreover, it appears to this reviewer that the attempt to talk detente while ignoring the issue of human rights detracts substantially from the book. The implementation of some of the rights contained in the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) would indeed further the cause of East-West co-operation. Perhaps it is not irrelevant to note that the publishing house Pahl-Rugenstein belongs to the 'Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialistischer und demokratischer Verleger', an organisation founded by the German Communist Party (DKP).

University of Göttingen ALFRED M. DE ZAYAS

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

The Arms Bazaar: The Companies, The Dealers, The Bribes: From Vickers to Lockheed. By Anthony Sampson. *London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1977. 352 pp. £5·95.*

A BOOK on the arms trade seems to suit Anthony Sampson's investigative talents particularly well. Here is a murky area of international life, populated by grasping and amoral multinational corporations, euphemistic government agencies, influence pedlars, both seedy and glamorous, as well as sophisticated instruments of violence. Sampson writes in the Introduction that it was his 'special aim to convey the *feel* of this business', and in terms of this aim the book must be judged a success. It is well written with a collection of fascinating anecdotes, revealing quotations and a welcome sense of history.

Nevertheless, one has to be careful because Sampson's methods determine his focus. The availability of reports and hearings on the disreputable activities of some of the major companies, coupled with Sampson's sense of drama, has resulted in a concentration, as the book's subtitle indicates, on the dealers and the bribes. It is the big, billion-dollar deals and the high politics that attract his attention. We are, therefore, not given a complete picture of the arms trade. There is little on the sale of ships, missiles, armoured vehicles, let alone parachutes and uniforms. The small-arms trade is described at its nastiest in the Lebanon in the first chapter but this bears little relation to the rest of the book. In fact, apart from the early historical chapters, Sampson has provided not so much the story of the arms trade as the story of the desperate attempts by the world's major aerospace companies, supported by their respective governments, to keep themselves profitable by expanding the market for their more sophisticated and expensive wares (including civil aircraft such as the TriStar).

Sampson is at his best when describing the efforts of the contending parties to secure the big contracts, though this comes at the expense of playing down the more substantive and legitimate arguments over strategic requirements and political relations. Of particular interest is the question of bribes. The companies were anxious to secure orders from new customers whose political cultures and conventions they only barely understood. Unsure of how things were done in these countries, convinced that their competitors were stealing a march on them because *they* did, the companies doled out large sums of money to agents and middlemen in the hope that they had enough influence to secure the deal. Sampson doubts whether the bribery and corruption did the companies much good. He notes the possibility that Edward Heath's visit to Japan in August 1972 'was more important to Lockheed in clinching the TriStar deal than any of [Carl] Kotchian's large bribes'. It is never fully clear just how much the companies, in their ignorance and anxiety, forced a level of bribery upon the customer countries above the local norm. In many of these countries an unearned commission to important functionaries acts as a sort of pre-sales tax which few can avoid paying. This is quite different from million-dollar handouts to swing particular deals. Furthermore, Sampson seems to suggest that bribery is a consequence of the arms trade, whereas the potential for this sort of corruption is there in any sales of large numbers of high-priced items. Nor does Sampson ever fully deal with the question of culpability for the trade itself. Many of his stories are about competition to meet a general requirement determined by the customer.

After more than 300 pages on the history of the arms trade, its major personalities and most celebrated deals, Sampson is at a loss for credible ideas on how to bring the trade under control. His suggestion of nationalisation is relevant only to the competition between the American companies. Elsewhere many of the high-pressure arms salesmen are from nationalised industries or are government officials. The employment and financial consequences of failing to secure arms exports are of greater concern to most governments than the excesses that might result from the pursuit of orders. Sampson sees cause for optimism in the attitude of the Carter administration. Only the United States is in any position to moderate the trade. The Americans will, however, find it far harder to turn the market down now than it was to turn it up in the early 1970s. One cannot blame Anthony Sampson for his unsatisfactory prescriptions. The challenge of devising satisfactory measures for conventional arms control has thwarted all comers. At least he has provided us with a highly-readable, if limited, aid to understanding.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Civilization in Crisis: Human Prospects in a Changing World. By Joseph A. Camilleri. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 303 pp. £7·50. Pb: £2·50.*

THIS book contends that the scientific and technological ethos of contemporary political organisation has created a 'fundamental disequilibrium' between man and his environment. It describes, often in bewildering detail, the effects of this imbalance in reducing man to a frustrated

automaton manipulated by a state which is unable to fulfil its promises of economic well-being. At the international level, the misfit is visible in the extension of a system of inequality by the worldwide distribution of wealth, power and prestige, and in pollution and other ecological violence.

Joseph Camilleri believes in man's potential and hopes that a balance can be restored between the individual, released from the corrupting influences of industrial society, and the natural laws and rhythms of nature. He sketches a Utopian world of small, organic and largely self-reliant communities founded on the 'affirmation of man's triumph over death', functioning through participation and sharing in a 'non-growth steady-state' framework with a constant population, a constant stock of physical wealth and stable systems of distribution. In order to realise this Utopia, he recommends the strengthening of transnational cultural and educational associations, the formation of community projects and non-violent resistance to existing political authorities.

Thus has a well-intentioned Christian added his voice to the many concerned with the fact that science and technology have become powerful and invidious tools for manipulation, repression and domination rather than the means to individual enlightenment and freedom. The weakness of this book lies in the tone of voice. The converted will feel no need to read the whole of this dogmatic study and the unconverted will judge contentious and inadequately substantiated statements (such as 'various attempts of governments to control inflation by some form of prices and incomes policy . . . have resulted in total failure' (p. 51) or 'It is now generally accepted that oil is a finite commodity whose supply will reach a peak in 1990 and disappear almost completely by 2050' (p. 127)) as proof of the fallacy of the book's main argument.

Change is one of the most illusive and inscrutable of all phenomena, although, perhaps, the most important. Would a retreat into the ethos of self-reliant semi-industrial community life effect the change that Joseph Camilleri desires, since self-reliance carries within it the seeds of aggressive individualism which is the cause of so much conflict? Would it not be better to encourage human beings to rethink the meaning of a rational life for themselves in order to *use* their developed intellectual capacity and technological skills to achieve goals compatible with the happiness of the entire human race? This is not to quarrel with Dr. Camilleri's ends, but with his means.

Chatham House JUDITH GURNEY

Controlling Multinational Enterprises: Problems, Strategies, Counter-strategies. Edited by Karl P. Sauvant and Farid G. Lavipour. *Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1976. 335 pp. $25.00.*

The Future of the Multinational Enterprise. By Peter J. Buckley and Mark Casson. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 116 pp. £7·95.*

KARL SAUVANT and Farid Lavipour set out to edit a book of readings which would give some indication of the dimensions of the multinational company 'problem', of the factors constraining policy makers who seek to control these bodies, and of various counter-strategies which are being

considered. Although the editors have tried hard, the volume does not really succeed.

Naturally it does have good points. A contribution by Sauvant illuminates the way multinationals can act as vehicles for transmitting business cultures, and he has interesting things to say about the spread of business schools and international advertising agencies. Michael Morris and the two editors have a good piece looking at the politics of Alcan's nationalisation in Guyana and they demonstrate the constraints affecting the company and the two governments concerned (Canada and Guyana). Franklin Root explains how American-based multinationals would respond to an international regime which restricted their freedom of investment and of trading. There is also a comprehensive bibliography of some 800 entries.

On the other hand, there are gaps (nothing of note on trade union reactions) and there are too many articles which disappoint. Some are dated (such as the one on the Andean Common Market's investment regime) and others are too sketchy to be of much use (such as the article on multinationals and Eastern Europe). Ultimately, however, the volume fails because the editors have not really defined the readership they wanted. About half the articles are too narrow to benefit anyone but a specialist in this field, but the editors also include an appendix and chapter from the UN report (*Multinational Corporations in World Development* [1]) which is one of the basic textbooks on the subject. They compound the confusion by also including the *Foreign Policy* [2] debate between Bergsten and Krasner about the extent to which OPEC's success would be repeated in other commodities, which is virtually irrelevant since the two debaters barely consider the multinational company dimension of OPEC's success.

The final disappointment is that the book leaves the reader with no idea why the multinationals exist and behave in the ways they do, and, as Peter Buckley and Mark Casson argue in their slim but useful volume, one cannot start to talk about political remedies until one understands something of these companies' dynamics. Buckley and Casson give a useful summary of the alternative theories about the spread of these companies (Vernon, Kindleberger, Hymer, Caves, Aharoni *et al.*), and they argue that the multinational is a device to get round inefficiencies in world markets by internalising imperfect markets within the multinational corporate structure. They make a reasonable case (the general reader may get a bit blinded by statistics at this point) that the post-1945 surge in multinational investment has been a case of research-intensive companies internalising flows of knowledge across national borders. In the space available, it is not possible to do full justice to this book. Certainly it has its weaknesses (its projections are politically somewhat naïve) but, overall, it is a good concise introduction to the multinational debate, putting a sound empirical analysis into a convincing theoretical framework.

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

Government, Business and Labour in European Capitalism. Edited by Richard T. Griffiths. *London: Europotentials Press. 1977. 229 pp. £9·50.*

THIS book comprises a collection of papers read at the 1977 conference of the University Association for Contemporary Studies. While the con-

[1] New York: United Nations, 1973.

[2] No. 11, Summer 1973, pp. 107-111 and No. 14, Spring 1974, pp. 68-90.

ference was interdisciplinary, including political scientists and lawyers as well as economists, the contributors were drawn almost entirely from the closely related fields of economics, economic history and business management, though one political scientist can be identified among them. The nature of the conference clearly influenced the character of the contributions. Whilst many of these will be of considerable value to the non-specialist and give him useful insights into some of the problems facing the economies of Western Europe at the present time, few can be regarded as making any significant contribution to our understanding of these problems.

The authors have been allowed to approach their subjects in their own manner. There is therefore a great variety of treatment. Moreover, it means that there is no unifying theme to the book. The reader will learn—if he does not already know—that there has been a slowing down of economic growth, accelerating inflation, rising unemployment, especially among young people. The introduction asks whether this is just a hiccough or a fundamental structural change. There is a suggestion that it may be the latter, and that the capitalist system is becoming less capable of adjusting to change. Unfortunately, few of the papers pursue this important question. There are, for example, no contributions dealing with the political and social reactions to the present economic difficulties—surely what one might have expected from a multidisciplinary conference.

Instead, there are contributions which deal with particular aspects of economic planning, either generally or in particular countries, with incomes policy and wage differentials, with regional policy, youth unemployment and migrant labour. Yet for all its weaknesses this book is not without interest. Professor Postan's survey of the European economy since 1945 is masterly. He points out the exceptional nature of the rapid economic growth of the postwar years, the nature of postwar inflation and recessions, the change from the relatively mild demand-induced inflation of the earlier part of the period to the more violent cost-push inflation of recent years. The role of wages as the major factor in this acceleration of the rate of inflation is shown and there is some discussion of the attitude of trade unions in different countries towards inflation and unemployment. In particular, he points to the failure of British unions to appreciate that a slower growth of real wages may be a necessary price for full employment.

This paper could have been the starting point for a systematic analysis of some important issues from a variety of angles. That this was not to be may not be too serious a fault in a conference, but it is a grave one in a book. It may well be that some of the papers will provide some readers with the information they require, but the unsystematic coverage means that a person seeking information in this general field would probably be better advised to look elsewhere.

University of Dundee J. M. JACKSON

Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? By Kenneth W. Dam. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1976. 193 pp. £7·25.*

THIS is a critical study of British and Norwegian petroleum licensing in the North Sea from a peculiar but interesting point of view. Peculiar

because Professor Dam examines both these 'discretionary' systems of licensing against what he considers the ideal criterion of a system that is virtually unused anywhere outside the United States. This is competitive auction bidding for 'leases' to explore for and develop petroleum, which is applied to most federally-owned and much state-owned acreage in that country. Most rights to subsoil minerals in the United States are the private property of the surface landowner to dispose of in whatever way he chooses. Only under federal and state lands, and the continental shelves offshore, are petroleum rights in America government owned—and hence on a par with such rights almost everywhere else in the world.

Professor Dam's study is not quite a comparison: he takes the superiority of the auction system as largely self-evident, and focuses on the weaknesses of the two European systems. In theory, indeed, a competitive auction could extract from the successful bidder, for the government and in advance, the highest current assessment of the 'economic rent' *expected* from any lease. This 'economic rent' would be the present value of net future revenues from petroleum that may eventually be developed there, after deducting all relevant costs including an acceptable return on capital that allows for risk and the probability of finding the petroleum. Discretionary systems, by contrast, confer the rights on the explorer almost free to start with, and only seek to extract the economic rent later, if and when petroleum is produced, through royalties, taxation, and perhaps government participation.

None of these levies after the event can be guaranteed to extract precisely the actual economic rent gained (as distinct from the rent expected beforehand). Some might have perverse effects, notably in discouraging the development of, or even the search for, 'marginal fields' that are only on the borderline of offering an acceptable return. Many governments applying discretionary systems are aware of these possible and undesirable side-effects, and seek ways to offset them. Britain, for example, employs the 'oil allowance' of annual output free from petroleum revenue tax, the 'safeguard' protection for a minimum rate of return on book investment, and the entirely discretionary provision for remission of royalty in hard cases. Full-scale government participation as used in Norway and in the latest British round of licensing (though not the 'financially neutral' participation negotiated in earlier British licences) may achieve much the same purpose by involving the government, from at least the development decision onwards, in marginal fields as well as bonanzas. But Professor Dam has no great difficulty in showing that these adjustments may still fall short of extracting the whole economic rent, or take too much; and perhaps also fail to achieve other purposes of these European governments, such as 'adequate' exploration and 'optimum' development (define those how they may).

What would not be so easy for him would be to demonstrate whether his own ideal system of extracting economic rent automatically in advance works satisfactorily in practice, apart from theory; and he hardly tries. This would in any case be inherently difficult, because the results in terms of exploratory success and development, let alone revenues and rents, occur so many years after the government collects its bonuses; as yet there is insufficient history of petroleum development from auctioned leases to assess. (Professor Dam might conceivably argue that all this is irrelevant to the government once it has pocketed somebody's best

current estimate of the expected economic rent. Are subsequent exploration and eventual development, on his analysis, any of the government's business?) Yet in practice, as he notes, recent administrations and Congress have become a good deal less satisfied with the performance of his ideal system than he remains. They have been studying various others, some of which would include features of the discretionary licensing that he thinks so inferior. Nor is there the least sign that any other government in the world is now anxious to move over to the auction system. Foreigners may feel that it accepts too readily current expectations of volumes to be found, costs—and nowadays, above all, prices—long in the future. Almost certainly they would not accept the obligation implicit in it not to interfere in what petroleum entrepreneurs may do (or not do) afterwards.

This does not invalidate Professor Dam's often penetrating criticisms of these European petroleum terms, even for readers less devoutly attached than he to the theoretical purity of auctions. There is only one warning to offer about this lively monograph. Its title is misleading. It is *not* in any sense a general analysis of petroleum exploration terms throughout the world. Its only reference to systems outside the North Sea and the United States is a thin and slightly-informed chapter on OPEC terms that seems hardly to have been worth including.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London J. E. HARTSHORN

Borrowing by Developing Countries on the Euro-currency Market. By P. A. Wellons. *Paris: OECD. 1977. 449 pp. Pb: $20.00. £9·80. F 80.00.*

ONE of the most striking features of the growth of the Eurocurrency market has been its emergence as a major source of medium-term funds for developing countries. The increase in developing countries' borrowing raises a number of problems, of which the one that has received the most attention is the rising debt burden of some of the heaviest borrowers.

A problem which has received much less attention arises from the fact that the concerns of the banking community, and consequently the banks' behaviour as lenders, differ quite sharply from those of the official international institutions and bilateral aid agencies with which most developing countries are more familiar. This is the problem to which Philip Wellons has addressed himself. The rationale of his study is crisply stated in the first two sentences of the preface:

> Despite the prodigious flow of Eurocurrency loans to borrowers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, little is actually known about how and why the funds are raised. Such lack of knowledge, while obviously of concern to lenders and interested observers, creates a special problem for prospective borrowers in developing countries: in this sort of market, a buyer ignorant of the actions of other buyers operates at a disadvantage.

Wellons has arranged his material carefully, drawing on his teaching experience to produce a book that will serve the practical purpose for which it is intended, as a source of information and to some extent as an operational manual. The first part of the book consists of a general

survey of the market, followed by a discussion of the methods by which various countries have sought to achieve effective debt management, and then a comparative analysis of lenders, of borrowers, and finally of some of the practices which have been characteristic of Eurocurrency operations. All this is compressed into less than a hundred pages, to leave room for the main body of the study, which consists of ten country case histories (Brazil, Zaïre, Ivory Coast, Panama, the Philippines, Indonesia, Colombia, India, Kenya and Nigeria). A final section looks at the role of banks in developing countries as intermediaries.

In practice, that is too much ground to cover in a single book. The comparative survey, notably the crucial chapter on borrowers' and lenders' practices, is *too* compressed. In principle, the problem is overcome by cross-references to the country case studies, but it is inevitable that with as many as ten of these some should be rather sketchy. Furthermore, accepted practice in the Eurocurrency market changes so rapidly that it would be misleading to rely on this book for guidance without keeping up to date by means of the financial press.

The fact remains that such a book was needed. To the new borrower in a developing country, to whom it is addressed, it will provide a useful introduction to what one can expect to achieve, and, more important perhaps, what is unattainable.

University of Sussex JOHN WHITE

Population Fallacies. By Jack Parsons. *London: Elek. 1977. 286 pp. £8·00. Pb: £4·00.*

THE statement that only a finite population can be supported on a finite planet is a tautology with which few would disagree. In the long run, world population growth will have to cease and no long-term growth rate different from zero can be supported. There is, however, disagreement whether the world is already overpopulated, or whether there exists a self-regulating mechanism operating not, as Malthus suggested, through the death rate, which will lead to equilibrium, or whether deliberate steps can or should be taken to control population growth.

Mr. Parsons's book does not help to advance the consideration of these problems. He parades a number of Aunt Sallys which he then proceeds to knock down with some panache. Some hardly deserve the space that he gives them: there will be few outside the ranks of science fiction writers who seriously believe that migration to outer space will provide a solution to the problem of overpopulation, and it does not need the nine pages that Mr. Parsons devotes to this 'fallacy' to demonstrate its absurdity. Not all the 'fallacies' which Mr. Parsons demolishes are so outrageous, but they are of very variable importance and some of them are a great deal more subtle than Mr. Parsons is prepared to allow. In particular, his discussion of transition theory is not really adequate and he does not even mention Ansley Coale's important recent restatement [1] in his bibliography.

[1] A. J. Coale, 'The Demographic Transition Reconsidered', *International Population Conference* (Liège: International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 1973), Vol. I, pp. 53ff.

It is doubtful whether generalised and abstract discussions of populatio problems are really very helpful at this stage. At present, some areas c the world could almost certainly support larger populations, whilst in othe the effect of population pressures is already evident. As Mr. Parso points out, at present rates of growth whatever empty space is le will in any case soon be filled, and population growth will then ha to cease. But this is not necessarily a view which commends itself to th leaders of the countries in which growth rates are at present high, witness the discussions on the World Population Plan of Action at th Bucharest conference. To the general public in these countries, th connection between high fertility and low standards of living is by n means self-evident. As Professor Caldwell has recently pointed out, fro the point of view of the individual family in a developing country, hig fertility may represent completely rational behaviour, and there ma well exist a divergence between long-term public and short-term priva interest in this area.

Nor is advocacy of deliberate population control likely to advance th argument. One is reminded of the story of the inventor who visit Trotsky during the early days of the Revolution, claiming he had four a solution to the problem of head-on railway collisions which were on too frequent at that time. It consisted, he said, of fitting a device to ea locomotive which would sense a train coming in the opposite directi on the same track and automatically apply the brake. When asked wh the device consisted of, he replied: 'But that is simply an engineeri problem!' One presumes that as a liberal-minded man, Mr. Parsons wou advocate policies designed to persuade and educate people to be prepar to limit growth rates. But such policies have not been conspicuous successful in the past. And those who advocate compulsion should pond the important contribution that official sterilisation policies made the defeat of Mrs. Gandhi's government in last year's general election India.

Mr. Parsons includes himself among the would-be population controlle He does not accept the view that individuals should have the right determine the number of their children and argues that control necessary to preserve more fundamental freedoms. Perhaps there are ma in the developed countries who agree about the necessity of control, and many of them growth rates of zero or near zero have recently be achieved. But the position is different in the developing countries, a what experience exists does not encourage much hope that populati control is either politically feasible or likely to succeed, as long as peop live at or near subsistence levels. Perhaps, Malthus was not so far wro after all!

Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, London E. GREBENIK

LAW

The Influence of Law on Sea Power. By D. P. O'Connell. *Manchest Manchester University Press. 1975. 204 pp. £6·50.*

As Professor O'Connell reminds us, 'there is no public servant with su means of involving his government in international complications as t

naval officer' (p. 179). The author has in mind in this passage the need for naval officers in command of modern warships to have clear political directions as to policy on international law when the law is susceptible of widely differing interpretations in an operational situation. His words do, however, neatly sum up the basic theme of the book: that naval operations outside the territorial sea of the flag state (and perhaps inside as well) are inevitably constrained by international law, and naval planning and policy staff must know some law and take the law into proper account. The law, in short, is as significant a factor in any projected use of maritime power in peacetime as the political and military implications.

Professor O'Connell's illustrations are vivid. He picks up the legal implications, so often disregarded, of classic naval incidents of both war and peace in the present century. From the Second World War, the Battle of the River Plate is selected to show the scope afforded belligerent naval powers when the law in relation to neutral powers in naval war affords the possibility of broad interpretation. As the author remarks (p. 39), 'the points of law . . . were weapons in the overall armoury' of all the protagonists. The naval by-play of the Spanish Civil War involving the Royal Navy is described, revealing the problems which ambiguities in the law created for a navy protecting neutral shipping in a naval war in which the contestants had not been given belligerent status. More recent legal issues associated with limited naval wars fought, as it were, within the constraints of the law of self-defence are analysed—wars fought without the conferment of belligerent rights, wars usually confined to the territorial seas of the protagonists. The confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Vietnam War, the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971: these are the author's models. They are all conflicts of which the full naval account remains to be written.

Professor O'Connell is of course happiest when he is describing the legal constraints impinging on the traditional naval task, that of using naval power effectively for the resolution or promotion of international disputes or, to use the delightfully simple rule of engagement given the British Flag Officer in the Baltic in 1918 which he quotes (p. 170), that of showing the British flag and supporting British policy as circumstances dictate. The author's real contribution, however, lies in his application of the legal precedents of naval war to the peacetime confrontations at sea so common since 1945. Limited war, he points out, requires as great a concern for the niceties of law as traditional war with belligerent rights. In this respect at least Professor O'Connell is largely re-working old themes, following up his previous contributions on the law's impact on contemporary naval operations in the *British Year Book of International Law 1970* [1] (the Vietnam War) and the *American Journal of International Law* [2] (the cruise missile).

The international lawyer will find Professor O'Connell's analysis masterly, albeit somewhat dogmatic and idiosyncratic. It is certainly highly compressed. The naval officer on the Staff College course will undoubtedly benefit, given some grasp of the basic principles of international law. As the author himself remarks (p. xiv), this is not a textbook. It is,

[1] (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1971), pp. 19–85. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1972, p. 664.

[2] Vol. 66, No. 5, Oct. 1972, pp. 785–794.

however, a stimulating guide to the rich legal precedents which can assist naval planning staff for as long as conventional naval operations are contemplated.

A work so compressed, albeit so original, inevitably leaves the reader with a host of questions unanswered. How much force may naval boarding parties use in fishery protection arrests? What counter-measures may be employed against AGIs (electronic intelligence vessels)? Are naval exercise areas really illegal and based on 'a misconception running through the literature of international law' (p. 164)? Can submerged submarines, presumably belonging to a potential enemy, be tracked or hunted to exhaustion on the high seas in peacetime? What 'ambiguities in the rules of the road as applied to carrier operations' were exploited by the Soviet navy so as to lead to the collision between HMS *Ark Royal* and a Soviet destroyer in the Mediterranean in 1970 (p. 178)? Can a coastal state lay defensive minefields in peacetime? These are a sample of the questions which occurred to this reviewer. He has only one real regret: that Professor O'Connell did not discuss the probable impact on naval deployment and operations of the changes in the traditional law of the sea (notably with regard to straits) mooted at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. One would have expected that the records of the Caracas session of the Conference at least would have been available to the author when he prepared this, the extended version of his Schill Lectures of 1974.

King's College, London GEOFFREY KINLEY

SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

The Rhineland Crisis 7 March 1936: A Study in Multilateral Diplomacy. By James Thomas Emmerson. *London: Temple Smith for the London School of Economics and Political Science. 1977. 383 pp. £9·50.*

THE Rhineland crisis of March 1936 has occupied a special place in the consideration of the origins of the Second World War. Many writers have long suggested that on this occasion firm action could have been taken by Britain and France to prevent the re-militarisation of the Rhineland. Hitler, it has been contended, was over-exposed and under-prepared. He would have retreated in disarray, with great personal loss of face, while the morale of the Western powers would have been correspondingly raised. In the event, of course, Hitler achieved a triumph which placed him in a good position to embark on even more risky adventures and his success left London and Paris divided and uncertain—with unhappy consequences for the future.

Professor Emmerson is the first scholar to devote a whole book to this question in the light of the archival and secondary material now available, and it is a most useful one. In a thorough way, he considers the main stages of the crisis from the standpoints chiefly of Berlin, London and Paris. His thoroughness is not to be criticised, but the testimony to his scholarship is a little excessive—the notes and bibliography combined amount to half the actual text. In this respect, a little more ruthlessness might have produced a shorter (and cheaper) book, or allowed the author some room to expand his conclusions.

Emmerson carefully explains the legal background to the existence of the demilitarised zone. Britain and France, particularly the former, were already coming to the belief that it could not be maintained indefinitely—though the German action took them by surprise. He paints a convincing picture of Hitler's planning and assessment of the international situation. Once he had taken the decision, however, he was content to leave the execution of policy very largely to von Neurath and 'traditional diplomacy'. The great majority of people, both in Britain and France, felt that Germany's methods were distasteful but that they were not, on their own, worth a fight. In the end, no amount of military or political discussion could circumvent this fact. If there had been a fight, Emmerson convincingly argues that Hitler and his generals would have been prepared to join in; any withdrawal would have been tactical. Once the coup had proved successful, Berlin was able to appear conciliatory by making proposals which appeared to stimulate the British desire for a lasting settlement. By design in Berlin, they came to nothing, but the danger was already over. At this later stage, most interest centres on Anglo-French bargaining, the author concluding that 'allies, both real and prospective, can dilute, as well as strengthen, the resolve of a nation' (p. 247). His more interesting speculation, however, is that perhaps if Hitler had been prepared to wait for the matter to have been settled by negotiation, as could well have happened, he might not have aroused the suspicions which his success undoubtedly kindled.

University College of North Wales, Bangor KEITH ROBBINS

British Appeasement in the 1930s. By W. R. Rock. *London: Arnold. 1977. 111 pp. £5·95. Pb: £2·50.*

PROFESSOR GOODWIN, in his general preface, welcomes this study of the rise and fall of the British policy of 'appeasement' by a leading American authority on this subject and rightly states that the topic requires the special qualities of impartiality, sympathy and balanced judgment. He then goes on to mention Chamberlain's utter lack of 'realism' and shrewd judgment; perhaps a comment which shows how difficult that 'balanced judgment' is. Of course, Professor Rock is not just concerned with the idiosyncracies of Chamberlain, though it is still with Chamberlain that his study begins. He goes on to discuss what he considers to be the meaning and nature of appeasement, its origins and early development, the motive forces behind it, its major proponents and opponents, together with a final chapter in which he considers appeasement 'in Historical Perspective'. There is, perhaps inevitably, some repetition in these chapters and the general assessment, while interesting, rather labours some obvious points. The chapter division between the 'major proponents' and the 'major opponents', while neat, is not very subtle and makes little allowance for the men who straddled in-between. Some of these 'majors' look rather minor. Nevertheless, this is a valuable introduction to put into the hands of students. It provides easily digestible material for debate and contains a useful bibliography and real footnotes to guide them in further reading.

University College of North Wales, Bangor KEITH ROBBINS

Sir Samuel Hoare: A Political Biography. By J. A. Cross. *London: Cape. 1977. 414 pp. £10·00.*

THE vaulting ambition which, as Lord Butler remarks, Hoare possessed in large measure, took him steadily up the ministerial ladder after a rather exotic wartime career. He moved from being Secretary of State for Air in the 1920s to being Secretary of State for India in the early 1930s. He consolidated his reputation by the skill and industry which he devoted to the passage of the enormous Government of India Act. He took over the Foreign Office in June 1935 and a successful tenure of this post might have opened up the possibility of a future premiership. Instead, dramatically, by the end of the year he had resigned, driven from office after the hostility aroused by the Hoare-Laval pact. He did return to the inner circle as a reforming Home Secretary and had a successful role during the Second World War as Ambassador on Special Mission to Spain. While Professor Cross very properly stresses these accomplishments, it seems inevitable that interest should still focus on that six months at the Foreign Office.

The author is not primarily a diplomatic historian, but he does provide a very competent account of the international situation which Hoare inherited and takes us easily through the successive phases of the Abyssinian crisis. The pressures on and in the Cabinet are carefully considered, though it is a pity that Waley's book on British public opinion [1] appeared too late for its conclusions to be discussed in this study. While the Foreign Secretary was undoubtedly a very tired minister, he never subsequently attempted to plead ill-health as an explanation for his faulty assessment not only of Mussolini but of British opinion. Cross does not advance this explanation either and he also rejects the school which sees Vansittart as 'The Man Behind It All'. While not overlooking Hoare's mistakes—especially his failure to insist on a special Cabinet before his Paris visit so as to be clear how far he could go with Laval—the biographer argues that the Hoare-Laval proposals were really implicit in the policy which he inherited and which he was 'virtually powerless to alter, even if he wanted to' (p.264).

Such a position is clearly tenable and grows out of one of the strengths of the book, namely the author's feeling, in this episode and elsewhere, for the organisation of the departments of state. This mastery is especially evident in his discussion of Hoare as air minister when he struggled for the survival of the young RAF in the 1920s. Nevertheless, while this emphasis on departmental structures and the constraints they place upon politicians is very welcome, it perhaps weakens this otherwise admirable book even as a study in political biography. The sources of Hoare's intense and very evident ambition are perhaps inadequately probed and more might be said about his willingness to take money from Beaverbrook. It is still a little difficult to understand why Hoare once had such a high reputation but Professor Cross's very welcome study forces us to consider this question afresh.

University College of North Wales, Bangor KEITH ROBBINS

[1] Daniel Waley, *British Public Opinion and the Abyssinian War. 1935–6* (London: Temple Smith for the London School of Economics, 1975). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1976, p. 652.

The History of the German Resistance 1933–1945. 3rd edn. (1st English edn.) By Peter Hoffmann. Trans. by Richard Barry. *London: Macdonald and Jane's. 1977. (Publ. in US by MIT Press.) (First publ. as* **Widerstand-Staatsstreich-Attentat** *(Munich: Piper, 1969); 2nd edn. rev. and expanded, 1970.) 847 pp. £15·00.*

THE first German edition of this book was reviewed in *International Affairs* in April 1970. The present translation, which does not read like one, is based on the second (1970) German edition, though the bibliography contains works up to 1975. A certain amount of new material has been added to the original text, notably some secret United States government reports on the *Widerstand*, the texts of the more important teleprinter messages on July 20 and a report by the Sergeant-Major who, by hovering round the anteroom in which von Stauffenberg was preparing his bombs, may have prevented him from setting the second one and thus inadvertently have altered the course of history. On the other hand, an annex on Hitler's personal security between 1933 and 1944 has been omitted. There has been a certain amount of rewriting and rearrangement to accommodate new evidence, particularly as regards the period 1938–40.

The book has established itself as indispensable to any serious student of its subject and a careful reading of it will demonstrate that some popular criticisms of the *Widerstand* are superficial. Above all, it brings out the extraordinary difficulty of organising a coup in the Third Reich, and particularly of doing so without the whole-hearted support of at least one general in command of troops. If only all the 200 people who were subsequently executed for taking part in the plot had done so unreservedly, it might well have succeeded! But those who could easily have killed Hitler were not prepared to act while those who were keen to act could not get at Hitler. If it had not been for the accident that one of the latter was in June 1944 put into a position which involved his regular attendance at the Führer's conferences, the attempt would probably never have been made. But the consequence was that the leading spirit needed to be in two places at once, and the delay which resulted prevented the follow-up action from getting going fast enough to have any chance of success. The senior generals have much to answer for at the bar of history but one must in fairness remember that their reluctance to act arose largely from a sense of responsibility for the fate of their country.

While the translation in general seems reasonably accurate, the change which has been made in the title is unfortunate, since as a history of the resistance the book is not comprehensive. Thus the names of neither Bishop von Preysing nor of the Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund figure in the index while local studies of resistance in Munich, Hamburg and Mannheim are omitted from the bibliography. The five pages on the Socialists which Professor Hoffmann has added to the original edition are still inadequate as a treatment of the controversial problem of the communist *Widerstand*. Nor is the book complete as a record of July 20, since it omits some of the actions of the government (as is shown by the absence of von Oven's Diary from the bibliography). It is a study, starting in 1938, of the men, discussions and plans culminating in von Stauffenberg's bomb. As such, it is likely to remain the authoritative source for a long time.

A summary of the author's conclusions would have helped to ensure that they are absorbed by less diligent readers. The fact, for example, that the total number of arrests directly connected with the coup only amounted to 700 has to be discovered from the notes.

MICHAEL BALFOUR

Fascist Movements in Austria: From Schönerer to Hitler. By F. L. Carsten. *Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1977. 356 pp. (Sage Studies in 20th Century History Vol. 7.) £9·00. Pb: £4·50.*

PROFESSOR CARSTEN'S book is the fruit of the most detailed and systematic research in hitherto unpublished material. So although it deals with a subject about which a great deal has been written by Austrian, British and American historians, it offers much that is new and important. But it is less for the general reader than for the serious student of fascism in its various forms, or of Austrian internal history.

This is because it gives a remarkably full and complex picture of the internal feuds—personal, local, political and tactical—inside the two Austrian movements of the interwar years with some claim to the name of fascist, the National Socialists and the Heimwehr, some elements of which were at times allied or even overlapping, while other elements at other times were at loggerheads or in total conflict. The interplay between these elements and their leading personalities is inevitably confusing and relationships are constantly shifting. Professor Carsten presents the confusion and the kaleidoscopic changes in considerable detail. He also, in a masterly way, makes sense of them and draws valid conclusions from them.

He makes it abundantly clear that neither the National Socialists nor the Heimwehr—nor any lesser bodies such as the Grossdeutsche or the Turnvereine—were capable of producing a leader with authority or charisma; such success as they had depended mostly on outside support from Germany or Italy or Hungary, far less on indigenous strength. Without Hitler's rise to power in Germany, they would gradually have withered, leaving political power in Austria in the hands of the two big traditional parties, Christian Social and Social Democrat. As the author puts it, 'the story of the Austrian fascist movements is really a story of their failure to achieve power by their own efforts' (p. 333). He therefore sees a key moment in the history of the Austrian National Socialists in the party leaders' meeting with Hitler at Passau in August 1926, when Hitler demanded that they should accept him as their Leader, and also his 'Leadership Principle', without question; almost all did so (pp. 146–47). Yet, as he also shows, most of them went on resenting dictation from Germany and arguing against Hitler's orders and tactical switches right up to the moment of the Anschluss, with the result that Hitler felt free to throw them on the scrap-heap and abolish all outward signs of a separate Austrian identity.

Was Hitler's determination to take this form of revenge on his native land the reason why in March 1938 he abandoned the 'evolutionary' strategy for taking over power in Austria, in favour of a bloodless military operation which had some of the trappings of a victorious conquest? Professor Carsten does not explore this question, probably—and rightly—

thinking it outside his field of inquiry. Yet his researches show how close the Austrian National Socialists came to taking over power themselves, at least in Styria, Tyrol and Upper Austria, in the early days of March 1938. Perhaps Hitler (rather like Stalin in relation to the East European countries) wanted the Austrians to owe their 'liberation' to him personally rather than to their own efforts.

The great difference of political mood and allegiance of the different Austrian Lands, throughout the period 1918–38, emerges very clearly in Professor Carsten's book as one of the key historical factors. He is able to make this point with great force because of his research in the archives of the individual Lands, as well as in those in Vienna, Munich, Berlin and Coblenz.

ELISABETH BARKER

Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg. By Bradley F. Smith. *London: André Deutsch. 1977. 349 pp. £6·50.*

THE sheer bulk of historical and legal literature on the trial of major German war criminals is daunting. A wise man thinks more than twice about adding to it. Yet, by the end of this book, Professor Smith has proved amply that his own wisdom at least is not to be doubted. Most previous discussions of the Nuremberg Trial have drawn principally from the rich sources provided by the transcript of proceedings and the prosecution's supporting evidence. Moreover, the chief points of human interest have related to the character of the twenty-one defendants who appeared in person (Bormann being tried in *absentia*). Professor Smith, however, claims to supply 'the first study which penetrates behind the public trial sessions by using heretofore classified documents of the U.S. and British governments and records from inside the Tribunal's secret deliberations' (p. xvi). His early chapters trace the tricky diplomatic bargaining which led to there being a Nuremberg Trial at all, and describe the far from tidy process by which the Allies agreed upon the list of accused and the counts for indictment. In summarising the proceedings themselves, he draws special attention to the many points of ineptness displayed by Robert H. Jackson, the leading figure among the prosecutors. Even in these familiar areas, Professor Smith's sources yield new information. But their worth is most apparent in regard to the Judgment, an extended examination of which constitutes the core of the book. Of outstanding value here have been the papers of Francis Biddle, the senior American member of the Tribunal. On one level, he and his colleagues are less dramatic objects of study than Goering and his fellows. Yet we can now see properly how, on another level, the pairs of judges from the four occupying powers participated in a deeply absorbing drama of their own, which culminated in virtually continuous secret sessions during the late summer of 1946.

The author defines their central problem as that of trying 'to reach a publicly acceptable verdict while upholding a charter with a shaky basis in international law' (p. 76). His detailed revelations about the extent of their private disagreements concerning the jurisprudential issues involved make his book an indispensable complement to such works as

Robert K. Woetzel's *The Nuremberg Trials in International Law.*[1] No one has made clearer than Professor Smith the theoretical and practical difficulties encountered by the Tribunal when handling, in particular, the matter of conspiracy and the claim that certain organisations must be deemed criminal. He also provides exceptionally interesting insights into the behaviour of the Soviet representatives. Some of the deliberations over the verdicts and sentences appropriate to individual defendants are too full of horse-trading to be edifying, and especially nagging queries are raised by the cases of Hess, Sauckel and Schacht. The author is less convincing about Streicher: was there really such a 'world of distance' (p. 203) between him and Eichmann or Heydrich? The most detailed account concerns the wrangle over the fate of Doenitz, whom the British government had tried to avoid prosecuting lest the conduct of its own naval commanders be roughly handled. It also turns out that the Tribunal's adverse findings on the Admiral were drafted, as part of a complex 'deal', by Biddle himself—the one judge who favoured complete acquittal.

Professor Smith certainly makes some palpable hits against the Tribunal, but generally his assessment shows good understanding of the immensity of the task before its members. He has steered an appropriately judicious course, tempted neither towards uncritical complacency nor towards cheap carping. This book, with its extensive reference notes, will prove indispensable to experts. Even despite the unavoidable passages of legal technicality, it is readable enough to deserve a more general public as well.

University of Leicester MICHAEL D. BIDDISS

Poland and the Coming of the Second World War: The Diplomatic Papers of A. J. Drexel Biddle Jr., United States Ambassador to Poland 1937–1939. Edited by Philip V. Cannistraro, Edward D. Wynot Jr. and Theodore P. Kovaleff. *Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1976. 358 pp. $17.50.*

IT is an almost routine practice to reward someone who helps to finance a victorious politician running for the American Presidency with an embassy. Only exceptionally such a man reveals himself as an accomplished diplomat and a good servant of his country, and Anthony Joseph Drexel Biddle Jr. was such an exception. In the 1930s, after a successful career in business and society, he threw himself into domestic politics as an early and active participant in F. D. Roosevelt's campaign. He made generous financial contributions to the Democratic Party and in July 1935 was appointed ambassador to Norway; he was transferred to Poland where he served until the outbreak of the Second World War.

Biddle made himself popular in Warsaw. He had also the ability to gather vast amounts of information, evaluate them and then draw accurate conclusions about the *réalité des choses.* He supplied Washington with perspicacious reports that Poland would eventually fight Germany and that the main aim of its diplomacy was to ensure that the German aggression on Poland would mark the beginning of a much larger war. As early

[1] 2nd rev. edn. London: Stevens; New York: Praeger, 1962. 1st edn. (1960) reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1961, p. 73.

as February 1936, writing to Roosevelt from Oslo, Biddle rejected the suspicion that Poland 'would join the Italo-German group', affirming that 'it must eventually fall in line with the British-French-Soviet combination'. In December 1937, after six months of observation in Warsaw, Biddle sent the State Department a report in which he wrote: 'To my mind, in terms of European considerations Beck's fondest aspiration is a close tie-in with Britain.' On June 19, 1938, in a lengthy memorandum, Biddle concluded: 'I should look for Poland to be fighting on the side of Britain and France in the event they came to blows with Germany.' Soon after the Polish campaign Biddle was in Paris from where he dispatched a bulky report to Washington entitled 'Pivotal Events: Factors and Forces which Led to War'. Not knowing the existence of the secret protocol to the German-Soviet 'non-aggression' pact of August 23, 1939, he observed that 'Moscow's machinations smacked of a deliberate attempt to foment a European conflict'.

The three American historians who collected Biddle's diplomatic papers are fully entitled to comment that 'Tony' was indeed a 'diplomat's diplomat'.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

Bulgaria during the Second World War. By Marshall Lee Miller. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1975. 290 pp. $10.95.*

THIS is the best, so far, political and diplomatic study of Bulgaria's vicissitudes during the Second World War. It is concise but rich in information gathered from hundreds of books written not only in English, German and Italian but also in Bulgarian, Serbo-Croat and even in Macedonian. Mr. Miller has relied, too, on personal interviews in Bulgaria and elsewhere as well as on accessible archival material. He is neither critic nor an advocate of Bulgarian policies; he explains what diplomatic moves brought Bulgaria into the German camp; he describes the efforts of Tsar Boris III to maintain at least a partially independent policy despite the external and internal pressures; he concludes by describing how Bulgaria was transformed from a German into a Soviet satellite.

Mr. Miller is right in affirming that the seeds of Bulgaria's misfortunes during the last hundred years were sown in 1878 when Russia not only liberated it from Turkish subjugation (unquestionably an act of justice), but also created a 'Big Bulgaria' extending its frontiers to the west, south and south-east—to within striking distance of the Turkish Straits. This strategic Russian plan was short-lived, but on the one hand it made the Bulgarian people grateful to the Russian liberators, and on the other hand it frustrated Bulgarian nationalists who believed themselves despoiled of territories that ought rightfully to be theirs.

In the First World War Bulgaria joined Germany and Austria-Hungary hoping that these powers, whom it considered the probable victors, would establish a 'Big Bulgaria'. In the Second World War it joined Germany in its anti-Yugoslav and anti-Greek campaign, and occupied almost all the territories within the tentative 1878 frontiers. When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 Boris refused to declare war on it, fearing the pro-Russian feelings of his people. After Pearl Harbour, however, he did declare war on Britain and the United States.

Mr. Miller devotes a chapter of his valuable book to the death of Boris on August 28, 1943. He rejects the suspicion that he was murdered by the Germans or anybody else, and concludes that he 'died of a heart attack'. When the last Bulgarian royal government proclaimed a strict neutrality on September 5, 1944, the Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria. Why? 'It now seems', states Mr. Miller, 'that the real motive was to enable the Red army to enter Bulgaria and assist in the creation of a Communist state.'

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

Singapore 1941–1942. By Louis Allen. *London: Davis-Poynter. 1977. 343 pp. £6·50.*

THE swift defeat by the Japanese in 1941–42 of British, Commonwealth and Imperial forces in Malaya and Singapore—a blow from which Britain's prestige in Asia never fully recovered—has been re-told and analysed many times. Major-General S. W. Kirby, for example, having produced the official military histories of the land war against Japan, has more recently offered, in a private capacity, his study of *Singapore: The Chain of Disaster.*[1]

Nevertheless, Louis Allen manages to provide us with a useful addition to the literature on the Singapore debacle. His command of Japanese, for one thing, enables him to weave together the fortunes of the opposing sides in the battle, and to emphasise how close to the end of their resources the attackers themselves were when General Percival took the decision to surrender to them. He also makes good use of various collections of British private papers, thus bringing out how, in the years before 1941, not only Percival but also C. A. Vlieland, the civilian Defence Secretary of the Malayan administration, was urging that in order to protect Singapore and its naval base, the entire peninsula would have to be defended. Less convincingly, the author seeks in addition to restore in some measure the reputation of the Governor of the colony, Sir Shenton Thomas (a man whose unsuitability for a crisis of the 1941–42 kind was noted at the time by Duff Cooper, who had been sent out on behalf of the Cabinet in London, and by non-official observers such as Ian Morrison of *The Times,* who published his *Malayan Postscript*[2] soon afterwards).

For all its merits, however, Louis Allen's book is far from being as good as it could have been. There are signs here and there—repetition, for example, as on page 205—that it was produced in too great a hurry, and the treatment of the historical background to the 1941 situation is not always satisfactory, for instance, in the remarks made on Britain's naval situation before 1941. Above all, the author seems to have decided that there was nothing to be gained from exploring the vital material to be found in the Public Record Office—an omission that is all the more remarkable in that the book forms part of a series which seeks to interweave 'the politics and strategy of the Second World War'. The Prime Minister's Office papers; the records of the Cabinet and its Defence Committee; relevant files from the Foreign, Dominions and Colonial Offices: all are ignored, and as a result important politico-strategic aspects of the

[1] London: Cassell, 1971.
[2] London: Faber, 1942.

subject, such as exchanges between London and Canberra and the China-United States factor, receive inadequate treatment. In this connection, the omission of Australian and American unpublished primary sources may appear less surprising, though even this feature looks a little odd when set alongside the author's readiness to sift through archives in Japan.

A similar failure to research his subject thoroughly limited the value of Mr. Allen's last book, *The End of the War in Asia.*[3] In both cases the reader's regret must be all the greater in that the author obviously has much to offer in the way of clear exposition and shrewd analysis.

University of Sussex CHRISTOPHER THORNE

WESTERN EUROPE

The Futures of Europe. Edited by Wayland Kennet. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Commission of the European Communities. 1976. 242 pp. £6·50.*

THIS book is the result of an initiative taken in 1974 by Professor Dahrendorf when he was an EEC Commissioner. Concerned by the piecemeal, crisis-determined character of much EEC decision making, Dahrendorf sold the Commission and then the Council of Ministers the idea that the desirability of creating a forecasting instrument should be investigated. The 'Europe Plus Thirty' project was launched to make a preliminary survey of the likely developments over the next thirty years and to decide whether such work should be institutionalised. The book is not the report itself but a revised and partially rewritten version by the Director of the project.

The Futures of Europe begins with an examination of the forecasting process. It is undoubtedly true that forecasting by public and semi-public agencies and more generally futures research or long-term studies had a great vogue in the 1960s, but it does not appear to have had much impact upon public decision making. This is perhaps not surprising when one considers that even medium-term forecasting has been difficult to integrate into the processes by which goals are set and resources allocated. Short-term improvisation generally predominates because of the fact that political and administrative convenience—and sometimes necessity—places the capacity for flexible response to changing circumstances far above the capacity to anticipate future problems in the minds of public decision makers. Having argued the intellectual case for integrated forecasting in compelling fashion, Kennet goes on to confess that 'Of all the areas dealt with here, the political and institutional is the least amenable to forecasting' (p. 196). Yet the seventeenth-sector cross-impact matrix (p. 76) makes evident the dependence of most of the other sectors on unpredictable politics, which is not reassuring about the reliability of a doubtless highly desirable problem-oriented intersectoral forecasting.

Kennet and his colleagues are not only aware of the dangers of single-sector and intersectoral extrapolation; they are also aware that the political process—of the EEC as well as of national governments—is dominated by short-term imperatives focused on immediate issues. The main problem

[3] London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1976. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1977, p. 290.

was therefore how to give EEC politicians and officials the incentive to do more than leave thinking systematically about the future to academics, multinational corporations and partisan research groups. The feasibility study undertaken clearly did not achieve this purpose because the EEC Commission has got cold feet about establishing even the small, modestly funded, experimental forecasting agency envisaged by the project team. The Commission appears to favour a piecemeal and incremental solution enabling it to muddle along. Concerned mainly to acquire a technology assessment capability enabling it to undertake advance evaluation of the effects of applying existing or envisaged technologies, the Commission seems to have abandoned the idea of an intersectoral forecasting agency presenting the EEC's decision makers with considered policy alternatives so that they can choose *en connaissance de cause*.

The sad fate of this imaginative proposal—even if one discounts some of the 'puffing' that accompanies the attempt to persuade—underlines an important lesson of past attempts to institute centralised planning agencies. Such initiatives meet with the opposition of the existing sectoral —and in this case state—policy makers who feel that the intrusion of such an intersectoral agency into the game would represent a potential threat, even if not in the immediate future. Although they do not usually engage in futurology, in the matter of their own power and influence they are inclined to take a 'doom-laden' rather than 'rosy future' view of competition. Only in the currently unlikely event that the EEC acquires a strong political leadership would such a body as 'Europe Plus Thirty' be likely to have real influence.

University of Hull JACK HAYWARD

A New World Role for the Medium Power: The British Opportunity. By James Bellini and Geoffrey Pattie. *London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. 1977. (Distrib. by Seeley, Service and Cooper, London.) 121 pp. Pb: £4·95.*

ANY book setting out to present a new world role for Great Britain would be ambitious; to attempt to do so in not much more than a hundred pages verges on the foolhardy. But the title of this slim, expensive, volume is misleading. Only that part of Britain's world role covered by defence matters, especially procurement, is dealt with in a meaningful way. One hopes that this does not reflect a belief by the authors that military power is the only significant element of influence in the contemporary international system. Even this single sector of activity is confined to Europe, which is represented as being threatened, at least technologically, by its transatlantic partner.

Within the narrowed confines of defence in a European setting the book has twelve chapters, ranging from an examination of the changing strategic environment, across new technologies, to the economic base and pleas for the reform of the procurement process. Of necessity, the argument is spread rather thinly. Indeed, some chapters are absurdly short—for example, 'The new technological war' and 'A European challenge' rate only about 2,000 words each, whilst 'The new technologies of conventional war' is accorded only about 1,200 words.

Basically, the book is very scathing about Britain and the British, especially those working in Whitehall. It is very flattering about France and things French. If only Britain would become like the French and *plan* the future; stand up to transatlantic influences in a truly Gallic manner, and follow the French example of increasing the resources allotted to defence, then all would be well. Perhaps. What the authors almost totally overlook—or choose to ignore—is the complexity of decision making; the element of luck in choosing the single, correct, technological option in the absence of resources to back all options; the difficulty of crystal ball gazing when weapon systems have ten-year gestation periods. Even the French have cancelled projects, or produced the wrong equipment at the wrong time, and it may be that the British record is rather more respectable than is credited.

The book is strongest, and the chapters longest, in dealing with defence procurement. Although the prescriptions, and a number of the supporting statistics, would be disputed by some, these are the most logical, best thought-out and developed chapters of the book. Even in this area, however, a series of unrelated case studies of *lost* opportunities (pp. 72–77) seems a strange method of pointing the way forward.

It would be tempting to be dismissive and suggest that this was little more than polemical journalism pleading the case for greater defence spending and the cruise missile. However, beneath the wry humour—there is even a use found for Concorde (p. 40)—and beyond the bland assertions that at times replace careful arguments, there is a seriousness of purpose that must be heeded. The underlying argument that there is a need in Britain for long-term planning, and more important, for *effective* planning allied to a consistency of purpose, is indisputable.

Lanchester Polytechnic ROGER CAREY

Social Democracy in Capitalist Society: Working-Class Politics in Britain and Sweden. By Richard Scase. *London: Croom Helm; Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. 1977. 184 pp. £7·95.*

IN this book a political sociologist first makes a comparison between class inequalities in Britain and Sweden, using as yardsticks inequalities of economic condition, of opportunities for social mobility, and of power—power, that is, to represent specifically working-class interests within the framework of a capitalist system. Next he analyses workers' perceptions of these class inequalities in both countries, basing his analysis on a careful survey carried out in 1970 in two comparable but necessarily unnamed factories: as is frankly stated, the results here are indicative rather than representative. Finally, he reaches some tentative general conclusions (prefigured on page 141 in the text): in particular, that social democracy is likely to be a transient phenomenon in capitalist societies because of the tension created by the gap between radicalised expectations and the lack of opportunity for satisfying them. So workers will *either* switch to a non-socialist voting line (' strong indications of this in the mid-1970s ', observes Scase on p. 141) *or* ultimately a fully socialist society has to be established.

The thesis has a general interest and lends itself to lively discussion; the conclusions reached about Sweden are original and thought provoking,

and for this, one is grateful; the argument proceeds by clear and logical stages. On all these counts the book has considerable value, and can cheerfully be recommended. Some questions, however, remain. For example, the general drift of the argument might lead one to expect a rise in support for the Communist Left Party, whose *intensity* of class-consciousness is greater than that of the Social Democrats: yet of this there has been little or no sign, indeed rather the reverse so far as the 1976 elections were concerned. This leads on to the observation that the parameters of class-inequality which are employed, though undoubtedly important, are perhaps too narrowly circumscribed: less easily quantifiable, but nonetheless, significant, *status* differences, it could be argued, are milder in Sweden than in Britain for a number of reasons, one of which is the fact that in Sweden the classes live more cheek by jowl (and so, for instance, comprehensive schools are more comprehensive schools). Again, the author would seem right to stress the superior solidarity and—to the workers—legitimacy of the Swedish labour movement, as well as its greater pervasiveness. But it is less than monolithic for all that: the proportion of white-collar workers affiliated to the LO (Trades Union Confederation) may be low, but the proportion voting Social Democrat is relatively high, and this can have its political consequences for the relationship between the political and industrial wings of the movement. Again, the argument that frustrated workers may switch to voting non-socialist would seem to call for some elaboration but gets none. One could continue, but suffice it to say that this book manages to be both scholarly and lively—and, to repeat, original.

University of Hull N. C. M. ELDER

Le Discours Communiste. By Dominique Labbé. *Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. 1977. 204 pp. Pb: F 80.00.*

IT is never particularly easy to adapt techniques learned in one discipline to another, and the attempt made here is not totally successful. Labbé's aim as a political scientist is to analyse the workings of the ideology of the French Communist Party (PCF), and his method is drawn from linguistics. He has chosen a 'matrix' (several key PCF texts from 1961–67) and submitted it to a detailed linguistic analysis, much of it at a very technical level, and with numerous asides, so that at times it is a struggle for the non-specialist linguist to follow. None the less Labbé's conclusions are clear and unsurprising. The PCF's language is indeed ideological, despite its pretentions to science; the function of such ideology being that it 'structure une perception spécifique de la vie politique et cimente l'unité du groupe' (p. 22). This vision of politics is essentially Manichean: on one side the PCF, leading the wage-earners and *petits bourgeois* who make up 90 per cent of the population, on the other 'une poignée de milliardaires', as G. Marchais is wont to put it. So much is evident. But what is less obvious is that this world-view is itself subordinate to and ultimately shaped by the dominant bourgeois ideology. Linking up with many leftist critiques of recent years, Labbé shows that PCF language conceals a total absence of any kind of alternative to the present authoritarian structures of French politics. Nor in all logic could it be otherwise, as the internal structures of the PCF are themselves thoroughly authoritarian (a fact which Labbé

believes to be widely enough accepted to exempt him from any demonstration). Hence the PCF project can only be to govern in the style of a 'paternalisme politique', though its leaders with their ideological language will call it anything but that. The best part of the book is in fact this demonstration by Labbé of how language is plastic enough to be used by ideologies (and therefore by politicians) to perform 'une réécriture du passé dont la fonction est d'occulter les contraditions et de fournir aux buts présents du groupe une légitimité historique' (p. 145).

Many of the above views are of course held by historians and social scientists who have reached them without the benefit of a training in linguistics; and it is this which makes one wonder at times about the value of Labbé's enterprise, especially when he concludes that 'le PCF, les valeurs et les buts qu'il poursuit . . . sont le noyau et l'objectif du discours communiste' (p. 185). One wonders what other objective the PCF might possibly have had! Nevertheless, the demonstration of the plasticity of political language is one that cannot be made too often; in addition the author reveals *en passant* a good grasp of the recent development of the French left and of the current debates within French Marxism. Linguistic theorists apart, the main intellectual influence on this book is in fact undoubtedly that heretic among French Marxists, J.-P. Sartre; and nowhere does Sartre's presence bulk larger than in the book's optimistic conclusion that human society will probably always retain sufficient capacity for change to allow us to believe that a break with ideology—even that of the PCF—remains possible.

University of Reading DAVID HANLEY

Between Center and Periphery: Grassroots Politicians in Italy and France. By Sidney Tarrow. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1977. 272 pp. £10·80.*

The Prefect in French Public Administration. By Howard Machin. *London: Croom Helm. 1977. 210 pp. £8·95.*

IF much historical writing has recently concerned the slow process through which national central authorities extended, or incompletely established, a hold over rural and outlying areas, Professor Tarrow's study poses the problem in reverse and inquires into present-day relationships, describing conditions in which officials of two modern states bring influence to bear upon central government with a view to furthering the interests of their local communities.

Between 1969 and 1972 a questionnaire of some seventy-five items was presented to 248 Mayors, half of them in France and half in Italy, these two countries being adjudged sufficiently similar on a variety of planes to permit fruitful comparisons. Professor Tarrow has used the strategy of paired comparisons and taken Mayors of communes in regions which again he considered roughly similar in their remoteness from the centre of national and political power. The answers to the questionnaire being 'attitudinal and behavioural' (p. 5), they would be of little value unless complemented from secondary sources, or by a knowledge of the legal status of the institutions involved and by official statistics where available—and the commentary on the analysis indeed makes use of such data. Furthermore, the interpretations are guided by an intricate combination of models of

centre-periphery relations. For although he confesses that the appeal of rural France first led him to undertake this study, the author seems above all interested in the methods of 'theoretically engaged comparative political research' (p. 6).

He successfully demonstrates that in a period of distribution of benefits by the state the Mayor becomes a *broker*: in Italy he has sought to fulfil this function by exploiting party allegiances and by bringing pressure to bear on the political centre; however in France—where the party system is traditionally weaker and where the Napoleonic framework of the administration survives relatively intact—Mayors manifest an *apolitisme* which can itself be seen as a response to their integration into the administrative system of the state, so that they more frequently use administrative and bureaucratic channels. Clientelism dominates in Italy but no longer does so in France, where the ethos of modernisation has captivated town and village, Gaullist and communist alike. In both countries the existence of networks of habitual contacts engenders amongst members of the local elites opposition to institutional reforms that threaten to *chambarder la combine*. These points are not new, but it is pleasant to see that an Index of Administrative Activism and an Index of Administrative Contacts (pp. 148–149) so neatly confirm them. Those tables, however, reflect the behaviour of Mayors, and it does not seem, despite the elaborate theoretical framework of this inquiry, that convincing answers can be obtained to the question of the effectiveness of their interventions, through whatever channels they may operate.

More than twenty years after the first publication of Professor Brian Chapman's *The Prefects and Provincial France*,[1] Dr. Machin now gives us what represents only the second general study devoted to the role of the Prefects in either French or English. It too is essentially historical in method, building on legal and institutional dispositions in order to discuss how they work out in practice. The exposition is clear without being over-simplified, the style crisp and often witty, and the book will be appreciated by undergraduates, scholars and the general public alike.

As the Prefects are one group of local administrators amongst others, their role and functions have changed considerably between 1959 and 1975 in conjunction with the communal reforms, reorganisations of the exterior services of the central ministries, and the constitution of the new regions, all of which have modified the context in which they operate. Dr. Machin gives a brief introductory history of the prefectoral institution, and precedes a description of the reforms of 1964, 1970–71 and 1972 by an account of the political currents that influenced the elaboration and adoption of these measures. The texts themselves are seen therefore as the result of compromises effected as the needs of a modernising and increasingly demanding society made themselves felt and were variously interpreted in the policy-making sphere. In this way the partial nature of the reforms and the ambivalences of their implementation are made readily comprehensible. Nor are the statutory conditions of the Prefects' employment omitted, the nature of their daily routine, the impact of the training given by the Ecole Nationale d'Administration since the war, or the social and educational background of members of the service. So

[1] London: Allen and Unwin, 1955. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1955, p. 370.

Dr. Machin's approach to his subject allows him to be informative not only on Prefects and regional Prefects but in passing on Presidents, ministries and Mayors. His subject also allows him to touch on political questions of the widest interest and generality: is there not, for instance, an in-built inconsistency between the aim of overall economic expansion and modernisation as understood by the national plan, and the addition of a regional dimension? And in exploding the myth of the authoritarian Prefect, the embodiment of the state in his department, Dr. Machin presents a portrait of a negotiator and legal adviser—a man who is a trouble-shooter with little real power and heavy responsibilities, subject to re-posting at the behest of the government and only accounted a success provided he can *please*. Is this scarcely enviable situation, one wonders, symptomatic of a servitude destined to become general amongst actors on the modern Western political scene?

Dr. Tarrow found that Mayors in Italy experience little job-satisfaction, but that in France they love their duties. Of the Prefects we do not know, as no such naïve question was put to them. Dr. Machin conducted interviews, but they were of a documentary kind, and this means that he knew through his contacts and acquaintance with the literature whom he wished to question and what it would be most appropriate to question them about. He commands the necessary ingredients of an accurate and illuminating study, and has assembled them with skill.

University of Birmingham M. Hilton

Aspekte deutscher Aussenpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert: Aufsätze Hans Rothfels zum Gedächtnis. Edited by Wolfgang Benz and Hermann Graml. *Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1976. 304 pp. Pb: DM 30.00.*

This set of essays on specialised aspects of German foreign policy was intended as a *Festschrift* to mark Hans Rothfels' eighty-fifth birthday. Sadly, his death occurred before the book was published, but this collection of studies of German foreign policy themes in which Rothfels himself had shown interest stands as an appropriate memorial to one of the most influential of German contemporary historians.

Hans Mommsen's introductory essay on the career and published work of Rothfels tries to link sympathetically the personal philosophy of Rothfels, his engagement with Germany's own recent history (Rothfels was the victim of Nazi discrimination, and was refused access to libraries and archives, which led him to emigrate first to Britain, then to the United States), and the subject-matter of his books and articles. In particular, stress is quite properly laid by Mommsen on the importance, as a pioneering work, of Rothfels' study of *The German Opposition to Hitler.*[1] As Mommsen points out, this was representative of Rothfels' determination, as editor of the *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte* for twenty-three years and as teacher and author, that German scholars should not ignore or forget the Nazi past.

Mommsen singles out as one of the most important aspects of Rothfels' work his continuing concern with the personal element in historical situations, and thus with the moral dimension of politics. Almost without

[1] London: Wolff, 1961.

exception, the other essays in this book reflect this theme of the significance of personality as a factor in national politics, and in foreign policy especially: for example, the roles of Stresemann, Briand, Brüning, Byrnes, Pfleiderer and Brandt are emphasised in various essays in this collection.

The essays range in time from pre-First World War Germany to Berlin in the 1960s, and the topics are equally wide ranging. Each of the contributions is a careful and well-researched study, adding to our understanding of German history and German foreign policy, but several in addition have the merit of challenging, explicitly or implicitly, generally-held assumptions about German politics and about international relations. For example, the essay by James C. Hunt on the role of German Liberals in promoting Franco-German detente in the year or so immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1914 draws attention both to the seriousness with which this initiative to prevent armed conflict was pursued, and to the significance of the German Liberals' participation in this movement, despite the preponderance of socialists among those at the Bern and Basel meetings of the groups representing French and German parliamentarians. Karl Heinrich Pohl, discussing Stresemann's foreign policy and the issue of German entry into the League of Nations, stresses the role of Adolf Müller, Germany's ambassador to Switzerland, in trying to prevent or delay German membership of the League. Alexandre N'Dumbe, in the only essay dealing with the period of the Third Reich, focuses upon the neglected subject of Hitler's foreign policy towards Africa, especially the Allies' colonies in central Africa, and draws attention to the primacy given to racial, rather than economic, strategic or politicial, considerations in that policy. John Gimbel contests the theory that Byrnes, and the American government, had already planned to accept a divided Germany when proposals were published to create a bizonal authority in West Germany. Karl-Heinz Schlarp, writing about the Liberal parliamentarian Pfleiderer in the early 1950s, and Diethelm Prowe, looking at Brandt and his associates in Berlin in the early 1960s, both offer interesting contributions to the debate about the development of West German policy towards the German Democratic Republic in the period before Brandt's own *Ostpolitik* was implemented.

Two categories of reader will find this collection of essays of special interest. Those with an interest in twentieth-century German history, and in the development of German foreign policy, will probably wish to become acquainted with the majority of the contributions—and will also find the comprehensive chronological listing of Rothfels' publications which concludes the book of immense benefit. But the book also belongs in libraries where it can be available for students of specialised topics, whether in economic history, such as the topics covered by Hans-Erich Volkmann's examination of relations between Germany and Spain before the Spanish Civil War or by Holm Sundhaussen in his review of the effects of the economic depression on German policy towards the countries of the Danubian and Balkan region; in political history (the frequent references to the role of pressure groups in foreign policy is another of the interesting general themes of the book); or in the development of contemporary foreign policy in Germany.

Collections of rather disparate essays cohabiting within a single set of covers do not always succeed in demonstrating an underlying unity or common theme. Thanks perhaps to the example provided by the integrity

of Rothfels' own prolific writings, these essays justify their publication in this format because they all emphasise the significance in foreign policy of the relationship between national interest and the force of personality.

UMIST, University of Manchester GEOFFREY K. ROBERTS

Begegnungen und Einsichten: Die Jahre 1960–1975. By Willy Brandt. *Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe. 1976. 655 pp. DM 36.00.*

In Acht und Bann: Politische Emigration, NS-Ausbürgerung und Wiedergutmachung am Beispiel Willy Brandts. By Hans Georg Lehmann. *Munich: Beck. 1976. 387 pp. Pb: DM 29.80.*

IN spite of great differences in personality and outlook, Konrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt, the two outstanding West German Chancellors since 1949, had some points in common. Both made their political reputation first as burgomasters, the former in Cologne during the 1920s, the latter in Berlin during the 1950s. Both had no truck with the Hitler regime, but while Adenauer spent the Nazi period in retirement within the Reich, the young Socialist, whose name was then Frahm, escaped from Germany in April 1933 and lived in Scandinavia until 1945. The emigré worked as a journalist in the Norwegian Workers' Party, but in 1940 had to flee a second time from the threat of the Gestapo to Sweden.

Earlier, when with the help of the German embassy in Oslo the Gestapo discovered Frahm-Brandt's activities as a courier between Socialist organisations in Scandinavia and Paris, it insisted on his *Ausbürgerung* depriving him of his German citizenship. In his thoughtful and incisive study, based on much evidence from the Gestapo files and the archives of the German Foreign Ministry, Dr. Lehmann uses the story of Brandt as a case study of the phenomenon of political emigration and the Nazis' treatment of thousands of German refugees.

Although Brandt became a Norwegian citizen in 1940, ideas for a better postwar Germany continued to occupy his mind. In the autumn of 1945 he covered the Nuremberg war crimes trials for his Norwegian newspaper and soon became press attaché in the Norwegian legation in Berlin. He made contacts with the reborn German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and in 1948 decided to re-emigrate and become a German citizen again. Although his pleasing and open-minded personality soon proved an asset in Berlin, yet as Dr. Lehmann shows, 'Brandt had made his peace with Germany but the Germans had not done so with Brandt. In exile he had only sometimes been made to feel what ostracism and proscription meant. Now he had been repatriated and was to feel it still more harshly than before' (p. 237).

In his many-sided and rich memoirs Brandt mentions these attempts by opponents in the new Federal Republic to defame him as a political turncoat who had worked against his nation abroad. During the Federal election campaign of 1961 he was denounced as a 'camouflaged Communist' and there was adverse comment on his illegitimate birth. Nevertheless Brandt advanced. After he became Chairman of the SPD in 1964, the party constantly increased its votes in the Federal elections and gradually appealed more to younger voters. No longer a party only for the working classes, the SPD entered the government of the Great Coalition in 1966 and Brandt became Foreign Minister. His efforts to improve relations

between the Federal Republic and the East European states coincided with a measure of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. In spite of setbacks and disappointments, the relative success of *Ostpolitik* remained Brandt's main achievement during the four years of his Chancellorship.

The attraction of his book, which is based on his notes and speeches, lies less in the details of his negotiations than in his pen portraits of, and comments on, a host of statesmen and politicians. One photograph, entitled 'A new generation of politicians', shows Brandt, then Burgomaster of Berlin, with President Kennedy in the White House in 1961. In retrospect Brandt's account of Kennedy is balanced and penetrating. Later President Nixon's 'free, flexible foreign policy', demonstrated by his unconventional journeys to Moscow and Peking, seems for some time to have impressed Brandt. Though Nixon was not burdened by scruples, Brandt feels it difficult in retrospect 'to recognise in the amiable host the man who transformed the White House into a "fortress" . . . and field of operations for the despotism of zealots . . .' (p. 375).

On the French side, both de Gaulle and Pompidou encouraged Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and helped him to improve Bonn's relations with Eastern Europe. Both men's distrust of American intentions in foreign affairs, and especially of the distinct improvement in the co-operation between Washington and Moscow, was frequently unmistakable. However, Brandt appreciated the personality of Georges Pompidou, 'a man who carefully balanced things, yet was quick in repartee, conservative but not without a feeling for the requirements of the future' (p. 336). At the Paris summit in the autumn of 1972 the co-operation between Brandt, Pompidou and Heath seemed particularly promising, but by the spring of 1974 the three men, for different reasons, were no longer at the helm of their countries.

The chapter on 'Moscow' is one of the highlights of the book. Brandt's detailed conversations with Andrei Gromyko in New York in November 1969 paved the way for the rapprochement with the Soviet leaders in the following year. He found Gromyko 'much more agreeable' than 'the image one had made oneself in the course of the years of the cutting "Mr. Njet"' (p. 253). Gromyko left no doubt that the recognition by Bonn of the postwar frontiers was to the Russians 'a question of life and death'. Before the Chancellor's visit to Moscow and the signing of the historic treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic, many false concepts and misunderstandings had to be cleared up. As Brandt observes, 'what is an enigma to us seems to be a matter of course to them' (p. 429). Of the two top leaders, Alexei Kosygin appeared to be a hard worker, 'rather sceptical, if not pessimistic', with features bearing the mark of past struggles for political survival. By contrast Leonid Brezhnev displayed an undisturbed optimism and a wide-ranging consciousness of his own importance which steadily increased between his three meetings with Brandt in Moscow (1970), the Crimea (1971), when the two men spent 16½ hours together tête-à-tête, and Bonn (1973).

On the whole the memoirs indicate that Willy Brandt's strength perhaps lies more in foreign than in domestic affairs. Yet he has contributed much to the modernising and broadening of his party, of which he is still chairman. His undoctrinaire and humanist attitude has proved an asset not only to the SPD but also to his country and the wider world. Brandt

admits that he is rather thin-skinned and this perhaps explains to some extent why his book remains deplorably silent on the reasons for his dramatic resignation from the Chancellorship in May 1974.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

Memoiren. By Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk. *Stuttgart: Seewald. 1977. 340 pp. DM 38.00.*

THIS very readable and informative autobiography, which appeared shortly before the death of the author, covers the span from Wilhelm II to the present Federal Republic. A member of the North German landed aristocracy, he served as an officer in the German army during the First World War and then joined the civil service where he rose quickly in the Reich Ministry of Finance to the position of head of its budget department. He later presided over its reparations department as well. Among his masters he appreciated Hans Luther as Reich Finance Minister but much less so as Chancellor, while Chancellor Brüning much impressed him as 'a fanatic of duty and work' who 'demanded a great deal from his associates, but even more of himself' (p. 120).

The abrupt dismissal of Brüning by Hindenburg came as a blow to Count Krosigk, and the President had to make a strong appeal to his honour as 'an officer and aristocrat' to persuade him to accept the post of Reich Finance Minister in the Papen Cabinet. He retained this office until the end of the Third Reich. He did not join any party until 1937 when Hitler bestowed the Gold Party badge on all his Cabinet ministers. Krosigk's main ambition, it seems, was to keep the Reich budget 'balanced' and his customs officials at the frontiers efficient. He claims to have warned Hitler on September 1, 1939, against a war in the West, and Göring in April 1941 against an attack on the Soviet Union. Looking back, he deplores that he co-signed the decree which imposed the severe 'Atonement Tax' on the German and Austrian Jews after the pogroms in November 1938. While at the time he thought that this drastic fine would prevent any further anti-semitic mob action sponsored by the SA, he later realised 'the terrible error of the Old [conservative] Guard in believing that the transitory safety of the lives of the Jews, obtained at a high cost, would become permanent' (p. 191).

His attitude on this occasion was one of the points put forward by the Allied prosecution in its indictment of Count Krosigk at the 'Wilhelmstrasse' trial at Nuremberg after the war. Hans Schäffer, formerly an Under-Secretary of State under Brüning, who as a Jew, had left Germany in 1933,[1] testified in Krosigk's defence that the latter had not taken part in any crime in the Third Reich, but he regarded it as a heavy moral guilt that Krosigk had worked for men who in Schäffer's view were 'dregs of mankind' (p. 288). Krosigk maintained that his decision to stay in office from a sense of duty was the only correct one. Nevertheless he admits that he should have helped victims of the regime more often and more intensely. Sentenced to ten years in prison in 1949—he was in fact released after serving only two—he regarded the verdict

[1] See the book on him by Eckhard Wandel, *Hans Schäffer: Steuermann in wirtschaftlichen und politischen Krisen* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1975, p. 261.

as unfair punishment for crimes he had not committed but 'a just atonement for quite a different sort of guilt, that of a blunted and sleepy conscience' (p. 289). There is little doubt that many conservative officials, judges and professors of his generation reasoned similarly about their support of the Hitler regime.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

The Plough and the Swastika: The NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany 1928–45. By J. E. Farquharson. *London, Beverly Hills: Sage. 1976. 312 pp. (Studies in 20th Century History 5.) £9·00. Pb: £4·50.*

ALTHOUGH the wooing of the peasants for electoral purposes by the NSDAP after 1928 has been fully studied, less has been written in English about the organisation of agriculture and food production after the Nazi takeover. This book, therefore, fills a gap. Dr. Farquharson has concentrated on the *Reichsnährstand* (RNS), the *Erbhof* and the problems of resettlement in the East. In the process, he has elucidated two related questions: the unqualified failure of the Third Reich to check the drift from the land; and its qualified success in maintaining domestic food supplies.

In treating these topics, Dr. Farquharson has sketched the career of Darré, who was the main architect of Nazi agricultural policies; this, too, is a useful service, as no biography of Darré exists. He was a late-comer to the party, but at first prospered in association with Himmler, who shared his ideological preconceptions; but Dr. Farquharson goes too far in twice referring to their 'friendship' (pp. 152 and 243). This was not a word that had any place in the vocabulary of the *Reichsführer* SS. Darré became an obstacle to Himmler's determination to control all settlement policy and was thus doomed, irrespective of his merits as a minister or his ideological beliefs.

Dr. Farquharson does not have much use for ideology; indeed his chapter on National Socialism and peasant culture is the weakest in an otherwise impressive book. This may explain why he ascribes Darré's failure, in part, to the fact that 'the "Blood and Soil" group around Darré was to some extent isolated even within the party . . .' (p. 259). This is a dubious judgment. No two historians agree about the degree of Hitler's ideological commitment, but there can be no doubt about that of Himmler and Bormann, whose stars were very much in the ascendant in 1942, when Darré was finally sacked. It is true, of course, that Hitler's insistence on rapid rearmament and stable prices for urban workers nullified the party's original aim to halt the flight from the land; the former objective took priority, but it does not follow that the latter was insincere. The self-respect of the peasants was, at least in some measure, restored and, as Dr. Farqharson points out, their loyalty to the regime scarcely wavered. In the Third Reich there was less talk than there is today about conservation; but the regime respected the fact—as many later governments in many other countries have failed to do—that there is a type of man who will live and work on the land, even if it is not made profitable for him to do so.

Dr. Farquharson has produced a useful addition to the voluminous literature on Nazi Germany. It has two defects that could well be remedied

in a later edition: the index has too many omissions, and a comprehensive list of abbreviations (other than those for sources) is badly needed.

University of Reading R. CECIL

The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective. By Raymond Carr. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1977. 336 pp. £10·00.*

PERHAPS it is only now, when democracy is struggling to rebirth in Spain, that we can hope to see the tragedy of its agony and demise in true perspective. The intervening dictatorship, which General Franco believed would set Spain permanently on a new course, now stands revealed as merely one phase in the nation's continuing growth, arguably an aberration stunting that growth. Professor Carr's new book provides a survey of the whole process which could hardly be bettered. It forms a distinguished sequel to his *Spain: 1808–1939*,[1] a classic study of the earlier period.

The book is intended as an analysis and commentary rather than a narrative, though chronological summaries, a short who's who and a glossary of political terms have been inserted for easier comprehension. Introductory chapters on the *ancien régime*, the monarchy and the Second Republic lead to a consideration of the Civil War itself. Not only the involved political manoeuvring, the military operations and the international repercussions are discussed, but also the economic factors and conditions of life behind the lines. Particularly interesting is the account of developments in the Nationalist Zone, the structure and ethos of which was to shape Spain's ensuing regime.

The author has mastered the now voluminous literature on the Civil War and his conversations with many of its leading figures have provided him with fresh and stimulating insights. Discussions, for instance, with General Rojo, left him with the impression that the strategy of the former Chief of Staff of the Republican armies was 'a curious combination of excessive optimism and excessive pessimism' (p. 194). On the other hand, the Nationalists' decision—generally regarded as a strategic blunder—to turn aside to relieve the beleaguered garrison at Toledo instead of striking against Madrid, seems to him fully understandable; 'in civil wars symbols count. . . . Franco could have taken no other decision' (p. 153).

The book ends with a two-part epilogue on Franco's rule and a postscript on developments since his death. The three-and-a-half decades of political inertia, repression and intellectual asphyxia which followed his victory offer less scope for a lively pen. But there is a perceptive account of the economic progress, with its accompanying social and psychological changes, which occurred during the latter part of the period and created the climate for the post-Franco era on which Professor Carr permits himself some speculation. Subsequent events bear witness on the whole to his prescience, and where they do not, to his modesty. 'I was pessimistic', he writes in his postscript, 'about the progress towards democracy and the potential of the Right to resist.'

The study could have been better served by its publishers. The text seems to have been completed two years ago; since then events have moved rapidly, and to graft a postscript on to an epilogue is an unsatis-

[1] Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.

factory updating device. Nor is the reader likely to be consoled for the absence of references in the text by an assurance that he can find them in the Spanish edition. Insufficient care has been taken to eliminate repetitive detail; we are twice informed, for instance, that Largo Caballero was a self-educated plasterer (pp. 32 and 46) and Nin a 'genial bespectacled fanatic of revolution' (pp. 18 and 170). The accentuation of Spanish words is far from impeccable, specially in the rather inadequate index. These are minor blemishes on an admirable book.

STEPHEN CLISSOLD

The Greek Upheaval: Kings, Demagogues and Bayonets. By Taki Theodoracopulos. *London: Stacey International. 1977. 262 pp. £4·90.*

THE *metapolitefsis*, as the Greeks term the collapse of the military regime and the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1974, was an event virtually without precedent in history. Seldom, if ever, can a corrupt, inefficient and brutal military dictatorship have simply disintegrated under the insupportable burden of its own incompetence, to be succeeded by civilian politicians who promptly set about incarcerating their erstwhile oppressors. The genesis of the Colonels' regime, its nature and eventual downfall are for this reason alone certainly in need of serious analysis.

Unfortunately, Taki Theodoracopulos's *The Greek Upheaval* cannot be said to meet this need. Instead we are treated to what is essentially a parade of the author's manifold political prejudices, spiced with journalistic irrelevancies. The beautiful silk suit of politician X, we learn, was 'rumpled beyond recognition', while ambassador Y was 'incredibly handsome and dashing'.

Mr. Theodoracopulos's degree of loathing for the Greek political establishment comes close to that frequently expressed by the Colonels themselves. His principal bugbear is Andreas Papandreou and it is characteristic of the general tone of the book that he trots out the old canard about Papandreou's wife being of Bulgarian descent. Nor are other members of the *politikos kosmos* spared fierce attack. 'Supposedly honest and responsible' politicians like Messrs. Kanellopoulos and Mavros are dismissed as vain and self-seeking. Just about the only figure to emerge with credit from Mr. Theodoracopulos's dismal story is Spyros Markezinis. 'History', he affirms apropos the short-lived Papadopoulos-Markezinis experiment in 'guided' democracy, 'will probably be kind to Markezinis'. This is not a view, in my experience, that is widely shared by Mr. Theodoracopulos's compatriots. By contrast with the politicians we are assured of the sincerity of the 'socialist and egalitarian' ideas of Papadopoulos and his fellow conspirators and of their belief in the old fashioned virtues of 'loyalty, honesty and reliability'.

He contrasts the 'galloping inflation' of George Papandreou's 1963–65 administration with the 'incredible economic strides' achieved by the Colonels. But how the Greeks must have longed for the 3 per cent hyperinflation of Papandreou when they fell victim to the 30 per cent inflation of Papadopoulos. Mr. Theodoracopulos suffers under the delusion that Papadopoulos was able to call on the services of Greece's best brains, who came flocking back to the country to assist in the work of national salvation. But this is by no means the only odd notion in the book.

At the time of the occupation of the Athens Polytechnic in November 1973, we are told, mobs of students rampaged through Athens beating up officers. The December 1974 referendum on the monarchy was preceded by a 'psychological atmosphere of terror created by the left'. And so on and so forth.

Had Mr. Theodoracopulos troubled to document the wealth of detail in his narrative then the book might have had some real value to the student of contemporary history. As it is, however, *The Greek Upheaval* cannot be recommended as a reliable guide to Greece's turbulent recent history.

King's College, London RICHARD CLOGG

The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic. By Kyriacos C. Markides. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1977. 200 pp. £9·00.*

THIS book deals with the tensions inside the Greek-Cypriot community after independence in 1960, analysing the local groups which, in collaboration with the military junta in Athens, prepared the way for the disastrous coup d'état of July 15, 1974. Its title is thus seriously misleading. Dr. Markides has almost nothing to say about the rise of the Cyprus republic; and either it fell (leaving aside the difficult question of who did most to push it) at the end of 1963, when the two Cypriot communities separated and the Constitution broke down in violence, or it has not fallen yet. This is not a quibble. No doubt Dr. Markides is right in believing that the coup was primarily the result of external manipulations; but that is not to say that the failure of the Constitution, more than three years before the Colonels seized power in Greece, can be blamed to an equal degree on forces outside Cyprus.

On its real subject the book is useful and informative. The author makes much of the fundamental contradiction between the two roles which the late archbishop-president had to play: first as the prophet and organiser of the anti-colonial struggle to achieve an impossible goal, and then as the head of a state whose Constitution made explicit the abandonment of that goal, and so from the start divided and embittered Greek-Cypriot political feelings. The 'disloyal opposition' was a heterogeneous and disunited collection, lacking class cohesion, a common economic interest, or a political philosophy; the ease with which Makarios outflanked his three insubordinate diocesans in 1972–73, even though they were backed by the Greek ambassador and his masters, shows that amongst this opposition the National Guard were his only dangerous local enemies. Thus the breakdown of the Constitution doomed the archbishop, in the long run, since the consequent menace from Turkey compelled him to raise the military force which ten years later overthrew him, albeit so briefly. Of necessity it had to be led by Greek officers or by EOKA veterans of the sacred struggle for union with Greece. The threat which the National Guard represented, once it enjoyed the patronage of Athens, was obvious to anyone who saw the slogans and emblems decorating their camps in the early 1970s (has this changed, one wonders?) or read their regimental journal; the army of the state, aided by conscription, had become the main breeding-ground for its enemies, and a parallel with Weimar Germany often suggested itself. Dr. Markides argues that Makarios should have

prepared his ground much more thoroughly before challenging the National Guard, and its upholders, in his letter to President Kyzikis of Greece on July 2, 1974 in which he demanded that all the 650 Greek officers should be withdrawn. His own loyal 'tactical reserve force' had only been created two years ealier.

Like nearly all Greek Cypriots, Dr. Markides is convinced that the ultimate factor making possible the temporary overthrow of Makarios was that it had come to suit the policies of Dr. Kissinger. His book is balanced and readable, despite some rather profitless brief forays into abstract theorising; he clearly knows the ground well and combines a dispassionate approach with a keen eye for detail.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

Northern Sphinx: Iceland and the Icelanders from the Settlement to the Present. By Sigurdur A. Magnússon. *London: C. Hurst. 1977. 261 pp. £7·50.*

WITH not much generally available on the subject this book, from publishers who have recently specialised in Nordic studies, deserves to be noticed as a source of background information on Iceland. The author has been Chairman of the Writers' Union in Reykjavik since 1972, and has to his credit a number of other books, including translations. He introduces his account of the modern state with a history of the Icelandic commonwealth which flourished in the age of sagas, then declined over centuries of foreign rule and natural catastrophe, reviving with its emergence into full independence after the Second World War. While by no means unscholarly, the book is personal and journalistic in approach; and it is not free from a tendency to national self-advertisement that involves occasional extravagant claims, for example a comparison of the Golden Ages of Iceland and classical Greece. But as a whole it could stimulate interest in a country which despite its growing international significance is still comparatively little known (albeit perhaps hardly 'sphinx'-like), while the factual material it contains on the island's political, economic, social and cultural life could be of use to the would-be student of Icelandic affairs. There is a ten-page bibliography, largely literary in emphasis.

M.F.C.

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States. Edited by Archie Brown and Jack Gray. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 286 pp. £10·00.*

WHEN you hear the words 'political culture' do you reach for your gun? Well, perhaps not quite; but the term is still winning general acceptance, at least on this side of the Atlantic, and the present reviewer must confess to some doubts, born of a suspicion that political scientists like inventing intellectual steam-hammers to crack nuts which can just as well be dealt with by the pincers of common sense. *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States,* if it has not achieved a full conversion, has done something to allay these doubts.

After an admirably lucid Introduction by Archie Brown, the book proceeds to an examination of political culture in seven communist countries—the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, China and Cuba—by scholars specialising in each, and is rounded off with Conclusions by Jack Gray. It is described as 'inter-disciplinary' in approach: around the 'core' of political science we find contributions from history, sociology and economics. The complexity of the subject is at once apparent, and methodological problems inevitably bulk large.

The crucial distinction, on which most of the argument turns, is between the 'official' and the 'dominant' political cultures which, in the authors' view, may overlap, but are not identical. Brown asks pertinently: 'Do the *official* values . . . actually *dominate* the minds of the majority of the citizens? Are they, in that sense, the "ruling ideas" or are they merely "the ideas of the ruling class"? This is surely a matter for empirical investigation.' It is indeed. Defining 'political culture' in subjective terms (viz. the perception of previous political experience, values and fundamental political beliefs, foci of loyalty, and political knowledge and expectations), the authors rule out observed political behaviour as a source to determine its content. This may have analytical advantages, but it means that the empirical material is disparate and unevenly available, with survey data at one end of a scientific scale which runs through belles-lettres, memoirs etc., to personal impressions verging on the anecdotal.

The general premiss of the work is that all the communist countries (except Cuba) started as such with a common ideology and institutions, and that variations which have been manifest since then have been due inter alia to differing pre-existing political value systems (rather than, or no less than, different economic levels). Now to *prove* this would need a rigorous methodological uniformity and comparability of data, for example, opinion surveys before and after the communist seizure of power in each country. These conditions simply are not present. Only in Czechoslovakia was a 1946 survey replicated in 1968; the excellent Polish surveys of the past twenty years have neither precedent in Poland nor parallel elsewhere; and some countries have no surveys at all. Short of such proof, however, there is much that is suggestive.

In the Soviet Union the present political beliefs of Soviet citizens largely coincide with the 'autocratic inheritance' of unrepresentative, personalised and comprehensive government, and if 'New Soviet Man' has notably failed to appear, Modernised Parsonian Man is not much in prospect either. Yugoslavia's notorious heterogeneity is compounded by the succession of two official communist political cultures, before and after the introduction of self-management. Both here and in the other East European countries the authors find degrees and qualities of 'dissonance' between the official and the dominant political cultures which can plausibly be traced to specific features in the traditional culture. In China, Mao's insistence on stirring things up ran directly counter to the traditional ideal of harmony; it remains to be seen whether the victors in the struggle for his succession will settle for anything less than a re-imposed harmony. Cuba is something of an anomaly in this *galère*, since its revolution was made Marxist only *ex post*; and its current trend towards a Soviet pattern seems to have little to do with either official or dominant political culture.

Since Archie Brown modestly but rightly describes the book as a 'preliminary essay into the problematical field of comparative communist political culture', it may be in order to suggest possible lines of further investigation. First, even with patchy material, a more Procrustean editorial policy could carry comparativism a little further. What is the relationship between the family's function as a repository and transmitter of political values, as noted in Czechoslovakia, and the Confucian tradition of filial piety in China? Or again, Jack Gray compares Chinese popular literary heroes with Robin Hood and Brer Rabbit; but what about, say, Ilya Muromets and Kraljević Marko? Secondly—except in China, where Gray gives full value to the peasantry's millenarianism—that awkward class is largely excluded; perhaps Teodor Shanin's suggestion that passive resistance at times of crisis is the peasant's specific contribution to politics could be explored in terms of political culture. Lastly, and with possible relevance to this point, David Dyker lets fall, almost casually, what could be one of the most significant remarks in the book: 'there is some empirical evidence . . . that in times of crisis values might shift radically . . .' It is not merely that, as Brown and Wightman point out, political crises can alter the content of a political culture. Do not most of us carry inside ourselves some values to cope with normality and others to cope with crisis? Both sets, no doubt, qualify for inclusion in political culture: and political culture, far more than economic levels, should be apt to explain not only the difference between normal behaviour and crisis behaviour, but the modes of transition from one to the other. It is significant that many of the cultures examined here contain alternative strands of romanticism, heroism, idealism and hardness on the one hand and compromise, realism and adaptation on the other.

To point to these areas is not to underestimate the difficulty of covering them, nor to disparage the very real merits of the present volume. To quote Shanin again: 'Limping along main roads achieves more than strolling along side roads'. The main road here is nothing less than Historical Materialism itself, applied to communist countries, and the value of this book is to set up a sign reading: 'Caution—work in progress'.

St. Antony's College, Oxford RICHARD KINDERSLEY

Change and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics. Edited by Jane P. Shapiro and Peter J. Potichnyj. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 236 pp. £12·05.*

THE extent and nature of the change wrought on the countries of Eastern Europe by the impact of communist rule is the thread linking this collection of papers presented at the first International Slavic Conference, held at Banff, Alberta, in September 1974. The writers direct their attention to three broad aspects of political life—censorship, nationality problems, and what one author describes as the political culture itself. Within these contexts they examine the methods by which the postwar elite sought to modernise, to industralise and to impose rapid social change on societies that were essentially rural, semi-literate and multinational.

There can be few societies that are totally static and impervious to adaptation, but some are susceptible to development, while in others the

inheritance of the recent past is likely to impede change. The society which Marx had envisaged as being ripe for revolution was industralised and capitalist, with class lines clearly drawn between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In the event his disciples had to make do with peoples and circumstances that fell far short of his ideal, and the implications of this for the perpetrators of the communist revolution form a major theme for each author.

The issues surrounding modernisation have already been frequently and thoroughly explored, and a reviewer can thus do little more than give some indication of the wide range of topics treated in this volume. Each of the essays, in its separate way, is seeking to gauge the level of popular participation in the machinery of government, to assess how much the general public endorses the leadership and adheres to its objectives.

Philip D. Stewart studies the attitudes of members of the Soviet political elite by codifying opinions expressed by thirty-nine regional party secretaries in articles published between 1955 and 1966. While these did not reveal views consistent with democratic politics, they did exhibit a surprising range of attitudinal diversity. Ray Taras looks at the policies of the Gierek regime towards the local government system in Poland and at the factors inhibiting wider participation and an overhaul of the administrative machine. The picture he paints is not particularly optimistic, and yet he concludes that 'control by the party leadership varies in time and in degree, but it is rarely absolute' (p. 73). Joseph Held shows how the survival of former values and attitudes impedes the progress of socialist modernisation in Hungary while Gayle Durham Hannah describes how modern forms of communication enable those who are sufficiently determined to escape the government's interpretation of events, thus weakening its hold on one of its most powerful weapons.

The message which comes through from this varied and detailed research is that while Eastern Europe is by no means democratic it is by no means monolithic. Yet for the most part diversity only occurs within a narrow framework or where its impact can be but limited. The only question that is left unanswered is whether essays of this nature would be of greater use to the student of East European affairs if they appeared in a moderately priced journal instead of in a rather costly book.

ELIZABETH BALSOM

Current Research in Comparative Communism: An Analysis and Bibliographic Guide to the Soviet System. By Lawrence L. Whetten. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 159 pp. £11·55.*

IT is useful to have an up-to-date list of many of the books and articles which have been published in the field of communist studies. Only a small minority of those listed are explicitly concerned with the comparative study of communism, but since comparisons must rest upon a detailed knowledge of individual communist states, the inclusion of the majority of works cited can be justified by the author.

Dr. Whetten's introduction may be found helpful by undergraduates, but it suffers from imprecise use of language and oversimplification. When he writes that 'a less strident model has been presented by . . .', one almost expects to read 'Christian Dior', but in fact it is Harry Rigby (as distinct

from Allen Kassof). And far too many questions are begged by such a statement as: 'The party's leading role within the society is still important, but its main function now is to aggregate interests and arbitrate disputes, a manifestation of the progress of the modernization process within the Soviet system' (p. 43).

So far as the bibliography itself is concerned, a straightforward alphabetical or chronological listing of entries would probably have been at least as useful as the thematic classificatory system which has been adopted. In many cases, the books or articles could be classified under one of several headings and choice of section becomes almost a matter of taste. But who would expect to find Jaroslaw. A. Piekalkiewicz's *Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968–69* [1] in a section headed 'Individual Incentives', or Sir William Deakin's *The Embattled Mountain* [2] under 'Interest Aggregation'?

The classifications, in short, are too arbitrary to be really helpful to the potential user. Numerous misprints in the names of the authors detract further from the value of what is, on balance, a disappointing work.

St. Antony's College, Oxford ARCHIE BROWN

The Future of Soviet Military Power. Edited by Lawrence L. Whetten. *New York: Crane, Russak. 1976. 190 pp. $14.50.*

IN May 1975 a conference was held at Ebenhausen in West Germany on the future role of Soviet military power within the East-West context. As is now the habit, the conference papers have been published as a book together with an over-long introduction by the editor. The book's title is misleading because there is little on the future of Soviet military power, although quite a lot on its recent development and the asserted propensity of the Americans to misperceive the lines of this development. Reading one of the few essays that does attempt some specific predictions—a generally interesting piece by Robert Legvold on Soviet attitudes towards arms control in Europe—one is struck by how little of the course of the European Security Conference was anticipated. The star of the collection is a long discussion by John Erickson on Soviet theatre-warfare capability. Together with an essay by William Scott on changes in tactical concepts within the Soviet forces, it does a lot to correct the imbalance in Western writings away from the over-concentration on strategic forces, as well as to remind one just how much a careful and thorough outsider can find out about the Soviet military.

The first three contributors—Leon Sloss, Colin Gray, William Van Cleave—all examine past American perceptions of the strategic balance, and all tend to suggest that there was a serious misreading of Soviet strategy and the direction of the arms race because the Americans were too sure of their own strategic concepts. If this was the case in the past, then Van Cleave's piece, which contains an excess of quotations from people who happen to agree with him, indicates the mistake is to be repeated in the future.

[1] New York, London: Praeger, 1972.

[2] London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1972, p. 336.

A consistent theme in the book is that some of the main benefits to be gained by the Soviet Union from the build-up of its military power are political. There seems little reason to doubt that the Kremlin believes in the political utility of military power. Most of the writers in this book seem to feel that they are right to do so though as Lothar Ruehl, writing on the Soviet threat to Western Europe, notes: 'It is difficult to judge the precise merits inherent in this position'. Given the diplomatic setbacks suffered by the Soviet Union in these recent years of great and growing military strength, this notion needs a far more critical analysis than it has yet received.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Soviet Political Elites: The Case of Tiraspol. By Ronald J. Hill. *London: Martin Robertson. 1977. 226 pp. £7·85.*

THIS book is a study of the people who take part in local politics, both State (Soviet) and Party (*Gorkom*), in the small Moldavian town of Tiraspol (population 106,000). The study spans seventeen years (1950–67), thereby identifying longish-term trends in the composition of local political bodies and the careers of particular individuals. The time-span is significant, since it encompasses three regimes: those of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and a number of political crises. It therefore enables the author to investigate whether and how these major crises were reflected at local level. Did local politics follow the changes at the centre; or did they presage imminent changes at the top? How far did the small town depend on higher levels for policy initiatives? These are the sort of questions investigated. The answers certainly help to shed light on the nature of the Soviet political system and how it operates. Significantly, the findings merit the conclusion that 'the whole question of Soviet local political life is substantially more subtle and complex than it might have seemed' (p. 187).

The research is based largely on an academic year (1967–68) spent in Kishinyov, the capital of the Moldavian SSR, and the assiduous reading of the local newspaper *Dnestrovskaya pravda*—from which information is culled on individuals, the composition of various political bodies, their meetings, the topics discussed and the participants. Some sceptics might justifiably question the value of basing conclusions on what the provincial press reports: what about *Glavlit's* long list of censored topics? For the present, however, as the author admits, no alternative source of comparable information is available. Dr. Hill's major chapters deal with citizens who serve on local councils and Party committees; he examines their performance, the process of recruitment and qualities necessary to stay the course (the 'older, Party member, males in prestigious occupation', p. 69), relations between the Party and the State. On the last point, Hill challenges the traditional view that the State is directly subordinate to the Party: 'My analysis suggests that the relationship is not a simple one, whereby the Party in some way controls the Soviet. I argue from my data that it is a two-way relationship' (p. 130).

Of particular interest is his description of the procedure for selecting candidates to be elected to State and Party bodies: first come the *nomenklatura* appointments of the republican authorities, followed by 'ex officio' members, 'rota' members, meritorious individuals and, lastly, those needed to make up the desirable composition (for example, a certain percentage of

women, young people, workers, etc.). These are then allocated to a con stituency and stand as the sole candidate for a 'yea' or 'nay' vote. Thi will sound strange to ears attuned to parliamentary democracy, but, as ; number of authors have suggested, it accords with the 'development model devised for modernising communities in the Third World.

Despite the misleading title (this is a book about local elites only) an a charming Irishness in style, this study is meticulous, fair and scholarly; i all respects, the book is unique, being the first detailed study since th war of political life in a small Soviet town. It deserves to be read by al students of Soviet politics.

University of Bradford JAMES RIORDAN

Sport in Soviet Society: Development of Sport and Physical Education i Russia and the USSR. By James Riordan. *London: Cambridg University Press. 1977. 435 pp. £10·00.*

DR. RIORDAN, who lived in Moscow in 1961–65 and 1970–71, has considerabl first-hand experience with which to give his writing on Soviet sport a extra freshness. He worked for a Soviet publishing house and so was abl to enjoy the sports facilities provided for Soviet employees as well a being given access to archives normally closed to Westerners. He was ; keen participant in, and spectator of, a wide range of different sports. Hi varied personal experience does not, however, lead him to adopt an anecdota approach. His study is thoroughly researched and extensively documente providing substantial factual information without ever losing direction. H considers Russian sport in all its forms, from folk games to Olympi athletics, from football to chess.

The first part of the book is historical, discussing organised sport fron its origins in Russia through six distinctive Soviet periods to the earl 1970s. While clearly admiring much of what the Soviet regime has don for sport, the author sees the roots of Russian organised sport in th Tsarist period. British industralists living in Russia are given credit fc their part in setting up various sports clubs. They also attempted t introduce soccer. The diplomat, Lockhart, who was in Russia during th First World War, wrote that had the British industrialists been able t spread their passion for playing soccer more quickly, the Whites migh have won on the playing fields of Moscow what they lost in the Readin Room of the British Museum (p. 40).

The ideological roots of sport in Soviet society are also discussed attention being drawn to the fairly sparse writings on sport by Marx an Lenin. In the chapters on the Soviet period, sport is shown to be bot encouraged by the authorities as a means of training fit and discipline workers and soldiers and enjoyed by the ordinary Soviet citizen as a approved way of relaxing in a frequently tense society.

The second half of the book treats a number of contemporary socia issues related to its theme. A long chapter on the organisational frame work of Soviet sport describes such topics as sports centres, the financin of sport, standards, personnel and publications. The next chapter con siders sport in relation to various social groups—the military, peasants, th different Soviet nationalities, women and schoolchildren. The significan role of sport in the socialisation process is highlighted here. Finally, fift

pages are devoted to sport and foreign policy, examining in some depth the relationship between sport and politics in the Soviet Union.

It is hard to think of any topic remotely connected with sport which the author does not touch on in this book. Yet even for someone like myself who is not interested in physical exercise, this book is fascinating because the author manages constantly to relate his theme to general aspects of Soviet society. It is a book to satisfy the sociologist, the sports enthusiast and the interested layman alike. Both in its thoroughness in documenting sporting trends and its discussion of significant social issues it forms a very valuable contribution to the field of Soviet studies.

FELICITY O'DELL

Khrushchev: The Years in Power. By Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev. Trans. by Andrew R. Durkin. *London: Oxford University Press. 1977. 198 pp. £3·95.*

THE total effacement of Khrushchev and his period of political dominance in the Soviet Union suggests that no more information from Soviet sources is to be expected until the current attitude towards him changes. But, notwithstanding his undoubted faults and mistakes, Khrushchev deserved a better fate from his countrymen than oblivion. And who, one might think, better qualified to write his biography than the distinguished Medvedev brothers both of whom were living in the Soviet Union throughout the Khrushchev period and had been planning a biography since 1963.

> For Roy and me, Khrushchev and his times are a still living history—we participated in the hopes and disenchantments of the period; we experienced enthusiasm and bitterness, elation at his bold political and diplomatic reforms and exasperation at his sometimes startling ignorance when it came to handling simple economic, agronomic and theoretical problems. It is painful to contemplate how much Khrushchev, after a brilliant start, could have done for the Soviet Union and the whole world, yet his contribution turned out to be extremely limited by the time he reached the end of his political career (p. ix).

These introductory words aptly summarise the Medvedevs' attitude to their subject. They also raise high hopes in the reader for a work which might throw hitherto new light on the personality and career of Khrushchev.

On reflection, it was not to be expected that the Medvedevs, neither of whom had contact with higher government or Party circles, would in fact be in a position to throw much new light on Khrushchev's career. They have, however, produced a well-documented, balanced assessment of the man, illuminated by some little known, or perhaps hitherto unknown points. Thus, in describing 'Khrushchev's stepped-up anti-religious propaganda', they mention that the rich murals in the famous Borovsk monastery 'were obliterated with ordinary white paint' (p. 150) and also that the effect of the closing or destruction of rural churches gave the people less reason for staying in their villages 'and added to the number of elderly people who left the kolkhozes'. I, at least, had not heard of these points before.

The Medvedevs rightly dwell on the incalculable benefits to millions of Soviet citizens resulting from Khrushchev's rehabilitation policy and the large-scale closure of the infamous Stalinist camps. This act alone, in my view, should earn Khrushchev a sure place in Soviet history, towering as it

does over economic follies like the wildly over-ambitious schemes to surpass America in the production of meat, milk and butter in four years and other disastrous economic and administrative blunders. Yet, this 'impetuous iconoclast' had great if unrealisable dreams for Soviet Russia and many of his ideas, like his virgin lands policies, showed his natural flair for great initiatives which too often were matched neither by his personal experience nor his expertise.

It is regrettable that this biography only covers Khrushchev's years in power. These years have been more or less adequately analysed already but not the previous period when Khrushchev behaved so docilely as one of Stalin's henchmen. It remains a mystery how this ebullient original character so long concealed the personality he so strikingly revealed in the years of power that no one apparently suspected its existence. It is scarcely possible to believe that he was merely a late developer! This is to me a real and most interesting psychological problem, inviting more research in depth than it has so far received.

The index to this well-made book is a bad and incomplete guide to its contents and should not be relied on.

VIOLET CONOLLY

Political Development in Eastern Europe. Edited by Jan F. Triska and Paul M. Cocks. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 371 pp. £20·10. Pb: £5·30.*

IN Eastern Europe, communist systems have been established for approximately three decades. According to current ideological formulations, those East European countries which belong to the Soviet bloc are in the period of the construction of a developed socialist society. In these countries, it is further asserted, the state is a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, although in the process of the construction of a developed socialist society it will gradually change into a state of the entire people, a final stage in the development of the socialist state. However, in Albania and Yugoslavia the state is also officially a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Not surprisingly, this raises a number of questions concerning the political systems in the region. Inter alia, what is the nature of these political systems? What similarities and differences do they reveal, and which of these similarities and differences are those of essence and which merely those of form? What changes within and of the political system, as well as in its domestic and foreign outputs and inputs, have taken place over time in each of these countries? What degree of legitimacy do these political systems enjoy? What is the attitude of the ruling elites towards political modernisation? What political changes can be expected to take place in the future?

Some of these questions are the subject-matter of this book. Utilising modernisation theory and political change analysis, it explores four major areas of current interest to both West and East European scholars, namely, ideological adaptation and conceptual change, institutional development, political participation, and external influences (Soviet and non-Soviet) on domestic policies.

The empirical studies included in the book are confined to Hungary, Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia. Although their findings cannot be

discussed here, at least three points should be made. First, the studies provide some new evidence that although the ruling elites are concerned with political modernisation, they do not want to lose control over the political system. Second, one of the studies draws attention to the fact that although many East European institutions whose function is to link elites and masses are not valued by the masses and, consequently, persist and seem stable because they are propped up by coercion mobilised by the regime, it is easier to ascertain the degree of legitimacy of particular East European institutions than that of the entire system. Third, another of the studies deals with attitudes towards differing local interests, and conflicts among them, in a socialist society: according to a Hungarian survey conducted in 1972, many of the local deputies interviewed regarded the existence of and conflicts among independent interests as negative phenomena, as socially detrimental; but to the local professionals conflicts of interests were part of the routine.

However, the principal weight of the book lies in methodological, conceptual and theoretical questions. Within communist studies, it recalls, there is an unresolved conflict between two approaches: the abstract theoretical approach and quantitative analysis of political behaviour on the one hand and non-cumulative, non-comparable, untheoretical historical case studies on the other hand.

While it undoubtedly is true that more concrete empirical case studies are needed, because of the lack of empirical data, it is also true that there is a need for concept formation and theory construction, for several reasons: a theory would point to neglected spheres, guide empirical research, put isolated empirical data into a context, and enable both cross-communist and cross-societal comparisons. Expressed differently, the two approaches should be seen as complementary, not as mutually exclusive or separated in time.

This leads to another critical problem, stressed by the book, namely, the relationship between communist studies and comparative politics and, more precisely, the need to incorporate the former into the latter. Of course, the problem does not apply merely to the relationship between communist studies and comparative politics, but to that between communist studies and other social sciences (for example, sociology) as well.

In sum, the book draws attention to the process of change in the sensitive, albeit relatively neglected, region of Eastern Europe, and contributes to its better understanding. It assumes, too, that the process of change in Eastern Europe will remain the object of study and analysis for many years to come and, simultaneously, that its study and analysis will inevitably have an impact on the development of communist studies themselves.

St. Antony's College, Oxford J. L. Porket

Education and the Mass Media in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Edited by Bohdan Harasymiw. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 130 pp. £10·10.*

The book contains seven papers selected from a number of contributions presented at the first International Slavic Conference, held at Banff, Alberta in September 1974. The introduction and the conclusions come

from Professor Bohdan Harasymiw, who concedes the heterogeneous nature of the papers assembled in this volume, but suggests—with some justification—that an important element linking all the diverse studies is the focusing of attention upon the complex forms of interaction between the individual, the state, society and ideas.

Professor Oskar Anweiler's paper, 'Towards a Comparative Study of the Educational Systems in the Socialist Countries of Europe: Recent Findings and Problems' (previously published in 1975 in the journal *Comparative Education*), touches upon an important problem of the usefulness of different types of models for a deeper understanding of the communist systems of education.

Professor Elisabeth Koutaissoff's paper juxtaposes young people's choices of careers in the Soviet Union and the rigidities of Soviet manpower planning. She refers to numerous empirical investigations by Soviet sociologists into the aspirations of school leavers, their training and subsequent employment, and discusses the problems associated with the upgrading of vocational schools in the country, vocational guidance and theoretical and experimental studies of the different kinds of occupations. The paper is highly informative rather than analytical, but it draws attention to Soviet research in the field and the concentration of investigators upon specific issues. George Avis systematically reviews the expanding empirical research work of Soviet sociologists on student selection in higher education, academic performance and failure and the crucial question of the importance of the social background of students for access to higher education.

Alexandra Kwiatkowski examines the non-conformist trends in the Soviet literary press and scrutinises the articles which appeared in *Novy Mir* after the resignation of Tvardovsky in January 1970 and before the middle of 1974. Theodore Kruglak's paper on the role and evolution of press agencies in the socialist countries contrasts the international news cartels before 1914 with a socialist model of the news agency, tracing the emergence and growth of the latter in the different East European countries in more recent times. It is a factual report rather than an analytical study. Michel Kwiatkowski's contribution contrasts the information policy and the role of the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug, with that of Tass and Hsin Hua and builds up a not unconvincing picture of the Yugoslav agency as an 'occasional influencer' with a dual role: in quiet times and in an emergency.

The final paper by Georges Mink deals with the conceptual approach to public opinion surveys in the Soviet Union. Here, the evidence suggests that the pragmatic and utilitarian value of knowing the feelings and desires of different social groups has come to create a pressure of its own, when 'it is no longer necessary to hold public opinion to the rigid line of ideological education, but to determine the pattern.' It very much depends, however, on what is meant by the 'pattern' and on what constitutes an important issue with respect to which the diversity of public opinion is unacceptable to the system. This may be a good starting point for further investigations in this field.

Taken as a whole, the seven papers explore in some depth some of the more burning issues within the vast fields of studies of educational development and of the role and character of the mass media in the communist

states of Eastern Europe, and may contribute to a better understanding in the West of the social and political realities of life under communism.

J. J. TOMIAK
University of London Institute of Education and School of Slavonic and East European Studies

Czechoslovakia. By William V. Wallace. *London: Benn. 1976. 374 pp. £9·95.*

I HAVE to confess never to have been particularly happy with the 'Nations of the Modern World' series. The volumes in it seem to fall uneasily between two stools, being neither detailed enough for the serious student, nor attractive enough for the reader whose interest is transitory. This must, of course, be true of most outline histories. Much is demanded of them—they have both to stimulate further reading and yet avoid the pitfalls of the over-detailed approach. Professor Wallace, given the format, does his best, covering the period before Czechoslovakia became a nation state to the present day. There is a clear account of the political events and internal conditions within the country, and although not nearly enough space is devoted to cultural activities, nevertheless what is covered is adequate. A serious attempt is also made to discuss Czech foreign policy in the context of European diplomacy.

Despite its short existence, Czechoslovakia has had an exceptionally moving and interesting history. Governed in its early years by the philosopher-politician Masaryk, the Czechs managed to avoid the excesses of their Central European neighbours only to be the one nation to disappear completely before 1939. Although hardly affected by the war, yet only three years after the end of hostilities the country became the test-case in East-West relations from which the Soviet Union emerged victorious. And, although apparently undisturbed by the unrest of the 1950s, Dubček's tentative bid for reform in 1968 resulted, once more, in military invasion and virtual subjugation. Professor Wallace does not do justice to so stirring a tale.

His account has another serious drawback. Too often the book lacks the analytical objectivity needed for this kind of introductory history. British historians of Central and Eastern Europe have sometimes tended, particularly in the past, to view the successor states with somewhat rosy spectacles. Professor Wallace, in describing the major events of Czech history, and the politicians who were most involved in them, is *plus catholique que le pape.* All is for the best always, motives are pure, the decisions taken are correct, no blame can be apportioned. This is difficult to accept of a nation which, within a short period of thirty years, went through some of the most traumatic upheavals ever to be experienced by any modern state.

The three most influential politicians in Czech history, Masaryk, Beneš and Dubček, are portrayed as men who rightly hoped that avoidance of hostilities would produce situations which they could manipulate, and in spite of the fact that they clearly failed in their objectives, their own evaluation of their policies is accepted uncritically. The case for Beneš is made particularly strongly. His grave miscalculation of the extent of Anglo-French appeasement is glossed over, even though he knew both that the French were reneging on their military commitments to Poland,

and that under Laval they had crushed the Eastern Locarno negotiations. In any case, by 1936 they had lost their leadership of Europe to the British, and the latter, as Professor Campbell Gregory has recently shown [1] had by as early as 1933 become antagonistic towards the Czechs and therefore less inclined to thwart German aims. This is revisionist history at its most uncritical, and mars an otherwise competent piece of historical writing.

Brunel University LISANNE RADICE

MIDDLE EAST

Urbanization in the Middle East. By V. F. Costello. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 121 pp. £4·95.*

DR. COSTELLO sets out in this volume to define and elucidate the nature of the Middle Eastern city. His principal concern is with the evolution of traditional cities and the processes of modernisation that have affected them during the last hundred years. Although the author is a geographer, he is above all intrigued by social change and whether the Middle East region has developed a distinctive urban ethos. Examination of the regional characteristics deriving from environmental factors are, of necessity in such a short book, dealt with rather cursorily and from the outset the author does not make it clear whether he accepts or rejects the notion of the Middle East as a coherent geographical unit, and whether indeed there are common denominators to cities of the region which both give internal unity and differentiate them from cities elsewhere. Confusion arises from Costello's uncertainty on these issues. From beginning to end the implicit analysis of Middle Eastern cities is based on ideas of central place and the models devised by geographers working in the United States and Western Europe. Yet much of the best material in the book, concerning Kashan, Iran, suggests an antithesis to the general theme of the volume.

The conflict between conventions of Western urban study, with its strongly economic bias, and Middle Eastern approaches to the city, articulated through use of space as a social dimension, is not resolved in this book and for the most part appears to be unperceived. The fabric of Middle Eastern society is also seen by Dr. Costello in highly European terms. There is constant reference to 'aristocracy' (p. 27), 'bourgeoisie' (p. 9) and 'social class' (pp. 73–83), but without definition or insight adequate to persuade the reader that a convincing analysis is being made. The trend of his argument leads to lapses such as 'Iran's elite for instance is known as the Thousand Families' (p. 76); and 'the close connection between the commercial bourgeoisie and the *ulama*', which in Moslem Iraq, where trade was largely in the hands of the Jews, would have been most unlikely in any day or age. More important faults appear as a result of the narrow Western view of the area and give an unfortunate superficial air to the text. The author observes that 'Street patterns were irregular' in Middle Eastern towns but makes no effort to

[1] F. Campbell Gregory, *Confrontation in Central Europe: Weimar Germany and Czechoslovakia* (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1976). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1977, p. 305.

explain the guiding forces that gave rise to the street patterns and does not link the agricultural landscape of field boundaries and irrigation channels and the expansion of urban areas.

This book does not achieve the goals it sets itself. The area covered is very large and the changes taking place there are enormously diverse. Generalisation in this context is the undoing of the author since his simplifications detract from rather than assist in the comprehension of urban form and society. The volume might be of value to those travelling to the Middle East for the first time, but it will not be satisfying fare for those who have already tasted the fascinating paradoxes of the Middle Eastern cities, large and small.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London KEITH MCLACHLAN

Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies since 1967. By Brian Van Arkadie. *New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1977. 164 pp. Pb: $3.75.*

DR. VAN ARKADIE is an authority on development problems who had never been to the Middle East until he wrote this study; he therefore undertook his survey of the two areas under Israeli occupation with an open mind. Further, to guarantee his impartiality, he worked for the Carnegie Endowment.

The conclusions that he reached differ little from those set out more than a year earlier by Dr. Vivian Bull in *The West Bank—Is it Viable?* [1] He reasons, as she did, that both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are better off under Israeli than under Jordanian occupation. Largely through wages earned in Israel, and very little through new investment except in imitation of Israeli agricultural practices, West Bank incomes have shown a 50 per cent growth in ten years. Expenditure of those incomes on the purchase of Israeli commodities has further increased the link with Israel. By comparison, agricultural exports from the territories to Jordan over the 'open bridges' have if anything diminished slightly in the years under review. Therefore Israel's hope that its open bridges policy would give it an entry into trade with the Arab world has not been fulfilled.

Nor has its hope of contenting the Arabs. For though these did so well in the Israeli boom of 1970–74, they have since then felt the impact of the Israeli recession of 1975–76, and been hit by the successive devaluations of the money they earned, by galloping inflation, and by the imposition of more Israeli taxes and import dues than in the early years of the occupation. What is more, they have observed at first hand that in the high income, capital intensive society within Israel, they (though well off in their own low income, labour surplus areas) are second class if not third class earners; in 1972, for instance, their monthly average earnings were 384 Israeli pounds, as against the I£918 monthly average earned by Israeli workers. The 1973 war quickened their discontent; the increase of disturbances since that date confirms this.

The book is proof, if proof is needed, of the illusion that economic interdependence promotes peace. Yet the information that it provides

[1] Farnborough: Heath, 1975. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1976, p. 490.

for those who want a peaceful future in Palestine is not without its uses. For it suggests that, if only Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation would shout a simultaneous shout of recognition the one of the other, the way to a compromise would be opened. The alternative is, sooner or later, another Palestine war.

The preface by Larry Fabian contains an admirable summary of events since the Peel Report of 1937, though few British would agree with his dictum that the historical clash of the two nationalities was 'relatively dormant' throughout the years between then and 1967.

ELIZABETH MONROE

The Palestinian Movement in Politics. By Paul A. Jureidini and William E. Hazen. *Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 139 pp. £8·45.*

THE public image and the problems associated with its projection have become a question of cardinal importance to a political movement as radical and disparate as the Palestine guerrillas. The primary concern of *The Palestinian Movement in Politics* and its joint authors is to show that far from being wild and callous killers who carry out murderous raids on school children or incarcerate passengers in hijacked civil airliners, the Palestine guerrillas have in fact a genuine grievance of a national dimension. They have been driven to desperation by their own leaders' inept handling of their case—for example, when the first delegation of Palestine Arabs arrived in London to protest against the policies initiated by the Mandatory power, which led ultimately to the transformation of the territory from an Arab country into a Jewish state, its members could not speak English and had no friends to help them in the British capital. After the Arabisation of the question of Palestine as a result of the London round-table conference in 1939, the tragedy of the Palestinians was only to be exacerbated by inter-Arab rivalry and disputes which virtually obliterated the name Palestine from the map of the Middle East.

This book provides a brief and sympathetic survey of the history and growth of the guerrilla organisations and their involvement in Arab politics as well as international terrorism. It also includes an outline of the strategy employed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to reach a formula for the accommodation of the guerrillas in the Arab states which share common borders with Israel. Thus the underlying causes of the friction and consequential civil wars in Jordan and Lebanon are examined and discussed. However, the analysis is somewhat myopic and at times rather superficial. The authors seem to ignore the fundamental conflict of interest between the Arab states which from the very outset placed them on a collision course with the PLO. As independent sovereign states possessing a precarious political existence, countries like Jordan and Lebanon could not allow the guerrillas a free hand since they could easily become a destabilising factor or a subversive element serving the interests of Arab rivals. It is for this reason that Mr. Ahmad Shuqairi, who was appointed first Chairman of the PLO in 1964 could not have been 'eminently qualified' for the task when he was practically persona non grata in Saudi Arabia, and had been looked upon as an

instrument of Nasser's Arab policy by Syria and Jordan. The authors would do well to read Shuqairi's four volumes of memoirs (published in Arabic) about his political career.

The authors may have been pressing the urgency of a settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict on the American Pentagon for whom parts of the book seem to have been originally written, but there is no reason to believe that the stability and prosperity of Jordan and Lebanon are entirely linked to such a settlement. It has been the manipulation of the internal dynamics of Lebanese and Jordanian politics that has enabled the guerrillas to insinuate themselves into powerful positions in these states rather than the dispute with Israel. A settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute could easily aggravate the endemic sources of political unrest so that these countries must in the meantime try to resolve their difference with the guerrillas independently from the wider conflict with Israel. Moreover, it would require some imagination to conclude that the Israeli commando raid on Beirut airport in 1968 'was to move the Lebanese government and people close to the Palestinians', when polarisation was the only result as the book's subsequent narrative indicates. Finally, there is no evidence to support the assertion that the guerrilla organisations 'deal very ruthlessly with dissidents from within their own ranks' as the fractious and fissiparous Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has shown.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London ABBAS KELIDAR

Egypt 1798–1952: Her Advance towards a Modern Identity. By J. C. B. Richmond. *London: Methuen. 1977. 243 pp. £7·50. Pb: £4·50.*

IN the first sentence of his preface the author states that: 'There is nothing new in this book'. This may be so but it is the first time that those 154 years have been covered, with the focus described in the subtitle, in detail and in considerable depth. To have done this in 226 pages is a feat. Consequently some chapters are so concentrated that the reader needs to match them with like concentration. Each of the many Egyptian governments between 1920 and 1950 are noted, with reasons for their rise and fall. There is a memorable summing-up in one paragraph of the differing Egyptian, French and English impressions, at the time, of the crucial years 1879–82. The ordinary Egyptian's bewilderment at the British bombing of Alexandria is portrayed by what an Englishman said of the policeman detailed to protect him during those troubles: 'He seemed to be lost in wonder as to who were his friends and who his enemies.' These miniatures convey much. It is also rewarding to follow some of the secondary themes in this book such as Anglo-French relations, Moslem-Christian attitudes and the marked changes in some Islamic concepts after the fall of the Caliphate. Something of the character and political outlook of British representatives is given, from Cromer to Lloyd (including, of course, Gorst of whom it was once said 'Hopeless fellow. Went to the Gezira races in a straw boater!').

Although three quarters of the book is concerned with events before 1950, these years are dealt with in a way which shows how pertinent they were to the formation of modern Egypt.

About transliteration, John Richmond takes the wise but unusual course of proclaiming: 'I have not attempted to be logical or consistent', thus neatly undercutting reviewers who, at times, make the subject an opportunity for riding their particular hobby-horse to exhaustion. Printing errors seem non-existent but a few minor points could be mentioned. The words, Tel al Kebir, are first introduced with no hint of what they are meant to convey. Though the explanation follows 28 pages later, and though no difficulty would arise for most readers, yet this could be confusing for a reader new to the scene. The important figure of Nubar Pasha is mentioned nine times before we are told that he was a pro-British Armenian Christian, facts of significance in the history of that era. And what has happened to Al Ahram's definite article? 'Ahram' sounds as lame as 'Times' would sound without its 'The'.

For those unfamiliar with these important decades of Egyptian history this is a most informative book. And for those long interested in the subject there is much here to clarify thought and give fresh perspective.

MARY ROWLATT

North West Africa: A Political and Economic Survey. 3rd edn. By Wilfrid Knapp. *Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1977. 453 pp. £12·50.*

NEVILL BARBOUR first edited this book under the title *A Survey of North West Africa (The Maghrib)* in 1959 and he produced a slightly revised edition three years later.[1] So many changes have taken place in the area since that time that a new version is long overdue. Wilfrid Knapp includes a section on the Libyan economy by Robert Mabro and a short but perceptive section on literature in North-West Africa by Robin Ostle. He has kept the historical sections from the earlier work, but otherwise the book has been re-written. The number of maps has been reduced from six to four, and although these are useful, it might have been appropriate to the changed emphasis of the book to have one depicting North Africa's oil and mineral resources, and perhaps one on land use. The statistical appendix is helpful.

Within the given format, Mr. Knapp has written with care and without controversy. The revision, however, regrettably raises the question of whether the act of piety in re-issuing this 'handbook' was justified or not. The *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*[2] can carry so much more information and discussion, and as it appears more frequently can cope with changes of emphasis, as well as providing articles written by specialists on various aspects of the area. This book will have to stand for a decade or more without revision, and it is now so expensive that it can hardly be considered as a convenient introductory text. It might have been better to give Mr. Knapp a free hand to produce a book of his own, possibly on the lines of the Nouvelle Clio series,[3] which indicated the problems of the area, presented trends and gaps in research, and

[1] 1st edn. (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1959, p. 482. 2nd edn., 1962.

[2] Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.

[3] Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

gave a guided bibliographical section for those who want to check statements and follow up ideas.

University of Aberdeen ANN WILLIAMS

Le Fellah Marocain Défenseur de Trône. By Remy Leveau. *Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. 1976. 297 pp. Pb: F 94.00.*

THIS book is a study of Moroccan rural elites since independence, based primarily on the election returns of 1963. The first section is an historical account of the relationship between these groups and the monarchy; the second part is a geographical analysis of their distribution in the regions, and the third a breakdown of information on the 1963 election, tracing the social and educational background of the candidates. Although it sounds like a straightforward presentation of the material, in fact, it is difficult to follow and the reader may well be advised to begin with the second section.

Jacques Berque and John Waterbury, to select only two scholars from a distinguished company, have shown the value of studying the component groups of Moroccan society for an understanding of both the country's history and present development. M. Leveau attempts to emulate them in looking at rural elites, which he sees as the 'groupe stabilisateur' limiting the expansion of the urban bourgeoisie (p. 242). They were discredited politically under the Protectorate because of their relations with the imperial power, but the restored monarchy appreciated their value as a check against nationalism.

But it is difficult to generalise about rural elites as a whole, as the author himself suggests (p. 94). The regions are very different. The north-west, formerly under Spanish rule, had groups which 'n'ont pas, au même degré, la legitimaté que l'on retrouve dans le Sud du pays à cause de la lutte qu'elles ont menées contre la puissance coloniale avant l'independance' (p. 102). In the south, rural groups were much more concerned with trade. The third region, 'le Maroc utile', with its towns on the Mediterranean, had been much more affected by French colonial rule. These differences have shaped their development since independence. M. Leveau maintains, however, that whatever their differences they all remained resistant to social change, and that the royal alliance with these 'forces du passé' has made modernisation impossible.

The author ends on a questioning note. Will the Moroccan rural elites be able to adapt, as the Turkish have done, to the better communications between town and country? It would have been interesting to have a concluding report on the situation over a decade later.

University of Aberdeen ANN WILLIAMS

AFRICA

La Banque Africaine de Développement. By Yewou Ch. Amégavie. *Paris: Pedone with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and the Association des Institutions Africaines de Financement du Développement. 1977. 368 pp.*

THE African Development Bank differs from other regional banks in that it has no non-African countries, and therefore no developed countries,

among its members. In 1972, the exclusion of non-African countries was modified by the creation of the African Development Fund, administered by the Bank but largely financed by the traditional Western aid givers. More recently, a growing number of African governments has come round to the view that non-African countries should be admitted to membership of the Bank itself, the hope being that a dilution of its African character will be compensated by an increase in the resources at its disposal. At present, opinion is very evenly divided, so Dr. Amégavie's study, which gives special attention to this issue, is timely. The fact that it appears in French is useful, since by and large the francophone countries have been less constructive in their attitude to the Bank than the anglophone countries.

The book originated as a doctoral thesis, and shows the faults and virtues of the genre. It is perhaps too narrowly focused, and gives too much space to summarising the available literature. At the same time, the detail and thoroughness of its discussion enhance its value to those who have to weigh the specific issues to which it is addressed.

Dr. Amégavie's approach is legalistic, but he has a good grasp of the institutional substance within the legal form, and it is on institutional grounds that he comes down firmly on the side of preserving the Bank's exclusively African character. He argues the case forcefully for seeing the Bank as an exercise in independent African institution-building. That is a good case, but unfortunately he does not follow it through with a discussion of the strategies to which such a perception of the Bank might give rise. This is particularly regrettable in an African writer. He remains preoccupied, as do many Africans writing about aid, with resource *mobilisation* and with the failings of the aid-giving countries who withhold resources. A concentration on resource *deployment*, i.e. on policy, could give rise to quite a different perception, in which the problem of aid would be reduced to its proper proportions.

Nevertheless, apart from the fact that any serious contribution to what is still a very thin literature on an important subject is welcome, Dr. Amégavie's study is helpful as a starting point for one view of the Bank's future. It should be read, in particular, by those who assume too easily that a massive injection of Western or Arab money is all that is needed to solve the Bank's very real problems.

University of Sussex JOHN WHITE

Strategic Highways of Africa. By Guy Arnold and Ruth Weiss. *London: Friedmann. 1977. 178 pp. £5·95. Pb: £3·50.*

TRADITIONALLY, highways are the channels of a country's development. But the 'highways' that serve the more troubled areas of Africa have political and strategic roles that give them an importance out of all proportion to their simple economic function as trade routes. Strategic highways—whether roads, rivers, or railways—have played a vital part in the political development of Africa. Indeed the fact that half of the world's twenty-eight landlocked states are found in Africa means that international communications routes have a particular importance on the continent.

Guy Arnold and Ruth Weiss have chosen to approach their subject with a series of case studies. Virtually the entire book is devoted to descriptions of specific highways (such as the Botzam Road, the Tanzam Railway and the Zambesi River) and the transport problems facing particular countries (South Africa, Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Angola and Zaïre). *Strategic Highways of Africa* concentrates on the southern part of the continent. Certainly developments in Southern Africa during the next few years are likely to be deeply affected by the pattern of transport routes that has already been established. But the book lacks perspective because of the cursory treatment given to the rest of Africa.

A study focusing on the politics of communications represents an interesting approach to the twin concepts of conflict and co-operation. But the most serious omission in this book is the lack of analysis of the common features that arise in the case studies. Certainly the central thesis is clear—that transport routes and political relations are closely intertwined—but this is to state the obvious. The authors, therefore, end up by doing little more than presenting a catalogue of facts about particular highways. It is an interesting book as far as it goes, but it only leads the reader part of the way into the subject.

MARTIN BAILEY

How Long will South Africa Survive? By R. W. Johnson. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 328 pp. £8·95. Pb: £3·95.*

THOSE hoping for an answer to the question posed in the title will be disappointed. Mr. Johnson presents no scenarios of South Africa's future. Indeed, the main strength of the book is that he appreciates the extent to which South Africa has been affected by external factors. (Pompidou's acceptance of Britain into the EEC and the discovery of oil in Nigeria are two of the more indirect examples he gives (p. 315).) He therefore stresses the futility of attempting to predict South Africa's future independently of the international order. This is hardly an exciting conclusion but it is a valuable one.

A weakness of much analysis of the South African situation has been a tendency to accept at face value, on the one hand, Afrikaner nationalist rhetoric extolling South African self-sufficiency and, on the other, Western rhetoric stressing South Africa's political isolation. Though many dismiss such rhetoric nowadays, few possess the breadth of knowledge of international politics to contribute to a deeper understanding of South Africa's place in the present world order. Johnson tackles this subject with both verve and nerve.

South Africa's relations, both overt and covert, with the rest of the world from Sharpeville in 1960 to April 1977 forms the nub of his book. At times it reads like a detective novel. It is as exciting. The picture he paints of Western diplomacy in southern Africa, especially during the Angolan civil war, is unflattering but convincing. Whether it is altogether a true picture is another matter. Johnson deliberately does not give sources for his information so as not 'to swamp the reader in attributions' (p. iv). Further, he freely admits that his account is in part speculative and asks the reader to judge whether he has backed his hunches too outrageously far. As he carefully grounds his explanations of events on

a subtle and dynamic analysis of Western interests, I think few will feel any of his judgments outrageous, though some may be wrong. However, I do not think that new evidence is likely to suggest that he has exaggerated the squalid character of Western diplomacy in southern Africa in the period before the election of the Carter administration. Where his judgment may be open to question is in his treatment of the relationship between events of more general international importance, such as the war over the gold price and events in southern Africa. In this case he may have exaggerated the influence of South Africa in this arena.

There is much in the book that can be criticised; for example, analogies with other countries (in particular Russia and the United States) are pursued to dead-ends. Nevertheless, as a piece of instant history, this book is a very considerable achievement. The publishers have done very well to get it out so quickly. The absence of an index and a bibliography is a small price to pay.

Queen's University of Belfast A. GUELKE

White Wealth and Black Poverty: American Investments in Southern Africa. By Barbara Rogers. *Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press for the Center on International Race Relations, University of Denver. 1976. 331 pp. (Studies in Human Rights 2.) $14.95.*

Investment in South Africa: The Options. Report of a seminar held at the Methodist Missionary Society, London, February 24, 1976. *London: Christian Concern for Southern Africa. 1976. 59 pp. Pb: £2·00.*

THE question of Western economic involvement in South Africa has become highly controversial. Increasing criticism of the role of multinational corporations in sustaining apartheid has sometimes resulted in reforms to employment practices. More often, however, it seems to have forced the companies to defend their involvement by launching public relations campaigns. Barbara Rogers's book represents a counterblast against the large-scale public relations industry that has developed over the past few years with the aim of presenting American investment in Southern Africa as a liberalising influence.

South Africa is the economic, political and military centre of power in the region. Barbara Rogers therefore concentrates her analysis on the heartland of apartheid. Considerable attention is also devoted to Namibia, but Rhodesia and the former Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola are examined in less detail. The author focuses on the controversial issue of the role played by Western companies in the apartheid system. The 'Oppenheimer thesis'—that economic growth is breaking down apartheid—comes under strong attack. Growth is managed by the white community, who naturally benefit from it and use their economic and political power to maintain and strengthen white supremacy.

Barbara Rogers argues that the issue of Western investment is often obscured because it is posed in terms of the simple question of whether companies should attempt to reform from within or simply withdraw. But this is not the decision that faces management; they are more likely to look at the question in terms of whether or not to make *further* investment. The author argues that recent developments, both political and economic, have seriously weakened commercial prospects. 'When white minority

rule is challenged the solution will not be a peaceful one, and those involved in the present situation are likely to be involved in the ultimate conflict.'

Investment in South Africa: The Options is the proceedings of a seminar organised by Christian Concern for Southern Africa in February 1976. The Rev. Elliott Kendall opens the report with a paper on ' The Response of the Churches in Britain '. This criticises the churches for their failure to confront the issues posed by their shareholdings in companies operating in South Africa. The remaining papers put both sides of the reform and withdrawal arguments. Merle Lipton, a South African academic, argues that ' constructive engagement ' is possible. She claims that ' the blacks have been and are gaining from growth, and that growth is in some, though not all, ways undermining apartheid '. The opposing view is put by Abdul Minty, of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, in his contribution on the case for disengagement. Minty dismisses the suggestion that companies can act as agents for change as simply a ' manoeuvre to try to legitimise their investment '. The reformist argument falls down because it ignores ' the fact that the South African economy is not operating independently of its wider political structure '.

Both these books represent important contributions to the debate on Western economic involvement in the minority regimes of Southern Africa.

MARTIN BAILEY

Namibia? By J. H. P. Serfontein. *South Africa: Fokus Suid. 1976. London: Rex Collings. 1977. 433 pp. £10·00.*

MORE than half Mr. Serfontein's text deals with the years from 1971, when an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice transformed the international legal issue of Namibia into a domestic, political one, with serious international complications. For this development, in his analysis, the South African government (and official opposition) were totally unprepared, as were the white people of Namibia. Mr. Serfontein, an Afrikaner journalist who has moved in stages from the National Party to the Progressives, laments his country's handling of Namibia in the years before 1971, and excoriates it for its role since.

The United Nations' slow-moving campaign could at last begin to detach the old League of Nations mandated territory of South West Africa from South Africa when the 1971 Opinion unequivocally declared that country to be in illegal occupation. ' As a White South African ', he writes, ' I can but look back with sadness over what proved to be 25 wasted years.' South Africa had underestimated the importance of accommodating the political aspirations of the Namibians, insulting their intelligence instead with the ' diabolical farce ' of the Odendaal Plan, and alienating what support and sympathy may have remained in the UN. It did not even try to ' counter the growing support among the younger generation for radical parties such as SWAPO, relying instead on " stooges " '. In short, it ' squandered its chances of seizing the initiative ', while the issue moved from the niceties of mandate and trusteeship to ' a full-blooded battle for decolonisation and independence '.

If words like ' sadness ' and ' squandered ' give the impression that Mr. Serfontein is not in favour of full independence for Namibia, and con-

vinced of the stature and importance of SWAPO, this must be because he writes as a convert who saw the light only during the writing of this book. He even had some residual faith in Mr. Vorster's genuine intentions about granting 'non-apartheid independence' to Namibia; and had, since 1972, defended Vorster's government against critics abroad on this point. 'My own disillusionment was great when I discovered that this was never intended, that Mr. Vorster and his colleagues genuinely believed that they could bluff the world with a Bantustan facade and get away with it.' He has the grace to apologise for 'some possible contradictions' that have been left in.

He tells the 1971–76 story of the international tug-of-war and the Turnhalle Conference with fascinating and valuable detail, believing that it is 'vital for White South Africans to know the full story and to learn so that Namibian blunders will not be repeated in South Africa'. In other words, may one assume that Vorster or his successor will honour their commitments honestly and fairly, even to the point of transferring their own power?

The summary of the years before 1971, the brief accounts of the Namibian parties, the key role of the Churches, the 1971 strike, Walvis Bay, the Angola War are all interesting companion material to the general student of Southern African affairs, and useful to the specialist both for the range of sources and because it is told by an enlightened Afrikaner. The book's main failing, it must be said, is in its presentation which is always journalistic and occasionally inaccurate (for example, the reference to this reviewer's own journalistic activities on page 153, which is totally in error). It also sometimes surprises by its failure to encompass the deep human issues involved. The South African-Namibian conflict is much more than the political and diplomatic duel it tends to seem here. Nevertheless, Mr. Serfontein's treatment of it as such is always enriching, and occasionally revealing.

RANDOLPH VIGNE

Race Relations in Rhodesia: A Survey for 1972–73. Compiled by Dorothy Keyworth Davies. *London: Rex Collings. 1975. 458 pp. £6·50.*

Education, Race and Employment in Rhodesia. Edited by M. W. Murphree, G. Cheater, B. J. Dorsey and B. D. Mothobi. *Salisbury: Association of Round Tables in Central Africa with the Centre for Inter-Racial Studies, University of Rhodesia. 1975. (Distrib. outside Southern Africa by James Redshaw Ltd., 2 Corn Exchange, Conduit Street, Lichfield, Staffs.) 478 pp. Pb: £5·95.*

BOTH these books, products of research carried out at the University of Rhodesia's Centre for Inter-Racial Studies, are welcome additions to the study of race relations in Rhodesia.

In the volume compiled by Dorothy Davies those interested in any of the varied aspects of race relations in Rhodesia now have available a local equivalent of the invaluable annual surveys of race relations by the South African Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg. The book provides comprehensive coverage of such matters as the Anglo-Rhodesian constitutional dispute as well as relations with other countries, population and geography, developments in both rural and urban areas, the security situation, labour relations, religious affairs, sport, education, and so on. There is also a useful chronological table of events from the Ndebele invasion into Mashona territory in the late 1830s up to the closure of

the Rhodesia-Zambia border in 1973. Since this volume is the first of a proposed series the author rightly refers to some of the more important developments before 1972–73.

Despite this wide treatment of the subject-matter one has to note that the survey suffers from rather too heavy a dependence on Rhodesian press sources. The author points out, however, that she was 'not unaware of news reports and differing expressions of opinion in the news media of other English language countries but has reluctantly accepted the limitations imposed by censorship since an important objective of the survey is to collate and disseminate material for Rhodesian readers' (p. xx). This may be—the author certainly strives to offer as fair a picture as possible given these limitations—but the result is a somewhat Rhodesia-centred view of the world which occasionally tends to overlook or underplay an event of otherwise obvious significance. One example of this is that there is no mention of the despatch of South African para-military forces to Rhodesia in mid-1967 either in the text or in the table of events, although from a regional or international perspective this is of obvious significance. (There is a brief description of these forces' activities at a later date.) But in general there is no doubt about the value of this book and one can only look forward to the next volume.

Education, Race and Employment in Rhodesia, which focuses on a critical problem not only for Rhodesia but for all developing countries and offers conclusions with far-reaching implications, should prove to be one of the most important contributions to the study of race relations in the country.

Professor Murphree, who writes Part I (Introduction) and Part IV (Summary and Recommendations), notes that 'human aspirations and human resource utilization' is the general concern of the book. Specifically he poses the questions:

> Are the primary reasons for African underemployment to be found in 'cultural deprivation' factors leading to a lack of proper motivation and adequate cultural conditioning for effective participation in the entire spectrum of the occupational structure, or are they rather to be found in the labour market itself, in the recruitment and employment patterns which this market exhibits? (p. 293).

It is the first question which Dr. Dorsey examines in Part II (The African Secondary School Leaver). She looks at the aspirations, academic achievements and post-school employment of Form IV and Form VI African school leavers. Her research findings are based on numerous carefully prepared and detailed questionnaires submitted to some 2,500 secondary school pupils in sixty-seven schools representing 94 per cent of the senior secondary school population at these levels in 1971. Among the factors assessed for their influence on pupils' aspirations and achievements were parental education and occupations, tribal origins, general family background, religion, sex, education of elder siblings and residence (urban or rural). Other tables show the pupils' prestige and preference ratings for thirty-five different occupations ranging from doctor to domestic servant. This information was supplemented by the O and A level examination results achieved by the pupils. In a follow-up study of their post-school experience it was discovered that only 11·6 per cent were employed and that 50·2 per cent were unemployed while the balance had continued with other forms of

schooling. Of those who found employment 45 per cent could be classified as underemployed. Dr. Dorsey's conclusion is that the fault

> does not lie primarily with the educational system which is producing African secondary school graduates of high potential but with the occupational structure which fails to utilize adequately this potential (p. 174).

Part III (Employment in Commerce and Industry) by G. Cheater with the assistance of B. D. Mothobi provides an analysis of the occupational structure. The researchers looked at such factors as company structures, personnel services, job analysis and description, recruitment, selection and training procedures, constraints on managerial decision making, government policies, trade unionism and labour legislation. Seven companies of various kinds and sizes were covered in depth for all aspects of the research programme while partial reference to seven other companies was also achieved. The conclusion is that educational criteria are less significant than racial criteria as far as access to the middle and upper level occupational categories is concerned, which results in a considerable wastage of African manpower potential.

In the concluding chapter Murphree makes recommendations which would help to improve the situation but does not offer much hope that they will be taken to heart by either government or management. His conclusion is a sombre one.

> The composite picture presented is one in which African youth perceive the opportunity structure facing them as being restrictive, controlled by a white power structure unresponsive to change, and experiencing alienation—both perceived and real—from the political, social and economic mechanisms which might bring about desired changes. . . . Under such circumstances it is not surprising that tensions and antagonism between these youth and the established social order have arisen. . . . That some have turned to more radical forms of anti-establishment behaviour is also not surprising (p. 291).

Developments since this research was completed bear out this latter observation. Many schools in the border areas have closed as large numbers of pupils have absconded to the guerrilla training camps in neighbouring black states. It seems clear that radical political changes will have to occur before the problem to which this book is addressed can be remedied.

A. R. WILKINSON

The Gezira Scheme: An Illusion of Development. By Tony Barnett. *London: Cass. 1977. 192 pp. £10·00.*

IN *Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan,*[1] Arthur Gaitskell saw the creation of the Scheme as a remarkable example of development achieved by combining the entrepreneurial spirit of private enterprise with the paternalistic spirit of colonial government. Barnett, nearly twenty years later, sees the Scheme rather as a means whereby the structures of underdevelopment have been, and still are, systematically reproduced locally, regionally and nationally, and thus as 'a link in the dependent

[1] London: Faber, 1959. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1960, p. 399.

relationship between the Sudan and the rest of the World' (p. 132). Barnett writes in the broad tradition of the 'dependency and underdevelopment' school, one of whose doyens is A. G. Frank; but he is critical of Frank and significantly more pessimistic regarding the possibility of radical change at the periphery of 'the international capitalist system' (see p. 26). His approach emphasises the reproduction of dependency and underemphasises the possibilities for transformation at the periphery—although not to the point where more optimistic readers cannot identify, in the material presented, factors which might help generate the radical changes that Barnett himself apparently rules out. One cannot be sure, however, for the book concentrates almost exclusively on the Scheme itself, although important information regarding the wider economic and political context is provided in various chapters.

Although one misses a full discussion of the national political economy, it is one of the merits of the book that it penetrates beneath the global assertions of the first chapter to a more specific and detailed analysis—based on anthropological field-work as well as existing sources—of the complex structures which maintain and reproduce relations of inequality and deprivation at the local level. Chapter 2 introduces the village where the author carried out field-work between 1970 and 1971, while chapters 3 and 4 discuss what Barnett terms 'social resources and labour strategy' among local farmers. All farmers within the Scheme are tenants, but their production decisions are based on the range of resources they can command; the tenants' class position, it is argued, is determined in the long run by differential access to social resources: tribal affiliation, money, education, religion, political access, administrative access and kinship—this last being 'perhaps the most important resource, particularly as class distinctions appear to follow kin affiliations' (p. 55). One aspect of inequality relates to the development of credit and debt among the local population, and in chapter 5 this is explored in some detail. All tenants stand in a common contractual relationship to the Gezira Board and chapters 6 and 7 analyse the implications of the fact that, despite this homogeneity in the eyes of the law, tenants are significantly differentiated, according to class and control over social resources. Chapter 7 demonstrates effectively that 'the way in which tenants manipulate the water resources of the Scheme tells a great deal about both social relations within the village and relations between tenants as a group who all stand in the same *formal* relation to the Sudan Gezira Board' (p. 100).

In chapter 8 the scope of the analysis is extended to consider the Scheme in relation to evolving government policy; the central theme here is the constant tension between pressures for devolution and the maintenance of central control over the Scheme. Chapter 9 considers the origins and work of the field-staff and suggests that their general situation, and the divisions that exist among them, can be understood only in terms of the Scheme's overall function within the colonial and post-colonial economy and state. The conclusion, stated baldly at the beginning of the final chapter, is that 'the Gezira Scheme still operates as an element within the capitalist system of production and exchange. For this reason its organisational technology is as relevant today as it was when it was first constructed over forty years ago' (p. 158). The Scheme is not monolithic but Barnett argues that, while the field-staff 'are expected to resolve the core conflict within the organisation, between national economic

and local welfare goals . . . the conflict cannot be resolved by them or by anyone else in the Gezira Board, for their job is to administer an organisation which forms a vital part of the dependent Sudanese economy.' (p. 156). It is important to recognise, however, that contradictions within the Scheme itself do not merely reflect those of the wider society, they also generate divisions among the staff which have political implications for that wider society; the poor farmers too and the farm labourers are perhaps not quite the helpless pawns that Barnett sometimes makes them out to be.

University of East Anglia DAVID SEDDON

Politics of Decolonization: Kenya Europeans and the Land Issue 1960–1965. By Gary Wasserman. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 225 pp. (African Studies Series 17.) £9·50.*

A FASCINATING and illuminating account of the period in Kenya's history when land transfers from Europeans to Africans became vitally tied up with the independence negotiations and with the determination of the type of economy and society which would evolve in Kenya after political independence.

While it might appear that the two most directly interested parties in the land question, and therefore the most influential, would be the European settlers on the one hand and landless and land-hungry Africans on the other, Wasserman's analysis is important for pointing up divisions amongst both Europeans and Africans in Kenya at this time, and for his argument, backed with detailed factual research and analysis, that the dominant influence on the Kenyan scene at this time came from neither of these groups:

> Resettlement in the Kenya Highlands was an integral part of the adaptation of a colonial political economy to the removal of formal colonial authority and the entrenchment of an African political élite. Both the European mixed farmers' threats to abandon their farms and the African (Kikuyu) masses' threats to fulfill by their own hands their leaders' promises of land, were potentially disruptive to this process. Both groups' demands were bought off (sold out) by the bureaucratic, political and economic vested interests of an evolving transnational system (p. 129).

In Kenya the two most powerful groups that were, or became, members of this system were the 'liberal European commercial and industrial interests' represented in the New Kenya Group (NKG) led by Michael Blundell and members of the African nationalist elite in the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) and the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). Much of Wasserman's study focuses on the attempts by the European members of NKG to control the form of post-independence economy and society in Kenya, and above all their concern to ensure respect for the sanctity of private property (a significant part of it being theirs). This reviewer was left wondering about the nature of the justification for using the epithet 'liberal' (one of the terms the author does not define in Chapter 1) to describe this group.

Wasserman also sets out to show how the African nationalist elite, by giving priority to the attainment of independence and the distribution of

political power among themselves, were diverted from considering the nature of post-independence Kenya, including a genuine land strategy for the country as a whole:

> the type of society that would evolve, the position of the great bulk of Africans in that society and, in a real sense, the reason why one wanted independence in the first place were questions which by their failure to pose at this time the nationalists showed themselves passively accepting the colonialists' answers. They inherited a ready-made state with sufficient resources to make their rule profitable without coming to terms, other than those of the colonizer, with the problems and potentials of Kenya (pp. 133–134).

Within these other, overriding, power struggles, the redistribution of land becomes a political tool used in various and vacillating ways to buy off two potential sources of disruption to the peaceful transfer of political power while maintaining and perpetuating most of the structure of the colonial economy. The legacy in the Kenya of 1977 is a continuing 'land problem'. One cannot help wishing that many of those currently involved in the Rhodesia settlement negotiations would read this book. There are a number of obvious parallels.

University of Sussex DIANA HUNT

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

Southeast Asia in International Politics 1941–1956. By Evelyn Colbert. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1977. 372 pp. £13·15.*

THE author of this study establishes her credentials on the first page by thanking her colleagues in the Office of Strategic Studies, the State Department and the American intelligence community. However, any reader approaching the book in the hope of finding the sort of sensational inside revelations to which we have become accustomed in recent years will be disappointed. It is a sober historical analysis of the kind that could have been written in a library by any competent academic scholar, and it should be judged in those terms. Let it be said at once that in its own terms the book is exceptionally good and deserves to be widely read. If nothing else, it will have the value of restoring a perspective of South-east Asia which—especially in the United States—was lost during the years of obsession with Vietnam. Whilst not ignoring the importance of Indochina, the book devotes special attention to Indonesia, which must in the long run be seen as the centre of gravity of the region as a whole. There are also some interesting sections on the early development of international co-operation, from the days of the British-sponsored Special Commission of 1946–47 and the Asian Relations Conference of 1947, to the evolution of the Colombo Plan and the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung. In this perspective, and also that of the expanding American aid programme, the author is able to demonstrate the relatively less important role of SEATO despite the amount of attention it has received from writers on international relations. It is in these other arrangements that one must

seek the roots of the more recent ASEAN, rather than in SEATO. The book also gains by taking 1956 as its terminal date, rather than 1954 or 1960, in that the author is thereby obliged to examine the two years after the Geneva settlement in terms of their own perspective rather than merely as a prelude to the conflicts which came later. Her chapters on that period are especially good.

One might, however, question the wisdom of taking 1941 as her point of departure, and of concentrating on the colonial issue as the most significant theme of the war years. By doing so, Dr. Colbert misses the opportunity of exploring the continuity of both American and communist policies from the 1930s to the 1940s. She also fails to explore the problems arising from the specifically military aspects of the war—for example the issue (between the United States and China on one side and Britain on the other) of which war theatre should embrace Thailand and Indo-china. Nor is she able to place the events of the crucial years 1945–46 (which are perhaps too superficially treated) against their background of developments in the 1930s. Again, one might criticise her for not saying enough about the role of Japan in shaping South-east Asian nationalism at that point.

Three other serious criticisms of the book can be made. First, the strength of its analysis on the American side is also its weakness, in that communist policies are also seen from an American point of view rather than in terms of their own objectives. Whilst presenting a careful study of the diplomacy of the period, Dr. Colbert has relatively little to say about the 'struggles' of the Huks in the Philippines or the Malaysian Communist Party in Malaya, as efforts to change the whole political framework of the region. Second, the book pays no attention to the attempts of 'radical' American writers in the past decade or so to produce a 'revisionist' interpretation of this period. Dr. Colbert may well disagree with their views, but it is no longer enough to ignore them altogether. The whole question of the economic (that is, business) dimension of United States policy in Asia needs now to be taken into account. And finally, one cannot help but remark upon the limited range of source materials used. The development of American thinking, as revealed in the sequence of published documents (from the volumes on the Foreign Relations of the United States in the 1940s, to the 'Pentagon Papers' material on the early 1950s), is studied in some depth. But no use has been made of the Freedom of Information Act to go beyond the published record; nor has the author looked at the British archives, which for the Second World War period have been open for several years now. There are some interesting references to contemporary articles in learned journals, but no use is made of newspapers for the period. Last, but not least, there is no indication that any indigenous South-east Asian sources have been used, even in translation.

One is left with the feeling that, for the most part, the book could have been written ten years ago. Perhaps it is a pity that it was not. For despite these criticisms, and despite the fact that it may well be soon outdated, the book represents a valuable contribution to our understanding of the region.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London R. B. SMITH

Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970s and Beyond: An Interperceptional Study. By Bhabani Sen Gupta. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 368 pp. £17·50.*

AFTER the withdrawal of American troops from Indochina and President Nixon's visit to Peking, it is not surprising that scholars have rushed to write on the changing politico-strategic situation in Asia. Among recent publications Gupta's book stands out for its broad survey and novel approach. He examines the whole scene from Teheran to Tokyo and looks at Soviet policies, and the reaction of Asian countries to them, from the point of view of their self-perceptions. His hypothesis is that '. . . relations between and among nations reflect their perceptions of one another. Relations are friendly if the mutual perceptions are compatible and reinforce one another, while relations are hostile if the mutual perceptions are grossly incompatible and antagonistic' (p. 338). The clearer and more sophisticated, from an ideological point of view, is the self-image, the greater the weight it is likely to play in the decision-making process. Gupta's scholarship is thorough and his conclusions are convincing and shrewd.

Gupta traces the origins of the Soviet self-image to Marxism-Leninism and shows how the rise of Russia as a super-power on a par with the United States has reinforced rather than undermined the Russians' belief in their country's role as the world's leading revolutionary power. Contradictions that are so apparent to others between its various international roles are apparently easily resolved for the leaders in the Kremlin 'by a simple Leninist doctrine that obliterates all frontiers between Marxism-Leninism and the interests of the Soviet state, that is, Russian nationalism' (p. 2). The Soviet self-image, therefore, has remained basically unchanged, but Gupta argues that it has in recent years become more complex and is as a result closer to international reality.

Although the Soviet view of the world is still fundamentally a bipolar one, Gupta describes how room has been provided within it for potential allies and friends in Asia. Their self-image, however, owes little to ideology and is, therefore, easier to change. If the communist states of Indochina are excluded, he can see no evidence of any real convergence between the Soviet and Asian self-images. He concludes that although impressed by Russia's power, the Asian countries have not found Soviet civilisation attractive nor have they been convinced by its claim to be a Euro-Asian nation.

There are two parts to this book: the first examines the ideological roots of the Soviet image; its view of Asia; its security model for the continent and the growth of Soviet naval power. The Soviet strategic goal is identified as parity with, rather than primacy over, the United States. Gupta expects that the Russians will persevere with their efforts to create regional alliances to promote Soviet interests, while paying particular attention to Iran, India, Vietnam and Japan. He discusses how security-related issues have become a major feature of Soviet diplomacy in Asia, and how Moscow anticipates that dissidents and governments will turn to it for support as the continent continues to be troubled by domestic instability and international conflicts. The image that the Russians, therefore, will seek to project is that of a great power seeking to assist the countries of Asia to prosper and safeguard their independence.

The second half of the book looks at the three main regions of the continent. As one would expect from an Indian scholar, the chapter on Southern Asia is the best in the book. He shrewdly points out that Russia's policies in the Persian Gulf, and especially with regard to Iran, must be seen as part of its overall strategy in Southern Asia.

What Gupta describes is a record of success. There is no denying that Soviet power and influence has grown appreciably throughout Asia. However, his assessment of likely developments in the future lacks balance, because of his failure to take a more positive view of the ability of China and the United States to inhibit further Soviet advances. After all, American strategy in Asia was not entirely devoted to supporting reactionary governments and its more constructive aspects will still present serious obstacles to Soviet ambitions. Gupta does appreciate, nevertheless, that American reluctance to become involved in wars of national liberation in the future will make nationalism in Asia a greater barrier than before to Soviet penetration.

This is a fine book and one's only regret is that few students will be able to afford to buy it. Praeger are to be complimented for publishing it so quickly, but its price is appallingly high.

University College of Swansea J. E. WILLIAMS

Ideology and Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia: Indo-Soviet Relations 1947–60. By Zafar Imam. *Delhi: Kalyani. 1975. 260 pp. Rs 50.00.*

IN his book, Imam traces in a chronological fashion the ups and downs in Soviet-Indian relations from 1947, when the relationship was cool, to 1960 when fear of China and many other factors drove Russia and India into a close working relationship. The most interesting part of the book looks at the speeches of Khrushchev and Molotov at the 20th Party Congress—these, Imam claims, were an important milestone in Soviet policies towards Asia. He further considers the relevance of ideology to Soviet policies. A number of his assertions are open to question, such as his claim that Krishna Menon played a decisive role in the 1954 Geneva Conference.

University College of Swansea J. E. WILLIAMS

Green Revolution? Technology and Change in Rice-growing Areas of Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. Edited by B. H. Farmer. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 429 pp. £12·00.*

OF the exaggerations which the 'Green Revolution' has generated, its name is not even the worst. To be sure, on the wheat farms of the Punjab, the technology which 'packaged' the sowing of high-yielding varieties with the timely use of irrigation water and commercial fertilisers brought almost instantaneous success. By comparison, results were less readily forthcoming in the paddy fields of South Asia, particularly where, outside the delta areas, the supply of water was insufficient. B. H. Farmer, the Director of the Centre of South Asian Studies in Cambridge, and his team thus chose wisely in carrying out an inter-disciplinary survey in non-delta districts in the north-east of Tamil Nadu and the south-east

of Sri Lanka, where the new farm technology encountered problems unknown to, or overlooked by, those bent on generalisations and on 'some previously conceived "grand theory"' (p. 225).

This book contains the augmented and amended versions of some two dozen papers presented at a seminar late in 1974. Some of them are rather raw; others could have done with some rigorous pruning. It is to the credit of the contributors that they describe their findings as preliminary and tentative. Even so, had some of the source material and statistical calculation been relegated to appendices, and had the hundred or so tables been listed like the graphs, the volume would have become more readily accessible to the hard-pressed practitioners with no time to work their way through 400 pages. Thus, the editor's advice to read the last chapter first makes good sense.

Between them, John and Barbara Harris, apparently unimpressed by their editor's admirable brevity, hold the lion's share of the book. By comparison, some of the Indian and Singhalese contributors might have deserved more than the space left to them. Barbara Harris is a shrewd observer of problems caused by the use of electric pumps, tractors, rice mills and rice levies. John Harris is rather preoccupied with previous writers' views on class and group conflicts in the villages; yet he writes perceptively not only about the hierarchical caste structure, but also about increased differentiation among the peasantry and increasing 'proletarianisation' in the rural areas: 'the story of Randam's Harijans is one of declining fortunes' (p. 233). Among the cultivators, pump sets, like seeds and fertilisers, have enhanced inequality. This is what causes conflict. Widely varying seasonal fluctuations in the use of farm labour are reported by B. N. Chinnappa and W. P. T. Silva, but although the same phenomenon applies to draft animals, technical tools, farm incomes and consumer spending, these aspects have not been covered in this survey. Neither has farm expenditure nor the role of rural, non-farm employment been studied sufficiently. Much remains to be done before the survey's final results are issued. The valuable report of the International Rice Research Institute on changes in rice farming (Los Banos, 1975) came to hand too late to be consulted. Other relevant sources, such as the Agricultural Development Council's study on farm mechanisation [1] and the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation's evaluation of the Paddy Lands Act (Rome, 1970) were not used either. These omissions might be remedied before the publication of the survey's final findings.

The most outstanding contributions to this volume are those by Robert Chambers, who writes (together with W. E. Wickremanayake) about the 'mythology of extension' services (p. 162) and, on his own, on 'the maddening nature of water', 'the very stuff of politics' (p. 345). He rightly urges that both water management and continuity of employment be given central positions in South Asian affairs. At the farm level, no distinction is made between natural and social matters. There is thus need at the academic level for inter-disciplinary teamwork, much of the best of which 'takes place in the same brain' (p. 400), Chambers maintains. His is one of those brains. May it continue to furnish remedies for those whose lives are most precarious.

St. Antony's College, Oxford W. KLATT

[1] H. Southworth, ed., *Farm Mechanisation in East Asia* (New York: Agricultural Development Council, 1972).

The Transfer of Power 1942–7. Vol. VII: The Cabinet Mission 23 March–29 June 1946. Edited by Nicholas Mansergh with the assistance of Penderel Moon. *London: HMSO. 1977. 1130 pp. £30·00.*

As in the previous volumes of this series,[1] the documents are printed in chronological order and are indexed subject-wise in notional chapters. The high standards of objectivity and presentation of the earlier volumes have been fully maintained and the introduction is so good that lazy readers may be tempted to skip the documents themselves.

This volume covers the activities of the Cabinet Mission in 1946. Immediately after the arrival of the delegates in Delhi they spent a fortnight interviewing Indian leaders, after which they issued a statement setting out the alternative choices. These were: scheme A—a federal constitution in which the provinces would have the right to form groups; and scheme B—partition. Discussions with the Indian leaders showed that there was no prospect of settling the Pakistan issue by agreement. The Mission therefore issued a draft which began by stating that Pakistan was impracticable and went on to propose a three-tier constitution, in which there would be provinces, groups and a Union Centre.

Attempts in the second Simla Conference to secure agreement to this draft failed. On May 16, therefore, the Mission issued its own proposals, on the lines of the previous draft. This also emphasised the importance of an Interim Government. Jinnah accepted these proposals since they provided for what he called compulsory grouping and so paved the way for Pakistan. He also agreed to negotiate about the Interim Government. But the Congress would not accept the parity in the Interim Government on which the Moslem League insisted. Faced with this impasse, the Mission therefore issued a new statement on June 16, in which fourteen individuals were nominated to the Interim Government. The statement provided that if the Congress or the Moslem League refused to co-operate, the Viceroy would proceed to nominate a Cabinet as representative as possible of those who accepted the statement of May 16.

On June 25 the Congress accepted the statement of May 16. Jinnah maintained that as Congress had not agreed to the proposals for an Interim Government, the Viceroy was bound by the terms of the statement of June 16 to call on the Moslem League to form a government. The Mission did not accept this view—and whatever the correct interpretation of the two statements might have been, it is clear that an Interim Government without the Congress would have been meaningless. At this stage the Mission went home, having, through no fault of its own, achieved very little. The agreement of the Congress and the Moslem League to the statement of May 16 did not mean that any advance had been made towards the settlement of the Pakistan issue, and moreover, there had been no agreement about the Interim Government.

It is impossible not to admire the sincerity and patience which the Mission showed, but they had been trying to solve an insoluble problem. It is clear from these documents that without partition no solution was possible and Cripps, perhaps because of his great intellectual qualities,

[1] Vol. I (London: HMSO, 1970) reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1971, p. 202; Vol. II (1971), reviewed Jan. 1972, p. 152; Vol. III (1971) reviewed April 1972, p. 359; Vol. IV (1973) reviewed April 1974, p. 330; Vol. V (1975) reviewed July 1975, p. 451; Vol. VI (1976) reviewed Jan. 1977, p. 154.

was incapable of understanding the strength of the emotion behind a demand which he regarded as irrational. The British government was determined to hand over power—but to whom could it in fact be transferred? That question was still unanswered.

P. J. GRIFFITHS

The Lessons of Vietnam. Edited by W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson S. Frizzell. *London: Macdonald and Jane's; New York: Crane, Russak. 1977. 288 pp. £10·50.*

IN 1973 and 1974 the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy held a colloquium and conference on the subject of the Vietnam War as part of its programme of studies in security. It has now published an abstract of the results in the form of papers presented and the consequent discussions, organised into fifteen chapters covering a wide range of warlike activities. The title is slightly misleading, because for all that three ambassadors and no fewer than nine professors took part, it proved to be a post-mortem on the reasons for the military failure of the United States when faced by so puny an antagonist. The temptation to concentrate on such subjects as the tactics of guerrilla warfare, the use of air power, the mathematics of attrition, the validity of a quantitative or statistical approach to the conduct of warfare and so on proved great. The *military* lessons of the Vietnam War is a more accurate title. On that level the book is good, and essential reading for the student of war. By covering so much each subject is dealt with somewhat superficially, but the compensation is that the military landscape is well mapped, and each chapter is a sound, or provocative, basis for deeper study.

There remain some important questions which are not answered, or half answered, or answered only indirectly. What sort of situation did the Americans expect, or hope, to exist after military action had ceased and their soldiers had gone home? How far, and how justly, had the American policy makers understood the workings of the minds of the leaders in Hanoi? This was crucial, for the Americans, eschewing their own version of Clausewitzian strategy, had adopted 'limited' war, and a precise estimate of the reaction of the North Vietnamese to a war of carefully calculated attrition was essential to its success. (The signs were not lacking that they were prepared to endure damage and casualties on a scale intolerable in another type of society.) There was the failure to judge the effect on world opinion. (To say nothing of public opinion at home.) Ironically, the very constraints of a 'limited' war served only to prolong it and make it more brutal, until thoughtful observers, by no means all on the left, began to perceive that as an exercise to preserve liberty the cure was worse than the disease.

These mistakes were not due to stupidity. Whole squadrons of academic and other 'whizz-kids' with the best brains in America grappled with the problems of the war. American generals are excellent, and working within their curious terms of reference, they won a series of Pyrrhic victories of technological brilliance, but all to no avail. Some of the answers to this puzzle do emerge from the discussions of strategical and tactical detail which form the bulk of the book. Great institutions tend to become rivals, and favour policies which advance their own prestige

rather than the common aim. This is hardly news: the question is, why were they allowed to get away with it?

The machinery of government, outwardly well-constructed and well-staffed, was ponderous and inflexible. Once committed to a certain line, its massive momentum made it impossible to switch it to another track, even when the operators in the field saw they were heading for the wrong destination. Said a senior commanding general when asked why he was persisting in an obviously unprofitable, even disastrous, policy he had been ordered to adopt, 'I can see it coming [the disaster], but what can be done about it?' (pp. 48–49).

Robert Komer, an ex-ambassador, says: 'A complex of built-in constraints made it difficult for America to perform in any other manner than it did—except of course to disengage' (p. 211). That is the unsatisfactory epitaph for the dead and the bitter theme of this candid and critical survey of the war, whose value is enhanced by the fact that many of its contributors took a prominent part in the events they were later to analyse.

SHELFORD BIDWELL

Communism in Indochina: New Perspectives. Edited by Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown. *Lexington, Mass., Farnborough: Heath. 1975. 295 pp. £8·00.*

As the editors have pointed out in their introduction to this book, this collection of papers, presented at an ad hoc seminar on 'communist movements and regimes in Indochina' in New York in 1974, precedes the decisive events in Indochina of 1975. This does not, however, reduce the value of these papers, which together form a most useful background to the victory of the communist movements in Indochina.

Inevitably, the bulk of the papers presented deal with the Vietnamese communist movement. Given the paucity of the documentary evidence, it is not surprising that little that is startlingly new has been added; however, some interesting points are made. William Duiker, in his paper on the rise of communism in Vietnam in the period 1925–54, shows how the Vietnamese communist leadership gradually managed to evolve an indigenous political strategy for Vietnam freed (in all but name) from the frequently disastrous guidance of Moscow. Carlyle Thayer's paper unravels the complicated organisational relationship between the Lao Dong and the various revolutionary organisations to emerge in South Vietnam in the course of the insurrection against Ngo Dinh Diem. Since the partition of 1954 and its acceptance of the necessity for two separate political and social strategies for North and South Vietnam, the Lao Dong has continually been faced with the dilemma between on the one hand maintaining the goal of national unification and on the other of working with the special and separate conditions obtaining in the south. This is clearly illustrated in Thayer's article and in Gareth Porter's article on the Lao Dong's strategy in South Vietnam, where he shows the concern of the leadership that 'radical socialist transformation' should not be pushed ahead too fast in the south.

The conflict between socialist and nationalist goals is also illustrated in the papers by William Turley (on the North Vietnamese army) and by Daniel Elliot (on land reform in North Vietnam). William Turley

shows how the emphasis on national above social goals in the war against France enabled the Democratic Republic to build an officer elite on the basis of talent rather than class purity. As a complement to this, Daniel Elliot's article explains how reliance on all classes of 'patriotic' Vietnamese in the war created difficulties in the subsequent period of class struggle in the 1950s.

Finally, the papers on Cambodia provide a very useful background to the obscure but horrifying events of the last few years. The papers by Milton Osborne and Peter Poole illustrate Sihanouk's distinct inclination to the right in the years before 1970; hence, of course, the mistrust between Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge after 1970. Donald Kirk's article shows that the Khmer Rouge had been pursuing a policy of crude coercion and terror (amounting to a systematic attempt to eradicate all the social and cultural features of the *ancien régime*) in the areas that they controlled, long before the final takeover of April 1975.

University of Hull C. J. CHRISTIE

Peace with Horror: The Untold Story of Communist Genocide in Cambodia. By John Barron and Anthony Paul. *London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1977. 234 pp. £4·95.*

Cambodge: La Révolution de la Forêt. By François Debré. *Paris: Flammarion. 1976. 261 pp. Pb.*

ONLY the most mulish fellow traveller could still question today that an extensive bloodbath followed the conquest of Cambodia by the Marxist-Leninist forces in 1975. Indeed, Barron and Paul quote one atrocity actually boasted about by the Phnom Penh radio itself—the slaughter of the eighty-odd air force pilots who, under training in Thailand when their side was overwhelmed, opted to go home, were given a welcome of reconciliation with banners at the frontier for the foreign press to photograph from the Thai side, but were then 'executed as the traitors that they were' (that is, clubbed and knifed to death, in accordance with pre-colonial political culture). Both these books consist in the main—Barron and Paul entirely—of the horrors recounted by refugees who have since escaped from the emptying of the towns, the starvation and the massacres. The sufferings witnessed or undergone by the wretches interviewed here are consistently heartrending and retold with vivid sensitivity by Barron and Paul—by Debré with a shunning of unmanly *sensibilité* favoured by French socialist writers and with a detachment that smacks of getting his information at second hand (a point he is not frank about).

Of greater concern for political science and international relations is the identity of the mysterious *angka* ('organ')[1] in whose name, as in that of the mysterious *derg* in Marxist-Leninist Ethiopia, all the horrors were perpetrated, as well as the reason for a 'class' liquidation in Cambodia more brutal than has followed other communist-party takeovers—even Stalin's and Mao's. Only Debré goes into these questions. He identifies

[1] This is a Sanskrit-Pali religious term; one of its uses in former times was as a delicate substitute for *lingga*, the monarch's sexual organ worshipped in Hindu temples at Angkor. That 'organ' = communist party (as it did in 1945–51 Vietnamese usage) was disclosed by Saloth Sar (now Pol Pot) in Peking—*Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct 21, 1977.

the *angka* as a five-man Politburo comprising Comrades Ieng Sary (like the Laotian 'chairman', Kaysone Phomvihan, half Vietnamese), Son Sen, Saloth Sar and two of the latter's lieutenants, but excluding Comrade Khieu Samphan and others who collaborated with Sihanouk before 1970. He attributes their emergence as communist leaders to spontaneous adoption of Marxism-Leninism as a road to power when they were students in France in the early 1950s, coupled with fervid 'nationalism'—like 'charisma' (i.e. flamboyance), 'nationalism' dies hard!—and an ascetic intolerance among the rank and file generated by years of living in the bush. He gives no source for his key facts, and I find the analysis based on them rather shallow.

It is only in extremism that the *angka* differs from the Party in Vietnam or Laos; the basis of policy has been the same in all three states—transfer of urban populations to canal-digging in remote places on the grounds of food shortage, and liquidation of the administrative, military and professional class of the old regime to which the communist leaders themselves belong. Cambodian extremism (de-urbanisation carried out by hounding at bayonet-point, liquidation executed with the bayonet-point) is accounted for by the complete lack, already apparent during the war,[2] of any administrative cadre capable of running the country in succession to the old regime once Phnom Penh had been captured: if the tasks of government could not be discharged, the atrocities which so outrage Barron and Paul were an efficient way of avoiding the need for government. Moreover, quite apart from the overweening ambition Debré attributes especially to Comrade Tran ('Ieng Sary'), there is an elementary Marxist-Leninist logic behind the policy: if we concede that it is right to overturn the old regime and to subject the state and people to socialist transformation, then, as Lenin argued, there must be a Party ('organ') to dictate all the steps; since anything which jeopardises the organ of dictatorship logically threatens the whole revolutionary enterprise, self-preservation by *angka* must take absolute priority over every other consideration and not even the slightest risk of dissent be accepted; and since administrative machinery is lacking and the only executive agents available to the Politburo are what the Indochinese peoples euphemistically call 'lacquer-teeth' (illiterates), incapable of exercising discretion, the ruthless measures these two books describe can be seen as minimum, not maximum, precautions fully justified in the local circumstances by the *a priori* Marxist-Leninist purpose.

University of Kent DENNIS DUNCANSON

Contemporary China. By Bill Brugger. *London: Croom Helm; New York: Barnes and Noble. 1977. 451 pp. £9·95. Pb: £5·50.*

Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars: The Training of the Chinese Communist Leadership, 1920–45. By Jane L. Price. *Folkestone: Dawson. 1976. 226 pp. £12·00.*

MANY teachers of post-1949 Chinese politics in institutes of higher education will have long felt the need for a suitable 'standard account' to be used on their courses. Bill Brugger's *Contemporary China* is clearly intended

[2] See *The World Today*, March 1974, Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 98.

to fill this gap. Indeed, in large part this book is based on the author's lecture course at Flinders University, Australia, and so would appear to be ideal. Unfortunately, the attempt is only partially successful, for this book's attractions are also its major defects.

Without laying down any hard and fast rules on the subject, it is quite clear that any introductory account must present a certain amount of detailed information in a relatively structured way. The problem with this book is that it provides far too much detail for the reader to assimilate through a structure which is not just over-complicated but also does not aid explanation. The result is a useful, interesting and sympathetic account of China since 1949, but one which supplements, rather than replaces, other introductions.

Brugger's account of Chinese politics is essentially historical. He maintains that Chinese politics since 1949 have been a battle between conservatives, radicals and ultra-leftists. These three groups have agreed about the desirability of achieving socialism, but have differed as to the best means for reaching this goal. The conservatives have regarded economic development as the precondition of social change, the ultra-left have viewed disorder as creative, while the radicals have seen change arising out of alternating periods of order and chaos, and social and economic development as being inextricably linked. The battleground for this conflict has been the continuing debate on the appropriate strategy for development. In simple terms this debate has been between two models of development—the Yenan model, employed by the Chinese Communist Party in the revolutionary war before 1949 and embodying its guerrilla heritage, and the Soviet model adopted by the regime in the 1950s.

The story of this battle is described in terms of nine periods—or cycles—since 1942. Each cycle comprises a period of radicalism, accelerated radicalism, and consolidation. Such a framework is not only useful for explaining China's development since 1949, but it is also one which has achieved a degree of acceptance among China scholars and is that favoured by the Chinese Communist Party itself. In this view, progress in general, and each cycle in particular, is 'saddle-shaped' if drawn on a graph whose axes are radicalism (i.e. towards socialism) and time. A high point (of radicalism) is followed by a trough (a period of consolidation) which in turn is followed by an even higher point in the progress to socialism.

In effect, Brugger is combining three different methodological approaches. Although the attempt to weave together the struggles among the three 'lines' and the conflict between the two models with a cyclical interpretation of contemporary China is a valiant and intriguing effort, it does not really succeed in the chosen context of an introductory textbook. Any one of the three alone would be an adequate heuristic device, but as presented here together they create a structure for the book which is cumbersome and confusing. Apart from the Yenan and Soviet models, neither of the other two approaches is fully articulated, nor are the relationships between them. This is no doubt at least partly due to limited space, but the author also has a tendency to describe and assert rather than to explain. Thus, for example, Brugger describes a cyclical pattern of development but does not explain it, nor does he enlarge on how the struggle between the three lines or the conflict between the two models has effected this cyclical pattern. Again, there is no critical dis-

cussion of whether and how progress towards socialism has been achieved —it is merely asserted that China is on the road to socialism.

Most original but least satisfactory is Brugger's attempt to describe the battle between conservatives, radicals and ultra-leftists. According to the author in his preface this battle is 'The main theme that runs through this book' (p. 14). However, the three positions are not clearly observable throughout the book. In fact it is difficult to maintain such a three-way divide in analysing the whole period since 1949. Consequently, despite the preface, there is no mention of an ultra-left before the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, there is a confusing use of terms—such as the description of a 'moderate radical position' (p. 318)—and the reader is left with the distinct impression that the radical position is merely the residual category left by the post-1949 leadership purges. The radicals have been the consistent winners—the conservatives and ultra-left born losers.

In complete contrast, Jane Price's *Cadres, Commanders and Commissars* is a research monograph of the first order. Although this is a book very much for the specialist, it is one which will attract those interested in revolutions in general, as well as the Chinese experience in particular. It is a study of the Chinese Communist Party's education and training of leadership cadres before 1949 which focuses on an important part of the organisational issues behind the party's success in 1949. Through a discussion of the development of cadre policy, and a description of the various party schools and educational techniques, the author argues convincingly that the leadership training programmes of the party provided it with an invaluable 'organisational weapon' in the struggle for victory. In more general terms she argues, as does Friedman (in *Backward toward Revolution* [1]) that it is not just organisation which is the guarantee of successful revolution, but the quality of organisation which is all important. Largely as a result of its concern with leadership training, the Chinese Communist Party managed to outstrip its rivals in this respect.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne DAVID S. G. GOODMAN

Party, Army and Masses in China: A Marxist Interpretation of the Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath. By Livio Maitan. Trans. by Gregor Benton and Marie Collitti. *London: New Left Books. 1976. 373 pp. £8·00.*

THIS book is a competent and well-written account of Chinese politics with particular reference to the Cultural Revolution period. It begins with some fifty pages in which developments between 1949 and 1965 are traced. It then devotes some 180 pages to a detailed discussion of the most turbulent phase of the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1969. Finally, a further hundred pages discusses the 'aftermath' up to 1975, both in domestic and foreign policy, concluding with the author's analysis of the 'Social Nature of China'. The book is based entirely on material which has long been in the public domain—official news agency reports, American translation series and some of the more readily accessible secondary material. Because of this it contains virtually no factual information which is in any way unfamiliar.

[1] Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1974.

It would be a great mistake, however, to assume that this is just another case of 'academic recycling', for this book possesses considerable originality. Professor Maitan, of the Roman Institute of Sociology, may not use Chinese language sources, but he brings to the materials tools of analysis which are extremely rare among Western China scholars. For he is a Marxist, and this book is offered as a Marxist interpretation. By which I do not mean to suggest that he has anything in common with those who parrot and paraphrase the *Peking Review* in order to spread the Maoist gospel. Maitan is a sophisticated observer who analyses China from a Trotskyist perspective. His insights are often perceptive and, although often similar to those of non-Marxist scholars, are derived from a very distinctive world view, and are expressed within a rigorous intellectual framework.

The freshness of this study arises, in the author's words, from its attempting 'a Marxist assessment of developments since 1949, based wherever possible on official sources and first-hand accounts, but not subordinate to the official mythology'. The main theme of the work is that 'the immense possibilities opened up by the revolution of 1949 are partially frustrated and denied by a bureaucratic political system'. Maitan accepts fully the enormous achievements gained since Liberation, and makes the usual contrast with the Indian experience. Thus he notes with approval that 'China has emancipated herself completely from imperialist control . . . overthrown age-old class barriers . . . succeeded in unifying the country . . . set out on a qualitatively new path of economic development . . .'. But he also points out that the full revolutionisation of society was prevented by the emergence of a bureaucracy possessed of many Stalinist features (among which, it is worth noting in these days of the 'gang of four', is the willingness to 'indulge in exceptionally virulent and mendacious attacks on defeated opponents'). The Cultural Revolution was an attempt by Chinese leaders to rectify such deficiencies, but met with only limited success because of the very same leaders' unwillingness to sacrifice their political monopoly, and to permit the rise of genuinely democratic forces. Hence, Maitan argues, in recent years, a new 'bureaucratic restabilisation' has taken place. He puts his case well, writes more in sorrow than in anger, and the result is stimulating and provocative.

University of Manchester JOHN GARDNER

The Chinese Communist Party in Power 1949–1976. By Jacques Guillermaz. Trans. by Anne Destenay. *Folkestone: Dawson. 1977. 614 pp. £18·00.*

THIS is an English translation of the second of two volumes originally published in French in 1972.[1] The author has revised the text of the second volume and brought it down to 1976, which was a dramatic point in the history of the party marked by the departure of its three major figures (Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Chu Teh). Jacques Guillermaz was a French diplomat in China in the 1930s and 1940s with first-hand experience of the events during the period covered by the first volume. In this second work he has understandably been unable to reach the same standard of

[1] *Histoire du Parti Communiste Chinois (1921–1949)* (Paris: Payot, 1968). Eng. edn., *A History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921–1949* (London: Methuen, 1972), reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1973, p. 156. Vol. 2: *Le Parti Communiste Chinois au Pouvoir 1 Octobre 1949–1 Mars 1972* (Paris: Payot, 1972).

confident judgment, although on military and international affairs he is noticeably less tentative.

In the preface the author distinguishes four problems faced by the leaders of the new regime, which remain as factors conditioning its future, and on which he has concentrated his attention. These are the demographic problem (which has long bothered the Western world); the economic development from a backward self-sufficient peasant economy to that of a modern industrial power, by means likely to be unique in world history; the creation of a new society out of one which has had a continuous history of some forty centuries; and, finally, the problem of power involving experiments in control by military, party and government in various combinations and relations. The author emphasises that the way in which China attempts to tackle these problems will directly affect the entire Western world. It will also decide the extent to which a civilisation created by forty centuries of effort will survive as a basis for a world culture.

The two volumes as a whole will long serve as solid works of reference but much of the second volume is necessarily sketchy and tentative and already the revelations of the last year call for a number of adjustments and additions to the text.

University of Leicester M. HOOKHAM

Agriculture in the People's Republic of China: Structural Changes and Technical Transformation. By Leslie T. C. Kuo. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 288 pp. £16·45.*

CONDITIONS for field studies or analytical research of any kind by qualified observers inside China do not exist. In spite of visits by several distinguished scientific delegations in recent years, access to parts of the countryside and agricultural institutions is still ruled out except to a few privileged travellers who can be relied upon to draw the picture the Chinese authorities want. Statistics have been spasmodic since publication of the *Ten Glorious Years* in 1960 [1] and confined to imperfect provincial data and off-the-cuff statements by members of the party or government at opportune times. Reliable studies of China's agriculture, therefore, are hard to come by; most tend to be impressionistic and their value depends on the author's background and perspicacity in grappling with fragmentary data and contradictions. The study of China's agriculture is further complicated by fundamental problems relating to differences in basic approaches to economic theory as well as terminology. Because even as specialists we must view China as outsiders, it is inevitable that much of the meaning of the internal contradictions will be lost, forcing us to fall back on generalisations which will tend to fit neatly into Western patterns of development. Agriculture in the People's Republic of China cannot, and should not, be viewed as a whole since it is agriculturally diverse, unequally developed and subject to severe political restrictions.

The background of the author of this study, however, makes him ably qualified to present an account of developments in the People's Republic of China. Born in China, he later served eleven years with the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation and is at present at the National

[1] Peking: Foreign Language Press.

Agricultural Library, United States Department of Agriculture. Dr. Kuo visited China in 1975. The present book follows on from his earlier study, *The Technical Transformation of Agriculture in Communist China.*[2] The present study, however, is not merely an updating of that work, but attempts to synthesise institutional changes and technical innovations as well as social, political and economic developments since land reform in 1949. Careful attention is paid to raising yields per unit of land: fertilisation, soil conservation practices, plant breeding and genetics, tool improvement and biological control. The latter area in which China has had a long history of experience since 1600 AD (p. 217) is well treated. The author is well aware of the dangers of working without adequate data and, therefore, he makes great use of Japanese sources, as well as the usual American, Taiwan and Hongkong files, to supplement official statistics.

The book has benefited from his contact with Chinese librarians who visited the National Agricultural Library in 1973 and the present study incorporates some of the latest material on the post-Cultural Revolution period which became available after that visit. Although the technical transformation of agriculture in the first 25 years of the People's Republic is considered to have been rather limited as compared with the vast backlog of traditional Chinese agriculture and, therefore, has benefited overall productivity 'only to a small degree' (p. 260), emphasis on technology is now increasing. Technology has been handicapped by lack of investment, raw materials and trained personnel. The 'trial and error' technique is picked on as a significant factor in Chinese rural development experience. The process of continual education has meant that China has been able to maintain a flexible response to circumstances. However, decision makers must now begin to realise that future agricultural development will require much larger injections of financial and material resources if productivity is to rise to realistic levels. The provision of incentives for the peasant is thought to be important in this respect. The tendency of many visitors to China today is to fall into the trap of taking China's aggregate agricultural production to be higher than it really is. This fact does not escape the author of this book, who, whilst acknowledging China's obvious advances, considering its inherited assets and liabilities in 1949, and the strides made in providing a more equitable distribution of food and other resources, maintains that the country still faces an enormous task on the agricultural front in terms of the supply of farm products in the coming decades.

Wolfson College, Oxford K. P. BROADBENT

Japanese Industrialization and its Social Consequences. Edited by Hugh Patrick with the assistance of Larry Meissner. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press for the Social Science Research Council. 1977. 505 pp. £20·00.*

THERE are few topics of greater significance in the social sciences than the study of the process and effects of industrialisation. Most political ideologies assume the inevitability of a given pattern of industrialisation, usually derived from the local experience of a particular society. Theories of development, whether capitalist or socialist, are likewise built on models

[2] New York: Praeger, 1972.

of industrialisation deduced from particular historical experience. The mid-twentieth century, however, has demonstrated the fact, over and over again, that there are many strategic choices to be taken in the course of industrialisation and the number of patterns or routes of social and economic change are much greater than was ever imagined twenty years ago. The case of Japan is of outstanding importance, both because of its dramatic growth rate and its relative success in coping with the consequences of economic change. Any study of Japanese industrialisation is therefore potentially of interest to developed and developing societies.

This volume of conference papers, edited by Professor Patrick, dates from the year of the 'oil-shock' and represents the research and ideas of twenty-five leading scholars from the United States, Japan, England and Israel. The result is a book of major importance. Three reasons could be cited to support this judgment. In the first place, the twelve papers presented together provide the best source to date, in the English language, of the detailed development of the labour market and the industrial structure of Japan since the Meiji Restoration. The work of Lockwood, Broadbridge, Bain, Dore and Taira has, of course, provided much insight into the specific historical process by which the vast economic power of modern Japan has been built up, but these papers offer a synthesis of the work of so many writers which makes it look like a quite indispensable reference book.

Secondly, there is, as the title implies, an emphasis here on the social implications of decisions taken by entrepreneurs and government leaders and officials. These include decisions on types of technology, sources of energy, business structure and sub-contracting, export strategy, wage systems and levels and the type of worker employed. The implications flowing from these decisions include income distribution, attitudes to work, marriage patterns, family life and fertility, consumption patterns and environmental problems in urbanised Japan. It is evident from the studies reported here that the social consequences of the Japanese pattern of industrialisation have a quite different mix of benefits and costs, when compared with West European countries, the United States or the Soviet Union. The obvious environmental costs in Japan and the poverty of welfare arrangements for those outside the large modernised firm sector has to be set against a striking reduction in the extent of poverty and the marked trend towards the reduction of income inequalities.

The third reason for commending this book is perhaps the most important. The study of Japanese society has been dominated in the last twenty years in the West by the emphasis on the large corporation with its special culturally derived work ethic. The papers here of Hazama, Cole and Tominaga, Saxonhouse, Yasuba and others show that differences between occupations, types of worker and size of company have been crucial. The 'dual structure' is a crude model of a complex reality. There is an urgent need to develop that model in order to make sense of Japanese industrialisation.

London School of Economics KEITH THURLEY

Ruling Class, Ruling Culture: Studies of Conflict, Power and Hegemony in Australian Life. By R. W. Connell. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 250 pp. £9·50. Pb: £2·95.*

DR. CONNELL, one of the 'leading lights' in what seems to be an Adelaide 'school' of Marxist scholars, following up his work on the socialisation of

school children in Sydney and on class structure in Australian history, has brought together ten essays which he calls 'the products of a larger project that has attempted to grasp and analyse the class patterning of Australian society'. Earlier versions of five of these essays have already been published as articles, and four of the other five began life as seminar or conference papers. He has rewritten them and grouped them in three sections: the first on the logic of class analysis, the second on the recent history of the ruling class, and the third on consciousness and culture. The whole work is imbued with a theory of class as a structure generated by the operation of fundamental and highly general processes—with a stress on processes rather than types of social groupings. Class is described as an event rather than a category. His writings are therefore an interpretation of Australian history.

Dr. Connell is fascinated by 'the long boom' and the hegemony of the Liberal Party/Country Party since 1949. What he wants to analyse are the processes which legitimise the relationships between business and government, and which domesticate all forms of opposition. Gramsci's notion of hegemony is his favourite concept, and the counter-hegemonic role of socialist intellectuals provides his principal inspiration. Perhaps because his earlier work on socialisation led him to reject a great deal of sociological theory about stratification, he is inclined to dwell upon the role of ideology, and to study the part played by the media in the support of capitalism. He singles out teachers and journalists in the transmission of values, and sees the segregation of the working class as a result of new patterns of production and living. The motor car has hindered and not helped the mobilisation of working-class opinion.

The main interest of the book lies in the author's application of this approach to events since 'the boom' of 1969 and its collapse in 1970–71. The emphasis is on the part played by the major companies, on the difference made in property relations by the corporate structure, and on the special conditions of recession and monetary disorder in which the Labour Party came to power in 1972. The author selects a number of episodes to illustrate the significance of conflict within the ruling class, including the liquidation of Mineral Securities in 1971 and the controversy over foreign control of Australian industry in 1971–72. When 'the larger project' finally appears, it should have much to teach us about the connections between changes in capitalism and political methods.

Birkbeck College, London J. M. LEE

NORTH AMERICA

The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam. By Herbert Y. Schandler. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1977. 419 pp. £12·30.*

As Herbert Schandler's excellent and comprehensive bibliography emphasises, the literature on most aspects of United States involvement in Vietnam is already extensive, including numerous books and articles by participants from the political arena, the military, most branches of

the bureaucracy and the Third Estate. There are, in addition, thousands of pages of government documents of one sort or another, of which the Pentagon Papers form but a part. He himself served in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, International Security Affairs, in 1968–69, and was principal compiler of the Tet sections of the Pentagon Papers. He has excavated these vast resources, and also interviewed 34 leading figures including Dean Rusk, the former Secretary of State, William Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1964–69), General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1964 to 1970, General William C. Westmoreland, commander of the United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (1964–68) and Clark Clifford, McNamara's successor as Secretary of Defence in 1968.

His book is a detailed analysis of the impact of the Tet offensive of the early spring, 1968, on American policy in South-east Asia. The story is built around Lyndon Johnson's national television address of March 31. Here the President discussed American attempts to make peace according to the San Antonio formula of September 1967, when he had offered to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, in exchange for productive talks together with North Vietnamese agreement not to take military advantage of a bombing halt. He now moved a step forward towards disengagement with a unilateral decision to halt the bombardment of North Vietnam except in the area immediately to the north of the Demilitarised Zone. He also reported the decision to send a further 13,500 support troops to South Vietnam (but not the 206,000 requested by Wheeler), and then surprised his audience with the announcement of his decision neither to seek nor to accept renomination by his party for a further term as president. Schandler unravels the process whereby President Johnson came to these decisions.

Ultimately, he concludes, it was through the conviction of his advisers, particularly Clifford, that 'increased American effort would not make the achievement of American objectives more likely or more rapid', and because of the President's 'own deeply felt conviction that unity must be restored to the American nation' (p. 339). In reaching the strategic conclusion, the review of the entire American position in South-east Asia conducted by Clifford's task force in February–March 1968 was clearly of the utmost importance. Schandler traces with a sure hand the compromises reached by men of different opinions but each of honest goodwill, and sketches the administrative, political, military and indeed moral difficulties that circumscribed a total and immediate change of policy. If the logic of his argument is accepted, in tune with his general conclusions, then the particular judgment that 'The American system provides no institutional procedure for adversary political debate at the highest level in determining national objectives and policy other than the political process itself' (p. 331), does not stand unchallenged, despite the weight of footnote reference given to support the statement. Also, in view of President Johnson's concern on March 31 with national unity, more detailed discussion than Schandler provides of the domestic political scene would have rounded out the story. But it is a tale well told.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

Men against McCarthy. By Richard M. Fried. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1976. 482 pp. $14.95.*

THE career of Joe McCarthy and the influence which he exercised in American political life is a subject of continuing fascination to American historians and political scientists. To the outpouring of scholarly works there has been added, more recently, interesting work in the theatre and cinema, as those blacklisted during the McCarthy years take their entirely proper revenge. The very seductiveness of the topic may be leading to a retrospective distortion of history, causing McCarthyism to appear as a more dominating issue in politics than was in fact the case. Explanations of McCarthyism differ. There is the demonological school, which sees McCarthy as merely the most vicious in a long line of demagogues (including such men as J. Parnell Thomas and, of course, Richard Nixon) who used anti-communism as a means to obtain the publicity and punitive power which they craved. There is the sociological school, concerned to place McCarthy's supporters in the historical context of American populism, ethnic tension and status anxiety. And there are those who see McCarthyism as an aspect of high politics, of the relations between executive and legislature, and of the struggle between the parties. Professor Fried's study of the Democratic Party's response to McCarthyism is a valuable contribution to this last area of discussion.

It is not a heroic story. Professor Fried has little sympathy for the revisionist view that the Truman loyalty programme was a McCarthy-like exercise; but the fact remains that the administration was driven into a permanently defensive position in security matters, and more adept politicians in the administration recognised Dean Acheson's courageous refusal to turn his back on Alger Hiss as a political blunder of the first order. But the Democratic Party in Congress did no better. The defeat of Senator Tydings in the 1950 election, of which Professor Fried gives a clear and convincing account, encouraged their natural caution; while the support offered by liberal Senators like Paul Douglas and Hubert Humphrey for proposals to confine political spies and saboteurs in special detention camps did nothing for their reputation as defenders of civil liberties. The Democrats in Congress saw McCarthy as, successively, an electoral threat, a Republican Party problem, and a fruitful source of embarrassment to the Eisenhower administration. Senators like Johnson and Kennedy kept carefully clear of the issue; and only William Benton, that most unprofessional (and short-term) of politicians, fought desperately against the Senator from Wisconsin. The story is lucidly and exhaustively chronicled by Professor Fried. He is, perhaps, too kind to the Democrats. Many of them, for too long, put electoral fears, party advantage, and even senatorial courtesy before the national interest. The real 'men against McCarthy' were, with few exceptions, outside the Senate; they were McCarthy's victims, rather than his colleagues.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge GERARD EVANS

Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: British-Canadian Relations 1917–1926. By Philip G. Wigley. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 294 pp. £12·50.*

THIS is an important book for the historians of Commonwealth and Empire and more remotely for British and Canadian citizens confronted

by massive political myths about imperialism. Dr. Wigley's book is a detailed investigation of the record of relations between Canadian and British politicians and bureaucrats during the formative phase in the transformation of the Empire, which fought the First World War, into the Commonwealth tested in battle from 1939 to 1945.

Dr. Wigley has, for example, studied both the British *and* the Canadian archives; both the papers of Lord Byng *and* the diary of Mackenzie King. The result is an historical account rather different from that presented by Mackenzie King's biographers and some other Canadian scholars. The unexamined assumptions of Canadian scholars have tended towards the belief that the British government pursued a monolithic imperial policy which was only modified by the pressure and threats of politicians like Sir Robert Borden in one way and Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King in another. The facts presented by Dr. Wigley seem quite otherwise.

Mackenzie King and O. D. Skelton persuaded themselves, for example, that the Canadian delegation to the Imperial Conference in 1923 was standing up to the imperialists on behalf of an independent Canadian place in the international community. In fact, Mackenzie King was kicking at an open door. The British Foreign Office did not want to consult with the Canadians or anyone else, nor did it care whether the Canadians went their own way or not. On the other hand, the Colonial Office *was* concerned, but the leading British politicians were not. This it is in no way surprising when one comes to think about it.

Mackenzie King was not the only politician who had objected to Lloyd George's policy during the Chanak crisis. Stanley Baldwin, for example, rose from obscurity to the top of the political heap as a result of his opposition, not to monolithic imperial policy but to Welsh wizardry as particularly manifested in Britain's relations with Turkey.

An important generalisation emerges from Dr. Wigley's book which is of interest to political scientists and philosophers. This investigation suggests that political decisions are made more often than not by little knots of bureaucrats, and are the outcome of their rivalry with one another *inside* a government. War tends to cause the transcendence of this form of decision making, but only for the time being. Comes peace, and the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the incipient Canadian and Irish bureaucracies, and so on, return to 'normal', i.e. to the maximisation of their own activity no matter what that activity may mean in terms of overall national welfare or advantage. During the war the voice of the Foreign Office was muted because Britain needed men and munitions from the overseas empire. When peace came the Foreign Office was no more interested in the participation in its affairs by Canadians *et al.* than Eton would be interested in playing cricket with Manchester Grammar School. The Foreign Office did not care whether the Canadians played at diplomacy or not. It just did not want them in its league.

University of Birmingham H. S. FERNS

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Armies and Politics in Latin America. Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal. *New York, London: Holmes and Meier. 1976. 356 pp.*

Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil. Edited by Henry H. Keith and Robert A. Hayes. *Tempe, Arizona: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University. 1976. 258 pp.*

LOWENTHAL'S book contains few novelties for the student of Latin American politics. All its contents are reprints and the vast majority of the reprints are well known. Together they provide a fair indication of the ways in which political scientists have viewed the Latin American military over the past fifteen years. On the whole, the selection is well chosen, although, by reproducing only articles, the editor excludes certain major contributors whose main publications have been of book length (such as Johnson and Huntington) and reproduces work by others (notably Stepan and O'Donnell) which, though useful, is short of their best. However, many of the old faithfuls (Nun, Putnam and Germani and Silvert) appear, although these general writings are on the whole less satisfactory than the individual case studies (a point made by Lowenthal in the first article). Of the latter, the contributions of Ames and North are outstanding.

Of the general approaches, most writings are statistical (Putnam and Schmitter) or sociological (Nun and Germani and Silvert). This appears to mirror political science literature, although it might have been interesting to include a little more Marxist/Dependency writing (which is represented only by Nun's ten-year-old piece). The more glaring omission is the lack of attention paid to military ideology and consciousness (although this does receive more attention in the case-study section, notably from Stepan). If consciousness is important, it would suggest that reactions to particular external events (such as the Cuban Revolution or the coup in Chile) and to changes in the intellectual climate in Latin America are important factors in military behaviour. Such a conclusion would play down the explanatory power of sociological variables as well as reducing the value of comparative, cross-sectional statistical surveys which treat countries as 'units'. Indeed, the focus on subjective factors would make all theory more difficult.

But is theory an illusion? Certainly its absence can make for dull and depressing reading. As evidence one need look no further than Keith and Hayes's collection on Brazil where many of the contributors serve up an uneasy mixture of indigestible facts and unsubstantiated and sweeping statements (for example, on page 155 'one main Military Club group can be described as ultranationalistic because of the Jacobinistic zeal which led its adherents to carry nationalism to the point of xenophobia'—followed by no evidence of any kind). Other contributions are victims of the restricted format; thus, for example, Cortes's article on the Rio Grande do Sul might have been more interesting if the author had been given more than twenty pages in which to cover 130 years. Neale Ronning's article and Keith's own contribution are the only ones of value in this collection.

It appears, therefore, that the most successful writers on the military are those who have been able to show an awareness of the general

'theoretical' questions surrounding military behaviour without being dominated by them. Thus, despite Lowenthal's view that 'the most exciting task is to synthesise and integrate within an inclusive theoretical formulation the by now abundant literature on the political role armies play' (p. 20), the best work may be done by those able to harness the various theoretical perspectives to an understanding of a particular Latin American reality.

London School of Economics GEORGE PHILIP

Cuban Economic Policy and Ideology: The Ten Million Ton Sugar Harvest. By Sergio Roca. *Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 70 pp. (Sage Professional Paper in International Studies 44.) Pb: £1·75.*

Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization. By Carmelo Mesa-Lago. *Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1974. 179 pp. $9.95. Pb: $3.95.*

On Negotiating with Cuba. By Roger W. Fontaine. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1975. 99 pp. (Foreign Affairs Study 28.) Pb: $3.00.*

Castroism and Communism in Latin America, 1959–1976: The Varieties of Marxist-Leninist Experience. By William E. Ratliff. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. 1976. 240 pp. (AEI-Hoover Policy Study 19.) Pb: $4.00.*

NOT unnaturally, Allende's Chile and Castro's Cuba exercise a compelling fascination on students of Latin American affairs in the United States. Those who specialise in Cuban affairs, who have on the whole been more critical of Castro's Cuba than, for example, the American press, are finding it difficult to reconcile themselves to the inevitable *rapprochement* between the United States and Cuba which is now taking place, but on the whole they contrive to approach the matter with a fair degree of objectivity. They dwell perhaps with undue emphasis on Cuba's failure to achieve the almost impossible goal of a ten million ton sugar harvest in 1970. Sergio Roca's short study is entirely devoted to it. It contains a wealth of information, including briefly, the fact, often overlooked, that by far the greater part of the sugar cane planted in Cuba takes eighteen months to reach maturity. This alone is enough to make the Cuban leadership's decision to attempt the ten million ton harvest in one year almost incomprehensible. Sergio Roca deals with every aspect from planting to harvesting, transport and milling, and also with the deplorable effect upon the rest of the Cuban economy, starved of many resources, including manpower and transport, of trying to meet the impossible target. Unfortunately the book is repetitive and often clumsily written to the point of occasional obscurity.

Like Sergio Roca, Professor Carmelo Mesa-Lago is Cuban born, but he has a far greater command of English, and an ability to assemble his facts, his evidence and his conclusions, as well as to achieve an objective approach. His book is a valuable study of the causes and methods by which Cuban policies have, since 1970, increasingly fallen into line with the policies of the Soviet Union. 'My contention is', writes Professor

Mesa-Lago in his preface, 'that [the Cuban] Revolution has come of age and, learning from its mistakes and under Soviet influence, has become increasingly pragmatic and institutionalized' (p. ix). The book amply justifies the author's belief.

Roger Fontaine's book, written in 1975, is a bold attempt, successful in the main, to foresee the obstacles and problems that are already beginning to arise as Cuba and the United States try to come to terms with each other. To solve the major issues will be a formidable undertaking and, writes Mr. Fontaine, '... impatience for "concrete results" would be foolish' (p. 98). Nevertheless he believes that an American-Cuban understanding would be of benefit to the United States.

The most ambitious of these four books is William Ratliff's comprehensive survey of communist activity in Latin America. He succeeds in reducing to order the apparent chaos of the multiple factions of orthodox pro-Soviet communists, Maoists, Castroists, Trotskyists, etc., and the bewildering initials by which they are known. Mr. Ratliff lists six pages of acronyms (pp. xv–xx). There is ample evidence of a real desire to achieve objectivity; for example, when dealing with orthodox communist opportunism, the author writes: 'Communists are not necessarily more venal than other political leaders . . .' (p. 85). Occasionally Mr. Ratliff makes eccentric judgments, as when, for example, he writes: 'The lack of unity among leftish parties . . . was the most important of several factors contributing to the downfall of the [Chilean] Popular Unity government' (p. 185). Of course the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* was a thorn in Allende's side; but hardly the major cause of his failure. Nevertheless this book fills a real need and Mr. Ratliff has achieved a considerable feat.

All four books add to our knowledge of Cuba and the political left in Latin America and those by Carmelo Mesa-Lago and William Ratliff will be of lasting value.

J. A. CAMACHO

Peruvian Democracy under Economic Stress: An Account of the Belaúnde Administration, 1963–1968. By Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1977. 308 pp. £12·70.*

THIS is a remarkably interesting book, combining an insider's knowledge with the expertise of a professional economist. Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski was an executive director of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru for the latter, and most crucial, part of the government of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry, who was deposed in 1968 by the present military government. Although most of the book deals with the economic problems facing Peru, and the inadequacies of the government's response, inevitably a great deal of politics is included in the analysis. The author is sympathetically critical towards the Belaúnde administration, though he rarely loses the opportunity to demonstrate, mostly with damaging irony, the economic ignorance if not irresponsibility, of most policy makers. One senator opposed a much needed tariff reform ostensibly on the grounds that he would no longer be able to get Parmesan cheese for his spaghetti.

Blame for the political stalemate attaches largely to the congressional majority in which the *Acción Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA)

played its usual unscrupulous role. The heroes of the conflict were the *técnicos* of the Central Bank (those 'hippies' in the view of the more traditional politicians). Belaúnde's difficulties (and achievements) are sympathetically outlined. But the author's reflective prescriptions for ending political deadlock are very institutional, largely limited to a few, albeit necessary, congressional and constitutional reforms. Yet Peru's current economic difficulties do not look so very different from those of ten years ago, even though the present military government faces none of the institutional problems of Belaúnde's politically weak administration. Perhaps one should look to more radical explanations of Peru's problems.

However, there is so much that is so good in this account that one must end on a note of praise. Very few books on Latin American policy making can rival this one for its perceptiveness, clarity and intelligence. Many of the problems of the period—the economic role of the United States, devaluation, protection, and, not least the International Petroleum Company—are discussed with a degree of insight that could only have come from an author who combined personal experience with academic rigour. And though the content of the discussion is limited to Peru, 1963 to 1968, the implications and significance of the economic debate of that period are much wider. This is one of the most important books on Latin American policy making to have been published for a long time.

St. Antony's College, Oxford ALAN ANGELL

The United States and the Andean Republics: Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. By Frederick B. Pike. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1977. 493 pp. £17·50.*

'HAD they attended at all to the situation, business, political, religious, and academic leaders in the United States might have been able to brave themselves for shocks ahead by observing that the most influential guides for young Andean intellectuals in the 1920s included such antidemocratic, antiliberal figures as Ortega y Gasset, Carlyle, Spengler, Keyserling, and Nietsche, and especially Marx and Lenin' (p. 210). As this quotation suggests, Professor Pike, who is a leading Latin Americanist in the United States, Professor of History at the University of Notre Dame and author of, among other works, *The Modern History of Peru,*[1] sees the relationship between the United States and the Andean countries primarily in terms of intellectual conflict; an enduring clash of ideas. His present book is primarily, therefore, an intellectual history of the three Andean countries of the title. As such alone it would be a valuable contribution to the literature on the area, and particularly useful in the way it draws out the similarities between them, a theme which specialists on each of the countries concerned have in the past tended to play down. It will be welcomed by anyone with a serious interest in, or dealings with, any of the three countries, and, most of all, by anyone who is interested in more than one of them.

However, a gentle objection may be made that the title is misleading. The book is in no way a diplomatic history, as the reader might

[1] London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1969, p. 191.

reasonably have expected it to be. Though well documented from many sources it simply does not devote very much time to the United States, which is, it must be said, so much taken for granted that the elliptical allusions to its policy, and even more to the development of its own ideology, may well baffle a non-American reader. Moreover, it is a book with a message: that United States policy makers have failed to understand that liberal democracy, as they understand it, is alien to Andean elites, whose actions in first embracing and then rejecting it were alike based on the desire to maintain control over the masses. United States foreign policy has, to that extent, been based on wrong assumptions. But the obvious question is, had United States policy makers paid more attention to the intellectual climate of the Andean countries, would their diplomatic relations with the area have been substantially improved? Peru, it may well be argued, constitutes something of a success-story in the history of recent American diplomacy, much as did Bolivia in the 1950s. And it does seem as if those people who have been the effective policy makers of and for the area have not been the intellectuals at all, but businessmen, professional politicians and career military officers—all men whom the United States career diplomatists understood very well. As for the future, there can be no doubt that Professor Pike has done much to promote the cause of better understanding, and it will be doubly interesting to see how rapidly the enthusiasm for it in non-governmental circles is transfused into action.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

The Making of Modern Belize: Politics, Society and British Colonialism in Central America. By C. H. Grant. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 400 pp. £14·00.*

IT is a rare treat to see a work as definitive as this one, and even rarer when it is an absorbing study of a grossly unresearched and fascinating area of the world. That some may be drawn to reading it because of the much publicised recurrent claim of Guatemala to at least part of the territory of Belize is understandable: without this famous case, over a century old, it is quite possible that Belize's political evolution and the development of its distinctive society would go unnoticed in the same way as continuous British neglect ensured its obscurity within the Empire. Before June 1973, when Belize replaced British Honduras as a symbolic gesture, and particularly before the granting of internal self-government in 1964, it was a low status posting, epitomised by a remark reportedly made by a high-ranking official that the best way to see the country was from the stern of a departing steamship.

Compounding that has been the strong tendency to view the political development of Belize as an adjunct to the Guatemalan claim. We are in Dr. Grant's debt for rectifying this. But his scholarly history results in a very detailed account indeed, with a faithful description of the confusing myriad of political groups but a less than satisfactory analysis of their real strength and appeal compared to the long-running dominance of George Price's semi-coalition, the Peoples' United Party.

Such a proliferation of political expression is not surprising given powerful external forces, the demands made by decolonisation and the

existence of a divergent society. The various external factors in particular are skilfully woven together in this book. Most apparent to the outside world is the Guatemalan claim and Grant's analysis shows it to be strong if the maxims of international law are rigidly interpreted. Mediation and intermittent bursts of negotiation have produced proposals which have either been politically unacceptable, or have outstepped the bounds of contemporary international legal convention, or both. The issue has also provoked a strong indigenous response despite Belizean representation being denied in Anglo-Guatemalan negotiations before 1965. Another factor is Belizean society itself. Fragmented not only in terms of being drawn towards the two distinct cultural complexes of White-Creole-West Indian and Spanish-Mestizo-Indian, it is also divided by its multiple and often ambiguous and tantalisingly contradictory orientation to the Commonwealth Caribbean, North America, Central America and Britain. In the background is the fact of economic dependency and a neo-colonial economic system accentuating social divisiveness. This has always had great significance from the days of slavery to today's multinational company control of the plantations: it was the mismanaged devaluation of the Belizean dollar in 1949 that gave rise to Price's nationalist, albeit non-radical, movement.

Will the future remain intractable? In Dr. Grant's view, the pre-occupation by the various political organisations with the Guatemala issue has a 'tired air', while the occasionally voiced views that the cultural differences are insoluble is becoming, he argues, slowly recognised as being over-pessimistic. This comment is, incidentally, in surprising contrast to his constant use of the concept of the plural society which, in sociological theory, implies unbridgeable division. Thus it remains to be seen whether he is right in saying that 'it is becoming clear that the competition for power . . . [is] going to arise over socio-economic issues although they are still likely to be perceived in cultural terms until the impact of . . . incipient economic development is deeply felt throughout the country' (p. 331). I sincerely hope so.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TONY THORNDIKE

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A LARGE number of new entries have been added to the latest edition of this well-known who's who. Others have been expanded or revised. As usual, the information is clearly set out and remarkably up-to-date.

Chatham House D. H.

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VOLUME 1 of this series covered 1960 and was favourably reviewed in *International Affairs.*[1] Subsequent volumes have dealt with events in 1961,

[1] Jan. 1963, p. 160.

1967, 1968 and now Volume 5 in two parts covers 1969–70 with the volume for 1971 in preparation. An impressive list of sources has been used. Over two hundred newspapers, reports and other documents in Middle Eastern languages, Russian, German, French and English were regularly scanned in order to compile a detailed chronological record of political events in the Middle East arranged according to topic. There is a full table of contents and a forty-page index. This record should therefore provide an excellent framework for anyone undertaking extensive research on the period.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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TOWARDS A BRITISH ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS*

Humphrey Trevelyan

IN politics as in scientific research, it often happens that many people are thinking on the same lines. There have been several indications, since I started cogitating about this lecture, that it is true of the subject which I have chosen. This shows at least that the subject is one relevant to our present condition. The question is whether we can satisfactorily define what our role should be in precise terms. We can learn from the late Abdul Nasser to be cautious in trying to define a political role in foreign affairs, for his concept of Egypt as the meeting point of three circles, Arab, African and Islamic, was soon seen to be beyond the political and military strength of his country, and quickly disappeared without trace.

As Lord Harlech has reminded us, Dean Acheson remarked pertinently that Britain had lost an empire, but had not yet found a role. He was attacked for saying it, but it was and perhaps still is true. Since that date we have with some difficulty convinced ourselves that we have lost an empire, but we have not progressed much further than assessing the more obvious consequences of our bereavement and enjoying the masochistic pleasure of mourning for the departed. Lord Harlech put it in another way—that we are still reacting to the discovery of our new situation, but have not started to act on fresh lines. The approach of the Central Policy Review Staff is that we have sunk to point X in the League table of economic performance. The resources which we apply to foreign affairs must therefore be reduced and reallocated, in order to prevent waste, to concentrate on the promotion of our exports and to ensure that the standard of our expenditure is lowered to a point which accurately reflects our relative poverty. This is in practice little different from the exercises which the department carries out regularly as part of its normal functions, even though an old diplomat like me, steeped in ancient prejudices and with little experience of the new diplomacy, will nurse doubts about the Review Staff's basic premises and question the narrowness of their computer's outlook.

Whatever view one takes of the formidable results of the Review Staff's labours, they have not covered the whole picture, and we need

* The text of the 26th Stevenson Lecture given at Chatham House on November 29, 1977.

to examine in parallel—one might say in another dimension—what we can make of our new position in the world. I do not pretend to be able to present to you today a complete blueprint of a new policy neatly tied up in pink ribbon. All I can do is to offer a few indications of what can be discerned in the fog and darkness of this ruthless century.

We can at least see the outlines of what faces us. The Concert of Europe, broken by two terrible wars, has given way to the two superpowers; the British Empire has gone the way of all previous empires; the Russians and Chinese glower at each other across the barrier of the Amur river; the rivalries of Western Europe are giving way gradually and with difficulty to the compulsions towards European unity; the colonies of Asia and Africa have exchanged their old bonds for a new but not always comfortable freedom, while over all presides the nuclear angel with his flaming sword, at the same time threatening the extinction and protecting the future of this troubled planet.

An examination of our foreign policy will, of course, start from the premise that British policy should serve British interests. This is not a purely selfish concept. It is a British interest, for instance, that the peace should be secure, that the strong should not gobble up the weak, that international disputes, even if they cannot be settled, should at least be talked over until the danger point is passed, that atomic weapons should not get into the hands of any country which might be tempted to use them, that the nuclear balance should be firmly maintained, that relations between the capitalist and communist countries should become gradually easier, that the less-developed countries should be able to raise the living standards of their people, that raw materials, including oil, should be generally available on terms equally reasonable for supplier and consumer, that governments should keep their word, in particular their treaties and other international agreements (at least so long as they have the power to do so) and should generally observe the principles of international law and treat in a civilised way those of their own citizens who question their ideology or behaviour. A citizen of the United Kingdom cannot forget that he is also a citizen of the world and that this shrinking world's interests are his own.

To be effective our policy should of course be founded on a clear understanding of the world as it is and on an objective assessment of the balance of political, military and economic forces, not on sentimental recollections of a vanished past. It should be one that we and our allies can back up effectively by the economic and military power which we can together apply to a particular situation. It must be determined in the light of its influence on other policies and of their influence on it—as Bevin remarked, the conduct of foreign affairs is like keeping a lot of balls in the air at the same time—and since there is never an absolutely

correct answer to any problem of foreign policy, we can only choose what appears to be the least disadvantageous course open, however unpalatable it may be. Rhodesia is a case in point. The principles which should govern foreign policy are clear enough, but at the moment of decision, emotion, ideology or plain politics are sometimes stronger than rational thought.

A British Foreign Secretary will know that he no longer has the responsibilities of a power of the first rank but is enmeshed in an immense variety of complex relationships. He is confronted by struggles of ideologies and nationalisms and by all the complications arising from history, political instability and tribal rivalries in a host of new states having leaders with little political experience and an uncertain power base. He will reflect that there have been few periods of British history when Britain could act effectively on the world stage without allies. He must resist the temptation to be too active or to overplay his hand, but must use every bit of influence which the country inherits from the past and which it can still exercise effectively in spite of its relative loss of power. He must bear in mind that a country which appears to have lost confidence in itself will lose the confidence of others. And he must reconcile himself to the knowledge that there are no victories to be won in foreign affairs. In that sphere, with persistence and patience over a long period, a situation can sometimes be improved; but though you can lose sensationally, you never seem to win.

Relations with the European Community and the United States

The basis of our role must be our membership of the European Community and the American alliance. Our relations with the Community both before and after our entry have often been lacking in realism and creative imagination. We have allowed our policy to be distorted by the battle of internal politics. We lost the chance of being present at the Creation—to adapt Dean Acheson's phrase—and exercising a dominant role in the Community from its inception, and now that we have at last become members, it has often seemed that we looked on it merely as a cow to be milked to our advantage. It is not surprising that at one stage —I have it on good authority—M. Pompidou said to Herr Schmidt: 'Wasn't de Gaulle right after all?' It should now be a major aim of our policy to convince our European partners that whereas we shall not be backward in defending our own interests, we shall have no truck with the 'Little Englanders' who would have us out, and shall take a vigorous part in the efforts to build a new Europe.

We are in a better position to convince the other members of this since Mr. Callaghan wrote his public letter addressed to the faint of heart and obdurate in his own party before the party conference of

1977, in which he said: 'My aim is to conduct a policy of reform consistent with wholehearted membership which would bring a great deal of support from our people; namely, a proper promotion of British interests combined with a positive direction in which the Community could move effectively.' In the light of the political problems which he faced, I do not think we need assume that this gave any comfort to the remaining opponents of our membership. They will, I trust, now realise at last that our membership is irreversible and that in their own political interests they had better not commit themselves to continued opposition. But we still have to start thinking of the Community as our Community and we still have to learn a great deal more about how it works and what it is trying to do. Though the subjects of day-to-day debate in the Community are rarely either exciting or inspiring and entail much tiresome in-fighting between individual interests, the younger generation should surely see our membership as a great adventure worth sustained effort. Our most important immediate task is to conduct elections for the European Parliament. It seems at present highly unlikely that we shall be able to complete the arrangements in the allotted time. The other members will have to reconcile themselves to a postponement. Although some other members also may not be in time, we shall be blamed, for we are believed still to be holding back from the Community.

We need not think that little has been achieved by the Community and that all is discord, the impression so often given by the media which find discord a more palatable food than agreement. Nor should we expect too much. International organisations embodying unfamiliar ideas normally suffer as much from their starry-eyed well-wishers as from those whose interests are adversely affected. It was expected that the League of Nations, and then its successor the United Nations, would almost instantly produce a new world with an assurance of perpetual peace. When that did not happen, there were only too many people prepared to write them off. The European Community too suffers from those who support it in theory but are profoundly disappointed that after twenty years Europe is not yet politically and economically united. We must give it time; and meanwhile note the considerable progress that has been made.

I take as an example of successful endeavour the Community's common commercial policy. As a member of the Community we belong to the largest international trading bloc in existence, which should bring us substantial advantages. All the members now fully subscribe to the common customs tariff. With that as the basis, the Community's commercial relations with non-members have been developed in a manner showing that the fears expressed before we entered the Community that it would be an inward-looking protectionist organisation

were wide of the mark. The Community's agreements, especially those with the Mediterranean non-member countries, and a large number of former British and French colonies, are based on a generous understanding of the needs of the states in which poverty is still the main problem.

As you will know, the Lomé Convention is of particular interest as showing the impact of new ideas on the Community's external relations. As I understand it, it arose from an imaginative French idea to build a new relationship with the old colonies, in form commercial but with political overtones. The earlier Yaoundé Convention, covering principally the old French colonies, was supplanted by the Lomé Convention which brought into the scheme the old British colonies in East Africa and some small territories in the Pacific and the Carribean. It is an agreement between one bloc of countries and another bloc. Unlike the Generalised Scheme of Preferences, it cannot be unilaterally amended. It is worked by an elaborate—perhaps too elaborate—superstructure of consultative bodies representing both parties. It provides not only for tariff preferences, but also for development aid and help in trade promotion. It is developing an ingenious system of stabilisation of export earnings. On the whole the convention has up till now worked well. Its future is now under active consideration. It is, I suggest, significant that a recent visitor to China found great interest being taken in the convention, presumably chiefly on political grounds, as a new system of relationship between the industrial states and the less-developed world.

There are of course many problems to be faced. Is erosion of preferences inevitable as the policy is extended to new states? What should be the Community's relationship with the vast old British Asian dependencies which are too large to be easily accommodated in the Community's framework? Since this policy was developed in a time of economic growth, are adjustments necessary to cope with the world-wide economic recession? Will some protection be necessary, as suggested by Lord Harlech's team, for individual industries facing extinction and to prevent widespread unemployment in them? How will the policy be affected by enlargement of the Community through the accession of perhaps three Mediterranean states?

The question of enlargement is already in the front of Community thinking. British policy on Greek membership, as outlined by Mr. Crosland in a memorable speech, is that the political arguments for enlargement are over-riding and the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have recently confirmed the British government's commitment in principle to the membership of Greece, Spain and Portugal.

It is a fair argument that the Community must either admit the applicants or degenerate into a customs union of little political sig-

nificance, while if the applications are refused, the area will breed dangerous political conflict. (One such conflict, between Greece and Turkey, already exists.) On the other hand, the economic consequences of enlargement, particularly in the treatment of Mediterranean produce, will entail substantial difficulties. Assistance and structural reforms will be needed in the weaker states during the negotiating period to enable them to undertake the obligations of membership without economic disaster. There are awkward choices to be made affecting the non-member states having agreements with the Community. There will be administrative consequences too. The Commission now copes with only moderate success with its present numbers and languages. It may be hoped that the prospect of the addition of more members and more languages will spur the Community to already overdue structural reform in order to improve the decision-making process. And the Nine will have to face new financial burdens. But I believe that the political arguments must prevail, and that the economic difficulties can be overcome with the aid of transitional periods after membership.

I come back from visits to the Community encouraged. The Commission's staff is obviously of a high standard and I have no evidence to show that the Commission is over-manned, though it lacks flexibility. The Commission is a new bureaucracy. Bureaucracies, with some justification, are generally disliked and are always accused of being too large, but those who are in contact with the Commission do not support the charge. The British delegation, headed by one of the best members of the Diplomatic Service, is a satisfactory mixture of diplomats and home civil servants, about half and half. I was impressed by the degree of integration already achieved in the Commission's work. Negotiations in the GATT, for instance, are conducted by an exceptionally able member of the Commission's staff who assured us that there was no difficulty in arriving at a common negotiating position, though it was rather like going to negotiate accompanied by nine mothers-in-law. The North-South dialogue—an expression particularly disliked for obvious reasons by the Australians—which will be a permanent feature of the international scene, is difficult to manage since it is carried on in many different bodies, inside and outside the United Nations. Co-ordination in the Community will clearly be of immense advantage. I may add that the importance of the North-South dialogue is shown by the new Soviet attitude towards it. While the Russians continue to maintain that the old colonial states have a primary moral obligation to mitigate the poverty of the less-developed countries, they admit that it is a problem which they too share.

Although foreign political relations remain formally outside the purview of the Treaty of Rome, the practice of co-ordinating views on

political issues has gone a long way and is becoming an important strand in the life of the Community. A recent example is the co-ordination of the members' approach to the negotiations in Helsinki and Belgrade. Some of us will remember hearing in this hall from a French scholar an exposition couched in rigid terms of the impossibility of unifying the members' foreign policies. My answer to that would be that no one is pressing for a formal unification. If we get used to co-ordinating political views, we shall gradually come close to integration without formality and without taking too seriously periodical actions by the French designed to show their own people that they are independent of everybody and everything in this world and the next. On the lesson of French habits for us I shall have more to say.

In a Ditchley Foundation lecture in 1969 Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that in the preceding decades Americans had been recurrently in danger of mistaking the knowledge and concern of Europeans for a readiness to act. Europeans had withdrawn from having a concern with outside areas of the world. The war had ended the notion of distant power for Germany and for Italy; the peace had ended it for France and Britain. Europe had only Europe left for its foreign policy. The West Europeans had ended their wars with one another and could have no decisive foreign policy except that of the future of Europe. There was nothing in the laws of nature which said that a nation must have a foreign policy and it remained a real possibility that the major nations of Western Europe might prefer not to have a serious foreign policy any more.

I suggest that this pronouncement has already been shown to be false. At the time of Mr. Bundy's lecture the Americans were still oppressed by the deep shadow of Vietnam, a deplorably misjudged enterprise, though undertaken for anything but selfish reasons, in which the Europeans sensibly would have no part. Europe will have a foreign policy apart from the narrow requirements of security if only as a result of economic interdependence in a shrinking world, and the effect of what happens outside Europe on the way in which we shall live. We are enmeshed, for good or ill, in an immense complex of international organisations. Moreover, if I remember aright, one of Dr. Kissinger's concepts was that world affairs would come to be managed by five powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Europe and Japan. Japan's great economic strength has not yet been manifested in political terms. China has still a long way to go. Europe is still burrowing in its foundations, but it would be a serious error to picture Europe as a kind of American Indian reserve, crouching behind its frontiers and concerned only to maintain its ancient ways of life.

I conclude that our role in Europe is our primary task in the international field and is clear. Whatever the compulsions of the power ratio,

on which I shall have more to say, Europe united can exercise an important influence on the way the world goes. If we and our European partners show common sense and initiative, we shall together have a role to perform which even on the narrowest interpretation of our interests it would be foolish of us to decline.

Our role vis-à-vis the United States has European security as its central theme. We are still subject to the temptation to face both ways, seeking to prove our new European identity, but at the same time blowing upon the dying embers of the 'special relationship'. De Gaulle had some cause to feel that we were not yet fully European. There is no reason to deprive ourselves of the advantages which both we and the Americans get from our habit of close consultation and mutual trust—in most matters, if not in the story of Concorde—but it must not be at the expense of the Community, for as the integration of the Community becomes more complete, so our relations with the United States must increasingly become a part of the bilateral relations between the United States and the Community, while in the realm of defence they must continue to be channelled through Nato, though without the formal adherence of the French.

That the integrity of Europe is dependent on the Americans continuing to regard it as a function of their own security is a basic doctrine for the whole of Western Europe, including the French, who continue to acknowledge their dependence on the Western alliance in spite of their attitude towards Nato. We can sometimes influence American policy; we must continue to foster the climate of mutual trust; but we must not allow our bilateral relations with the United States to impair the Community's interests. We must be loyal to the American alliance, but we must not forget that our loyalty should be effectively if not formally exercised jointly with our European colleagues. It is a difficult role to play.

Within Nato our role is of course clear. We must not take the American commitment for granted, even though it is principally a matter of America's own interests. Mr. Bundy in the same lecture said that the American centre was hard pressed. If it did not hold, then there could come a day when the nuclear commitment of the United States would become doubtful, because of a new American radicalism, or undesirable because of a new American reaction. He did not think this would happen in the coming phase, but the question existed and it would be folly to forget it. Meanwhile, the best way for the Europeans to strengthen the Americans' commitment is to show them that all the members of Nato are ready to play a significant part in their own defence, which will mean an annual increase in defence spending of at least three per cent in real terms.

Those who are searching for economies in government expenditure on items which do not arouse violent political abuse, and would therefore substantially reduce our defence expenditure, have even been known to justify their view by the dangerous nonsense that all we are concerned with is to prevent our being invaded and that that is most unlikely since we are farther away than West Germany from the Soviet Union. It can be argued that on a strictly mathematical basis there is a case for a gradual reduction of our contribution to Nato or an increase by the other members. But the mathematical case misses the point that if we continue reducing our contribution, not only do we reduce the standard of our defence beyond acceptable limits, but we put ourselves into a lower category, a nation probably not worth helping, so that our action is in the end likely to produce only a false economy.

We must rely on the Americans to retain a strong second strike capacity in inter-continental weapons, but we have a right to be consulted on all questions affecting defence policy on the ground, such as the interaction of nuclear and conventional weapons, defence against intermediate nuclear weapons targeted on Western Europe and the presumptive use of a new generation of nuclear weapons such as the cruise missile or the neutron bomb upon European battlefields. We must also continue to take part in the talks in Vienna on the reduction of forces in Central Europe in view of the continuing importance of the alternative deterrent posed by conventional forces.

The future of detente

Next, we have to consider our part in the great political debate with the Russians, the follow-up of the Helsinki agreement and the future of detente. Here we have a substantive part to play, for it is the political basis of intra-European relations. Our role must be seen as part of a co-ordinated European participation in these negotiations, and the extent to which it has been possible to achieve a European position in advance of them is encouraging. Of course, detente suits the Russians. They would not press for it unless it did. They cannot exercise their military power outside their own backyard without undue risk, and they are cautious people: so they hope they can do better on the political front. But our question is whether it suits us.

We also cannot ignore the possibility that the Russians regard a period of detente as a means of buying time while they build up their strength. This argument is sometimes used to support the view that detente is wholly to Soviet advantage. I do not see the logic of this. The alternative is a continuation of the cold war, during which the Russians could more easily give priority to an increase of their already vast armaments on the ground that national defence required a further postpone-

ment of measures to raise the living standards of their civilian population. In either case the Americans will have to maintain their side of the balance. It is surely the only rational Western policy to encourage an atmosphere which will commit the Russians in the eyes of their people to easier relations with the West and to some relaxation, however hesitant, of their harsh internal regime.

It may then be argued that easier relations will enable the Russians to pursue more actively their political goals. It is not difficult to find indications of recent Soviet political pressures in Western Europe, but provided we do not allow detente to weaken our will to defend ourselves, there is little reason to fear that easier relations will give the Russians significant political gains. The attractions of the Soviet ideology are on the whole diminishing. The attitude of the Eurocommunists shows that the Russians, like everyone else, have to deal with a rapidly changing world, as they themselves admit, and there is no reason to believe that the future political pattern of Western Europe will suit them any better than the present one. Moreover, a deliberate refusal of detente by the West would not be accepted by the West Europeans who want disarmament and peace. It is not as if we even had the choice of accepting or refusing it. We must accept it, but negotiate its conditions in such a way as will suit our interests and will hold the Russians to the general principles to which they agreed at Helsinki, while within detente the Western alliance assures the main balance of forces.

Nor do I consider that an atmosphere of detente will make it significantly easier for the Russians to pursue a forward policy outside Europe. At this point we have a major disagreement with them. They take the line that detente must apply everywhere, but their actions imply that detente is divisible and should in effect be confined to Europe. This we cannot accept. They argue that the ideological struggle is a legitimate and natural human activity which we have to accept as a fact of life, and that we can have no reasonable objections to any of their activities in pursuit of it. When we take an active part in the struggle, they call us cold warriors. We know that the struggle will continue and that the Russians will not resist the temptation to interfere in any part of the less-developed world where they can hope to extend their influence. While continuing to argue that their action is inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation of detente, we can also demand their agreement to the implicit establishment of rules of the game, at the very least a tacit understanding that if a player does not exercise a reasonable restraint, he is off side. We cannot accept the Soviet attempt to promote exceptions, such as the support of national liberation movements, on the ground that they accord with the principles of the United Nations or constitute a fact which requires them to interfere; but without con-

travening our general rules we can influence the natural processes of change that occur in the Third World and even in the communist world in a direction favourable to Western ideas, without playing the dangerous game of trying to destabilise the Soviet system in Eastern Europe.

It is salutary when dealing with the Russians to recall that in the Middle East they, like us, have made many mistakes and have often been unsuccessful. In 1955 in Moscow it must have seemed so straightforward. Lenin had taught that the politics of the colonial world were set on the road to communism. Nasser was engaged in his struggle against the British and the French, who were inevitably to be associated in the Arab mind with the Israeli attack on Sinai in 1956, while Nasser was to emerge unscathed from the Suez crisis to become for a time the embodiment of Arab nationalism. The acceptance of Soviet arms seemed to ensure Egyptian dependence on Soviet friendship or perhaps even domination, and soon after the clash of arms on the Suez Canal the new Iraqi revolution offered a fair prospect of communist victory in Baghdad. It must have seemed virtually certain that the Arab states would in succession swing from unpopular monarchies to left-wing revolutionary leadership under Soviet guidance, and soon thereafter to government by the Arab Communist parties. Now, after President Sadat has shown the world that Egypt need not wholly submit to Soviet demands, the Russians have—at least for the moment—no significant position in the Arab world, and the newly-rich oil states have succeeded them as paymaster. It is not surprising that the younger people in Moscow are believed to be thinking that they have got no good out of their Middle East policy and should withdraw from their involvement.

The Russians have got themselves into an equivocal position in the Horn of Africa, by trying to back both sides. We must counter their pursuit of the ideological struggle in Africa, though I doubt whether they will get on much better there than they have in the Middle East. In the 1960s Castro was out of their control in his pursuit of revolution in South America and is probably not wholly in their control in Africa. Whether or not they do any good to their real interests by interfering in Africa, they will have plenty of opportunities to make trouble there so long as there is no comprehensive settlement in Southern Africa of the conflicting political claims of the black and white populations.

Negotiations with the Russians on the great issues of politics and disarmament are likely to be, and should be, permanent. We must negotiate with power. We shall be involved both as a member of the Western alliance and the Community and in bilateral discussions such as those which we in Chatham House have recently been holding with the Soviet

political institute. We surely have a substantial role to play on this stage.

United Nations, human rights, Middle East, Rhodesia

I have described at some length what I believe to be our role in the European Community, in our relations with the Americans and in our negotiations with the Soviet Union. Before we can decide whether we can arrive at any categorisation of our role in international relations in general, I should like more briefly to take a few examples of other aspects of our foreign policy. We are founder members of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council. It can be a highly irritating organisation, particularly when it is pretending that we are still a wicked colonial power due at any moment to be cast with other malefactors into outer darkness. Is it worth our while taking much notice of it? The Chinese use it in order to castigate the super-powers, in particular the Russians in the guise of social-imperialists. The French do not seem to take it very seriously. The Russians regard it as an institution to be taken seriously and positively for the sake of their own interests. The Americans have to take it seriously in order to make sure that the Russians do not win a few tricks in their absence and because it is one facet of their relations with the Russians in the area of disarmament and during international crises for the handling of which they have through their power a major responsibility. Moreover, they are influenced by harbouring the United Nations in New York and by the fact that they pay so much more for it than anyone else.

What about us? It is in our interest to use our membership of the Security Council to support a sensible handling of crises, after co-ordinating our policy with the Americans and the other members of the European Community. We are not by our membership of the Security Council arrogating to ourselves at any one moment a superior status based on world conditions which have passed away, for there is a permanent presence of non-permanent members who can be very active in promoting the interests of themselves or their bloc. We can use the Security Council and the representatives of the smaller powers to work for a solution of points of conflict with which we are particularly concerned, such as Southern Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, and can lobby the other missions in New York in favour of our views on a host of questions in which we have interests, such as civil aviation, the law of the sea or pollution of the atmosphere. The United Nations is one of the main places where serious discussions take place on the North-South dialogue in matters such as energy policy, development aid, and the control of raw materials. The old saying, 'Les absents ont toujours tort', has particular application, as the Russians learnt at the

beginning of the Korean war. We would be foolish to neglect the United Nations, which is the main public platform for the new countries, however inadequate or unreasonable we sometimes find it.

We cannot ignore the fight for human rights which have been so outrageously trampled on in my life-time. We have a right to make our voice heard as a country which prides itself on its record of humanity and is prepared to submit to international judgment where its own officials are at fault, but it is a right which should be exercised only sparingly and with great care. If we are to intervene, we must be sure that we are not employing double standards and that the evidence is watertight. I cannot accept the argument, which has been used in defence of double standards for South Africa and Cambodia, that we should expect more from our friends who share our ideas. Moreover, we must use the best method of securing redress, whether by public or private representation, in such a way that our purpose is clearly to right a wrong and not merely to pose as a champion of the oppressed. Gladstone could use the Bulgarian massacres in his Midlothian campaign without worrying about Bulgarian reactions, but Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vance, before tackling the Russians about their dissidents, have to remember another old motto, 'Il faut vouloir les consequences de ce qu'on veut faire', since they are also engaged in shoring up the peace of the world. It is like walking in bare feet on broken glass: sometimes it is better to leave it to the *Sunday Times.*

There are questions in which we are vitally interested, but in which we cannot act effectively. The interminable contest between Arabs and Israelis is still far from settlement. The Russians at the moment have little effective influence on it. Only the Americans have access and goodwill on both sides, but they have not been willing to use their only effective weapon, financial pressure on Israel. Although we were initially responsible for the conflict through the Balfour declaration, and our interests in Middle East oil are materially affected, we cannot at present take a major part either alone or through the European Community in the negotiations. But it is of interest that President Sadat seems anxious to keep in touch with Mr. Callaghan. Our old closeness to Middle Eastern affairs still has its effect. This is an example of a situation in which influence is not wholly a reflection of power. We should use it to give whatever help we can. If there is to be a conference at Geneva and if we are asked to take part, we should accept. Meanwhile we should give Sadat such unobtrusive support as will not be an embarrassment to him, and publicly rest on the United Nations' resolutions to which we are already committed.

As a result of history, we are properly stuck in the Rhodesian bog. The Anglo-American initiative has not prospered, since we lack the

power to enforce a settlement and American power cannot be applied effectively. It remains to be seen whether an effective settlement can be produced by Mr. Smith and the African politicians inside Rhodesia, or whether his negotiations break down and Dr. Owen is seen to be right in continuing to encourage the politicians working from outside, now called the Patriotic Front. It is a difficult moment. I can only hope that we keep all our options open and do not nail our colours to either mast. The situation is very fluid and may well have changed radically again by the time this lecture appears in print.

Looming up before us is an even stickier bog into which we shall be plunging at any moment, South Africa. Only recently, Dr. Brzezinski was saying that the problem is how to avoid historical tragedy by trying to get South Africans to rethink the historical destiny of their country, so that through change that society can survive and make possible the cohabitation of the white and black communities. Such a solution is not wholly out of the question, though the South Africans have made clear that they bitterly resent Western attitudes and have no intention of submitting to Western pressures. It is difficult to see any way to prevent some innocent people, black and white, suffering in the southern countries of Africa and one can only say with Housman,

Be still, be still, my soul, it is but for a season:
Let us endure an hour and see injustice done.

Adjusting to the new power ratio

How can we define our new position in the world? We are for most purposes a major European power which cannot expect and does not try to dominate Europe, but contracts alliances within which we seek to adjust the balance of power to suit our interests. Our membership of the European Community is in line with our historical position. Dr. Kissinger failed to take account of the realities of the European position when he proposed his European charter which gave the impression that he was seeking to reduce the Europeans to the status of clients of the United States, and was annoyed when they were not prepared to do his bidding during the Yom Kippur war; but he recognised his mistake and rightly changed the line to one of close consultation.

We have to adjust ourselves to the new power ratio, but it is of course not a matter of simple mathematics. The two super-powers have immeasurably the greatest power, but they cannot use their weapons to anything like their destructive capacity without destroying everyone including themselves, and they can therefore only use the less destructive part of their power in a way which will make it clear that they will not cross the limits of prudence. Vietnam is an example. Up to a point therefore the legend of the super-powers is a gigantic hoax, since for all

purposes except Armageddon they are reduced to the strength of the medium powers round them. This is recognised much more clearly by the present rulers of the Soviet Union than it was by Khrushchev to whom I used to have to listen threatening that he would blow us out of the water in ten minutes. We play with the super-powers on a special board with knights and castles but without the queens.

In these circumstances, countries of the second rank in world power will in certain conditions be respected by the super-powers, will be listened to by them and may assert themselves without serious risk up to the point at which the super-powers' security is affected. The question is, what are the specific characteristics which a Western state of the second rank will need to enable it to act in this way? It must be able to follow through its policies. The French, for instance, were able to follow through their African policy by providing an air-lift of arms to Zaïre. It must be able and prepared to sustain a deviation from American policy while retaining the posture of an ally. Examples are the French withdrawal from Nato and the recent German sale of the whole nuclear cycle technology to Brazil and the Brazilians' reported rebuff to Mr. Vance on human rights and their contemplated nuclear reprocessing industry. (I do not mean to commend these actions, only to cite them as examples of the characteristics that I have in mind.) It must be able to remain an effective government with a policy that can be sustained and have independent means of an economic and so of a military character. A Western country of the second rank which does not have these characteristics is Italy which can only get what it wants from the Americans by frightening them about the consequences of the chaos which will ensure if it does not. A country of the third rank may temporarily assert itself against the interests of a super-power, but normally only when it can lean on the other super-power and for a limited short-term purpose.

Do we qualify as a major power not of the first class but having a wide range of opinion and action open to us? We can have no effective role in this category, unless we can recover our confidence by improving our economic performance and showing everyone else that we are still a stable country with a tradition of freedom for the individual and are not going to become a corporate and declining state in the hands of a militant minority in the trade unions. Perhaps we can help ourselves by learning a trick or two from the French who are adept at propelling themselves out of defeatism. I used to be scornful about de Gaulle's proclamations about Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, since there was a divided Germany in the middle and the Urals were not a frontier of any kind. Now I see more clearly that the facts—which de Gaulle knew well enough—were irrelevant to his purpose, which was to inspire his people

with a vision of the greatness of France, however far his European conception was from the facts of geography or politics. In these days it matters little that President Giscard d'Estaing's recent plan for general disarmament is likely to have as little effect as the numerous Soviet declarations to the same effect, if it helps to boost the confidence of the French in themselves.

Katherine Whitehorn put it well in *The Observer* when she wrote: 'It's entirely arguable that what pulled France out of the economic trough was exactly those Gaullist expressions which seemed so irrelevant, but which gave them back the confidence—let's say, since they are French, the arrogance—that they needed. The Charles de Gaulle airport will never pay for itself in fifty years; but it does wonders as a symbol of economic thrust. Maybe it's our introspective obsession with our economic problems that makes us so incapable of rising out of them, and, if so, what we most need is a figure of fire to make us lift our heads.' And I have sympathy for her comment that Mrs. Thatcher could be falling over backwards to be J. M. Keynes, when she ought to be Joan of Arc. I do not say that she should actually be burnt at the stake, though she surely will be, since that is the fate normally reserved by the Conservative Party for its leaders. Anti-elitism is a poisonous British disease which is surely peculiar to ourselves. Must we in all walks of life strive to lower ourselves to the common denominator?

If we can get back our self-confidence, it will have its effect on others too. A friend returning from the Middle East told me that his Arab friends could not understand why we had lost confidence in ourselves and a shrewd friend in Moscow (not British) writes: 'Mad about the enquiry on Britain abroad and the ambassador travelling by bicycle and serving fish and chips. Won't we ever learn that a show of wealth produces respect and credit?'

Perhaps it matters little that the French should declare their independence of Nato so long as they co-operate in the defence plans of the alliance to which they subscribe, or if they flirt outrageously with the Russians, for while French public opinion will be flattered that Brezhnev should appear periodically at the Charles de Gaulle airport, everyone knows that the French have no intention of ignoring the American life-belt if they are in danger of drowning and, if I may mix my metaphors, are not likely to forget on which side their bread is buttered. Their posture as an ally is sustained. I do not advocate that we should act in precisely the same way as the French nor that we should go so far as they in contriving to be on both sides of every political fence and making rude noises at the Americans; but I see every advantage in our asserting our right to take a prominent part in the conduct of international relations, in consultation with the other members of the Community. We

shall do better for the Western alliance on which we depend and for the Community if we too assert our individuality as a power in our own right, and we should do well from time to time to remind the Americans, our protectors and close friends, that it is in accordance with their ideas that Europe should build itself up into one of the five major world powers. We have to show them that it is better for them that within the alliance the British should be a strong and confident people, still able to make an impact on the world. Meanwhile let us put on a show occasionally, presenting President Carter to Newcastle and Dr. Kissinger to Cardiff and conducting on a walk through Green Park the leaders of eight great nations not all of whom are able to rely so confidently on their security at home.

Finally I return to Dean Acheson's question. Have we found a new role? My answer is that it lies in the substance of the world around us, for all to see. The world is both bi-polar and multi-polar. We can only marginally influence the great debate between the super-powers on nuclear armaments, but we are deeply concerned with a whole host of international problems which affect our lives and our future. It is for each state to find what is the best contribution it can make to the problems displayed before it. We, as a major industrial power, can exercise substantial influence in many fields, principally in the problems of the European Community and the East-West and North-South dialogues, provided we can present to ourselves and to the world at large a genuine image of a prosperous and confident state. We have it in us to make in the coming period as great a contribution to civilisation as at any period of our past history.

AFTER BERRILL: WHITEHALL AND THE MANAGEMENT OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY

William Wallace

THE British are not very good at reforming their institutions. Typically, a body of wise men is asked to consider some aspects of the problem, not including the underlying assumptions and objectives, and produces a report; which is then either implemented in a fashion less coherent than the report had recommended, or largely disregarded in the heat of the ensuing debate. The Fulton Committee, which led to the establishment of the Civil Service Department, provides a classic case of the first of these consequences, the Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution of the second.[1] Eight years after the establishment of the Civil Service Department, its structure and effectiveness are widely questioned. Four years and more after the publication of the Kilbrandon Report, the parliamentary and political struggle over devolution staggers on.

The reform of Britain's structure of overseas representation raises less central political questions than the major issues of administrative and constitutional change considered in the Fulton and Kilbrandon Reports. But the storm of protest which greeted the publication of the Berrill Report in August 1977[2] demonstrated the difficulties of dispassionate discussion and implementation of administrative reform. Initial reactions suggested that the outcome of more than twelve months' study by a Cabinet Office team, working to terms of reference considerably wider than those of the Plowden Committee in 1962–63 or of the Duncan Committee in 1968–69, might, after heavy exchanges of fire from entrenched positions, be little more than a few modest changes in the status quo.[3]

Admittedly, this review had neither an auspicious beginning nor a sympathetic climate in which to work. A succession of newspaper reports during the course of 1975 developed the theme of overstaffing

[1] *The Civil Service*, Report of the Committee, 1966–68, Cmnd. 3638 (London: HMSO, 1968); *Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969–73*, Cmnd. 5460 (London: HMSO, 1973).

[2] Central Policy Review Staff, *Review of Overseas Representation* (London: HMSO, 1977).

[3] The Plowden Committee on Representation Services Overseas, 1962–63, reported in Feb. 1964, Cmnd. 2276 (London: HMSO, 1964), and the Duncan Committee on Overseas Representation, 1968–69, in July 1969, Cmnd. 4107 (London: HMSO, 1969).

and extravagance in British embassies abroad, in particular in Washington and Bonn. A Parliamentary Committee's strictures on the very high cost of a new residence in Paris for the British ambassador to the OECD, and press revelations of a flat in Rio de Janeiro 'for the occasional use of the Ambassador to Brazil', added fuel to the flames.[4] A front-page 'scoop' in the *Daily Mail* on December 29, 1975 then reported an internal Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) paper which, it claimed, 'accuses the Foreign Office mandarins of perpetuating an elitist cadre, lavishing perks and privileges on its staff on a scale unknown elsewhere'. Thus Mr. Callaghan's announcement, on January 14, 1976, of a comprehensive review of all aspects of the work of overseas representation, took place in an already heated atmosphere, with the diplomatic service already feeling itself to be under unjustified attack.

To make matters more difficult, the review was entrusted to the CPRS itself, a body established by the last Conservative government to look at the strategic objectives underlying different policies rather than to undertake specific organisational studies, and moreover a body which had had little previous experience in questions of foreign policy. The review team operated under a veil of secrecy more appropriate to the preparation of the budget than to an investigation of administrative change, leaving unauthorised leaks the only means by which the interested public were informed of progress. This laid it wide open to scandal-mongering from the popular press, and condemned the team to disapproval even before its Report was published. The radical sweep of the Report, proposing inter alia the abolition of the diplomatic service and of the British Council as separate entities, and severe reductions in the scale of service representation overseas and in the operations of the BBC's external services, was matched by its provocative language: suggesting for example that much routine work 'is being done to an unjustifiably high standard' (p. xiii) and that the 'potent ethos' of the diplomatic service 'tends to encourage conservatism' and 'a sort of "middle-classness" in the prevailing values' (1.9, 21.22).[5] Immediate public reaction was overwhelmingly adverse, as shoals of letters to *The Times* and comments in the press leaped to the defence of the Foreign Office, the BBC and the British Council. Initial reactions, both within Whitehall and outside, to proposals for major changes in structure and staffing at home and

[4] The quotation is from the 9th Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1975–76, *Diplomatic Manpower and Property Overseas*, HC-604 (London: HMSO, 1976), para. 7. See also the 8th Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1974–75, HC-473 (London: HMSO, 1975).

[5] Unless otherwise noted, references are to the CPRS Report, either to its opening foreword and summary, pp. v–xvi, to the numbered paragraphs of its 21 chapters, or to Annexes A–S which follow.

abroad, were staunchly to defend the status quo. The Report's conclusions on the division of responsibilities between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Cabinet Office in handling European Community matters (5.36) could, its critics implied, have justifiably been extended to cover most of the Whitehall structure concerned with overseas policy: 'it looks untidy but we believe that it works reasonably well'.

The aim of this article is to argue for a more balanced consideration of the issues raised in the Berrill Report. The team's brief, according to Mr. Callaghan's statement, was to include 'political, economic, commercial, consular and immigration work, defence matters, overseas aid and cultural and information activities whether these tasks are performed by members of the Diplomatic Service, by members of the Home Civil Service, by members of the Armed Forces or by other agencies financially supported by the Government'. Second thoughts on how this brief has been carried out have been less uniformly unfavourable, both within the diplomatic service and among outside critics. A Parliamentary Committee, which has been considering the Report, has heard the Foreign Office's Permanent Under-Secretary defending some of its recommendations, and noting that some were indeed already being put into effect. The Foreign Secretary has also defended the general calibre of the Report in evidence to this Committee, and has promised to reply in published form to its conclusions which are due to be published before this article appears.[6] Ministers are reported to be meeting to consider some of the questions raised by the review team, and further internal Whitehall studies are apparently under way. The worst outcome of the current debate, after all, would be a confirmation of the status quo. Since Britain's overseas relations and responsibilities *have* changed quite radically since the Duncan Committee reported nearly nine years ago, and since it is unlikely that the international context which they face or the domestic base from which they operate will remain stable from now on, there would inevitably be renewed pressure for review and reform in three or four years' time. It is far preferable to acknowledge that the Report has addressed itself to a range of problems which Britain's overseas representation is already facing. Full consideration now might allow the implementation of administrative changes which would have some

[6] The Defence and External Affairs Sub-committee of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee held a number of sessions between November 1977 and February 1978 on this subject, calling amongst others officials from the FCO and several other Whitehall departments, the present Foreign Secretary and two of his predecessors, representatives of the affected civil service associations and officials of the industrial associations which represent the clientele for much overseas economic work. Its report was due to be published in March 1978; comments in this article therefore rely on press coverage of evidence submitted.

prospect of providing a stable environment for policy making for the next ten years or more.

The international context of British diplomacy

In 1969, when the Duncan Report was published, Britain's application for membership of the European Community had not yet passed beyond formal submission to serious consideration, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was a little-known body generally accorded only minor significance, and the Conservative Opposition was still committed to halting the Labour government's withdrawal of troops from East of Suez. One has only to recall these facts to appreciate how rapidly both the international context and British perceptions of our international role have altered since then. The CPRS team quite rightly places particular emphasis on the achievement of EEC membership, in altering the framework within which British policy makers operate internationally and at the same time widening the interaction between domestic and foreign policies. 'If the U.K. is to have influence in the world,' the Report states bluntly, 'it will more and more be as a result of influencing the policies pursued by the Nine as a whole' (p. x). 'Membership of the EEC', it adds, has 'introduced a new dimension to a very wide range of domestic economic policies (including environmental and social policies). It has required changes both in the policies themselves and in the methods by which they are implemented' (5.2).

The Report's identification of 'the nexus of issues between developed countries and the Third World known recently as the "North-South dialogue"' as a major new factor in Britain's international context which is 'likely to be a feature of the international scene for a long time to come' will perhaps meet with less widespread recognition (5.2). Yet politicians and industrialists who have grappled with the impact of the enormous rise in oil prices after the 1973 Middle East War, or who are aware of the implications of the Multi-Fibre Agreement or the Stabex scheme for domestic industry and employment included in the Lomé Convention, will readily agree that the demands of developing countries and the increasing politicisation of international trade have forced the British government into a series of complex and time-consuming negotiations on matters which ten or more years ago were only occasionally matters of ministerial or official concern. They will also concur with the Report's emphasis on the increased importance of multilateral work in Britain's overseas relations, particularly in international economic relations. Annex G lists some 126 international bodies to which the British government subscribes, in addition to the central institutional framework of Com-

munity membership. In many of these, British activities are no multilateral on more than one level, first concerting positions with tl other member governments of the European Community and the operating as part of the 'Group of Nine' within other organisation

But the Report's most insistent, and most contested, argument that the continued deterioration in Britain's economic position ov the past eight years has directly and unavoidably weakened Britain international standing, that North Sea oil is unlikely radically to alt the country's economic position within the foreseeable future, ar that 'in today's world a country's power and influence are basical determined by its economic performance. Inevitably therefore tl UK's ability to influence events in the world has declined and the is very little that diplomatic activity and international public relatio can do to disguise the fact' (p. ix). Critics have seized upon th brutal conclusion and condemned it as crude economic determinis which ignores the contribution that effective diplomacy and the pre tige enjoyed by a civilised society and a respected cultural traditic can make to the weight accorded to a country's representatives international negotiations. The starkness with which the argument put reflects, one suspects, the review team's determination to c through lingering illusions about Britain's international status whic it suspected lay behind the size and style of the country's large embassies overseas and justified the scale and balance of its cultur and information activities. 'It is misleading and dangerous to thir that the UK can maintain its position in the world by keeping u appearances' (2.23). 'Power and influence are not, of course, synon mous. . . . But, over time, a decline in a country's economic ar military strength will lead to a decline in its political influence. Tl extent to which this process can be delayed, and its consequenc mitigated, by diplomacy or international public relations is in practic limited' (2.8).

This is the crux of the Report's analysis, the fundamental assum tion upon which its more publicised recommendations about, fo example, the reduction of cultural and information activities rest. was put to the team during its work 'that this is too defeatist a attitude' (2.20).[7] More powerfully, the argument has been advance since the publication of the Report that its gloom is now outdate The arrival in quantity of North Sea oil during the past year has, it claimed, at last removed the balance-of-payments constraint fro British foreign policy, giving Britain for the first time since tl

[7] The Confederation of British Industry has baldly asserted in a memorandum to tl Expenditure Committee that 'military or economic decline can be largely offset l diplomatic skill and influence', but has offered little evidence to support tl challenging statement.

Second World War a chance to look soberly and constructively at its international interests and objectives without being hampered by budgetary cuts and international financial weakness. Officials within the Foreign Office consider that the rapid improvement in Britain's international economic position has demonstrated that Berrill's analysis was addressed to the problems of the 1960s and the early 1970s. The need now, they argue, is for a reform of Britain's overseas representation appropriate to the period of oil revenue surplus, that is, for the next twenty-five years. Yet optimism about North Sea oil does not entirely answer the review team's argument—unless one believes that oil will transform not only Britain's balance-of-payments position but also its entire economy. Few economists are yet convinced that the oil revenues will on their own support a reinvigoration of Britain's economy sufficient to close the gap which has opened during the last fifteen years between Britain's Gross National Product and those of, for example, France and Germany. Few politicians have yet put forward a case for allocating a high priority for increased expenditure on defence, diplomacy or overseas aid among the many spending programmes competing for a share of that revenue. The Report notes repeatedly that in absolute terms Britain's scale of diplomatic representation, military expenditure, and cultural and information efforts bears comparison with the 'analogue countries' of France and Germany. This means that in relative terms these consume a higher proportion of Britain's national budget, and—barring an economic miracle—are likely to do so for some considerable time to come.

The conclusion which the review team draws from its analysis of the international context and of Britain's declining position within it is, hardly surprisingly, that for Britain at least 'economic work is the most important and the most multi-dimensional area of overseas representation', and that over the next decade the probability is that 'more attention and resources will need to be devoted to this area' (5.9). The relationship between such a conclusion and the Report's (and its critics') assumptions about Britain's overseas objectives will be examined below. What should be noted here is the unquestioned assumption that British governments are now heavily and directly involved in almost every aspect of economic transactions between our domestic economy and the international market. The longest and most detailed chapter of the Report is devoted to government export services. Though it is not explicitly spelt out in this chapter, the degree of state involvement in supporting industrial and financial efforts overseas has clearly continued to grow since the time of the Plowden and Duncan Reports (with their repeated emphasis on the need to give more importance to economic work), and is likely to continue to

grow. 'We have been impressed by the co-ordinated assaults on overseas markets by Japanese trading companies, France (with the well publicised involvement of Ministers and sometimes the President) and sometimes Germany, and we believe that there is scope for using similar techniques' (6.45). Not only in East-West trade, but through chasing major contracts in oil-producing countries and in the developing world, and by bargaining over public procurement policies in the military and the civilian sphere, states now find themselves directly involved in trade, whether they like it or not. Recently, there have been reports of efforts by EEC negotiators, in discussions over imbalances in Euro-Japanese trade, to press the Japanese government into a commitment to purchase the European airbus as a gesture of good faith; these reports suggest that not only nation-states but also international bodies are being forced by economic recession and the conditions of international trade to become directly involved in entrepreneurial bargaining. (See article by John Zysman, p. 264.)

Previous reports and studies over the past fifteen years have chronicled the demands which these continuing changes have placed upon the structure and personnel of British government.[8] Multilateral representation and the ever-increasing numbers of international conferences have built up a daily traffic of visitors going out from London on official business for short or long periods abroad. The spread of traditionally domestic issues which have gradually been drawn into international negotiations—agricultural, industrial, and now increasingly also environmental and social—has drawn more and more home civil servants into diplomacy, alongside their traditionally diplomatic colleagues. The Berrill Report provides figures to document the enormous scale of the current effort. Fourteen separate Whitehall departments, as well as the Bank of England, are now directly involved in overseas economic work; others have specific responsibilities in the security sphere and in military procurement, in the administration of overseas aid, the control of immigration, or the sponsorship of educational and cultural activities. A survey of overseas visits made by staff from the 'D.T.I. complex' (the Departments of Trade, Industry, and Prices and Consumer Protection) during 1975 showed a total of 3,528 visits abroad, of which 186 involved ministers or permanent or deputy secretaries (5.53). There were 2,700 separate visits from the Ministry of Defence to the United States *alone* during 1976, many of them including more than one visitor (8.16). The case

[8] See William Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain* (London: RIIA, 1976), for a survey of developments up to the end of 1974. Max Beloff, *New Dimensions in Foreign Policy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), provides a perceptive study of 'the results of a radical change in the conditions of international life' (p. 11) on the structure of British government when that process of change was still in its early stages.

for administrative change rests as much upon such statistics as these as upon arguments about the characteristics of Britain's international standing and objectives. The response of Whitehall to these new demands, reinforced as they have been by Britain's membership of the European Community and by the additional emphasis which Britain's continuing economic weakness has placed upon both the diplomatic and the home civil services, has been impressive in its scale and in its determination. But it has not always been well directed or co-ordinated, and the administrative divisions appropriate to policy making within a national framework have not always proved appropriate to policy making and implementation at an international level.

The objectives of British diplomacy

'The quality of a nation's diplomacy', an American authority on foreign policy recently wrote, 'involves a clear conception of national purpose [and] . . . prudence and skill in the use of the tools of statecraft.'[9] The CPRS team was asked to examine the tools of British statecraft without being provided with a clear conception of the national purpose, or foreign policy objectives, which those instruments were intended to serve. In its absence, the team attempted to reach its own rough definition of Britain's overseas objectives, tentatively concluding (2.31) that 'there seem to us to be four:

(a) to ensure the external security of the U.K.;
(b) to promote the country's economic and social well-being;
(c) to honour certain commitments or obligations which the U.K. has voluntarily entered into or cannot withdraw from;
(d) to work for a peaceful and just world.'

A careful reading of the Report makes it evident that the review team attaches most importance, within this brief and general summary of objectives, to (b), the promotion of the country's economic and social well-being. Britain's external security is no longer, it is assumed, a matter for independent action, but for consideration within the multilateral context of Nato, subject to political decisions upon the appropriate size and shape of Britain's contribution to Nato. Post-imperial commitments and obligations remain to be honoured in various regions of the world; but they are unlikely to be with us in ten or fifteen years' time, as the process of adjustment to Britain's reduced political and military capabilities continues. The underlying conception is of Britain as a trading nation, a country concerned with the promotion of its economic welfare and of international conditions

[9] Roy C. Macridis, *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, 5th edn. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 14.

best suited to the promotion of that welfare, rather than the conception of Britain as a 'major power of the second order' set out in the Duncan Report.[10] This conception is shared privately by many in the diplomatic service, but contested by politicians in both major parties as well, oddly enough, as by leaders of Britain's industrial associations.

It would not be untypical of the pragmatic style of debate beloved in Britain for discussion of policies or of institutional questions to try to avoid explicitly considering the problem of objectives. The long approach to the European Community was scattered with ministerial and prime ministerial assurances that a commitment to membership did not 'fundamentally' affect parliamentary sovereignty or Britain's international role; in retrospect it is clear that membership has profoundly affected both. The continuing debate on devolution has been muddied by the attempts of both politicians and officials to cling to established assumptions about the nature of the British constitution even while introducing reforms which would, if successful, force a rapid re-examination of these assumptions. The CPRS team, inhibited by its official status, restricted its appeal for ministerial reconsideration of objectives to a cautious and allusive comment. 'An important policy question is the role that Ministers believe the U.K. should play in the world. Since the War, there has been a tendency for governments to take insufficient account of the decline in Britain's power' (2.30).

One regrets that the team was not asked to include within its terms of reference consideration of the formulation of Britain's objectives for overseas policy, their consideration by government and Parliament and the way in which that consideration is related to a wider public debate. The reader of the Berrill Report might imagine, with some amusement, the language in which the review team would then have criticised the inadequacy of parliamentary scrutiny and debate on matters of foreign policy and the cloudy rhetoric with which ministers have so often referred to the objectives of foreign policy. The 'ambiguities at the very centre of our policy decisions', of which the Duncan Committee complained, unfortunately remain even if their focus has shifted[11]: on British policy towards the European Communities, on attachment to sovereignty and independent initiatives in foreign policy, and on the balance to be struck between the pursuit of economic welfare and the promotion of political objectives. In the first flush of governmental responsibility, in April 1974, Mr. Callaghan as Foreign Secretary invited

the experts and the interested parties to consider how we can

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

> secure full and open debate about these issues which affect such problems as peace and war, riches and poverty, liberty and oppression. . . . One useful aid [he suggested] might be an annual White Paper on the general trends of our foreign policy. An additional way would be to produce Green Papers from time to time on particular issues so that they can be debated and discussed before conclusions are arrived at. Perhaps in addition to the all too rare debates in Parliament we could have public conferences when these seem appropriate.[12]

Four years later no public conferences have been held, and no Green Papers have appeared. There were unofficial reports in the later months of 1975 that an experimental White Paper on foreign policy was in preparation, along the lines of the annual Defence White Paper, the purpose of which is declared to be 'to state the Government's defence policy simply and clearly'; but no White Paper appeared, and the outsider can only conclude that the draft disintegrated somewhere between official unease and ministerial distractions.[13] As readers of *International Affairs* will be aware, Chatham House has itself embarked upon a three-year study of the external policy options facing Britain during the period up to 1985. But it is not easy for an institute to stimulate wide-ranging discussion of the objectives open to foreign policy makers and the constraints on those objectives without active ministerial and parliamentary interest to support it.

The members of the review team were therefore forced to fill a gap, to open a debate which has so far hardly been joined by their critics. It may be that they were too pessimistic about Britain's economic prospects. It may also be that they were mistaken in concluding that even if Britain's economic position improves it is unlikely that public opinion will willingly support a reassumpton of old roles, or warm to politicians who talk of Britain's international status or contribution to world peace. But the case against their arguments is as yet unproven. Meanwhile, in the absence of any positive consensus across the parties on the aims and objectives of British foreign policy, or any great clarity within them, we are forced to consider the reshaping of the administrative instruments for that foreign policy with only a very uncertain design to guide us.

[12] Speech by the Foreign Secretary to the Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers Association, Marlborough House, London, April 10, 1974 (FCO News Dept. text).

[13] The quotation is from the observations of the Secretary of State for Defence on the 9th Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1972–73, HC–269 (London: HMSO, 1973); Second Special Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1973–74, HC–30 (London: HMSO, 1973).

It is not the intention of this article to discuss the Berrill Report's recommendations on cultural and information work, or on consular activities, in any detail. On both, the Report was usefully provocative, presenting for parliamentary debate and ministerial consideration choices which in the normal course of things governments might happily avoid. If Members of Parliament were willing to accept a lower quality of official protection for British citizens abroad, and ministers were prepared to defend their consequent inability to aid citizens' interests overseas in all cases, then substantial savings could be made in consular representation. If there is little likelihood that governments will provide the BBC with the substantial capital expenditure needed to improve audibility for its present range of overseas services, then it would be more realistic to reduce the range of those services and concentrate its resources on achieving a higher quality for a narrower spread. There is room for a separate article, at least, to examine the assumptions on which the review team based its recommendations on cultural policy and the dissemination of news and information; this writer, for one, would question many of them. But given the primarily economic emphasis of the Report, it seems most valuable here to investigate further the implications for government and for industry, as well as for the structure of overseas representation, of the long-term growth of government involvement in this area.

The state as trader

Official support for private industry in the form of export promotion has mushroomed since the early 1960s, as the balance of payments became a source of increasing anxiety and promoting exports a consuming passion for ministers and officials alike. The British National Export Council, established in 1964 as (at least nominally) a joint operation by government and industry, gave way in 1971 to the British Overseas Trade Board, rather more closely under government control. Spurred on by the recommendations of Plowden and Duncan, diplomats have moved increasingly strongly into commercial and export work, demonstrating a degree of flexibility and flair which earns them compliments from the review team. Some 5,000 officials at home and abroad are now engaged in promoting British exports, accounting for over a fifth of total expenditure on overseas representation (6.158). The Report is least happy with the division of responsibilities among departments and agencies in Britain, with their recruitment and staffing and with the status accorded to their personnel (6.105). It is only obliquely critical of the failure of private industry to respond to a level of government activity and expenditure on promoting exports notice-

ably higher than that of France, Germany or Japan.[14] Members of the diplomatic service in posts abroad who have struggled, in the face of reluctant or minimal British interest, to interest British companies in wide-open export opportunities, only to witness foreign companies gain the contracts, would in some cases question whether the current scale of effort is worthwhile, or whether the failure of British exporters to respond more favourably to the rise in government sponsorship of export promotion does not relate fundamentally to factors outside the control of the official machine.

Government involvement in industrial co-operation and sponsorship overseas has also mushroomed since the early 1960s, since the first uncertain plunge into technological collaboration with the Concorde project and the European Launcher Development Organisation. The degree of government-to-government involvement now expected in the negotiation, conclusion and financing of major public contracts, whether it be concerned with ships for the Polish merchant fleet or hospitals for the Saudi Arabian government, is enormous. The development programmes of industrialising countries, or the infrastructure projects of oil-producing states, offer opportunities for large-scale contracts which in terms of employment and foreign exchange are worth more than dozens of private export successes, but which before they are won require months or even years of official preoccupation, backed up on occasion by ministerial prestige. The CPRS team notes the extent to which existing bodies like the Crown Agents are stretched by the demands of such public contracts, and suggests among other possible ways of creating the appropriate machinery that the role of the National Enterprise Board might be extended in this direction (6.69). The team does not attempt to answer the question whether the British government should shoulder the financial liabilities for underwriting such projects when, as now happens, they are too large for any private contractor to contemplate accepting the liabilities on which client governments insist. This issue is thrown back to Parliament and ministers as 'an important question of policy, but one that is outside the terms of reference of this review' (6.67).

There is, however, no convincing rationale for government involvement and government-industry relations in this large and growing field. As so often with British practice, principles have been built up case by case, leaving uncertainties and ambiguities in their path. The review team notes that

There is a contradiction in firms' present attitudes towards Gov-

[14] See Table 6.8, p. 81. 'One justification for the relatively high level' of expenditure in the UK, it adds, 'is that, contrary to the popular image of Britain as a trading nation, exporters are surprisingly ignorant of what is required' (6.80).

ernment: on the one hand they seek assistance of various kinds (not only financial); on the other hand they resist any kind of government influence over their planning and decision-making; they want the assistance to be unconditional. (6.22)

No evidence was apparently offered to the review team, or to the Select Committee, which suggested that government involvement in export promotion and industrial sponsorship on the international plane should be reduced from its present level; on the contrary, there were complaints that insufficient attention had been given to invisible exports and to consideration of the appropriate level of official support for them. Yet the implications of such an active government role in international economic policy for the government's degree of involvement in domestic economic management, given the inextricable links between the two, have not yet been fully appreciated either by the political parties or by private industry. As this article goes to press, for example, a row is raging in Parliament and the press about governmental discrimination between private firms in awarding public contracts—in this case, in order to influence the private sector to respect government guidelines on pay policy. But successful government action in export and international industrial policy will require deliberate discrimination among firms in deciding which should be supported in the bidding for a major project, or where, in exploiting export opportunities, it would be most effective to direct scarce resources and market intelligence.

In France and Japan close relations and shared values between government and industry present few problems, and positive discrimination in government support and financial backing is accepted. In Britain the picture is confused. Current policy, the review team notes, 'is to be slightly selective', though 'there is probably more selectivity in practice than the stated policy would suggest' (6.52). 'The evidence from firms and organizations was mixed. They noted that it was a delicate issue, and some organizations (e.g. CBI, Chambers of Commerce, the Institute of Export) reported a conflict of views among their members' (6.55). There is also a conflict of views among the political parties. The Conservative Party, if returned to office at the coming general election, would not find it easy 'to move positively and publicly in the direction of more selectivity' in its external policies, as the Report recommends (6.56), at the same time that it was moving positively to reduce the scale and discretionary nature of government involvement in the management of the domestic economy. It is, incidentally, committed to the abolition of the National Enterprise Board, so doing away with one potential vehicle for governmental

discretionary activity which would operate at one remove from ministerial direction.

The issues raised by the economic chapters of the Report are not therefore easily settled by reorganising the Department of Trade or upgrading the staff of Export House. They stretch to the centre of the debate about government's relations with industry and governmental involvement in economic management. They also suggest, contrary to the Report's categorisation of overseas work into separate economic, political and foreign-policy compartments, that (as the review team itself admits in passing) 'there is no clear dividing line between foreign policy and overseas economic policy' (5.27): that economic work and the wider dimensions of political reporting and representation abroad also intertwine. Businessmen attempting to negotiate with foreign governments are interested as much in the stability of that government, the identities of its most influential members and the likely directions of its future policies, as in the directly commercial prospects to which these form the background. Governments which successfully cultivate good relations, through ministerial visits, assiduous diplomacy, and even through cultural activities and the reputation of their news media, will stand to gain advantages in seeking out commercial opportunities and negotiating contracts. The state as trader will need, in the government-to-government international market of the 1980s, to have at its disposal many of the instruments of diplomacy familiar to the old-style powers.[15]

Structure and staffing

After the reorganisations and restructurings of the diplomatic and home civil services over the past fifteen years, suggestions for further administrative change tend to be greeted with dismay. The Berrill Report proposed a 'merger of the Home Civil Service and the Diplomatic Service and the creation within the combined Service of a Foreign Service Group (FSG) which would staff most of the jobs in the U.K. and overseas' concerned with international policy (p. xv).

[15] *Trade and Aid*, the 1st Report of the Select Committee on Overseas Development, 1977–78, HC–125 (London: HMSO, 1978), provides some comments of relevance here. The Conservative members of this committee, who included one of the 'shadow' Foreign Office team, agreed to the Report's call for information on commerial opportunities in developing countries to be 'used in the construction of a medium term strategy of industrial regeneration and trade promotion in this country' (para. 22). The CPRS's recommendations in its field of investigation, this committee concluded, were limited in their usefulness by the CPRS's too narrow terms of reference. 'Your Committee believe that the terms of the debate need to be widened from the better coordination of foreign economic policy (though that is still essential) to the better coordination of domestic economic policy *with* foreign economic policy' (para. 42). More strongly, it adds, 'this is fundamental. Trade policy, aid policy and industrial strategy are parts of a single whole' (para. 43).

Not surprisingly, reactions to this suggestion focused immediately upon the disruption which would accompany its creation and the desirability of leaving the diplomatic service undisturbed to get on with its job. The Report also more cautiously floated the suggestion that the Foreign Office might usefully be combined at some future date with the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) and the external trade divisions of the Department of Trade into an integrated Department of Overseas Affairs (DOA), to reduce the duplication of effort between parallel units and to improve co-ordination (20.43–47 and Annex Q); this met with even less initial sympathy. Yet, here again, second thoughts about these recommendations have modified many opinions. There is considerable support within the diplomatic service for the idea of a Department of Overseas Affairs, but it is resisted by home civil servants for much the same reason that the review team pulled back from directly recommending it: the fear that such a unified department would be dominated by the personnel and ethos of the diplomatic service. The arguments for the creation of the Foreign Service Group, if not immediately, then as the culmination of moves towards greater interchange between the two services, have also upon reflection been recognised to be powerful; and it is hard to escape the conclusion that in time a unified civil service will emerge.

Part of the immediate resistance to the Report's proposals was due to the widespread assumption that they constituted an attack on the diplomatic service. The implications of the proposed changes for the home civil service were not noticed. Certainly, the Berrill team underplayed its criticisms of the home civil service, perhaps considering it too large a target for attack. But criticisms there are, scattered through the Report: of the slow adjustment of many home departments to the international dimension of their responsibilities, of the need to upgrade the authority and status of their international sections (5.18), of their occasionally haphazard attitudes to the demands they place upon overseas posts and to the visitors they send abroad (5.19, 5.21, 5.64), and of the lack of attention paid to overseas experience and representation in career planning and promotion (5.66, 21.39). The review team could have said more. It could, for example, have criticised the tendency for establishment officers in domestic ministries to discourage their more promising young officials from volunteering for service abroad, and urged them to treat overseas experience as a necessary or desirable prelude to promotion.[16] It could also have referred to the continuing reluctance of some senior officials, even permanent

[16] The review team does, however, make this point explicitly with reference to service attachés and the Ministry of Defence (8.63).

secretaries, in home departments to take full account of the obligations which Britain has accepted as a member of the European Community and of other international organisations, or to relate those obligations to the formulation and implementation of domestic policy.

Both the Plowden Committee and the Duncan Committee recommended greater interchange between the home and diplomatic services, in recognition of the increasing involvement of home civil servants in international work and in response to the need for greater subject expertise in Britain's overseas representation. Though the level of interchange has gradually increased, there are a number of obstacles to its further extension—and, the Report makes clear, these obstacles are to be found predominantly on the home civil service side. The official requirement is that ' All Civil Servants at or above Executive Officer or equivalent level are liable (even on initial appointment) to serve in any part of the United Kingdom or overseas '; but in practice the home civil service does not enforce this requirement, relying instead of volunteers to fill overseas appointments.[17] As a result, it is often difficult to find suitably qualified candidates to fill specialised posts abroad, and difficult to place members of the diplomatic service in sufficient numbers in home departments around Whitehall.[18] In many important sectors of overseas policy the officials responsible for the formulation of policy at home and those responsible for its implementation abroad lack common experience or mutual understanding of the constraints and possibilities of each others' work. There remains, too, a degree of rivalry, even of mutual suspicion, between the two services—far less than existed some years ago, it is true, but still evident in the air of diplomatic superiority adopted towards some sections of domestic ministries and the claim ' by some home departments that the FCO was duplicating—or even usurping—their functions ' (5.26).

A Foreign Service Group would have a number of advantages over the current division of responsibilities and personnel between separate services. First, it would integrate the FCO and overseas missions fully into Whitehall, removing mutual suspicion and spreading direct awareness of the international dimension of domestic policy more widely through domestic ministries. Secondly, it would ensure more often that ' the same group of staff perform both the UK and the overseas ends of each function ', rather than having, as in aid, economic and commercial work, diplomats acting as agents in the field for domestic principals with whom they have had only fleeting contact and who

[17] *General Information for Candidates*, Civil Service Commission (1976).

[18] Since ' unless exchanges are on a head-to-head basis, the department receiving more than it lends blocks promotion prospects for its own staff ' (21.39).

appreciate only partially the conditions under which they operate. Thirdly, it would allow for a shift in the balance of careers between home and abroad for those with a clear commitment to regular service abroad; the review team calculates that with an FSG some 37 per cent larger than the present diplomatic service, the present balance between one tour at home to every two abroad would shift towards an equal distribution, ensuring that Britain's representatives overseas have both wider and more regular experience of the domestic context and policies of their home government. Some in the diplomatic service would be unhappy with such a development, regarding their careers as nomadic by choice. But the changing expectations of diplomatic wives about pursuing jobs and careers, and about the disruptions of too frequent travel on family life, are in any case likely to alter attitudes to predominantly overseas careers within the next few years, pushing Whitehall towards a greater reliance for service abroad upon the young and unmarried or the older couple whose children have left home.[19] It will require substantial and sustained pressure from ministers and from Parliament to overcome the obstacles to inter-service integration, or even to achieve the much higher levels of interchange between the two services which should form the first step towards it. The long-term value of such a development, however, merits this deliberate pressure.

Meanwhile, much could be done to change attitudes and widen understanding by changes in the pattern of training for both diplomats and home civil servants—a subject oddly neglected in the Berrill Report. It is unfortunate that the very thorough investigation of civil service structure and training carried out by another section of the Expenditure Committee last year ' decided to omit the foreign service ', on the grounds that it did not wish to prejudice the CPRS review.[20] With the CPRS team touching only upon training within the diplomatic service (in Annex R), little attention has thus been paid by public bodies to the extent to which joint training, both on recruitment and in mid-career, could play a part in heightening awareness of overlapping responsibilities and increasing constructive interchange within Whitehall. The Civil Service College has been slow to develop courses on international themes, except on the European Community; the excellent facilities of the diplomatic service language centre are sadly under-used by the rest of Whitehall. Administrative trainees to the

[19] I cannot resist recording the comment of one British diplomat, whose wife on their return to London had recently found a rewarding job, on the detailed discussion and recommendations of the Berrill Report on staffing, allowances and career patterns: ' When all is said and done, no deliberate reform is likely to affect the Diplomatic Service as much in the next few years as the demands of working wives.'

[20] The 11th Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1976–77, *The Civil Service*, HC–535 (London: HMSO, 1977), p. xvii.

home civil service and the diplomatic service follow separate courses, soaking in the distinctive ethos and the characteristic blind spots of their professions without appreciating how much their responsibilities now have in common. In Paris relations between the Quai d'Orsay and domestic ministries are smoothed by the common training and *camaraderie* of graduates of the *École Nationale d'Administration.* Without necessarily pursuing such an elitist path, there are lessons here for Whitehall to absorb, in bringing together officials with overlapping but distinctive responsibilities and in extending the period of training in subjects outside their immediate or central fields of duty.[21]

The creation of an integrated Department of Overseas Affairs would require more radical changes. A Foreign Service Group might progressively evolve out of increasing interchange and altered conditions of service for home civil servants drawn into regular overseas commitments. A DOA would be a more deliberate break, involving the creation of new overlaps and anomalies in the fields of industrial and commercial policy even as it reduced the old anomalies. The review team is surely right to conclude that 'the departmental structure is in our view a less important factor than staffing arrangements in determining the relationships between Departments' (20.42). The ODM perhaps presents the most striking anomaly in the Whitehall structure today, inheriting as it has the remnants of Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Office traditions and responsibilities, and supported by the Labour government's symbolic commitment to overseas development, but without the weight to make its perspective felt significantly in the formulation of overseas economic policy. Here again the review team underplayed its criticism by calling only for 'a Management Review' of the ODM's present arrangements (11.39). The major structural problem, however, and one which the review returns to time and again, lies in the struggle to maintain consistency among the overlapping and inter-related decisions of all the Whitehall departments.

The review rightly identifies as the most urgent cause for attention this problem of co-ordinating bilateral policies within a government machine organised along sectoral lines, of pulling together the different strands of policy towards specific foreign countries (5.30–41, 20.6–11). Its remedy, however, seems unnecessarily to overload the official machine and its central co-ordinating apparatus, the Cabinet Office. If an Official Committee on Bilateral Relations with Overseas

[21] The Berrill Committee does recommend (5.63) that home department staff could serve short postings in larger numbers to multilateral delegations, to the EEC, the UN and OECD, 'in order to gain experience useful to them in future jobs'; but for some home civil servants similar postings to bilateral missions might alternatively provide useful and relevant experience.

Countries (20.7) were to be more than an occasional backstop to interdepartmental disagreements, it would threaten to consume the energies of senior officials in wearing down the sharper points of each other's points of view. A Foreign Office more closely integrated into Whitehall, working in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and regular interchange with the domestic ministries to which it relates most directly, should properly, and could conveniently, fill this role. The geographical departments of the Foreign Office have weakened progressively in recent years, as home departments have duplicated their analyses in specific sectors and as functional departments have grown up within the Foreign Office to monitor domestic ministries. Those geographical departments should now deliberately be strengthened, and given the responsibility for preparing the country policy programme which, after consultation with other ministries, should form the guideline for bilateral relations.

Looking ahead

It is difficult for a country with no clear conception of its foreign policy objectives to gain any clear idea of the instrument it needs to fulfil them. Some of the most interesting questions raised by this Report are those which are properly outside its terms of reference. Digging into the Report, for instance, one can discover a number of conditional references to the implications for Britain's overseas representation of closer co-operation within the European framework—should that become the government's intention. There has been some discussion already among the Nine about sharing facilities, such as consular or reporting functions, or even entire missions; to which the pragmatic attitude of the British government has been, characteristically, that it is prepared to move as fast as its partners wish to go. The review team would like it to move faster. 'EEC representation is the direction we should be moving in and we recommend that the government should take a positive line and be on the alert for opportunities for progress' (19.13). But that would involve a major policy decision, with implications for Britain's future capacities for independent initiatives in foreign policy and its claim to sovereignty. The review team even dares to question the value of Britain's permanent seat on the UN Security Council, as fostering 'the illusion that the U.K. has a greater world role than it is in practice within its power to perform' (2.14), and as, in the long run incompatible with working through the European Community to extend collective European influence. But this clearly differs from the attitude of the Foreign Secretary, who is reported to have told the Expenditure Committee that he would like to see British missions in all the countries repre-

sented in the UN, a requirement which he (like his French colleague) deduces from the responsibilities of Security Council membership. If the British government were actively to promote common European representation and progress towards a common European foreign policy, one would suspect that current proposals for reform in Whitehall will be outdated well within the next decade; but that remains an uncertain intention.[22]

For similar reasons, the Berrill Report is reticent about policy planning. An official body working within its terms of reference can only criticise officials; it is up to Parliament and to outsiders to draw the conclusions which require wider reforms. Some references are made to the desirability of greater reliance on outside experts, both in the collection of information and in the commissioning of detailed studies (5.14, 15.17). The blueprint for a Department of Overseas Affairs includes 'a small planning and co-ordinating unit, in close relationship with the Secretary of State', to be staffed by a mixture of insiders and outsiders (p. 437). No doubt these would help, at the margin, to clarify ideas and re-examine received opinions; but they can only make for marginal improvements in the absence of more positive ministerial guidance and parliamentary debate.

The Berrill Report thus raises as many questions as it answers about the future direction of British foreign policy and the appropriate structure to serve that policy. One hopes that the Expenditure Committee report will have addressed itself to some of these wider questions, falling as they must outside the boundaries of the review team's brief; one looks forward to the Foreign Secretary's response. The point to insist upon, in encouraging a wide-ranging discussion of the alternative directions of institutional reform, is that those within government and those outside cannot simply be guided by considerations of administrative convenience or bureaucratic politics. The fundamental question is: 'What do we need our structure of overseas representation *for?*' It has not yet been answered.

[22] The implications of progress towards a common European foreign policy, and the likely pace of such progress, is discussed further in William Wallace, 'A Common European Foreign Policy: Mirage or Reality', *New Europe*, Spring 1977, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 21–33.

DECOLONISATION AND INTERNATIONAL STATUS: THE EXPERIENCE OF BRUNEI

Michael Leifer

IN the final quarter of the twentieth century, the residual practi of decolonisation has been influenced by standards sanctioned its previous beneficiaries who dominate the General Assembly the United Nations. Governments which claim legitimacy on the ba of a popular will, expressed—if at all—more often than not in manag elections and referenda, have affirmed conventions about the bas of post-colonial state succession, especially the inalienable rig of self-determination. Internal consistency has not always been t strongest quality of such affirmation. For example, constitution association with a traditional colonial power is likely to be challeng even in the face of the verifiable wishes of the inhabitants of a imperial residuum. Thus, the people of the Falkland Islands a Gibraltar have been encouraged to contemplate life under Argenti and Spanish rule. In these cases, physical distance from the metropo tan power and close contiguity to claimant states have bulked larg whereas the principle of self-determination has been conveniently ove looked.

Such inconsistency of standards in the urging of decolonisation do not appear to be the case for the Sultanate of Brunei, a mere vesti of a Malay-Moslem suzerainty which once extended over the enti area of Northern Borneo. Brunei offends against all the canons new statehood. This is not because of its minuscule size which mig seem to validate charges of non-viability. Such charges are hard permitted in an age which has seen numerous micro-states accepted legitimate members of the international community. The fact that o of the oil majors exercises an overwhelming role in its economy al does not place Brunei in either a unique or a pariah position. Brun has been condemned as an objectionable political anachronism becau of its exclusive association with the United Kingdom and because as direct consequence of that association it is governed openly on monarchical basis without deference to the orthodoxies of popul participation. As a result, its international status is questionable the opinion of a vast majority of the members of the UN Gener Assembly. A relevant factor in successive attempts to make tl Sultanate conform to the standards espoused by this majority has be

the willingness of the government of Malaysia to bring the issue annually before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.

On the most recent occasion, in November 1977, when the Fourth Committee was seized with the issue of Brunei, the onus of responsibility for decolonisation was again placed on the United Kingdom. The key article of the draft resolution for the Assembly called upon:

> . . . the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, consistent with its responsibility as the administering Power, to take all steps within its competence to facilitate expeditiously the holding of free and democratic elections by the appropriate government authorities in Brunei, in consultation with and under the supervision of the United Nations, in accordance with the inalienable right of the people of Brunei to self-determination and independence, and further calls, prior to the elections, for the lifting of the ban on all political parties and for the return of all political exiles to Brunei so that they can participate freely and fully in the elections.[1]

The terms of this appeal suggest not only a close connection between democracy and decolonisation but also that the British government is capable of its own volition of transforming the political condition of Brunei to conform with the values endorsed by those states which constitute a majority in the General Assembly. Indeed, they more than imply that Britain is obstructing the process of decolonisation in the Sultanate. There can be no doubt, of course, that as the former protecting power, Britain has been responsible in great part for the way in which Brunei has evolved politically. However, its current responsibility in terms of the substance of the Fourth Committee's resolution is more subject to questioning. Indeed, the purpose of this article is to examine the international condition of Brunei in the light of the request for self-determination and independence for the Sultanate.

Brunei's ambiguous international status

Brunei consists of two territorial enclaves of only 2,226 square miles, with a population of 180,000, on the north-west coast of Borneo. The enclaves are separated from each other by the valley of the Limbang River which forms part of the Malaysian state of Sarawak which adjoins and surrounds Brunei on its land borders. In the sixteenth century, the suzerain authority of the Sultanate extended beyond Northern Borneo to the Visayan Islands of the Philippine archipelago. Its influence contracted concurrently with European

[1] UN General Assembly, Fourth Committee, A/C. 4/32/L.19.

involvement in maritime South-east Asia and as a consequence of internal rebellion. The suppression of the rebellion in 1841 by a British adventurer James Brooke set in train a process of territorial acquisition at the expense of Brunei which came to a halt only in 1890. Indeed, although Britain extended its protection in 1888, it was only in 1906 with the appointment of the first British Resident that the threat to the residual integrity of the Sultanate was removed.[2]

The international status of Brunei is somewhat ambiguous. At the outset of the period of British tutelage, the Resident 'advised' the Sultan on all matters of government except those relating to the Islamic faith and Malay custom. In time a State Council was established on which the Resident sat and to which eleven other members were appointed. This Council enacted legislation, but its creation neither changed the exercise of power nor the international status of the Sultanate. This arrangement was interrupted from December 1941 by the Japanese occupation. It was resumed with the re-establishment of the political association with Britain after the end of the Second World War. In September 1959, however, the first formal changes were instituted in the relationship with Britain. A statement of responsibility and jurisdiction was set out in an agreement whereby Britain assumed exclusive control of external affairs and defence (including internal security). A High Commissioner replaced the Resident but the right to advise the Sultan on all matters connected with the government of the state continued as a formal prerogative of the Queen's representative.

After Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malayan Prime Minister, suggested, in May 1961, a political union between Malaya, Singapore and the territories of Northern Borneo, the Sultan of Brunei, Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, indicated his interest in the incorporation of Brunei within a Federation of Malaysia. He was encouraged in this interest by the British government in London and by its officials in Northern Borneo. He was probably also influenced by the prospect of the drying up of the Seria oilfield which had been discovered in 1929 and which had provided the source of the Sultanate's considerable wealth.

Irrespective of any reservations held by the Sultan about the merits of entering Malaysia, such an undertaking was openly opposed within Brunei. At the same time as the 1959 agreement, a written constitution had been promulgated which invested supreme executive authority in the Sultan with provision also for a partially elected Legislative Council. The first elections to this Council were held in August 1962 and all sixteen seats (out of a total of thirty-three) were won by the radical

[2] See Nicholas Tarling, *Britain, the Brookes and Brunei* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971).

Partai Ra'ayat (People's Party) formed in 1956 by A. M. Azahari who enjoyed close political associations with Indonesia. Indeed, the identification of this party with an earlier British proposal in February 1958 for a federation of the Northern Borneo territories is believed to have prompted the Sultan to develop a countervailing relationship with the conservative government in Kuala Lumpur, to accelerate internal constitutional change and also to clarify the terms of the association with Britain.

With evident popular support, *Partai Ra'ayat* rejected the entry of Brunei into Malaysia and advocated instead the establishment of an independent state of *Kalimantan Utara* (North Borneo)—in effect, an expression of Brunei irredentism. In December 1962, before the Sultan's own equivocal attitude to Malaysia had been made clear, the clandestine military wing of *Partai Ra'ayat*, the self-styled *Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara* (North Borneo National Army) staged an uprising directed against the formation of Malaysia and associated British dominance. The Brunei revolt served as the catalyst for Indonesia's promulgation and prosecution of Confrontation against Malaysia. But within the Sultanate, it served to arrest any prospect of further peaceful political change. British troops from Singapore put down the uprising and the constitution was suspended. *Partai Ra'ayat* was proscribed and most of its leading members were detained; some still remain in prison without trial.

There can be little doubt that the revolt had a popular base and this factor may have contributed to the Sultan's decision in July 1963 against joining Malaysia. His decision was also influenced by his likely order of precedence among the other Sultans of the Federation who provide its kings on a five-year rotating basis. Further, the question of the distribution of oil revenues between Brunei and the prospective Federal government was a major consideration. It is interesting to note that fresh discoveries of offshore oil in commercial quantities were made only in 1963. Indeed, the Sultan was out of the state, engaged in negotiations concerning the terms of entry to Malaysia, when a telegram was despatched to him from the Shell Oil Company in Seria. Finally, a precipitating factor influencing the Sultan's decision was the brusque manner in which Duncan Sandys, British Minister for Commonwealth Relations, sought his compliance.

From the time of the abortive revolt in December 1962 until November 1971, the internal political structure and the international status of Brunei remained unaltered. The Sultanate was self-governing although government was exercised through the supreme executive authority of the Sultan. The Legislative Council continued to function but only with the participation of nominated members, although

elections were resumed in time for district councils. Brunei was still a British-protected state. The British government possessed jurisdiction to make laws relating to defence and external affairs. The formal responsibility and right of the High Commissioner—a member of the Council of Ministers—to advise the Sultan on matters connected with the government of the state, if not exercised in practice since September 1959, represented nevertheless a further derogation of sovereignty.

In November 1971 at the same time as the Anglo-Malaysian defence agreement was replaced by the consultative five-power defence arrangements,[3] the Anglo-Brunei agreement of September 1959 was formally amended. This agreement was signed by a new Sultan, Sir Hassanal Bolkiah, who had been educated at Sandhurst and enthroned in August 1968 at the age of twenty-two after the abdication of his father. The timing of this act of abdication in the previous October may well have been influenced by the British government's initial announcement in July 1967 of its intention to disengage militarily from East of Suez. But irrespective of motive, the *Seri Begawan Sultan*, as the old Sultan, Sir Omar, is now styled, continued to exercise decisive political influence.

The agreement of November 1971 removed the last formal vestige of Britain's control of Brunei's internal affairs, namely the responsibility and right of the High Commissioner to advise the Sultan on matters connected with the government of the state. The style and title of the High Commissioner was changed in order to emphasise that the Sultanate enjoyed full internal self-government. Accordingly, the British High Commissioner (as opposed to Her Majesty's High Commissioner) did not retain any advisory functions, nor any role in the government of the state. Britain did retain a responsibility for defence—excluding internal public order—but only on a consultative basis corresponding to those obligations assumed under the five-power defence arrangements. A British defence role was indicated in the provision for continued assistance with the training and staffing of the Royal Brunei Malay Regiment which had been formed in 1961. Only in external affairs was a formal derogation of sovereignty sustained. Thus article II of the agreement added that 'Her Majesty shall continue to enjoy jurisdiction to make for the State laws relating to external affairs.'[4]

[3] For a succinct account of the nature of these security arrangements, see Chin Kin Wah, *The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 23, 1974).

[4] *Agreement between Her Majesty The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Highness The Sultan of Brunei amending the Agreement of 29 September 1959*, Bandar Seri Begawan, Nov. 23, 1971, Cmnd. 4932 (London: HMSO, 1972), p. 4.

As a consequence of the agreement of November 1971 the international status of Brunei was clarified if not made fully clear. Given the rights of the British Crown in external affairs and the corresponding limitations on the government of the Sultanate in treaty relations, then Brunei is not fully sovereign in the sense that the state is the sole source of all its laws. Its constitutional separateness is violated by its lack of an external affairs power. As such, it cannot enjoy international status to the extent that the concept possesses an absolute quality. Indeed, this fact is exemplified by the title of the Queen's representative as High Commissioner in Brunei and not to Brunei as would be the case if the Sultanate enjoyed a recognised international status. It is further reflected in the fact that although Brunei issues its own currency and accredits an honorary Dutch consul, its citizens travel abroad on British passports. As far as the majority of the member governments of the United Nations are concerned, its status is compromised also by the critical role which British expatriate personnel play in the government, administration and services of the state and in sustaining the military viability of the Royal Brunei Malay Regiment. It is in respect of this contractual role that the Fourth Committee has represented Britain as 'the administering Power' irrespective of whether or not this description corresponds to legal or political reality.

In effect, the derogation of sovereignty which mars the international status of Brunei has been voluntarily and freely entered into by the government of Brunei although without any form of popular consultation. Indeed, well before the conclusion of the agreement of November 1971, it had been the government of Brunei which had sought to maintain and not revise the status quo of its international position. By contrast, it had been the British government which had sought to change its relationship with the Sultanate and also to encourage the introduction of truly democratic institutions. Indeed, after talks between the Sultan and British representatives in November 1969, the prospect of a unilateral abrogation of the 1959 agreement within a year and the conferment of full independence by default was only averted by the fall of the Labour government in June 1970. It was the new Conservative administration which negotiated the substitution of the five-power defence arrangements for the Anglo-Malaysian defence agreement and whose willingness to retain a Gurkha battalion in Brunei corresponded to its modification of the East of Suez policy of the preceding Labour government.

The Labour government's desire to withdraw

A subsequent Labour government indicated its intention to revise the relationship with Brunei in November 1974 when without consulta-

tion, it announced in a Defence Review that it intended to withdraw the battalion of Gurkhas stationed at Seria. This battalion is a constituent part of the Gurkha brigade deployed in the main in Hongkong. The presence of the Gurkhas is not provided for specifically in the agreement of November 1971 which merely stipulated that the Sultan should 'provide facilities necessary for any of Her Majesty's forces stationed in the State or training or exercising in the State with the agreement of His Highness.'[5] In effect, the presence of the Gurkhas, whose maintenance costs are borne fully by the Sultanate, is provided for in an unpublished exchange of letters. And although the declared role of the battalion is a training one, its presence is also relevant to Britain's consultative external defence responsibility. The agreement of November 1971 established a joint standing consultative Brunei Defence Council. The British representatives on this Council are the High Commissioner and 'as his adviser, a British officer who will normally be the senior officer of such of Her Majesty's Forces as are stationed in the State.'[6] In effect, this 'adviser' is the Commander of the Gurkha battalion who is directly responsible to the military staff in London.

The British decision to withdraw the Gurkha battalion and to revise the relationship with Brunei was the product of a number of factors. And for the Labour government it did not represent a new initiative but rather the revival of a past aborted policy. First of all for a Labour government, the nature of the relationship with the Sultanate was considered to be archaic in political terms and also out of keeping with defence priorities. Irrespective of the external defence implications of the relationship, jungle training for British forces was regarded as possessing a limited and diminishing utility. Indeed, the future role of the whole Gurkha brigade was subject to questioning in the process. Secondly, given the absence of democratic institutions in the state and the narrow base of government, despite its general munificence, the prospect of one day finding the Gurkha battalion interposed between the Sultan's administration and a popular uprising, possibly with external support, was a situation that the British government and its advisers were not prepared to contemplate. In addition, the British government was displeased to find itself charged from the end of 1974 with responsibility for denying 'the inalienable right of the people of Brunei to self-determination and independence'.

Under article VIII of the agreement of November 1971, one year's notice of a request to review its terms was given to the government of

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Brunei in November 1974. In effect, this represented a desire to relinquish all responsibilities in foreign affairs and defence. The notice took effect in November 1975 and negotiations began in January 1976 when Lord Goronwy-Roberts, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, spent six days in Brunei. His purpose was to make clear the inevitability of the Gurkhas' withdrawal and of the necessary changes in the long-standing relationship between Britain and the Sultanate. But the Sultan's father, the power behind the throne, resisted these entreaties, including suggestions for 'progressive democratisation'.[7]

The inconclusive visit to Brunei by Lord Goronwy-Roberts occurred in the month following the decisive Indonesian military intervention in the former Portuguese colony of Timor which ensured its formal incorporation into the Republic as its twenty-seventh province. The analogy between Portuguese Timor and Brunei as equivalent anachronistic vestiges of empire in South-east Asia had been considered seriously in Malaysia which completely surrounds the Sultanate along its land borders. Indeed, at a seminar in Jakarta in October 1974, the Malaysian Minister for Home Affairs, Tan Sri Ghazalie Shafie drew attention to 'the security issues that revolve around the continuing existence of vestigial colonial territories in our region'. He warned that 'their existence besides being historically anomalous, also makes them the foci of local discontent and foreign intrigue. The security issues that they pose may be peripheral to the ambit of our concern here, but they are nevertheless potential areas of instability.'[8]

Irrespective of any sense of territorial lust or a desire to add the oil and liquid natural gas revenues of Brunei to those of Malaysia, the political repercussions of the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement on East Timor had disturbed the government in Kuala Lumpur. The emergence of the radical Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (Fretilin) was construed as an indication of what the future might hold in store for the two territorial enclaves wedged within the East Malaysian state of Sarawak. It was no coincidence that Malaysia provided enthusiastic diplomatic support for Indonesia's

[7] For an assessment by Lord Goronwy-Roberts of the issues involved, see the interview which he gave in *The Borneo Bulletin*, Jan. 17, 1976.

[8] Tan Sri Muhammed Ghazalie bin Shafie, 'ASEAN's Response to Security Issues in Southeast Asia' in Centre for Strategic and International Studies, *Regionalism in Southeast Asia* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1975), p. 23. The prospect of regional political instability arising from the condition of Brunei has been argued by the Malay language press in Kuala Lumpur. For example, *Utusan Melayu*, Dec. 1, 1977, maintained 'The delay by Britain in granting independence and holding a free election in that country will only give an opportunity to the Communists to look for a new base in the midst of the Asean nations.'

military intervention in East Timor and its political absorption of the former Portuguese colony.

The government of Brunei looked at the experience of East Timor and at the attitudes displayed by Malaysia in the context of the East Timor crisis in a very different light. Indeed, since the end of the period of Confrontation between Indonesia and the neighbouring federation, relations between the Sultanate and Malaysia have become strained, in part, because of Brunei's revival of a claim to the interposing territory of the Limbang River Valley which, it is alleged, had been annexed illegally by Rajah Charles Brooke in 1890. The government of Brunei was exercised by the conviction that the administration of Tun Abdul Razak in Kuala Lumpur was actively engaged in steps to undermine political order within the Sultanate with the object of effecting its incorporation within Sarawak.

Malaysia's role in challenging the political status quo within the Sultanate had become only too evident from the latter part of 1974, given its sponsorship of resolutions on Brunei at the United Nations. However, there is a case to be made for suggesting that, during Tun Razak's tenure of office as prime minister, Malaysia, and not only in respect of Brunei, pursued a somewhat adventurist foreign policy. Its support for political dissidents within the Sultanate became manifest in July 1973 when eight detainees arrested after the abortive revolt of December 1962 broke out of the Berakas internment camp with the aid of two of their guards and the likely assistance of the intelligence network of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry.[9] They made their way across the border to Sarawak from where they travelled by air to Kuala Lumpur. In the Malaysian capital, the escapees, who included Zaini bin Haji Ahmad, deputy to Azahari, were granted an informal equivalent of political asylum. Subsequently, *Partai Ra'ayat* was provided with facilities in Limbang with which to broadcast to and disseminate pamphlets in the Sultanate. More dramatic among the measures of support provided was the despatch of thirty-two Brunei Malays to Libya where it is understood that they received instruction in terrorist techniques from resident members of the Japanese Red Army. This adventurist phase of Malaysian foreign policy terminated with the untimely demise of Tun Razak in January 1976 and his succession in office by Datuk Hussein Onn. Whether Tun Razak was himself instrumental in seeking to 'destabilise' Brunei, or whether one of his more headstrong ministers over-indulged a penchant for clandestine conduct without full reference to his Prime Minister, the assumption to high office of Datuk Hussein was followed by a moderation in Malaysian practice. Indeed, when the Libyan connection was

[9] See Martin Woollacott in *The Guardian*, July 14, 1976.

brought to his attention towards the end of 1976, he exercised his authority to sever it. Datuk Hussein probably also recognised that political adventurism was not the most practical way to ease Britain's exit from Brunei.

Despite a modification in the covert practice of policy, Malaysia through consistent action at the United Nations has sought to encourage change in the internal political condition of Brunei and also in its international status. The motivations of the Malaysian government may well be mixed in so far as the argument cited above by Tan Sri Ghazalie Shafie about the dangers of permitting the perpetuation of vestigial colonial territories possibly concealed a concern, not about the spill-over of radical sentiments from the Sultanate, but about the future viability of the Borneo states within Malaysia because of strains in federal-state relations. An early incorporation of Brunei into Malaysia may well be seen in Kuala Lumpur as a means of containing separatist sentiment in Sarawak and Sabah. Indeed, apprehension over separatism was a factor in Indonesia's decision to annex East Timor.

In its political endeavours at the United Nations, Malaysia has enjoyed strong support from both Indonesia and the Philippines which have sponsored resolutions on Brunei, while Thailand has cast affirmative votes for them. Singapore, however, the other member of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was conspicuously absent from the vote in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly in November 1977. The government of Singapore, constantly concerned about the vulnerability and viability of its island-state, possesses an evident stake in maintaining the separate identity of the Sultanate, if only as a precedent for its own survival. Singapore's relations with Malaysia since its involuntary acquisition of independence in August 1965 have never been truly cordial, while the government in Kuala Lumpur has denied it the use of certain of its military facilities deemed to be irrelevant for the defence of the island-state. Alternative facilities have been made available in Brunei where the armed forces of Singapore have access to the Gurkha jungle training school, while a company of infantry has been deployed in the Temburong enclave. In this respect the Singapore connection serves as an unofficial external relationship outside the terms of the Anglo-Brunei agreement of November 1971. There is no formal Singapore representation in Brunei's capital, Bandar Seri Begawan, but the association is an indication in practical, if not legal, terms of the international status of the Sultanate. Such an association, however, serves only in a marginal sense as a countervailing element in the face of persistent international pressure inspired by Malaysia and applied to Britain to transform its relationship with Brunei.

The related issues of decolonisation and international status may be rehearsed at the United Nations. But the practical future of the minuscule Sultanate will be determined by the consequences of any changes in the bilateral relationship with Britain. That relationship has been the subject of reappraisal and intermittent negotiations since November 1974. The view of the British government is that the maintenance of a Gurkha battalion and the retention of responsibility for foreign affairs and in part for defence is completely out of keeping with its orientation and priorities. And although the revenue from Brunei Shell Petroleum may be a consideration in its calculations, a British government contemplating the promise of North Sea oil is not prepared to tolerate indefinitely an association that appears so incongruous, especially to the left-wing of the Labour Party. Perceived from London Brunei is barely a spot on the map and as such an undue testing of British patience could well result in a unilateral termination of a historic relationship. Indeed, there is a sense in which it is regarded in a similar manner to that contemplated by Rajah Charles Brooke. As one historian has commented: 'In the eyes of Charles Brooke in particular, Brunei was reduced to the status of an abiding nuisance, an anachronism to be eliminated if possible . . .' [10] The British government does not wish the elimination of Brunei but it is undoubtedly perceived as an abiding nuisance.

The Sultanate's predicament

The government of Brunei, whose policies are determined by the former Sultan, regards the issues of decolonisation and international status, which have been raised at the United Nations and which trouble Britain, as misconceived. It would argue that the predicament of Brunei arises not from its lack of international status in terms of legal sovereignty, but rather from its lack of sufficient capability to enable the Sultanate to ward off the unwarranted attentions of neighbouring Malaysia. Thus, for the time being the battalion of Gurkhas serves as an effective deterrent against any external military intervention in alleged support of an internal popular challenge to rule by the royal family of Brunei. Correspondingly, Britain's stiffening of the two battalions of the Royal Brunei Malay Regiment and the local police force and special branch serves to sustain internal political order. Furthermore, an expatriate community plays a crucial role in maintaining essential services which Brunei's own population is not fully able to do, in part because a significant proportion of its limited pool of manpower is more attracted by the terms of service in the army and the police.

[10] Robert Pringle, *Rajahs and Rebels* (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 126.

The problem of Brunei as represented by Malaysia at the United Nations is put in terms of the issues of decolonisation and international status. It is maintained that the British connection sustains an anachronistic political system and accordingly denies self-determination and independence. But from the point of view of the government of Brunei, the issue at stake is the kind of independence which the Sultanate wishes to enjoy, given the perceived existence of an external predator. Like a number of micro-states which do enjoy an internationally acknowledged status, Brunei exhibits a strong sense of vulnerability and seeks sustained access to external countervailing capability and expertise. In its case, the exclusive diplomatic relationship with Britain is contemplated not as an expression of a dependent association but as a way of ensuring the neutralisation of hostile external influences. Indeed, there is a parallel of sorts between the experience of Brunei and that of Kuwait, although ironically Kuwait's delegation at the United Nations voted in 1977 in favour of Malaysia's resolution calling for self-determination and independence for the Sultanate.

This interpretation of the predicament of Brunei is, of course, couched in terms of the interests of a narrow aristocratic ruling group and their political beneficiaries. Despite the munificent social policies which follow from a liberal use of oil and liquid natural gas resources to the order of £450 million annually, some underlying political dissatisfaction is present. It arises from resentment of the manner of rule and from a belief that a fundamental alteration in the relationship with Britain would provide a range of openings and career prospects for those whose claim to preferment is based on meritocratic criteria. Indeed, such a prospect would be a likely outcome of the institution of the kinds of political change urged publicly by the United Nations and privately by the British government. But such a transformation in the political structure of the Sultanate would not necessarily work to the advantage of Malaysia.[11] On the contrary, political change within Brunei could even serve once again as a catalyst within Northern Borneo; this time in reviving separatist sentiment possibly for a North Borneo state as advocated in December 1962 by the leadership of the very same *Partai Ra'ayat* which ironically has become the political beneficiary of the Malaysian government. It is even possible that the government of Brunei hopes to capitalise on such incipient sentiment within Malaysian Borneo in an endeavour to find an acceptable alternative political format, given

[11] It is of interest to note the further comment in *Utusan Melayu, op. cit.*, '. . . it is necessary to stress that any efforts to establish a parliamentary democratic government in Brunei should be carefully planned so as to prevent the country from becoming a new communist base and a political pawn of the Powers.'

the inevitability of Britain's relinquishment of its current responsibilities.

The concept of decolonisation, which has been used as a standard with which to challenge the international status of Brunei, is not really applicable to the experience of the Sultanate. This is because of the reluctant role of Britain and the obdurate determination of the government of Brunei to retain the bilateral association as long as possible in order to overcome an intrinsic vulnerability which persists despite the considerable wealth at its disposal. The basic issue in the case of Brunei is not an absence of independence but an absence of democracy. However, it hardly behoves the General Assembly of the United Nations, of all bodies, to be self-righteous on that account. The credentials of Brunei have been challenged because of the British connection and because Malaysia has been able to attract support from its non-aligned and Islamic associates. In consequence the international status of Brunei is not acknowledged. Yet neither is it sought by Brunei because a formal derogation of sovereignty has been willingly accepted in the interest of overcoming an intrinsic vulnerability. There is a real prospect, however, of international status being thrust upon Brunei against its will as a consequence of a British act of volition. In this event, deprived of the justification of a tainted colonial association, the General Assembly can only condemn the Sultanate on the ground of its autocratic political system. The adoption of a resolution along these lines would constitute a most interesting undertaking for the world body.

SELF-MANAGEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA

Duncan Wilson

THE international position of Yugoslavia is recognised to be of crucial importance for the balance between East and West in Europe. President Tito has managed to maintain Yugoslavia's equilibrium between the 'blocs' with remarkable skill, combining a formal commitment to 'non-alignment', strong economic ties with Western Europe, and a form of one-party rule which links his country informally with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Given roughly the present relation of East-West forces in Europe, it should not be difficult for any successor to maintain this balanced foreign policy. It may, however, be harder to maintain the internal balance in Yugoslavia, with which its foreign policy is closely connected. An attempt to revert either to the pre-1948 type of centralist Party rule on the one hand, or to the confederalist ideas of 1971 (when Croatia came near to declaring independence) might have serious repercussions on Yugoslavia's internal stability, on its relations with neighbouring countries, and on the East-West balance in Europe. Foreign observers therefore have good reason to cultivate an informed interest in Yugoslav internal affairs, and not least in the concept of 'self-management' which is meant to render obsolete both centralist rule and Republican nationalism.

The two main laws defining the Yugoslav political system in the broadest sense are the Constitution of 1974 and the Law on Associated Labour of 1976. These are extraordinarily long and complicated documents. They are admittedly normative as much as descriptive, i.e. they define what ought in due course to happen rather than what should immediately follow the passage of implementing legislation. Nevertheless they define a system which should now be largely realised in substance. It looks at first like an anarcho-syndicalist's opium dream. On the industrial side (where the first steps towards self-management were taken in 1950) workers' councils at 'enterprise' (factory) level, have given way to self-management at 'shop' level by Basic Organisations of Associated Labour (henceforward 'working unit'). The working units co-operate with each other and associate together within an 'organ of associated labour' (formerly, and in this article henceforward, 'enterprise') on a contractual basis, and are free to conclude similar contracts with working units of other enterprises, though there are practical inducements to give priority to working units within their own. The working unit is meant to dispose as freely as possible of its own net income (gross income

being subject to Federal, Republican and local levies, in the determination of which the producers have a direct or indirect voice). The enterprise itself is theoretically a sort of federal or confederal organ, with delegated powers and only such income as working units agree to give it. At the same time it should link itself with similar enterprises, and also have contractual relations with other types of enterprise on an all-Yugoslav basis.

There is an equally elaborate political structure, consisting of delegations, from local up to Federal level. The intention has been to evolve a structure which is as representative as possible and as responsive as possible to those whom it represents at each stage. The only direct elections take place at the first stage when working units, or their equivalent in agricultural organisations, elect 'basic delegations' of between ten and thirty members to represent them in their capacity as producers. At the same time all voters, whether or not members of working units, elect similar delegations to represent them as inhabitants of local communities. The next stage is for the million or so delegates at the first level to elect further delegates to two of the three chambers in the Communal Assemblies (the Chamber of Associate Labour to represent producers, and the Municipal Chamber to represent the local population—there is a third chamber, of which more later). At the third stage the Communal Assemblies elect delegates from the three chambers to similar chambers at Republican or Provincial level. Finally, delegates are elected to the two chambers of the Federal Assembly. Here the confederate principle predominates. Thirty delegates for each Republic and twenty for each Autonomous Province are nominated by the basic delegations (directly elected at the first stage) and elected to the Federal chamber by the Communal Assemblies. The second chamber of the Federal Assembly, that of Republics and Provinces, is made up of twelve delegates from each Republican Assembly, and eight from each Provincial one, elected by those Assemblies from among their own members and responsible to them.

The social services too have their own form of self-management, which brings together the economic and political organs at various levels, and encourages citizens to act not only as producers or inhabitants of a local community but also as 'consumers' of social services. The basic concept is that up to a minimum level health and education services, for example, should be guaranteed by Federal or Republican governments; above that level needs should be established and finance provided by agreement between representatives of the technical services, of local inhabitants and of local enterprises. Experts, consumers and the main sources of finance will thus join to form local 'communities of interest' in various social fields, and these communities will eventually

replace Federal, Republican or local governments in collecting revenue and providing services.

This is only a bare outline of a system which tends to become more rather than less complicated with time. The theoretical scope of participation in Yugoslavia is such that by 1977 there were about 75,000 delegations altogether, comprising perhaps over a million citizens; thus nearly one in five of Yugoslav adult workers is actively involved in the process of self-management and, given the principle of rotation, under which delegates should not serve for consecutive terms, the total number with some experience of the system will soon be very large indeed.

The historical context

The first and natural reaction of an outside observer to such an elaborate system is that it cannot work, and can have little relation to real life. This first impression is heightened by the contrast perceptible on the spot between the everyday realities of life, as conveyed in talk with Yugoslavs who experience them, and the official picture (literal and metaphorical) given to viewers of Yugoslav television programmes, of which a large proportion is daily devoted to the activity of self-management in all sorts of committees, congresses and conferences. A little further reflection suggests that such an elaborate system must serve some purpose more definite than the construction *in vacuo* of an ideal theoretic democracy.

It is at this point that the self-management system should be viewed in its historical context, in order to gain some idea of the political, economic and social snags which it is intended to avoid. The reader must be prepared to go back over twenty-five years, and to follow a selective account of certain turning-points in the history of the Yugoslav political and economic system.

(1) In November 1952, the VIth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia took place. Its task was to develop a political theory which distinguished it from the 'hegemonist' and 'bureaucratic' practices of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under Stalin, then in the last months of his life. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia determined to give up the habit of command, to abolish some of the network which had previously enabled it to enforce central directives, to become a 'persuasive' rather than an 'administrative' organisation, and, in order to mark the change of line, to rename itself the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (henceforward LCY). This was the formal break with the policies of 'democratic centralism' as practised elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and there has never been any formal reversion to them.

(2) In January 1954 Milovan Djilas, who had carried further the logic of the decisions of the VIth Congress and wished to abolish the formal political monopoly of the LCY, was expelled from the Central Committee (and later from the LCY itself). This was a clear and still valid indication of the limits of political freedom in Yugoslavia, and was connected with the desire of Tito in particular to achieve some reconciliation with the Soviet leaders after the death of Stalin.

(3) In April 1958 the VIIth Congress of the LCY was held at Ljubljana. It adopted a programme which was a charter for the extension of self-management, particularly in the Yugoslav economy. The background to this decision is of special importance in the context of the present argument. From 1955 on there had been rapid but highly unselective economic growth in Yugoslavia. There was too much investment in new enterprises or very long-term projects, an excessive import programme and insufficient use of existing resources. This resulted largely from the freedom enjoyed by communal authorities and enterprises at communal level, which were not effectively checked by any shortage of credit from local branches of the National Bank. The misuse of such freedom was not officially regarded as an argument against self-management. On the contrary it was held to be a new manifestation of 'bureaucracy', as exercised by the management of the enterprises and the chairmen of the Communal Assemblies. It was held that, if self-management was extended to, for example, the control at shop floor level of management boards within enterprises, economically more sensible and socially more generally acceptable decisions would be taken, and that there would be an end to the more extravagant forms of 'localism'. The decisions of the VIIth Congress cleared the way for further extensions of self-management in this sense, besides having important repercussions for Yugoslav-Chinese and Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Thus the VIIth Congress marked an important stage on the way to the LCY's policies of 1974 and afterwards.

(4) In 1965 economic reform followed a period of indecision, when the Yugoslav economy remained overheated and there was some movement back towards firmer control by state and party machinery. Reform was designed to adapt the price structure of Yugoslav industry to world conditions, and to make it competitive. In the medium term it was quite a successful movement, but it led to much immediate hardship and unemployment. There was a strong conservative communist reaction, which, under Vice-President Ranković, assumed the proportions of a 'fractionalist' movement against Tito's leadership. When this was duly suppressed in 1966, there was a high tide of what may conveniently, if inaccurately, be called 'liberalism' in Yugoslavia. This in retrospect was the time during which expert advice played a comparatively large

part in economic and parliamentary decisions. To the old-fashioned generation of Yugoslav communists, and to a younger generation of 'revisionist' intellectuals, the technocrats, bankers and experts in the machinery of parliamentary committees seemed to be taking over control.

(5) This process led indirectly to the crisis of Croat nationalism in 1971. If economic development in Yugoslavia was to be guided on strictly economic lines, there was a natural tendency to invest in success, i.e. to develop further those Republics—Slovenia and Croatia—which were already more developed than the rest. The north-south tension between the racial constituents of Yugoslavia was thus increased. Macedonians, Bosnians and Montenegrins broadly speaking regretted the days of centrally-determined industrial investment, when their industries received Federal funds on social and political grounds. On the other side, the Croats in particular thought of themselves as continuing to subsidise uneconomic projects in other Republics out of their own resources (not least of foreign currency). Croat nationalism virtually brought the Yugoslav Federal machinery to a stop in 1971. Moreover even the Croat communist leadership was the prisoner of the nationalist movement. The process was only halted in December 1971, when Tito finally decided to purge the Croat Central Committee and threatened the use of Federal forces against it if necessary. The purge in Croatia was followed a year later by one directed against the Serb Communist Party, which under the leadership of the former Foreign Secretary, Nikezić, was regarded as being insufficiently ready to apply the 'firm hand', and too 'economist' in tendency.

This is the background against which the present Yugoslav system of self-management should be seen. The LCY leaders have not broken abruptly with any of the traditions established over the last thirty years. Reversion to firm centralist rule by the LCY would in practice cause great difficulty and theoretically is not regarded as desirable. In spite of occasional public grumbles by Tito about the decision of the VIth Congress to confine the LCY to a 'persuasive role', this decision remains in force. Nor would it be at all easy to reverse the decisions which reduced to a minimum the Federal economic machinery, and gave enterprises a considerable degree of control over their own funds. There is in fact plenty of genuine de-centralisation in the Yugoslav economic system. At the same time self-management is directed as far as possible against those who are officially thought to have undermined the influence of the LCY early in this decade—technical experts, directors, chairmen of the credit committees of banks, presidents of Communal Assemblies, professional politicians in committees of the Federal Assembly and representatives of nationalism in the Republican capitals. The last-named may indeed have been killed or rendered im-

potent by kindness, in that important Federal measures are subject to a virtual veto at Republican level. It is the experts of all sorts who are in theory considered to be the main enemy. Of course they cannot be abolished even in theory, and many no doubt retain much influence; but the self-management system is designed to keep them under control by the workers who elect them to their posts, and to see that they do not settle into these posts irrevocably. At the same time it is an article of faith that the curbing of 'technocrats' and 'bureaucrats' will not decrease production; indeed, once technocratic influence is eliminated, workers are expected to increase production within their working units and to conclude the most rational arrangements possible for integration or exchange at enterprise level. In so doing they should maximise production in an all-Yugoslav framework, breaking down inter-Republican barriers. In all this activity the workers or members of local government assemblies should theoretically be kept up to the mark by the LCY—not through directives issued by local cells of the Party, but through the persuasive influence of 'politically conscious' LCY members who are simultaneously (but not ex officio) members of the working units or local government Assemblies.

The Party's role

At this point the question arises: Is the real object of the new self-management system to re-introduce by the back door effective rule by the LCY and to make it once more what it theoretically ceased to be as the result of its own VIth Congress in 1952, a party of government? This is by no means an idle question. Careful study of the 1974 Constitution and the 1976 Law on Associated Labour shows that the positions of the LCY, its 'front organisation', the Socialist Alliance, and the closely linked Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU) have been formally strengthened, particularly in the parliamentary organs of self-management. Even at the level of basic delegations (the only ones directly elected), candidates have to be proposed by the Socialist Alliance, and the make-up of the delegations has to 'correspond to the social composition of the basic self-managing organisation or community concerned'; i.e. there must be a majority of worker delegates, and the danger of 'technocrats' being over-represented is eliminated from the start. At the communal level too there is an innovation, a third chamber (in addition to the Chamber of Associated Labour and Municipal or Communal Chamber), elected by 'socio-political organisations', i.e. principally the LCY, the Socialist Alliance and the CTU. The same pattern is repeated at Republican and Provincial level, where 'socio-political' delegates are elected by the appropriate communal chamber Even at the Federal level, the candidates for the Federal

Chamber, though elected by the basic delegations, are taken from a list proposed by the Socialist Alliance. The whole electoral system in any case discriminates in favour of the industrial worker, who has two votes at basic level (one as producer, the other as inhabitant of a district), and possibly a third as a member of a 'socio-political organisation'. And the LCY itself has a special position. At its Xth Party Congress in the spring of 1974, the leading role of the Party was strongly emphasised, and in discussions of the theme of 'democratic centralism' there was more stress on the need to carry out decisions uniformly than on the need to reach them democratically.

The Associated Labour Act, designed to bring existing laws on economic organisation and labour relations into line with the Constitution, was avowedly the result of intensive general discussions organised by the Party, Socialist Alliance and trade unions. The negative objects of the Act—to paraphrase what was officially stated when it was introduced in the Federal Assembly—were to guard against any revival of capitalism, state socialism, or effective rule by Republics, technocrats or bankers. And the detailed articles of the Act include several that accord the trade unions a particular position not only in ensuring that the workers enjoy their full rights but also in stimulating them to exercise these in directions which will be useful to the Yugoslav economy as a whole.

It could therefore be plausibly argued that: (1) Some purposive economic and political co-ordination is highly necessary if the machinery for extended self-management is to work in anything but a negative way, i.e. is not merely to subject potential bureaucrats in management to continuous control but also to promote industrial growth rationally on a nation-wide scale. (2) The LCY and CTU are now constitutionally empowered, and indeed obliged, to perform this co-ordinating function. (3) This is the essential social reality of Yugoslavia today. The more elaborate provisions for economic and political democracy are no more than a disguise for the revival of the most direct form of Party rule compatible with conditions in Yugoslavia as determined by its history since 1948.

Those who argue this case can point to the fact that since 1971 there has been a parallel process at work of tightening control by the LCY over the intellectual and cultural life of Yugoslavia, and that, for example, revisionist Marxist philosophers as well as Croat nationalist agitators have had their wings clipped in this process.

How well does the system work?

On a priori grounds alone it seems to the present writer unlikely that the LCY in fact exercises fully effective control over the present system.

Each phase of the social development of Yugoslavia since 1950 has contributed something lasting to the present reality. Centralist communism, Republican nationalism, communal or 'localist' patriotism, and the development of a 'technocratic' elite have all left traces visible in Yugoslav society today. It is unlikely that enterprises which have in many cases enjoyed a good deal of independence will subject themselves totally to the control of the LCY under a system which is meant to extend self-management. Nor is the LCY itself likely to become, even over a period of years, an efficient instrument for determining and enforcing an agreed economic policy. The Yugoslavs have found it no easier than other peoples to determine such a policy. And one of their main problems has been that LCY members themselves have been so much subject to 'localist', 'technocratic' or Republican influences and loyalties. Influence has not been a one-way process, and it seems unlikely that this will be so in future.

These however are all a priori arguments. At least a cursory look is also necessary at the actual functioning of the new system, so far as this can be assessed by an outside observer. The data for a deep analysis could only be acquired by continuous contact with representatives of the new Yugoslav institutions at all levels, and such contact is not easily made even by a resident foreigner. A certain amount of information can however be gathered by the outsider from two sources —official statistics of economic performance, and official expositions, particularly those addressed to a domestic audience, of the achievements and failings of the system so far.

Yugoslav official statistics suggest that by the end of 1976 some progress had been made over three years in stabilising an economy which in the early 1970s had become badly over-heated, with an inflation rate running at more than 20 per cent. In 1976 the growth in consumer prices was down to 12 per cent (though average individual receipts had only grown by 3 per cent). Industrial production was 3 per cent up on 1975 (the rate is meant to double by 1980). Agricultural production also increased by about 3 per cent. There was a large rise in the number of tractors (over three quarters of them by now used in the private sector), and in the yield per hectare of wheat. Above all there was in 1976 a marked improvement in the balance of trade. Total foreign trade increased by about 5 per cent, but the balance of payments, with exports covering nearly two thirds of imports, was the best achieved since 1972, and improved greatly over 1974 when exports covered little more than half the import bill. Within these total figures there were substantial increases in exports to the EEC countries and imports from those of Comecon, both of these representing trends desirable from the Yugoslav point of view.

The statistics cannot yet be said to show a trend, but they suggest that the economic situation is improving, if not very fast; and at home we have learned to regard such movement as very good news. The new Yugoslav system thus seems to be working in the right direction, so far as it is having an effect. This proviso is important, and some clues on the extent to which the system is being realised may be found in official progress reports over the last two years.

It has been easier to change the political than the economic machinery. It may be accepted that public general elections to the Republican and Federal Assemblies, such as those of 1964 and 1968 with their occasional demagogic excitements, are a thing of the past; and an end has been put to what communist theorists had come to regard as excessive independence and interference by elected representatives and parliamentary committees. With the disappearance of the 'general political deputy', Kardelj said in an interview last autumn, 'the first major problem of self-management' has been abolished.

The economic picture is more complicated, as is shown by a study of some of the more critical official pronouncements about the functioning of self-management since 1974. These can be briefly summarised. First and presumably easiest to remedy, is the failure to bring the full system of self-management into operation quickly enough. There was some delay in forming basic units and in devolution within the larger firms. There was insufficient interest by workers in local 'communities of interest', and misunderstanding about the new banking system, designed to take effective power from the credit committees at local level. None of this is surprising, given the complications of the new system. Nor can the LCY leaders be unduly worried by the sort of statistics produced by a CTU survey (1977) about attendance at meetings at unit level, and the subjects which attracted most attention there. Official figures showed a rising average attendance reaching over 75 per cent, with more interest in pay questions than in those of broad general policy.

Considerable publicity has been given to a new and very active system of industrial courts, dealing as informally as possible—and largely within factory buildings—with complaints about pay, transfers, dismissals, etc. This is designed to show that self-management includes the administration of justice. It also suggests that the self-managing worker may concentrate heavily on the more immediate determinants of his own working conditions. The same conclusion could more reliably be drawn from Kiro Gligorov's speech at the end of November 1976, introducing the Associated Labour Act to the Federal Assembly. One of the main proponents of economic reform ten years earlier, Gligorov evidently set great hopes on the new self-management system as a stimulant for

increased production, and he expressed some disillusion about its performance in this respect. In particular he remarked that the current system of income distribution did not provide sufficient incentive and that there had been quite insufficient progress in rationalising investment. It can be deduced from these and other official comments that increasing devolution of the economy has not, as might be expected by Western observers, produced an undue increase in the proportion of net profits distributed as personal income compared with that retained for investment. The trouble has rather been excessive egalitarianism in the share-out of the income distributed, arising from 'false slogans about solidarity at a low level of income' and resulting in low productivity. Here is an unexpected and unwelcome consequence of the LCY's anti-technocratic attitude.

These are somewhat random and superficial clues to the functioning of economic self-management. Moreover they may already be out of date. For what it is worth, however, such evidence suggests that self-management is not merely a façade, and that its processes are not easily controlled by the LCY, however strong the formal position of the League within the new system. Thus the a priori deductions from the history of modern Yugoslavia are to some extent reinforced. Two of these may be repeated and linked in conclusion. It is very unlikely that the LCY has been able 'at a stroke' to bring under totally effective control those directors, managers or bankers, who have been attacked for exercising arbitrary, bureaucratic or technocratic rule, but also represent genuine and very necessary expertise. As a class they have had some experience over the last few years in Yugoslavia of playing various political systems, and no doubt many manage to play the present system effectively. Moreover the most efficient of them are likely to do so with the full approval of the workers concerned, who have everything to gain from good management of their firm's affairs and may discover soon enough that it is not easy to check on the often complicated day-to-day decisions required of the directors. In such cases there will be self-management which is economically effective and good for morale all round.

The longer-term difficulties for the LCY may lie at the next stage, in ensuring that the economic self-interest of efficient enterprises can be brought into line with the economic development of Yugoslavia as a whole. There is no doubt that this is the general objective of the LCY. It is not clear how far it has been achieved, and how far the gap in development between the Republics of Yugoslavia has been bridged. The leaders may find it easier to harness technocratic skill than to cope with the longer-term and larger-scale problems of communal 'localism'

and Republican nationalism. The constitutional and legal machinery for doing so exists and has functioned since 1972 without obvious crisis. All that can be said as a conclusion to this superficial survey is that the outlook is not too gloomy but the real tests are probably still to come.

THE STATE AS TRADER

John Zysman

WHEN international trade resumed after the Second World War, the Western Allies intended it to be an open system of exchange between private agents on terms negotiated among themselves. It was hoped that expanded trade would mean profits and prosperity,[1] and many believed that open trade was required to establish a stable international order.[2] The problem was to establish a system for private exchange, and then to construct institutions and arrangements that would resolve conflicts and accommodate disruptions in that system. Institutions and procedures such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) helped serve these ends. Nevertheless, it took nearly a decade before exchange controls could be significantly reduced, and an era of open trade truly inaugurated.[3] Governments, of course, continued to concern themselves with the domestic consequences of foreign trade. The rules of trade have always had to assure the well-being of specific industrial sectors in those countries strong enough to make their will felt in shaping the international system. Trade balances, the health of particular industries, and the security of crucial supplies all attracted government attention and often provoked intervention in the affairs of industry. Even though the common purpose of the industrial countries was to create and support freer trade, governments did enter markets to promote exports and protect industries.[4] Often they collaborated among themselves to shape those markets and influence industrial behaviour. Indeed, the Coal and Steel Community and the EEC's agricultural policy, the pillars of the European edifice, are institutions that permit governments to regulate crucial regional markets. Nevertheless, despite the extensive involvement of governments in trade, the central postwar theme was the opening of trade and the expansion of exchange. The lead stories have been the reduction of exchange controls and the dropping of trade barriers.

[1] Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder* (Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1977).

[2] Stephen Krasner, ' US Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness ', *International Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 4, Autumn 1977, pp. 635–71.

[3] A series of volumes published by Chatham House is helpful here. The most recent is the two-volume study ed. by Andrew Shonfield, *International Economic Relations of the Western World 1959–1971* (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1976).

[4] See ch. 7 of John Zysman, *Political Strategies for Industrial Order* (Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1977).

In recent years, however, the conduct of state trade and the arrangement of trade flows by direct negotiations between governments have become crucial issues for the Western industrial nations. Today's basic problem will be to maintain a system of free trade. Partial withdrawal from the open system can be forced by competition, or by fluctuations that disrupt domestic industry or throw any country into unacceptable deficit. Certainly, the task of maintaining free trade is not new, but the conditions are.

The more prominent and direct state role in trade is primarily a response to two developments: the entrance of state-planned economies into the Western trading system; and world-wide over-production in some industries which has disrupted sensitive markets in Western Europe and the United States. Three sets of issues—East European trade, the relations of the commodity-dependent economies with the industrial nations, and the multilateral or bilateral arrangements to regulate and accommodate sharply expanded imports in specific industries—all have a common feature: the state has a direct and critical role in arranging the terms and volumes of trade.

Western governments are no longer simply promoting exports and determining the terms of entry into their own markets; they are now directly negotiating trade outcomes. That is, they have begun to settle the volumes and prices of exchange in particular goods, either by negotiating particular deals with other countries or by organising the market-place. The multi-fibre agreements that limit the access of a variety of Third-World textiles to the markets of industrial countries, restrictions on Japanese penetration of American and European markets, and the negotiated adjustment of European steel are all instances of trade outcomes directly established a priori by international negotiation between governments rather than by competition in international markets. The negotiations with the Japanese, it should be noted, were sparked off by unilateral Japanese actions that threatened to disrupt these markets. Nation states increasingly act to control and direct trade, conducting exchanges and directly influencing patterns and terms of exchange, rather than simply maintaining a system for private trade. These direct and political arrangements have moved to the centre of the stage, rather than being treated as an anomaly or a temporary obstacle. Indeed, the French, who believe that such deals must become permanent features of the trade system, have called them 'organised free trade'.

There are two sets of activities in which the state attempts directly to determine trade outcomes. The first serves to 'make the market'—that is, to determine price and volume or to specify the activities of particular traders. The second involves governments in the actual exchange of goods, whether it be for import or export. For the industrial

countries, market-making has tended to be *defensive*—that is, an effort to preserve the status quo, to maintain the stability of particular markets or the well-being of specific industries.

To make a market, a government may negotiate with other states the terms on which it will allow those governments or their agents to buy and sell in domestic markets. This can take several forms. One type is suggested by the Soviet-American grain negotiations. This deal included agreements about the size of Soviet grain purchases so that Soviet action was more predictable. The purpose was not to determine market outcomes, but to stabilise the market by making the behaviour of a powerful actor more predictable.

The second type of orderly marketing agreements, such as the multi-fibre agreements, are arrangements between governments to limit the activities of private traders. Such arrangements are, in essence, import quotas under a different name, but they emphasise the element of international negotiation rather than that of domestic fiat. Again, the intent is to limit and regularise the activities of one trader—that trader being, in this case, all national producers of a particular commodity or product. These orderly marketing agreements are aimed at controlling over-production, which is the result partly of import-led growth strategies and partly of a decline in demand. Expansion in Third-World textile production, dealt with by the multi-fibre agreements, results from growth-led development strategies. Surpluses in shipbuilding result partly from expanded world production and partly from declining demand. In both shipbuilding and steel, the problems are complicated by the remarkable variation in productivity amongst the industrial countries, which makes some markets very vulnerable.

Third, supplier governments may agree amongst themselves on the behaviour of the market, as the countries belonging to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have, or as other commodity producers are demanding.[5] The major task has been to set and maintain prices. The critical problem is regulating over-capacity and limiting surpluses, whether that over-capacity is generated by a decline in demand or by the entry of new producers. (OPEC's success, one must note, rests on the stabiliser role of the dominant producer, Saudi Arabia, and would be difficult to repeat.)

As noted above, governments may involve themselves in the actual exchange of goods. This paper will focus on this second set of activities—state trading. To define the phenomenon is not difficult—state (that is, government executive) rather than private, initiative in making trade deals or controlling the markets. However, setting criteria that would

[5] See for example Neil Jacoby, *Multinational Oil* (New York: Macmillan; London: Collier Macmillan, 1974).

permit us to draw the boundary clearly between state promotion of private exports and actual trade by the state would be very difficult. Initiative in foreign trade is often shared, and the balance in many cases probably could not be assessed. Government schemes to insure companies against political or exchange risk may simply serve to bolster private initiatives. The selective use of such assistance may, alternatively, permit the government to involve itself in the affairs of domestic industry and take the lead in the trade negotiations themselves. Moreover, some publicly-owned companies act quite autonomously, while many private companies can serve the purposes of governments—willingly or not. We must certainly be careful not to conjure up the image of a single unified and centralised trader. Nevertheless, whatever the precise line, state trading is widespread and easy to spot.

Let us begin by considering some instances of state trading. In 1972 Soviet grain purchases disrupted the American, and consequently the world, grain markets. This forced the American government to negotiate with the Russians the terms of access to American markets. In 1976 President Giscard d'Estaing returned from Saudi Arabia with a list of French projects that would pay for oil imports. The impressive list of projects was mostly illusion and partly a stew of private contracts already agreed to or likely to be signed. Nevertheless, the French state, directly through its ministries and indirectly through para-public firms, actively sells to other states a line of goods ranging from transport facilities to nuclear plants. In 1977, Edmund Dell, Secretary of State for Trade, returned from Iran with the Shah's offer to barter oil for British manufactures, and a British ship deal in 1977 with the Poles required intervention by the Prime Minister. The problem with the Iranian arrangement, of course, was who would handle the oil and turn it into money—essentially, who would act as broker and bear the rather odd exchange risk of a liquid currency. The task, one might expect, would fall to the state.

This Iranian deal simply dramatises the substitution in the 1970s of national states for private companies in the oil-producing countries. Equally, as increasingly large sums are earned by governments, they themselves become the direct client, creating the markets for the industrial goods or services required to pay for commodity imports.

State trading, it must be emphasised, is not entirely new, even among the industrial countries. France has long promoted and sold particular large-scale equipment or systems, partly for purely commercial motives and partly to sustain segments of domestic industries considered critical to its national security. Japan, of course, represents a particular case, in which the popular image often suggests a co-ordination approximating to a detailed trade policy conducted by a foreign trade ministry. This

image exaggerates; the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has never dictated a policy, and has always had trouble gaining acquiescence from small companies.[6] Nevertheless, the Japanese government's influence in the allocation of credits to industry has given it real power in shaping trade patterns. The international arms trade is another sector that has long been dominated by government dealings.

State trading may not be new, but one can claim that its volume has increased sharply. Although the precise quantities are difficult to judge, several basic changes in international markets support this conclusion.

First, in developing countries, many of them recently sovereign, the state has taken the lead in sponsoring and organising economic growth and trade, or has at least played an expanded role in such matters. Since commodities are their primary exports, much of the commodity trade is now at least formally in the hands of these national states. On the other hand, one must remember that public companies are not always the servants of governments. Likewise, national companies often do not entirely replace private multinationals, even if they do displace them, thereby creating new conditions in which they operate. Thus, although the chief multinational oil companies no longer directly control their own oil or production facilities, Louis Turner's study of the oil industry has identified a pattern in which they continue much of their business as before, competing with a few new state companies in international markets and contracting with national companies to provide technology skills and advice.[7] Political sovereignty and late development, one might argue, breed state traders.

Second, some of these developing states have sharply expanded the funds available to them; some, such as the OPEC countries, have accomplished this through trade, and others, such as Brazil, by borrowing. These countries are important markets for industrial goods. To Western states confronted with major trade deficits, sales to these countries have become vital.

Third, trade with the centrally planned East European economies has substantially expanded, adding to the layer of state exchange surrounding the chief Western economies. From the 1950s until 1969, that trade expanded at about the same rate as the trade of industrial countries in general. In the years from 1969 to 1974, however, it apparently expanded some twenty-fold. Western trade with Eastern Europe now constitutes 6 per cent of total world trade.[8] For some countries, the

[6] See Chalmers Johnson, 'MITI and Japanese International Economic Policy', Robert Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 227–79.

[7] *Oil Companies in the International System* (to be published by Allen and Unwin in May 1978).

[8] Richard Portes, 'East Europe's Debt to the West: Interdependence is a Two-way Street', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55, No. 4, July 1977, p. 759.

volumes are truly significant. For example, West German exports to East Germany alone were worth DM 4,269 million in 1976, an increase from the annual average in 1965–70 of DM 1,844 million.[9] By some estimates this constitutes 9 per cent of West German exports. More important, East-West trade represents the entrance in force of a new kind of player, and a crucial one in some sectors.

Next, there is arms trade, or that portion of the arms trade that is clearly conducted by national governments. Here the figures suggest that trade has expanded at about the same rate as the foreign trade of the industrial countries in general. Thus while it represents a crucial sector of the economy in a few industrial countries, it is not a new phenomenon in the last ten years. Finally, we must note at least those sectors in which governments have negotiated some form of orderly marketing arrangement that limits the exports of private producers. These agreements, though not strictly part of state trading, add to the volume of trade negotiated in one form or another by governments. The volume of state trading, which grew so rapidly with the entrance of new players, is not likely to jump so sharply again, and will probably expand henceforth with the incomes of the present state traders.

The industrial countries, the core of the Western liberal economy, have now been surrounded by a set of state traders in Eastern Europe, OPEC, and the developing countries. These state traders confront the advanced capitalist countries with new conditions of trade competition. The question is whether this layer of trade surrounding the core of the principal OECD countries is cut off from private trade, incorporated within present arrangements for conducting private trade, or has altered the system of private trade itself.

State trading, then, no longer appears exceptional or anomalous. The question is what difference it makes and to whom. The clearest difference would seem to be that the political nature of trade results will make international economic conflicts harder to settle, because governments will be placed under greater domestic scrutiny and pressure when negotiating abroad. State trade will typically appear where the government plays a powerful role in domestic industry or private general contractors are unable to undertake massive international projects. Those industrial countries in which the state already plays the largest role will tend more than the others to be tolerant of and even encourage state-negotiated trade arrangements. Thus, differences in the organisation of the domestic economies of the several Western powers may make it more difficult for them to develop common international positions. There are, of course, compensating impulsions towards common positions. Though state trading may be intended to alter the economic

[9] *DIW Wochenbericht*, 9–10/77, March 10, 1977.

results of trade, it is by no means evident that it will. State trading is not a secret ace in the game of trade poker, though it may become a necessary part of the play. Finally, one must consider whether the business calculus of the state trader will be different from a private trader.

Conflict in trade

State trading makes it transparent that there is a political element in trade relations, though of course it does not reveal all the details. Competition conducted by states for markets and goods must necessarily underline the differences between them, emphasising their particular interests rather than any shared interests they may have. The French Minister of Industry, for example, has used an image of economic war, with France's industries serving as its weapons.[10] Trade may increase aggregate income, and therefore trade itself will expand. Yet countries in Eastern Europe or the Third World may appear to be fixed markets: increased trade may not increase income, and increased income may not be permitted to expand trade. Moreover, since exports to these countries are needed to pay current trade deficits, future gains from expanding trade may be entirely discounted. Thus, countries that lose a particular deal may feel that their loss is absolute.

Most important, in negotiations which directly determine trade rather than rules of exchange, it is more difficult to disguise the winners and the losers in any competition. Both politics and victory are more evident, and the results are immediately evident. When the rules of trade are negotiated, the results may not appear for years, and governments may claim that the fears of the groups affected by the changes are exaggerated. When a trade deal is negotiated, however, the results seem to be known almost immediately. Consequently, if one nation loses a competition on what it perceives to be political grounds, it may feel compelled to use political instruments to right the balance. Nor can the state effectively argue to domestic groups that the trade results are an inevitable outcome of the economics of the trade competition. If negotiations become more political, each bargaining position may become more rigid. The realm for which the government is perceived to be responsible may be extended without any expansion of its powers to control the result.

In such a setting, international co-operation could collapse into trade struggle and alliance leadership could become infinitely complicated. Co-operation about trade outcomes, not trade rules, would amount to state-created market shares or cartels; and while governments do in effect negotiate such matters—the Coal and Steel Community being a

[10] *Le Monde*, December 3, 1977.

noteworthy example—it is always difficult, and certainly problems would increase as more sectors are involved. Moreover, cartels are notoriously hard to manage, and efforts at co-operation could easily become conflicts all the more quickly if domestic groups are putting pressure on national governments. Cartel arrangements and alliance arrangements could become entangled. Alliances, like cartels, require a leader to cajole or impose solutions. The cartel leader, presumably the strongest ally, is likely to be one of the 'winners', and consequently may be continually called on to forgo its private benefit in the community interest. Maintaining an alliance would then require imposing unwanted solutions on national or international clienteles, which would involve using power or force on someone. Trade conflict might easily spill over into security arrangements: trade losers could be expected to mix military and security issues into trade packages, particularly when dealing with third countries.

In essence, once politics is used to encourage trade, it becomes more difficult to use trade as an instrument of politics. A clear case is the French use of political prizes to assist trade in sales of arms and nuclear plants. It would appear that the easier it is to keep the score, the harder it becomes to play the trade game. Balance of trade figures always provide a way of keeping the score, but because the results are usually very aggregated and often difficult to analyse, the policy choices seem to be the general ones of protection or free trade. State trading focuses attention on particular deals, which makes the score-keeping all the more simple and public, attracts attention to the results, and makes trade competition more openly political.

Trade problems and the domestic role of the state

State trading could, therefore, appear to throw a monkey wrench into alliance and security arrangements between the Western allies, as well as making trade issues more difficult to resolve. Of course, only a small portion of the trade of advanced industrial countries is conducted on a state-to-state basis. Even when a client or supplier is another state, a government will not always initiate and conduct trade instead of private firms. We ought to ask, however, why in our capitalist economies the whole matter of trading with government is not simply left to the private sector. One part of the answer depends upon the existing relations between business and the state in a particular country, and the other part upon the nature of the trade problem—both the character of the goods being traded and the nature of the trade partner. Certainly, government interest in foreign trade is a blend of commercial considerations, involving the competitiveness and well-being of particular industries, the macro-economic consequences of trade deficits and currency

adjustments, and the preservation of national autonomy and security. State trading is an instrument of government, and its use will depend upon how difficult it is to use and the advantages it is thought to offer.

The state can intervene in promoting trade as a direct trade agent, organising production or distribution itself; or as an intermediary, leaving the production and distribution to the private sector, but serving as a negotiator or go-between with other governments, or simply, as has long been done, as a provider of technical services that facilitate the efforts of private firms. In other words, the state can undertake trade deals, or promote them, or simply react to the efforts of private firms. *The costs that are specific to state trading, and not central in other forms of intervention, are organisational and administrative, rather than financial.* When the state grants subsidies to private firms, it leaves the management and negotiation headaches to those companies. A state may decide to assume administrative as well as financial costs when a limited effort—such as setting up a trading operation or undertaking particular negotiations—is likely to return substantial increases in exports or reductions in imports. The higher these initial administrative and political costs, and the harder it is to get the operation under way, the less attractive such an approach will appear. However, once a general trading operation is set up, the costs of using it in any particular situation are low, and the inclination to use it will consequently be greater.

The French, for example, have a wide variety of devices for setting up para-public companies. Their use in any particular situation poses limited additional administrative costs. Moreover, now that they have created a Minister for Overseas Trade and appointed a General Director in the Ministry of Industry who is a former arms salesman, the apparatus for any particular state intervention is available. Even nations less committed to state trading have established similar institutions. The British have an agency in the Department of Trade responsible for setting up overseas trade exhibitions and a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence takes responsibility for arms sales.

The conditions in which such administrative efforts will seem likely to have substantial rewards are clear. In concentrated markets where a few large firms sell to a few larger purchasers whose choices are influenced by national governments, the state might be attracted to support its champions. The rewards for any deal are high, and the deal can be arranged between a limited number of actors. *The government, in other words, is trying to maximise its return on administrative effort. This can best be done when long-term delivery arrangements can be made or when the goods are of high value in themselves.* It is important to note that for Eastern Europe and OPEC—both of which are actively

trying to promote industrial development—deals for the import of capital goods and technology will predominate. Thus, those industrial sectors most suitable for state administrative intervention are precisely the sectors in which the state traders surrounding the industrial countries are most interested.

The return a government seeks on its administrative effort is not, of course, limited to simple industrial profit. A few sales in high-value capital goods, or in large-scale development projects, can have a visible impact on both the balance of payments and the health of particular domestic industries. Indeed, the narrower the nation's export base, or the more difficult the balance of payments problems, the more crucial a particular deal may appear. For example, the percentage of French firms that export is about one half the number in Germany. Thus, French exports depend upon the efforts of a more limited number of large firms. Equally important, state trading can amount to a form of selective assistance to industry and may serve as part of an effort to solve domestic problems in the international arena. The government, in other words, absorbs a part of the marketing costs. When marginal production appears vital to ensure economies of scale and to bring down average costs, the search for the next market or the next sale may be quite critical. Foreign sales may be required not only to maintain employment but also to ensure that average production costs are low enough to maintain a national product. Some observers believe that elements of French military production for home use depend in this way on foreign sales. Another reason for state intervention, as mentioned earlier, is that a foreign government may have sufficient impact on a national market, as the Russians did on American grain markets, for the home government to have to negotiate directly the terms of access to that market. A state-to-state arrangement may be required to stabilise the domestic markets.

We can, then, identify the kinds of deals which might encourage the Western governments to enter the trade game. But do governments have distinct advantages over private traders in these industries when dealing with other states? Governments may be able to sweeten a particular deal or arrangement with compensation or favours from other economic sectors, apart from political advantages. Some private companies can do this too. American oil companies, collaborating with governments or acting as the agents of governments, have both negotiated directly with Middle Eastern governments and provided a vehicle for American aid to those governments.[11] Governments assist their companies politically

[11] Most studies of the oil industry deal with these questions. Certainly one of the most entertaining is Anthony Sampson, *The Seven Sisters* (London: Hodder and Stoughton; New York: Viking Press, 1975).

without undertaking the trade, and a company's success often hinges on its dealings with foreign governments. Nevertheless, a government client does not demand a government supplier.

To put our question differently, what particular competitive problems that core industrial governments might be tempted to solve are posed by the characteristics of the kinds of goods that the periphery states buy, or the fashion in which they purchase them? We know that state purchasers in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere are often involved in large-scale and long-term projects that do create particular problems. The first problem is that a government may wish to purchase a certain mix of goods, leaving the packaging to the seller; or it may wish to buy a finished factory, not the components. Thus, Saudi Arabia contracts for entire refineries, rather than just oil equipment, and the Russians buy a tool factory, not just individual machine tools. The second major problem is assuring payments and finance. For many firms, the currency risks and the delivery risks in large-scale undertakings are simply too large to bear alone. A related more critical problem, perhaps, is that price competition requires setting the terms of financing, and if one government subsidises its nation's exports, all the rest will. Moreover, those East European governments sensitive to their balance of payments and hard currency problems, not simply to the financing terms for a single deal, may wish to arrange compensating exports for any massive import scheme. OPEC nations may arrange product payback deals partly to insure the development of specific industries. The third problem is that a foreign state trader may affect the domestic markets that are composed of many small companies. In that instance, the government may act as an intermediary, a filter between the domestic and the international market-place, regulating access.

In sum, then, large-scale projects, those consisting of complex deals involving many products and those involving the relations between an atomised domestic market and large-scale foreign traders, call for effective general contractors or a flexible trading company. They call equally for financial arrangements that limit the exchange and inflation risks a company undertakes, arrangements that have become elements in price competition. The financial schemes, which often involve export subsidies, may require government funds.

Yet neither the financial nor the contractor role demands that the government assume the role of trader. When a government doubts whether a private firm will be able to put the pieces together, it may step in and play the role of general contractor. But whether the government organises the deal or not, it may have some of the glue needed to fasten the pieces together, and as a result of its intervention, government and business may be drawn even more closely together. Thus,

for example, Louis Turner and James Bedore point to this distinction in discussing Saudi trade relations: 'The most active single foreign partner [of Saudi Arabia] is not a company, but the Japanese government, which has spearheaded Mitsui's entry into Iran, gone a long way towards getting Mitsubishi and a variety of other Japanese companies into a couple of Iraqi ventures, and been very active in trying to win a Japanese stake in Saudi plans. . . . The other foreign partners are the Western companies which are dealing with Saudi Arabia on their own initiative.' [12] In this instance Japan's purpose was to make sure it had exports to pay for its oil imports. In other instances, such as the recent computer negotiations between British soft-ware firms and Japanese companies, similar tactics have been used by MITI to develop a specific industry.[13] The issue, however, is precisely how the government will assist and whether the balance of initiative will lie with government or firm.

The clear conclusion is that nothing in the nature of the industrial problems themselves requires that Western countries should engage in state trading. Governments will take trade initiatives when they decide that the private sector will not be able to capture trade opportunities on its own, or when they are concerned that arrangements negotiated by private companies will not serve their policy purposes. The presumption in the United States is that private companies will be able to capture new markets and that the state should simply facilitate the process, whereas in France there is a continuous concern that private efforts will not suffice. At the same time, the French might find it administratively and politically simpler than it would be for the Americans to set up a trading operation that would supplant private efforts. The greater the size of the public sector and the larger the role of the government in directly managing sectoral problems in its domestic industry, the more likely it is that the government will engage in state trading in international markets. In other words, existing control over or influence in domestic trade will provide a government with a base from which to engage in foreign trade or act as an intermediary in it.

At first glance, it would seem that the government role will depend on existing relations between state bureaucracy and private business; that is, the new problem will tend to be resolved in the traditional fashion and absorbed into existing ways of doing things. In that view, in the splintered American polyarchical bureaucracy, where government bureaus are often the fiefdoms of particular private interests, a government agency engaged in 'state trading' may be less likely to serve as an

12 Louis Turner and James Bedore, 'Saudi and Iranian Petrochemicals and Oil Refining: Trade Warfare in the 1980s? ', *International Affairs*, October 1977, p. 579.

13 'Japan seeks a British Ally in World Computer Markets', *Financial Times*, December 12, 1977.

instrument of government policy in the economy than as a support for particular private interests. Indeed, in the strong liberal economies, West Germany and the United States, the tasks of contractor and trader discussed earlier are for the most part undertaken by private firms, and the government finds itself in a facilitating role. In France, where the state's role as intermediary between the national and international economy has in the past allowed the government to shape the organisation of industry, an expansion of that role is likely to improve the position of the state in any bargaining. On the other hand, the weaker economies, particularly Italy but also Great Britain, may see an expansion of the state's role as compensation for perceived weaknesses in private firms. In all cases, the position and well-being of those groups with the best access to the state is likely to be improved.

The domestic and international issues are thus entangled. We may see a divergence between the trade tactics of liberal and state-led economies in the West. Certainly part of the difference between American and French oil strategies must be attributed to differences in the organisation of their domestic energy sectors. The divergence rooted in international institutional structures will make it more difficult to find workable international trade procedures.

The common problem for the Western industrial countries, then, will be to accommodate the several national trading styles within an alliance approach that permits the West to present a common position to the commodity suppliers and Comecon countries. The principle seems clear; the task will be establishing which category—alliance problem or national trade issue—is to apply, and in what fashion.

Terms of trade

Finally, will state trading affect the terms of exchange between nations? The conclusion of the previous section—that governments are not compelled to replace the private sector in trade dealings with foreign governments—would seem to imply that the emergence of state traders will not affect trade terms. But the example of OPEC, a cartel of state traders, which sharply raised the price of petroleum when it seized control of the market from the oil companies, suggests that the problem is at best more complicated. How do we analyse the consequences of state trading on terms of exchange?

The emergence of the state trader involves a change in industrial organisation, often involving a change in the nationality of the firms, and a shift from private to public firms. Changes in economic results or in political dynamics will result from an interplay of these three elements. It is crucial, therefore, not to confuse them or their particular dynamics —for example, by attributing consequences to a change in nationality

that in fact result from an altered market structure. One must be particularly careful not to confuse changes in the organisation of international market-places with changes in market conditions, particularly the supply and demand for particular goods. Changes in market conditions can affect economic results whatever the institutional arrangements, and they may provoke changes in those arrangements. Furthermore, *market developments that alter industrial power may be confused with political changes that permit that power to be exercised.* Let us now consider such political changes.

First, the emergence of the state trader may force changes in the organisation of particular industries. Industrial organisation refers to the conditions of competition in an industry, particularly the number and size (relative to the market) of the players and the technological basis of production and distribution. In grain, for example, the Soviet Union is in world grain markets, an oligopsonist, a powerful buyer whose actions can affect price and supply conditions, operating in a generally atomised market composed of many small buyers and sellers. As events in the early 1970s suggest, its purchases powerfully affect price. Irregular purchases cause sharp short-run upward price movements, and yet they provide little incentive for producers to expand production to provide for those occasional short-term needs. One could argue, of course, that Soviet harvest failures would have produced these changes even if the state were not the trader; that is, that a group of small purchasers acting individually would have collectively arrived at the same result. In fact, a single purchaser was able to move massively and quickly to buy at low prices, the volume of its purchases perhaps encouraging intermediaries to assist. The Soviet Union provided both an obvious target for anger and a single counterpart with whom to negotiate, a means to manage the market.

The oil case provides another example. Here the OPEC countries wrested power and authority over production from the multinationals. That political change formally decoupled vertical links in highly integrated companies. Before, a series of companies integrated from well to pump, surrounded by a series of smaller firms dependent on the producers, had constituted the industry; for the most part, producer and distributor were one. Now, at least nominally, producers of one nationality whose profit is the gap between crude sale prices and production costs, face distributors of another nationality whose profits are the gap between crude and refining costs and the sale price of final products. The general issue is that at any moment the structure of industry establishes the logic of choice and perhaps of action, but not the outcome. The exercise of power determines the outcome, and sufficient power may alter the structure.

Governments have often become state traders after they have nationalised private foreign holdings, thus changing the nationality of ownership. In theory, such a change in nationality could be the result of private dealing. But in practice, it seldom occurs that way; few private entrepreneurs arise to challenge foreign ownership, in part because their collaboration with foreign nationals is often most profitable, and in part because any effort within the old rules to enter the market could be beaten back. In many industries a change of nationality requires an exercise of political, not economic, power. *The change in nationality, however, may be more important than the fact of nationalisation; it may be more important to know the nationality of a company than whether it is public or private.* It has been suggested that a national company can follow strategies often not open to a foreigner. For example, because the energy conglomerate ENI was Italian, it followed strategies of diversification and horizontal integration that a foreign company would not have adopted.[14] It has, of course, been noted that because multinationals have options in several countries and can play the several governments against each other, they are often independent of any nation's control. Nevertheless, a national company may be permitted to use power that a foreign company would not, or be accorded privileges and subsidies not available to the foreigner. Most important, and tied to market structure, is the fact that a shift in national control can often place the interests of producers and consumers under different national labels—as in the case of oil, where something is produced primarily in one country and consumed mostly in another.

Finally, of course, the state trader supplants or supplements the private trader. Exchange is moved from the private into the public realm, from the economic into the political arena. Economic exchange thus becomes politicised, and in this context competition between traders becomes conflict between nations. *But the fact that these issues become political does not mean that the result will necessarily be different.* States may, quite evidently, attempt to structure the international rules in ways that favour themselves or their nation; but whether acting as trader or as rule-maker, a state's chances of determining the outcome will depend upon the power it can bring to bear in the particular conflict.

The state as trader is distinguished from a private trader by its organisational purposes, or perhaps more exactly by the ideologies and intents of the men who run the state organisation. A technical focus on what a state *can do* obscures the fact that the advent of public power in many countries involves a shift in what traders want to do and what

[14] See Dow Votaw, *The Six-legged Dog* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

e 'public'—however constituted—may accept. At least abstractly, me set of public purposes is substituted for those in other institutions, ıich may involve a change in nationality as well. But as the actions Pertamina, the Indonesian oil company, clearly show, it is not always e public interest but rather the private interest of the bureaucrats that pursued. A second difference is that a state trader may be better able link economic and political issues, or to bring together economic atters that would otherwise be treated individually by private com- ınies. Thus, political concessions or political advantages may be part any trade package, and the economic payoff may be increased by the le of political prizes. Foreign aid, one might argue, amounts to the me thing as the sale of political prizes, but aid as charity implies a ıent status, a status that is not as obvious and may not exist at all ıen politics is rewarded in trade. Likewise, exports and imports may tied together into packages when the state is trader, but there is no ason to assume that greater profits will necessarily be won in this ıgle transaction than could be obtained in a series of individual deals. ıe outcome, it would seem, will depend on the particular deal and ı a state's ability to estimate the value of the entire package more tutely than its trade partner. More important, the preferences of the ıte may simply be different from those of the private companies.

Such a profit focus may be deceptive, however, serving to hide the al advantage of package arrangements. These packages may permit government to undertake projects that it could not attempt if it had assemble the pieces itself. One of several ingredients or skills may be issing. A government, for example, may lack the capital, and may erefore try to ensure financing by making one of a variety of barter rangements. Likewise, when governments purchase entire production cilities—a common arrangement now, both in Eastern Europe and e Middle East—they may lack marketing outlets for the production. this instance, barter arrangements that oblige the plant builder to ısorb some of the production transfer the state's marketing problem the contractor. Indeed, some East European deals seem to amount to estern nations lending money to their own companies to build plants Eastern Europe and to guarantee markets for the products that will me from the plants they themselves have built. Indeed, in an extreme se, Eastern Europe and the Middle East might be thought to provide ıly location and labour.

In itself, the fact that the state is a trader does not alter economic ıwer relationships, and the mechanisms by which trade terms will be tered must still be demonstrated. Economically, if the state trader pplants a series of smaller traders it may gain market power, but e fundamental fact is the merger, not the agent of trade. Equally, the

creation of a state trader may decouple an integrated industry, permitting the nation to bargain for its economic payoff in an integrated process. Therefore it would seem that the crucial issue may be a political matter: what a state company as opposed to a private company attempts to do, and what is politically acceptable within the country. Whether new purposes can be achieved, however, will depend on market structures and market conditions. The only general conclusion is that in a world of state traders, each national interest is more likely to be explicitly articulated and pursued, but the results will depend in each instance on the fit between market structure, conditions in the marketplace, and political purposes and strength.

International problems and domestic solutions

The growth of state trading reflects changes in the international landscape, not in the basic strategies of the industrial countries. It is a part of a change in players and rules. The emergence of OPEC, the asserted sovereignty of the other commodity producers, the development of East-West trade, and the assertive expansion of industrial exports in developing countries have all combined with recession to prod governments into an active role in arranging the volumes and prices of exchange in particular goods. The development of state trading will depend on the evolution of all these factors, and barring any major changes, it is unlikely that we will again see dramatic alterations in the volumes of trade conducted in this way. Inevitable joustings will occur. For example, national defence departments will be likely to oppose certain aspects of East-West trade arrangements, and governments may become more conservative in financing foreign production facilities that can only be paid for by exports back to the sponsoring country. The ability and willingness of the Eastern bloc countries to accept the adjustments required by foreign trade with the West will set the limits on the totals of trade. The greatest tensions will undoubtedly result from the expansion of industrial exports from developing countries. As these exports go beyond labour-intensive goods, such as textiles, to capital-intensive products, such as steel and later petrochemicals,[15] serious dislocations in the markets of industrial countries will be threatened.

What is likely to change dramatically, then, is not the volume of trade but the character of the goods traded, the roles of the agencies conducting the trade and the politics of state traders. Two developments are likely to be important. First, the state agencies in OPEC, Eastern Europe and the developing countries that conduct such trade in the name of the

[15] Louis Turner and James Bedore, *op. cit.*

government are likely to become more sophisticated at the trade game. If they are successful, they are equally likely to develop a certain autonomy from their governments. Both the sophistication and the autonomy will vary widely, but we must anticipate both.

The central international problem will be to establish workable procedures for managing conflicts resulting from such trade. The dangers of trade war are understood, and one can already watch a kind of structured and stylised jousting between governments. Indeed, negotiations over volumes and prices and over the strategies of companies and firms may become as customary as those over tariffs. For the Western countries, as argued earlier, the central difficulty will be to accommodate the differences in their trade styles. Those industrial countries in which the state plays a powerful role in domestic industry (France and Japan) will be more likely to undertake bilateral trade arrangements between governments than will the United States or Germany. In essence, some industrial countries will accommodate themselves to state trading more easily than others. More specifically, France and Japan simply confront a more congenial environment for tactics they have long used. Consequently, the problem for the West will be to accommodate the several national trading styles within an alliance approach that permits it to present a common position to the commodity suppliers and East European countries. The principle seems clear. The problem will be to establish in each instance which category—alliance problem or national trade issue—is to apply and in what fashion. Such negotiations will demand great sensitivity to the internal economic and political functioning of each of the partners.

BOOKS

FROM PEARL HARBOUR TO STALINGRAD: GERMANY AND ITS ALLIES IN 1942

Geoffrey Warner

Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945. Serie E: 1941–1945. Band I: 12 Dezember 1941 bis 28 Februar 1942. *1969. 611 pp.* Band II: 1 März bis 15 Juni 1942. *1972. 582 pp.* Band III: 16 Juni bis 30 September 1942. *1974. 623 pp.* Band IV: 1 Oktober bis 31 Dezember 1942. *1975. 656 pp. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.*

ONE of the relatively minor consequences of Germany's unconditional surrender in 1945 was the seizure by the victorious Allies of the remaining civil and military archives of the defeated country. Despite last-minute attempts at destruction, these were remarkably complete and much use was made of them, both for intelligence purposes and to provide documentation for the war crimes trials of the immediate postwar period. In June 1946 the British and American governments decided to publish a more systematic collection of documents on German foreign policy between 1918 and 1945, entrusting the selection and editing to an independent team of reputable scholars. The French government joined the project in 1947, but the Soviet Union remained ostentatiously aloof, although it did publish various volumes of German documents on its own initiative.

The original plan to complete the Anglo-Franco-American project in some twenty volumes proved much too ambitious, and in the end it was decided to cease publication after having produced eighteen volumes covering the period between Hitler's accession to power in January 1933 and the German declaration of war upon the United States in December 1941. These volumes, which appeared between 1949 and 1966, were in English, although they were accompanied by some parallel German editions containing the documents in their original language and by a few abridged French translations. In the meantime, the original documents had been handed over to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which decided that it wished to continue their publication. In 1960 an agreement was reached between the West German, British, French and American governments to set up an editorial commission consisting of scholars from all four countries which drew up a plan for the completion of the original publication programme. As a result, volumes have been steadily appearing over the past decade or so. Some have been German editions of the volumes originally published only in English, but the rest have contained new documents.

The volumes under review are the first four of Series E, which covers the years 1941–45.[1] Although use has been made of the preliminary work

[1] The other series are: A (1918–25), B (1925–33), C (1933–37) and D (1937–41). Series C and D were published by the Anglo-Franco-American editorial team (London:

done by the Anglo-Franco-American editorial team before the original documents were returned to Germany, these volumes are the responsibility of West German editors. Their methods and principles are set out in the preface to each volume and the reader is referred to these for more detailed information. It is sufficient to state here that the editorial work has been carried out with great care. The documents are printed in chronological order, but the contents pages are arranged by country and topic so that the documents on a particular subject may be easily located, especially as each one is summarised there. Footnotes give the names of persons referred to in the text by their functions and also refer readers to related documents, both published and unpublished. There is a full description of the organisation of the German Foreign Ministry at the back of each volume, together with lists of archival references and abbreviations.

With more than 1,200 documents published for a period of just over one year, it is obvious that the selection is on a fairly generous scale. There is, indeed, scarcely an aspect of German foreign policy which the interested reader is unable to explore, be it the economic negotiations with conquered and satellite governments, to the importance of which the work of Professor Alan Milward has done so much to draw our attention,[2] the relations with wary neutrals like Spain and Turkey, and the treatment of Europe's Jewish population. In this latter connection, the editors have performed a valuable service in showing just how deeply the Foreign Ministry was involved in the hideous process of the 'final solution'. These bland, bureaucratic texts with their studied euphemisms make chilling reading.[3]

It is, of course, unfortunate that these documents are only available in German. It means that, outside German-speaking countries at any rate, they will be virtually inaccessible to all but the most determined undergraduate, let alone the general reader. They will form a handy reference collection for the academic specialist, but he or she does not really need them, for it should be remembered that the files upon which these volumes are based have been open to research for many years,[4] while many of the individual documents have already been summarised and even published elsewhere. At the same time, the specialist is acutely aware of the hydra-headed nature of decision making in the Third Reich and will certainly be less inclined to regard any collection of documents emanating from only one government department, however important, as providing a complete picture of German policy on any issue. With this caveat in mind, the reviewer will attempt, in the remainder of this article, to examine some of the major diplomatic and strategic issues which arose for Nazi Germany in 1942 and which are illustrated by these documents.

* * *

'So we had won after all!' This, Winston Churchill assured us, was his feeling on hearing of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and the

HMSO; Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1949–66). Several volumes of Series B have also now been published in West Germany.

2 See most recently his *War, Economy and Society, 1939–1945* (London: Allen Lane, 1977).

3 Apart from the record of the notorious Wannsee conference on January 20, 1942, which is printed in Vol. I, No. 150, the long report of August 21, 1942 by Martin Franz Luther, head of the German section of the Foreign Ministry (Vol. III, No. 209), is particularly worth reading.

4 The present reviewer used them for his *Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1968) more than ten years ago.

consequent entry of the United States into the Second World War.[5] But was it really as certain as all that? Although American power was ultimately decisive in bringing about the defeat of the Axis powers, there is no disguising the fact that, during the greater part of 1942, the initiative lay firmly in their hands. How wisely did they use it?

Hitler outlined German strategy for 1942 in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima, on December 13, 1941. After congratulating the Japanese for having made the right sort of war declaration—i.e. by the strike on Pearl Harbour—he maintained that American entry into the war had made things easier for Germany, especially as far as submarine warfare was concerned. 'You could not trust a U-boat commander to work through an entire book before every torpedo attack in order to decide whether the ship was English or American', he explained. The U-boat campaign was indeed an essential part of his strategy. 'His principal aims,' he said, 'were first of all the destruction of Russia, the thrust across the Caucasus towards the south and the torpedoing of the Anglo-Saxon battle and merchant fleets.'

Describing Japanese plans, Oshima said that it was inevitable that, after the capture of Singapore, Japan would move against India. 'In this connection, he thought it important for German and Japanese operations to be harmonised. It would be highly advantageous if, when Japan attacked India from the east, German troops threatened India from the west.' Hitler seemed to agree. Repeating his intention of attacking on the southern sector of the Russian front, he pointed out that 'the thrust towards the Caucasus, which was also connected with oil, and subsequently the advance on Iraq and Iran, with which the threat to India was also related' was the most important task.[6]

Although the tripartite military agreement signed in Berlin by representatives of Germany, Italy and Japan on January 18, 1942 established a fairly rigid division of military operations at the 70th degree of longitude between Germany and Italy on the west and Japan on the east, it also called for joint consultation on operational planning,[7] and this was taken seriously in some quarters. Thus, on February 22, the German ambassador in Tokyo, Major-General Eugen Ott, and his naval attaché, Vice-Admiral Paul Wenneker, reported that Japanese naval staff officers had told the latter that, despite the considerable successes of Japan's armed forces, the navy realised that these were only the first step towards victory. 'The outcome of the war at present hangs in the balance,' they argued, 'with perhaps a slight advantage in favour of the Axis side. America's powerful armaments will become effective next year at the earliest. They must be anticipated. If the Axis powers could link up via the Indian Ocean this year, the war would be decided in their favour. All forces should therefore be employed to this end, and the attack should be carried out simultaneously with dynamic impetus by Germany and Italy from the north and by Japan from the south. The sooner the date, the better. The enemy must be given no time to recover. Joint agreements between the Axis powers for the implementation [of this programme] should follow as soon as possible.'[8]

[5] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Vol. III: The Grand Alliance* (London: Cassell, 1950), p. 539.

[6] Undated Hewel memorandum, Vol. I, No. 12.

[7] Tripartite military agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan, Jan. 18, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 145.

[8] Wenneker/Ott telegram, Feb. 22, 1942, Vol. I, No. 270.

But this eminently sensible appraisal of the situation and the proposals for its exploitation were soon to be vitiated by another suggestion from the same source which was anathema to the Germans. Ott reported on March 3 that Wenneker had been approached by the head of the attaché section of the Japanese naval staff with the news that, according to the most recent information from Moscow and Kuybyshev,[9] 'a change had taken place in the Soviet government's attitude regarding the continuation of the war with Germany. The desire to put an end, if possible, to the conflict which was proving all too costly in the long run had greatly increased.' Given the need to achieve a junction of the Axis forces via the Indian Ocean before the Anglo-Saxons had stepped up their armament, the Japanese navy wondered whether Germany was in a position to carry out this difficult operation at the same time as smashing the Soviet Union. Might it not be better 'to postpone the final destruction of the Soviet Union and to attempt to come to an arrangement on an acceptable basis for Germany'? The Japanese navy would be engaged elsewhere until the end of April, but 'then it would be ready for a simultaneous pre-planned action from west and east, in the direction of the Suez Canal and the Near East on the one hand and the Indian Ocean on the other. If the German government declared itself in agreement with this programme, Japan was ready at any time to mediate with the Soviet Union.'[10]

Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, promptly informed Ott that Germany saw no possibility of reaching a satisfactory agreement with the Soviet Union. In any case, the blows they would suffer during the coming year would compel the Russians to sue for peace.[11] Acquainting Oshima with the Japanese navy's *démarche*, Ribbentrop explained that Germany wished to link up with the Japanese via the Caucasus as well as via Africa and he did not believe that Stalin would agree to the use of this route as part of a peace settlement. It could only be achieved by force of arms. Germany was confident that the Soviet Union could be decisively beaten this year, and he pointed out that this would also be in Japan's interests, as the best hope for its security in the north lay in the final smashing of Russia. Indeed, he concluded, 'Germany would welcome it if Japan would also attack the Soviet Union during the course of this year, from the east, provided her powers permitted it.'[12]

The idea that Japan should join in the war against the Soviet Union seems to have been exclusively Ribbentrop's. It was certainly not shared by Hitler, for when the Foreign Minister had raised the matter in an earlier conversation with Oshima in his presence, the Fuehrer had said that 'the most important thing as far as Germany was concerned was for Japan not to be defeated by the Anglo-Saxon powers. She should under no circumstances split up her forces prematurely.'[13] He had not changed his mind at the end of April, when he met his Italian ally, Benito Mussolini, at a summit conference at Klessheim, near Salzburg. 'Both the Fuehrer and the Duce took the view,' runs the record of their meeting, 'that, at least for the present, the energetic fighting of the Anglo-Saxons

[9] Kuybyshev was the temporary Russian diplomatic capital.

[10] Ott telegram, March 3, 1942, Vol. II, No. 4.

[11] Ribbentrop telegram, March 7, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 19.

[12] Ribbentrop telegram, March 18, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 48.

[13] Undated Hewel memorandum, Vol. I, No. 87. The conversation took place on January 3, 1942.

was Japan's most pressing task, from the implementation of which she should not allow herself to be diverted by an operation against Soviet Russia.' [14]

This did not prevent Ribbentrop from approaching Oshima yet again on July 9, after the 1942 offensive on the eastern front had begun. 'If Japan felt militarily strong enough,' he said, 'the time had perhaps now come for Japan to attack Russia. He thought it possible that, if Japan did attack Russia now, this could bring about the final collapse of morale, or at least considerably hasten the collapse of the system. In any event, Japan would never again have such a favourable opportunity to eliminate the Russian colossus in East Asia once and for all as now existed.' This time, the Foreign Minister claimed, he had discussed the question with Hitler and had the latter's agreement.[15] The Fuehrer's alleged support notwithstanding, the Japanese government replied through Oshima on July 30 that 'in spite of the previous successes of the Japanese armed forces, the resistance of the U.S.A. remained so stubborn that Japan must increasingly use her forces for future operations against this enemy Japan's efforts to close off sources of support in the South Seas to her enemies and to hold them for herself were only in their preliminary stage. In these circumstances, a move by Japan against the Soviet Union would lead to too great a division of Japanese strength. By lessening the Japanese pressure, this could result in an increase of military strength by the U.S.A. and Britain in Europe and, what was more, provide suitable bases for the Americans to mount attacks against Japan.' [16]

Not only were the Japanese extremely reluctant to become involved in Germany's war against the Soviet Union, but it seemed that they had also not entirely abandoned the idea of acting as a mediator between the two belligerents. On August 31, Ribbentrop told Oshima that the rumour of a separate peace between Germany and Russia continued to circulate and that it was invariably nourished by Japanese sources. This was 'extraordinarily harmful' to the Axis cause, for Stalin was using the rumour to put more pressure upon England to send him supplies. Ribbentrop said he would be grateful if the ambassador would inform his government that a separate peace with Russia was impossible because Stalin would not accept the necessary conditions. When Oshima admitted that there was a school of thought in Japan which believed such a peace could be politically useful, Ribbentrop 'stressed once more that the notion of a separate peace was totally Utopian and must be withdrawn from discussion. Our enemies must have the quite clear image that the Tripartite Pact powers were completely united in their attitude.' [17]

* * *

In the meantime, the ambitious scheme for a junction between Italo-German and Japanese forces somewhere in the general area of Persia had come to nothing. The idea had perhaps reached its high-water mark in

[14] Schmidt memorandum, May 2, 1942, Vol. II, No. 182.

[15] Gottfriedsen memorandum, July 10, 1942, Vol. III, No. 76.

[16] Unsigned memorandum, July 31, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 142. It might be noted in passing that Oshima agreed with Ribbentrop that Japan should attack Russia. Indeed, he often seems to have been a typical example of the kind of ambassador who is more in sympathy with the government to which he is accredited than with his own.

[17] Undated Gottfriedsen memorandum, Vol. III, No. 255. See also Gottfriedsen memorandum, Sept. 18, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 295.

April 1942, when a Japanese naval task force had carried out raids in the Indian Ocean. Ott asked the Japanese Foreign Minister, Togo Shigenori, whether these raids were designed simply to upset the efforts of the Cripps mission, which was then in India, or whether they had a broader strategic significance. Togo replied that both interpretations were correct. Ott reported, moreover, that from confidential military information, the impression was confirmed that the Japanese had decided to direct their main advance into the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the representative of the naval staff had told Ott that, in his opinion, Ceylon and the Indian Ocean were Japan's next goals.[18]

A month later, however, all had changed. Ott reported on May 15 that shortage of troops and transport prevented any major operation against India itself. As for a landing on Ceylon, it seemed that that too had been abandoned for the moment. 'The onset of the monsoons at the end of May made such an operation look fairly risky in view of the enemy's continuing will to resist. Gaining a foothold in Ceylon alone, without a subsequent energetic seizure of the British-Indian position, would have to be purchased at the expense of continual aerial attack from the mainland and difficult supply lines. Without a simultaneous attack on the Anglo-Saxon position in the Near East, the Japanese leadership clearly regards the operation as difficult. Until further notice, therefore, it seems that Japanese operations in the Indian Ocean will be confined to harassment raids by naval and air forces.' The ambassador suspected that the main area of Japanese activity in the near future would be the South Pacific.[19]

After the Italo-German successes in North Africa in midsummer 1942[20] and after the 1942 campaign on the Russian front had successfully begun, the Japanese showed a renewed interest in the possibility of a link-up with their European allies. Ott reported on July 7 that the Japanese army staff had let it be known that it would welcome the opportunity of sending a delegation to Europe in order to discuss joint military planning.[21] It subsequently emerged that this idea had been mooted at a very high level indeed and had been put before the Emperor himself. It was envisaged that the delegation would consist of some six persons, who would travel as the Emperor's representatives. In view of the recent Italian achievement in flying a long-range aircraft from Europe to Japan, they proposed to travel by air.[22] The German response was negative. Ott's contact was to be told that 'the technical preconditions for the implementation of the [Japanese] suggestion did not exist for us at present. The construction of special aircraft, which would enable an aerial link with Japan to be established, was under way in Germany at the moment, but they had not yet been completed.'[23] Despite this disappointing reply, the Japanese continued to show interest in sending the delegation to Europe, but Ribbentrop told Oshima on September 17 that he had discussed the matter with Hitler and that the latter felt that it was 'too dangerous to bring really important Japanese personalities to Germany by aircraft'. The machines had not been properly tested and 'the thought that a delegation

18 Ott telegram, April 14, 1942, Vol. II, No. 134.
19 Ott telegram, May 15, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 212.
20 Tobruk, it will be recalled, fell to Rommel's forces on June 21.
21 Ott telegram, July 7, 1942, Vol. III, No. 68.
22 Ott telegram, July 14, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 92.
23 Ribbentrop telegram, July 19, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 113.

of the Emperor might crash or be shot down in a German aircraft was unacceptable to the Fuehrer.' [24]

One may legitimately wonder whether these considerations were the only ones. Erich Kordt of the German embassy in Tokyo asked the Foreign Ministry whether the German refusal was based on technical grounds or whether it was thought that the time was not ripe. He was told by the State Secretary, Ernst von Weizsäcker, that in the latter's view the real reason was because it was considered desirable 'not to disturb existing responsibilities'.[25] Since the Foreign Ministry was engaged in a bureaucratic struggle with the armed forces on the question of military representation in Japan at this very time,[26] it is quite possible that it saw the Japanese proposal as a threat to its near monopoly of channels of communication with Tokyo.[27]

Whatever the motives behind the Foreign Ministry's attitude, this episode marked the end of any serious attempt to co-ordinate German and Japanese strategy in 1942. By the autumn, in any case, it had become clear that the Germans were not going to seize the Caucasus or capture Cairo that year. Reporting on the situation throughout the Japanese sphere of operations on October 7, Ott stated that a number of difficulties, including shortage of oil and heavy weapons, 'lead Japan at the moment to think primarily in terms of defending what has been achieved'. People were beginning to think in terms of a long war and were therefore making greater efforts to exploit the conquered territories in order to supply East Asia with the necessary raw materials and foodstuffs. 'The tendency to abstain from major operations and to restrict oneself to [limited] tasks . . . ,' he concluded, 'is also shown by the fact that the army, which originally seemed very disappointed at the non-realisation of the aerial link [between Japan and Europe] . . . has not reverted since about the end of August to its wish, hitherto expressed so urgently, for a direct contact in order to discuss joint operations with its European allies.' [28]

Apart from the evidence presented in these volumes of German unwillingness to go beyond general declarations of support, we know from other sources that the Japanese proposals for a co-ordinated assault upon the Middle East did not meet with unalloyed approval on the part of the military authorities of the Third Reich. As in Japan, the navy seems to have been the main advocate of the idea, while the army was sceptical to say the least.[29] That the Japanese were in fact no more united than the Germans can be gleaned from Ott's reports,[30] but it is spelled out much

[24] Gottfriedsen memorandum, Sept. 18, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 295.

[25] Weizsäcker memorandum, Aug. 13, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 113, n. 4.

[26] See, for example, Ritter letter, Sept. 10, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 278. This issue was not settled until the end of November. See Ribbentrop telegram, Nov. 28, 1942, Vol. IV, No. 236.

[27] In his memoirs, Kordt claims that the real reason for the Japanese proposal to send a delegation to Europe was because the army staff wished to use it to push the idea of a compromise peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. Although the German embassy in Tokyo deliberately refrained from reporting this fact, Berlin either discovered or guessed it, and this was why the proposal was blocked. See Erich Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten* (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1950), pp. 419–22. There is, however, no support for this thesis in the documents.

[28] Ott telegram, Oct. 7, 1942, Vol. IV, No. 20.

[29] This statement is based upon research which the present reviewer carried out some years ago in the unpublished German naval records.

[30] See, for example, Ott telegram, Jan. 29, 1942, Vol. I, No. 179.

more explicitly by those with access to Japanese sources. Thus, one authority writes, 'It should be remembered . . . that what the German navy . . . took to be evidence of fully matured Japanese intentions [to mount a large-scale offensive in the Indian Ocean] was no more than a plan under study by only *one* admittedly influential branch of *one* of Japan's services.'[31]

Was the idea of a link-up between the Axis powers in the Middle East nothing more, then, than a phantom which needlessly haunted Allied strategists?[32] Even without considering the enormous logistical problems involved, it might seem from the above that this was the case. Who can tell, however, what might have happened if the Germans had responded more positively to the Japanese navy's overtures? And the fact remains that, apart from the U-boat campaign, the plan offered perhaps the only chance of an Axis victory, or failing that, of a negotiated peace on satisfactory terms.

* * *

November 1942 saw the military initiative wrested from the Germans by the Anglo-American landings in North Africa, supported by Montgomery's offensive against Rommel in Egypt, and by the Russian counter-attack in the Stalingrad sector which led to the encirclement of Von Paulus's 6th Army. Although the latter event was, by dint of the far larger numbers involved on the eastern front, more significant in the long term, the former had a more immediate impact because of its effect upon Germany's principal European ally, Fascist Italy.

Italy had long been a liability to Germany. Militarily, Hitler had been forced to go to the aid of Mussolini in North Africa and the Balkans in 1941. Economically, Italy's need for vital raw materials, especially oil, exacerbated Germany's own acute supply problems.[33] Politically, Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East complicated Germany's dealings with Spain, Vichy France and Arab nationalists.[34] If Hitler had been willing to accord a higher priority to the Mediterranean theatre in his overall strategy, as his naval advisers consistently urged, many of these problems might have solved themselves, but with Rommel in retreat from El Alamein, and British and American troops landing in Morocco and Algeria, the opportunity had passed. Indeed, the very real possibility now existed that the Axis would be driven out of North Africa altogether and the war then carried to Italian soil.

Just over a fortnight before the Allied landings in North Africa took place, Mussolini discussed the potential threat in a conversation with the commander-in-chief of the *Luftwaffe*, *Reichsmarschall* Hermann Göring. He told the latter that he was preparing to send three more divisions to North Africa, two of which would be deployed on the Tunisian frontier to seize Tunis if the Anglo-Americans landed in French Africa. 'For if the latter established themselves in Tunis,' he explained, 'the possibility of a British

31 Johanna Menzel Meskill, *Hitler and Japan: The Hollow Alliance* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 74 (emphasis in the original).

32 That it did haunt them can be seen from the memorandum of April 12, 1942 by General Eisenhower, then of the US Army's War Plans division, printed in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years*, Vol. I (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 241–44.

33 See, for example, Keitel letter, Oct. 21, 1942, Vol. IV, No. 85, which describes how the German navy had run down its own stocks of oil to help the Italians.

34 On the last point, see Hewel memorandum, Aug. 31, 1942, Vol. III, No. 250.

landing in Italy existed, even if it had no prospects of success. The French population played a waiting game. If things were going well for the Axis powers, collaboration was encouraged. If, on the other hand, the struggles of the Axis took a long time, they turned towards American power in France. In North Africa the officers were all Gaullists and the civilians formed a fifth column. In the event of an Anglo-American attack, France would merely make a show of defence to save her honour, as she had done in Syria [in 1941] and Madagascar [earlier in 1942]. It ought not to be forgotten that the Axis had recently made available a great deal of war matériel to the French and that all Frenchmen hated the Axis partners. They hated the Germans with respect and the Italians with contempt.'[35] On November 6, two days before the landings, the Duce linked the need for the settlement of the French question with that for an early compromise peace with the Soviet Union. Without these two, he told General Enno von Rintelen, the German high command's representative in Rome, 'the future conduct of the war becomes too difficult'.[36]

For a brief moment, it looked as though the problem of relations with France might be solved by the North African landings. At midday on November 8, Mussolini asked Rintelen to inform Hitler that 'if the French government is really prepared to fight, together with us, against the British and Americans, then I am ready to agree In order to clarify the situation, it seems to me imperative that France should not only break off diplomatic relations with America, but declare war upon England and the U.S.A. . . .' In addition, an agreement for the landing of Axis ground forces in Tunis to ward off further attacks was essential. 'If these prerequisites are not established', he went on, 'and a common struggle as allies does not eventuate, I regard the immediate occupation of the rest of France and of the island of Corsica as necessary. Corsica must in all circumstances be prevented from falling into enemy hands, as the threat from Corsica would be fatal for Italy.'[37]

The outcome of this message was a telephoned instruction to the German ambassador to the Vichy government, instructing him to approach the French with the request that they should declare war upon Britain and the United States. 'If the French government takes such an unequivocal stand,' the message concluded, 'we would be ready to accompany it through thick and thin.'[38] Although the French premier, Pierre Laval, had always been an advocate of collaboration with Germany, he was not prepared to urge such a momentous step upon his colleagues without a substantial quid pro quo. He had already asked for a guarantee of French territorial integrity,[39] and he now proposed a meeting with Hitler to discuss the whole question of Franco-German relations.[40]

It is doubtful whether there was any real prospect of an alliance between Vichy France and the Axis powers. It is true that an agreement for such an alliance was drawn up, incorporating a guarantee of France's territorial

[35] Schmidt memorandum, Oct. 26, 1942, Vol. IV, No. 98.

[36] Rintelen/Mackensen telegram, Nov. 7, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 146.

[37] Rintelen/Bismarck telegram, Nov. 9, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 156.

[38] Weizsacker teleprint, Nov. 8, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 151. The fact that this document appears before the one cited in the previous footnote is accounted for by the fact that the latter was simply an information copy of a message originally sent through military channels.

[39] Abetz telegram, Nov. 8, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 149.

[40] Unsigned telegram, Nov. 8, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 154.

integrity within its 1914 frontiers,[41] but it was never handed over.[42] Laval's evasiveness in his conversation with Hitler on November 10,[43] and even more the lack of strenuous resistance to the Anglo-American landings in North Africa culminating in the defection of Admiral Darlan, the senior Vichy representative on the spot, reinforced the already entrenched scepticism of both Hitler and Mussolini concerning the possibility of genuine collaboration with France and led to successive decisions to occupy the rest of France (including Corsica), to establish a bridgehead in Tunisia and to seize the French fleet anchored at Toulon since the armistices of 1940.[44]

The pace of events in North Africa had temporarily pushed Mussolini's second proposal—for a separate peace with the Soviet Union—into the background, but his son-in-law and Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, raised the matter again in a conversation with Hitler on December 18. 'The Duce took the view,' Ciano explained, that the English and Americans would carry out large-scale operations in North Africa, South-east Europe and West Europe in the year 1943. In these circumstances, the Duce wondered whether it was not possible to find a political settlement with Russia to avoid a two-front war. An ideal solution seemed to him to be a new " Brest-Litovsk peace ",[45] although he realised that it might be extremely difficult to reach such an agreement with Russia. If such a settlement were not possible, it was appropriate in the Duce's view to establish a position in Russia which would permit the Axis to transfer greater numbers of troops from the east to west as soon as possible.'

Hitler replied that he had unsuccessfully tried to reach a political settlement with the Soviet Union in 1940–41 and went on to explain why it was both dangerous and impossible to make another attempt now. If the Russians were given a chance to reorganise their forces over six months as the result of an armistice, Germany would have to attack them again. 'Besides, there was no line upon which Germany and Russia could agree in respect of their food and raw material supply requirements. Germany could not accept a line which merely cut off Poland and the Baltic States from Russia, for not only her existence, but also that of Italy and many medium and small states of continental Europe depended upon supply, especially of Caucasus oil, from Russian territory which was at present occupied. A line which provided a basis for existence for Russia and the Axis in terms of coal, iron and grain could not be found.' Even if there were a settlement, Germany could not run the risk of withdrawing forces from east to west, because it would take eight months to get them back again. In any case, he was not worried by the threat of Allied action in the west, although he went on to warn, somewhat paradoxically, that the slightest whisper of political conversations with the Russians would prompt the British and Americans to take all kinds of risks and 'to proceed to the greatest and most foolhardy operations against the Axis'. Summing up,

[41] i.e. minus Alsace-Lorraine.

[42] Undated draft agreement, Vol. IV, No. 242.

[43] Schmidt memorandum, Nov. 14, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 176.

[44] Italo-German note, Nov. 10, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 155, n. 3; Hitler letter, Nov. 11, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 159; Hitler letter, Nov. 26, 1942, *ibid.*, No. 226. The French fleet scuttled itself rather than fall into Axis hands.

[45] A reference to the separate peace between Germany and the new Bolshevik government in Russia in March 1918. Its terms were extremely favourable for the former.

the Fuehrer declared that 'a military stand-down in the east would be of no use whatever in the south and west. Finland would in all probability desert the Axis and go over to America, and the position of Norway would become difficult.' [46]

Ciano did not attempt to argue the point, but many Italians, probably including himself, had already drawn their own conclusions. The end of 1942 saw a number of peace feelers put out to the western Allies by both supporters and opponents of the Fascist regime.[47] Total defeat in North Africa and the subsequent invasion of its own territory would compel Italy to change sides only nine months later. Using one of his favourite expressions, Hitler had told Ciano that Germany and Italy stood together 'in a struggle for existence or non-existence' (*in einem Kampf um Sein oder Nichtsein*). The year 1942 marked a crucial stage in the Third Reich's progress towards the latter.

[46] Schmidt memorandum, Dec. 21, 1942, Vol. IV, No. 303.

[47] See Winant telegram, Dec. 18, 1942, in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1943, Vol. II: Europe* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 315–16. This telegram contains a letter from the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, reporting on the peace feelers. The Germans themselves picked up reports of at least one, emanating from the Italian diplomatic mission in Lisbon and allegedly known to Ciano. Ribbentrop, however, regarded the report as the outcome of 'Anglo-American intrigues . . . designed to disturb the relationship between Germany and her ally.' See Von Hoyningen-Huene telegram, Nov. 4, 1942, Vol. IV, No. 129, and Rintelen memorandum, Nov. 6, 1942, *ibid.*, n. 3.

REVIEWS

CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

Survey of International Affairs 1963. By D. C. Watt. *London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1977. 351 pp. £25·00.*

THIS volume is intended to be the last in an annual enterprise which Arnold Toynbee initiated in 1924 and which he wrote practically singlehanded year by year between the wars while at the same time grappling with his mammoth *A Study of History.* As Andrew Shonfield writes in the preface, 'the task of effective synthesis and interpretation of the whole world's affairs, as national and international centres of power have proliferated and identifiably significant events have multiplied, has become less and less feasible' (p. v). This is borne out, of course, by the fact that, since 1945, the publication of each volume has lagged further and further behind the year to which it relates: in the 1920s and 1930s Toynbee's stout tomes rolled off the press almost always only a year later. But, as Shonfield hastens to explain, this is no reflection on Toynbee's successors, including names like Peter Calvocoressi, Coral Bell, Geoffrey Barraclough and Donald Watt. The world has just become a bigger, more complicated place and the old European-centred unity is lost for ever.

The whole, or almost the whole, of this 1963 volume is devoted to non-European affairs: super-power relations, the Sino-Soviet collision, the Indian subcontinent, South-east Asia, the Middle East, Africa. Europe is conceded two pages, the European Community—the only Europe, presumably, which matters—being dismissed as 'largely frozen with shock at the unexpected last-minute French veto of Britain's application to join the Community' (p. 30). 'The Yemen Revolution', on the other hand, by Geoffrey Warner, is accorded 23 pages (pp. 217–40). Such is the reversal of international fortunes.

Significantly again, Europe, the centrepiece of Toynbee's annals, re-appears, ingloriously, in Donald Watt's first chapter, 'East-West Relations: the Cold *Détente*', under his heading 'The end of the regimes'—Dr. Adenauer 'went in bitterness and defeat' (p. 28) in 1963, and so did Harold Macmillan, 1963 being for Britain 'a year of political scandal of a Rabelaisian nature and scale' (p. 29). But even these whimpering endings were overshadowed by the American tragedy at Dallas in November. On Kennedy, Professor Watt's judgment is mixed, though arguably fair: 'his control over the gigantic and diffuse machinery of American government was far from complete'; 'he was prepared to tolerate in office men of whose drive and abilities he had no very high opinion'; 'his nerve was excellent'; 'his Grand Design suffered essentially from his feeling that in the end its success or failure would affect him and America very little' (pp. 29–30).

By far the greater part of the volume, however—the section on the financial policies of the Western powers, India, Pakistan, South-east Asia

(apart from a chapter on Vietnam by Ralph Smith) and Africa—is written by James Mayall, another luminary of the London School of Economics, who might have been accorded more credit on the title page. Mayall writes in a cool, clear, altogether impersonal way about the consequences for Mr. Nehru's non-alignment policy of India's war with China in 1962, its effect on his relations with the Western powers, on Indian rearmament and on the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir; then he takes in his stride the formation of the federation of Malaysia in 1962 and the ensuing conflict with the Philippines over Sabah and the origins of the disastrous confrontation with Indonesia which was to last until 1966. As a final example of his competence in Third-World affairs, Mayall rounds off the book with an account of the formation of the Organisation of African Unity at Addis Ababa in May 1963, after a short chapter on United Nations activities in the Congo in 1962 and 1963 by John Major, culminating in the suppression of the secessionist movement in Katanga.

It is a worthy volume with which to end the series, careful, judicious and thorough. At the same time, it cannot help underlining the reason for ending the series, namely the resistance of world affairs today to being encompassed within one man's, or one team's, vision.

London School of Economics F. S. NORTHEDGE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

International Economic Conflicts: Prevention and Resolution. By James Fawcett. *London: Europa for the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. 1977. 127 pp. £5·00.*

A MAJOR enterprise of the David Davies Institute over the past ten years has been the detailed and systematic study of international conflict—a theme which in the mid-1960s still seemed to grapple with the central security issue of the international system. After a substantial volume dealing with the legal machinery for the settlement of disputes and the fairly massive Northedge-Donelan-Grieve duo on fifty major political conflicts between 1945 and 1970,[1] there comes this slim study by Professor Fawcett, formerly of the IMF and Chatham House, now of King's College London as well as the European Commision of Human Rights. It consists of two highly condensed essays on the national and international instruments available to prevent or resolve economic conflicts and on the efficacy of these instruments in the fields of trade, investment, monetary exchanges and access to resources. There are appendices giving illuminating extracts from typical bilateral investment treaties, summarising the origins, provisions and experience of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and giving the full text of the UN Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States. From a teaching point of view,

[1] David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, *International Disputes: The Legal Aspects* (London: Europa, 1972). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1973, p. 99. F. S. Northedge and M. D. Donelan, *International Disputes: The Political Aspects* (1971), reviewed Jan. 1972, p. 77; and M. D. Donelan and M. J. Grieve, *International Disputes: Case Histories, 1945–1970* (1973), reviewed Oct. 1973, p. 629.

it is good value. There are useful and succinct chunks on the generalised system of preferences, the Lomé agreement, Stabex (the EEC's compensatory financing scheme), the Multi-fibre Agreement, the GATT anti-dumping code and the legal treatment of disputes arising out of the expropriation of foreign investors. The conclusion that economic conflicts do not lend themselves to settlement by judicial process, and the authority of legal institutions is only weakened and the issues hopelessly confused when they are brought for arbitration, is sound uncommon sense.

If the reader is still uneasily dissatisfied with this rather stark and abrupt ending, it may be because it is only through extreme brevity that the study has avoided tackling the underlying paradox—which is that while economic conflicts of a bilateral kind do not often seem half so dangerously explosive as the 'political' ones already surveyed, yet current disagreements over the management of the world economy are a good deal more important in the long run than most localised arguments over territory and jurisdiction. It is these basic conflicts over the nature of the global production, investment and trade systems and the consequent distribution of risks, costs and benefits among the nations and classes of the world that are now a large part of world politics. It is too late for prevention and too early for resolution of such questions.

London School of Economics SUSAN STRANGE

Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: A Comparative Approach. Edited by Christopher Clapham. *Farnborough: Saxon House. 1977. 184 pp. £8·50.*

THIS is one of three monographs—the other two are on Western Europe and on communist countries—making up a series which was conceived at the Political Studies Association meeting of 1974 and placed under the direction of William Wallace. It contains five chapters on different regions in the Third World (South-east Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America) as well as an introduction by Christopher Hill on theories of foreign policy making and a conclusion by the editor who is also the author of the Africa chapter.

The inspiration behind this volume seems to be a reaction against the techniques used in industrial countries to explain the process of making foreign policy in terms of bureaucratic behaviour and the routines of administrative procedure. The models devised by Allison, Halperin or Rosenau are not simply inapplicable in developing countries which have no stable bureaucracies to manage foreign relations; they are also positively misleading whenever it is more important to grasp the external constraints which limit action than to describe how policy choices are made. Decision-making theory is a luxury enjoyed by powerful states which are assured an influential place in the global order. The essays in this volume reflect both the natural frustration of scholars who have tried to use research methods in conditions where there is 'a dearth of useful information about bureaucracy' (p. 4), and the strong convictions of those who want to establish that foreign policy analysis outside the industrial nations is a legitimate academic endeavour. This mixture of disappointment and faith which pervades the volume tends to give it the inward-looking character of

intellectual soul-searching. The essays are occasionally a little too dependent on such articles as Weinstein (1972) which emphasises 'the uses of foreign policy' and Korany (1974) on 'situation roles'.

Christopher Clapham as editor redeems the doubts of his contributors in a conclusion which recommends that work should be concentrated on 'function', whenever the regularised patterns of 'process' 'can scarcely be discerned' (p. 175). He suggests a number of techniques (such as the analyses of capability, events, diplomatic links, and trade or aid), and although the regional studies have revealed many differences, he finds three common features which can be used in further study—the internal structures of development, the degree of dependence on external powers, and the forms of identification with other states in a similar position. As he realises, he comes close to rediscovering the 'function' of defining and defending 'the national interest'. The foreign policies of new states are initially responses to both the difficulties of establishing a permanent domestic regime and the need to make a presence felt in international affairs. In his chapter on Africa, Clapham emphasises what he calls the 'state-centredness' of domestic political systems (p. 84).

Each essay carries a useful bibliography, usually including material up to the end of 1976. But the index does not do justice to the contents, and the regional maps contribute little to the presentation.

Birkbeck College, London J. M. LEE

Social Change, Charisma and International Behaviour: Toward a Theory of Foreign Policy-Making in the Third World. By Baghat Korany. *Leiden: Sijthoff; Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales. 1976. 460 pp. (Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, Collection de Relations Internationales 4.) Fl. 87·00 $34.75.*

HARDLY an eye-catching title, but a fair index of the theme, scope and content of Dr. Korany's massive volume. An interpretation of contemporary international politics from a postulated set of Third-World predicaments, the book contains an analytical history of super-power relations as seen through the perceptions of the non-aligned, as well as a critical review of concepts current in international politics studies. The result is a great plum-pudding of a book. Some of it is pretty indigestible. But there are rich ingredients. The style is uncompromising. While jargon represents a technical vocabulary in which specialised ideas may be expressed, in the study of human behaviour the application of clear and even vivid language to the task of explanation may be sorely missed. It is unfair perhaps to wrest one sentence out of context, yet the following is typical of much of Dr. Korany's prose: 'Thus at this stage we reemphasise the multivariate character of the proposed model by showing in matrix form the complementarity of the multilevel components in the choice of non-alignment'. Symptomatic also are two graphs. One is called 'Complete Data Matrix of Diplomatic Interaction in the Nonaligned Subsystem and Positions of Individual Members of the Nonaligned Continuum', the other, 'Structure of Diplomatic Interaction in the Nonaligned Subsystem and the Positions

of Individual Members'. They plot the political position of states with such precision that one wonders how the investigator can really have taken into account so many variables, so many impediments to complete knowledge, as to enable him to be sure that India, for instance, must be placed at point 45 on the vertical and not at 46 or 44. All so painstaking, yet so unconvincing. But the book impresses greatly by the intellectual energy and industry that have gone into its making. A formidable array of authorities is laid under contribution, largely representing the behaviouralist approach. A doubt remains whether the author's elaborate theorising does not subject the turbulent international politics of the Third World to a degree of explanatory exactitude scarcely justified by the political activities themselves.

Dr. Korany follows the traditional Western view in identifying the Third World principally in terms of non-alignment with either the free world or the Soviet bloc. He notes the preponderance in the Third World of ex-colonial states, and takes account of the economic implications of ex-colonial status. There is much that is suggestive about development in the Third World. Dr. Korany notes with due regret the under-development of theory concerning the problems of under-development. But his analysis does not resolve the ambiguity of the Third-World concept. For there are non-aligned states that are rich, and poor countries that are aligned. The Western view of non-alignment contrasts sharply with the Chinese notion of the Third World as comprising the poor countries in general as against the super-powers and the 'intermediate states'. If the Third-World concept is such a catch-all, its analytical usefulness may be seriously impaired and make problematic Dr. Korany's attempt to identify special characteristics of Third-World foreign policy making.

In his study of charisma Dr. Korany writes of such Third-World leaders as Pandit Nehru and President Nasser with sympathy and insight and much personal detail. For instance, there is a list of Nasser's preferred reading when he was a military cadet. The author is interesting and thorough on what he calls the 'Personality Variable', and works hard to define and delimit the role of personality in international interactions with their collective and often fortuitous effects which cannot be validly attributed to any one man or group of men. This section makes quite lively reading.

In his concluding section Dr. Korany examines the role of the non-aligned states in relation to the attempted management of world politics by the super-powers. He discusses in particular the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Indian War. He reviews the attempts of non-aligned states to manage crises, contain conflicts and promote world stability. He is neither dismissive of their contribution nor taken in by the tone of righteous self-congratulation with which the non-aligned have sometimes commented upon their role. His argument here is balanced and wise.

Despite the reservations indicated above, there is no doubt of the timeliness of Dr. Korany's work. There is a particular need for carefully researched analyses of the changing patterns of economic and political power which stress the evident present and likely future effects of the emergence to profound international influence of the governments and peoples of the Third World. The ambiguity of the notion renders the task more urgent. A crucial effect of current changes of balance seems

certain to be the net decline in the power and influence of the advanced countries. If the Third World still dreams of development, the industrialised world's main preoccupation may well be in coming to terms with its own 'de-development'. The northern and southern hemispheres may, by complementary processes, meet in another generation at a common level of relative deprivation. Meanwhile Dr. Korany's close examination of the style, perceptions, prejudices and hopes of political leaderships in the Third World remains a valuable recognition of the growing significance of those leaderships in international relations as a whole.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth ROBERT PURNELL

Unofficial Diplomats. Edited by Maureen R. Berman and Joseph E. Johnson. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1977. 268 pp. $18.75. Pb: $7.40.*

THIS is a fascinating collection of papers on activities by non-officials, sometimes as lobbyists for some altruistic cause, sometimes as intermediaries between parties to a conflict, and sometimes simply as promoters of understanding and goodwill. These are discrete forms of 'diplomacy': the common thread is that all the actors described in the book were operating in non-governmental capacities, though sometimes with the knowledge of governments.

Altruistic lobbying is illustrated by accounts of the successful efforts of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to secure an important extension to the 1951 convention on the status of refugees and, in a rather disappointing contribution, of certain phases of the work of the organ of the World Council of Churches concerned with international affairs. The good offices role is described in papers on Quaker mediation efforts after the India-Pakistan war of 1965 and the Middle East war of 1967, a perceptive paper by Jacques Freymond on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a paper by Harry Ashmore on what he calls demi-diplomacy during the Vietnam war. Papers on the promotion of understanding and goodwill cover bilateral or general international conferences of the Pugwash type (although Pugwash itself receives skimpy treatment), structured or controlled communication among people emotionally and intellectually identified with the parties to a particular conflict, and various exercises in gaming or simulation. The editors contribute a useful introductory essay and a brief 'Afterword'.

Workshops, games, and simulation exercises depended for success on guidance or even control on the part of un-involved social scientists, and the cases of lobbying needed discreet publicity during certain phases. In the other cases, however, privacy was an essential ingredient. Freymond writes that a neutral intermediary 'should not enter through the front door' (p. 148), and the two Quaker contributors stress the importance of patient and private listening (pp. 82 and 104).

Some of the agencies whose activities are mentioned occasionally have to combine humanitarian service and good offices (ICRC, Quakers, World Council of Churches), and this can cause considerable tension within the organisation because of incompatible needs: publicity so as to secure adequate funding and privacy so as to safeguard sensitive and confidential negotiations. This, to my own knowledge, is a problem for the Quakers,

when important but relatively expensive peace-making activities have to be protected by something like the thirty-year rule. Professor Freymond insists that the primary role of the ICRC is to intervene on behalf of the victims of armed conflict (p. 143), and he doubts whether the ICRC should have gone as far as it has done recently in seeking legitimation for combatants at the expense of victims (pp. 145–46).

The editors and sponsors are to be congratulated on a valuable piece of work. It is new territory, and they have given it a preliminary tilling.

SYDNEY D. BAILEY

World Politics since 1945. By Peter Calvocoressi. 3rd edn. *London: Longman. 1977. 458 pp. Pb: £4·75.*

THE second edition of this survey was published in 1971 [1] and it has now been revised up to the end of 1976. The section entitled 'The Great Powers' contains a new chapter on Japan and, elsewhere, there is new material on the consequences of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the enlargement of the EEC and events in the Middle East and Africa.

Chatham House D.H.

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Aims, New Arms. Edited by Johan J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich. *London: Macdonald and Jane's. 1977. 314 pp. (Publ. in USA by Crane, Russak, New York.) £10·50.*

WHEN bombing of North Vietnam was resumed in 1972 eight aircraft carrying laser-guided ('smart') bombs destroyed an important bridge complex. From 1965 until 1968 this same complex had withstood 600 sorties by aircraft using only 'dumb' bombs. This was a great publicity success for the new conventional military technologies. More favourable publicity was obtained the next year during the Yom Kippur war when anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles were used to devastating effect. These new technologies now have a number of strong promoters convinced that they favour the defensive, reduce collateral damage and open up a whole variety of discrete and precise tactical options as well as being relatively cheap.

This book can be considered a moderate manifesto in support of these new technologies. Some of the sharpest defence analysts from both sides of the Atlantic have been brought together to explain the nature and benefits of precision guidance. The presentation is moderated by two features. First, an undertone of caution concerning the many uncertainties that still surround these technologies, the possibilities for their exploitation, the probability of counter-measures and the likely cost. Second, a frank recognition of the fact that large organisations such as Nato do not respond easily to the doctrinal challenge posed by the new technologies. David Greenwood explains the limits of budgetary flexibility and Graham Allison and Frederic Morris the institutional barriers that will have to be overcome before the full potential of precision guidance can be realised.

The two editors, Uwe Nerlich and Johan Holst, emphasise the main-

[1] First publ. 1968. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1968, p. 751.

tenance of the cohesion and solidarity of the Alliance as a major priority. They acknowledge that Europeans are weary of continual shifts in doctrine by Washington and that active American promotion of the new conventional technologies is often viewed with suspicion as a means of ' sweetening the pill of US manpower reductions in Europe '. All resulting innovations must be carefully managed through Nato institutions. Furthermore, it is argued, they must be ' socially acceptable to domestic audiences '. They argue for the need to integrate the radical left into the Nato consensus. ' Strategic concepts ', writes Nerlich, ' can no longer be separated from the conditions of their political implementation '.

This is by far the most sophisticated book on the problems of European security to come out for many a year (perhaps too sophisticated for the non-specialist on occasion). Unusually for a book of this sort, the contributions fit well together. The desire to link strategic theory with the practicalities of national and alliance policy making is particularly welcome.

Though the argument in favour of the new technologies is compelling, it remains doubtful whether the overall impact on war-fighting will be quite as revolutionary as some of the authors seem to think. A wide variety of military options is now considered valuable in itself without much thought being given to whether or not many of the options available will ever be of much use. A rather jarring note is struck by Benjamin Lambeth who points out the traditional Soviet scepticism and hostility towards flexible options and selective strikes. If the Russians fight in a crude and imprecise way then many of the benefits of the West's precision technology will be lost. Furthermore the editors, in their desire to respond to political change in Europe, may not have quite the measure of the changes involved. Pierre Hassner's excellent piece on instability in Southern Europe suggests new political forces that will not be readily ' domesticated '.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought. By Brian Bond. *London: Cassell. 1977. 289 pp. £7·95.*

THE career of Basil Liddell Hart as a strategist and critic of national defence lies between the classical writers on the subject, notably Clausewitz, who was his bogey-man, and the academics of today, with their numerate, social and economic approach, their understanding of technology and the use of games theory and disciplines unheard of by a pre-1914 history graduate. It is astonishing how his reputation has survived, although possibly not intact, for his military thought was not a coherent body but a farrago of wild contradictions and inconsistencies, and his prophecies were confounded by the events of the 1939–45 war.

After the war was over he seduced the vanquished German generals into admitting that he had influenced their tactics, while ignoring the Russians who had defeated their *blitzkrieg*. He preached the innate superiority of the defence and then propounded infallible nostrums for victory by offensive action and, a humanitarian, recommended the strategic short-cut of subduing an opponent by the bombing of civilians in open towns. Yet to attack Liddell Hart is still to risk the accusation of being a military reactionary.

What has long been needed is a comprehensive and critical account of

what he actually said and wrote, for apart from his self-contradictions (and endless self-justifications) his mind was so fertile and his work so many-sided that there has been so far no collected basis of fact for a debate: and such a debate is still worth while, for whatever he said, however irritating and however absurd, stimulated and can still fruitfully stimulate thought. Brian Bond, who has so ably filled this gap, is himself a distinguished academic student of defence and a military historian who has had full access to the Liddell Hart archives. He has also the added advantage of having known and worked with the great man, but this connection has not deterred him from dealing rigorously with Liddell Hart's errors and fallacies; quoting freely from critics, like Spencer Wilkinson, and adding his own comments where it furthers the argument.

His study has two weaknesses. We are no wiser at the end of Chapter 2 of the precise nature of the theory of the 'indirect approach', and the book dealing specifically with that subject is omitted from the select bibliography.[1] Israeli tactics (Ch. 9) may well have been inspired by the image of the 'expanding torrent', but if ever two wars were won by smashing frontal attacks it was by Israel. Moreover, the account given of the actual operations is partly erroneous.[2]

The main object, however, is achieved. Brian Bond claims that it is only a beginning, an encouragement for more detailed analysis. He is too modest. He has written an admirable book throwing much light not only on his baffling and fascinating subject, but on the defence debate as a whole in Britain between the wars.

SHELFORD BIDWELL

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers. By Amos Perlmutter. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1977. 335 pp. £10·80.*

Soldiers and Politics in Southeast Asia: Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective. By J. Stephen Hoadley. *Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman. 1975. 307 pp. $16.25.*

AMOS PERLMUTTER offers a historical, comparative and theoretical analysis covering nearly fifty countries and two centuries. The emphasis is, however, on the theory, and one question is whether he fulfils the claim of his publisher and his mentor, Samuel P. Huntington, that he develops an argument which is both distinctive and original. If that claim is based, as it seems to be, on his perception of the essentially political nature of civil-military relations and the conclusion that the single most valid explanation for military intervention is the political motivation of politically-oriented officers, then it is hardly substantiated. The book is nevertheless a considerable work of scholarship, admirable in its range and for the author's courage in attempting a comprehensive synthesis.

[1] B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, 3rd edn. (London: Faber, 1954). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1955, p. 96. See also, S. Bidwell, *Modern Warfare* (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp. 201–204.

[2] Compare C. Herzog, *The War of Atonement* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), especially ch. 15. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1977, p. 504.

Inevitably with such a wide perspective, there are apparent inconsistencies and illogicalities which in most cases arise from the author's attempt to reconcile the separateness of the army from the society which it is supposed to serve with its social integration in it. There are also over-simplifications and what some readers will regard as plain errors of interpretation. It is not, for example, good enough, at least in this country, to state unconditionally that the rank system differentiates the military from business, where promotion and authority is usually determined by merit rather than seniority (p. 10). That seems to betray either limited experience in regional terms or a lack of intimacy with both types of institution. Similarly, the British may not specifically have transferred the concepts 'warrior race' or 'martial people' (p. 118) which they used in India to the context of Africa, but they did as they recruited there talk about Africans in terms of their 'worthwhileness as soldiers', which in its application amounted to very much the same thing and certainly led to tribal preferences.

These and other flaws in this stimulating work may well be related to its very sophistication. Amos Perlmutter's classifications of military-political behaviour are certainly over-refined. To talk of a category of officer 'whose political skill outweighs their rank, position and role' (p. 17) begs almost all the questions that can be asked in the field of civil-military relations. There are some passages too in which the author's superior knowledge of the military in the Middle East, and in Israel in particular, evidently leads to overstatement. A combination of such encyclopaedic knowledge with an elaborate conceptual apparatus is not an infallible recipe for consistent success: it may lead to far-fetched, even if academically provocative, generalisation. But how else would it be possible to cope with Africa, Latin America, the Arab states and France, Prussia, Japan and the Soviet Union? In some ways indeed the most stimulating passage is that which uses the cases of China and Israel together to develop a typology of 'the revolutionary soldier'.

J. Stephen Hoadley's book on South-east Asia seems and is by contrast naïve, in spite of its plethora of correlation tables—an impression which unfortunately the introduction itself particularly conveys. He lays claim to five different scholarly approaches, from the historical case study and regional survey through to the testing of hypotheses with quantitative data. His central argument is, however, concerned with the performance in power, and suitability for involvement in the process of development, of particular military regimes. Thailand, Burma, South Vietnam, Indonesia and Lon Nol's government in Cambodia all come under his scrutiny, and unlike some writers in this field he does not wholly neglect the recruitment and consequent social composition of the armies concerned.

In the matters both of intervention and performance Dr. Hoadley finds Burma the exception to some general rules which he asserts: in particular, we are told with some justification that Burma under military rule 'pursued a course of extreme neutralism bordering on isolationism' (p. 172) and moved rapidly to state socialism. But statements such as 'events in the civilian political sphere, usually exacerbated by economic conditions, provide the background conditions of and excuse for a coup or intervention by military officers' (p. 158) add nothing to our understanding of the phenomenon of intervention. The same is true of the author's verdict on military governments that their ability to provide and protect democratic

institutions and practices 'appears to be less pronounced than that of their civilian predecessors' and 'to preside over economic growth appears to be only average in the region' (p. 211). While the utility of Amos Perlmutter's book lies primarily in the stimulus which it provides, that of J. Stephen Hoadley's work lies exclusively in the incidental information which it contains.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

Alternatives to Monetary Disorder. By Fred Hirsch, Michael W. Doyle and Edward L. Morse. *New York, London: McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1977. 153 pp. £5·20. Pb: $3.95. £2·95.*

The Evolution of the International Monetary System 1945–77. By Brian Tew. *London: Hutchinson. 1977. 254 pp. £6·50. Pb: £3·25.*

THE first of these books is one of the series of studies being produced by the 1980s Project of the Council on Foreign Relations. Questions which that project would like to see answered in this context are: What kind of international monetary system should the world be trying to create for the future? Ought it to be a modified version of what we have known or something radically different? If different, in what respects? The aim of the essays in this volume is to answer these questions, not by examining in detail the operating features of monetary systems, but by relating the monetary system to the international system as a whole, 'especially to the shifting patterns of economic and political strengths and weaknesses in the world' (p. 3). While they do this very successfully within the limitations of their 54 and 73 pages each, these short essays can only be preliminary skirmishes with the very large problems they tackle. However, in an area where lack of forethought and of attempts to see the problems in a broad international, rather than narrowly national, context, could lead us into far-reaching difficulties, the stimulus to further discussion which they provide is valuable.

Fred Hirsch and Michael Doyle are particularly concerned with the challenge to the present structure of political and economic power which they see as coming from the developing world, the countries of which believe it to be in their interests to politicise international economic issues. This causes tension in relations with the governments of Western developed countries, who would like to reverse this trend, which they regard as a threat to economic prosperity and political harmony. Since, the authors argue, 'politicisation' can bring gains to the developing countries, a world system which would reduce its importance must offer some compensation for this.

An economic order which would be looser but more dependent on the provision of specific political and economic benefits is recommended by Hirsch and Doyle. They identify as crucial the need to set bounds to arbitrary national actions and to do this by identifying a leadership group in whose interest it would be to accept responsibility and make sacrifices. They suggest as members the United States, Germany, Japan, France and Britain (p. 57). The authors are aware of the difficulties which immediately spring to mind when one contemplates the enormous task of negotiating a comprehensive international economic order. It would be difficult to

maintain the allegiance of all parties, but they feel that those countries for whom the specific benefits of participation might appear small, should be encouraged to co-operate by being given fewer obligations, whereas the greater task of persuading the major powers 'to undertake the trials of collective leadership' can perhaps only be achieved in a period in which the threat of chaos as the sole alternative is particularly evident (p. 64).

Hirsch and Doyle make little reference to the problem of accommodating the socialist bloc countries in a world system, though the growing difficulty of dealing with their large debts to the West and the need to face the implications of technology transfers cannot be overlooked in a survey which purports to relate the monetary system to the international system as a whole. Edward Morse's essay, however, contains the interesting suggestion that the belief that gold is less and less useful as a source of reserves and liquidity may have to be revised in the light of the need to facilitate a growth in trade between the Soviet Union and Western states (p. 75). He feels that the goal of Western society, which has been the maintenance of a monetary system that is instrumental to the liberalisation of trade, may have to be modified, since other governments which must be brought in to the system will not share a background of liberal values. Co-operation will be possible, however, because non-democratic societies will increasingly have to satisfy the demands of their citizen-consumers, just as democratic societies do.

Four alternative monetary regimes for the 1980s are set out by Morse for analytical purposes, recognising that elements of each would be likely to exist in whichever system finally prevailed. The first three are: (a) a highly centralised, (b) a narrowly national, or (c) a regional system. The fourth would be 'a regime based on efforts by the governments of the industrialized market-based economies collectively to manage their market and policy interdependencies, to preserve their traditional liberal values and to manage their mutual vulnerabilities' (p. 96). This is his own preferred system and in discussing it he manages to cover many of the diverse problems such an approach must raise, such as the difficulty of effective surveillance to prevent 'dirty floating' which would probably lead to the adoption of relatively fixed exchange rates, and the difficulty of placating EEC countries not in the core leadership group. (This last point indicates an approach his preferred alternative has in common with that suggested by Hirsch and Doyle.) The members of this regime would have to accept a tiered arrangement, the aim of which would be to act as a buffer against outside pressures, that is from the less developed economies of the South and the command economies of the East. The unashamed self-preservationist aspect of this system is justified in terms of a belief in the need to maintain the benefits of a liberal society. Morse is realistic in his approach to the problems faced by the West, but his system would be most likely to founder, as would the system of Hirsch and Doyle—as they themselves acknowledge—on the difficulty of gaining sufficient support from both major and minor participants. Things may have to get worse before they get better.

Brian Tew's aim, in contrast to that of the above essays, is simply to examine in detail the operating features of the international monetary system between 1945 and 1977. He does this, managing to be concise yet comprehensive and thorough. Although the 'serious student starting from

scratch' at whom the cover tells us this book is aimed will not find Part One, in which Tew describes the years from 1945 to 1958 in terms of the bilateral and binary monetary arrangements which characterised that period, easy reading, he will be rewarded if he perseveres. This and the remaining three parts will give him a thorough grounding in the development of the international monetary system during this period. The last section, from 1971 up to date, gives some particularly good insights into topics which have not been so frequently examined as the earlier period. These include the Barber Plan of 1977, the workings of the Committee of Twenty and a description of the way official intervention has been practised since 1973. In paperback at £3·25 this book will be a valuable reference work for students of monetary policy.

Chatham House JOCELYN STATLER

The International Monetary System, 1945–1976: An Insider's View. By Robert Solomon. *New York: Harper and Row. 1977. 381 pp. $17.50. £9·95.*

Money and the Coming World Order. Edited by David P. Calleo. *New York: New York University Press for the Lehrman Institute. 1976. 120 pp. $7.95. Pb: $3.95.*

FROM 1947 to 1976 (when he resigned to write his book) Bob Solomon was on the staff of the Federal Reserve Board in Washington. For a decade, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, he was senior enough to have participated directly in the conduct of United States monetary diplomacy and policy making in Washington, Paris and London and also among the other central bankers at Basle. He can justly claim to have written the first comprehensive account by an insider of the international monetary system from Bretton Woods to the present day—though it is only in the second half of the book that the author has something from his own experience to add to the tale; the earlier parts are quickly passed over and even the account of the events of the early 1960s is drawn almost entirely from already published sources. The key chapters therefore are those which deal with the lead-up to the dollar devaluation of 1971, the Smithsonian negotiations, the resort to managed floating, the impact of the oil price rise, the vain quest for a plan of reform and for acceptable guidelines to replace the old order of fixed rates and (more or less) general rules.

These chapters raise the question, more familiar in military and political than in monetary history, of how big an advantage is gained from personal participation. Insiders naturally believe they have the edge on outsiders. Outsiders are more sceptical, suspecting the insiders of partisan bias, of suppressing as much truth as they reveal (with a hey presto flourish) and of being more, not less, liable than others to miss the wood for the trees. They demand that insiders should justify their privileged vantage point either by an ability to convey greater immediacy and to infuse more drama; or by providing large amounts of new and significant information; or by displaying a capacity for illuminating analysis based on long and careful thought about the underlying issues.

Solomon does poorly on the first count. He has neither the light touch

nor the lively style that made Charlie Coombs's recent book [1] such a pleasure to read. Nor has he Coombs's capacity to communicate his own zest for the game and his sense of drama and excitement. Solomon's style too often lapses into the plodding, predictable phrases of non-committal bureaucratic communiqués. And though he adds the occasional personal description and circumstantial detail, some of these—like the fact that Paul Volcker lost his hat in Tokyo in 1973—are merely trivial and irrelevant and do little to help along the story-telling. On the third count Solomon's score is average, the analysis conventional, complacent, suffused with a vague hopefulness that international consultation will be an adequate substitute for the management that he correctly recognises the system requires. The tale he tells—in much greater detail than any previous account—of the efforts of the Committee of Twenty to work out schemes of reform only to be met in the end by the calculated disinterest of the United States in any such ideas, accords ill with the assertion at the very beginning that 'there are no deep-seated national interests standing in the way of an improved international monetary system' (p. xii). Similarly, the assertions that gold will slowly 'seep out' of official reserves into the private market and that further large increases in foreign official dollar holdings are unlikely (p. 335) are no more convincing than the conclusion that the role of the dollar in the international monetary system is no longer an important political issue (pp. 321 and 331).

In short, it is not simply that the opinions put forward are rather narrowly American, showing little awareness of more critical attitudes to the functioning of the system, but that there are some rather large gaps between the facts in the narrative and the conclusions drawn in the analysis. The book's major contribution therefore is the information it contains, and it would be helpful if it could soon be supplemented with other accounts of these crucial years from insiders with a European, a Japanese or indeed an OPEC vantage point.

The shorter book, *Money and the Coming World Order*, looks ahead rather than backwards and presents some rather divergent essays on the future of the international monetary system. This is a subject important in its own right and also one to which non-specialist readers often seek some helpful introduction. Coming to us from that system's heart and centre—New York—the book, predictably, does not fully reflect the deeper doubts and misgivings about the present state of the international monetary system and its rather substantial economic and political side-effects that are widely felt but only occasionally expressed in Europe and the Middle East, let alone farther out in the Third World. The biggest disagreement between the authors is not—despite the folklore—between the academics, but between the two practical men—Van Cleveland, the banker, and Lehrman, the entrepreneur. The banker believes the system has actually been improved by the greater flexibility of exchange rates in the 1970s, that US-European conflicts are less sharp and that it will continue to work tolerably well if some minor concessions are made by the strong, rich countries to poor, weak ones. Such complacency, Lehrman finds, goes against the lessons of history: 'reserve currencies break down with real and often disastrous consequences. Self-discipline in monetary affairs can

[1] *The Arena of International Finance* (New York, London: Wiley, 1976). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1977, p. 453.

never be taken for granted.' Rueff, in his eyes, was right: a stable, efficient international monetary system must be based on convertibility and fixed exchange rates and must rule out the use of any national currency as an official reserve asset. Lehrman's forceful and (in American circles) unconventional argument is worth reading. Particularly notable is his percipient stress on the irresistible market force of arbitrage in posing the current dilemmas of monetary management.

But who is to manage? The academics do not seriously believe that ultimate authority can be vested in any international organisation acting as a world central bank. Short of continued anarchy therefore the choice lies between the hegemonic model under American leadership and the pluralist one based on bargains struck by the United States with Europe and Japan. Calleo and Kindleberger clash sharply on this issue. Calleo's anti-imperialism leads him to feel that 'Nothing but ruin lies ahead if we cannot learn to limit our pretensions' (p. 67) and that the best hope lies not in 'the restoration of imperial hegemony but in gradual evolution toward an integrated plural system' (p. 59). Europe therefore must overcome its differences and negotiate a stable and relatively open international system. 'Sooner or later, the European states will have to face up to their world responsibilities or expect to pay the price of weakness' (p. 63). Kindleberger's view, already developed in *The World in Depression 1929-1939*,[2] does not require this because, as he argues, any organisation based on functional rules is likely to break down or to be replaced by a system controlled by a leader accepted as legitimate through its readiness to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of providing the collective good of stability in the system. Kindleberger thinks the difficult part is seeing that the despotic leader remains benevolent—or at least is viewed as such by the constituents. At present, it is not the leader but the led who seem to be bearing the disproportionate costs—in terms of risk, the strain of adjustment and the costs of market management. Hence the general disbelief in the prospects for effective, legitimate and capable leadership.

The book is well and clearly written without resort to obscure technicalities or academic jargon. But it cannot be recommended to those looking for comfortable reading and comforting assurances about our future prospects.

London School of Economics SUSAN STRANGE

Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee: 1977 Review. Report by Maurice J. Williams. *Paris: OECD. 1977. 240 pp. Pb: $16.25. £8·00. F 65.00.*

Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries: Data on Disbursements 1969 to 1975. *Paris: OECD. 1977. 285 pp. Pb: $17.50. £8·50. F 70.00.*

BY tradition, the annual report of the Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has three main components—an introductory chapter

[2] London: Allen Lane, 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1973, p. 638.

which is commonly read as the Chairman's personal statement, one or two chapters addressed to themes of current concern, and a number of statistical chapters which, together with the statistical annex, constitute the basic source used by virtually all specialists in the study of foreign aid for their analysis of current trends.

The 1977 report departs from this tradition. The statistical reporting function is carried out with the care and competence that one has learned to expect. But virtually the whole of the remainder, including the opening statement, is given over to a single theme, the orientation of aid towards the satisfaction of the 'basic needs' of developing countries. Subsidiary discussions, for example, of the special problems of the least developed countries, are closely tied to that dominant theme.

The phrase 'basic needs' has risen so rapidly in the hierarchy of developmental rhetoric that one's first suspicion must inevitably be that it is merely another in that endless succession of fashionable slogans with which the international development community sustains itself. Certainly, in the form in which the concept was first presented, devoid both of intellectual content and of operational utility, the suspicion was justified. When put into the hands of people who have to draw practical conclusions, however, it turns out to be a slogan with a difference. At one level, it may be seen simply as a common-sense description of what most people who argue carefully in favour of aid have always thought they were talking about. At another level, it can be used to take the argument a little further, towards tighter specification of what aid is for, and, by implication, of what it is not for.

The consistent strength of the DAC report has always been its commitment to the possible. The question arises, therefore: has the DAC at last succumbed to the rhetoric of those who use the slogans of development for their own ends, which would be a matter for regret, or does it remain on the side of realism? On the evidence of the 1977 report, it is very difficult to say. There are traces of an unrealistically grand design—unrealistic, that is, in relation to the resources available and to what the governments of developing countries appear for the most part actually to want—in the hankering, especially in the introductory chapter, after a global strategy and an unattainable relationship. And the crucial discussion (Ch. V) of the concept of 'basic needs' is uncharacteristically, and significantly, lacking in operational content. At the same time, the introductory chapter contains firmer warnings than one has read before against Utopian solutions, against too didactic a conception of the development process, and against the propensity towards paternalism in much of what is written about development.

The evidence provided by such warnings, that realism has already begun to reassert itself, is reinforced by the subsidiary chapters, on aid to the health sector, to the least developed countries, and to the countries of the Sahel, in which a 'basic needs' approach is used to arrive at firm operational conclusions. Even more significant, perhaps, is the annex reporting the new guidelines on aid for local costs, which exhibits a remarkable departure from the past preoccupation with statistical targets, in favour of recommendations which relate the substance of aid to its context.

What appears to be happening is that the whole concept of aid is indeed, as claimed, going through a process of fundamental change. As always,

the DAC report provides useful pointers. Previous reports have identified the precursors of change—the diminishing significance of aid in the total flow of resources, and the growing concentration of aid on the poorer countries. The culmination of change, foreshadowed in the 1977 report, will be a perception of aid as only one element, significant but not dominant, in the relationship between developed and developing countries, an element which has clear but rather limited uses, mainly of a humanitarian nature. If that constitutes a move away from the obsession which converts all questions about the relationship into demands for 'more aid', so much the better. If it leads on to more realistic consideration of all the other aspects of the relationship which the concept of 'basic needs' does not and cannot cover, better still.

In its traditional role as a statistical survey, the 1977 report provides a useful consolidation, especially in the expanded statistical annex, of work done in the past two or three years. In that respect, it is supplemented by the latest edition of the *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows*, which provides country data on a much more comprehensive and continuous basis than has previously been available. In particular, figures on the gross flow, which for most purposes are more useful than the figures on the net flow and for almost all purposes are more useful than the discounted figures given as 'grant equivalent', are much improved, though a rather odd arrangement of the tables produces a number of anomalies in the coverage of non-concessionary resources, for example, the different treatment of the hard-loan and soft-loan arms of the World Bank.

The most significant omission remains the Eurocurrency flow, but the people who run the established reporting systems now seem well alerted to the issue, and the necessary work appears to be in hand. When that omission is made good, a more fundamental question will arise concerning possible further developments in this solid body of work, but that is hardly a question for discussion in a brief review.

University of Sussex JOHN WHITE

Perceptions of Development. Edited by Sandra Wallman. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 210 pp. (Perspectives on Development 6.) £8·75.*

THIS book sets out to show possible conflict and reconciliation between 'autonomy' and 'development', where autonomy means the preservation of a community's social pattern and development the economic progress around that community. The first four essays are concerned with inward-looking responses. The traditional way of life is kept separate from that of the outside world. An Italian Alpine village separates itself geographically. The village spurns development on its own soil but lets some of its people participate in development by spending their working lives in France. But when they come home for part of the year, or retire from development, they are expected to conform to the village code. An Hawaiian community preserves its autonomy through a special form of separation of church and state. A religious community is created where emphasis is on traditional ways, but the members spend their working lives in a capitalist society. It seems that they are Hawaiian at prayer and American at work. Somewhat different is the case of a Red Indian

community which participated in the economic life of the surrounding society, and then used the funds amassed over time to pay for the traditional way of life with modern comforts. By contrast, a Nigerian community was artificially created to engage in communal enterprise. It flourished under one leader, but after his day it decayed. In each of these cases, there is or was a small community which kept itself apart from the larger political entity which surrounded it. In the three cases where separateness was based on an ancient communal tradition, autonomy was preserved. But it failed in the end in the one case where such autonomy was an artificially created response to one man's leadership.

The last point also emerges from the first of the next four studies which are concerned with backward and outward-looking responses. It concerns a Cameroonian tribe which in the past did will under one chieftain, but now is distinguishable from its surroundings only through dreams of a bygone age. The chapter reads like the Nigerian case a generation on. The next three essays concern Malta and Lesotho. These are small countries, and not small communities within a larger political entity, so that their response is one of foreign policy rather than of social autonomy. Geography compels Malta to respond to both Europe and North Africa. How far this response is determined by domestic party politics and how far by the international balance of power is an important subject in itself. But it is far removed from the village autonomy of the previous five papers. Lesotho's case fits slightly better into what was shown before. It is a country caught in a poverty trap and surrounded by a wealthier neighbour. The gap between the two countries is said to be so large that Lesotho's response is purely passive.

Of the remaining four essays, two are concerned with housing problems in Montreal and Zambia, where solutions imposed by political authorities failed to lead to the community response the authors consider essential. The others make the same point in relation to forced resettlement plans in Newfoundland and a hydro-electric project in Quebec. The common denominator is that planning without consent will end in failure.

The reviewer puts this book down with admiration of the workmanship that has gone into each of the contributions, but yet bewildered by the whole. The major reason is the chasm between the social sciences. To one brought up to view economics as the study of alternative means towards given ends, it seems odd to learn that economics is concerned with the 'necessary' and only sociology with the 'possible' (p. 122). By stacking the cards this way, the authors make economics the champion of unrealistic 'development', and sociology the champion of 'autonomy', formerly known as the status quo.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

The Discovery of the Third World. By Ignacy Sachs. Trans. by Michael Fineberg. *Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1977. 287 pp. £11·25.*

THIS addition to the growing volume of literature on the Third World is remarkable for its penetrating insight into the historic origins of and cause and effect relationships between, the underdevelopment of some nations and the overdevelopment of others, and the author makes a strong plea for urgent action in bridging the widening gap. Sachs urges

the industrialised nations, in their own self-interest, apart from any moral imperatives or notions of human dignity, to assist and participate actively in the emancipation of developing countries. In the author's words: 'What is at stake is the future of mankind' (p. 287).

Ignacy Sachs, Professor of Social Sciences at the Sorbonne and a consultant for the United Nations, is no arm-chair philosopher. He has succeeded in 'discovering' the Third World by getting under the skins of people, the struggling, pulsating and surging mass of humanity, by living amongst them rather than observing them through the end of a telescope. A Pole of Jewish origin, he has lived in Brazil (fourteen years) and India (three years) and his varied background enables him to appreciate the need for a radical change in attitude towards the problems of the Third World. The first step, of course, is to have the correct 'Image of the Other'. He argues that it is so distorted at present that the United Nations must take the initiative in proposing and implementing bold measures for re-education, and real understanding of the problems faced by the 'other half' of mankind.

Ethno-centrism and Euro-centrism, national chauvinism, racism and many other evils that plague human groups in both developed and underdeveloped societies are central to the whole theme of the book. Heightened national chauvinism leads to religious intolerance, discrimination and false feelings of superiority and arrogance. Euro-centrism which is another manifestation of ethno-centrism, has been projected throughout the world by colonialism and the growth of economic imperialism, and it continues to dominate the thinking of many Europeans. Sachs is convinced that the needs and resources of Third-World countries are completely different from those of the West and any attempts to force Western economic theories of development based on Keynes, Schumpeter or Marx down their throats would be abortive. He himself is in favour of planned economic growth as against abandoning developing economies to free market forces; and plenty of evidence to support him is available in the developing countries' experiments, especially the success of India's five year plans, and the growth of protectionism in Europe. The author warns Third-World countries against inaction based on fanciful theories of spontaneous development and asks them to adopt policies best suited to their own specific requirements. He advocates the channelling of aid and transfer of technology and skills through the United Nations.

The book, translated into English from the original French, makes heavy reading at times. But it is a very informative study and the profusion of notes, references and data provided make it invaluable for all those interested in the Third World.

CHANDRA KUMAR

SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936–1939. By Anthony Adamthwaite. *London, Totowa, NJ: Cass. 1977. 434 pp. £12·00.*

ALTHOUGH there have been innumerable studies of the successes of Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1942 and of the belated resistance and hair-breadth victory of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, the

failures of France have hitherto been given relatively scant treatment and dismissed in terms of the most sweeping condemnation. One reason is that while other continental states defeated by Hitler tend to be excused on account of their small size and lack of resources, France has been seen traditionally as having both resources and opportunities between 1933 and 1938 to curb Hitler before he had built up the power to inflict the defeats of 1939–40. The French failure to stand up to Hitler has been seen therefore as a sordid picture of spineless defeatism and incompetence among prominent individuals and ruling groups suffering from moral and physical inadequacy in Darwinian terms. Dr. Adamthwaite's book will be of great importance to historians of the interwar period partly because it is the first fully documented analysis of French foreign policy in the late 1930s but even more because it reveals the severely limited nature of French ambitions, power, and opportunities to confront Hitler, and thereby for the first time presents French policy failures in a thoroughly intelligible form. Moreover, this complex study has the rare virtue of combining a readable, sparklingly witty, almost Taylorian style with close precision in its handling of a remarkable spread of international sources.

It has been possible for Dr. Adamthwaite to complete this book now, or rather in 1974 when he delivered his typescript to the publisher, because of the tremendous increase in available documentation in France over the past decade: the official series of *Documents diplomatiques français, 1932–1939* only needs volumes for 1935 and 1938–39 to reach completion; improvements to the former fifty-year rule since 1970 have opened up massive unpublished official archives including private papers of deceased politicians and civil servants; potential problems for research into 1938–39 have been overcome by the author's resourcefulness in obtaining access to official archives for those years in advance of the government publications and by his use of new material from private papers. With the exception of the military archives for the 1930s, which are still in the process of being organised for research, and taking into account the serious loss of documentation after 1940 (see author's note on archives p. 397), the French sources have been so well covered, together with judicious use of British, German, Italian, and particularly American documents, that this study is likely to prove definitive on the issues of fundamental importance for French policy.

The book holds some surprises for those who, at the time and ever since, believed that the crucial decisions in France regarding war or peace were taken between March 1936 and September 1939 on the occasions of successive crises sprung by Hitler. In the Rhineland crisis of 1936, for instance, the French military decided in advance not to fight but to trade off acceptance of German remilitarisation for a compensating British alliance if possible (p. 40) And in the Munich crisis of 1938 the French had decided at least six months beforehand to do everything to avoid war for Czechoslovakia, so that in September the issue was one of 'procedure not principle' (p. 206). At an earlier stage Blum, who emerges from this study as the nearest approach to a statesman among French leaders of the period, had been anxious to help Czechoslovakia in some way but had been thwarted by economic problems and political pressures: 'the Left wanted to save Czechoslovakia in Spain' (p. 91), while for Blum 'charity began at home' (p. 43).

The view that a number of issues were determined in advance of the

various international crises accounts for the interesting structure of the book as a whole. The first Part comprises five chapters on French socio-economic problems arising from the First World War, the structure of political forces, the guiding principles of foreign policy in the 1920s, the breakdown of disarmament and the rise of Hitler, the destruction of Locarno in March 1936 and the achievement of Austro-German Anschluss in March 1938. The author's emphasis is on the demographic, economic and geographic vulnerability of France, its increasing dependence on Britain as 'leading rider' (p. 51)—one is tempted to suggest easy rider—on their tandem from 1936, and dangerous friction with Italy with consequent effects on French security in the Mediterranean, a vital aspect of the Abyssinian and Spanish crises that is given due importance in this study for the first time.

Then follow five chapters in Part Two which examine the key centres of decision making and control in French government and the main personalities involved in the late 1930s. The executive is shown to have been surprisingly strong, the legislature surprisingly weak; the Quai d'Orsay had organisational weaknesses and was treated in cavalier fashion by Bonnet; military organisation, equipment and strategy were inadequate but not to such an extent as often assumed hitherto, and in the context of economic depression the French military development in 1938–39 was impressive compared to that of Britain and Germany. Regarding a search for individual sheep and goats, appeasers and resisters, as futile, the author firmly attributes French policy failures to deep-seated demographic and economic disadvantages in the contests leading to the Second World War. On this basis nine chapters in Part Three chronicle the disastrous developments from April 1938 to September 1939, and a convincing picture emerges of Daladier, Bonnet, and their colleagues having much less choice and room for manoeuvre than has been assumed hitherto and having to play for unlimited stakes with a poor hand while receiving negligible support from their partners abroad. Nevertheless, the author concludes that 'France could and should have fought in 1938. From a purely military viewpoint, 1938 offered a last chance of fighting Germany on better or at least even terms' (p. 227).

It is a book with few blemishes. Domestic political forces are sometimes treated hazily; for instance it is inaccurate to lump together Poincaré, Tardieu, Flandin and Reynaud (p. 10); Paul-Boncour was not a Socialist after 1928 (p. 84); Briand did not resign office to contest the presidential election in 1931 (p. 404); above all, it is an exaggeration to say that 'Left and Right took to the barricades' (p. xiii) for it was the strength of moderate republicanism that prevented France from following the fascist trail blazed by Italy and Germany. The interesting account of French diplomatic and military resurgence in 1939 might have been reinforced by mention of Raoul Dautry's energetic support for Joliot-Curie's research into possibilities of atomic weaponry which was in an advanced stage before being disrupted in 1940.[1] If France had been given more time to reorganise its economy and armed forces the story might have had a happy ending.

University of Reading NEVILLE WAITES

[1] See B. Goldschmidt, *Les Rivalités atomiques 1939–1966* (Paris: Fayard, 1967).

Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia 1937–1941. By Peter Lowe. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1977. 318 pp. £8·50.*

THIS book provides a valuable sequel to Dr. Trotter's *Britain and East Asia 1933–1937*,[1] and although to some extent it overlaps Dr. Lee's *Britain and the Sino-Japanese War 1937–1939*,[2] it offers the most detailed study to date of Britain's Far Eastern policy making between the outbreak of war in Europe and Pearl Harbour. It possesses, moreover, the kind of virtues that we have come to expect as a result of its author's earlier study of Anglo-Japanese relations between 1911 and 1915[3]: clarity of exposition; the provision of a great deal of documentary evidence, and careful analysis.

It was in the period covered by Dr. Lowe's book that the frailty of Britain's position in the Far East—a frailty that went back to the turn of the century, but had long been disguised in various ways—posed huge problems for those in official positions in London. Especially during the crises at Tientsin and over the Japanese demand that the Burma Road be closed, and above all in the context of a fight to the death in Europe, there was no escape from the fact that Britain's naval, military and (in some ways, what was to prove the decisive factor) air forces were unable to meet a major challenge east of Suez. In this situation, there were those who argued strenuously, as Neville Chamberlain had done in the mid-1930s, that some kind of settlement had to be reached with Japan.

One of the main dilemmas involved was that Britain could reach an understanding with Japan only at the expense of China. And although there continued to be a fair measure of exasperation and sometimes distrust of the Chinese, there was also a belief in London that, in time, they would prove to be too resilient for the Japanese. Moreover, opinion in the Foreign Office leaned in the direction of Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the Ambassador in Chungking, rather than in that of Sir Robert Craigie in Tokyo, when it came to deciding how far Britain could or should go in placating the Japanese. Even Neville Chamberlain, as Dr. Lowe puts it, 'disliked Japan, disapproved of her war with China, and was not disposed to consider Japanese grievances with the sympathy he displayed towards the policy of Germany down to March 1939'. True, the practical assistance that Britain gave to China during these years was not great in absolute terms; but it was significant when seen in the light of the crisis—financial and material—that Britain was facing at the time.

Ultimately, however, Britain's entire position in the Far East—as Vansittart among others had recognised during the 1931–33 crisis there—depended on obtaining the support of the United States in resisting a possible Japanese assault. Moreover, as Dr. Lowe rightly emphasises, even had this local, Far Eastern consideration not existed, British policy was in any case 'tied closely to the United States by the over-all demands of the war [in Europe]'. Here, too, however, these were years of uncertainty and frustration for those responsible for shaping British policy, and the

[1] London: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1975, p. 624.

[2] Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1975, p. 305.

[3] *Great Britain and Japan, 1911–1915* (London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1970, p. 412.

distrust and, in some quarters, dislike of the United States that had existed throughout the 1930s was in no way diminished by such episodes as Cordell Hull's public expression of regret at Britain's closure of the Burma Road when in private he had previously made it clear that no American help could be expected if London chose to reject Tokyo's demands over that matter. And despite secret naval conversations, together with other discussions on area defence possibilities that were held at Singapore, it was only a few days before Pearl Harbour that Churchill and his colleagues received from Roosevelt an undertaking that if Japan attacked British or Dutch possessions then the United States, too, would join in the fray.

Until that moment, Britain's posture and planning in the Far East had to be temporising and cautious—although (and in this respect Dr. Lowe's evidence complements that produced earlier by, for example, Major General S. W. Kirby in his study of *Singapore: The Chain of Disaster*)[4] this in no way exonerates Churchill over his blunders and misjudgments before Pearl Harbour. And on two occasions at least, London did go out of its way to placate Tokyo. Yet even so, what is remarkable in retrospect is the very limited extent to which Britain can be said to have 'appeased' the Japanese (using the word in its pejorative sense), and Dr. Lowe's emphasis to this effect is surely nearer the mark than that offered by Aron Shai, in his much less substantial book, *Origins of the War in the East.*[5] Dr. Lowe also provides ample evidence of the extent to which an under-estimation of the Japanese was a factor in this aspect of British policies, together with a continuing belief in some quarters in the country's greatness east of Suez that is remarkable in retrospect. 'Your point that we are a much greater Asiatic power than Japan is excellent', wrote Charles Orde of the Far Eastern Department to a colleague in October 1937. 'This they must be made to realise and accept. . . . When they have a case and have learned to state it properly and reasonably, we will, no doubt, be prepared to listen to them with respect and magnaminity. . . . The poor things would like to "enlighten" us, "correct" and "rectify" our attitude [to the Sino-Japanese war] but they are hard put to it. . . .'

Dr. Lowe, then, has provided a helpful book; and if even so one comes away from it with a certain feeling of disappointment it is because on this occasion he does not seem in every respect to have given his readers the full benefit of his manifest abilities. It would perhaps be demanding too much if one were to regret that he had not consulted a range of non-British sources of a kind that could have added to what he has to say about British policy. (To take two detailed examples: there is evidence to suggest that Clark Kerr may have drafted for Chiang Kai-shek the strong protest that the latter despatched to Washington on learning of Hull's sketch of a modus vivendi proposal to be put to Japan; and before describing how bitter Chiang Kai-shek was over Britain's closure of the Burma Road in 1940, Dr. Lowe might have obtained some interesting recollections from Professor Owen Lattimore, who became an adviser to the Generalissimo not long afterwards.) It is rather more surprising, however, to find that this book does not deal with the co-operation over intelligence matters (embracing the Far East as well as Europe) that William Stephenson established with Donovan and Roosevelt in this period. Even more questionable would

[4] London: Cassell, 1971.

[5] London: Croom Helm, 1976. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1977, p. 473.

seem to be Dr. Lowe's decision not to discuss or even mention Sir Robert Craigie's Final Report, produced after his repatriation to Britain, in which he lamented that Britain had in effect handed over to the United States government the conduct of its Far Eastern diplomacy in the summer and autumn of 1941 and went on to castigate the clumsy way in which Hull had handled his dealings with Japan in that period. (Even though Craigie had already toned down this Report, at the request of Cadogan, the final version infuriated Churchill, who ordered all copies of it to be recalled.)

In addition, it could be argued that Dr. Lowe has chosen to concentrate overmuch on Foreign Office minutes and on the continuing debate within that organisation. It is not that this is without interest or significance, but that it is here accorded an amount of space and a degree of emphasis that tends to overshadow what is provided regarding the preoccupations of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The consequence, in terms of the analysis provided by the book, is that the Foreign Office debates over Far Eastern policy are not always held within a sufficiently strong and thorough framework of the dilemmas facing the government over the entire field of foreign affairs and defence policy. This is particularly so where Anglo-American relations are concerned.

It would, however, be wrong to conclude this review on a note of regret, for Dr. Lowe has written a book which will be of great assistance to all students of the period. It is also to be taken as an acknowledgment of his qualities as a researcher and writer if one adds the hope that he will spread his wings a little wider when he next helps us in our quest for understanding of Britain's Far Eastern policies.

University of Sussex CHRISTOPHER THORNE

Hitler's War. By David Irving. *London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1977. 926 pp. £9·95.*

HISTORIANS engaged today in the profitable industry of writing on Hitler and his associates have some undeniable advantages over their predecessors who published in the 1950s and 1960s. New evidence has come to light, including much archive material recently released, while with the passing of time many Germans once in Hitler's entourage have been willing to talk, particularly to non-German inquirers. In the nature of things these witnesses will no longer be able to testify in the not too distant future.

David Irving provides a long list, mainly of Germans, who allowed him to use relevant documents or put written or oral evidence at his disposal. They include such diverse people as the late Ernst Putzi Hanfstängl, Ambassador von Herwarth, Field-Marshal Friedrich List, the former Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg, the late Otto Skorzeny, Pastor Martin Niemöller, General Karl Bodenschatz and the widow of Hitler's stenographer, killed on July 20, 1944.

With such a wealth of material at his disposal and with little sympathy for the Allied cause, Mr. Irving attempts to see the last war through Hitler's eyes, sitting, so to speak, behind his desk, following his political manoeuvres and military campaigns and studying his reactions to major events and developments. On the one hand, he wants to de-demonise Hitler, blaming earlier biographers for allowing their dislike and hatred to colour

their judgment. 'They cannot grasp that he was an ordinary, walking, talking human weighing some 155 pounds with graying hair, largely false teeth, and chronic digestive ailments' (p. xviii). On the other hand, the Führer is presented as being far from infallible. With a superb disregard for the earlier figure of Kaiser William II, Irving even argues that Hitler was 'in fact probably the weakest *leader* Germany has known in this century' (p. xi). While offering some new insights into Hitler as a decision maker during the war, the author at least admits that his 'exploration of sources throwing light on Hitler's inner mind was sometimes successful, sometimes not' (p. xxi). If the leader matters in this book, the led, surprisingly, do not. The attitudes and moods of the German people during the war are not discussed and the relevant work by Marlis G. Steinert *Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen* [1] is omitted from the bibliography.

Regrettably, a short review of this lengthy, provocative, but never dull book can only consider the treatment of some events relevant to international affairs. One of these is the unexpected, sensational flight of Rudolf Hess to Scotland on May 10, 1941. The account in the book is based on about twenty relevant documents and interviews. The first reaction at the Berghof was a wave of hysterical speculation. Had Hess been a British agent or had he flown to Russia? Both Hitler and Göring were agitated, but Hitler thought that Hess, however mad, had acted from idealistic motives.

Hess's desire that Germany and Britain should join in a drive against the Soviet Union in a way reflected Hitler's own frustration in failing to bring about such realignment. For it is likely that when in September 1940 Hess had urgently asked his friend Professor Karl Haushofer 'about ways and means of communicating Hitler's serious wish for peace to leading Britons he was acting as the Führer wanted' (p. 153). Mr. Irving emphasises Hitler's love-hate attitude towards Britain, but this has been done by previous historians, from the late Sir John Wheeler-Bennett onwards. Without giving the source of information, we are told that Hitler had complained to Major Quisling on August 18, 1940: 'After making one proposal after another to the British on the reorganisation of Europe, I find myself in the same position as Martin Luther who had just as little desire to fight Rome but was left with no alternative' (p. 152). Making much of some peace-feelers during the phoney war Irving deplores Britain's decision to continue the ruinous fight in which it gained nothing and lost an Empire. Does he really believe that the unpredictable Führer would have kept his word in an alliance, or even a mere understanding, with a re-orientated Britain? Hitler was certainly frank when he confided to Walter Hewel: 'For myself personally I would never tell a lie, but there is no falsehood I would not perpetrate for Germany's sake' (p. xvi). How could any responsible British statesman trust a man who in the 1930s —a period, by the way, not covered in this book—had broken promise after promise?

The most controversial aspect of the book is its thesis that with all his fanatic hatred of the Jews Hitler had no knowledge of the 'final solution' at the time it was carried out in the Eastern occupied territories by Himmler and his merciless SS *Einsatztruppen* between December 1941 and October 1943. The fact that among the masses of surviving documents

[1] Dusseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1970.

no *Führerbefehl* ordering the systematic extermination of the Jews has been found is supposed to mean that no such order was ever issued orally or in writing and that Himmler deliberately kept the harsh facts from the Führer for a considerable time. It is true that Irving registers Hitler's repeated threats of the total annihilation of European Jewry, from his 'Prophecy' in January 1939 to its reiteration nearly four years later at a Party meeting in November 1942 when he said: 'As a prophet they [the Jews] always laughed at me. But of those who laughed loudest then, countless laugh no longer. Nor are those who are still laughing likely to do so, when the time comes.' Hiter confided to Walter Hewel in July 1941: 'I feel like the Robert Koch of politics. It was he who discovered the bacillus thereby opening up new paths for medical science to explore. And it is I who discovered the Jews as the bacillus that causes all decay in society' (p. 291).

Goebbels, who during the war in many ways had Hitler's ear, knew what was happening to the Jews. After he had seen Hitler on May 13, 1943, Goebbels, in his Diary, gave it as the Führer's conviction that 'there is therefore no other course for modern nations than to exterminate the Jews'. David Irving reads too much into Hitler's instruction to Himmler, conveyed by him to Heydrich in Prague by telephone on November 30, 1941: 'Judentransport aus Berlin. keine Liquidierung' (Convoy of Jews from Berlin. Not to be liquidated). By not translating the order literally, the reader is given the impression that Jews in general were not to be liquidated, whereas this order only applied to one specific transport. Even if Hitler was not informed of all the grim details of the mass extermination of the Jews, it was certainly in line with his continuous determination to eradicate the Jewish bacillus. Even in his 'Political Testament' drawn up a few days before his suicide in Berlin in April 1945, Hitler insisted: 'Above all, I enjoin the government and the people to uphold the racial laws and resist mercilessly the poisoner of all nations, international Jewry.'

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

Wartime. By Milovan Djilas. Trans. by Michael B. Petrovich. *London: Secker and Warburg. 1977. 470 pp. £7·95.*

THIS is the third of Djilas's autobiographical volumes,[1] excellently translated by Michael B. Petrovich. It is first of all an absorbing human document, an exciting story of adventure written by a man who even in his youth was a philosopher as well as a patriot and man of action, interested in the general human reaction (including his own) to extreme physical hardship, bloodshed and horror. Djilas's book is thus of much more than local and specialist interest, but this does not mean that such interest is lacking. Specialists in modern Yugoslav affairs will find here a new and three-dimensional portrait of Tito, all the more impressive in total effect because it admits and illustrates weaknesses and the difficulties resulting from them—for example, from his liaison with an inefficient secretary—and does not insist that Tito was always original ('he had a way of quietly absorbing the ideas of others only to put them forward later as his own,

[1] *Land without Justice* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972); *Memoir of a Revolutionary*, trans. by Drenka Willen (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973).

when they had passed through the sieve of his pragmatism '). This is a comment very pertinent to Tito's later style of government.

The chapter to which historians will probably turn most eagerly is that on the talks early in 1943 between the German Command and the Partisans, represented by the author, Koča Popović and Vladimir Velebit, about an exchange of prisoners (this was successful). The possibility existed that these talks might have developed into a wider accommodation, under which the Germans would have given the Partisans a free hand against the Chetniks (and perhaps Italians) in return for a cessation of Partisan attacks on communications in Slavonia. There was also at least a strong suggestion that if the Western Allies landed on the Adriatic coast the Partisans would oppose them. Djilas's account adds little of substance to what has already been revealed from German documents, but it is straightforward and full of interesting detail.

Among many other interesting episodes and judgments, there is an interesting, if still obscure, account of the dispute between Djilas and his fellow leaders about operations in Montenegro 1941–42; a thrilling and moving narrative of the Sutjeska battle in June 1943 (which would, however, be much easier to follow with a map); and a fair estimate of the choice before the British government in the autumn of 1943 in relation to Yugoslavia—Djilas pays warm tribute to the role and personal courage of Fitzroy Maclean.

This is altogether a movingly generous book, particularly in the light of Djilas's subsequent fate, and a remarkable personal and historical document.

Corpus Christi College, Cambridge DUNCAN WILSON

The Making of the Second World War. By Anthony P. Adamthwaite. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1977. 235 pp. (Historical Problems: Studies and Documents 28.) £6·95. Pb: £3·50.*

THIS collection of documents (all of them in English or English translation) will be widely welcomed by those who teach courses on international history between the two world wars and by other interested readers. The author has not concentrated on the immediate prewar period but goes back to 1932—though the formal division made between 1932–36 and 1936–39 is not explained and seems rather pointless. While some of the documents drawn from the published German or British collections will be quite familiar, Adamthwaite has been careful to include extracts from sources which are less accessible to students—like the Austen Chamberlain papers or the Léon Blum archives. Given the author's interests, the strong representation of French documents is to be expected and welcomed.

The collection is overwhelmingly 'official' in character, consisting of letters, diary extracts, memoranda and dispatches written by prominent politicians and diplomats, with an occasional admiral or general thrown in. Perhaps the views of these distinguished figures are indeed the only ones worth considering when it comes to the making of war. It must be admitted that the only time the 'public' makes an appearance, in the form of the result of the Peace Ballot of 1935, perhaps silence is the appropriate verdict. In a curious way, the choice of documents continues to reflect many of the preconceptions of their authors. Adamthwaite's documentary

war is one in which only the players from the European Super-League, Britain, France and Germany, have roles to play. There is no place, for example, for documents from not-so-gallant little Belgium, and Czechoslovakia is, it seems, as far away as ever. Despite its title, the collection is not concerned with displaying a range of documents which illustrate the making of a *world* war. The editor only displays interest in the European conflict which broke out in 1939, and the reader of his selection will have no idea how the events they illuminate relate to the world war of 1941.

Adamthwaite prefaces his collection with a fully-footnoted introduction of 110 pages. He discusses the nature of the sources available to the historian of this subject and then canters quickly through previous historiography. Subsequent chapters, in which he moves from a consideration of Europe in the aftermath of the First World War to a consideration of appeasement in 1937 38 and the approach of war in 1938–39, are less successful. Inevitably, his argument must be compressed, but—at least to this reviewer—it is inadequate to come at the last to the grand conclusion that the supposed feebleness and timidity of British and French foreign policies in the late 1930s ' were symptomatic of the shortsighted selfishness of a ruling class set on self-preservation ' (p. 95). While many points are well taken, the text is marred by too many clichés—death knells are sounding constantly, sorrows come not singly but in battalions, anti-communist drums are loudly beaten by Hitler, British sympathy for the underdog persists (pp. 42–43 and pp. 54–55). These tired phrases contribute to a feeling that while the book will be helpful, it is not quite the fresh and comprehensive documentary and historiographical approach to the Second World War which students need.

University College of North Wales, Bangor KEITH ROBBINS

Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941–45. By Michael S. Sherry. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1977. 260 pp.* (*Yale Historical Publications, Miscellany 114.*) *£9·00.*

DOCTORAL theses are often regarded as unsuitable for publication. Dr. Sherry's book is an exception. It is a well-written, well-presented research monograph which fills a gap in the published record of the history of the Second World War. Dr. Sherry analyses the attempt by military planners to devise a coherent strategy for after the war; to determine adequate force levels; to orchestrate a campaign for universal military training; and to establish a viable relationship between soldiers and scientists. He convincingly demonstrates the importance of inter-service rivalry in the preparation of plans. Even the identification of likely adversaries was affected. The Army, Air Force and the Navy favoured Germany and Japan as future adversaries, since unlike the Russians they had developed impressive naval and airborne capabilities. Only towards the end of the war did this change. But throughout, military planners proceeded on the assumption that the past was prologue to the future. It was therefore essential to avoid the mistakes of the First World War. There should be no repetition of the demobilisation of 1919. Commitments about the level of postwar forces should be obtained from Congress during the war. Such forces should be sufficient to meet the dangers revealed by Pearl Harbour.

Quite rightly, Dr. Sherry criticises the naïveté of much of the planning that followed from this approach. He also shows that by the war's end the military had not achieved the political commitments they desired. Nor had they developed a coherent strategy which in any way foresaw that future wars might not be either total or global. His analysis of the reasons for this failure is impressive. Only in his argument that the State Department's 'lassitude' about postwar issues forced the military to plan in a vacuum is his judgment questionable (p. 24). For surely this was the one area to which the State Department devoted considerable resources, as the Harley Notter files in the National Archives reveal.

Yet despite their failures, the military ultimately triumphed. Postwar forces remained enormous by prewar standards. Dr. Sherry ascribes this success not only to pursuit of an Open Door economic system and suspicion of the Soviet Union. He adds a third component, the 'ideology of preparedness', defined as the view that military forces could deter or subdue future troublemakers (p. 235). By the war's end this was a pervasive doctrine accepted by civilians and the military. Thus Dr. Sherry concludes that: 'Before the cold war developed, there had arisen a cold war mentality, an anxiety about the nation's security and an insistence on mobilizing full resources to protect it' (p. 235). It was not a new doctrine, but this book indicates its importance in acting as a prism through which postwar events were viewed. Indeed the only flaw in this otherwise excellent book is that an attempt to relate this theory to the wider arguments about the cold war is confined to the last four pages of the book. It deserved more extensive treatment.

E. J. HUGHES

WESTERN EUROPE

The Lomé Convention and a New International Economic Order. Edited by Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau. *Leiden: Sijthoff. 1977. 249 pp. (Publications of the John F. Kennedy Institute, Center for International Studies 11.) Fl. 64.00. $26.00.*

THESE essays are the outcome of a conference held at Tilburg, in the Netherlands, at the end of 1975. The theme which runs through all the essays is the extent to which the Lomé Convention constitutes an advance towards a new economic order in the world. Clearly, there are some new features in the Lomé Convention which were lacking in the preceding Yaoundé and Arusha Conventions, but whether this means that Lomé can become the model for global economic relations is a separate question which provides a focal point for much of the book. In its treatment of nearly fifty developing countries as an integrated area; in its automatically operating provisions; in its special provisions for the very poor countries; in its attempts to include the ACP (Africa, Carribean and Pacific) countries as equals in the decision-making process; in its Stabex arrangements (the EEC's compensatory financing scheme): in all these ways, and others, the Lomé Convention does represent a new departure in international economic relations.

The Stabex arrangements have probably attracted the greatest attention. Persaud's essay deals with these and, although he is generally in favour of

them, he has some suggestions for making them more workable. In particular he questions whether an arbitrary level of 7·5 per cent for triggering compensatory transfers is more equitable than a graduated system. He also questions whether the Stabex fund is large enough, whether stabilisation should be based on nominal rather than real earnings, whether the larger countries might benefit unduly from Stabex, and whether the reference period for calculating earnings could not include the current year as well as a forecast for the next two years.

Almost all the writers see the Lomé Convention as a possible model for economic relations between the developed countries and the developing ones. Zartman, giving an ' American viewpoint ', emphasises the ' decolonising ' impact of Lomé as the ACP countries are forced to become more self-sufficient. Zartman denies that Lomé could be seen as ' reinforced European regionalism or a reaffirmation of imperialism ' (p. 143). In another essay, the only really critical one, Palankai does just this. He argues that Lomé is splitting the Third World and that the ACP countries will be reluctant to share their privileges with other developing countries. He also sees Lomé as an extension of European influence in Africa and as a deliberate attempt to forestall American influence. Palankai concludes that Lomé is ' only a small step forward from the old links, and is basically preserving the traditional capitalist division of labour, maintaining dependence and the former possibilities of exploitation ' (p. 156). This is an academically respectable viewpoint and one which may acquire even greater credence with the passage of time. It is a pity that such criticisms are either ignored or dismissed in other essays, many of which tend to be unduly laudatory.

Queen's University of Belfast E. MOXON-BROWNE

Britische Aussenpolitik 1929–1931: Ebenen und Faktoren der Entscheidung. By Hans Heinrich Rass. *Berne, Frankfurt am Main: Lang. 1975. 439 pp. (Beiträge zur Politikwissenschaft Bd. 2.) Pb.*

THIS analysis of the ' levels ' and ' factors ' of decision making in foreign policy under the short-lived Labour government of 1929–31 is based on detailed historical research into the primary sources on Britain's relations with Europe and the League of Nations, disarmament and rearmament, and international economic policy, and compares and contrasts decision making in these four issue-areas. The analysis plausibly stresses the elitist as well as somewhat erratic nature of the conduct of foreign policy during the period. The Labour Party and its organs did not play any part, nor did the House of Commons with its feeble ' Ponsonby Rule ' as the only outcome of the campaign for democratic control of foreign policy in the early 1920s; decisions were made either in Cabinet sub-committees or through informal consultations between the ministries concerned, with the Cabinet merely formally confirming the outcomes. Among the factors investigated, socialist ideology played no part at all as, in its ruling role, the Labour Party absorbed the foreign policy values of the Conservatives and the Liberals; the influence of public opinion was limited and selective and interest groups were not active. Thus the government had a relative degree of freedom of manoeuvre at home to cope with the grave economic and political problems abroad. As may well be expected, under the

circumstances the impact of leading personalities was important both upon what was decided and how it was done.

The application of the contemporary decision-making categories to the 1929–31 period may not significantly add to our understanding of the period in itself but could be very useful for comparing it with the present. It provides a historical dimension to the continuing debate about the role of the Labour Party and its ideology as well as the difficulty of establishing some form of meaningful parliamentary and popular controls over the making of foreign policy which, as the Crossman Diaries have again demonstrated, has remained not only an essentially elitist but also a rather erratic process.

University of Southampton J. FRANKEL

Révolutionnaires de la SFIO: Marceau Pivert et le Pivertisme. By Jean-Paul Joubert. *Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques with the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique. 1977. 296 pp. Pb: F 95.00.*

Tout est possible was the famous Popular Front slogan coined, in fact, by Marceau Pivert. This book is a political history of Pivert and his followers in the French Socialist Party or *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (SFIO) and later, outside it. The Pivertists were a faction within the SFIO who thought of themselves as the left wing of the party, who had their own uniformed *service d'ordre*, and who were finally expelled in 1938.

Pivert was not much of a philosopher (or a practical politician): he was a publicist, a pamphleteer, an activist and a general irritant. His talent and liking for propaganda led him to practise techniques culled from the Nazis which he used to great effect during the period of the Popular Front. The book also shows that Pivert neither had any understanding of the tactical problems and practical choices faced by the SFIO leadership nor understood the allies with whom he was dealing in his attempts to force the leadership's hand. This is made clear in the incredible letter written by Pivert's brother, in exculpation of Marceau's activities, when the leadership finally attacked Pivertism head-on. Moreover, Pivert's view of the Nord Federation, which incarnated (so he said) everything wrong with French Socialism, is brought out by the author. In contrast to the Nord, the history of the SFIO's Seine Federation (Pivert's base) is one of infiltrations by Trotskyites, splits and well-publicised ' happenings '—Pivertism was nothing if not flamboyant.

However, it is clear that what finally caused the eviction of the Pivertists from the SFIO was their conception of the party itself. There has always been a current in the French Socialist tradition which has hoped to use popular pressure—through marches, demonstrations, trade unions, direct action and other extra-parliamentary means—to impel France in a Socialist direction. For this reason they were the main competitors to the Communists (as the PCF complained throughout the 1930s) and also constituted an ultimately impossible problem for the Socialist leaders. Furthermore it is probably this *gauchisant* conception of the Socialist Party which is Pivert's main bequest to contemporary French politics. As the last chapter makes clear, CERES (Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialistes) refers specifically to Pivert as an inspiration.

Thus the book is the history of Pivert the pamphleteer, Pivert the romantic and Pivert the moralist, and the judgment is generally in his favour. However, it is written from Pivert's angle; the documents examined do not seem to include the party congress reports (where there were immense intra-party battles) and there could possibly have been more analysis of party strategy. The book has a substantial bibliography and is essential reading for those interested in the SFIO.

University of Sussex DAVID S. BELL

Political Strategies for Industrial Order: State, Market and Industry in France. By John Zysman. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1977. 230 pp. £9·55.*

THE core of this work is some interviews conducted by the author in eighteen French electronics firms and slightly fuller descriptions (' case studies ') of four of these firms. While author, and perhaps publisher, wished to hurry through the duller bits, it might still have been wiser to have concentrated at greater length on this material, for the ' research results ' and ' case studies ' fill only twenty-eight pages of the book and are presented in too unsystematic a manner for any proper judgment to be passed on them. The rest is a baroque essay containing a mass of opinions and assertions which the author claims, possibly correctly, to be substantiated by his research. Certainly the conclusions are for the most part perfectly sensible, although they are not at all as new, original and surprising as the author seems to think.

Briefly, Zysman is concerned to argue that the adoption or rejection of particular technologies is influenced not only by purely economic forces but is a product of political, social and historical circumstances. In particular, he argues that the policies of industrial intervention as pursued in the particular *milieux* of French ' planning ' since 1944, although successful in other industrial sectors, have failed in the electronics industry because the context of French intervention policy and planning has been such as to encourage ' traditional centralized and functional organizations that are inappropriate to the imperatives of technology ', especially a technology that needs to respond so flexibly and so quickly to market changes as that of electronics.

It hardly needs the didactic portentousness of spattering the pages with italicised hypotheses to argue that neo-classical economic theory may be an inadequate framework in which to consider the process of technological innovation, or that French society is not the same as American. These conclusions may well be less important for the reader down whose throat they are rammed than they have been for the author. The work rests heavily on the author's categorisation of the French ' tradition ' in economic life. His analysis of that tradition as it has existed since 1944 is a fair one, but before that date the economic history which he repeatedly summons to his aid is one-sided and out of date and it would not have taken much of an effort to improve it. It is, after all, easy to show from any reasonable modern work that the ' roots of industrialisation ' in France were not ' directly political ', that French tariffs in the 19th century were not among ' the most restrictive in Europe ', and that if France has an ' anti-market tradition ' coming from the 19th

century, only the United States and Britain can reasonably be held to have had a 'market tradition'.

This is in fact one of those rare academic monographs which would have greatly benefited from a more restricted theme, as well as from more scholarly humility; with more consideration it might have reflected rather than obscured the author's abilities.

UMIST, University of Manchester ALAN S. MILWARD

The Spanish Economy 1959–1976. By Alison Wright. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 195 pp. £8·95.*

MRS. WRIGHT provides in compact and readable form the sort of vade-mecum of the modern Spanish economy which we have needed in English for a long time. Indeed, this book covers more ground more succinctly than most Spanish introductions to the subject. Agrarian and industrial structure, communications and foreign trade patterns are all dealt with. The labour situation is touched on briefly and some acute comments are made about education. Perhaps the most helpful chapters of all are those about banking, credit and the government's fiscal and monetary policy, which show how startlingly limited were the real controls that policy makers were able to exercise over the economy during this period, for all the densely packed pages of legislative texts in the Official Gazette.

Indeed the overall picture which Mrs. Wright presents is a negative one. She is understandably exasperated by the cavalier attitude towards statistics which she found in government circles and she is appalled by the maze of paperwork, interminable delays and sheer caprice that characterises the Spanish bureaucracy. She is unimpressed by the practical effects that are attributable to such prestige works of the Franco regime as the Badajoz Plan and the Development Plans. She expresses justifiable fears that failure to invest in the development of industrial skills may leave Spain appallingly vulnerable now that labour costs can no longer be held back by repression. Unlike those who have been convinced of the Spanish economic miracle from the perspective of the Eurobuilding in Madrid, or of the conference centre in Torremolinos, Mrs. Wright has clearly been into the villages of the interior where modern Northern Europe still seems decades away.

Yet there has been progress, maybe not miraculous but striking all the same. But though at intervals through the book the fact of progress is asserted, it is not as fully illustrated as it might have been if the span of years covered had included the hungry years with which Spaniards contrasted the 1960s. Those public servants, for example, to whose inefficiency long hours of moonlighting have contributed, might in the 1940s have been putting in extra work to vary the family's carbohydrate diet with a little protein, instead of in the 1960s doing it to keep up the payments on the plot for a holiday chalet. Again, it is pointed out quite fairly that many economically ludicrous decisions were clearly taken on political grounds, but here too the scope of the book precludes the detailed illustration which would highlight the vital importance of this element. It would be silly to ask that Mrs. Wright should have written a different type of book, but readers should beware of skipping over her

references to the importance of factors outside her canvas; they are not just routine obeisances to those interested in those areas.

A small complaint by way of postscript: Macmillan have produced this interesting and valuable book very nicely, but it is confusing that on several occasions (pp. 122, 124, 128, 134) they have printed 'billion' for 'million'.

University of York J. W. D. TRYTHALL

Guernica! Guernica! A Study of Journalism, Diplomacy, Propaganda, and History. By Herbert Rutledge Southworth. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1977. 537 pp. $19.95. £15·00.*

ON the afternoon of April 26, 1937, the small town of Guernica, lying in Republican-held territory some miles behind the northern front in the Spanish Civil War, was attacked by planes of the German Condor Legion and all but obliterated, causing heavy civilian casualties. Why, after more than forty years and the occurrence of other and greater holocausts, should this particular episode continue to arouse such general emotion and controversy, and now the scholarly attention of one of the most perceptive historians of the Civil War? There are several reasons. Guernica happened to be the historic cradle of the Basque race, and the memory of its destruction continues to embitter relations between Madrid and the vigorous movement for regional autonomy. Guernica's fate was also the first grim demonstration of the havoc saturation bombing could inflict on an urban target. Picasso's genius universalised it into a symbol of the mindless horror of all warfare and sharpened the eagerness of each side to place the blame for the outrage squarely on the other. The propaganda battle continued to rage long after the city had risen again from its ruins, and it is the meticulous analysis of this phenomenon which gives Mr. Southworth's study its exceptional value and interest.

On the evening of the attack, four foreign newsmen from Bilbao visited the still burning town. Their reports—particularly that of *The Times* correspondent, G. L. Steer, who comes out of the author's investigation with high credit—caused world-wide shock and indignation, which Franco's headquarters attempted to dispel by a succession of mendacious and contradictory denials and counter-charges. Bad weather, it was first alleged, had prevented all flying on the day in question; then it was admitted that 'military targets' had been bombed, but alleged that 'Red incendiaries' had themselves done the real damage. Franco's apologists in England and France—as well, of course, as the Axis press—eagerly took up and elaborated these claims. The French government, and to a lesser extent the British, turned a blind eye to the evidence of Nazi involvement in an attempt to safeguard their policies of non-intervention and appeasement. Not until the last years of the Caudillo's regime did neo-Franquista historians begin an uncertain retreat from the 'Red incendiaries' thesis and admit that German pilots had been responsible—though allegedly without the knowledge, and indeed to the subsequent indignation, of Franco. But Mr. Southworth makes out a strong case to show that the attack was made with the full knowledge, and probably on the initiative, of Franco and his generals.

But *why* was Guernica, a town of little military importance, so brutally

assaulted? Possibly because the Nazis wished to test out their techniques of aerial destruction; possibly to warn the Basques that their capital, Bilbao, would suffer a like fate if they continued to resist. On this point the author reaches no firm conclusion. 'There are, in all probability', he writes, 'people still living in Spain and in Germany who know the precise motive for the terror bombing. Perhaps one of them will speak up' (p. 386). Despite the wealth of research and shrewd interpretation presented in this impressive volume, the last word on Guernica has probably still not been said.

STEPHEN CLISSOLD

The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution. By Douglas Porch. *London: Croom Helm; Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1977. 273 pp. £7·95.*

PORTUGAL, until April 1974, was largely neglected by political observers and scholars in other European countries. Its poverty was barely acknowledged. The survival of its African colonial empire caused some surprise and some alarm. The presence of a corporatist dictatorship in Nato was a source of some embarrassment but was usually forgotten. The British Left (like the Left elsewhere in Western Europe) tended to write off Portugal as a hopeless case; British Conservatives contented themselves with platitudes about 'our oldest ally'.

The overthrow of the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship in April 1974 startled most observers; few were aware of the depth of bitterness and disillusionment in the Portuguese armed forces arising from the prolonged struggle in the African colonies. The literature in English on the Portuguese revolution has, to date, been regrettably thin and insubstantial. Douglas Porch makes a significant contribution by providing a narrative account of the role of the armed forces in Portuguese politics; he focuses on the period from the beginning of the decolonisation struggle to the defeat of the radical military elements in an internal coup in the armed forces on November 25, 1975.

The book opens with a description of the army under the First Republic (1910–26), and continues with a discussion of its role in the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship. It contains a skilful analysis of the radicalising effects of the African wars upon substantial sectors of both the officer corps and the rank-and-file. Porch provides a thoroughly convincing analysis of the democratising and divisive impact of the 1958 reform that abolished tuition fees in the military academy: intended to enlarge the recruitment base of an over-pressed officer corps, the reform had the effect of promoting class and generational cleavages and of lowering educational standards among officers.

The book continues with an analysis of the events in Lisbon that preceded and followed the coup against Caetano. Porch carefully follows the relationship between factions of the armed forces and the principal political parties that surfaced after the coup. Using ad hoc interviews to considerable effect, he makes a subtle analysis of frictions within the armed forces in 1974–75, and pieces together an illuminating account of the role of the enigmatic General Antonio de Spinola. The struggle for control of the media is described with equal panache.

The book can be recommended with three provisos. First, Porch tends to take the writings of the Socialist leader, Marío Soares, at their face value rather than as the product of an active participant in the revolution. Secondly, Porch tends to stress discontinuities rather than continuities: it would, for example, be interesting to know how many members of the Caetano bureaucracy remained despite the purges of the revolutionary governments and how far former employees of the Caetano regime were involved in promoting the drift to the right in the latter half of 1975. Finally, the book suffers from an overwhelmingly capital-city perspective: though Portugal remains the most rurally-based country in Western Europe, the book lacks sufficient detail on the course of the revolution in rural areas and is over-dependent for what detail there is on capital-city sources. It would be excellent if the author would write another book on the armed forces and the revolution in the countryside.

University College, London CHRISTOPHER ABEL

Aspects of Modern Turkey. Edited by William Hale. *London: Bowker for the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham. 1976. 131 pp. £7·00.*

THIS book contains a collection of papers read at a conference held at Durham University in April 1973. The merit of presenting these various contributions in a significant arrangement belongs entirely to William Hale who, in addition to editing the book, has produced two excellent papers. In 'Particularism and Universalism in Turkish Politics', he attempts to answer the important question: what is the dividing line between government and opposition in Turkish politics? Can one talk about class distinction or are preferences for large parties geographically determined? Dr. Hale shows that particularism in politics is evident in the less developed parts of Turkey and that, by contrast, in the more developed areas more universalistic political values are emphasised. In order to prove his point, he analyses the economic and social substructure in terms of inter-regional comparisons based on the degree of urbanisation, communication, linguistic and cultural factors, landownership and tribalism. He concludes that voters in the south-east and east do not and cannot follow developments on the national scene as closely as their fellow citizens in the more developed regions. They may thus be more prepared to follow such candidates as big landowners who personify in a concrete way the power relations in a given area. Thus deputies from eastern and south-eastern provinces feel themselves relatively independent of the party's central executive. On the other hand, in the urbanised areas abstract party programmes and symbols are definitely effective in determining the voter's choice.

Although Dr. Hale studied election returns only until 1973, the same tendency was equally dominant during the 1977 elections. He also discusses in an interesting way whether there is an open link between communal electoral solidarity and belonging to a distinct religious sect. The most valuable part of this paper lies in the richness of the individual cases cited to support the general argument. Its carefully collected data confirm the previous findings of Turkish political scientists, such as Deniz Baykal, Ergun Özbudun, Ahmet H. Yücekök, Sabri Sayari and Ilter Turan.

William Hale's second paper describes the development of labour unions in Turkey and then discusses some of the problems they are facing, such as the exclusion of seasonal agricultural workers from all kinds of collective bargaining, and the cluster of problems arising out of the increase in the unions as well as the battle between the more integration-oriented Türk-Iş and the more belligerent and leftist Disk. This paper does not try to discuss the growth of Turkish unions within a given theoretical framework, but the richness of the data and the detailed description are of great interest.

Paul Stirling, a British anthropologist, who spent some years in Turkey, tries to evaluate social changes in two villages he lived in during 1949–52 and revisited in 1971. His very challenging paper deals with four types of changes, mainly in (1) social relationships; (2) knowledge and belief; (3) values; and (4) general characteristics of the society. Interestingly, he found that the three major areas with the *least* change were marriage patterns, child-rearing practices and the related moral and cognitive assumptions; and the commitment of each village to its own particular interpretation of Islam.

Among the other contributions, 'Agricultural Problems and Regional Development' by John Dewdeney, examines the demographic situation and the development of the economy as a whole. The other, by J. Bridge, O. Baykay and K. Ataç, discusses some political and social aspects of planning in Turkey in 1963–73. The authors conclude that in spite of some economic benefits, development plans have not fundamentally altered the basic economic, social and political structure of Turkey, and they attribute this mainly to the unsolved problem of how effectively to encourage the private/public sector and the inefficiency of the administrative system. One of the most richly-documented and interesting parts of the book is David Barchard's analysis on 'The Intellectual Background to Radical Protest in Turkey in the 1960s'. Oddly enough, the author prefers to include under the label 'radical' only leftist movements—very different from Jacob Landau's book *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*,[1] which presents a balanced appraisal of both radical right and left currents of thought.

Altogether, in spite of the unequal quality of some of the contributions, this book represents a very valuable and fresh contribution in the field of Turkish studies.

University of Ankara NERMIN ABADAN-UNAT

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Nationality and Populations Change in Russia and the USSR: An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897-1970. By Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Rowland and Ralph S. Clem. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 456 pp. £17·90.*

DEMOGRAPHIC study in the Soviet context is notoriously difficult. In modern history there have only ever been five nation-wide censuses—in 1897, 1926,

[1] Leiden: Brill, 1974.

1939, 1959 and 1970—and they present the researcher with numerous difficulties. Not least amongst these are the inaccuracy or incompleteness of some censuses, and the huge problem of data comparability. For these and other reasons detailed demographic study of the Soviet Union has until now been widely neglected. The present volume thus clearly meets a serious need. It is in fact the first of three volumes on Russian and Soviet demographic development, which when published will represent the most detailed and complete analysis of the census data yet attempted by Western scholars. The project, under the supervision of Professor Robert A. Lewis at Columbia University, has been continuing for more than ten years. Professor Lewis and his colleagues have already produced several scholarly papers based upon their labours.

The first volume focuses upon the ethnic aspects of demographic development. In the multinational environment of the Soviet Union, where over one hundred languages are spoken, this approach is clearly of particular interest. But the more general relevance of this study is heightened by the borrowing of several valuable concepts from the social sciences. Anchoring upon the idea of modernisation, the study analyses the impact of this multi-faceted phenomenom upon the various ethnic groups. As is perhaps only to be expected, the Russians prove to be the most modernised group in many respects, the Central Asian peoples amongst the least.

One of the most valuable aspects of this book is the fact that the authors have succeeded in doing what nobody has done before them—they have provided a set of territorially-consistent units with which to compare census data over time. Although these units are large, corresponding with the nineteen major economic regions of 1961, the labour required to achieve even this level of analysis was immense, and the problems (freely acknowledged) were many. This feature, however, allows the authors to apply a few of the more useful statistical devices, such as factor analysis and correlation analysis, to measure some aspects of the modernisation process. Amongst facets of the demographic situation most carefully investigated here, special attention is paid to urbanisation, population growth and population redistribution. Large sections are devoted to the impact of each of these processes upon the major ethnic groups.

Data-rich studies of this kind rarely prove highly readable throughout. Unfortunately, this volume is no exception, despite the numerous insights and an abundance of unexpected findings. Amongst the most interesting sections, however, is that focusing upon the implications of the demographic situation. The most notable of these is the possibility that the Soviet Union may soon face large-scale migration of Central Asians, whose birth rate is very high, to wealthier parts of the country. The authors conclude that, if the experience of other industrial countries is at all relevant (and they contend that it is), then an increase in racial tension is likely. For the Soviet Union, which has always prided itself upon the absence of such stresses under socialism, this development would be highly disturbing.

The study concludes with the observation that, in terms of demographic and ethnic processes, there are no major surprises in the Soviet Union. It is perhaps the first time that Western scholars have been able to say this with any real degree of confidence.

University of Birmingham DENIS J. B. SHAW

Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States: Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region. Edited by Edward Allworth. *New York: Praeger for the Program on Soviet Nationality Problems, Columbia University. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 299 pp. £14·40.*

PROFESSOR EDWARD ALLWORTH, the editor of this volume and Director of the Program on Soviet Nationalitity Problems at Columbia University, has long been involved in these studies and is the author of many important works, especially on nationality problems in Soviet Central Asia.[1]

His succinct introductory chapter to the subsequent essays on various facets of the nationality problem in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will doubtless be welcomed by the interested but non-specialist reader because in these few pages Professor Allworth has summarised the main conclusions of the microscopic analysis of the subject in the subsequent chapters. Not only is this analysis microscopic, but it is, for the most part, expressed in such technically overloaded jargon that even the most simple and obvious concepts are often elaborated almost to obscurity for those not familiar with the jargon. This of course is not to undervalue the wealth of information gleaned from interviews with Baltic refugees, Soviet publications and *Samizdat* for which one is grateful, however off-putting the stylistic obfuscation may initially be.

But to return to Professor Allworth's general conclusions. It appears that within the frustrating restrictions of Soviet federalism, the three Baltic states, with Latvia in the van, are doing pretty well, materially and culturally. There is no fear, as in other smaller Soviet national units, of erosion of the spoken Baltic languages, while their cultural attainments and educational levels are 'significantly high' (p. 16). Both in agriculture and industry, the Baltic peoples have been remarkably successful and this may be, it is suggested, because of the relatively late formation of Baltic eponymous republics, after a period of independence before 1939. Economic centralism coexists with fairly strong local management but the Kremlin evidently still shuns any significant sharing of command with the Baltic peoples, though limited flexibility, in Professor Allworth's view, might satisfy growing numbers of efficient Baltic technicians and administrators (p. 17). Another rather widely felt grievance is the effect on the indigenous population of the immigration of Slavs to cope with a locally largely unpopular level of industrialisation and the officially encouraged depopulating migration of Baltic elements to Central Russia and the Soviet East. But on balance, both psychologically and otherwise, the situation in the Baltic countries seems to have been improving in the last decade. And there has been a shift from the earlier emphasis on oppression and a radical solution of ethnic problems to a more balanced and constructive approach.

Analysis of 'support-factors' for the maintenance of the Baltic ethnic identity plays a large part in this book. But, I venture to wonder whether the preservation of national identity is not a much more unconscious,

[1] *Cf.* E. Allworth, ed., *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1973) and E. Allworth *et al., eds., Soviet Nationality Problems* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) *inter alia.*

inalienable element in the human psyche than is allowed for by these professional sociologists? Consider the cases, nearer home, of Wales and Ireland.

VIOLET CONOLLY

The Ukraine within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet. Edited by I. S. Koropeckyj. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 316 pp. £14·85.*

IN the opening chapter of this book Holland Hunter writes: 'Western scholarship on the USSR has understandably tended to give priority to obtaining an overall national assessment . . . but this is no longer necessary or sufficient for a sensitive appreciation of the full complexity of the forces at work in the Soviet Union today' (p. 3). The present study indicates the advantages to be gained by examining the parts in relation to the whole, so that how and why the whole operates in the way it does becomes more clearly understood.

The book is the outcome of a conference held at Harvard University in September 1975. The question before the participants was: 'How has the Ukraine fared as part of the USSR?'. Eleven chapters are included covering the macro and micro consideration but with the major emphasis on macro economic factors. Following the opening chapter (by Hunter on the nature of the book) the editor has a chapter on what he calls the economic prerogatives which establish the limits of the Ukraine's rights and powers within and outside the Soviet Union. Unknown to many people, for example, the Ukraine has a delegate at the United Nations and yet cannot make decisions without reference to Moscow (note not Kiev). The conclusion to this section speaks of waste, inefficiency and bad management of the economy, and yet one cannot accept these views without noting that they are based not on what could have been achieved but what should have been. The comment by Peter Wiles at the close of the book echoes these remarks.

A detailed study of the growth of the Ukrainian economy is provided by Stanley Cohn who shows the significant place the state has in the total economy of the Soviet Union. Besides the conventional economic assessment, Cohn provides an unusual benchmark with the West by comparing the Ukraine within the Soviet Union with the Midwest in the United States. The chapter by Gertrude Schroeder on consumption and personal incomes sets out the data of the relative position *inter* and *intra* the national economies. Her conclusions are interesting in that she suggests that the Ukrainian worker is better off than the workers in other states in the Soviet Union, at least in relative terms of wages and cost of living. She goes on to suggest that consumers in the Ukraine improved their lot substantially between 1960 and 1974.

The water economy of the Ukraine is critical; it is a resource which has to be conserved and although renewable is poorly managed. The study by Craig Zumbrunnen shows the history and development of water management in the Ukraine and the present level of pollution. At a time when the Thames in England was being cleaned, the Dniepr and Volga were progressively getting fouled and misused. Another resource which has been poorly employed in the past is manpower (the chapter by F. D. Whitehouse and D. W. Bronson) and in particular the case of farming

manpower. The case of mineral and energy resources is explored by Leslie Dienes who concludes that 'All round, the Ukraine is still the best-endowed Soviet province . . . .' (p. 184), but at the same time notes that the long-term energy requirement will not be met from within the state.

The remaining chapters include an input-output analysis (by J. W. Gillula) of the Ukraine region (a) within the Soviet Union and also (b) within the wider community of Comecon. The detailed implications of the trade and capital transfers of the Ukraine with other economic sectors are considered by V. N. Bandera. The results of this work show that the Ukraine is a key centre for the supply of capital and equipment to other sectors of the economy in the Soviet Union and no equivalent recompense has been received by the Ukraine.

An interesting view is provided by Peter Wiles in his chapter 'Comparison with some alternatives'. He sets up a hypothesis: 'How rich and how well developed would the Ukraine have been without Soviet rule?' (p. 300). He postulates four plausible political assumptions and proceeds to estimate the effects on the economy. Wiles concludes that, 'In terms of sheer growth, the Ukraine has done very well. This includes the growth of consumption, for the investment proportion is constant in a Soviet type economy, as elsewhere. But in terms of the size of that proportion, of consumer sovereignty, quality of life and such aspects as efficiency, the country has clearly suffered: such faults are the obverse of the virtues of the Soviet system' (p. 311).

This is a book primarily for economists. Too little, however, is said about the micro-sector of factories, towns, schools and homes, and there are no comments on the indigenous differences that survive and are encouraged. But these weaknesses do not detract from the value of the book. Students of the Soviet Union can only hope that it is the beginning of a new trend of studying the country through the study of its constituent parts.

University of Birmingham T. JOHN GRAYSON

Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926–1929. Vol. 3, Parts I and II. By Edward Hallett Carr. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 643 pp. £15·00 each part.*

ALTHOUGH the numbering of individual books and volumes is liable to create confusion, the two books under review are the penultimate components of E. H. Carr's authoritative history of Soviet Russia in the 1920s. The works themselves constitute the first two parts of the third volume of the section of the history dealing with the emergence of a distinctive Stalinist system. The first two volumes[1] deal with domestic politics and the economy; the works at present under review deal with foreign policy; that still in preparation will deal with the intriguing and mysterious topic of Sino-Soviet relations.

The first of the two parts published in 1976 deals with two subjects: diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the major European powers (together with the United States and Japan) and relationships

[1] Vol. 1, Parts I and II (London: Macmillan, 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1970, p. 366. Vol. 2 (1971) reviewed July 1972, p. 508.

between the Comintern and the capitalist world. The second part attempts to provide a brief history of developments within the communist parties of the countries discussed in Part I. This arrangement is no doubt logical and it allows the author scope to present accounts of particular incidents from three points of view. But, in some cases at least, I feel that it results in greater weight being given to developments than they in fact merit.

Indeed, that is my feeling about this section of the history as a whole. Professor Carr presents us with informed accounts of the development of Soviet relations with the more important European (non-socialist) countries. And it is true that the subversion of the Comintern, the subordination of foreign communist parties to Moscow's diplomatic or international political objectives (a subordination from which they are only now breaking free), had a significant impact on the course of developments in many European states. (For example, what might have happened in France or Italy in the postwar period if the communist parties had in fact been autonomous and not thought to be 'ruled from Moscow'?) Still, it is my belief that international affairs are of relatively minor importance in understanding or explaining Soviet developments in 1926–29, the destruction of NEP, the decision to adopt the 'rapid industrialisation' strategy, or even the re-emergence of Russian nationalism, the emphasis on military preparedness and the extensive recourse to terror. All these owe much more to internal political pressures, to the logic of the Bolshevik position, to Stalin's *weltanschauung* (and that of his many supporters) than to the war scares of the late 1920s, the Arcos affair and the Zinoviev letter. Thus, to devote as much space to the discussion of foreign affairs as to that of domestic political and economic issues seems excessive.

It might be argued, however, that Part II does not concern itself with the impact of international developments upon Soviet domestic politics; rather, it provides an insight into the effects of Soviet policies and perceptions upon domestic developments in other European countries. There is some truth in this contention—but, from the point of view of those interested in the history of Germany between the wars, for example, the decision to limit discussion to the years 1926–29 appears arbitrary; it is no more satisfactory for the other countries dealt with. Also, relations between the various communist parties and Moscow occupy the foreground of the analysis (and rightly, given the character of the work as a whole), whatever their importance in explaining party policy in the countries concerned.

Further, Professor Carr's approach to the writing of history, his emphasis on records of speeches, of letters, of editorials, of pronouncements on policy, does little to clear away the murk from the shadier side of left-wing politics in the period. He tells us little of the mechanics by which Stalin and his supporters imposed their control over the Comintern, by which individual parties were transformed into Moscow's puppets. He provides little guidance about which methods proved most effective—or even about who did what to whom. (It would, of course be impossible to write an authoritative, let alone a definitive history of this side of inter-party relations without access to archives both in Moscow and in the headquarters of each of the parties concerned. But, perhaps something more could have been said.)

Still, to ask for such an account is to demand that Professor Carr

write a very different book from those under review. And these two parts in fact constitute a significant addition to our understanding of the period; they provide a perceptive analysis of the interplay between domestic and foreign affairs; in them, Professor Carr organises and presents a wealth of detailed information with his customary mastery. They, like their predecessors, will deservedly form part of the essential reading of all students of Soviet affairs, of all who profess an interest in the Soviet Union and its development. I look forward to the appearance of Professor Carr's account of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1920s.

University of Essex ALASTAIR MCAULEY

Economic Development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Vol. 1: Reforms, Technology, and Income Distribution. Vol. 2. Sectoral Analysis. Edited by Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl. *New York: Praeger. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.)* Vol. 1 *1975. 354 pp. £13·75.* Vol. 2 *1976. 409 pp. £16·80.*

THE first International Slavic Conference, held in Canada in 1974, included all disciplines involved in the study of the Slav countries. Since these countries include Russia and most of the communist-governed part of Eastern Europe, the economists concerned were interested in the practice and theory of the socialist economy as such as well as the economic experience and problems of the individual Slav countries. The two volumes reviewed here consist of the economic papers given at the conference and some of the discussion on them. Together with editorial materials, some forty substantial items are included. Dr. Fallenbuchl is to be congratulated on his excellent editorial work which provides a reasonably valid structure to what otherwise might have been a rather disparate collection.

Economic Reform is the first general topic. Since the postwar stabilisation of the Soviet economy and its smaller East European analogues in the middle 1960s, all these economies, aware of the waste and frustration of initiative caused by a highly centralised 'command' planning system, have tried to increase flexibility and effective incentives. In all of them the reforms have collided with the need to maintain the concentration of political authority, a need which has so far proved dominant. The reform attempts have been largely abortive, though each country has tried, and failed, to reform in somewhat different circumstances and national conditions. The Reform section includes contributions by a political scientist, a sociologist and a historian as well as economists, and gives special attention to Hungary, where reform has gone furthest.

Science and Technology is introduced by a short critical survey of Soviet progress. The papers that follow analyse Soviet domestic innovation and the import of new technology; research and development and the innovation problem in the Soviet Union as at the beginning of the 1970s; problems of measuring the Soviet level of technology; civil air transport as a case in point; and (by one of the few Soviet participants at the conference) interconnections between society, science and technology. Most of the papers touch on obstacles to innovation specific to the Soviet system.

The papers on Income Distribution deal with method of measurement; earnings in Bulgaria (by a Bulgarian); and national income of the Soviet

republics in 1970. Although in the last the method used, on whicl results depend, is more interesting than the results, instances of the come may be worth noting: the Soviet Union's total is half that o United States, with the Russian Republic (RSFSR) equal to Japan an Ukraine to Italy: while the richest Soviet republic per caput, Est is equal to the United Kingdom, and the poorest, Tadzhikistan, to S A final paper finds female earnings two thirds of male in both socialist and capitalist economies, slightly more equality of incom the former, the private sector in Russia still providing a quarter o food, and state subsidies on state-grown food there (mostly meat) to the defence budget.

The second volume, on particular sectors of the economy, begins a critical survey of existing explanations for the declining rate of gr in Soviet industry. The accustomed view that investment industries heavily subsidised at the expense of light (consumer) industries is a to be out of date in the next contribution. A very abstract paper the elements of socialist location theory, based on the model of a firm in capitalism. Hungary's economic reform in industry, with parti reference to pay, incentives and profits, is next treated.

Two substantial papers on Foreign Trade (and a participant's cri of their methodology) form the next section: changes in Soviet fo trade from 1950 to 1970, and foreign trade in the Hungarian ref Hungary appears prominently yet again in the section on Agricul where the efficiency of this sector since the Hungarian reform is exam A paper on agriculture in the East European countries omits Poland Yugoslavia where farming is not collectivised. Otherwise, all the p in this section are on the Soviet Union. The immense investmen Soviet agriculture with relatively poor return in the ten years Khrushchev are noted in a survey of the period. Other papers stud 'agro-industrial' complexes; productivity per farmer during 1950–70 (it rose more slowly than in American agriculture, despite far gr Soviet investment); and a comparison of farm efficiency on each side o Soviet-Polish border—in search of differences possibly due to colle and state farming on the Soviet side and private farming on the P

A section relating to Public Finance concludes the two volumes. final paper, in this section, on alcoholism and state policy, is socially o the most interesting (though its findings have been published in se articles elsewhere). With the highest and perhaps most harmful cons tion of hard liquor in the world, the Soviet state appears to hav effective policy to reduce it, although it has more power than democ countries to offset by other taxes or by wages policy a fall in rev from sales of alcohol.

University of Glasgow J. MILL

Inside Stalin's Russia: Memories of a Diplomat 1936–1941. By H Eeman. *London: Triton. 1977. 208 pp. £5·95.*

IN the years of the Terror man and society in the Soviet Union subjected to pressures so great that human behaviour was distorted in that continue to amaze. Harold Eeman's memoirs will have a perma place, if a modest one, in this terrible record. M. Eeman was couns

at the Belgian Legation in Moscow from 1938 to 1941. Before that he visited Leningrad as a guest of Lady Muriel Paget, that eccentric, warm-hearted British aristocrat, who dedicated herself to helping British subjects stranded in the Soviet Union after the Revolution. Smiling sweetly she went straight through the obstacles raised by Soviet suspicion and bureaucracy. Characteristically, she gave up her own room to M. Eeman 'and slept on a sofa, dressing in the middle of the drawing room, undismayed by people passing through, remaining sweet, regal, and unabashed in her underwear'.

Two years later M. Eeman went to Moscow *en poste*. Physically energetic, he walked, rode, canoed and motored. He saw far more of the Soviet Union than most of his diplomatic colleagues. For one split second he even saw the Khevsurs of the high Caucasus, those legendary descendants of the crusaders. But most of the book concerns life in Moscow at the height of the Terror and in its immediate aftermath. Much of it is familiar to all who have studied the subject. But anyone new to the ways of life under the Terror might do worse than start with this book. It is the detail that stands out. Between the wars Moscow had been a happy hunting ground for antique dealers from the West. Priceless items from once rich houses found their way into the state's Commission Shops. Here there 'could be seen at all hours a small crowd of eager citizens'. Poorly dressed 'they did not go there to buy; they went there as they would have gone to a theatre . . . for a glimpse of the treasures which could no longer be seen'.

M. Eeman gives a grim picture of Riga in the first days of Soviet occupation. The Belgian Minister was desperately ill and in his delirium clutched the secret codes under his pillow, refusing to let them be burnt. Jewish dealers came eagerly to buy the Legation's furniture, not knowing that the next day everything would be taken from them. The Latvian bourgeoisie ate, drank and were merry, not understanding that most of them would go to the Gulag Archipelago in days rather than weeks. A Soviet colonel, pointing to a flower bed, said to his newly arrived wife, 'I am glad you managed to get here in time to see Riga while everything is nice'.

The Soviet Union has changed since then, and is still changing. The magnitude of the change can only be understood by comparison with what went before.

JOHN LAWRENCE

Socialism with a German Face: The State that came in from the Cold. By Jonathan Steele. *London: Cape. 1977. 256 pp. £6·95.*

Die DDR zwischen Ost und West: Von 1961 bis 1976. By Peter Christian Ludz. *Munich: Beck. 1977. 367 pp. DM19.80.*

FOR the many people who believe that East German communism is but a dreary replica of the Soviet model, distinguished by a certain thoroughness in matters of sport and wall-building, Jonathan Steele provides a powerful, but often misguided counterblast. Despite Soviet control, East Germany has, he says, remained faithful to some of the traditions of German communism and has evolved in a number of ways more European than Russian. After an historical survey and a detailed examination of major features and institutions of contemporary GDR society, Steele concludes that there is a distinctive socialism with a German face.

In the historical section (chs. 1–6), the author rightly emphasises the importance of the German Communist Party (KPD) during the Weimar Republic. The Party was the largest outside the Soviet Union and in 1932, at the last free election before Hitler came to power, received nearly 17 per cent of the votes. However, Steele does not describe the uniquely German qualities of the Party beyond saying that it was ' revolutionary ' (p. 21). Furthermore he plays down the growing subservience of the KPD to Stalin's wishes; this led, in the years immediately before Hitler's assumption of power, to the Party concentrating its attacks on the Social Democrats rather than combining with them to combat the Nazi menace. Steele's explanation of this shameful episode is unsatisfactory (pp. 24–26).

For all the Soviet influence before 1933, which was to mushroom in the years of bitter exile that followed, there were still numerous Communists of more liberal and national persuasion in the postwar Party. Indeed they made repeated attempts to steer the fledgling regime in their direction, only to be thwarted by Ulbricht who, his own nationalism notwithstanding, knew that the survival of his rump state depended on Russian backing and on his own relatively mild brand of Stalinism. (East Germany was, for instance, the one satellite state to escape bloody purges.) In Steele's eyes, Ulbricht was arguably the greatest German statesman since Bismarck (p. 4). That may seem a little far-fetched until one stops to consider that only Adenauer's achievement has proved to be of comparable durability; and Adenauer had far more room for manoeuvre than Ulbricht ever had.

Steele's survey of contemporary GDR society (chs. 7–10) positively bulges with interesting information, much of it hitherto unpublished in English. We learn, for instance, of the soaring divorce rate, caused, it seems, by the unwillingness of East German men to accept the growing emancipation of their spouses. Figures are produced to show that socialist woman, unlike her forbears, is not prepared to put up either with an unsatisfying sex life or with the reluctance of her man to help after work with what is called, ironically, the ' the second shift '—shopping, cooking and cleaning.

Much space is devoted to the country's institutions—such as the control commissions, trade union bodies which combat petty crime. Here, as with other analyses, one is left with the rather cosy feeling that troops of well-intentioned citizens are working hard, by and large successfully, to improve society. And even where they are having problems, we are left in no doubt that the Party is earnestly searching for a solution.

Significantly, Steele relies heavily on written sources and on information from people whose attitude to the regime is, at its most deviant, one of critical solidarity. Nowhere does he quote individuals who are out of sympathy with the Party or members of the largely apathetic masses. Yet such people exist in abundance as Steele, who visited the country dozens of times as East Europe correspondent of *The Guardian*, should know. Ignoring them gives his otherwise interesting analyses a rather one-dimensional character.

More serious is Steele's failure to define what is distinctively German about the GDR brand of communism, what makes it more European than Russian. The wholesale exile of many of the country's best writers and artists—beginning with the dissident poet, Wolf Bierman, in November 1976—and the suppression of a nascent civil rights movement prevent the author from claiming that East German communism is particularly liberal. An alternative definition is suggested by the dustcover of the book which depicts a small red hammer and sickle superimposed on a Prussian spiked

helmet. But the author is reluctant to notice the Prussian flavour of East German communism (p. 10). Indeed he even has the nerve to deny the existence of militarism in the GDR on the specious grounds that the NVA officer corps is younger and more humble in its social origins than its colleagues in the West German Bundeswehr (p. 217).

Yet for all his bias, Steele has written a stimulating book. It is a major contribution in a field sadly neglected both by academics and journalists in Britain.

From an Anglo-Saxon point of view, too many West German analysts of East Germany suffer, understandably enough, from an over-involvement in their subject. An exception is Professor Peter Christian Ludz of the University of Munich. Not only does he maintain a pleasing distance to his subject but he also writes with exemplary clarity. His latest volume—a collection of essays, some of them published for the first time, covering various aspects of the GDR's development between 1961 and 1976—bear eloquent witness to his virtues.

W. TREHARNE JONES

Modernization in Romania since World War II. By Trond Gilberg. *New York: Praeger. 1975. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 261 pp. £8·75.*

THIS book is an attempt to apply certain new theoretical approaches and concepts developed by Western political scientists to the case of a communist country. With the general notion of modernisation in mind, he defines its communist version as a 'curious mixture of classical Western concepts and generous doses of marxism-leninism' (p. 8) particularly as embodied in industrialisation, collectivisation of agriculture, and social and infrastructural development. The author then tries to fit Romanian reality in the post-1944 period into this scheme of political thought because, in his view, 'modernization in Romania follows the communist pattern in all its essential features' (p. 7) and 'the leadership of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] fits squarely within the communist modernization model' (p. 9).

The author's attempt to distinguish a so-called communist modernisation model and illustrate it with the case of Romania is rather simplistic; it rests on thin ground for two basic reasons. First, it is highly debatable whether there has ever been a communist modernisation model, although all the East European countries and the Soviet Union have certainly had a number of common traits in their social and economic development. That no communist modernisation model has been accepted and, therefore, one cannot exist, has been amply proved by the resistance, sometimes armed, to its imposition and by the theoretical as well as practical disputes about the validity of a country's experience for the moulding of a development model. Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union and its own workers' self-determination path towards socialism, the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Polish risings of 1956 and of other years, Romania's relative independence in foreign policy, the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Sino-Soviet and Albanian-Soviet disputes—all these were clear and solid indications that there is no such thing as a communist modernisation model. Moreover, Eurocommunism, at present flourishing although not to be taken at its face value, and the often sharp

and public conflicts between its standard-bearers and the Kremlin demonstrate the opposition to a communist modernisation model and how impossible it is for one to exist.

Second, Gilberg's choice of the starting point of the country's modernisation process seems short-sighted. To him modern Romania is the 'multilaterally developed society' to be built on the basis of the socio-economic development plans adopted at the party congress of 1969 and on other party occasions. 'The multilaterally developed society stage is to be reached through a two-pronged approach that can be best characterized as socio-economic and political modernization' (p. 15). But to this reviewer, the basis of modern Romania was established by the declaration of Romania's independence in 1877, and with the regaining in 1918 of some territories (certain of which were lost in 1940), the process of creating the modern Romanian state was completed. Instead of cursorily passing over, in less than one page (p. 9), a period of Romania's history more than twice as long as the one he chose to illustrate his political theory, the author might perhaps have done better to analyse more comprehensively the modernisation process in prewar Romania as the foundation for its further progress after the Second World War.[1] Then, he could not have written, 'To sum up: The modernization process has only been operating in Romania for a quarter of a century . . .' (p. 231).

On the basis of his self-imposed modelling of postwar Romanian history, Gilberg's examination of the country's industrial, agricultural, social and infrastructural development is generally correct. However, there are analytical points open to dispute and conclusions not entirely substantiated: for instance, the economic reform has never been 'an imaginative attack on the dual problem of lagging production and jurisdictional overlap' (p. 166); and it is hardly correct to call Romania a country with a 'multinational society' (p. 207).

University of Reading IANCU SPIGLER

MIDDLE EAST

Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East: Domestic Influences on Policy in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, and Syria. By R. D. McLaurin, Mohammed Mughisuddin and Abraham R. Wagner. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 313 pp. £14·40. Pb: £5·30.*

FOR too long, a superficial distinction within the field of International Relations has existed between the 'methodologists'—those whose interests lay primarily with abstract theoretical formulations—and the avowedly empiricist 'area specialists'. The debate, sometimes acrimonious and aggressively personalised, was conducted as though the two intellectual paths were necessarily mutually exclusive. Only recently have area specialists endeavoured to use the tools of the 'methodologists' for their empirical analyses, and the results have been, on the whole, characterised by greater depth and clarity, leading to more rigorous comparative activity.

[1] For detailed analyses of economic, social and infrastructural changes in Romania during the interwar period, see E. A. Radice and M. Kaser, eds., *The Economic History of Eastern Europe Since 1919* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, forthcoming).

At the very outset of this book the authors make their intellectual position clear: 'Recognising that there are major differences in the structure and influences on the four governments, we have nevertheless attempted to retain an approach to the four that allows maximum comparability' (p. 5). The discussion that follows, therefore, adheres to the dictates of a conceptual framework that unfolds in three logical parts. In the first part, the internal environment, including the structure of government, the operation of the political system, and the main interest groups, is analysed. In the second, the major issue-areas, as perceived by the decision makers of each state, are identified. And finally, a description of the political and military objectives and the policies of each government is undertaken.

The four chapters are competently written and assiduously researched. They all contain a wealth of useful information, particularly with regard to the formal decision-making machinery of the four countries, and the individuals and personalities who occupy key governmental positions. The adherence to a universal framework facilitates a comparative analysis of this data in the last chapter which points to interesting conclusions about the differences in the roles and behaviour of institutions and personalities between Israel on the one hand and the three Arab countries on the other. The authors conclude that because of a variety of influences, decision making in the Arab states is highly personalised, dominated by Sadat in Egypt, Assad in Syria and Sadam Hussein in Iraq. In Israel, however, personalities tend to be merged into a much wider and more developed competitive institutional structure. The authors' further conclusion in this section that 'consultation is more visible, more institutionalised and far broader in Egypt than in Syria or Iraq' (p. 282) does not stand up to empirical evidence. Thus, for example, the recent Egyptian initiative to 'break the psychological barrier' between the Arabs and Israelis was entirely Sadat's. Not one of his advisers, aides, or cabinet ministers seems to have been consulted—a situation that in no way could have been emulated by Assad, given the powerful institutional constraint of the Ba'th party in Syria.

The major shortcoming of the book, however, relates not so much to the authors' analysis but to their area of specialisation itself. The volatility of Middle Eastern politics is such that analysis is frequently overtaken by events. Consequently, the book, published in 1977, seems strangely out of date a mere six months after publication. For example, the very important May 1977 elections in Israel are not mentioned. As a result, Mr. Begin's Likud alignment is referred to as 'Israel's perennial opposition party' (p. 189). Similarly, in the case of Iraq, it is stated that the membership of the Revolutionary Command Council had decreased from fifteen in 1969 to six in 1975. However, in the following two years, the membership further decreased to five and then dramatically increased to twenty-two. Indeed, it is a tribute to the stability of the Assad regime that the chapter on Syria is the only one which has stood the test of the last six months! For these reasons, no book on the Middle East could be considered 'timeless'. Rather, this book is 'timely' in the sense that, empirically and methodologically, it has filled a needed gap in the literature of foreign-policy behaviour in the Middle East.

International Institute of Strategic Studies A. I. DAWISHA

OPEC and the Middle East: The Impact of Oil on Societal Development. Edited by Russell A. Stone. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 264 pp. £13·05.*

Arab Dollars for Africa. By E. C. Chibwe. *London: Croom Helm. 1976. 147 pp. £5·95.*

THE first of these books is another of the Praeger 'quick and dirty' series on international politics and government; the 'dirty' refers only to the offset process which leave the original typed page, complete with unjustified right-hand margin, as the printer's final product. It might be argued that in this series the publisher is doing all of us a favour, even at the price, by making quickly available new data and research. On the other hand, much of what gets published might better fit in various journals or never see the light of day—the latter option perhaps a plus in too many instances.

This book is the product of a conference on the same topic held in the spring of 1976 at the State University of New York, Buffalo; everyone's paper has evidently found its way into print. The volume is divided into four sections: social change, political change, economic development and various country studies. The first short section, by the editor, Russell A. Stone, is the only sociological projection of what new-found oil money is likely to do to Middle Eastern society. It is a good but extremely general review, covering amongst a host of topics the population boom, social services, educational impact, status of women and religion.

The next two chapters, by Don Peretz and I. Robert Sinai, are the meat of the volume. Peretz does a general review on regional rivalries and arms sales which will soon be dated but is useful. Sinai is far more controversial. He cannot see any forthcoming 'revolution' (either literal or attitudinal) that he considers a prerequisite for true modernisation and concludes the 'Middle Eastern states . . . do not seem capable of forging a modern society based on communist methods of organization or one founded on capitalist methods of operation'. They are '. . . unstable societies and cultural misfits, men without roots or genuine values'. Indeed. One can only speculate on what an Arab political scientist might write of the roots and values of the men in Mr. Sinai's hometown, Potsdam, New York. Nor does Mr. Sinai comment on the fact that true modernisation in the Western sense must necessarily be evolutionary; one does not change attitudes towards work practices, problem solving or family life by literally or figuratively overthrowing the established political regime. It is, however, an interesting and thought-provoking article.

The remaining ten chapters, all by different people, are not up to this standard. The four dealing with economic development are greatly limited by the near gospel use of statistics lifted largely from national plans (notoriously unreliable) and other out-of-date figures. Some of the country studies in the last section are of general historical attraction, covering items of development in Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, Algeria and Iran. James Paul's article on Algeria is of particular interest, even if his apparent definition of a neo-colonialist economy could now characterise not only most of the Third World but many of the nations of Western Europe as well.

The author of the second volume was the Zambian Ambassador to West Germany at the time of publication and the introduction is by President Kaunda. Mr. Chibwe, in his preface, acknowledges the 'invaluable' help

of Tiny Rowland's 'immense business knowledge' during the book's preparation.

The author gives an interesting interpretation of why so many of the sub-Saharan states broke off diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973 (Israeli invasion of brother-African state Egypt rather than fear/hope of the oil weapon/largesse) and goes into immense detail as to how the Arabs should invest their petrodollars in Africa, rather than OECD states. The reasons centre largely on the availability of African raw materials and the moral duty of Third World states to help each other. While quoting President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast to the effect that the day that Africa can realise the added-value of producing products from its own raw materials is the day of redemption, Mr. Chibwe does not seem to realise that the Arabs have the same problem with oil; they want Western technology and machinery, rather than African raw copper or bauxite, to overcome it.

If the book is read by other African statesmen, the author may be serving a useful purpose in attempting to convince us that 'no business can survive for a long time unless it is operating above the break-even point'. All the author's detailed examples of what has yet to be done in terms of economic feasibility studies, national and area development banks, incentives, tax holidays and fears of nationalisation, however, make apparent exactly why investments are not pouring into Africa. The Arabs, like other investors, want stability, safety and interest on their capital; the disappointing probability is that the Africans will have to be satisfied with large gifts or soft loans from rich Arab friends for a long time to come. An unfortunate, if hilarious, 'misprint' is repeated three times on pages 79 and 80 where the London Interbank Rate becomes LIMBO instead of LIBOR, e.g., 'The following projects should attract LIMBO rates of interest . . .'. Proof-readers (and investors) beware! Strangely, the most useful part of the book is the last two chapters; these do not deal with Arab dollars for Africa but expound on the history and importance of the Lomé Convention and how it affects African/EEC trade relations.

Chatham House JAMES BEDORE

Political Culture in Israel: Cleavage and Integration among Israeli Jews. By Eva Etzioni-Halevy with Rina Shapira. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 249 pp. £13·40.*

ONE feature of Israel's 'seven fat years' after the Six-Day War of 1967 was (as the authors of this important book point out) 'the unprecedented blooming of empirical social research'. This was particularly true in the field of political science, and it is on the basis of survey data accumulated by Israeli researchers between 1967 and 1973 that this book attempts 'a systematic secondary analysis' and 'a synthesis of the existing body of previous work'.

The authors declare that they have two 'central analytical concerns': first, the relationship between the centre and the periphery, that is, between the political establishment and the general public; second, the role of value orientations and attitudes in Israel's socio-political reality. In both these areas the authors have important things to say, the more so because their conclusions are invariably based on solid empirical evidence.

Their analysis of the centre-periphery relationship is of particula interest because (although written before the Israeli elections of May 1977 it provides several clues which help to explain Mr. Begin's toppling o the half-century-old Labour hegemony in the *Yishuv*. The authors stres that 'an ideological incongruence' had developed between the Labour dominated establishment and the public, which was increasingly threatenin the survival of the establishment. They further show how the 'integrativ mechanisms' developed by the establishment were becoming more and mor fragile in recent years.

The analysis of value orientations further illuminates the nature of thes developments. In particular, the traditional values of Labour Zionism the fundamental ideological basis of the state, have in recent years gradu ally lost their grip on the public consciousness. Why the change? Surpris ingly, the authors tend to play down the impact of the 1967 and 197 wars. They produce some interesting survey data which tend to beli the popular view of the Israeli public between the wars as 'drunk witl victory'; and they show that the results of the general elections o December 1973 (in which Labour lost some ground but managed to clin to power) closely followed the results presaged by opinion polls carrie out in September 1973, i.e. *before* the Yom Kippur war. The effect of th 1973 war on public morale and solidarity (especially ethnic solidarit between Ashkenazi and Oriental Jews) was, they argue, transitory.

The judgment of the authors may perhaps be questioned on certai points of emphasis. For instance, their view that there are 'practicall no completely alienated groups among the Jewish Israeli public' (p. 131 is open to doubt; it may be asked why Israelis are now literally alienatin themselves from the state to such an extent that emigration has recentl exceeded immigration?

Although the authors prudently disclaim the role of prophets, thei central conclusions do help to explain the revolution in Israeli politic (for that is what it is) represented by the ousting of the Labour establish ment. After decades of power Labour had indeed grown bloated, corrup and isolated from the working class. The 'ideological incongruence between the pioneering revolutionary ideals and the sordid realities o cynical machine-politics led large numbers of erstwhile Labour supporters especially in the former Labour strongholds, the *kibbutzim* and the big citie to switch in May 1977 to Professor Yadin's newly-formed 'clean govern ment' party, the Democratic Movement for Change. The effect was to spli the left-centre vote and to hand over power to Mr. Begin. The interna consequences in Israel are already becoming plain: Friedmanite economi policies, an intensified nationalism in education, greater stringency i religious matters by the state. Whether there will be a change in th political *structure* remains to be seen. As for Israel's foreign policy, tha more than in most countries can be related to the nature of its 'politica culture'. It is on the success with which Mr. Begin can maintain th 'ideological congruence' between his new establishment and the Israel public that the issue of peace or war in the Middle East will largely depend

University of Sheffield BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784–1975: A Survey. By Thomas A. Bryson. *Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press. 1977. 431 pp. $17.50.*

THIS useful book could and should have been better than it is. It is marred by careless writing (or proof-reading), by a number of factual errors and by the undigested character of the more recent chapters.

Nevertheless, Mr. Bryson's approach to current American policy through its earlier phases is valuable. He shows it as dominated by three successive preoccupations. In the nineteenth century political and economic considerations were of less importance than the missionary, educational and philanthropic institutions which largely embodied the American presence in the Middle East. In the 1930s the development of petroleum interests gave a higher priority to the region in American policy making. And finally, after the Second World War, the containment of Soviet influence demanded a radical departure from the tradition of political non-involvement. At the same time, the oil factor retained its importance, and Mr. Bryson convincingly emphasises the weight of the Arab oil embargo of 1973–74 in the motivation of Dr. Kissinger's exhausting and ultimately successful 'shuttle diplomacy' in the latter year.

The embargo of course resulted from another aspect of American policy, which Mr. Bryson unambiguously deplores. The growth of Zionist sentiment in the United States, he writes, was 'based on moral considerations that ran counter to the realisation of the nation's vital interests' (p 111). Support for the creation of Israel 'was a great aberration in the Middle Eastern policy of the United States' (p 161). Though many American students of the Middle East share this view, few have expressed it with comparable clarity.

It may indeed be said that in his concluding chapter Mr. Bryson has allowed the logic of his argument to outrun his political judgment. Referring to the suggestion, made by Senator Fulbright among others, that the United States should conclude a mutual security pact with Israel, he writes: 'With the growing American dependence on Arab oil, the mere thought of a mutual defence pact between the U.S. and Israel seems unwise' (p. 301). But the object of such a pact, in the eyes of its proponents, is primarily to restrain Israel; and it presupposes the acceptance by Israel of frontiers which the Arabs could tolerate and which Washington would consequently be prepared to guarantee. It may be the only way of liberating the United States from what Mr. Bryson sees as its present bondage.

HAROLD BEELEY

AFRICA

Soldiers and Power: The Development Performance of the Nigerian Military Regime. By Victor A. Olorunsola. Stanford, Calif.: *Hoover Institution Press. 1977. 168 pp. $8.95.*

Nigeria: Economy and Society. Edited by Gavin Williams. *London: Rex Collings. 1976. 226 pp. £5·25.*

'A UNITED, strong and self-reliant nation; a great and dynamic economy; a just and egalitarian society; a land of bright and full opportunities for all

citizens; a free and democratic society.' This fivefold objective represents the Nigerian dream as expressed in the Second National Development Plan, 1970–74. Professor Olorunsola's book attempts to assess the extent to which General Gowon's regime fulfilled these promises in terms both of objective performance and the perceptions of various interest groups that form part of Nigeria's articulate society. As for the former, the author relies, perhaps too heavily, on conventional measures of economic performance though he does discuss sectoral balances and social policies. He concludes that 'There is evidence to support the military government's claim of concern not only for economic growth but also for economic development.' However, its efforts were largely misdirected because of incompetence, bad planning and the inability to predict the consequences of its policy measures. 'Finally, the increasing lack of proper trust between the governors and the governed continued to be a handicap' (p. 56). This lack of trust is documented in later chapters where the 'perception of development performance of the Regime' by students, lecturers, farmers, traders, the press, labour and the military regime (personified by Gowon himself) is discussed. The material for the author's conclusions is drawn from public statements and reactions to policies on the part of the reference groups. With the not unexpected exception of the Head of State (and even his support was qualified), the evaluations of Nigerians were on the whole negative; and in an epilogue written after Gowon's overthrow, it is acknowledged that even the military's self-evaluation was poor. The author concludes that the events of 1975 show the danger of very low subjective ratings, 'objective statistics notwithstanding' (p. 128).

Soldiers and Power is an interesting attempt at inter-disciplinary analysis; using concepts employed in political science, economics and sociology, the author is apparently able to establish a framework for evaluating policies formulated by a particular regime. But the book must be faulted for a lack of appreciation of both ethnic and historical factors. Nigeria is a country so well known to be troubled with ethnic and regional problems that the reader might expect some comparison of the attitudes of say, farmers or labour in the different regions; yet these, like those of other groups are presented as an undifferentiated set. We can compare this with the essay by Peter Waterman in *Nigeria: Economy and Society* on 'Conservatism amongst Nigerian Workers', where the attitudes of different categories of workers in Kaduna and Lagos to power, enterprise and hierarchy are compared in terms of their radicalism. Professor Olorunsola's approach is also unhistorical: it is as if Nigeria's history started in 1970. As a very simple example, at one point, he writes '*Even* the farmers were becoming restless . . .' (p. 79, emphasis added), as if this were an exceptional happening; yet throughout *Nigeria: Economy and Society* and especially in 'The Politics of the Ibadan Peasantry' by Beer and Williams we are reminded that rural unrest has been the rule ever since colonial times.

Gavin Williams's book consists of nine contributions covering a variety of issues mostly written from an explicitly Marxist perspective. In the long introductory chapter on the Nigerian Political Economy, the editor argues that the colonial relationship set the stage for Nigeria's development: it established a rigidly hierarchical structure in which client relationships endured; it established a peasant class whose fortunes depend on foreign markets; it fractured the possibility of the development of an indigenous capitalist manufacturing class, able to compete with foreign capital. The

immediate post-colonial state was equally unable (or unwilling) to develop a productive capitalist class; rather was it an 'instrument of private and sectional interests' (p. 45). Entrepreneurship, except in certain trades, was geared to competition for office or client relationships with office-holders. Thus the bourgeoisie were not 'welded into a coherent block' and the state was unable to maintain control. Gowon's military regime relied on the higher civil service for policy formation. Williams seems to be arguing that these men understood the conditions for Nigeria to become a progressive capitalist nation; this required the supremacy of the Federal government and the regulation of markets and the relationships between the different classes of society both indigenous and foreign. These things, the regime was unable to do; and in the final chapter, 'Capitalism and the Coup', by Williams and others, the prognostication is equally gloomy. But the analysis of the post-1966 period lacks the clarity of that of the early period. Indeed, it finally degenerates into assertion as if the author is unwilling to assemble all the building blocks of his argument. The other chapters in the book are mostly elaborations on the argument in the introduction. They explain why Nigeria is not united, strong, self-reliant, just and egalitarian. Williams rightly claims that these studies are not specific to any discipline and the Marxist perspective gives the work a coherence that is lacking in Professor Olorunsola's book. Williams admits his book is not comprehensive: however, it must be said that both the absence of any but the most minimal analysis of the impact of the oil economy and the lack of any contribution on Ibo society either ante or post-bellum are two most serious omissions.

University of Bath E. HORESH

Guinea: The Mobilization of a People. By Claude Rivière. Trans. by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1977. 262 pp. £12·40.*

IT is nearly twenty years since President Ahmed Sékou Touré made his famous option for poverty in freedom. Several French studies have, from various ideological standpoints, appraised the methods by which his *Parti Democratique de Guinée* aims to build a modern socialist state on the foundations of an ethnically heterogeneous French colony; in 1976 the Nigerian scholar 'Ladipo Adamolekun provided English readers with a brief and basically sympathetic survey.[1] Professor Rivière, a sociologist who taught for four years at the Conakry Polytechnic, seems to have found initial sympathy wearing rather thin; his final verdict on the regime is 'a mobilization system in which socialist, but not Marxist, goals only partially disguise the development of social inequality' and a self-enriching state bourgeoisie (pp. 238–39). His informative study uses unpublished statistics, evidently obtained from émigré sources, to demonstrate the failure of Guinean economic policies; alumina and pineapples, two enclaves controlled by foreign capitalists, account for nearly 80 per cent of the exports of this 'self-styled socialist state' (pp. 180–81). Fluctuating economic fortunes are skilfully related to the impulsive lurches which have

[1] *Sékou Touré's Guinea: An Experiment in Nation Building* (London: Methuen, 1976).

characterised Sékou Touré's foreign policy, and his recurrent revelations of 'plots' which become the justification for new tightening of the party's political tyranny. (M. Rivière's book went to press just before the 'Fula plot' of July 1976, though he does indicate that this proud people had been less successfully integrated than others into the new Guinean nation.) M. Rivière's evident disenchantment does not prevent him giving credit to the regime for its achievements, or acknowledging the magnitude of its problems, and his book, somewhat broader in scope than Adamolekun's, should become a standard work of reference. Unfortunately his fluent style has not matched well with his translators' concern to provide a literal rendering, and to grasp the full drift of Rivière's argument it may occasionally be helpful to retranslate into French.

University of Aberdeen JOHN D. HARGREAVES

Education and Politics in Africa: The Tanzanian Case. By David R. Morrison. *London: C. Hurst. 1976. 352 pp. £9·00.*

THE widespread interest in Tanzania's educational experiments over the past ten years has stimulated very few publications, largely because it has not been possible to carry out systematic field research on the results. Readers hoping for an end to the long silence will be disappointed in this book, because the research it reports took place in 1965 and 1966, before 'Education for Self-Reliance' became official government policy. Only Chapter 11 discusses this programme, and its report on progress depends largely on government documents and newspaper reports, neither of which can be expected to be unbiased.

For those unfamiliar with the history of education in Tanzania, the earlier chapters provide a well-written analysis of the development of the educational system through the colonial and early independence period. Tanzania got less and later education than other parts of East Africa; lack of financial resources and the low level of urbanisation meant that few children entered schools and most of these got only three years of instruction. As in so many other countries, the new opportunities for jobs which opened up at independence resulted in a greatly increased demand for education at all levels, and the rapid expansion of the primary system soon produced large numbers of unemployed school leavers. Morrison's main contribution is his careful analysis of the political decisions which had to be made and the factors which influenced the decision makers; most similar studies have been made by educationalists rather than political scientists and the problems of decision making have therefore been neglected. The high level of popular expectations and the growing disaffection of articulate university students led the government to institute a programme of political socialisation in the schools in an effort to increase understanding of its problems and acceptance of its programmes. President Nyerere took the initiative in proclaiming that the educational system must be completely reformed, but so must the society. This is very difficult to achieve, and the author suggests that we must not expect results too quickly. Teachers are gradually being retrained, experimental programmes are being tried, and hope is still more prominent than satisfaction.

The book is occasionally marred by naïveté and lack of information on developments in African education over the past ten years. The worst slip,

in the first paragraph of the Introduction, implies that Africans had no 'minimal cultural base' on which to build. The suggestion on page 18 that a government's political capacity depends on being able to provide wage employment for anyone who wants it ignores the level of unemployment in the West and vastly oversimplifies the issue of governmental legitimacy in newly independent nations. Morrison assumes that all school leavers seek wage jobs, whereas this phase ended some years ago in African countries more educationally advanced than Tanzania. Many primary and even secondary leavers now often look for opportunities in self-employment; they may wish the government could do more for them, but they are sufficiently aware of economic and political realities not to question its basic legitimacy solely on these grounds. The author has also been too uncritical in his acceptance of the Chinese educational system as the best alternative for developing countries; the new Chinese leaders have found it inefficient for developing the high-level manpower they need. Unfortunately, there appear to be no simple solutions to educational problems.

University of Birmingham MARGARET PEIL

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

The Origins of the Cold War in Asia. Edited by Yōnosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye. *New York: Columbia University Press; Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. 1977. 448 pp. $25.00.*

MOST of the papers collected in this volume were given at a seminar at Kyoto, sponsored by the Japanese government, in 1975. Ten of the contributors are Japanese, five American, one British (D. C. Watt). All are scholars of high standing, and they show in general a remarkable freedom from prejudice. It becomes clear that the origins of the cold war have to be looked for first of all in Europe, and that the contagion spread to Asia from there. The longest essay, a well-documented one by Ito Takayuki, studies East-West confrontation over Poland as a prime cause, and puts much of the blame for it on the intransigence of the London Poles. The Truman administration was very soon spoiling for a fight: Walter LaFeber's excellent survey emphasises that it moved far ahead of public opinion, and jumped at the Greek civil war as an opportunity to alarm the country with a picture of world-wide communist aggression.

In eastern Asia, apart from Japan, the United States was at first more restrained; it faced no Soviet challenge there. Its attitude, however, from the beginning was unfavourable to the emerging nations, with several of which it was eventually to go to war. In an instructive essay G. M. Kahin shows that while ostensibly neutral between the old colonial powers and the territories on which they were trying to reimpose their control, the United States was in fact giving aid and comfort to Dutch and French imperialism. Conversely, Tanigawa Yoshihiko investigates the much talked of Calcutta youth conference early in 1948 and demonstrates that it was *not* a platform for a clarion call from Moscow for revolt. Stalin and the

Cominform were really interesting themselves very little in South-east Asia.

Three papers are devoted to Korea. R. M. Slusser's attempt to unravel Stalin's objectives is necessarily speculative. J. L. Gaddis points out that America's belief that he had North Korea completely under his thumb now seems highly implausible. Okonogo Masao tries a different and fruitful approach in 'The Domestic Roots of the Korean War'; he sees no sign of either super-power desiring a confrontation there, but both Syngman Rhee and Kim Il-sung were undisguisedly bent on unifying the country by force, and each was pushed on by factional pressures in his own camp. China's involvement in the cold war is discussed by Okabe Tatsumi and, with special reference to Mao, by A. S. Whiting; while Nakajima Mineo writes on the Sino-Soviet rift, going, it may be, too far in ascribing Machiavellian motives to Stalin, whom he sees as utilising the Korean war to drain a rival China's strength. Three other papers are concerned with Japan; Akira Iriye's is an account of how the main lines of American occupation policy were worked out in advance during the war, with no pretence of consultation with allies.

If the focus is frequently on the 'basic malformation and malfunction of the foreign policy-making machinery in the United States', as Watt calls it (p. 118), this is of course partly, as is pointed out, because of the material available. There is a far greater wealth of documentary evidence about Washington's plannings or plottings, for historians to get their teeth into, than about its opponents' activities. The economic dimension is only occasionally noticed in this collection of political studies, and Kahin, one of the few to touch on American economic interests, gives them a low, perhaps too low, place (p. 351). Despite this limitation, the volume is a very notable one, and a welcome landmark in intellectual co-operation across national boundaries.

University of Edinburgh V. G. KIERNAN

Sri Lanka: A Survey. Edited by K. M. de Silva. *London: C. Hurst for the Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg. 1977. 496 pp. £12·00.*

IN this volume eleven Sri Lankan scholars, with the support of the Institute of Asian Studies in Hamburg, seek to provide 'the first comprehensive review of Sri Lanka since independence' (p. x) by presenting material from a wide range of disciplines. The book opens with essays on the physical environment, the island's plural society and demography and a survey of its history up to independence in 1948. This is followed by the first major discussion since the mid-1960s of economic change, including essays on the economy at independence, economic and industrial development since then, planning, foreign trade, plantation and peasant agriculture and a statistical appendix. A further section on post-independence politics includes articles on political development and constitutional reform, foreign policy, administration and the judiciary. Essays on religion, education, literature and the arts complete the picture. The text is accompanied throughout by profuse statistical tables dealing with everything from rainfall to religion.

The authors have succeeded very admirably in their daunting task. A high level of discussion is maintained through most of the volume.

Some of the contributions will mainly be of interest to specialists, but the text is generally intelligible to serious laymen. The reader will come away from this book with a multi-dimensional understanding of this intriguing country with its enduring multi-party parliamentary system, its persistent ethnic and religious antipathies and its troubled economy. Very few works deal with individual developing nations with comparable comprehensiveness and authority.

As this book was being written, the University of Sri Lanka, where most of the contributors teach, encountered great difficulties from the government which ruled between 1970 and mid-1977. Research was often impeded. Politicians' heavy-handed intrusions in the university led to serious demoralisation among academics. At least one of the authors was threatened with the loss of his livelihood because of his writings. He and other contributors set forth views, in this volume and elsewhere, which might have incurred harassment. Under such circumstances, this book is a remarkable achievement.

As is inevitable with works of this scale, the book has its faults. Bibliographies are provided after only seven of the eighteen chapters. In conveying a survey of recent developments, several of the authors miss the opportunity to examine rigorously the assumptions underlying the prevailing economic and political order. (In many areas this could have been done without alienating politicians whose interference in the university often had less to do with ideology than a desire to find sources of political patronage.)

The volume's main weakness is a failure to examine several important topics adequately. The most serious omissions come under the heading of society and social change. More substantive discussion might have been given to caste among both Sinhalese and Tamils, to family and kinship patterns and their importance in political and economic relations, to the Kandyan-Low Country division among Sinhalese. The rich anthropological literature could have been more fully exploited. The discussion of the internal organisation of political parties (or the lack thereof) is inadequate, as are the analyses of two related topics—the reluctance of the national elite to share power with people in rural political arenas and the relationship between the great power centre of Colombo and the rest of the island. The riots of 1915 and 1958, the abortive coup of 1962 and the insurrection of 1971 might have had more attention. These omissions, however, are understandable, since the authors were hard pressed for space. And several of these under-emphasised topics have still to be fully explored by scholars. In that regard, some of these weaknesses constitute a kind of strength, since they suggest areas for future research.

K. M. de Silva and his colleagues have given us a very valuable distillation of most of the important things that are now known about their island. Some of the views expressed in this volume will be overturned by further research, but the authors would clearly welcome this. Indeed, several of them can be expected to play their parts in revising and extending the material presented here. This volume should be an essential part of any reference library and an attractive prospect for anyone with an interest in the Commonwealth or the non-Western world.

University of Leicester JAMES MANOR

Indonesia. By Donald W. Fryer and James C. Jackson. *London: Benn; Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1977. 313 pp. £9·25.*

THIS introduction to Indonesia for the general reader, in the series Nations of the Modern World, offers a systematic survey of some quality. It does not assume prior knowledge and in consequence contains standard accounts of the diverse peoples and pre-independence history of the archipelago. It also relates the experience of the new state up to the fall of Sukarno, who is treated in a scathing manner—indeed, some might argue without full regard for his role in containing the centrifugal political forces of the early Republic.

The principal interest of this volume for readers of this journal will be in the very informative chapters on current economic problems, especially those arising from the essentially agricultural base of a society whose resources are meagre in relation to the size of its population. The authors are both professional geographers with a special interest in the economic dimension of their subject. Their assessment of Indonesia's problems leads them at the outset to the pessimistic judgment that the country may not long survive unless some solutions acceptable to the great mass of its rural population are found quickly. To this end, apart from considering the modern face of development, they discuss the prospects of remedy through land reform, although perhaps with less than full conviction, given their own assessment of the opportunity for such practice in rural Java. Part of the reason for this lack of conviction is also indicated when they point to an excessive centralisation of economic policy by government, reflected in part in an unwillingness to permit that measure of local initiative which might promote greater agricultural production. A preceding discussion of the nature of the political order established by General Suharto is germane to this apparent failing and the authors display a welcome insight in laying bare the political dynamics of a system which shelters under a thin mantle of constitutional legality. That there exists a governmental commitment to development is undisputed, but the problems of managing authoritarian rule based on the political presumption of the military take priority. In addition, the legacy of regional dissent shapes the perspective of central government and impedes the kind of local initiatives which the authors advocate in the interests of the rural population.

This book, in terms of content and understanding, more than meets the terms of reference set by the publishers for their series. It is an introduction of substance to contemporary Indonesia.

London School of Economics MICHAEL LEIFER

China Policy: Old Problems and New Challenges. By A. Doak Barnett. *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1977. 131 pp. $8.95. Pb: $2.95.*

The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Implications for the Future. By Harold C. Hinton. *New York: Crane Russak for the National Strategy Information Center. 1977. 68 pp. $4.95. Pb: $2.95.*

THE first of these books is essentially a companion volume to Barnett's *China and the Major Powers in East Asia* [1] and consequently treats Chinese

[1] Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977.

external policy only indirectly until the brief concluding chapter, which raises a number of question marks about future styles of Chinese leadership and about the likelihood of Chinese acceptance of American ideas about a stable four-power equilibrium in East and South-east Asia. The pattern of bilateral Sino-American relations in the 1970s, sketched in the first chapter, is a far cry from the direct confrontations of the 1950s or the confrontation by proxy of the 1960s, and the new basis subsequently outlined moves from the premise that 'further progress in Sino-American détente is possible, and important to strive for, but that the two countries will continue to be competitors in many respects' (p. 21). The main immediate problem is that of the fate of Taiwan, the solution of which, it is repeatedly stressed, is hardly likely to be immediate. It is therefore unlikely that, without any compromise on this issue, the Chinese will be prepared to establish formal diplomatic relations with the United States on the model of Sino-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, possible areas where further cautious exploration of mutual accommodation should be pursued, such as in issues of economics, military security, arms control and cultural exchange, are identified and outlined.

In many ways, the Sino-American relationship is most interestingly highlighted in the penultimate chapter within the context of American relations with the other Asian powers. Important as is the goal of improved Sino-American relations, Barnett argues that this 'cannot be pursued at the expense of the fundamental U.S. interests in maintaining close relations with the Japanese and avoiding military conflict with the Russians' (p. 79). Although it is clear from international parliamentary diplomacy that Chinese rhetoric is angled towards inciting Third-World states against the super-powers, the US administration is urged to try to bring the Chinese, through efforts that are likely to be both persistent and prolonged in time, to a recognition that their own long-term interests will best be served by a greater degree of interdependence with the world community than the engrained traditional and Maoist policies of self-isolation and self-reliance dictated in the past. Although such commendable liberal sentiments are frequently aired throughout the essay, the underlying tone remains one of deep-seated scepticism about the prospects for any sincere deepening of Sino-American relations and its recommendations for the future favour a continued American military presence in East Asia to secure vital interests in the north-east as well as a capacity to influence developments in the south-east of the region. In the wake of the Indochina debacle, however, it is recognised that America's priority must lie with increased economic and political rather than military contributions to regional stability, working hand-in-hand with the Japanese but maintaining very much a separate silhouette over the horizons of the western Pacific from its ally, as well as from China and the Soviet Union, and perhaps even encouraging the Europeans to sell more advanced military technology to the Chinese (but not, presumably, to the Japanese in view of vital American interests) rather than permit difficulties to arise from the United States itself supplying the most advanced equipment to the Chinese.

The continuing Sino-Soviet hostility represents the most formidable and unpredictable of difficulties in the way of American efforts to arrive at a mutually acceptable formula for maintaining stable multipolar relationships in East Asia. Both Barnett and Hinton see it as in the American interest for this relationship to remain suspended, however uncertainly, between

the pole of conflict and the pole of collaboration. Hinton appears to paint the relationship in particularly sombre terms as holding 'the only serious likelihood of war between two major powers' (p. 1), but then goes on to discount both war and a full reconciliation between them as likely future options. Barnett, on the other hand, has drawn attention in a valuable way to the relevance of the Sino-Soviet dispute in American security concerns over the Korean Peninsula, together with ones of lesser magnitude in South-east Asia. He fears that competition for influence might have unforeseeable consequences which would be far less easily controlled even than the sporadic incidents that have arisen directly between the two powers along their mutual borders, issues that form the main focus of Hinton's analysis both with regard to their past handling and to the possible future differences that may arise between the successors of Mao and Brezhnev. The main intention of this pamphlet is to shed light on the obscurity into which many aspects of the Sino-Soviet relationship have fallen and to remind the American public that an absence of spectacular events should not blind it to the continuing significance of the dispute for American policy in Asia. It succeeds, if a trifle laboriously, in doing so and ends with a plea for the United States to project a new image as 'a power that knows its interests and is determined to promote them, in so far as possible without infringing on the legitimate interests of others' (p. 66).

Although addressing themselves to quite different audiences, both books make much the same appeal to the new administration to assert itself positively in Asia in spite of, or because of the immediate legacy of the past and the apparent lack of any clear vision on the part of its predecessor. In the short term, it is perhaps fortunate for the United States that both Vietnam and China are heavily preoccupied with reconstruction and the absorption of foreign technology, but the medium and long-term agenda drawn up by Barnett remains a truly formidable one that will call for sustained patience and skill of an order that has not been so much in evidence in the past three decades.

University of Sussex J. W. M. CHAPMAN

Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History: A Preliminary Assessment organized by *The China Quarterly*. Edited by Dick Wilson. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 331 pp. £10·50. Pb: £3·50.*

Mao Tse-tung: The Man in the Leader. By Lucian W. Pye. *New York: Basic Books. 1976; London: Harper and Row. 1977. 346 pp. $12.95. £6·95.*

As Dick Wilson points out in his introduction to *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History*, 'Any leader who ruled a quarter of mankind for a quarter of a century would be assured of a place in history'. During 1976, as Mao was clearly nearing the end of his life, it was thus inevitable that assessment of his life and work should be planned and published. Although Mao's place in history has long been assured, the substance of his historical rolè has just as long been a matter of debate in the West. He appears, as all the authors in these two books agree, an extremely contradictory figure, ideologically committed yet often pragmatic, a Chinese nationalist and a Marxist, a conservative and a radical in Chinese

politics. In part this debate results from Mao's continual development and in part from the identification of Mao with China since 1949. The way one automatically tends to view the development of the People's Republic of China between 1949 and 1976 in terms of Mao Tse-tung reflects his importance, but it is a process which helps to obscure both China and Mao. Mao's death thus releases the Western observer from these intellectual shackles and although the results in these two volumes do not solve the enigma, they do help to provide a more rounded picture of Mao the man, the politician, and the philosopher.

Any limited stereotype of Mao, for example as the communist dictator who was always in command, is considerably broadened in the volume edited by Dick Wilson. This is a collection of ten essays on Mao by eleven leading China scholars, each dealing with a different aspect of Mao's place in history. These range from chapters on Mao's ideas (Benjamin Schwartz on Mao the Philosopher, Stuart Schram on the Marxist) through Mao's leadership (Michel Oksenberg on the political leader, Jacques Guillermaz on the soldier, Enrica Collotti Pischel on the teacher, and Christopher Howe and Kenneth Walker on the economist) to Mao's status inside and outside China (Frederic Wakeman on the patriot, John Gittings on the statesman, Wang Gungwu on the Chinese, and Edward Friedman on the innovator). The result, as one might expect from such an array of academic talent, is a useful introduction to the study of Mao Tse-tung which will undoubtedly prove its worth, not least as teaching material for students in higher education.

Given the speed of publication, it would be easy to over-criticise this volume. Obviously the difficulties involved in publishing such a volume so quickly do detract somewhat from a fully rounded assessment. There is not enough time for co-ordination between individual chapter writers or for reconsideration, and (partially as a result) there is a tendency for the authors to overemphasise the positive aspects of their theme. Thus, for example, although there is Edward Friedman's well-written and exciting chapter on Mao as the innovator, little consideration is given—either in that chapter or elsewhere—to the ways in which Mao was not novel.

Nevertheless, as a whole (and despite the exigencies of time) the book does fulfil its purpose reasonably well. Here is a Mao who was not only a demi-god but also a ruler faced by often hostile (or at least resistant) colleagues or environment. Moreover, whether one agrees with their arguments or not, three of the chapters stand out as contributions to our understanding of Mao and China. Professor Schram's consideration of Mao the Marxist is a masterly *tour de force*. Instead of becoming bogged down in dogmatic 'definitions' of Marxism, Professor Schram discusses the various ways in which Mao was or was not meaningfully a Marxist. He concludes that although Marx would have rejected Mao as his follower, the latter none the less contributed significantly to the theory and practice of revolution. Economic thought and development is clearly central to any discussion of the Chinese revolution. In their chapter, Christopher Howe and Kenneth Walker consider Mao's notions of economics and his participation in economic change. Interestingly, they suggest inter alia that Mao partially abandoned his dialectical approach to economic development after the Cultural Revolution. Finally, the strength of Michel Oksenberg's contribution on Mao the political leader lies in its recognition that Mao required different political skills to handle the different sectors

of the polity and that his power was by no means unchallengeable, indivisible, or immutable. What emerges is a picture of Mao as perhaps the most accomplished political manipulator of the contemporary era.

This is a view which echoes throughout Professor Pye's *Mao Tse-tung: the Man in the Leader.* Those who object on principle to psychological interpretations of history and politics will hate and attack this book. Others of a more agnostic or favourable disposition will find it a fascinating exploration of the psychological relationships between Mao the private man and Mao the public figure. Professor Pye moves from general impressions of Mao in public and private to a more detailed discussion of his emotional development and his relations with his family, friends and acquaintances. He then uses this discussion to illuminate Mao's behaviour as a politician. Surprisingly, but convincingly, Professor Pye argues that the relationship with his mother was the most important element in Mao's emotional composition. Having been cared for intensely as the first-born, he later felt abandoned and resented the attention given to his later siblings. As a result Mao craved adoration but refused to trust completely those who supported him because of his fear of abandonment, and so throughout his career continually turned on his allies. There is much to excite, much to intrigue, and much to aggravate in this book, but certainly it is a much more human Mao who emerges from its pages.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne DAVID S. G. GOODMAN

The Japanese. By Edwin O. Reischauer. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1977. 443 pp. $15.00. £9·75.*

THIS book is not intended for the specialist, though specialists would do well to read it. In the course of reading one becomes aware of at least two authors: Reischauer the scholar, who has devoted his life to the study of Japan, and Reischauer the diplomat, who was American Ambassador to Japan from 1961 to 1966. Towards the end we may detect a third *persona*: Reischauer the teacher.

The main body of this substantial study is the work of a scholar, and it is excellent. He surveys and analyses his subject in a lucid and smooth-flowing style, giving the reader a deceptively simple introduction to the land, history and society of Japan. In doing so, he demolishes many of the stereotypes and clichés which clutter the minds of outsiders and some Japanese. He makes the Japanese both human and understandable, but at the same time stresses their unique qualities.

The extraordinary homogeneity of the people and their basic group orientation, which does not submerge their individuality, provide the main theme of the book. They make for that mixture of cohesion and flexibility in Japanese society that has served it so well in its adjustment to a rapidly changing world. But these qualities have also proved to be a handicap in Japan's relations with other countries. Reischauer makes much of this and explains the reasons very well, though he recognises that things are changing rapidly in this respect.

At various places in the text, Reischauer the diplomat begins to take over. Here and there we get some bland descriptions which read more like passages from travel brochures. This is particularly noticeable in the chapters on 'Mass Culture' and 'The Emperor'. He is very fierce, and

rightly so, when discussing the terrorism of some radical students, but he is much gentler when handling the Lockheed scandal. For instance, there is no mention of the link between some of the politicians who were implicated and some behind-the-scenes manipulators of the extreme right.

The author's handling of American-Japanese relations seems to be influenced by a desire to act as mediator between the two countries. American policies during the Occupation are treated rather uncritically. His rosy view of the future of American-Japanese relations glosses over the tensions and frictions which are all too apparent today. And can one really assess the delicate balance of inter-state relations by quoting statistics about tourism?

The concluding section on 'Japan and the World' is particularly interesting in the light of Reischauer's knowledge and experience. There are some splendid passages which point to a fundamental shift in the perception of national security: 'The real front line of defense for Japan is not on any military perimeter. It is the maintenance and healthy growth of international cooperation' (p. 378). Among his many insights into Japan's contemporary situation, the chapter on language as a barrier between Japan and the world is particularly illuminating.

At this stage we also catch glimpses of Reischauer the teacher. He is very keen to see the Japanese reform their script. He adopts a somewhat headmasterly tone: 'Japan in its own interest needs to do better' (p. 420). And he lectures the Japanese on the need to make a more positive contribution to solving the world's economic and social problems. This is the current American line, but it is very questionable whether Japanese policy is any more at fault here than the policies of other countries, the United States included.

The author's varied approaches to his subject do not detract from the value of the book. On the contrary, they enhance its interest. Given its vast scope, there are also remarkably few errors—all of them minor. All in all, it is a masterly treatment of an extremely difficult subject.

King's College, London WOLF MENDL

Oceania and Beyond: Essays on the Pacific since 1945. Edited by F. P. King. *Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Westport Publications, London.) 265 pp. $22.50.*

THIS odd book is dedicated to one of its contributors. The editor is one of twelve American contributors in a total of eighteen. But Colin Aikman, a New Zealander, tells us in the foreword, that he is 'chauvanist' (sic) enough to say we should begin by reading a different, New Zealand, volume. Perhaps that had the organising themes like land and development suggested in the paper here by Noel Grogan. What is unacceptable at this stage of Oceanic history and bibliography is an undirected collection, in which better papers, like a competent economic survey by J. K. Thomson and a thoughtful piece by Ralph Premdas, are lost.

The editor has created a garb for six papers on the United States and Micronesia, five on Oceania and the Pacific Powers, and five on the Metropolitan Powers and Oceania. That implies questions a student might ask: why so much on Micronesia? Papua New Guinea has 2½ of the 3½ million total population, without including not merely French and

American dependencies but also parts of the United States, the Philippines and Indonesia. The editor says he takes something other than the 'rim'. A glance at the maps shows the problems unless island smallness, isolation, water supply, monocultural dependence are taken as the themes. They are not. Hence some of the toughest problems are neglected. If the editor would, as he says, like to have included Australian aborigines, why did he not? He would then not have been able to escape a different list of authors and deciding what the book was about: anthropology, economics, history, politics, or better, some one organising issue: for example, racialism.

As it stands, the volume fails to represent the best work now being done on Oceania or even a report on some crucial questions, any one of which might call for a collection of papers, if that is the style wanted: tourism; out islands; the integration of new states from small, even micro-communities; migration; the politics of ex-colonial island groupings; or alternatively, a re-examination of cases in the recent past which remain, even revive: religion; the universities in Fiji and Papua New Guinea and how they came about; the phosphate story; the distinctive patterns of de-colonisation and hence present independence and dependence; and so on.

Supposing, on the other hand, that a reader puts any specific question, like tourism, or a more general one, like a possible centripetalism in Oceania, he is then frustrated by the incompleteness of the papers, the gaps between them and the unevenness of treatment: tables which do, others which do not include United States territories, or whatever. The frustration is not lessened when one recalls the excellent work unrepresented here, or the impact which has been achieved in Oceanic studies by explanatory notions such as the impact on primitive peoples of the technological transfer from the use of stone to steel implements. One recalls, again, the profound relevance of some of the major issues in development: contracts; skills; budgets; expatriates; plantations; colonial boundaries; and the contrasts: the rise of Japanese tourism and continuing French colonialism (New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Fatuna); or the income per caput of the Nauruans and the treatment of the Banabans. Is this the time for such a collection?

University of Sussex B. B. SCHAFFER

NORTH AMERICA

The Diplomacy of Detènte: The Kissinger Era. By Coral Bell. *London: Martin Robertson. 1977. 278 pp. £8·50.*

IN this short straightforward book of twelve chapters, Coral Bell examines the nature of detente, traces the role of Dr. Henry Kissinger in its evolution, and explores its influence in a number of specific policy areas, from strategic arms control negotiations to particular regional crises. Detente is defined as a diplomatic strategy deployed in the pursuit of objectives, rather than as an objective in itself, and is seen as a strategy for the management of adversary power. As a method of conducting policy it antedates popular acceptance of the word, but Coral Bell suggests that one fundamental characteristic of the Nixon-Kissinger approach distinguishes it from earlier examples. This is its triangular nature, triangular, that is, from

the American viewpoint, for the third leg of a proper triangle, Sino-Soviet detente, has not coherently developed. Indeed, the existence of Sino-Soviet tension was probably a significant factor in the improvement in Soviet-American, and Sino-American, relations.

In the brief discussion of 'The Theorist as Policy-Maker', considerable reliance is placed on Kissinger's first book, *A World Restored*.[1] His distinction between a balance of power, and a concert of powers that is necessarily underlain by a balance of power, leads to the conclusion that 'a balance of power is now necessary as the foundation of the detente, which is not yet a concert of powers.' A concert of powers is then asserted to be 'always a construction of conscious statecraft. So has been the detente . . .' (p. 25). The logic of this argument, which is amiable enough in itself, can also be that detente is *not* just a process but a state of being, if not of bliss, in international politics, the creation of which, and the continued sustenance of which, may be a much more substantive objective of policy than the book maintains.

Detente would then become an umbrella of mutually recognisable great-power strategic relationships, beneath which more immediate tactical objectives may be pursued according to a set of implicit understandings. Indeed, in using phrases like 'since the detente' (p. 75), and in deploying sentences such as, 'If the overall diplomatic context had been cold war rather than detente . . .' (p. 169), Coral Bell herself seems to suggest that she considers it to be in fact something more than simple crisis-management technique.

This problem of definition emerges crucially because the book, in its panoramic global discussion and its attempt to bring together disparate events into something like a co-ordinated pattern. stimulates both the imagination and the reason of the reader. Detente is used as a structure facilitating the analysis of problems from Africa to Australasia. For the student, as for the generalist, it is an absorbing story, and assertion is always leavened by the scholar's awareness of the frailty of judgment in advance of the opening of archives. The text is also enlivened by vivid phrases such as the 'televisual anguish' of Vietnam (p. 120) and by clear use of specialist terminology such as that of 'block obsolescence' in the discussion of Soviet-American naval rivalry (p. 76). This is necessarily an interim statement of the diplomacy of detente, but as such it is welcome.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy. By Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter. *New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1977. 334 pp. $17.50. £9·85.*

Two Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy. Edited by William P. Bundy. *New York: New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1977. 251 pp. $15.00.*

THE first of these books traces the emergence of that well-heeled and prestigious institution, the Council on Foreign Relations. The authors

[1] *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812–22* (London: Gollancz, 1973; first publ. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).

argue that the Council's influence grew to such an extent after its post-Versailles birth that by the early 1940s the major diplomatic moves in the war and the preparations for the postwar world reflected to all intents and purposes the Council's will and not that of the State Department. Yet the Council, so goes the argument of the authors, was not merely a disinterested advisory body to aid the official agency of American foreign policy; rather it was a purpose-built vehicle carefully designed and directed by the capitalist interests of the American corporate elite to ensure their welfare at the expense of the American body politic.

To Americans grown accustomed to the 'in and outer syndrome' of lawyers, financiers and academics parading their talents in Washington's corridors of power, there seems almost a touch of 'small earthquake in Chile, no deaths' unimportance about Shoup and Minter's book. Alternatively, it can be argued that such a blasé reaction indicates the extent to which one has come to accept the degree to which interest groups and experts, often outside the ken of elected officialdom, make an impact upon the foreign policy process in the United States. The values and dangers of this 'in and outer' phenomenon can be considered from many perspectives, but Shoup and Minter's Marxist viewpoint, like so many revisionist writings of that orientation, leaves unanswered some very basic questions. The history of the war and early post-1945 period does not suggest the coherent policy orientation or consensus amongst the leadership which revisionist writings largely assume Certainly decision-making theory and organisational analysis lead one to query the rampant 'goal maximizing' assumptions underlying not only Shoup and Minter's work but much of the revisionist work in general. The unicausal motive, namely that of economic determinism, is yet another issue which this reviewer finds too simplistic a basis upon which to deal with the complexities and contending motives that were all part of the foreign-policy process. Here, Shoup and Minter follow the same narrow economic determinist route of many of their intellectual precursors.

Still, despite these criticisms, the book has definite merits. Once one acknowledges its particular orientation, there is no doubt that *Imperial Brain Trust* is well written, well constructed and, within its own intellectual paradigm, objective. Furthermore, in 281 pages, a considerable amount of new material concerning wartime and postwar relations between the Council and Washington is brought to light, material which could well prove of assistance to historians, particularly those interested in the early 1940s.

Turning from a book which deals with the impact of the Council on Foreign Relations upon American foreign policy to one which deals with that same Council's view of two hundred years of American foreign policy is an interesting sequence for any reviewer. While William Bundy, the editor of *Two Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy*, insists that the volume's contributors do not necessarily reflect the Council's views, one cannot help but feel that much that justifies the Council's reputation for excellence is reflected in this volume. Bundy has brought together seven authors, each either a distinguished academic or diplomat, or, as in George Kennan's case, both, to discuss the origins and evolution of United States foreign policy from both general thematic and specific regional perspectives. The result is seven elegant historical evaluations, each notable for the way that two hundred years of history has been assessed and used as a platform

to predict what the future might hold in store for the international relations of the United States. Alastair Buchan's contribution on Anglo-American relations is worth particular note, as is Charles Kindleberger's essay on 'US Foreign Economic Policy, 1776–1976' and Kennan's piece on US-Soviet relations. Yet in pinpointing these three contributions, it should be emphasised that none of the contributors has failed the editor's injunction 'to look beneath the surface of events, to find central unifying themes, and to write clearly and vigorously' (p. ix).

In a slightly perverse sort of way, one might suggest that if this volume is indicative of the views of Council members (though not necessarily the official views of the Council), then that supposed link between the Council on Foreign Relations and the Department of State to which Shoup and Minter point perhaps would have a certain raison d'être.

University of Southern California RANDOLPH C. KENT

Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: The Limits of Presidential Power. By Maeva Marcus *New York: Columbia University Press. 1977. 390 pp. $18.70.*

IN 1952 the Truman administration had reached its lowest point, saddled with responsibility for the undeclared war in Korea, unpopular with the public and increasingly resented in Congress, and burdened with an elaborate apparatus, designed to stabilise wages and prices, which seemed ineffective in controlling an inflation-threatened economy. When, in this situation, the steel companies resisted the wage demands of the steelworkers' union, the government's compromise settlement proved unacceptable to the employers. To resolve the problem, President Truman, by executive order, took the steel mills under government control, hoping by this means to maintain uninterrupted steel production, to keep the men at work, and to shock the companies into acquiescence. His justification was the inherent power of the President and Commander-in-Chief, under Article II of the Constitution, to act in what was, owing to the Korean intervention, a national emergency.

Claiming irreparable injury, the steel companies fought the seizure to the Supreme Court. Some observers believed that the Court would decline to act, on the grounds that it had no power to judge the President's action; Truman expected to be upheld by a Court which had, for years, condoned the expansion of presidential power. The Court did nothing of the kind. Although Chief Justice Vinson and two other justices held that national security justified Truman's action, the remaining six members of the Court, with Black and Douglas the most condemnatory, held that the military power of the Commander-in-Chief could not extend to the seizure of the steel mills, and that the President's inherent power could not be used to undertake legislative action more properly reserved to Congress. The President promptly returned the steel mills to their owners, the unions went on strike, and fifty-three days later a settlement was reached which differed only in detail from that originally proposed.

The decision was immediately recognised as highly important, and hindsight confirms that view. The Court was to embark on the line of positive interventionist activity which characterised the Warren period. More particularly, it was to assert its prerogative, not merely against the President,

but also, in the crucially important reapportionment decisions of the 1960s, against Congress as well. And when the doctrine of inherent power reached its apogee under Nixon, the Court made clear that the limitations on executive action were to be respected.

Dr. Marcus has recorded the complexities of the steel seizure case with clarity, explaining the political and industrial background, summarising the lawyers' briefs, and commenting relevantly on the various judicial opinions. She perhaps limits herself too closely to the case itself; a more analytical discussion of the nature of constitutional authority and executive power would have been helpful. It is, however, difficult to disagree with her conclusion that, while Truman deserves sympathy—what else could he do?—the decision that presidential action could be reviewed by the Courts marked a significant stage in the modern constitutional history of the United States.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge GERARD EVANS

Canadian Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea. Edited by Barbara Johnson and Mark W. Zacher. *Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 1977. 387 pp. $19.00. Pb: $6.50.*

So much has been written about American views on the law of the sea that it is salutary and refreshing to read of the contrasting attitudes and positions of the United States' great neighbour. Canada is fortunate in that it has an immense coast-line (eight of the ten provinces face the sea), off-shore oil and minerals, profuse coastal stocks of fish, and an ecologically unique territory in the Arctic, possibly rich in oil, that it naturally wants to preserve. Its specific problems are that it has border disputes with three neighbours, there are federal/provincial jurisdictional disputes, only partially resolved, which hamper oil and mineral exploitation, and its fishing communities, virtually confined to coastal fishing, have political importance which must not be disregarded. Canada is not a global naval power and therefore has not the same keen interest in free passage through straits. As far as the exploitation of deep-sea-bed minerals is concerned, Canada, mindful of its land-based nickel production, is interested only in the long term, and not as an immediate participant These factors help to explain why it has pursued a different policy from the United States at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS) while avoiding direct confrontation.

The authors of this valuable and informative book, all hailing from the University of British Columbia, show how Canada emerged as the leader of the coastal states at UNCLOS, seeking to extend jurisdiction over fisheries, sea-bed resources, scientific research and pollution control within a 200-mile economic zone and sometimes beyond. In this role Canada found itself opposed to many of its traditional allies among the developed nations and has aligned itself with the coastal developing nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It sympathises with the developing countries in that like many of them it has an economy based on heavy exports and is dependent on a powerful ' metropole ', i.e. the United States. Since UNCLOS vastly favoured the coastal states, Canada could easily maintain its tradi-

tional approval of international conferences and work steadily for this conference's success.

The domestic and external political implications of Canada's policy and attitudes are well plotted. M. Trudeau took the line that national interests must come first, although Canada knew how to give way gracefully on a number of issues and was always willing to compromise. But national interests entailed showing scant sympathy for the developing land-locked countries, deserving though they are. Fear of disadvantaged European and Caribbean fishermen may have been at work here, but it gives a slight tarnish to Canada's reputation as a protector of struggling nations.

But Canada's position at UNCLOS is shown to be more neutral than one might expect. Of the seventeen formal proposals it sponsored between 1971 and 1975, Canada made eight alone and co-sponsored nine. The high multilateral score indicated an effort to find allies wherever possible, not only with the developing countries.

Some complexities remain. Thus Canada was in favour at UNCLOS of the compulsory settlement of disputes, yet it had earlier (1970) passed an act amending the 1929 declaration which accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The cynical may aver that Canada is in favour of the observance of international law, so long as that law is codified in its favour. But at least the problem that produced this ambiguity of attitude is a real one, namely the legal status of the North-West Passage, an issue lying mainly between the United States and Canada. The authors give a fine and full account of the 'Manhattan' incident when an American tanker attempted to test the feasibility of passage from Alaska to the eastern United States by way of the North-West Passage. The legal status of the Arctic archipelago was described as 'fuzzy', the Canadians claiming the territory as 'internal waters', as well as appealing to historic usage and the 'archipelago theory'. Finally in 1972 Canada passed the Arctic Waters Act which established a 100-mile pollution zone, entailing the setting of shipping standards, an act which much incensed the United States. Canada steadfastly refused to agree that the Arctic strait should be treated as an international waterway without any state control. The authors skilfully plot the series of steps whereby Canada gained its main objective at UNCLOS III, namely the right of a coastal state to prescribe pollution control standards in ice-covered waters (the Arctic exception).

There is so much of pith and moment in this book that it will not easily be superseded. A minor criticism is that the non-Canadian reader would welcome some speculation as to the effect the possible secession of Quebec may have on these issues. Another is that the maps, though good, are too few in number.

Chatham House AUDREY PARRY

LATIN AMERICA

Latin America in the International Political System. By G. Pope Atkins. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1977. 448 pp. £9·00.*

PROFESSOR POPE ATKINS has produced a book which attempts to fill 'a gap in the scholarly literature dealing with the international relations of Latin

America' (p. xiii). It must be said at once that he has largely succeeded. This is a substantially comprehensive examination of a subject which cannot be covered simply by recounting and studying the relations of the governments of the area with each other and with those of the rest of the world. Professor Pope Atkins believes that to do the job properly it is necessary also to study the roles of what he calls 'Nonstate Actors' which include not only global international bodies like the League of Nations and the United Nations and its many agencies, not only regional organisations such as the European Economic Community and those within the western hemisphere itself (the Organisation of American States, the Latin American Free Trade Association, the Central American Common Market and the Andean Group), but also other international groups such as those of the communist countries and the British Commonwealth, not forgetting the Roman Catholic Church, international business, labour organisations and guerrilla groups. All this Professor Pope Atkins does with admirable objectivity; he does not hesitate to make sharp criticism of United States governmental and private action in Latin America.

It is not perhaps surprising that in so large a canvas there are some curious omissions. For example, there is no reference to the Roca-Runciman agreement of crucial importance to Argentina after the British Commonwealth Ottawa Conference of 1932. There is no mention of the strike of forty thousand United Front Company workers in Honduras in 1954 to which the company had to yield after over three months of heavy losses. There is no recognition of the fact that Colombian troops, albeit a small contingent, fought in Korea, and formed a part of the United Nations peace-keeping force in the Suez Canal area. Few scholars will be satisfied with the simplistic account of the revolt which led to the independence of Panama in 1903 (not 1907, p. 215). Some may be surprised that the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* is not mentioned under *Americanismo* (pp. 275 281) and receives only a cursory reference earlier in the book (p. 43). Though Henry Meiggs is mentioned (p. 135) nothing is said of his extensive bribery, not least of the corrupt Peruvian President José Balta. But these are minor blemishes in an otherwise comprehensive and remarkably objective study. Even Philip Agee's book, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*,[1] 'deserves special mention as an authoritative and detailed account of clandestine activities in Latin America' (p. 230).

Scholars may applaud, but many general readers will deplore, Professor Pope Atkins's insistence on what he calls 'systems theory'. As he himself writes, when applied to international politics, it 'raises some methodological problems' (p. 6). Unfortunately it also leads to tedious theorising and verbose academic jargon, not to mention a great deal of otherwise unnecessary repetition. When Professor Pope Atkins prepares a new edition—and the book certainly deserves one—he might do well to forget the theory and stick to the facts and their background explanation. It would then be an even more valuable book than it already is.

The bibliography is impressively massive and the index is competent.

J. A. CAMACHO

[1] London: Allen Lane, 1975 (A Penguin Original).

Urban Latin America: The Political Condition from Above and Below. By Alejandro Portes and John Walton. *Austin, London: University of Texas Press. 1976. 217 pp. £9·10.*

THERE can be few justifications for yet another survey of the immense literature on Latin American urbanisation unless it can offer a radically different theoretical perspective. Portes and Walton attempt to do this by marrying two hitherto unrelated aspects of urban research: the politically disadvantaged and the political decision makers.

The book consists of four essays, two by each author, and a conclusion. Portes's contribution offers an excellent overview of the processes of urbanisation in the colonial period, the republican era and under modern capitalism. There is some timely debunking of popular myths about squatters, and the empirical material is synthesised in some extremely useful up-to-date comparative tables. Portes moves easily between the analysis of micro-processes at the neighbourhood level and the wider structures and processes which create them. He uses a jargon-free radical framework which sees urban patterns in Latin America as a reflection of an interaction between political and economic structures. With regard to modern cities his thesis is that while foreign capital concentrates its activities in the metropoles, accelerating internal migration, domestic capital for various reasons seeks refuge in real estate speculation, producing artificially high land values and impeding access to living space for powerless groups. Disparities in living standards within these cities is thus analysed in terms of competition for land by unequally endowed political groups rather than in terms of migrant-native differentiation, or subcultures of poverty. The extent and nature of political action amongst the under-privileged is interpreted as a pragmatic response to forms of pressure and manipulation by the urban elites.

Presumably Walton's role is then to examine the basis of urban elite structure in order to complement and complete the analysis. Unfortunately this section of the book does not match the precision and clarity of the first part. Although Walton's essays contain some useful comparative detail on the different social bases of urban elites, he is unable to account for these differences adequately. The work is static and empiricist in emphasis and there is a tendency to reify political structures. Therefore one is unable to get a feeling for the way in which vested interests emerge and change in response to changes in the macro-structures, and there is little analysis of the interaction between decision makers and the disadvantaged. There is, for example, no discussion of the participation of the urban elites in the land market, so emphasised by Portes as a crucial cause of inequality.

In spite of these weaknesses, the book represents a good attempt to relate two sectors together, and it offers excellent material in terms of inter-city comparisons and reviews of the literature.

University of Essex ALISON M. SCOTT

United States Penetration of Brazil. By Jan Knippers Black. *Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1977. 313 pp. £11·50.*

THIS book is a study of influence that American officials and organisations brought to bear between 1960 and the present on the armed forces and

police, large concerns, political parties, news media and regional development agencies in Brazil. It concentrates on the actions undertaken by agents of the United States government, in concert with agents of American private interests, in the name of 'security', to impede the progress of popular movements which were not favourably disposed towards foreign investment. United States policy is viewed not as commonly understood guidelines for action, but as a multitude of self-serving interpretations of the national interest by agencies and individuals with sometimes common and sometimes diverging interests. The author, a foreign affairs analyst, uses US Congressional hearings and reports, articles and newspapers originating in the United States and Brazil as well as in Hispanic America and Europe; books and speeches by the formulators of American and Brazilian policies, and participants in bilateral programmes and extensive interviews with leading American and Brazilian officials and private individuals. The first section summarises the background to the Brazilian coup of March 1964 and delineates some of the weaknesses of the Brazilian political system; the second traces the strengthening of some and the undermining of other political groups putatively by American influences. The third section deals with the interaction of United States and Brazilian military elites and describes common attitudes and interests. The final section addresses the question of which interests have actually been served by American activities and influence in Brazil

The book throughout postulates its themes with lucidity. The second and third sections are of most interest to the student of Brazilian affairs. The second contains a fascinating description of the American 'islands of sanity' policy whereby in the early 1960s assistance was concentrated on those state governments held to be pro-United States and anti-Goulart. The third section describes with great clarity the close relationship between the military establishments of the two countries Despite these virtues, however, the author's partiality must be viewed with caution. Some of the sources quoted are known as severe critics of the Brazilian government; they include Professor Celso Furtado, former head of the Superintendency for North East Development (SUDENE); Sr Márcio Moreira Alves, whose statements in Congress partly prompted the 1968 coup; and quotations from Philip Agee's *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*

The economic section on pages 239–47 makes no attempt to draw data from international or official Brazilian sources and gives no credit for the considerable progress achieved by post-1964 administrations for maintaining a high economic growth rate, lowering inflation, and strengthening the balance of payments. Little mention is made of political developments in 1975 and 1976, particularly of President Geisel's plans for gradual political liberalisation. The bias of the author is exemplified by the statement on page 252 that 'the individual, assuming that he can provide for his physical needs, is secure only as long as he is not suspected of being unsympathetic to the military regime or of having unsympathetic friends or relatives'. In sum, this is an interesting and well-written but flawed book, and its value as a reference work must be doubted.

ROBIN CHAPMAN

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

A Dictionary of the European Economic Community. By John Paxton. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 287 pp. £7·50.*

THE Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC came into force twenty years ago and there is now a need for a dictionary of the multitude of new abbreviations, acronyms and concepts, and of other related organisations which have come into being since then. On the whole, the present volume fulfils this need and in addition includes a useful chronology of the most important events in the life of the Community. There are, however, some curious entries (Napoleon I and Hitler for example) and it is doubtful whether economic profiles of EFTA members are worth including. One important omission is EMU. However there are sufficient items of interest and importance to justify having this work as a desk-side reference book.

Chatham House D. H.

Africa South of the Sahara 1977–78. *London: Europa. 1977. 1,183 pp. £19·00.*

A VERY great deal of useful and up-to-date information is contained in the most recent edition of this survey. Part 1 is made up of ten articles on the area as a whole. Part 2 is devoted to regional organisations, Part 3 to a country-by-country survey and Part 4 includes amongst other things a who's who in Africa south of the Sahara. It is convenient to have set out in a table the dates when the countries gained independence. The chapter on primary commodities is a good introduction to the subject.

Chatham House D. H.

Africa Contemporary Record. Vol. 9: Annual Survey and Documents 1976–1977. Edited by Colin Legum. *London: Rex Collings; New York: Africana Publishing. 1977. £25·00.*

THE latest issue of this annual maintains the high standard of its predecessors. Part 1 includes excellent articles on such subjects as the Organisation of African Unity and Soviet and Chinese policies towards Africa. Part 2 is a country-by-country review and Part 3 contains texts of documents arranged by subject and statistical information.

Chatham House D. H.

NEW PERIODICAL

ABSEES: Abstracts for Soviet and East European Economic Studies. Vol. 8, No. 1, September 1977. Director: Michael Kaser. Editor: Nikola Djurisic. *Published by Oxford Microfilm Publications, Blue Boar Street, Oxford for NASEES, in three annual issues per volume.*

EACH issue has about 100 pages of printed bibliographic entries and short descriptions arranged by country and subject; these refer the reader to nine microfiches, one for each country, in which full abstracts in English

are often supported by source documents. This information service revives and continues, under the same editorial board, the well-known abstracting journal published until November 1976 from Glasgow University. The new format allows considerable expansion—1,000 pages per issue—at reasonable cost, and coverage in greater depth of economics-related current affairs in Eastern Europe. The layout is designed for scanning and quick reference as well as for ease of reading. The subject index is cumulated annually. All back issues are available on microfiche and future expansion is planned. Full details and samples available from the publishers.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

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VERWEY, Wil D.: *Riot Control Agents and Herbicides in War*: Their Humanitarian, Toxicological, Ecological, Military, Polemological, and Legal Aspects. Leiden: Sijthoff. 1977. 377 pp. Fl. 135.00, $54.00

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BOOKS REVIEWED, APRIL 1978

CORRESPONDENCE

From Professor Robert R. Kaufman.

Dear Editor,

In his review of my monograph, *Transitions to Stable Authoritarian-Corporate Regimes: The Chilean Case?* (*International Affairs*, July 1977, p. 540), Mr. J. A. Camacho reports his impression that I have 'some sympathy' for the Pinochet regime. This impression is utterly incorrect. I regard the 1973 coup and the subsequent years of military rule as a major tragedy for Chile and for the rest of the world. The primary purpose of my monograph was not to condemn Chilean military rule, but to understand its causes and prospects. Nevertheless, my attitude toward the regime is reflected in references to the 'extraordinary violence' with which it seized power (p. 38); to its 'particularly brutal . . . repression' (p. 57); and to other such phrases scattered throughout the text.

Sincerely,
ROBERT R. KAUFMAN

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TO 1985

THE following two contributions continue *International Affairs*' series of articles prepared in connection with Chatham House's current programme on the external policy options facing Britain during the period up to 1985. Previous contributions appeared in the issues of October, 1977 and January 1978.

IV: BRITAIN AND THE ARMS TRADE*

Lawrence Freedman

FEW policy areas reflect more clearly the changing orientation of British foreign policy than that of arms sales. The cares and concerns of a great colonial power, with definite territorial interests to protect in the various regions of the world and a general sense of responsibility for international peace and stability, have given way to the imperatives of trade. The greatest priority is to hold on to and if possible expand existing markets for manufactured goods after the years of decline. If one of the world markets where the opportunities seem considerable is that for armaments, then there must be a major effort to seize these opportunities. The impression is of a policy of 'commercial pragmatism',[1] in which arms are sold to all potential clients unless there is an extremely good reason not to. Where once only surplus equipment was made available to deserving cases, complaints can now be heard that the British forces are having to make do with obsolete equipment while the most modern items go to meet export orders. Where once foreign policy would have been taken as a guide to the pattern of arms sales, it now appears as a constraint, ruling out potentially lucrative markets, for example in South Africa.

Whatever the economic incentives, there are limits to the extent to which instruments designed to kill, maim and destroy can be treated simply as marketable commodities. Armaments are a key currency in international politics as well as international trade. The benefits to employment and the balance of payments might be re-

* This article is based on one section of a detailed study, *Arms Production in the United Kingdom: Problems and Prospects*, copies of which are available from Chatham House. Orders, with a remittance for £4·95, should be addressed to the Publications Officer at the Institute.

[1] The phrase is Anthony Sampson's, *The Arms Bazaar* (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1977).

inforced by political benefits, in terms of enhanced influence with the client, but it could alternatively be negated by political costs, in terms of identification with a feared and unpopular state or assistance to a potential enemy. The aim of this article is to explore the role of arms sales in contemporary British foreign policy. It is concerned both with deliberate acts of policy designed to regulate trade and with the less deliberate but often significant political consequences that can result from a policy of commercial pragmatism.

This is one of those sensitive areas in which members of the government confine their remarks to generalities and are extremely restrained in their release of information. In the annual Defence Estimates a figure is given covering sales arranged by the government and another, which is a broad estimate, covering those commercial sales which have been monitored in Whitehall. Only the barest details, and often none at all, are made available on individual deals. The secrecy is ostensibly out of deference to the clientèle's desire for anonymity. No disaggregated figures are provided indicating sales by type of weapon or region. For any understanding of what sort of British weapons are going where one has to turn to private or non-British sources which are themselves not wholly satisfactory.[2] Because the available informa-

Table 1

Receipts from Arms Sales
(£m)

	Government	Industry	Total
1966/67	50	102	152
1967/68	55	110	165
1968/69	71	143	214
1969/70	76	151	227
1970/71	78	157	235
1971/72	73	169	242
1972/73	92	165	257
1973/74	128	297	425
1974/75	147	321	468
1975/76	159	371	530
1976/77	184	416	600
1977/78	190	600	790
1978/79 [a]	301	600	901

[a] Estimate.

Source: Defence Estimates 1977 and 1978; *Hansard*, Dec. 6, 1976; March 14, 1977; Feb. 8, 1978 (Lords).

[2] In compiling any statistics there are problems in deciding on what to count—only major pieces of hardware or parachutes and uniforms or essential support services or military hospitals; and when to count it—when the order is placed, contract signed,

tion is so sparse and fragmentary, the first half of this article is concerned with a description of Britain's participation in the arms trade and the effects of likely developments in the international armaments market on this participation.

Britain in the arms trade

By far the world's major supplier of arms is the United States. As President Carter noted in May 1977: 'Total arms sales in recent years have risen to over $20 billion, and the United States accounts for more than one-half of this amount.' It is generally felt that next in the league table of suppliers comes the Soviet Union, followed by France and then by Britain. Strict comparability is extremely difficult because the quality of national statistics varies enormously.

Figures produced by the Ministry of Defence indicate that after a sluggish performance in the early 1970s, British sales have grown considerably through the decade, even allowing for inflation. This trend is confirmed by the ACDA figures which show the value of British arms deliveries doubling between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s. However, the ACDA figures suggest sales running at half the level of the Ministry of Defence figures. This may be accounted for by the exclusion of sales of support services and the attribution of value only at the point of delivery.[8]

The Ministry of Defence forecasts an income from arms sales in the 1977/78 period of £790 million and estimates that the comparable figure will be £901 million in 1978/79. This represents some 25 per

items delivered or payments made. Thus the most thorough source for comparative data, the publication of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* includes all weapons and ammunition, and even smaller items such as uniforms, but excludes training, services, consumables and construction which are generally felt to cover an additional 24 per cent of world expenditures and for Britain may even constitute a greater percentage of total sales. ACDA's figures are based on estimates of the value of deliveries of arms rather than new orders. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) maintain registers of arms transfers which concentrate on the major contracts. SIPRI make estimates of total sales based on the value of major weapons that have been physically transferred during a given year. The value is determined by a standard price list for the main types of weapons expressed in constant 1975 dollars. Official British figures on non-government sales refer to whatever the Ministry of Defence has noticed and appear to represent actual receipts rather than new orders or the value of deliveries.

[8] Note the discrepancy between SIPRI and ACDA figures on British sales. Both refer to the value of weapons actually delivered in a given year, though the SIPRI figures include only major systems transferred to the Third World while ACDA includes all equipment to all countries:

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
ACDA (constant 1974 $)	264	106	216	363	366	463	346	..	..
SIPRI (constant 1975 $)	348	185	393	369	316	579	647	587	680

Many feel that Ministry of Defence figures if anything underestimate the value of arms sales. In 1976 the stockbrokers, Greene & Co., estimated that the value of British arms sales in 1975 could have been as high as £800 million, excluding 'software' such as trucks and uniforms, against official figures for 1975/76 of £530 million.

cent of the total business of the British defence industry and 3·5 per cent of total British exports. Export contracts provide direct employment for 70-80,000 people and indirectly contribute to the employment of another 100,000.[4] The economic benefits are concentrated in the aerospace, shipbuilding and electronics industry. About a quarter of the sales of the aerospace industry take the form of export of military goods and services.

Existing orders should ensure that the defence industry is kept busy for the next few years. Though the values of the deals identified in Table 2 have to be treated with some caution, major orders secured in 1977 appear to be worth over £1 billion, especially when the £500 million contract to develop, maintain and support the Royal Saudi Air Force is included. Orders taken by the beginning of May 1978 may have topped £500 million, again helped substantially by a Saudi order, this time a £300 million deal with Cable and Wireless for the supply and installation of a complete telecommunications system

Table 2

Major Identified Arms Agreements 1977–78

Recipient	Approx. Date of Agreement	System	Quantity	Approx. Cost to Recipient ($m)	Expected Date of Delivery
Australia	Early 1977	Blindfire Radars	10	42	—
Bahamas	June 1977	Patrol Boats	5	8	—
Botswana	1977	Britten-Norman Defender	3	—	—
Denmark	Sept. 1977	Lynx Helicopter	7	17	—
Dubai	April 1978	Scorpion Vehicles	—	—	—
Egypt	1977	HS-748-28 Transport	12	—	—
(Arab Organisation for Industrialisation)	Nov. 1977	Overhaul of Mig-21s	—	—	—
	Dec. 1977	Swingfire ATGW	—	75	—
	March 1978	Lynx Helicopters	280	600	—
	Jan. 1978	Patrol Boats	—	280	—
Finland	1977	Hawk Trainer	50	240	1980
Holland	Jan. 1978	Lynx Helicopters	8	20	—
Honduras	April 1978	Scorpion Vehicles	—	—	—
India	June 1977	SeaKing Helicopter	5	—	—
Indonesia	April 1978	Hawk Trainer	8	46	—
Iran	1977	Naval Supply Vessels	4	150	1981
	1977	Base Workshop for Tanks	—	136	—
	1977	Tank Transporters	1,000	170	—

[4] *Hansard*, Oct. 19, 1976.

Recipient	Approx. Date of Agreement	System	Quantity	Approx. Cost to Recipient ($m)	Expected Date of Delivery
Jamaica	1977	Britten-Norman Defender	1	—	—
Kenya	1977	BAC-167 Strikemaster	6	—	—
	1977	Britten-Norman Defender	2	—	—
Kuwait	Mid-1977	Fast Patrol Boats	10	180	—
Malaysia	1977	GKN Armoured Personnel Carrier	—	—	—
Mauritius	1977	Britten-Norman Defender	4	—	—
Nigeria	1977	Scottish Aviation Bulldog	12	—	1978
Oman	March 1977	Logistics Support Ship	1	—	1979
Saudi Arabia	Sept. 1977	Support/training Airforce	—	900	1978–83
	April 1978	Telecommunications	—	600	1978–83
Sri Lanka	1977	Fast Patrol Boat	5	—	—
Thailand	April 1978	Scorpion Vehicles	—	—	—
United States	April 1978	Radio Development (Marconi)	—	—	—
		Radio Development (Plessey)	—	—	—

Source: *Military Balance*: 1977–78 (London: IISS); *SIPRI Yearbook on World Armaments and Disarmament 1977* and *1978* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). Personal files.

for the Saudi National Guard. How much it will be possible to sustain this export growth, and in what particular areas, is dependent upon developments in the international market.

The major markets are those of the less-developed countries. Industrial countries have higher defence budgets but, on the whole, import far less. Germany, France, Italy and Norway all produce 75 per cent or more of their own equipment. The less-developed countries have lower budgets but import much more. American estimates suggest that over the past decade less-developed countries, as a whole, have imported 2½ times as much as developed countries. These markets are of particular concern to Britain. According to ACDA figures, in the 1966-75 period around three quarters of Britain's arms sales were to non-Nato countries, which in the arms trade essentially means developing countries. Britain sells far less to Nato than either France or Germany while outselling them both in the Middle East.[5] Because the markets

[5] Total French sales put on a spurt in 1977. New orders reported total some $5.75 billion, an increase of about a half over 1976. Germany has desisted from selling arms outside Europe until recently. With sales of submarines to Argentina and Iran in the offing, there are signs that this policy is changing.

of the developed and the developing world have distinct characteristics they can be examined separately.

(i) Developed countries. The opportunities for sales to the larger European countries are limited. These countries tend to be conscious of the needs of their own armaments industries. When a particular item cannot be handled adequately on a national basis the inclination in the first instance is to collaborate with one or more allies rather than buy off-the-shelf from another country. Germany has been an important market in the past but it is becoming increasingly self-sufficient. Despite 'best endeavours' clauses concerning purchases of British goods in German agreements to offset the costs of BAOR, actual purchases have been at an extremely low level.[6]

After the war Britain enjoyed a close relationship with the armed forces of many of the smaller European states. Over time these countries have moved away from Britain to the United States as a source of modern equipment at reasonable prices. Thus from an immediate post war position as the sole supplier of military equipment to Norway, Britain is now down to a mere 5 per cent. Opportunities for reversing this trend may come as a result of moves towards greater European solidarity in military procurement, as evidenced by the Independent European Programme Group.[7]

Another area which may be more promising in the future than it has been in the past is that of the United States. The American market for military goods has been one of the most protected in world trade. The 'Buy America Act' has prohibited the Defense Department from buying foreign-produced equipment unless the price is 50 per cent lower than the price of comparable American-made goods, which, given the economies of scale regularly enjoyed by American firms supplying the Defense Department, has not happened frequently. It has only been when there have been no comparable American goods that there has been a readiness to make use of a European product (as with the Harrier). Out of recognition that such an attitude is inimical to Alliance solidarity some effort has been made to open up the American market. In September 1975 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Britain and the United States which allowed British firms to compete on more or less equal terms with American companies for American orders. This official enthusiasm for a 'two-way' trade between America and Europe has not been matched by Congress and the services. Furthermore, there is some

[6] See Lawrence Freedman, 'Britain's Contribution to Nato', *International Affairs* January 1978 Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 40–41.

[7] *Sunday Times*, April 30, 1978 reports discussions of defence contracts worth some £300 million with Norway, including Lynx helicopters, Rapier SAMs and submarines. Substantial offsets would be required.

suspicion in Europe that American interest will be at the level of combat bridges and trucks or else, if a superior European technology is involved, the licence will be purchased. The most promising avenue for British firms is likely to be consortia with American firms. Thus in April 1978 both Plessey and GEC Marconi, in conjunction with American firms, won contracts for the development of battlefield communications systems.

Nato countries are all committed, in principle if not in practice, to an annual 3 per cent rise in real terms in their defence budgets. Such a rise can only barely keep pace with the escalating costs of new equipment, and if the 1980s is a 'low growth' decade the necessary funds may be hard to find. There is no reason to expect any expansion in the Nato market, though on occasion a country (such as Canada at the moment) may embark on a spending spree to modernise obsolescent forces.

(ii) **Developing countries.** The growth in demand for arms in the Third World is normally associated with the flow of funds into member countries of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) after the 1973–74 oil price rises. However, there was a significant growth in arms sales before 1973, a consequence of Western encouragement of friendly countries in the Third World to take on greater responsibility for their own security. As the economic and political costs of basing large military forces overseas grew, indigenous forces were developed based on local manpower and imported sophisticated equipment. This policy can be seen in the 1970 'Nixon Doctrine' and, by implication, in the British withdrawal from East of Suez. A final factor, originating in the mid-1960s, has been the commercial desire of Western countries to improve their balance of payments. An aggressive American sales policy helped to create a climate of fierce competition for large orders which the British and the French felt they had to meet. The setting up of the Defence Sales Organisation within the Ministry of Defence in 1965, to promote British military wares, was one response to this challenge. The competition for this growing market was intensified by the flow of petrodollars into the Middle East and the desire of the Western powers to regain some of them through a trade in arms.[8]

Since 1974 the OPEC countries have been responsible for some 75 per cent of all new military orders, thus creating a sense of 'boom'. While other nations were more circumspect, between 1974 and 1975

[8] The Soviet Union has responded to similar impulses. There is a considerable desire for foreign exchange, though Soviet sales are more closely tied to foreign policy. CIA estimates of October 1977 valued Soviet delivery of arms to the Third World during 1976 at $2·25 billion and new sales agreements at $2·34 billion.

the Shah of Iran ordered 400 warplanes, 500 helicopters, 730 tanks, 18 warships and thousands of missiles.[9]

Doubts have been raised over whether Iran can absorb this equipment let alone order much more. There are signs that the developing countries are rapidly reaching saturation point as far as imports for their own armed forces are concerned. The inflow of military equipment has put a strain on their social and economic development. After ambitious military build-ups, some of the OPEC countries are loaded with equipment which they find difficult to master and for which they have paid out a large portion of their oil revenues. Future buying is liable to be more restrained. A 1977 American report on sales to the Third World noted: 'From the 1974 peak of $21 billion, Third World procurement from all sources in 1975 dropped 20 per cent and in 1976 another 15 per cent . . . Unless major political, economic or military developments upset this trend, the CIA projects that worldwide new orders may level off at $10–$15 billion annually by 1890.'[10] It is important to remember that it will be some time before a decline in orders is reflected in actual deliveries and thus receipts.

One factor relevant to the future is that a number of developing countries, as many as fifteen, have embarked on schemes to build up the indigenous production of equipment. These countries include those that have most reason to be anxious about dependency on outside sources for arms, such as South Korea, Israel and Egypt. One of the more ambitious schemes is that of the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI) made up of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Many observers doubt whether such programmes have much chance of success, given the scale of the initial investment required and the demands placed on scarce technical resources. Success is possible in the area of small arms and light equipment but unlikely with the more sophisticated items. However, the effort is being made and some Third-World arms producers have now become arms exporters in their own right.[11] When asked to transfer technology to a country that has the capability to exploit it fully, companies are liable to think twice before agreeing. A number of recent deals have involved sales of licences, for example. Swingfire

[9] Michael T. Klare, 'Hoist with our Own Pahlavi', *The Nation*, Jan. 31, 1976. Cited in Anne Hessing Cahn, Joseph J. Kruzel, Peter H. Dawkins and Jacques Huntzinger, *Controlling Future Arms Trade* (New York: McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1977), p. 89. This book provides a thorough discussion of many of the issues raised in this article.

[10] US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Report to Congress on Arms Transfer Policy*, July 1977 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 11.

[11] Israel, if defined as a less-developed country, tops the list followed by Iran, Jordan, Libya and Brazil. Detailed information on trends in this direction is found in the *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1978* (London: Taylor & Francis, for SIPRI, 1978). Sales of tanks to Iran and India involve local production as do warships in Latin America.

ATGW and the Lynx helicopter to the AOI. If India decides that it requires the Jaguar aircraft, it is expected to seek a partnership, in which 60 to 70 per cent of the parts needed will be manufactured in India and in which Indian-made spares will be sold back to Britain.

Some sort of help to local infant industries tends to be a feature of most arms sales whether to developed or underdeveloped countries. Because it is a buyer's market and is liable to remain so, salesmen have to offer concessions on local production. Alternatively, or additionally, some sort of offset agreement is required to compensate for the outflow of foreign exchange. In order to sell Hawk trainers to Finland, Hawker Siddeley had to arrange offsetting sales of civilian goods from Finland. Iran has been extremely keen on barter arrangements, selling oil for arms.

Of greater foreign-policy relevance is the requirement, largely from less-developed countries, for assistance in military training and support. Given the general desire in developing countries to strengthen indigenous defence capacity, an important element in recent deals has been concerned with infrastructure. This element is difficult to quantify and is often neglected in both official and unofficial statistics. In American sales agreements signed in 1976, of those to the Near East and South Asia, worth $5,705·4 million, some 44 per cent were for supporting services, while in agreements with European countries, supporting services accounted for just over 4 per cent.[12] It would seem that the trend is also reflected in British sales. The head of Defence Sales, Sir Ronald Ellis, has been quoted as saying: 'The really big money is coming from military building projects—runways, hangars, laboratories, hospitals, arms factories and repair shops . . . but selling technology is becoming even more important.'[13]

One example of this comes from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have been moving carefully on purchases of hardware, preferring to invest in military construction to the extent of some 64 per cent of total expenditure (the comparable figure for Iran is under 20 per cent). In 1977 Britain was awarded a major contract for the maintenance and support of the Royal Saudi Air Force. It is a follow-on to a 1973 agreement which was in itself a result of the sale of Lightning aircraft in the 1960s. The deal is said to be worth some £500 million, and perhaps a lot more in the long run. The prime contractor is British Aerospace, but some 750 other companies might benefit. Runways, taxiways, roads, hangars, radar sites, missile sites, houses, schools, hospitals, shops and clubs will have to be constructed, and there will be a need for ground engineering and maintenance. The contract may well lead

[12] US Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Report on Arms Transfer Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
[13] *Daily Express*, August 30, 1977.

to civilian work in Saudi Arabia, yet there is no guarantee that it will lead to the sales of British aircraft. In fact the Saudis are purchasing American aircraft. Nevertheless, with some 2,000 British personnel involved and a contract lasting till 1982, Britain has forged far stronger links wih Saudi Arabia than could ever have been made through the simple sale of items of military hardware.

The same phenomena is being repeated elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East. Sales of tanks to Iran and patrol boats to Egypt and Kuwait each bring with them a commitment to train and support the local forces for some time to come (it is usually estimated that it takes at least twice as long to train Third-World forces than those in industrialised countries, where the general level of technical education is much higher). Concern has been expressed in the United States over the lack of skilled, competent personnel in these countries. Target dates for completion of training in a variety of projects have had to be put back.

A final feature of Britain's participation in the arms trade is that it sells best at the lower end of the market—trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carriers, helicopters and patrol boats, rather than the most sophisticated aircraft and large warships. There are exceptions to this, such as frigates to Latin America and Jaguars to Oman and Ecuador. But there has not been a success story such as the French Mirage. Twice as many Mirage aircraft have been built for export as for home use. In some years sales of Mirages constituted 75 per cent of French arms exports. There are hopes that the Canadians may buy Tornado, but the potential market for such a plane is not large. Harrier made the breakthrough into the United States, but apart from Spain (and possibly Iran and China) there has been little interest elsewhere. In the future there is reason to expect a trend away from highly sophisticated items to more manageable and cost-effective systems. If so, Britain's strengths in the lower ends of the market may turn out to be an advantage.

Arms sales and military influence

In Britain at least sales are rarely portrayed now as instruments of an active foreign policy. In part this is a result of a general unwillingness and inability to play a global role. In part, also, it is a result of the relatively minor role Britain can play as an arms supplier. Unlike the super-powers it does not have large stocks of weapons and ammunition available to be turned over to or withheld from a needy client. British factories do not produce surplus equipment in the hope that a buyer will be found. Customers usually have to wait. British arms, by themselves, can rarely tilt the balance in a regional conflict,

especially when one (or both) of the super-powers is involved. Although, when considering sales, there is often a professed concern with a local regional balance, in practice this is hard to determine. In no other region of the world is there so neat and tidy a division between opposing forces as there is between East and West in Europe. The shifts in political leadership or alliances can often be rapid. For example, a persistent focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East can result in a neglect of other other rivalries building up in the area. Distinctions between defensive and offensive weapons are rarely so straightforward as they might appear, especially with land and sea systems. They have to be assessed in terms of the total strategic situation of the recipient. The supply of a defensive weapon might well have the result of releasing other equipment for offensive roles. It can even be difficult to distinguish between civilian and military goods. On the outbreak of war most countries will attempt to mobilise all national resources. Whatever the original purpose, a plane, ship or vehicle capable of carrying military equipment will often be expected to do so.

Once a contract has been signed, the potential influence of the supplier declines. As recipients pay for goods and services these days rather than accept them *gratis* as a form of assistance, they do not feel themselves answerable to the suppliers for their eventual use. All the supplier may be able to insist on is non-transfer to third parties, a restriction which traditionally has proved difficult to enforce. There is often continuing dependence upon the suppliers for ammunition and spare parts, but as Egypt, Somalia, Israel and Turkey have shown, countries will pay a heavy price to avoid letting this dependence influence their foreign policy. Britain cut off supplies to the combatants in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and in the Middle East wars. This is a clumsy form of action, for it means reversing foreign policy. The side that has been favoured before hostilities will suffer most from the denial of supplies. Apart from being clumsy it is usually no more than a gesture. Having sold arms, one cannot be too surprised when they are used.

Arms sales and the East-West conflict

The clearest foreign-policy criteria for assessing arms sales have been derived from East-West considerations. There is a long tradition of supplying arms to countries threatened by the Soviet Union or Soviet clients. As Britain became unable to accept direct responsibility for the security of former dependencies 'East of Suez', so arms sales became a substitute for a British presence.

Communist countries are excluded from arms sales and there is a

committee, made up of the Nato allies minus Iceland but including Japan and known as COCOM, which monitors commercial exports to ensure no military assistance or advanced technology is provided inadvertently. Of the avowedly communist countries only Yugoslavia is excluded from the list. COCOM recommendations are not binding and Britain has ignored a recommendation in the past in the case of the sale of Rolls-Royce Spey engines to China. COCOM has yet to make up its mind on the Sino-Soviet split. There are signs of a greater readiness to allow some sales to China. Britain is willing to consider the two communist giants in quite different lights, a tendency that will be confirmed if it agrees to sell warships or Harriers to China. Such deals are highly tentative at the moment and if a formal request comes from the Chinese, Britain will have to consider it in the context of its relationship with the Soviet Union as well as that with the United States. *Pravda* has already made it clear that such a deal would not be welcome. This would be the most politically charged arms sales issue facing Britain. Already the matter has aroused considerable controversy, with those attracted by the prospect of business for British firms plus a desire to bolster China against the 'common enemy' opposed by those concerned not to provoke the Soviet Union, with whom relaxed relations are crucial for the security of Europe.

Sales to China would represent one of the few examples of the use of arms sales as a positive instrument of foreign policy. There are other similar cases from recent years where arms sales have been used to encourage states to move away from the Soviet Union. The sales to Egypt from Britain and France have been quietly encouraged by the United States, which until 1978 felt more constrained on selling arms to Arab front-line states. Sales to the Sudan can be viewed in the same light. Sales to Somalia might have been viewed this way too were it not for suspicion concerning Somalia's ambitions, especially with regard to Kenya.

Arms sales and political associations

The case of Somalia illustrates a problem in attempting to influence regional affairs outside Europe. Local disputes have become more complicated and less related to East-West rivalries. The regard for Kenya indicates a readiness to take the needs of Commonwealth countries into account. Strategic reasons other than those connected with the East-West conflict have declined as Britain's overseas possessions have declined. In this sense the refusal to sell surplus light armoured vehicles to El Salvador, because of its support for Guatamalan claims against Belize, was unusual. There was also El Salvador's unimpressive

record on human rights to be taken into account (though if this was always to be a factor the number of sales would be cut drastically).

The most recognised problem with arms sales is that of becoming identified with the recipient, as supporters of a particularly unpleasant or disliked regime, or as an accomplice in military adventures. An arms sale is often taken as a statement of support for the recipient. For this reason Britain has avoided sales to the main 'pariah' regimes such as Chile, South Africa and Israel. (This is not an area where firms would be pleased to find themselves subject to an Arab boycott!) There were reports early in 1977 that a sale of Rapier missiles to Taiwan had been vetoed.

The obverse of this is the temptation to use arms sales to cultivate the *nouveaux riches* of the Third World, the major OPEC countries, many of which are beginning to exercise considerable influence in their regions. There are sound commercial reasons for this but the long-term implications of entering into close, though limited, military relationships with states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia do not appear to have been fully assessed. In the United States there has been some debate, generated by projections of large numbers of American civilians working on Iranian defence contracts (up to 150,000 by 1980), on the dangers of a close military connection with Iran developing in an unintended or uncontrolled fashion.[14] There is concern over American subjects being held hostage in some crisis or over the United States being led into a more general commitment to Iranian regional policies. In an emergency, pressure might be put on available Western personnel to man equipment even if they had no contractual obligations to do so. These concerns have not been discussed in Britain. The problem is not as great since less people are involved, but it is still there. Government contracts forbid technicians or service personnel acting in an advisory capacity to get involved in any fighting.

Apart from the danger of getting inadvertently tangled in the squabbles of the Gulf or of Africa, problems may arise from becoming too identified with conservative regimes, vulnerable to political change. A new government may well want arms and it may be considered advisable to maintain supplies even though the intentions of the new regime, and its ability to keep secrets, may be open to doubt. In some cases, as when Colonel Gaddafi seized control in Libya, it has been felt prudent to re-examine sales offers. If the contractual obligations are tight this option may not exist.

The main point is that whereas arms transfers may once have been viewed as a way of exercising influence in the world, their main

[14] US Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Staff Report on *US Military Sales to Iran* July 1976 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976).

strategic function now is to contribute to the independence of other states. These states may or may not remain friends and may or may not act with their new weapons in ways conforming to the standards or the foreign-policy objectives of the supplier. It is only when a country is changing its international political allegiances, or has suddenly attracted attention because of a booming economy or rich reserves of key raw materials, that arms sales can help to determine relations. On the whole, arms are sold to countries with whom reasonably amicable relations already exist. Though only limited political benefits can normally be expected from agreeing to sell arms, since this is seen in commercial terms, refusing to sell arms is a major political act. It appears as a calculated insult, reflecting on the stability, trust and credit-worthiness, or technical competence of the would-be recipient. When this would-be recipient can influence the price of oil or has money to spend on civilian goods, care is usually taken not to give offence.

International control of the arms trade

The flow of arms into the Third World during the 1970s has been of great concern as a global problem. It has already been noted that Britain's contribution to the problem is marginal compared with that of the super-powers. In fact, the major boost provided by Britain to the arms trade resulted from the withdrawal from East of Suez rather than from any acts of high-powered salesmanship on gullible Third-World potentates. It should also be noted that the recipients of arms do not see the problem to be as great as the suppliers (or as the non-recipients). When moves are made to control the world arms trade, Third-World countries complain bitterly about imperialist attempts to deny them modern means of defence and to keep them militarily backward. Nevertheless, countries that really do have better things on which to spend their money or occupy their educated manpower often feel it incumbent upon themselves to keep up with their neighbours in the sophistication of their armed forces. Any initiative for solving this problem must come from the United States. President Carter has committed himself to restraining the arms trade. His approach involves both a unilateral arms transfer policy and 'multilateral cooperation'.[15]

There are three key aspects to the unilateral approach. First, a discouragement of general activity geared to arms exporting, including prohibition of the development or modification of advanced weapons systems solely for export, of sales or co-production of advanced weapons

[15] Congressional Research Service, *Implications of President Carter's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy* (Washington: Library of Congress, Sept. 1977).

before they are operationally deployed with American forces, of the promotion of arms sales by embassies and military representatives abroad. This is unlikely to be accepted by Britain and France which are unashamedly anxious for new trade. Second, the setting up of mechanisms within the executive and legislative branches for extensive scrutiny of all proposals. This may not stop many sales but it does have the advantage of enforcing full discussion of the implications of particular deals. The third aspect is a commitment not to be 'the first supplier to introduce into a region newly-developed, advanced weapons systems which would create a new or significantly higher combat capability'.[16]

An agreement to restrict transfers of the more sophisticated weapons and technologies would seem to form the basis of the multilateral approach. Discussions with the Soviet Union, for whom arms sales are a crucial instrument of foreign policy, took place in December 1977, and there were preliminary consultations with the British and French in the spring of 1978. There are strong arguments in favour of such a policy, especially with regard to nuclear-capable weapons, though it should be noted that the areas where the most sophisticated aircraft and missiles would now appear as novelties are few and far between. Though Britain does not sell as much of the 'up-market' equipment as, say, France, adoption of this restriction would involve sacrifices. The Americans would regret sales of Jaguar to India because it would put pressure on them to reverse their decision not to sell comparable weapons to Pakistan. They would also like to see restraints on licensed production in less-developed countries because the dispersal of the relevant technologies will make it more difficult for the current suppliers to exercise control.

A second American aim is to get support for unilateral acts of restraint. That is, attempts to use American restraint as a British opportunity, such as the offer of the Nimrod early warning system to Iran when President Carter seemed likely to deny the Shah the Boeing AWACS, will not be considered helpful. The moral force of this policy will be determined by the amount of visible evidence of American restraint. If the United States does make a real dent on the volume of business it conducts in this trade through an act of policy rather than the natural decline in demand, there will be pressure on other suppliers to make their own contribution.[17]

It is unlikely that any serious controls can be developed without the

[16] President Carter. Statement on US Arms Sales Policy. Washington, May 19, 1977.

[17] It has only been by considerable manipulation of the figures that the Administration's commitment to keep the volume of arms sales for 1978 below a $9 billion ceiling has been met. $1.5 billion in sales to allied countries and approximately $2.5 billion in construction projects had to be excluded.

prior agreement and compliance of the major recipients. A suppliers' cartel would suffer from doubts about who to include, since so many countries are now capable of producing some military equipment, and there are considerable variations in the foreign policy as well as trading interests of the major suppliers. The recipients, however, have shown little inclination to support measures which restrict their military options. There may have been some progress at the UN Special Session on Disarmament. Britain has proposed a study of the problem, a modest enough measure which may still lack support from the recipients. Beyond that, Britain has proposed a 'regional approach' as the best method of multilateral restraint. The attempt to control demand would seem to make considerable sense but the omens are not encouraging. In Latin America, the 1974 Treaty of Ayacucho, on the limitation of imports and associated measures of demilitarization, has had absolutely no effect.

It is difficult to isolate arms sales from the complex of international relations. As President Carter has discovered, however virtuous in the abstract, threatening to turn off arms supplies can irritate clients who will often simply look elsewhere for supplies. It may be that the very availability of arms to be sold can stimulate an artificial demand, or that Third-World leaders can become infatuated by the size and quality of their armed forces to the detriment of their countries' economic development. On the whole, however, sales are a response to genuine demand. Until measures can be found to dampen the demand, the sales will continue.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TO 1985

V: FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT*

Asher Winegarten and John Malcolm

MUCH concern has been expressed in recent years over the state of world food supplies. The 1970s began with quite considerable stocks of grain and other foodstuffs after a decade during which world food supplies had easily kept pace with the growth of effective demand; the early 1970s therefore saw some deliberate moves by producing countries such as the United States to begin to run down their stocks. From 1973 to 1975 successive harvest shortfalls, coupled with the inflationary effects of the oil price explosion, led to a complete turn-round in food supplies and in many food prices.

The rapidity with which the world food situation changed is illustrated by the run-down in world wheat stocks. At the beginning of this decade, carry-over stocks in the major exporting countries were equivalent to roughly three months' world consumption of wheat; by 1973/74 these stocks had fallen to little more than one month's supply. In this period, stocks of feed grains, of protein feeds, such as soya and fishmeal, and of sugar all fell and the world suddenly realised that the surpluses (over effective demand) of the 1960s had vanished and that prices of basic foods in the world market had risen to record heights. More recently world prices have fallen back somewhat as production levels have been restored. However, real food prices are now at significantly higher levels than they were in the 1960s.

In examining the future, a distinction must be made between considering world food consumption in terms of food 'needs' and food 'demands'—i.e. between requirements related to meeting certain food standards and those linked with the ability to pay. The former is clearly the right yardstick against which to measure food production if we can disregard the means by which these needs are to be satisfied. However, in the analysis which follows, although indications are given

* This article is based on a more detailed study, *British Food and Agricultural Policy to 1985*, copies of which are available from Chatham House. Orders, with a remittance for £2.50, should be addressed to the Publications Officer at the Institute.

of world food needs, it is the likely development of effective demand that predominates. This has been done because, although there is a limited world food aid programme in being—a programme which we believe ought to be expanded for humanitarian reasons in the interests of enhancing growth in the poorer countries—we do not see the likelihood of any large extension in this programme or of any major shift of emphasis away from the dictates of the market economy in the next few years.

In a study completed for the 1974 World Food Conference, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimated that between 1970 and 1985 total effective food demand was likely to rise by about a quarter in the developed countries and by three quarters in the developing market economies. By 1985 the total requirement of cereals alone would be of the order of 470 million tonnes more than in 1970: an increase of 40 per cent in 15 years. Total consumption in the developed countries was projected to rise from 620 million tonnes to 780 million tonnes, while in the developing countries the rise forecast was from 592 million tonnes to about 900 million tonnes.

As the world economy develops, consumption patterns are likely to change, but for the immediate future there will continue to be a tremendous difference between the diet of people in the developed countries and those in developing ones. Whereas in the former only a relatively small quantity of cereals is consumed directly by human beings, the bulk being fed to livestock, in the developing countries nearly 90 per cent of total consumption of cereals is for human food. Changes in consumption patterns are already apparent in the oil-exporting countries where more meat is now consumed because of the rise in real incomes. However, any large-scale changes in demand in the developing world as a whole will take a considerable time to emerge.

Of more significance for the next ten years or so is the changing emphasis in demand in Russia and Eastern Europe. The need to obtain grain to feed an expanding livestock sector seems to have been a major factor in the massive Russian imports of cereals in 1973. Increased livestock demand coupled with uncertainties over their own harvests suggest that the Russians will continue to be large, if somewhat spasmodic, purchasers on world markets. Another significant factor in considering the world demand-supply balance is waste. Much food is now lost because of wastage in production, storage, processing and distribution—a recent UN estimate puts it as high as one quarter of world food supplies, with some developing countries suffering losses of up to half their total production. Hence the FAO has recently announced a programme to halve post-harvest losses by 1985.

If it is expected that food demand will rise substantially over the coming years, what then is the outlook for world food production? The International Development Strategy formulated by the United Nations for the 1970s (designated the Second Development Decade) called for an average annual growth of food production in developing countries of 4 per cent. In fact, performance so far has been disappointing—the average for the first six years of the decade being only 2½ per cent—a rate of increase which is actually lower than that achieved during the previous decade. The picture is not all black—record levels of output have been achieved in Latin America, a region which could well develop into a major food exporter. Africa has much potential for expanding food production and in the long-term the continent could conceivably become pretty well self-sufficient in most foods. Although the Far East is likely to remain dependent on trade for a significant part of its food supplies, a number of countries in the region have considerable potential for expanding output.

However, a great deal of investment in the improvement of basic infrastructure is necessary before substantial expansion in those areas becomes a reality. In 1974, it was suggested that to meet production targets in the developing countries an annual investment of US $3·5 to $4·5 billion would be required. The capital would go towards pest eradication programmes, the husbandry of tropical soils, road-building programmes, and so on, associated with the intermediate technology necessary to develop rural economies.

For the next ten years or so it would seem likely that the demands for food grown in developed countries will increase. Commercial demand will grow from areas that are experiencing rapid economic development, for example, the Middle East, and more slowly from most other developing countries of the world where food aid is likely to remain an important factor for some time. However, whilst food aid will inevitably be required for the next few years, this is at best a short-term solution and it should not go on forever. In the longer-term less-developed countries need to expand both their own food production and their export markets so that when they require food supplies from abroad they can acquire them in the market rather than relying, except in emergency cases, on the generosity of food aid donors.

During the past decade considerable pressure has built up from the developing countries for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The aim is a positive redistribution of income in favour of the less-developed countries. Although it is as well to be alert to these pressures, there is little likelihood of substantial progress in this direction over the next few years—after the worst recession since the Second

World War, the advanced nations are likely to be more concerned in the immediate future with the re-establishment of their own economic growth.

Much of the time of the fourth UNCTAD meeting at Nairobi in May 1976 was taken up with discussing the means by which international commodity arrangements might be recast for the benefit of the developing nations. What ultimately emerged was an 'integrated programme' for commodities embracing the establishment of international buffer stocks financed by a common fund; compensatory financing arrangements to alleviate the effects of fluctuations in the prices and earnings of developing countries; multilateral supply and purchase commitments by the producing and importing countries; and measures to encourage processing in producer countries.

After the UNCTAD conference and further meetings of the Conference on International Economic Co-operation (first begun in Paris in December 1975), agreement has been reached in principle on the concept of a common fund, but the mechanics of the fund have yet to be agreed, and the whole 'integrated programme' has fallen behind schedule. Future progress on the NIEO will be greatly influenced by the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) multilateral trade negotiations in which the agricultural sector has attained a very considerable significance. Substantive negotiations are only just beginning and commodity agreements or arrangements of various types are under discussion in three areas—cereals, beef and dairy products. That the detailed discussions have actually begun is a result of quite fundamental changes in the attitude towards commodity agreements of the United States among others. There is now widespread recognition of the need to ensure greater world food security, with certainty of supply at reasonable prices for the consumer and of access to markets and reasonable returns for the producer.

Only very tentative conclusions can be drawn from this survey of world food developments. The first is that governments have many years' work ahead of them before they can claim to have established a firm foundation for securing food supplies throughout the world against economic, political and climatic vicissitudes. Initially, we shall probably see the negotiation of a few key commodity agreements establishing more stable world arrangements for prices and stocks: a start has already been made with sugar, and the wheat discussions are well advanced. The creation of an international emergency grain reserve has been under discussion for some time and there is a fair chance of seeing this established in the none too distant future.

The second conclusion is that, for some time to come, a large number of developing countries will need to supplement their own production with imports to meet their growing effective demand for

food. These imports will have to be supplied in large part by the developed agricultural exporting countries, including the European Economic Community (EEC). Third, the EEC, together with the other industrialised countries, will have to step up its financial and technological aid for development in the Third World and especially in the poorest countries. This includes helping those that are able to do so, to develop their own food production to meet a higher proportion of their needs. It also involves participation in schemes designed to improve the external earning capacity of these countries from trade.

The dilemma for world trade in food is that whilst some of the developing nations need to expand their domestic agricultural capacity as a means of import substitution, others could become economically more efficient by concentrating on a somewhat narrower range of food production and exporting some of their produce. But for one country to be able to export food there must be some other country willing to import. For some of the less-developed countries the most appropriate market for their food exports would be similar nations in their own region of the world. However, the difficulty for one less-developed country in exporting to another is that there is often a lack of effective demand in the latter country. For many of the less-developed countries, exports are only likely to achieve significance if they gain access to the markets of the developed countries—in particular this means a questioning of the present policies of the United States, the EEC and Japan. This is, of course, true not only of policy towards trade in agricultural products but even more so of trade in manufactures and in semi-manufactured goods.

Conflict between Britain's interests and obligations

Turning from the world scene to the implications for British policy, we see an immediate conflict between Britain's interests as a major food importer and its obligations as a member of the EEC. Even if domestic agricultural production were to be increased to the extent we consider desirable, Britain would remain in the mid-1980s a major importer of cereals and sugar as well as of tropical products. Let us, therefore, turn to consideration of the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the CAP is the principle of Community preference, a principle which is widely believed to have led to the pursuit of self-sufficiency in most of the major food commodities. Contrary to popular belief, self-sufficiency has never been the declared aim of Community policy. However, strong pressures are being exerted from some member countries—notably France—to interpret Community preference as meaning self-sufficiency for the

major products that can be grown in the EEC. The Community has in practice achieved a very high degree of self-sufficiency with many products being supplied almost exclusively from within the Community, and for some products there are significant surpluses.

Criticism of the CAP takes two broad lines. First, there are those who object to the principle of Community preference as such, because it limits access to Community markets for external producers and in some cases denies them access altogether. These critics would prefer to see a liberalisation of trade in agricultural products in general, so as to gain the benefits of comparative advantage. A problem here is that the high degree of agricultural support throughout the world makes it uncertain which countries are the most efficient producers of certain products. The second broad criticism is that internal support prices have been fixed at too high a level, thereby encouraging inefficient producers to remain in the industry and causing periodic surpluses which have then been expensive to dispose of or store. The size of EEC stocks and surpluses is sometimes exaggerated. It is not always appreciated that because of the vulnerability of agricultural production to the weather, one year's 'surplus' can quickly become the basis of an urgently needed strategic reserve. The rapid transformation of the Community's sugar supply position during the 1970s provides a good illustration of this point. Sugar stocks in July 1972 at some 3·7 million tonnes represented nearly twenty weeks' supply for the Community, but by late 1974, despite the cushion provided by these considerable stocks, the Community was facing a sugar shortage; now Community stocks are back at the 3 million tonne level.

It is important, too, to distinguish between different kinds of stocks. Some are structural surpluses, others are due to temporary factors such as the effect of weather on supplies or short-term changes in demand. Some stocks, particularly those of commodities which do not deteriorate during storage, have an important strategic role. Nevertheless, there are some structural surpluses which do give rise to serious problems. Some of the attempts to dispose of these surpluses have met considerable criticism as being at best an expensive palliative.

A number of suggestions have been made for achieving a reform of the CAP. One notable contribution to the debate was made by Professor John Marsh in this journal in October, 1977. Professor Marsh advanced five suggestions 'intended to contribute to a purposive reform of the CAP'—the establishment of Community 'trading prices' in place of common internal prices; 'standard quantities' fixing a maximum volume of production eligible for Community price support through intervention or export subsidy; a change in calculating the unit of account used for defining institutional prices; structural

investment aimed at reducing the costs of food production; and finally the creation of internationally co-ordinated stocks.

Space does not permit a full response to all these suggestions, the last two of which seem eminently sensible. But the suggestion that Community 'trading prices' should be established seems more like an abandonment than a reform of the CAP. In effect, it would come close to codifying the present green currency system into a formal recognition that in future the CAP would not aim at common prices or necessarily use common support measures. Instead the EEC would merely provide a loosely knit framework within which national food and agricultural policies could be pursued. Surely the Council of Ministers would find it no easier to agree on Community 'trading prices' than they do on present institutional prices. It would be to the interest of exporting countries to gain high trading prices to obviate the need to fund subsidies on agricultural exports from their national exchequers, whilst importing countries would seek low trading prices to keep down the balance-of-payments costs and the need to subsidise food prices.

Professor Marsh's second suggestion of fixing standard quantities eligible for support could all too easily degenerate into national production quotas with a consequent slowing down of the necessary adjustment of production throughout the Community. The acceptability of such a system to producers would really depend on whether they could be convinced that governments would genuinely use it as a tool of supply management or simply, as they fear, as a disguised means of depressing their prices and incomes.

The suggestion of redefining the value of the unit of account has achieved a fair measure of support in Britain. Many would like to see the change from the present unit of account based on the value of those Community currencies participating in the joint European float (the 'snake') to a 'basket' of all Community currencies, taking place on a 'one-for-one' basis so as to achieve a devaluation of the unit of account by around 15 per cent. However, it is difficult to see the Council of Ministers reaching agreement on such a reduction of support prices and from the point of view of Community producers, such a cut would scarcely be either feasible or acceptable.

The proper approach to reforming the CAP

At best these three suggestions amount to the hope that, since the political will is seemingly lacking for a frontal assault, the level of some Community support prices might be whittled away by subterfuge. Surely the proper approach is to undertake a full and searching examination of the Community's long-term food and agricultural policy, identifying how much of the total food requirements (including

commercial exports and provision for food aid and, in the case of appropriate commodities, a prudent level of stocks) should be produced by Community farmers and growers. It is only after such an examination of the longer-term objectives that the Community can be expected to adopt a coherent strategy for ensuring that whatever is decided as the appropriate level of Community production of the various commodities, is actually achieved. Such a strategy must involve a more flexible application of price policy, designed gradually to shift resources to those commodity sectors where demand is likely to remain strong, and which will thereby make the best use of the Community's indigenous resources. The political will to adopt a more flexible price policy is much more likely to be forthcoming after the development of long-term policy objectives than in their absence—the more so if the farmers' organisations have been consulted during the drawing up of those objectives.

Having identified the commodities whose production it is desirable to encourage and those which should be discouraged, the Community would then need to ensure the achievement of its objectives. The problem of structural surpluses is a difficult one but there is no reason to suppose it is insurmountable. However, the surpluses are not likely to be easily eliminated by using only one policy instrument. They will have to be tackled over a period of time through a combination of measures designed to stimulate consumption, discourage marginal production and assist structural change. In the context of the need for structural change, it is important to recognise the role that the EEC's socio-economic policy must inevitably play in complementing agricultural price policy.

Change is needed in some of the existing CAP support mechanisms with a view to stimulating consumption of agricultural produce and reducing the amounts of commodities sold into intervention (as distinct from the deliberate build-up of buffer stocks). The variable-premium type of arrangement currently used in Britain for supporting the beef market could well be extended to cover other commodities. Also efforts to co-ordinate and improve agricultural marketing within member countries could play an important role in raising farmers' returns without causing consumer food prices to increase. It is thus important for the Community to resolve any lingering doubts about the future of the British Milk Marketing Boards.

For the immediate future the Community should attempt, during the current GATT negotiations, to secure 'new style' international commodity agreements for a range of agricultural products, notably cereals, dairy products and beef. These agreements, which should be innovatory in coupling commitments on stocks with those on price

ranges, should be part of an integrated approach to greater world food security, involving some expansion of food aid and the establishment of reserves for emergency purposes.

Taken together, these measures would amount to quite a significant improvement in the CAP, whilst maintaining the basic conceptual framework of the policy. These improvements, however, can only succeed if they are introduced within a more stable monetary framework. So long as it is possible for individual member governments, by manipulation of their green rates, to frustrate the expected and natural development of the CAP, there will be very little point in working for the improvements we are suggesting.

Moreover, there must in future be a much closer alignment of agricultural policy and food policy. British farmers are aware of this and fully accept the need for both food and agricultural aspects to be considered when policy is being made. One has the impression that on the Continent, food policy criteria have rarely been judged relevant in considering the CAP.

What then should be the food and agricultural policy of Britain? Obviously, as regards the Community and the rest of the world, we would hope to see British policy following the evolutionary reform we have advocated. However, we must not lose sight of the prospects for greater food production within Britain. In 1975, after a detailed examination of the world food price prospects and the possibilities for domestic agricultural production, the government published a White Paper, *Food from Our Own Resources*,[1] which concluded that increased agricultural output was in the national interest. In the event, for a combination of reasons too lengthy to catalogue here, domestic production is now no higher than it was in 1973/74. The White Paper is itself viewed with much cynicism among the farming community—yet in our view the White Paper's broad conclusions remain perfectly valid. Given more resources and given the right incentives, British farmers could and should produce more food and reduce Britain's dependency on imports.

A number of measures benefiting the industry have been taken in the 1978 Budget, such as permitting farmers to average their incomes over two years where the actual incomes are 30 per cent or more apart; introducing an initial allowance on agricultural buildings; and extending the range of agricultural and business assets, reliefs for capital gains tax and capital transfer tax. All these measures should improve farmers' cash flow and reduce their tax liability, thus helping to restore confidence in the industry. The area in which action remains to be taken is in the progressive elimination of the distortions to intra-

[1] Cmnd. 6020.

Community trade resulting from the amounts of monetary compensation. Given some moves in this direction, there can be little doubt that British farmers will respond by substantially increasing domestic food production.

Britain's position is fundamentally different from that of the Community as a whole. Whilst it makes sense to reduce total Community production of a number of commodities currently in surplus, at the same time it may be good economic sense to expand British production of some of these commodities because British farmers are among the most efficient within the Community. British agricultural support prices are at present the lowest in the EEC; contraction within the Community should occur where prices are highest. It could be beneficial to the British economy, and to the Community as a whole, if during the 1980s the United Kingdom produced a significantly larger share of a somewhat lower total volume of output.

British food policy has to be determined in regard to (a) attitudes towards Community policy and (b) the objectives, within the overall Community policy, for domestic food production, processing, distribution and consumption. As to policy towards the Community, our earlier analysis suggests that, whilst working within the present conceptual basis of the CAP, Britain should strive to introduce a greater flexibility in price fixing, a greater awareness of the needs of the market, and arrangements for the further development of agricultural trade on a more stable basis. This would be Britain's best answer to those who claim that, if present policies continue, we shall see a return to protectionism.

Whilst pursuing a policy of restraint so far as Community institutional prices are concerned for products in surplus, Britain should pursue policies designed to free home production from the constraints on its development, essentially by eliminating existing monetary distortions. It must, however, be recognised that Britain cannot, without creating ill-will amongst its EEC partners, disregard the social and other reasons which may make it necessary to accept a higher level of prices than would be justified solely on economic grounds—especially at a time when the Community already has 6½ million people out of work. Our policy moves would have to take account of the wider issues involved and press for solutions to be worked out on a common rather than a purely national basis.

Britain's dilemma over sugar

By way of illustrating the dilemma facing British policy-makers, let us take the example of sugar production and supplies. Sugar is a commodity in which the conflict between the interests of British, other

European and Third-World producers is immediately apparent. The relative production costs of sugar have changed very significantly in the past ten to fifteen years—and could conceivably change again in the future. In the 1950s the world's lowest-cost sugar producers were the cane-producing countries of the tropical regions. By contrast, sugar beet production was both more expensive and seemed more vulnerable to climatic factors. Now, as a result of technological changes and increases in transport costs, European sugar beet production seems to be at least as cheap a method of getting sugar on to the European consumer's table.

The next decade could see further changes both in the relationship of basic beet to cane prices and in transport costs. Moreover, there could well be some shift in the refining and processing of cane sugar away from Europe to the cane-sugar producing countries in the next ten years, as those countries try both to increase the size of their industrial sector and to gain a larger share of the value added of the finished product. The outlook is clouded further by the growing problem of competition from the production of sweeteners from isoglucose.

In view of the Community's current surplus, it would be difficult to find any economic justification for the Community as a whole to increase sugar production. Within Britain, the government has in the past effectively restrained sugar beet production by means of a quota system. The extent to which the area sown to sugar beet changes in Britain will depend upon what happens to the beet price in the light of green pound policy and upon the relative profitability of alternative crops.

There is inevitably a question mark about the future, since the EEC commitment under the Lomé Convention to import 1·3 million tonnes annually from the developing countries is due for re-negotiation in 1979. Continental beet producers would strongly resist any attempt to reduce Community quotas or to reduce beet prices. A choice will have to be made between adherence to the principle of Community preference—one of the main planks of the CAP—and responding to pressure from developing countries for continued, and perhaps increased, rights of access. On this issue, Britain will almost certainly find itself virtually isolated from the other Community countries in favouring increased trade with the developing countries.

The example of the conflicts of interest over future sugar supplies to the Community indicates the extent to which Britain's policy options are affected not only by world supply and demand factors, as well as by British and EEC ones, but much more so by the political constraints which membership of the EEC makes upon an independent food and agriculture policy. Within a CAP hopefully developing during the

1980s, along the lines suggested in this paper, and given the elimination of the present monetary distortions, it would in our view be quite proper for British farmers and food processors to supply a rather higher proportion of the Community's food needs.

The dilemma for policy-makers is that it may perhaps be difficult to explain to the other member states and Community institutions what may appear in some respect to be a contradictory policy, i.e. an expanding *British* agriculture within an overall fairly static—or in some sectors even contracting—*Community* agriculture. However, politics is the art of the possible, and it is in this sphere, rather than the economics of agriculture, that the solution to the problems discussed in this paper will probably lie.

SAUDI ARABIA: THE POWER OF THE PURSE-STRINGS

Louis Turner and James Bedore

THERE are two different levels on which Saudi Arabia's foreign policy can be analysed. First, there is the level of day-to-day policy-makers who know that decisions in Riyadh can affect the US balance of payments, the future of the dollar, the rate of world economic recovery and even the eventual fate of Israel. These are obviously important questions, and we shall certainly look at them in this article. There is, however, the second, more academic level, of the International Relations specialist, for whom the sudden emergence of Saudi Arabia as a regional-cum-global power throws fascinating light on the emerging international order. Most of these commentators now accept that there has been some leakage of influence away from the two or (depending on how you rate China) three super-powers in the direction of emerging regional powers and transnational institutions such as international terrorist groups or multinational companies.[1] As far as the Third World is concerned, the arrival of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the launching of the debate over the New International Economic Order show that its members carry a clout which they did not possess ten years ago. Ralf Dahrendorf has gone so far as to suggest that we should talk about ' threshold countries '—for example, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria or Algeria—which are near the threshold of full development, potentially rich but also potentially powerful.[2]

The OECD world increasingly has to reckon with these countries in tariff negotiations and in discussions over commodity prices and nuclear proliferation. Although these nations admittedly provide complications for the OECD countries, it is less clear exactly how far their new-found influence actually runs. The imbalance of economic and military power between, say, Indonesia and the United States is still great. Therefore if we are to accept the ' threshold power ' concept as adding clarity to our perceptions of the international order, we need to give

[1] For one such debate, see International Institute of Strategic Studies (18th Annual Conference). *The Diffusion of Power: II. Conflict and its Control, Adelphi Paper 134* (London: IISS, 1977).
[2] Ralf Dahrendorf, " International power: a European perspective ", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, I, Oct. 1977, p. 83.

greater attention to the exact circumstances in which these newcomers can or cannot *affect* the policies of the traditional diplomatic superpowers.

In this article, we carry out such an analysis of Saudi Arabia. Clearly, this country is atypical of some of the other supposed threshold powers. After all, its population of around 6,000,000 compares poorly with India's 600 million, Indonesia's 130 million, Brazil's 110 million, Mexico and Nigeria's 60 million-plus or, even Iran's 33 million.[3] On the other hand, it is precisely the fact that Saudi Arabia's hold on oil gives it an influence out of all proportion to its minuscule population that makes it valuable to study. Whatever power the threshold states may or may not have rests on their growing economic importance, and Saudi Arabia is the Third-World power *par excellence* which owes its place in the world to economic factors. Petrodollar surpluses and the country's control over the world's key deposits of oil have bought Saudi Arabia power and influence. What limits are there on the kind of world role which can by built on economic advantages alone?

Before 1973

From 1943, when the United States government decided that Saudi Arabia qualified for Lend-Lease, no American administration forgot that this mediaeval country was sitting on vast reserves of oil. It was an advantage for Washington that these reserves were being exploited by American companies, but there was no avoiding the fact that the secure expansion of oil production ultimately depended on the stability and goodwill of the Saudi royal family. Since neither could be completely guaranteed, there were occasional flurries of diplomatic activity whenever the Saudis posed problems for Washington. Thus their demands for greater oil income led in 1950 to a National Security Council debate about accepting the tax-credit principle that was necessary if Aramco was to concede the fifty-fifty income tax system which the Saudis now wanted.[4] In 1956, the expiry of the Dhahran Agreement brought a short period of tension because the Saudis would only renew it on a monthly basis.[5] But it was the challenge to King Saud's regime from President Nasser's radical republicanism which particularly worried the United States, especially in the early years (1962–63) of the Yemeni civil war when it looked as though Nasser might declare war on Saudi Arabia, or even that republican

[3] 1975 figures from *Britannica Book of the Year 1977* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc, 1977), pp. 565–67.

[4] US Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. Report on *Multinational Oil Corporations and US Foreign Policy* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 85.

[5] Fred Halliday, *Arabia Without the Sultans* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 53.

forces within the kingdom might manage to overthrow the inefficient Saud. President Kennedy became involved in attempts to mediate between the various parties, but the threat to Saudi Arabia blew over as Nasser counted the cost of his intervention, King Faisal took over from Saud and the Americans collaborated with Saudi Arabia in an increased commitment to defence spending.[6] By the end of the 1960s, the stability of the Saudi regime had been much improved. At the same time, while Saudi oil was important, the market was generally characterised more by glut than by shortage almost right up to the OPEC price rises in 1973.

Thus, although the importance of its oil meant that the fate of Saudi Arabia mattered to the Western world, its leaders were not able to translate their economic importance into a political importance beyond the very narrow confines of the Middle East. The British, not having the Americans' economic interests in Saudi Arabia, automatically backed Oman in the early 1950s when the two neighbours quarrelled over the ownership of the Buraimi Oasis; in the end British-backed forces ejected the Saudis from the disputed area. On the Palestinian issue, the American performance was not much better. For a time after President Roosevelt's meeting with King Abdel-Aziz in 1945, both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations reaffirmed the promise that there would be no American action on Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. But when it came to the UN's partition resolution in 1947, it was clear that Saudi and Arab voices counted for nothing in the minds of American policy-makers.[7]

This belief that the Saudi voice could be ignored on matters concerning Israel persisted for the next quarter of a century—clear evidence of the virtual impotence of Saudi diplomacy. Western leaders ignored the kingdom's participation in the brief oil embargo which accompanied the Six-Day War in 1967, were unimpressed by the fact that Saudi Arabia was one of the three founder members of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in 1968 and failed to see the significance of the convergence of Saudi and Egyptian positions on the Palestine issue from the late 1960s.[8] Much of this blindness can be put down to stupidity, the outmoded belief (particularly on Nixon's part)[9] that any oil-producing state's misbehaviour could be controlled by an importers' boycott (as Iran had

[6] Halliday, *ibid.*, pp. 57–59, 101–30.

[7] Lenczowski, George, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1952), pp. 351–52.

[8] Don Peretz, ' Energy: Israelis, Arabs and Iranians ' in Joseph S. Szyliwicz and Bard E. O'Neill (Eds), *The Energy Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 92–93, 106.

[9] Anthony Sampson, *The Seven Sisters* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975), p. 248.

been broken by the oil majors' embargo in 1951–53) and to
contemptuous assumption that no Middle East producing state w
disrupt its economy for the sake of Israel. On the other hand,
fact that the message did not get through to the Americans tha
Saudis were by 1973 determined to use the oil weapon against Isı
supporters in any future war is also a comment on Saudi Ara
lack of diplomatic impact. This imbalance between the kingd
economic and diplomatic importance is emphasised by the way
Faisal had to resort to using Aramco as a channel to American pc
makers.[10] This too had no effect, but the fact that he had to fall
on such an unconventional channel shows how little Saudi Arabia
actually listened to in the early 1970s; OECD governments conti
to believe that cheap oil would be available in almost unlin
quantities for decades to come.

At the regional level, however, the picture was somewhat ı
positive. The Saudi decision to intervene in the Yemen on the sic
the royalists, despite the fact that the United States had recogı
the new republican regime, was hardly the action of an Ameı
puppet. King Faisal began to mould a generally effective Saudi regi
policy. Even before the Six-Day War, he had improved relations
Nasser, but it was in the aftermath of this conflict that the Saudis c
into their own. A severe cut-back in frivolous spending by mem
of the royal family, increased oil production and a larger share c
revenue from the oil companies combined to improve dramaticall
Saudi finances (though they were still far from the levels reached ir
1970s). Some of this money went to Egypt and Jordan to restore
war-shattered economies; agreement was reached with President N
for the mutual withdrawal of troops from the Yemen; and atteı
turned to devising ways of co-operating in the mutual struggle ag
the common enemy, Israel. At the same time, the Saudis success
used force in 1969 against South Yemen in pursuit of a border c
unsuccessfully (in 1971) tried to persuade Bahrain and Qatar to
a nine-member Gulf federation, improved relations with the Su
and mediated between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (F
and Jordan after their confrontation in 1971. Faisal continued a
experienced diplomatic traveller, and in the early 1970s visited
countries as Italy, France and a diverse group of African sta
Nor should we forget that the Saudis played their part in the gra
toughening of OPEC's bargaining position from 1970 onwards, alth
it was Libya and Iran which played the leading role in this proce

[10] Louis Turner, *Oil Companies in the International System* (London: Allen & U
for the RIIA, 1978), Chs 7 and 8.

[11] *The Middle East and North Africa 1976–7* (London: Europa Publications,
p. 597.

Lessons from the embargo

The prime lesson of the OAPEC oil embargo of 1973–74 was the demonstration that the oil weapon could now bring results. The fact that Dr. Kissinger embarked so fast and furiously on his shuttle diplomacy was a clear sign to the Saudis that their growing role as the world's producer-of-last-resort, and increasing American dependency on imported oil, meant that for the first time the United States had to heed Saudi views on the Palestine issue. It would obviously be a mistake to attribute all subsequent changes in the industrialised world's attitudes towards Israel to Saudi pressures alone. Obviously, President Sadat has played an important role, and so perhaps has the toughening of Israeli bargaining positions under Mr. Begin's administration. At the same time, however, it would be fair to say that since the announcement of the oil embargo in 1973 and the subsequent searching for a solution to the oil price, no one searching for a solution to the Arab-Israeli issue can fail to analyse Saudi Arabia's likely reactions to any given formula. This is a complete reversal of general attitudes before 1973.

What is not totally clear is the role which Saudi Arabia actually plays in the policy-formation of various Arab countries towards Israel. It has not, traditionally, been a ' front line ' state, its contribution of troops to the 1973 war notwithstanding. Certainly, compared with Egypt, its role is relatively passive. Twice since Faisal's death, the Egyptians have come up with initiatives (the limited disengagement agreement with the Israelis in September 1975 and President's Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977) with which such a relative hard-liner as King Faisal might have found it hard to come to terms. In the latter case, the Saudis were apparently not consulted in advance and there were reports that some key Saudi policy-makers were angry. Undoubtedly, if they had been consulted they would have advised Sadat against any such initiative as the trip to the Knesset, but there is no doubt that Saudi policies towards Israel have mellowed over the years. Crown Prince Fahd, for example, now talks openly of recognising Israel should there be a comprehensive Middle East settlement, with the Israelis withdrawing from all occupied Arab territory and the restoration of the legitimate rights of Palestinians in their homeland.[12]

The picture which emerges is of a country that is offended by Israel, but would support a stable settlement reached with this interloper, providing the Israelis can meet some quite tough conditions. The Saudis are partly motivated by an awareness that in another war they might very well become front-line participants since their influence has

[12] *Middle East Economic Survey*, March 20, 1978, p. 1.

expanded enormously in the Arab world, and their own mi presence has grown on the northern Saudi border, which pe might now invite Israel to make a direct attack on Saudi terri At the same time the Saudis are in a difficult position. They are caught between the different strategies of the two major confront states (Egypt and Syria), their own belief that only a unified . position can be ultimately useful, and a perception that the U States is the only entity able to persuade or force Israel to com terms.[18]

The weaving together of these conflicting strands is most diffi The attempt to do so, however, illustrates the Saudis' emerging of Middle Eastern conflict-resolver. Within the Arab world, they l now become the prime conciliators and a force for moderation. T were signs of their development in this direction before 1973. The that Saudi Arabia and Egypt had come to terms before Nasser's d was a tribute to the Saudis' level-headedness, and their media between Jordan and the Palestinian guerrillas in 1971 was a sign they wanted to find a middle way between the conservative and rac strands of Arab political philosophy. However, since 1973 their ciliatory role has flowered, perhaps coming to full bloom at 'mini-summit' in Riyadh in October 1976 when the leaders of S Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon and the PLO produced a p formula which subsequently permitted a ceasefire in the Leba civil war. This was a triumph for the Saudis who not only man to wend their way through the internecine complexities of the Leba civil war, but also persuaded the Syrians finally to reconcile themse to the Egyptians' unilateral acceptance of the 1975 disengagement with Israel.

It is still too early to tell whether the Saudis can pull off a sin coup in the confused environment created by Sadat's visit to Is Crown Prince Fahd and his foreign minister, Prince Saud, have b on the move within the Arab world, and the general consensus w is emerging is that the Saudis (along with the Kuwaitis and Jordani are once again trying to bridge the gap between the Syrians Palestinians on the one hand, and the Egyptians on the other. It be that this gap cannot be filled, just as it is possible that the Isr cannot move far enough to permit any common approach by the fr line states. On the other hand, it is clear that the Saudis are still tr to use their financial and political leverage to produce the maxin possible Arab unity.

[18] For a fuller analysis of Saudi diplomacy surrounding the Sadat peace initi see James Bedore, 'Saudi Arabia: Greatness thrust upon them.' *Middle East national*, no 79, Jan. 1978, pp. 14–16.

In addition to this conciliatory role, Saudi Arabia is also the chief instrument for enforcing the industrialised world's acceptance of Arab political goals concerning Israel. In 1973-74 its chosen weapon was the oil embargo, which, though politically effective, proved to be clumsy because its effect could be spread by the oil companies over all oil-importing nations, whatever their attitude towards the Israeli issue.[14] The embargo's potential has been further blunted by the creation of the International Energy Agency and its subsequent co-ordination of a major oil stockpiling programme among the industrialised consumers.

The Saudis, however, have found that they no longer need to threaten an oil embargo in order to keep the United States and the industrialised world aware of Arab priorities. At the most immediate level, there is the recurrent question of OPEC's pricing policies, on which the Saudi position is all important. By 1975, the Saudis had clearly become an important force for price moderation within OPEC councils, but the industrialised world has not needed reminding that this constraint could be dropped if the United States, in particular, should fall back into the pro-Israeli stance which characterised its policies before 1973. In practice, the oil-price weapon has some of the disadvantages of oil embargoes. It is difficult to aim at specific nations without affecting import costs throughout the rest of the oil-importing world. The damage to the global economy can feed back to the oil-producers in the form of higher-priced imported goods, and the social tensions thus caused in countries like Italy could lead to the emergence of communist governments—a phenomenon which the Saudis would not like to promote.

Ultimately, however, Saudi Arabia's political leverage in the world stems from the fact that it is going to be far and away the most prolific oil-producing state in the coming decades when world oil production will probably reach its ultimate plateau while global needs continue to rise, thus failing to satisfy world demand for oil at prices we would currently consider tolerable. For a while late in 1973 and early in 1974, President Nixon was able to delude himself that the United States could become self-sufficient in energy again—but this hope has long since disappeared, and been replaced by the realisation that the United States cannot eliminate its dependence on Arab oil imports.[15] A series of reports[16] have gone further, spelling out in graphic detail the

[14] Robert B. Stobaugh, 'The Oil companies in the Crisis', *Daedalus*, Vol. 104, No. 4, Fall 1975, pp. 179-202.

[15] Congressional Research Service, *Project Interdependence* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, printed for use of Committee on Energy, US Senate, Publication No. 95-31), pp. 2-3.

[16] Such as Central Intelligence Agency, *The International Energy Situation: Outlook in 1985* (Washington DC, 1977). Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies, *Energy: Global Prospects 1985-2000* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977).

warning that if the world is going to grow at satisfactory rates, there is a real danger that the OPEC countries might be physically incapable of supplying the necessary amount of oil and/or politically unwilling to produce at anywhere near the maximum sustainable rates which are possible. Now, it does not matter that some of these arguments may be over dramatic,[17] for Western policy-makers have to work on the assumption that they could well be correct, in which case it might be desirable that Saudi Arabia should produce at 20 million barrels a day by the late 1980s—well over double its current production. The US Energy Secretary, James Schlesinger, claims that the Saudis have indicated that they will be prepared to raise production to 12 million barrels a day by the mid-1980s, but have no plans to increase actual production beyond that level.[18] There is thus plenty of scope for future bargaining between Saudi Arabia and its industrialised customers, with the Saudis having the whip hand.

Thus Saudi Arabia has an influence far above what its population or military capacities would normally give it. But questions remain. For instance, in the interplay between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, exactly how far does the former's financial strength counter the latter's relative diplomatic importance which rests on its population, military strength, strategic position and its tradition of being the Arab world's centre of gravity? Or if Syria rejects or finds alternatives to Saudi largesse, what could the kingdom do to moderate Damascus's influence in the Lebanon or with the PLO? Moreover, given the bluntness of the oil weapon, Saudi Arabia would surely have to suffer extreme provocation before it again created the kind of major disruption of the world economy which we saw after the 1973 war. Just how selectively can oil be used as a political lever in a world which becomes more complex with each succeeding year?

The Peninsula and the Gulf

To play a supra-regional role, however, Saudi Arabia must look nearer home and be able to maintain control over its oil sector which alone gives it a major influence in the world. It should be able to achieve this, although the closer one looks at its relations with its neighbours, the more potential problems, which might sometime jeopardise Saudi interests, can be observed.

First, there is still some uncertainty about Saudi Arabia's national boundaries, though the most vexed problems seem to have been sorted out earlier in the 1970s. The dispute over the ownership of the Buraimi

[17] For a critical look at the alarmist approach, see Louis Turner and Audrey Parry, 'The next steps in energy co-operation', *The World Today*, Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1978, pp. 89–99.

[18] *Middle East Economic Survey*, Jan. 30, 1978, p. 1.

Oasis was settled during 1973–74, when the Saudis dropped their claim in return for winning access to the Gulf between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, and the UAE was persuaded to modify its claim to all the villages in question, thus recognising Oman's right to some of them. In 1976, the disputed parts of the Saudi-Iraqi border were submitted to international arbitration. The chief remaining border uncertainty stems from Saudi Arabia's undoubted interest in getting direct access for a pipeline to the Indian Ocean, which would logically call for some corridor through either Oman, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) for the UAE. This issue keeps on recurring in conversations with informed Saudis, but does not strike us as an issue which cannot be settled by negotiation.

If one accepts that Israel is a special case, Iraq is the neighbouring state which potentially could cause the Saudis most trouble. The Iraqis certainly do have more burning concerns to worry about—such as their feuds with Syria and Egypt—but trouble could still spill over into Saudi Arabia from Iraq's unsettled border-demarcation dispute with Kuwait, or from Iraqi-backed sabotage attempts to disrupt oil flows from the other Gulf states. In general, however, the Iraqis have their own vulnerable points, such as the dissatisfaction of the Kurds which is particularly amenable to manipulation by countries with long purses like Saudi Arabia.

The other main area of Saudi concern is Soviet influence within the PDRY and the Horn of Africa. The radicalism of the PDRY is no longer the threat to the survival of the Saudi royal family that the civil war was in what is now the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). On the other hand, the anti-communism of the Saudi leadership runs deep, so that it has inevitably been concerned about the depth of Soviet penetration in the PDRY as well as the Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Somali-Ethiopian-Eritrean conflicts. All to these the fact that Iraq provides a base for Soviet naval activities in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and one can see why the Saudis seek to counter this spread of Soviet penetration which could pose a threat to Saudi oil exports, or even in certain circumstances to the present Saudi regime. Attempts to ' buy off ' the PDRY leadership looked promising for a while in 1976, but the Yemeni position hardened again and when the Russians began to use PDRY facilities to supply the Ethiopians in the latters' war against Somalia, Saudi-PDRY relations were back to glacial. For a while, it looked as though Saudi largesse would be enough to block Soviet ambitions in the Horn of Africa, for it was primarily Saudi money (reputedly, $300 million) [19] which encouraged

[19] See *New Internationalist*, April 1978, p. 9. The whole issue is devoted to an informed discussion of the issues behind the conflict in the Horn of Africa.

the Somali government to eject its Soviet advisers in November 1977 and which has backed the Moslem Eritrean Liberation Front. But the reluctance of the United States to get involved in such legally messy disputes left the Saudis, the other conservative Gulf states and Iran totally powerless when the Soviet Union decided to commit really major resources of men and military equipment to the Ethiopian cause. Once the Russians had made that decision, countries such as Saudi Arabia could do little to help the Somalis, thus proving that money, though capable of buying influence, can be countered by a firm military commitment on the other side. Until Saudi petrodollars can assure as effective a force as the Cuban troops on African soil, its regional role will always rest on rather shaky foundations.

Elsewhere in the immediate region, Saudi Arabia can generally count on loyal support on most issues from Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE. But this support is not always automatic. For instance, only the UAE backed Saudi Arabia when OPEC split over oil prices in December 1976,[20] but the fact that Bahrain and Kuwait both dissolved their national assemblies (in 1975 and 1976 respectively) has been taken as evidence of their acquiescence in Saudi worries about the place of democracy in the Arabian peninsula. Obviously, the autocratic nature of these regimes does pose problems for the future, particularly given the growing number of Palestinians and other Third-World citizens who are generally not granted citizenship in the Gulf States, even after twenty years of residence. Again, the UAE is a federal state whose constituent emirates could well fall out with each other some day, thus providing scope for dissident forces to establish themselves on another Saudi flank But these are problems for the future; in the meantime Saudi Arabia will seek to maintain these states as autocracies and mediate between them.

If the Gulf micro-states are unlikely to cause Saudi Arabia many problems, Iran may be a decidedly different case. Iran has many of the trappings of power that Saudi Arabia lacks. It is considerably more populous, has over five times as many men under arms, four times as many tanks and nearly ten times as many bombers (1976 figures).[21] It is only in oil reserves that the Saudis are noticeably in advance of Iran, but even here commentators can easily overlook the fact that the latter country is sitting on the world's second largest reserves of gas (the Soviet Union has the largest). This could give Iran more leverage in the 1980s and 1990s than is sometimes assumed. So where does this leave Saudi-Iranian relations?

The first point to make is that these two powers have been drawn

[20] Bahrain is not a member of OPEC.
[21] Encyclopaedia Britannica, *op cit.*, p. 235.

together in recent years by a common perception of the threat from the Soviet Union and the radical forces in the Middle East. Both countries have been badly shocked by Western inaction during the Somali-Ethiopian war, and the Shah in particular sees the need for regional powers such as Iran to move into the vacuum created by the growing isolationism of the United States and the other non-communist powers.[22] There seems to have been some co-ordination of Saudi and Iranian policies on the Somali-Ethiopia issue, and Iran has taken steps to reduce the areas of tension between it and the Arab world. In 1977 it withdrew its troops from Oman where they had been helping to counter an insurgency campaign, and since 1975 the Shah has been improving relations with Iraq. This should make Saudi co-operation with Iran somewhat easier, but it would appear that relations will improve on a piecemeal basis and not as a result of some grand gesture such as a Gulf security pact which was last seriously considered in 1976. It would also appear that the Saudis and Iranians are sharing intelligence about the spread of Soviet and terrorist threats in the region. On the other hand, the Saudis will presumably remain uneasy about the way in which Iran is taking de facto responsibility for keeping under control the air and sea lanes round the Straits of Hormuz. But there is little they can do about such Iranian initiatives (other than build pipeline outlets to both the Red Sea and Indian Ocean) because, compared with Iran, they do not have the air or naval capabilities which would make it practical to think of taking on such responsibilities for themselves. As with the Horn of Africa, the difficulties for an under-populated country like Saudi Arabia of converting money into military influence are clearly demonstrated.

The simple answer has been to enter the arms market in a major way. Companies such as Bendix, Raytheon, Northrop, Vinnell and the British Aircraft Corporation (to say nothing of the US Corps of Engineers) have been brought in to raise the effectiveness of the various Saudi military institutions. The country is now the third largest purchaser of American armaments after Iran and Israel and its request to buy 60 F-15s, the world's most advanced fighter plane, has finally been approved.[23]

This is impressive enough, but there are genuine doubts about how effectively this military hardware can actually be used. At one end of the technological spectrum is the relatively neglected navy, which is unlikely to have even a landing craft capability until the mid-1980s.

[22] Shahram Chubin, 'The International Politics of the Persian Gulf', *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Oct. 1976, pp. 216–30.
[23] *International Herald Tribune* supplement 'Focus on Saudi Arabia: Part One', (Feb. 15, 1978) p. 4s.

At the other, there is the air force with its complex machines which will remain dependent on foreign maintenance personnel through the 1980s at the very least. The crucial importance of spare parts and maintenance will give foreign powers such as the United States some leverage over the Saudis (as with other Middle East purchasers) on issues such as where the planes are deployed and against whom they might be used—but this responsibility would be extremely embarrassing to the United States. All the Saudis can do is get their own pilots trained as fast as possible, increase the number of Saudi nationals on the maintenance side and invest in systems such as the F15s (which require less maintenance than earlier generations of aeronautical technology) and sophisticated missile and tracking systems. However, the success of this policy depends on the willingness of Saudis to accept the discipline of military life when there are so many more pleasant openings available to them. Moreover, the Saudi regime will be aware of the dangers of building up a military sector which may not always be ideologically loyal.

So what world military role are the Saudis buying themselves? In Arab-Israeli terms, they are building themselves into a nuisance for the Israelis. Assuming that tensions in this area remain high, each year that passes will increase Israel's temptation to include an attack on a Saudi base, such as Tabuk, in any general Israeli offensive—although Israel must seriously appreciate the tremendous adverse impact that the casualties amongst Western technicians would have on the United States. As far as Iran and the rest of the Arab world are concerned, the Saudis will soon have the defensive capability to deter most conceivable threats, but will lack the capability to get directly involved in any but the most limited offensive operations. Even then, we doubt that the Saudis could, by themselves, take over and hold down even a troublesome neighbour like the PDRY. The Saudis are in fact erecting a gigantic 'trip wire', because Western countries are so involved with both Saudi defences and Saudi oil that any attack on the kingdom would inevitably run such a chance of provoking Western retaliation that potential aggressors will think twice. On the other hand, it is the possibility that Western advisers in Saudi Arabia and Iran could in some cases be considered 'hostages' which has so worried US Congressional opponents of the massive arms sales which have been made to these countries.[24] All told, then, Saudi Arabia's economic power is not fully reflected in its military power.

[24] US Congress. US arms sales policy; hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and its Sub-Committee on Foreign Assistance on proposed sales of arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Sept. 16, 21, 24, 1976. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977).

World roles acquired

It would be fair to say that Saudi Arabia's policies towards Israel and towards its own immediate security in the Gulf region are matters of choice. However rich or poor it was, the country would have these problems. But its oil wealth means that its chances of successfully implementing its chosen policies have been tremendously strengthened. The same general picture can be drawn of the Saudis' attitudes towards their position as central guardians of the health of Islam which goes with their jurisdiction over Mecca. It is ridiculous to explain the growth of Islam by Saudi influence alone, for Islam's spread has been long-standing and the general success of the Arab oil states was bound to be attractive to Third-World countries. However, the Saudis have played their part in encouraging this spread—particularly in its more traditionalist forms. King Faisal was travelling to the countries of Black Africa before the Ramadan/Yom Kippur War, and since that watershed the Saudis have been strong backers of Arab and Islamic development agencies such as the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development and the Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank. Pakistan is the non-Arab country which has benefited most from this largesse, with countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Niger and Uganda also getting their share. In addition, the Saudis have tried to buy peace between Islamic nations such as Morocco and Algeria, which have been in dispute over the former Spanish Sahara. Much of this money has very diffuse effects, but the sudden influence of Saudi Arabia and the other central Islamic nations is bound to alter some power relationships round the world. Within the Middle East, there have been changes in the relative religious balances within the Lebanon and the fluctuating power relationships between predominantly Muslim Pakistan and predominantly Hindu India. Elsewhere there have been changes in Malaysia's relationships with its neighbours and the growth of communal tensions within Indonesia and the Philippines.

However, some roles have been forced on the Saudis by the sheer scale of their oil sector. The first of these is that of key decision maker within OPEC. Although the then Saudi oil minister, Sheikh Tariki, was one of the key personalities behind OPEC's formation, he very soon fell from grace and was replaced by the less militant Sheikh Yamani. Since then the Saudis have on the whole been a moderating force within OPEC. In the key moves by OPEC members, which led to the breakthroughs on oil pricing of the 1971 Teheran-Tripoli agreements, the Saudis generally followed the initiatives which were won by Libyan and Iranian leapfrogging. On the nationalisation issue, the Saudis again dragged their feet. In 1969, they were calling for

'partnership' rather than nationalisation. In 1972, after unilateral action by Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Venezuela, the Saudis led the conservative Gulf states into limited participation agreements. It was not until the end of 1974 that they accepted the need to demand the 100 per cent nationalisation of Aramco.[25]

On prices, the Saudi position was relatively passive up to 1973, but from then on Saudi Arabia's growing pressure for moderation could be distinguished within the admittedly militant councils of OPEC. Saudi confidence grew and manifested itself most strikingly at the OPEC meeting in December 1976 when Saudi Arabia opted (along with the UAE) for a 5 per cent price rise for 1977, despite the fact that the rest of OPEC opted for a 15 per cent increase (in two stages). An eventual compromise was reached, but Saudi Arabia's willingness to break ranks served notice that its attitude on oil prices was hardening, and that its position as the producer which alone could flood world markets gave it a leverage in OPEC councils which other members would ignore with difficulty. In the years to come, it is clear that Saudi pricing policies will be guided by American policies towards the Israel-Palestine issue, perceptions of the relative health of the world economy and the overall tightness of the oil markets. Obviously, the Saudis cannot be expected to sit back idly if the fall in the value of the dollar continues, since there is no evidence that they are positively seeking a cut in the real price of oil. The one big uncertainty is how they will react to the 'high absorptive' countries—Algeria, Venezuela, Nigeria or Iran—with their increasingly desperate need for high oil prices to finance their development programmes. All other things being equal, one would expect Saudi Arabia to give ground gradually, permitting oil prices to rise just enough to keep these countries within OPEC.

The second role forced on the Saudis is that of protecting the health of the world financial and economic system. This is forced on them partly by their key role in OPEC's pricing policies and partly by the fact that the value of their accumulated financial surpluses (at present between $70 and $100 billion)[26] is tied to the fortunes of the world economy in general, and the American economy in particular. There are signs that they are trying to diversify away from their over-reliance on the short-term American markets,[27] but they are stymied

[25] Edith Penrose, 'The development of Crisis', *Daedalus*, Vol. 104, No. 4, Fall 1975, pp. 40, 44–45. Dankwart A. Rustow and John F. Mugno, *OPEC: Success and prospects* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1976), pp. 22–23.

[26] James Bedore, 'Saudi Arabia in a Changing World', *National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review*, Feb. 1978, p. 20.

[27] It is difficult to isolate Saudi transactions, but see *Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin*, Vol. 18, No. 1, March 1978, p. 29.

by the fact that there is no market outside the dollar capable of handling the volumes of currency which they generate. With the bulk of their assets denominated in the dollar, they are caught in a classic vicious circle. The growing dependence of the United States on imported oil means that any increase in OPEC prices immediately worsens the American balance of payments; this then hits the value of the dollar, which hits the value of Saudi holdings; the Saudis cannot compensate for this by raising the price of oil because the whole circular process then starts all over again.

In the circumstances, one could hardly blame the Saudis for deciding that it is not in their interest to run up current account surpluses which promptly depreciate in value. Far better, they might argue, to restrict exports to the 5 million barrels a day which are all that is strictly necessary to cover their immediate needs. They would, however, immediately run into all the side effects which worry them. The OPEC militants would presumably use tighter oil markets to increase the price of oil, thus hitting the dollar and the whole world economy. The industrialised countries would interpret such a restriction as an unfriendly act, and much of the success of the Arabs in putting across their views on the Israeli-Palestinian issue might be jeopardised. The odds are, then, that in the short term, the Saudis will soldier on, producing sufficiently more than their immediate needs to keep their relations with the industrialised world reasonably friendly. At the same time, the OECD countries will come to terms with the fact that Saudi Arabia's financial strength now gives it the right to a voice in world economic affairs. This autumn, for instance, the Saudis are due to get the Executive Directorship of the IMF to which their contributions entitle them.

Over the longer period, the outlook is more problematical. The Israeli-Arab dispute may turn out to be insoluble by peaceful means, in which case one would expect growing Saudi impatience with those Western powers which try to have relations with both sides. This is the big difference between Saudi Arabia and countries like Japan and West Germany whose economic importance has not always been matched by a similarly assertive diplomatic stance. Like the diplomats of these countries, Saudi diplomats are often cautious and unsure of themselves. But unlike the West Germans and Japanese, the Saudis have a commitment to fight for a regional cause which inevitably involves the super-powers. They have already shown that they have the leverage to shift the position of one of the super-powers on this issue. Frustration with apparent lack of progress towards a settlement, could well tempt them to repeat their success.

Conclusion

The picture which emerges is of a country with immense potential economic power. As key decision-maker within OPEC, Saudi Arabia must take at least partial blame for plunging the world into recession during 1974 and 1975—and there are few other countries with that sort of power. On the other hand, we can increasingly see the obligations which its economic importance imposes. The various uses of oil as a political lever are clumsy in their effects. Financial holdings lose their potency if they must be invested in troubled economies. But the memory of what happened in 1973–74 remains and it is enough to warn the OECD countries that there is a point beyond which Saudi Arabia cannot be pushed without doing major damage to the world economy. This should ensure that Saudi concern about Israel will be kept at the forefront of policy-makers' minds throughout the world. At a regional level, however, the picture is less clear. Despite the fact that it is possible to buy most kinds of weapons from countries other than the United States, the Saudis still need outsiders as ultimate guarantors of their strategic well-being. In economic terms, then, Saudi Arabia is a world power. In strategic ones, it is still struggling to find an adequate regional role.

HORN OF AFRICA: LESSONS FROM THE SUDAN CONFLICT

John Howell

IN Africa as elsewhere, there are obvious links between domestic politics and foreign policy. Yet it is not always clear how far domestic politics are affected by the foreign policies of neighbouring states or how far the internal concerns of states spill over into the domestic politics of neighbours. Particularly in the Horn of Africa, there is either a tendency to ignore such issues or a temptation to discuss these domestic links in terms of relatively long-term and intractable factors of religion, race or ideology.

The settlement of the long civil war in the southern Sudan in 1972 is particularly interesting in this respect. First, the settlement has been interpreted as an internal *rapprochement* largely divorced from international pressures. Secondly, the obstacles to reconciliation have been interpreted as part of a region-wide racial and religious antagonism complicated by ideological subversion.[1] In fact, the settlement demonstrates a much more pragmatic, complex and ephemeral pattern of regional international politics in which considerations of survival and expediency dominate behind smokescreens of ideology and principled statecraft.

An examination of the southern Sudan settlement involves several threads, all of which contribute to an understanding of the nature of international politics in the region and the close relationship between the domestic politics of neighbouring countries. In turn, I examine Sudanese politics after the 1969 coup of Gaafar Numeiri, the organisation of the rebel Anya Nya movement, the respective importance of race, religion and ideology, the involvement of neighbouring states and powers outside the region, and finally the particular circumstances that led to a ceasefire and settlement.

Marxism and regional autonomy

The coup d'état in the Sudan in May 1969 was staged by a 'Free Officers Organisation' which traced its origins to the Nasserite example

[1] For example, Mohamed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace* (London: Hurst, 1975); Cecile Eprile, *War and Peace in the Sudan, 1955–1972* (London: David and Charles, 1974).

of the 1950s. Yet since the mid-1960s the Free Officers had been buttressed by the support of the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) and therefore Numeiri's Revolutionary Council did not come to power only with 'the usual prejudices of middle rank, radical Arab officers'.[2] Direct links with the military represented a break with the usual SCP recruiting grounds among Sudan's trade unions, professional associations and students, and they were links which created deep divisions and uncertainty within the party.[3] However, for at least a year it was the Communists who provided much of the intellectual stimulus and day-to-day advice on 'revolutionary reconstruction' for the Numeiri regime.

For the South, the SCP had from the mid-1960s advocated 'autonomous rule',[4] and Numeiri's new strategy, announced in June 1969, drew heavily upon the party's policy. The 'historical and cultural differences between North and South' were acknowledged as 'objective realities', and the southern people were granted their right 'to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a united, socialist Sudan'. However, there was one important proviso, or 'essential prerequisite for the practical and healthy application of regional autonomy'. This was that there must first be built 'a broad socialist oriented democratic movement in the South, forming part of the revolutionary structure in the North capable of assuming the reins of power in that region and rebuffing imperialist penetration and infiltration from the rear'.[5]

This represented a view of the southern problem which was far more revolutionary than any of the innocuous and vague parts of the 'revolutionary programme of implementation' contained in Numeiri's June Declaration. Southern politicians were seen as an obstructive

[2] J. Bowyer Bell, 'The Sudan's African Policy: Problems and Prospects', *Africa Today* (Denver) Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 1973).

[3] Most of the senior Communists were orthodox, both in their loyalty to Moscow and their acceptance of the need for objective conditions for a genuine revolution to take place. Numeiri's coup was accepted as 'reformative' and worthy of support, but not necessarily worthy of close involvement in a popular front-type coalition led by an essentially bourgeois nationalist military officer. However, close involvement did develop, especially with the influence of the communist officers who were less orthodox in their views. When the government began its purge of the Communists in November 1970, this confirmed the fears of those holding orthodox views and also further divided the Party because a 'collaborationist' wing remained, willing to work within the government despite the banning of the SCP. However, the most important ideological division concerned the intention of the dismissed communist officers to stage a coup themselves against Numeiri in 1971. To the orthodox (possibly represented by the small Executive Committee) this was 'adventurist'. To the larger Central Committee it was a necessary and historically correct step, although I have heard of no ideological defence of this latter view.

[4] Sudan Communist Party, *Thawrat el-Shaab*, (The People's Revolution) (Cairo) (probably 1964).

[5] This 'June Declaration' was issued as a pamphlet, *A Revolution in Action: Regional Autonomy for the South*, (Khartoum, 1971).

petty-bourgeois elite, essentially counter-revolutionary in class terms, and furthermore manipulated by the imperialist forces who controlled the Anya Nya movement.[6] A 'socialist oriented democratic movement' was needed to isolate the Anya Nya and the southern politicians in exile and within the Sudan. This was first, because of the alleged links between southern leaders and international imperialism, and secondly, because of the alleged opposition of southern leaders to the prospect of a popular-based revolutionary movement in the South which would eliminate their claim to represent regional interests. This view was put clearly by the communist Minister of Southern Affairs, Joseph Garang, writing pseudonymously in 1970, when he examined the counter-revolutionary pressures which were 'sharpening the class struggle in the country'. Recognising the significance of the growing strength of the Anya Nya within the southern resistance movement, Garang noted that 'imperialism is mounting pressure from the South via the renewed Anya Nya movement which is now united'. However, within the Sudan itself, 'this pressure is appearing in the form of an attack against the embryonic democratic movement with a tendency to magnify its mistakes and ignore its big achievements'.

At such a time of 'sharpening class struggle', Garang concluded that the 'main issue' needed to be kept clear: in the South this meant that a 'democratic movement' must be built 'with patience' as it was the 'sole guarantee against separation in the future. There is no short cut and those who seek such a cut will end up in the quagmire of petty bourgeois individualism, opportunism, and mercuric behavour.'[7] The question, however (which was never clearly put) was how far could such a 'democratic movement' emerge without some stability and economic development (or, in other words, 'peace') in the South; but how in turn could that peace be achieved without the collaboration of the 'petty bourgeois' Anya Nya and politicians.

The regime's ambiguity on this point was clear: while Joseph Garang became the new Minister of Southern Affairs, Abel Alier of the banned Southern Front party was made Minister of Housing. At the same time other former party leaders were imprisoned. In the 1969–70 period Garang was clearly the most influential minister on questions of southern policy and his views prevailed over those of Alier which sought to give 'regional autonomy' the constitutional shape that the politicians had been working towards in the period of parliamentary coalition between 1965 and 1969.

However, with the decline of SCP influence in late 1970, there was

[6] This view was never publicly made explicit, but it was clearly stated by Joseph Garang in a talk at the University of Khartoum in March 1970.

[7] 'J. Billo' (Garang, in fact), 'A Revolutionary Summer and a Sharpening Class Struggle', *Nile Mirror*, Oct. 29, 1970.

less of a commitment towards building a new socialist democratic movement in the South, and from early 1971 there were regular contacts with those exiled politicians of the 'Southern Sudan Liberation Movement' (SSLM) allied to the Anya Nya. These contacts began, in fact, in the middle of 1970 but Garang's stated intention was simply 'to encourage these Southerners abroad to join us in the implementation of regional autonomy'.[8] This initiative was doomed to failure because its main sponsor, the Movement for Colonial Freedom, was too closely identified with Garang and the Sudan government.[9]

The interest taken in a settlement by the World Council of Churches, and the affiliated All-Africa Council of Churches, had a more lasting effect,[10] although the willingness of the SSLM to accept 'unity' as a basic condition for negotiations was needed to encourage the churches to serve as a mediator between the two contestants. The SSLM also had preconditions for negotiations, which included the movement being recognised by the Sudan government as the representative of the southern resistance, and a neutral venue for negotiations under the chairmanship of an African head of state.

The 'southern problem' therefore returned to the constitutional arena, although it was still not certain if there was sufficient political will on both sides to allow endorsement of any constitutional formula. In August 1971, Alier set up an Advisory Committee on a legislative draft for regional self-government which drew heavily upon the recommendations made by northern and southern party leaders in 1967.[11] A further set of proposals, along the familiar lines of executive and legislative devolution, was framed by a small group of northern ministers and officials led by the Minister of Local Government, Gaafar Bakheit.[12] The drafts themselves were of less significance than the fact that the Numeiri regime was clearly indicating its willingness to reach an agreed constitutional formula with the former southern party

[8] This was stated during a London press conference on April 10, 1970. *Nile Mirror*, April 26, 1970.

[9] See, for example, a letter supporting the Numeiri regime from Miss Manuela Sykes, of the 'Committee for Sudanese Unity and Development', to *The Times*, Oct. 2, 1970. This was in reply to an earlier letter from Dame Margery Perham (Sept. 27) who was not impressed by the May Revolution and called for OAU efforts 'to deal with the prolonged oppression of a whole people by one of their own member states'. For an account of other supporters see Beshir, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[10] For an account of WCC and AACC initiatives, see M. Louise Pirouet, 'The Achievement of Peace in the Sudan', *Journal of Eastern African Research and Development* (Nairobi) Vol. 6, No. 1, 1976.

[11] *Report of the Twelve-Man Committee on the Southern Sudan* (Khartoum 1967).

[12] See 'Appeal to Southern Public and the Rebel Leaders by Southern Intellectuals, Students, Workers, Women and Youth' (*Nile Mirror*, Dec. 9, 1971). This appeal claimed that the Advisory Committee and the Bakheit drafts 'resolve to our satisfaction the points of difference in the Twelve-Man Committee'. It asked southerners 'to join hands in endorsing the principles of regional autonomy'.

politicians, along lines that those politicians had been demanding for several years.

The position of those northern ministers willing to accommodate the aspirations of southern politicians was significantly enhanced by the failure of the pro-communist coup of July 1971. Although this served to confirm Numeiri's abandonment of 'anti-imperialism' as a policy guide, it also reinforced the need for a major political success for the 'May Revolution' which had already lurched from pro-Soviet scientific socialism to radical pan-Arabism while continuing to lose political support in the country. The new willingness to concede southern demands, short of separation, was based on the argument that even if resistance leaders retained ideas of eventual secession, they could find themselves inextricably bound towards the North and thereby towards national unity. This view was based on the inevitability of the South's economic dependence on the North and as a consequence of this, the dependence of the southern leadership upon northern patronage. Thus a settlement would be bound up with wholesale southernisation and the creation of new posts for politically-influential southerners; as a group, and especially as individuals, these southerners would develop an interest in remaining Sudanese.[13]

The Anya Nya and military parity

The southern Sudanese rebellion, which began with an army mutiny just before independence in 1955, did not develop into a politically organised movement under a disciplined military leadership. For over ten years after the 1955 mutiny, it consisted of scattered local resistance bands; and even after the proclamation of the Anya Nya in 1963 and the extension of insurrection in the late 1960s, there was still little unity or organisation. The rivalry between various groups of exiles was reflected in the various claimants to Anya Nya leadership—even after 1969, when Joseph Lagu began to assert his claims, sectional rivalries dominated the movement and inhibited its military effectiveness and political credibility.

Yet despite all these weaknesses, the Anya Nya continued to recruit young men to its movement and bring villages under its authority, or under the authority of groups claiming to represent the Anya Nya. The movement was also normally able to draw upon whatever material support was available from the depleted villages and homesteads of the South; and the savagery of army reprisals against villagers suspected of giving such support indicated the extent of local connivance in

[13] I am indebted to Gaafar Bakheit (Khartoum 1972) for this insight into government attitudes.

protecting the foot-bound and often poorly-armed guerrillas. It would be misleading to claim that the Anya Nya 'controlled' most of the South, as most of the South was probably still ungoverned in 1971, but nevertheless the Anya Nya, and thus the SSLM, had a degree of popular support and armed strength which made it a formidable and relatively permanent force which could legitimately claim to represent 'southern interests' and gain the recognition of the Sudan government as a negotiating equal.

In a guerrilla war, parity is reached not necessarily by equality of armed strength, but at a point where the superior conventional force of the counter-insurgent is unable either to eradicate the insurgent or prevent his continued recruitment of men and continued access to weaponry; and the insurgent is unable to undermine significantly the armed strength of the counter-insurgent, is unable to wrest control in areas which the counter-insurgent has determined to hold, and is unable to destroy the political will of the counter-insurgent to defend. This stalemate does not, of course, necessarily lead to negotiation, particularly where ideological and racial antagonisms rule out any prospect of accommodation.[14] In the southern Sudan conflict these antagonisms were far less sharp than was often supposed, as I discuss below.

By 1971, Numeiri, his senior officers (most of whom had served in the South), and his most influential civilian ministers had all accepted that the Anya Nya could not be defeated without a prolonged and expensive war and continued military repression. The Anya Nya appeared to be able to recruit sufficient young men to maintain the insurgency, and their external support since the late 1960s indicated that even if countries such as Ethiopia or Uganda were prepared to state publicly their opposition to the Anya Nya and were prepared to clamp down on arms-running and training, there was no guarantee that their opposition would be effectively maintained.

For his part, Lagu, and probably most of the other Anya Nya leaders and politicians, recognised that the rebels were never likely to be able to over-run a major Sudanese army garrison or take over any sizeable town for anything more than a few days. Much of the force remained undisciplined and poorly-trained and armed. Nor could the unity of the high command be relied upon for any length of time. Further, there was a dependence upon external support, especially for ammunition, mines and medical supplies, which if cut off for any

[14] J. Bowyer Bell, 'The Conciliation of Insurgency: The Sudan Experience', goes over much of the ground, although I do not agree with him as the following account indicates. *Military Affairs* (Kansas) Vol. XXXIX, No. 3 (Oct. 1975).

reason would create great difficulties for the Anya Nya. The attempts to gain recognition had also proved a failure, with no African state, least of all those neighbouring on the Sudan, ever likely to consider recognition, especially in the aftermath of Biafra's eclipse.

Race and ideology

Despite these new perceptions and the military 'parity', the Agreement signed in Addis Ababa in February 1972 was widely regarded at the time as an extraordinary breakthrough in a seemingly inexorable and irreconcilable conflict. The reason for this belief lay in the fact that the conflict was seen as one involving just those strong ideological and racial antagonisms which make any accommodation out of the question in an armed insurgency. In reality, however, neither of these antagonisms of ideology and race was as immutable as it seemed, or rather as it was often presented by southern propaganda.

Among the various writers who have discussed questions of Sudanese national identity,[15] the Arab-African dichotomy has always been rejected as a misleading over-simplification of an ethnically-complex, marginal polity in which there are strong pressures towards the creation of a unique Sudanese identity drawing its strength simultaneously from 'Arab' and 'African' components. Among less reflective writers, Joseph Lagu had asserted that 'even Northern Sudanese are more African than Arab'.[16] And on a similarly subjective basis, I was constantly surprised to find how easily 'southern rebels' in both London and East Africa were able to mix with northerners, including those in diplomatic service. An argument along these lines is difficult to pursue but the degree of co-operation between northerners and southerners in the period after 1972 clearly indicates that racial antagonism, while often strong, did not in itself create an insurmountable barrier to a settlement once favourable conditions had been created.

Ideological antagonism was similarly of less significance than it often appeared. Indeed, from a northern perspective, it only became an issue when the Sudanese left held positions in government. In the brief period of radical government after the overthrow of the military in 1964, the southern rebellion was considered to be closely bound to international counter-revolutionary forces in supporting Moise Tshombe against the Lumumbists. The route for Egyptian and

[15] See, for example, Muddathir Abdel-Rahim, 'Arabism, Africanism and Self-Identification in the Sudan', and Ali A. Mazrui, 'The Multiple Marginality of the Sudan', in Yūsuf Fadl Hasan (ed.), *Sudan in Africa* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1971) and Francis M. Deng, *Dynamics of Identification* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1973).

[16] Joseph Lagu, 'A Southerner's View of the Sudan Settlement', *New Middle East* (London) No. 49, Oct. 1972.

Algerian military supplies—backed by the Soviet Union—for the Lumumbist rebels was through the South, and it was alleged that Tshombe and his backers were giving tactical support to the Anya Nya, with the aim of disrupting supply routes and deterring the Sudan from intervention in the Congo. As a result the southern rebellion was seen as a part of a wider conspiracy against an African radicalism drawing its inspiration from socialist Egypt and Algeria.

With the collapse of the rebellion in the Congo, however, and the eclipse of the radicals in the Sudanese government, this interpretation of the southern insurgency lost influence. In 1969 it was restored to prominence and by that time Israeli interest in the Anya Nya gave it some credibility. The interpretation of the southern rebellion as a creature of imperialism ruled out any compromise while the SCP had influence in the Sudan government, but for the non-communist left, compromise was easier. It was similarly alleged that the southern leadership had become entangled with 'reactionaries', but it had legitimate demands nevertheless, and needed to be detached from those who were using the rebel movement for their own ends. This view was most forceably expressed by Othwonh Dak, who had returned from exile in 1970: 'the activities credited to Israel in the Southern Sudan have the blessing of a body much more involved in international political intrigue than the state of Israel. These activities are directed not towards helping the rebels of the Southern Sudan, rather they are aimed at toppling the progressive socialist regime in Khartoum so that in its place will come phoney leaders who on the Middle East Problem and other international affairs could be regarded as moderates.'[17]

This account of ideologically-motivated international intervention was lent weight by the testimony of a captured mercenary, Rolf Steiner, at his trial in Khartoum in August 1971. Steiner disclosed a bizarre story involving not only Israel and General Amin, but also Roman Catholic groups who had previously been active in Biafra, British intelligence services and British mercenaries, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA was alleged to have paid a northern party the astonishingly high sum of $18 million in support of an abortive insurrection in March 1970.[18] It was a major political trial for the Sudanese government, and also a test of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and there was no cross-examination of Steiner on these aspects of his statement. In these circumstances it is not impossible that Steiner

[17] Othwonh Dak, *The Southern Sudan: The Internationalisation of the Problem* (Khartoum) no date. This was issued as a pamphlet by the Ministry of Southern Affairs.

[18] In which the large Ansar encampment on Aba island was attacked by Sudanese government forces after the Imam of the sect had refused to surrender arms held on the island. Resistance was swiftly broken and the Imam, el-Hadi el-Mahdi (Saddik's uncle) was killed trying to escape to the Ethiopian border.

elaborated his testimony to implicate others in the hope (or promise) that this would enhance his own prospects for an early release.[19]

More credibility could be attached to a letter allegedly from a southern political leader, Gordon Mortat, to the Political Secretary of the United States Embassy in Kampala which was 'found at a main rebel camp recently crushed by the Sudan Armed Forces'.[20] In this letter, Mortat offered 'a base in the Nile to defeat Communism in the continent of Africa' and the letter also thanked the United States government for its donation of LS. 10,000'.[21] Whether authentic or not, the Mortat letter (with its grand claims to 'Presidency' and predictions of 'wiping out the enemy in the Nile probably at the end of this month') illustrates the tendency for southern politicians with pompous designations to approach Western embassies in neighbouring African capitals in the hope of gaining same financial support.[22] It was convenient to be anti-communist and promote the idea of ideological confrontation in the Sudan, but I met no southerner who regarded anti-communism as anything other than a tactical ploy.

But to relegate both ideological and racial factors from the southern perspective requires more than this as evidence. After all, SSLM publications and press releases throughout 1970 and 1971 stressed this very aspect of ideological and racial confrontation, condemning not only Soviet intervention but also the 'Arab imperialism' to which it was allied. The 'Anya Nya struggle' was claimed to be 'not a Biafra-like fight tearing apart an African country' but 'a fundamental struggle putting an indigenous African culture against alien invading forces—Arabisation and imperialism. The Anya Nya is the vanguard of Africa's struggle against this new colonialism'.[23] Much was made of the Soviet presence in the South, with foreign journalists receiving briefings on operations and weapons involving the Soviet advisers[24] to the Sudan army.[25] John Fairhall of *The Guardian* saw the South as 'a point of conflict between Arab and Black Africa, between Arabs

[19] He was eventually found guilty and sentenced to death. This was commuted by the President to 20 years, but Steiner was then hospitalised for most of the time and returned to Germany after three years, if not even sooner.

[20] *Nile Mirror*, Sept. 1, 1971.

[21] The small, largely charitable, amount involved gives the letter some authenticity.

[22] This particularly angered exiled southern students and those in professional employment, I have subsequently found.

[23] *The Anya Nya Struggle: Background and Objectives* (no date or place of publication, but distributed from London 1971). Joseph Garang also alluded to Biafra claiming, in an interview with the Editor of the *Sudan News* that foreign intervention was designed 'to create another Biafra in the Sudan and, if possible, to transform the Southern question into an Afro-Arab conflict on a continental scale.' (The *Sudan News*, Sept. 24, 1970).

[24] See, for example, *Anya Nya* No. 1, March 1971. This was a monthly news sheet with excellent design and graphics. This particular issue was on 'white mercenaries'—the Russians and the Egyptians.

[25] See Eprile, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–114, in a chapter on 'The Russians in the Sudan'.

and Israel, and so between Russia and the United States', with the 'Arab-Russian build-up [threatening] the stability of both the Middle East and Africa'.[26] With the expulsion of the Russians from the Sudan in July 1971, Arab intervention was the major southern international preoccupation. Commenting on Numeiri's 'restoration' in July 1971, the SSLM claimed that Egyptian and Libyan support 'confirms the Southern Sudanese contention that Arab expansionism is the cause of the present conflict in the Sudan'.[27]

Yet despite all this evidence of southern antagonism based on ideological and (in its anti-Arabism) racial perception of the conflict, subsequent developments indicated that these represented only a tactical stance based on less intractable international factors. Indeed an understanding of these factors is crucial to any interpretation of the events leading up to the 1972 Agreement. Three countries were closely involved in these events—Israel, Uganda and Ethiopia—and discussion of their respective roles in the southern settlement illustrates the pragmatic and opportunistic nature of international politics in a region where it is tempting to exaggerate 'larger' cultural, ideological and racial factors.

International aspects of the southern settlement

Israeli interest in the southern Sudan may have started as early as 1963,[28] although 1969—after the Numeiri coup—has been regarded as the time when arms shipments to the Anya Nya began.[29] Since in 1969 Numeiri appeared to be drawing closer to Nasser, and later Qathafi, in a new radical Arab coalition, it has often been assumed that Israel's involvement in the southern Sudan was to create a military diversion and tie up Sudanese troops away from the Suez Canal.[30] This military gain was not derisory, but it was hardly enough to justify Israeli adventures on the upper Nile. Moreover, southerners have suggested that Israel's involvement began not in 1969 but in 1967 after the June War had established Israel as by far the strongest military power in the region. The post-1967 period also witnessed a major Israeli diplomatic and political offensive in sub-Saharan Africa

[26] *The Guardian*, March 5, 1971.

[27] *Southern Sudan Liberation Movement Official Statement No. 1*, August 4, 1971.

[28] Beshir, *op. cit.*, p. 91. Beshir was ambassador and head of the African Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the period before the Addis Ababa Agreement.

[29] Peter Kilner, 'A Better Outlook for Sudan', *The World Today*, April 1972. Also Theresa Scherf, *The Sudan Conflict: Its History and Development* (Geneva) 1971. This short study was issued as a pamphlet by the World Council of Churches.

[30] See, for example, J. Bowyer Bell, *The Horn of Africa: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973), p. 45; David Martin, *General Amin* (London: Faber, 1974), p. 159; and Tareq Y. Ismael, 'Africa and the Middle East' in Ismael (ed.) *The Middle East in World Politics* (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 1974), p. 179.

which sought to establish Israel as a sympathetic 'non-aligned' country in the Third World. A further aim was to forestall any Arab initiative to isolate Israel from external sympathy and form an 'anti-Zionist' Afro-Arab coalition against Israel.

It is in this context that Israel's southern involvement should be seen—as part of an attempt to discredit the 'Arab' northern Sudan in the eyes of the sub-Saharan Africa, with the further prospect of discrediting Soviet intervention in the affairs of the continent. Since the first days of SANU,[31] in 1963, southerners had attempted to attract support from African states by invoking 'Black African' solidarity against 'Arab Africa' and therefore it was easy for the resistance movement to accept Israel's support at the price of adopting an increasingly sophisticated propaganda campaign against 'Arab imperialism' in Africa. It was this propaganda that created a misleading impression that implacable African-Arab hatred in the Sudan ruled out the prospects of a negotiated settlement.

Israeli interest was not confined to the Sudan: more important strategically was Ethiopia with its long Red Sea coast. Ethiopia, for its part, had felt threatened for centuries by the prospect of an Islamic encirclement, and more contemporarily, by Somali irridentism and Eritrean secessionism. Israel was therefore a natural ally—especially during the pro-Western reign of the Emperor—and there was Israeli involvement in the training of the Ethiopian army. There was also Israeli support for the Anya Nya in Upper Nile which was channelled through Ethiopia. But this tacit Ethiopian support for the Anya Nya was not based on any solidarity with an African or Christian struggle against Arab domination. In the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Ethiopians were faced with a similar threat as the Anya Nya posed to the Sudan. With the ELF using the Sudan for refuge and arms running, Ethiopia was obviously unwilling to clamp down on any covert Anya Nya support activities.[32]

As in Ethiopia, the Israelis were involved in training the Ugandan army, and when the armed forces overthrew President Obote in January 1971, Israel was believed to have strengthened its position in internal Ugandan politics.[33] In Uganda, the southern Sudanese had never been afforded recognition as an African liberation movement and had often been harassed by the Ugandan government. Unlike Ethiopia, Uganda had—at least during the Obote period—nothing to

[31] Sudan African National Union, the first southern exile organisation to be formed.

[32] This point is expanded by Christopher Clapham, 'Ethiopia and Somalia', and Mordechai Abir, 'Red Sea Politics'. Both essays are in *Adelphi Papers*, No. 93 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Dec. 1972), under the title *Conflicts in Africa*.

[33] Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–169, further claims that Israel was alarmed at Obote's growing political closeness to Numeiri and thus encouraged Amin to seize power.

gain from supporting (or ignoring external support for) the Anya Nya. On the contrary, an escalation of violence along Uganda's northern border could only exacerbate tensions within northern Uganda itself, an area from which many of the Ugandan armed forces were recruited and from which Obote drew much of his political support.

In some sections of the Ugandan army, however, the Anya Nya had its supporters and there were several former southern Sudanese exiles in potentially senior positions in the Ugandan armed forces and security services.[34] When Amin came to power, southern resistance leaders, particularly in Equatoria, felt their position had been strengthened by the removal of Obote and the consolidation of Israeli influence. Early in 1971, as Abel Alier and other southerners within the Sudan were trying to persuade those outside to negotiate a settlement, the Anya Nya leadership felt themselves to be in a particularly strong position with Israeli support coming through two neighbouring countries. At the same time, however, the Anya Nya had become dependent upon Israeli support to maintain the political unity of its commanders. With Israeli support cut off, there was a danger that it could revert to the fragmented, mutually recriminating, and largely impotent 'struggle' of the late 1960s, with still no prospect of formal recognition by an African state.

In March 1971, the Sudan and Ethiopia signed what has been called 'perhaps the most important agreement in the direction of solving the Southern problem',[35] although it was not in fact substantially different from an earlier agreement signed in 1966 when the Sudanese Prime Minister, Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub, had attempted to isolate the Anya Nya by diplomacy. However, by 1971 both the ELF and the Anya Nya had acquired much stronger supporters. The ELF in particular had begun to assume significance in the Arab strategy of controlling the Red Sea area which the British departure from Aden had made possible. The Sudan was less enthusiastic (at that time) than other Arab League states about an Eritrean war of secession along its own border, and by 1971 both Sudan and Ethiopia had developed a strong interest in ending internal wars which showed dangerous signs of being internationalised.

In November 1971, Numeiri followed up the earlier agreement by visiting Ethiopia, leaving behind a delegation led by Abel Alier which discussed proposals for a settlement with representatives of the SSLM. This was not a successful meeting, for there was strong opposition

[34] These were often southern Sudanese who had left in 1955 or even before and who had been brought up and educated in Uganda. They were Uganda citizens, and were not ex-Anya Nya officers and men as Martin suggests in his account of the Amin coup and its repressive aftermath.

[35] Beshir, *op. cit.*, p. 84. He also includes the terms of the agreements.

among southern exiled politicians to any settlement of the terms of the draft constitutional framework of regional autonomy.[36] But the Numeiri-Haile Selassie meeting appears to have had a major impact upon the external support for the Anya Nya in Upper Nile, with the rebels suddenly cut off from arms and munitions upon which they had come to rely.[37] This development assumed particular significance as negotiations were resumed in Addis Ababa the following February 1972, but it was of minor importance compared to events in Uganda where, after a series of bewildering developments, the entire Israeli community left in March 1972.

Amin had not come to power without a struggle, especially in Obote's own East Nile where Langi and Acholi troops had resisted but then fled in some numbers into the southern Sudan. There they regrouped with the support of the Sudanese army and were visited in 1971 by ex-President Obote who himself had been given a house in Khartoum North by Numeiri. From eastern Equatoria there were plans to invade Uganda and restore Obote in collaboration with another armed group invading from northern Tanzania.[38]

In this way, the Uganda-Sudan relationship had suddenly become analogous to the Ethiopia-Sudan relationship in which internal wars imposed a mutual threat. However, in the case of Uganda the fear was not only of a prolonged internal war supported covertly from a neighbouring state but also of a swift invasion destroying the unity of Amin's own recently-installed military regime. Subsequent developments suggest that Numeiri and Amin recognised this mutual security interest and acted accordingly. In particular, Numeiri, in return for abandoning support for Obote's group, asked Amin to cut off all external access to the Anya Nya.[39] As the Anya Nya and their supporters had managed to evade such restrictions in the past, it was necessary for Amin to expel the Israeli military mission in Uganda. Since Amin had depended upon Israeli support in the past, this may have been a high price to ask, but it is quite likely that other factors may have influenced Amin's decision, including the possibility that he resented Israel's influence in his army. However, the strength and determination of the Obote forces in Equatoria were considerable, especially if they could invade their home area where Amin—as subsequent purges indicated—had no reason to feel confident of army

[36] Only hints of this 'breakdown' are given in Beshir, *op. cit.*, p. 106, and Eprile, *op. cit.*, p. 148, but Pirouet, *op. cit.*, gives a fuller account.

[37] Interview with Anya Nya 'adviser' operating in Upper Nile (Nairobi 1973).

[38] Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 176, clearly drawing upon Obote's evidence. He also states that there were 1,000 men loyal to Obote in eastern Equatoria.

[39] This is my own interpretation. However, it has been substantially confirmed by a southern Sudanese minister of the regional government and a minister in the Amin government.

loyalty. I would therefore suggest that the mutual interests of Numeiri and Amin were instrumental first, in removing the Obote threat from northern Uganda; second, in persuading part of the Anya Nya leadership to reach a settlement; and third, in hastening the expulsion of the Israelis from Uganda.

The Anya Nya leadership was under strong pressure from their 'external supporters' to negotiate a settlement when a SSLM delegation met the Sudan government negotiators in Addis Ababa in February 1972.[40] The questions of political leadership and political control in a regionally autonomous South proved easy to negotiate; but in addition to an agreed 'Draft Organic Law on Regional Self-Government', there was an armed forces protocol on the integration of the Anya Nya into the Sudanese armed forces and the creation of a joint military commission to supervise recruitment.[41] Colonel Frederick Maggott, representing the Anya Nya high command in Addis Ababa, was not in a position to know precisely what would be acceptable to his fellow Anya Nya officers, and on his return substantial opposition developed to the armed forces protocol and the agreement as a whole.[42] However, shortly after the Addis Ababa Agreement had been signed by the respective delegations on February 27, some thousand former Uganda army men were moved from their Equatoria camp to Upper Nile. In the following June they—and Obote—left the Sudan entirely, sailing to Tanga in Tanzania. (This was the force which led the invasion of Uganda in September 1972.) On March 24 (in the same month as the Obote forces withdrew from eastern Equatoria) the Israelis were expelled from Uganda.[43]

These events coincided with a period of uncertainty and confusion among the Anya Nya. Lagu was due in Addis Ababa on March 12

[40] Interviews with member of the former Anya Nya high command (Juba 1972) and senior Anya Nya civil administrator (Khartoum 1973). An alternative view of this external pressure is that Israel was never more than the client of the CIA in the southern Sudan and that the CIA, after Numeiri's move against the Communists in 1972, decided to work towards creating a stable, pro-Western, and united Sudan.

[41] There were three other protocols on 'Interim Administrative Arrangements', 'Amnesty and Judicial Affairs', and 'Resettlement and Repatriation' (*Grass Curtain*, Vol. 2, No. 3, May 1972—its 'Agreement Issue' included the full original text). The military agreement was on a new southern command with a force of 12,000 which would include 6,000 'citizens from the region'.

[42] Both Eprile, *op. cit.*, and Pirouet, *op. cit.*, discuss this opposition, Eprile (p. 15) including Lagu himself among the opponents.

[43] The Israelis later claimed that Amin expelled them because they had refused to supply the arms he required—on Israeli allegations—to invade Tanzania. The other interpretation is that Amin expelled the Israelis after a visit to Libya in February, from which he returned with either a massive aid offer, or a new commitment to Islam, or both. Ugandans have noted that massive Libyan aid did not in fact materialise, and they have also commented upon the unlikelihood of a suspicious politician like Amin basing a major decision simply upon the promises of people with whom he had had no previous dealings. Southerners have also been sceptical about Amin's sudden conversion to Islamic solidarity: he was not previously regarded as a serious Moslem and was known in the past to have a strong antipathy towards the Arabs.

to meet Numeiri and ratify the Agreement,[44] but did not arrive until March 26 and brought with him new demands for a southern command composed entirely of southerners.[45] In the event Lagu was unwilling (or unable) to press these amendments, which have subsequently been ignored, and February 27 is officially regarded as the final stage of the Agreement.

Conclusion

This interpretation of Anya Nya policy and external pressures almost certainly over-simplifies the southern settlement (as it over-simplifies Ugandan politics). As I have explained above, there were a number of factors which contributed to the achievement of the Addis Ababa Agreement and its timing. Yet the pressure of neighbouring countries towards a settlement is important for an understanding of southern Sudanese politics. The Numeiri regime came to power intending to exclude former southern party politicians from authority in the South and to ignore the Anya Nya leadership in the bush. Internal changes and international pressures forced it to abandon this policy, but an accommodating and pragmatic southern leadership was required to cement a *rapprochement*. The interests of such a leadership need not be dismissed as 'opportunistic' or 'petty bourgeois', but nevertheless their own personal status in a southern settlement was bound to lead to priority being given to the southernisation of posts and the creation of new ministries and commissions. The settlement itself therefore marked the beginning of a new phase in southern Sudanese politics with the prospect of substantial and relatively widespread opportunities for patronage among southern leaders.

An examination of the international aspects of the settlement demonstrates that politics in both the Sudan and in the region as a whole cannot safely be seen as bounded by racial, religious or ideological loyalties and antagonisms. It is clear that the politics of the Ethiopia-Sudan-Uganda region and beyond are a complex web of domestic instability, covert diplomacy, external subversion and temporary alliances in which race, religion and ideology often play only a small part. To suggest that events are more complex than they seem is not particularly helpful, but it may be an important corrective

[44] Numeiri was advised of the dangers of Anya Nya prevarication and promulgated the 'Southern Sudan Regional Self-Government Act' and ordered a unilateral ceasefire on March 3, thereby intensifying pressure on the more wary among the SSLM leadership.

[45] He also brought amendments to the new Act which enhanced the powers of the Assembly at the expense of the Regional President, limited the powers of the President of the Republic, and gave English parity with Arabic. Copies of the amended draft were distributed from an address in Geneva.

to any over-simplified interpretation of, for example, Ethiopian-Somali or Sudan-Ethiopian relations.

Finally, this narrow study shows the redundancy of any formal nation-state approach to understanding African international politics. This is not only because of the crucial role of forces operating at a sub-national level. The entire concept of 'foreign policy' becomes meaningless as policy towards neighbouring countries becomes inseparably bound to policy towards internal dissidents and support for dissidents operating across national borders. In this respect, the Horn of Africa is particularly unstable, even bizarre, but it does represent a pattern of regional politics which, unhappily, could become prevalent in the African continent where conditions of internal instability and external penetration do not seem, at least in the short-term, likely to diminish.

A COMMUNITY OF TWELVE IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY

Loukas Tsoukalis

BEFORE the Community had had time to digest the effects of the first round of enlargement in 1973, when Britain, Ireland and Denmark became full members, it was faced with applications from three Mediterranean countries—Greece, Spain and Portugal. The three new applicants can be described as semi-industrialised countries with a relatively high percentage of their labour force still engaged in agriculture (from 35·4 to 22·0 per cent as compared with 8·7 per cent in the Nine) and per caput incomes ranging between one third and one half of the Community average.[1]

The Community's decision-making system is a continuous process of negotiation frequently based on complicated package deals, and producing a very delicate balance of profits and losses on each item for every member country or pressure group. The longer a political system or organisation exists, the more will it lead to the establishment of vested interests identified with the status quo.[2] Such interests have been created as a result of European integration; Community farmers, who strive through their organisations for higher prices and for the preservation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), are only one of them. The entry of new members is bound to upset delicate balances of interests and will, therefore, be seen as a threat except in those cases where a participant sees the enlargement of a group as an opportunity to challenge the status quo.

The new applications for membership of the Community have come in a period of prolonged recession which manifests itself in high rates of unemployment and inflation—*pace* Phillips and his curve—low rates of growth, payments deficits and growing demands from Third-World countries for a new international economic order. This is in sharp contrast with the honeymoon period of the 1960s, at least as far as the Six were concerned. With no obvious signs of an early recovery of the West European economy, with economic and political pundits running out of new ideas, the immediate reaction of politicians

1 GDP per caput (1975, in dollars) = EEC–9: 5,235, Spain: 2,874, Greece: 2,306, Portugal: 1,530 (OECD, *Main Economic Indicators*).

2 A similar point was also made by Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold in *Europe's Would-Be Polity* (Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 126–28.

and organised interest groups is one of *sauve qui peut*. It is a sign of the Community's strength that so much of the *acquis communautaire* has been preserved despite adverse economic conditions. Nevertheless, it is a difficult time to apply for membership of the European Community. People tend to concentrate on short-term problems and to over-react to them, while there is a danger that any global view or long-term implications will be lost in the confusion. Academics can afford such a luxury; after all, they do not lose votes or money.

In such times, three applications to join are the best form of flattery. It is true that the Community looks much bigger from outside than inside. This is not unrelated to the fact that it is in the field of external relations that the Nine have been particularly successful in the recent past. Although the Community is basically an economic organisation, the applicants' motivations seem to be predominantly political. All three have recently emerged from dictatorial regimes and feel a strong need for international recognition. Membership of the Community is seen as enabling them to play an active role in European and international politics after long years of isolation, as in the case of Spain and Portugal, or after the frustration of being an object rather than a subject of international diplomacy, as in the case of Greece. Membership is also considered a guarantee for the preservation of the new democratic institutions. Inevitably, relations with the Community have become an issue in domestic politics, particularly in Greece and Portugal, where the Communist parties of the two countries, together with the Panhellenic Socialist Movement led by Mr. A. Papandreou, are opposed to entry, again for clearly political reasons. In Spain, on the contrary, all the political parties are completely unanimous on the issue of Community membership.

But it is, I think, economic factors which made the applications of these countries inevitable once the domestic political system allowed. Their geographical situation, and economic models which could be drastically changed only at a very high cost, as well as their previous association with the Community, left the three countries with no option but to apply for membership. All three are already effectively integrated in the West European economy. Their exports to the Community as a percentage of total exports range from 46·5 per cent in the case of Spain, to 51·1 per cent in the case of Greece.[3] This is almost identical with the figure representing intra-Community trade as a percentage of overall trade for the existing members. Another characteristic is that all three countries have been running big trade deficits with the Nine. The coverage of imports by exports in their

[3] Based on an average of 1973, 1974 and 1975 trade figures (OECD—*Statistics of Foreign Trade*).

trade with the Community ranges from 50·4 per cent for Greece to 60·8 per cent for Spain and 62·9 per cent for Portugal. These deficits have been at least partly financed by receipts from tourism, remittances from emigrant workers, foreign direct investment and, in the case of Greece, shipping. The three countries belong to the South of Europe in every sense of the word, geographical, political and economic. This is clearly shown in the level of their economic development and the composition of their imports and exports.

A long period of engagement

Full application of the Athens Agreement of 1961, which in principle should be achieved by 1984, would give Greece almost de facto membership of the Community, at least as far as the economic aspects are concerned. What the associated country is not entitled to is direct participation in the Community's decision-making system and therefore the ability to influence decisions. The fact that no serious progress has been made so far in the harmonisation of agricultural policies, although a provision to do so was included in the Athens Agreement, is another important factor. With the collapse of the colonels' regime in 1974, the new Greek government was faced with the alternative of applying for membership or re-orienting completely its external economic policy. The status of an associate was not a real alternative.

Portugal has been a member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). When Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the Community, Portugal signed a free trade area agreement with the latter which applied to industrial goods. Portuguese industrial exports have enjoyed free access to the Community since July 1977, with the exception of a few 'sensitive' products, while Portuguese tariff protection is planned to be removed by 1985. Given the present economic difficulties and the balance-of-payments deficit which forced the government to introduce emergency measures with the approval of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as well as the low level of economic development relative to that of the other two applicants, it is doubtful whether Portugal would be able to withstand the economic consequences of full membership in the near future, unless it were given special aid and a long transition period. The Portuguese negotiators are likely to strive for both. The Greek application in 1975, the expectation of an imminent application from Spain, together with internal political reasons, all help to explain why Dr. Soares decided that there was no time to waste.

Spain has traditionally protected its domestic industry from outside competition through high tariff barriers. The 1970 trade agreement

with the Community led to a 25 per cent reduction in tariffs in Spain and a 60 per cent reduction applying to most Spanish industrial exports to the Community. Proposals from Brussels for a free trade area, which would exclude most agricultural products, fell on deaf ears in Spain both during the last few years of the Franco regime and afterwards. Spain still has the relatively most protected economy among the Three but also the biggest potential for benefiting from the advantages of free trade with the Community.

Member countries have seen the second round of enlargement in political terms. The application lodged by Mr. Karamanlis in June 1975 was received with general enthusiasm as if the democracies of Western Europe were taking a straying child back into the fold. But this enthusiasm was gradually tempered as discussion over the price of peaches and olive oil replaced the rhetoric on the democratic ideals of the West. The Portuguese and Spanish applications, received in March and July 1977 respectively, also gave pause for thought. It was no longer a question of accepting a small country which could have only a marginal effect on the political and economic balance within the Community.

In France, despite Gaullist and communist opposition to enlargement, and the Socialist Party's slightly ambivalent attitude, President Giscard d'Estaing has remained firm in his support of the Greek application. Excellent relations with the government in Athens and the fact that Greek agriculture does not present any serious threat to French farmers in the South explain his attitude. The Mediterranean enlargement was originally seen by the Quai d'Orsay as a means of redressing the present geographical and political imbalance in the Community. But as the files were opened and studied, and as the farmers began to react, grand gestures and long-term geopolitical considerations gave way to second thoughts and concentration on immediate problems.[4] French support for Spanish and Portuguese entry will certainly not be unqualified, nor can it be taken entirely for granted. Although Italy, with its Mediterranean agriculture, faces similar problems as France, as regards competition from the Three, its attitude on enlargement has been less wavering than that adopted by France. The fact that no opposition has been expressed by left-wing parties, particularly the Italian Communist Party, which supports enlargement, is an important factor. (For the Greek application, both France and Italy have expressed almost unqualified support.)

[4] This is also the main gist of the argument in William Wallace, ' Grand gestures and second thoughts: the response of the Member Countries to Greece's application ', in Loukas Tsoukalis (ed.) *Greece and the European Community* (London: Saxon House, forthcoming).

The Federal government in Germany still appears to be the most enthusiastic supporter of the second round of enlargement, although it will have to carry a large part of the still undetermined, financial burden. German interest in political ' stability ' in the Mediterranean, the strengthening of the southern flank of Nato, and the inclusion of Spain in Nato, have been important considerations. This is, after all, yet another indication of the political role that the Federal Republic has assumed in Western Europe. On the other hand, the opening of three markets, in particular the Spanish one, is not seen with complete indifference by German businessmen.

Among the Big Four Britain is the country likely to be least affected by the second round of enlargement.[5] The government has recently expressed the fear that the decision to speed up Greek entry may be at the expense of Spain and Portugal.[6] There are in turn widespread fears on the continent that the Labour government may see enlargement as a means of diluting the Community. Mr. Callaghan's letter to the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party in October 1977 did not do much to dispel those fears. It is certainly true that the British government does not share the view of the Benelux countries, Ireland and the Commission that major institutional reforms should take place in anticipation of enlargement. The weakening of the institutions and cohesion of the Community in general have been the main cause of worry for the small members, with the possible exception of Denmark. Ireland has also been concerned about financial transfers to the three new applicants and their possible effect on its own net share of the Community budget.

The Commission's opinion on the Greek application, put forward in January 1976, was in clear contrast to the enthusiastic responses of member countries.[7] The Commission proposed some form of pre-accession period to allow for the introduction or acceleration of necessary reforms. The emphasis was placed firmly on the economic difficulties likely to arise both for the Community and for Greece. The Commission also expressed concern about the political consequences of Greek membership, both in terms of Community cohesion and relations with third countries, particularly Turkey. There were rumours that the idea of a pre-accession period and references to the political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean were added at the last minute by one Commis-

[5] A serious debate has started on the likely effects of enlargement on Britain. See House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, 17th Report, *Enlargement of the Community*. Session 1977/78, House of Lords Papers, 102 (HMSO April 1978). The House of Commons opened its consideration of the issue on May 2, 1978.

[6] Dr. Owen quoted in *The Times*, Feb. 8, 1978.

[7] Commission of the European Communities, ' Opinion on the Greek application for membership ', Supplement to *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 2/76.

sioner's *cabinet*. The Commission was divided and the four French and Italian members, who were in a minority and who favoured early Greek entry, expressed their opposition in public. In the end, the Council of Ministers rejected the Commission's proposal after strong pressure from Athens.

Negotiations with Greece started in July 1976. Until the end of 1977 they were limited to the exchange of preliminary documents, with the Commission constantly asking the Greek side for more information while itself refusing to present its negotiating position. Once the Portuguese and Spanish applications were submitted, a number of wider questions arose and remained unresolved for a long time with both Community and national governments guilty of muddled thinking. 'Globalisation' and joint negotiations with the three applicants have finally been rejected, although the Community has accepted the need to study the cumulative effects of the entry of three new members on Community institutions and economic policies and try to find solutions to the problems created. This is sometimes referred to as 'globalisation de réflexion'. As a response to it, the Commission prepared the so-called 'fresco' on enlargement which was submitted to the Council in April 1978.[8]

Simultaneous entry of the three applicants has also been excluded. Since Mr. Karamanlis's visit to Bonn, Brussels, London and Paris in January 1978, the Greek negotiations have gathered momentum so that one can talk with some confidence of Greece becoming the tenth member by 1981 at the latest. The Commission's opinion on Portugal was expected sometime in May 1978 while that on Spain will not be ready before early 1979. Therefore the time-table for Portuguese and Spanish entry, assuming no serious accident *en route*, will have to be extended to 1982–83. The period of engagement will consequently be long and it should be remembered that engagements are very serious affairs in the Mediterranean.

In order to avoid a repetition of the Greek experience, the Commission's opinion on the two Iberian applications is being prepared in consultation both with the applicant countries and the existing members. The type and length of transition periods after accession still remain undecided. Various ingenious suggestions have been put forward.[9] In its 'fresco', the Commission now talks in terms of a minimum of five and a maximum of ten years, possibly in two stages.

[8] Commission of the European Communities, 'General Considerations on the Problems of Enlargement' COM (78) 120 final, Brussels, April 20, 1978; Commission of the European Communities, 'The Transitional Period and the Institutional Implications of Enlargement', COM (78) 190 final, Brussels, April 24, 1978.

[9] Pierre Uri put forward the idea of 'une négociation par étape' (*Le Monde*, April 3–4, 1977) which was later taken up by Signor Lorenzo Natali in his report to the Commission in October 1977.

The first years of an uneasy marriage

When economic predictions about the current year have to be taken with a pinch of salt, attempts to estimate the effects of enlargement—which with the inclusion of transition periods will extend at least to a decade from now—on the Community's budget and economic policies is little more than an exercise in futurology. Previous attempts to estimate the budgetary implications of British membership, which all proved highly inaccurate, should make us more aware of the limitations. All we can do is to paint with a broad brush the general effects for the member countries and the three applicants in different fields of Community activity.

At present, about 70 per cent of the Community budget is spent on agriculture. Other important items of expenditure include development aid, manpower policy, regional policy and administration. The financial activities of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Investment Bank and the European Monetary Co-operation Fund come under a separate category. The bulk of Community revenue, as a result of the own resources scheme, comes from industrial duties, agricultural levies and VAT contributions which can reach a maximum of one per cent of VAT revenue.

Too much has been made of the agricultural aspect of enlargement. It seems to be too easily taken for granted that the three applicants will be net beneficiaries. Predictions are extremely hazardous because one has to make assumptions about the future relationship between world and Community prices, production levels in the Nine, the effect of the application of CAP on production and consumption in the three applicants, exchange rates and monetary compensatory amounts, to mention but a few.

The Three are producers of typical Mediterranean products like fruit, vegetables, wine, olive oil and in the case of Greece, tobacco. They have deficits in cereals, meat and dairy products. Spain and Portugal are already net importers of agricultural goods. On the budgetary side, the entry of the new members will partly alleviate the burden of financing surpluses of North European products (cereals, meat, milk and butter) because of increased demand for them. On the other hand, surpluses of a number of fruit and vegetables, wine, olive oil and some varieties of tobacco will tend to increase or be created. But there is a substantial difference in the market organisation of temperate and Mediteranean products which has very obvious budgetary implications. While the difference between target and intervention prices for temperate products is usually very small, market support for fruit and vegetables is based on withdrawal from the market and prices can be allowed to fall by up to 40 per cent of the

target price. For wine, the emphasis is on quality control and at times of surplus producers are given support for storage and distillation. For olive oil and tobacco, support includes direct payment to producers and it is with respect to these two products that Greece is expected to gain considerably in budgetary terms.

The difference in market support between northern and southern agricultural products, which is caused not only by the nature of these products but also by the political balance of power within the Community, explains why, in the static estimates of the budgetary implications of enlargement, the gross receipts of the three countries as a percentage of total expenditure in the guarantee section of the Agricultural Fund (FEOGA) are expected to be less than the percentage of their contribution to the Community's agricultural product.[10] A serious problem arises in the case of Portugal, the poorest of the three applicants, which is likely to be a net loser, and not only in budgetary terms, from its participation in the CAP. As far as the regressive nature of the latter is concerned, there is an analogy to be drawn between Portugal and Italy in the original Six. But the three applicants will be net beneficiaries from expenditure out of the guidance section of FEOGA, which so far accounts for about 5 per cent of agricultural expenditure.

In addition to the budgetary effects of participation in the CAP, trade effects can be equally or even more significant. Because of the external protection, the three new members will have to import some cereals, meat and dairy products from Community countries rather than from outside and will therefore have to pay higher prices. At the same time, they will be guaranteed access for their exports of Mediterranean products, although it is highly doubtful whether they can secure high enough export prices to compensate them for losses incurred as a result of higher import prices. Food prices will rise in these countries and, assuming their currencies are likely to move downwards rather than upwards, their governments will be faced with the difficult choice of devaluation leading to more jumps in food prices, or border taxes against their own farmers.[11]

Among the Nine, consumers and net exporters of temperate products are likely to gain. The negative impact will be concentrated on French and Italian farmers who will be hit by competition from the low-priced products of the three applicants, particularly Spain. The latter is, in fact, the only country which is likely to affect significantly the

[10] Treasury estimates in House of Lords Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 42–44; Commission estimates quoted in *Agence Europe*, March 2, 1978.

[11] A good analysis of the trade effects in agriculture was made in John Marsh, 'The Impact of Enlargement on the Common Agricultural Policy', Semaine de Bruges, March 1978; to be published by William Wallace and Inneke Herroman (eds.) *A Community of Twelve: the impact of further Enlargement on the European Communities*. (College of Europe, Bruges, July 1978).

balance between supply and demand for some agricultural goods. French and Italian farmers have already expressed grave concern,[12] and their governments have submitted proposals for a better market organisation for Mediterranean products. The Commission has already responded with its own proposals in which the main emphasis is placed on structural measures in the Mezzogiorno and Languedoc regions.

The three applicants will be net beneficiaries from the operations of the Regional and Social Funds, although it is very difficult to predict the amounts involved, particularly in the case of the Social Fund where there are no national quotas. According to estimates made by the Treasury, additional expenditure for both could amount in current prices to about 840 million units of account.[13] As a result of membership, the three countries will have to subscribe to the capital of the European Investment Bank but would eventually expect to benefit by way of loans and credits. They will also participate in the short-term monetary support and the medium-term financial aid mechanisms while at the same time they may benefit from the system of Community loans intended to help finance balance-of-payments deficits. The new financial instrument, proposed by M. Ortoli, would also enable member countries, old and new, to have access to loans for investment.

The Community is primarily a customs union for industrial goods. For the applicant countries, membership will involve free trade with the Nine and with members of EFTA who have signed free trade area agreements with the Community, it will also mean much lower tariff protection vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The applicants will have to adopt the Common External Tariff while all agreements signed with the Third World (Mediterranean agreements, Lomé Convention, Generalised Preferences Scheme) will be extended to include the three new members. Membership will also involve adoption of the internal market rules which form part of the '*acquis communautaire*'.

Although the three applicants have enjoyed high rates of growth and rapid industrialisation during the last fifteen years, they do not belong to the category of highly industrialised countries which includes all the present members except Ireland. They suffer from serious structural deficiencies: their industries are characterised by poor vertical structure, limited diversification and are made up mainly of small firms. Their principal concern is about the effects on employment, growth and the balance of payments of full exposure to competition from the Nine as well as the Third World, in the case of a few industries like textiles. Greece and Portugal have already, to a large extent, liberalised

[12] See Conseil National des Jeunes Agriculteurs (CNJA), Espagne; *Un Choc pour l'Europe* (Paris: April 1976); Michael Leigh 'Mediterranean Agriculture and the Enlargement of the EEC', *The World Today*, June 1977.

[13] House of Lords Report, *op cit.*, pp 42–44.

trade, which means that some of the necessary adjustments have taken place. Spain still keeps its industry behind high protective walls and therefore adjustment will be more difficult, although the potential of Spanish industry is by far the greatest.

The three countries have concentrated some of their exports on sectors which Community members regard as sensitive. Typical examples are textiles and clothing, and footwear, as well as steel and shipbuilding, especially in the case of Spain. M. Davignon has persuaded member countries to agree on an industrial policy for steel, which is likely to be extended to shipbuilding and textiles, involving a rationalisation of production at the Community level. The three applicants will necessarily be involved in this policy and it will not be easy to reconcile divergent interests. The three will soon discover that the comparative advantage they now enjoy in some of these products vis-à-vis Community countries will disappear when faced with competition from the Third World.

For the Nine, enlargement will add to the problems of a few declining sectors of industry, although all three applicants, including Spain, are marginal suppliers. The changing conditions of world trade are bound to have a much more significant effect than enlargement itself. Moreover, Greece already enjoys free access for its industrial exports and so does Portugal, with the exception of a few ' sensitive ' products. The small size of the market in these two countries also offers limited opportunities for exports from the Nine. Spanish officials argue that their main asset is industry rather than agriculture, despite the alarm felt in Community circles.[14] At the same time, the liberalisation of trade between the two sides is seen as a big opportunity for exporting firms in the Nine, especially for those dealing in consumer goods and consumer durables.

The accession of Greece will increase the tonnage of the Community's merchant fleet by about one third. Protectionist moves have been made by Third-World countries and the United States in favour of transporting goods in ships flying their own flags, which in turn has led to some discussion about the possibility of a Community shipping policy. The threat from Eastern Europe is a further incentive. Greek shipowners place most of their orders with Japanese shipyards. Could a bargain be struck which would both benefit the shipbuilding industry in Europe and lead to a common policy on shipping?

Two important topics in the negotiations with Spain and Portugal will be fisheries and labour migration. The two countries have large fleets and fishing contributes a higher percentage to their gross domestic product than in the existing member countries. The problem will be to

[14] Señor L. Calvo-Sotelo in Semaine de Bruges, April 1978.

agree on national catch quotas at a time when fishermen are withdrawing from non-Community waters and the importance of conservation measures becomes apparent. In a period of prolonged recession and high unemployment, the entry of countries many of whose workers migrate to Community countries is not seen with such a favourable eye as it was in the 1950s and 1960s when workers from the Mediterranean contributed a great deal to economic growth in the north. Since 1973 there has been a marked drop in emigration from the Iberian peninsula, while in the case of Greece there has been a net inflow of migrants since 1975.

As far as external economic policy is concerned, the main impact of the second round of enlargement will be on relations with other Mediterranean countries. Community self-sufficiency in typical Mediterranean products will increase substantially and this will mean that export outlets for countries which come under the 'global policy' will be much restricted. This may lead to increasing demands for compensation and make for acrimonious relations. It does not help that the co-operation agreements made after the adoption of the 'global Mediterranean policy' have not yet been ratified and only the commercial provisions are being applied under interim agreements. The Community will need to do some hard thinking about its relations with the countries of the area given their strategic, political and economic importance.[15]

Many people have expressed fears about the ability of Community institutions to survive yet another round of enlargement unless this is combined with the major reforms which are probably long overdue. This particularly concerns the small member countries and the Commission. The most frequently quoted problems have been the ability of a Commission consisting of sixteen or seventeen members to act as a collegiate body; the effect of a major inflow of new and inexperienced officials on the functioning of the whole Commission as a bureaucracy and an initiator of legislation; the question as to whether the Council, which is bound by the unanimity rule, will still be able to take decisions with twelve members; and last but not least the language bottleneck. These are indeed real problems, although by no means new and most of them are not specifically related to the second round of enlargement. But the entry of new members highlights existing problems while adding to the already considerable friction in the Community decision-making machine.[16]

[15] See also Loukas Tsoukalis, 'The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is "global" policy a misnomer?', *International Affairs*, July 1977.

[16] For a discussion of the institutional implications of enlargement, see also William Wallace, Geoffrey Edwards, Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Eine Gemeinschaft der Zwölf-Die Europaische Gemeinschaft und ihre Erweiterung nach Süden', *Europa Archiv*, October 10, 1977, pp. 655–666.

How to make a marriage successful

The second round of enlargement undoubtedly presents both the three applicants and existing members with problems and risks. The question is how to make this marriage, which is in fact closer to polygamy, successful in the sense that none of the partners involved is unduly harmed. Accession negotiations at the Community level are different from ordinary international negotiations involving sovereign states, because if the terms of entry lead to serious problems on either side, this would have an effect on the Community as a whole. Transition periods after accession are meant to ease for both sides the process of adjustment, which is likely to be much more difficult for the new members. This applies to the short and medium term. At the same time, both old and new members will have to think about the Community's raison d'être and the role in the future of a Community which seems to have been constantly searching for an identity ever since the end of the transition period which led to the establishment of a customs union and a common agricultural policy. Economic and monetary union, the project of the 1970s, proved to be ill conceived, at least in the beginning.

Both sides seem to agree that accession to the Community is intended to strengthen parliamentary institutions in the three countries. In a world where political and economic democracy is becoming rather a rarity, the Community would play an extremely valuable role if it contributed to the survival and improvement of democracy in Western Europe. But the survival of democratic institutions depends much more on economic conditions than on declarations of principles. Therefore democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain will be more decisively affected by a successful economic adjustment to the Community than by the existence of well-defined political criteria for membership. The three applicants will be faced with serious problems in their attempt to adopt the '*acquis communautaire*'. If transition periods are not carefully designed and if the Community does not show enough generosity or flexibility in the early stages, then a big step may be taken towards a Community of different tiers or towards a situation where emergency measures are the rule rather than the exception. Meanwhile, economic problems in the new members may destabilise their fragile political system, which is exactly the opposite of what their accession is supposed to achieve.

The German Social Democrats have been thinking in terms of a 'European Solidarity Fund' or a mini-Marshall plan for the Mediterranean. Nothing definite has yet been decided about the size of the fund, the participation of the other countries or whether it will be for the three applicants only or will include other Community regions as well.

As William Wallace has put it, such an initiative would help to transform a zero-sum game of bargaining into a completely different political exercise.[17] Financial aid to the three applicants, and possibly to the Mediterranean regions of France and Italy which are directly affected, would be more easily acceptable if extensive use were made of Community loans rather than funds coming directly from the budget. The Commission has also been talking in terms of a medium-term action programme which would help to shift the emphasis in current negotiations away from short-term problems.

Can the Community of Twelve, with growing economic divergences and regional disparities, follow common economic policies internally and negotiate as a unit with the rest of the world? Or to put it differently: does the Community of Twelve make any sense politically? If one wants an economically cohesive group, probably an ' optimum currency area ' as some would call it,[18] then one has to look to the countries participating in the ' snake ', namely Germany, Benelux and Denmark. Here we already have a Community of two tiers. The first ten years of the EEC coincided with a period of high rates of growth, near full employment, low inflation rates and payments surpluses, which in the end came to be taken almost for granted. European integration was based on the laisser-faire model, with agriculture, where the management of markets was deemed necessary, being an unavoidable exception. Since then, the situation has changed drastically: the philosophy may remain the same in some quarters but practices have altered. More and more sectors are added to the list of those where the need for management is openly acknowledged. Steel, shipbuilding, textiles, fisheries, oil-refining and cars to follow? On the other hand, illusions that there is an easy way to a complete economic and monetary union based on the fixity of exchange rates have been shattered. In a Community of Nine where the cumulative rate of inflation for 1970–76 varies from 40·8 per cent in Germany to 119·9 per cent in Ireland and 115·0 per cent. in Britain,[19] one does not need a second round of enlargement to decide that the old Werner plan can no longer be resuscitated.

The degree of economic interdependence reached between member countries forces the Community as a whole to provide a response at the political level, and this has to take some form of joint management. Otherwise there will be strong pressures in the weaker members to cut themselves off, which would be extremely costly for everybody

[17] William Wallace, ' The Reaction of the Community and of Member Governments ', Semaine de Bruges, April 1978.

[18] The term was first introduced in Robert Mundell, ' A theory of optimum currency areas ', *American Economic Review*, Sept. 1961, A whole literature has developed later centred on this concept.

[19] Source: Eurostat—*Monthly General Statistics Bulletin*.

involved. Until very recently, proposals for industrial policy seemed to concentrate more on glamorous high technology projects.[20] But it is in declining sectors, where the need is pressing and where purely national solutions do not make much sense, that the Community is actually making real progress. Industrial policy is inextricably linked with external economic relations. The recent protectionist moves seem to be directed mainly against exports from less developed countries. If morality is not a powerful force in politics, economics is. The Community depends on Third-World countries for export markets but mainly for the import of basic raw materials.[21] 'Organisation of markets', which for some may be a euphemism for protectionism, and industrial policy in declining sectors like textiles and steel, should be designed to give the Community's industry time to rationalise and redirect production and re-train workers. Undoubtedly, in times of low growth and high unemployment this is more easily said than done. A similar problem applies to agriculture where a long-term solution will be found in a substantial reduction of the workforce. But a new Mansholt plan is unthinkable in the late 1970s when there are no jobs in the cities for those who might leave the land. Nevertheless, a switch from an incomes-oriented to a more structure-oriented agricultural policy will become increasingly necessary.

The political level at which decisions are taken should ideally be a function of two factors, namely efficiency and legitimacy. The Community is gradually moving away from the old models of excessive and unnecessary centralisation.[22] For many economic decisions, we should probably be thinking in terms of delegating authority downwards rather than upwards from the national level. In the monetary field, the Community may have to move slowly in the opposite direction because of the increasing ineffectiveness of national monetary policy, international instability and the unwillingness of the United States to assume the responsibility for joint management. But this would have to be coupled with much more efficient structural employment and regional policies and considerable inter-regional resource transfers, which, in turn, imply a much bigger Community budget.[23] We are,

[20] See Michael Hodges, 'Industrial policy: A directorate-general in search of a role' in H. Wallace, W. Wallace, C. Webb (eds.) *Policy-Making in the European Communities* (London: Wiley, 1977).

[21] The concept of economic security seems to have been recently rediscovered in Europe. See Wolfgang Hager, *Europe's Economic Security* (Paris; Atlantic Institute, 1976).

[22] This section is intended to provide only a very rough sketch of a new economic approach. Two representative examples can be found in the Jean Monnet lecture delivered by Mr. Roy Jenkins at the European University in Florence on October 27, 1977, and the MacDougall Report (Commission of the European Communities, *Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in European Integration*, Brussels, April 1977).

[23] In the MacDougall Report, it was proposed that Community expenditure should rise to about 2–2½ per cent. of GDP as compared with the present level of 0·7 per cent.

therefore, talking in terms of a minimum welfare state at the Community level which seems to be a necessary counterpart for market integration if one is to judge from West European societies.

The European Community is not only about economics. But if the economic base does not determine political relations, it does at least set the limits within which the political system can move. If the different economic tiers become institutionalised, then the Community will lose most of its political meaning. The above description-*cum*-prescription applies to an enlarged Community, with economic divergence and regional disparities, but also with a high level of interdependence and a political commitment to preserve it. It is not a complete economic and monetary union but it is not a simple common market either. On the political plane, the most important motors for integration are a directly elected European Parliament which tries to establish its own authority and power, gradual but real progress in the political co-operation mechanism coupled with an active Community role in external economic policy and, who knows, a new wave of European enthusiasm coming from the new members. This may sound like a minimalist model. It does indeed assume that there will be no major external shocks, either from the East or the West, to push the Community more firmly towards integration, or any hegemonial power within the Community which could act as a federator. But then neither of these developments would be particularly desirable. In present circumstances, such a ' minimalist ' model may be the best we can hope for.

BOOKS

ENERGY: TOWARDS THE ALL-PURPOSE POLICY

Walter C. Patterson

Energy Policies of the World. Vol. 1: Canada, China, Arab States of the Persian Gulf, Iran. Vol. 2: Indonesia, the North Sea Countries, the Soviet Union. Edited by Gerard J. Mangone. *New York, Amsterdam: Elsevier.* Vol. 1 *1976. 387 pp. $19.50.* Vol. 2 *1977. 320 pp. $17.50.*

Oil in the Seventies: Essays on Energy Policy. Edited by Campbell Watkins and Michael Walker. *Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 1977. 283 pp. $14.95. Pb: $3.95.*

Energy Policy: Strategies for Uncertainty. By P. Lesley Cook and A. J. Surrey. *London: Martin Robertson. 1977. 240 pp. £8·50.*

Energy Technology and Global Policy: A Selection of Contributing Papers to the Conference on Energy Policies and the International System. Edited by Stephen Arthur Saltzman. *Santa Barbara, Oxford: Clio Press. 1977. 276 pp. £10·75.*

The Energy Syndrome: Comparing National Responses to the Energy Crisis. Edited by Leon N. Lindberg. *Lexington, Mass.: Heath. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 382 pp. £8·75.*

Rays of Hope: The Transition to a Post Petroleum World. By Denis Hayes. *New York: Norton for the Worldwatch Institute; Toronto: McLeod. 1977. 240 pp. Pb: $3.95.*

THE next time you hear someone refer to 'energy policy', ask him what he means. He may not be able to tell you. Furthermore, if you ask someone else the same question, you will almost certainly receive a different answer. Like energy itself, energy policy appears increasingly to be ubiquitous and protean, manifesting itself virtually everywhere, in an endless variety of guises. It was not, however, always thus. Indeed 'energy policy' as a concept has come into the general vocabulary only in the last five years, in the aftermath of the sudden unilateral fourfold increase in petroleum prices at the end of 1973. Since that time a major growth industry has been established—the preparation and publication of periodicals, papers and books on energy policy. Nevertheless, despite their common adherence to the use of the label, the material and the perspectives encountered in these publications range across a panorama effectively without limit. At this stage there is clearly no consensus even as to what the concept 'energy policy' embraces, much less as to what direction and form such policy might take. Six titles which have joined the list in recent months serve admirably to illustrate the disparity of views and approaches now on offer.

Energy Policies of the World, edited by Gerard J. Mangone, represents what might be called the classic approach. The two volumes thus far available include an editorial overview and eight essays by senior experts on eight geographical regions—Canada, China, the Gulf states, Venezuela and Iran (Volume 1); Indonesia, the North Sea countries and the Soviet Union (Volume 2). Each essay focuses on a region's resources of coal, petroleum, natural gas, hydroelectricity and nuclear energy; the amounts, costs and prices of these resources used and traded; the historical record of such activities, and of corporate and government decisions affecting them. Until 1973 such a discourse would have been described as dealing with 'fuel policy'. The gradual eclipse of the word 'fuel' since 1973 is one of the more curious corollaries of the rise of 'energy policy'.

Mangone and his co-authors acknowledge that the issues they discuss are now giving rise to considerable uncertainty. To appreciate the full depth of the uncertainty it is necessary to look further. *Oil in the Seventies: Essays on Energy Policy*, edited by Campbell Watkins and Michael Walker, is a compilation of eight commentaries by Canadian and American academics which, like those in Mangone *et al.*, deal mainly with fuel policy. Contributors discuss the basis for quantification of petroleum supplies; the mechanisms by which oil prices are established internationally and within a disparate country like Canada whose supply is at one end of the country and whose main users are at the other; and the financial and regulatory interactions between different national governments, between a national government and its provincial counterparts, and between governments and energy supply industries. Only one essay in the collection, by Ernst Berndt of the University of British Columbia, deals with more fundamental questions, pointing the way into a field which not long ago was *terra incognita* but which is now attracting a growing number of explorers: energy planning and economic indices. The forecasting of energy 'demand' seemed for a time more or less straightforward, a dependent sub-category of general economic forecasting. However, since 1973 it has become increasingly apparent that the links between energy use and economic performance are much more subtle and non-linear than earlier analysts recognised.

Energy Policy: Strategies for Uncertainty, by Lesley Cook and A. J. Surrey provides a vivid and fascinating dissection of the consequences of such earlier over-simplification, as they have become manifest in the United Kingdom. Cook and Surrey begin their survey with the British government's 1967 White Paper on 'Fuel Policy'—so called—and trace the subsequent metamorphosis which has led to the 1978 Green Paper on 'Energy Policy'. They delineate the objectives of the authors of the 1967 White Paper and the criteria then applied. They then recount the consequent histories of the coal, oil, gas and electricity industries in Britain, their progressively more uneasy interdependence, and the variously strained relationships between the industries, the government and the customers. Cook and Surrey spell out with crisp pungency the pressing need for a thorough overhaul of the premises governing energy planning. Although their case study concentrates on Britain and draws all its explicit and disconcerting examples therefrom, the factors they identify arise throughout the industrialised world and pay no attention whatever to national borders. Forecasting, financial criteria, pricing policies, investment in extraction, conversion and distribution facilities, technical and design criteria, employment policy,

environmental and occupational standards: all the traditional factors in energy supply policy are seen to require urgent reappraisal, lest their inconsistencies and inadequacies aggravate an already uncomfortable tension between conflicting interests, and push present instabilities closer to the brink of seriously disruptive social and economic discontinuity. But Cook and Surrey do not leave matters at that. To cope with the problems they perceive, they put forward an array of policy proposals, based on a significant departure from tradition: the choice, first, of a long-term energy strategy, with which medium-term and short-term strategies must be consistent.

Energy Technology and Global Policy, edited by Stephen Saltzman, takes a similar long-term perspective, on a broader front. It is a collection of papers prepared for the Conference on Energy Policies and the International System, held in December 1973 at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in California, under the direction of Elisabeth Mann Borgese. Six papers discuss energy technologies and scientific implications; ten consider various 'interdisciplinary and policy aspects', including energy-use modelling, energy and development, energy and the oceans, and a proposal for the establishment of an International Energy Institute. Given the fact that the papers were written before or during the 1973 oil embargo and price increase, most of them remain strikingly relevant, either because they tackle problems which are still far from solution, or because they offer solutions which are still far from application.

It should by this stage be evident that we are moving even farther away from the classical 'energy policy' exemplified by Mangone *et al. The Energy Syndrome*, edited by Leon Lindberg, carries us well into much less familiar terrain. The centrepiece of the book is a set of seven detailed commentaries on the energy scene in Britain, Canada, France, Hungary, India, Sweden and the United States. With the exception of the essay on Hungary (rather too complacent and abstract in tone), these essays are sharply perceptive and critical; and the criticisms are directed not only at particular decisions but at the often unstated assumptions underlying these decisions. The seven essays include quantities of numerical data and factual background, not unlike that in Mangone *et al.*; but the accompanying analysis takes a very different direction. The difference is drawn out in an introduction and two closing chapters by the editor. Lindberg, like Berndt in Watkins and Walker, is concerned not merely with supplying fuel energy to meet some more or less undifferentiated anticipated 'demand'—*à la* Mangone *et al.* Instead, Lindberg is attempting to find some satisfactory response to what he calls the 'energy syndrome'. 'These three characteristics (common to all the energy policies discussed in the book)—continued increases in energy consumption, public policies that focus almost exclusively on the supply side and institutional and structural obstacles to the adoption of alternative policies—make up a *syndrome*, that is, a group of symptoms that occur together and that describe a pathology or a system malfunction.' It is unfortunate, however, that Dr. Lindberg's prose style is itself too frequently a syndrome—the well-known and epidemic American academese. ('By virtue of their expertise, hierarchical control, and ability to mobilise resources, interorganisational coalitions of such elites generally dominate policy outcomes and are only occasionally constrained by their political base or by the processes of pluralistic politics.') This is doubly unfortunate, because when Lindberg's analysis is compre-

hensible it is penetrating and provocative, and concisely pinpoints issues of major current importance.

> 'By and large, energy policy has only very recently emerged as a distinct area of concern in its own right. . . .Decisions have been taken in other spheres on the basis of criteria internal to them, and the energy consequences toted up afterwards. Neither capitalist nor communist nations have developed criteria for energy policy per se, apart from the supply imperatives of the energy production industries or the vulnerability concerns of national security. Government policies have as a consequence been short run and reactive: expand supplies to meet demand, socialize risks that the private sector is unwilling or unable to assume, nationalize or regulate to facilitate the efficient production and transmission of energy, externalize adjustment problems to other nations or to the oil import sector where possible. Energy producers—whether private corporations, multinational oil companies, nationalized coal industries, privately owned public utilities or central electricity boards—have developed natural symbiotic relationships with government officials, regulatory boards and other parts of the executive and legislative branches. They have enjoyed privileged access to policy making, directly by means of elaborate structures of co-optation and consultation and indirectly by virtue of the fact that policymakers have had a general propensity to identify the efforts of producers to increase supply with the national interest itself.'

The Energy Syndrome gives an uncompromising portrait of the inconsistency, inefficiency and vulnerability of contemporary supply-oriented energy policies throughout the world. (It should be noted that the incisive chapter on Britain is contributed by a group which includes A. J. Surrey, co-author of the study introduced above.) Lindberg's final chapter offers a series of principles, based on international comparisons—what might be called differential energy policy—as guidelines for future policy-making. It remains nevertheless ironic that, although his proposals lean towards the Swedish model of wide-ranging public participation and involvement, in the context of 'democratic socialism', his exegeses of the proposals are all too often couched in terminology of an opacity which will appeal only to the sort of self-selected elite he is otherwise castigating.

Rays of Hope: The Transition to a Post-Petroleum World, by Denis Hayes, is written to be read. If that means that it lacks the weight of scholarship variously displayed above, it also means that Hayes is likely to reach many more readers than will be able to cope with the burden of data in which the earlier titles here cited abound. But *Rays of Hope* is by no means merely a slight and insubstantial popularisation. Not only does it provide a valuable and comparatively accessible complement to the heavier treatises above; it also carries the concept of 'energy policy' yet farther afield, with details about energy conservation policy, energy and food, energy and the international order, and energy and social systems, presented in outline with extensive references for further information.

To recapitulate: energy policy surfaced initially in the early 1970s, as a slightly more pretentious name for what was still the old field of fuel policy. Mangone *et al.* and Watkins and Walker provide a thick dossier of useful data and background for this part of the picture; but their presentations are inescapably partial, and the policies they consider suffer

accordingly. They venture a preliminary diagnosis of the problems accumulating; but they stop far short of the seat of the malaise. Lindberg *et al.* and Cook and Surrey attack the pathology with far more thoroughness, teasing out the many tangled strands of assumption and postulate which have led industrial nations to make wildly inaccurate forecasts of energy requirements; to plunge enormous sums into ill-judged investment in energy supply facilities; to face energy price-rises which have caused severe hardship to customers both domestic and industrial; to incur staggering import bills and their consequences; and to stumble clumsily through a succession of grandiose master plans (Project Independence in the United States, *le Tout-Nucléaire* in France, and so on) which have proved comprehensively futile even in the short term. Lindberg *et al.*, Cook and Surrey, Saltzman *et al.* and Hayes all variously undertake to devise more appropriate bases for policy formulation and execution. Cook and Surrey concentrate primarily on innovative policies for the planning of supply, and thus likewise fall somewhat short of the fully integrative approach which is evidently required. Lindberg *et al.* also pursue the matter as it concerns the use of energy; but they do so as yet somewhat tentatively. Hayes offers a synoptic view of a much more comprehensive approach; but those decision makers whose attitudes will need to change are unlikely to be swayed by Hayes, if only because he is not aiming at them, nor bringing to bear the heavy artillery which alone will shift them out of their present bunker.

To the public, the visible evidence of the energy 'syndrome' has been stupefying increases in bills for electricity, gas, and oil, coupled with a rising chorus of warnings about an impending 'energy gap'. The only way to avoid this gap, it has been said, is to press ahead rapidly with the development of nuclear electricity, including plutonium-fuelled fast reactors. However, a survey of the present health of the world's nuclear industry reveals that it is in a parlous state, starving for orders, and spending its time in ferocious fraternal litigation about defaults on fuel supplies and performance guarantees. The state of affairs in the United States and France is characterised in acerbic terms by Irvin Bupp of the Harvard Business School and by Louis Puiseux of Electricité de France, respectively, in Lindberg *et al.* To suggest that only nuclear electricity can save the world from the energy gap is, as they make abundantly clear, a counsel of despair. In any case, the vulnerability of nuclear electricity to every category of disruption, from the planning stage to fuel cycle embargoes and lack of availability, to industrial action at power stations, to civil unrest, makes it a precarious replacement for unreliable petroleum imports. Furthermore, electricity, despite its versatility, cannot readily be a substitute for transport fuels, one of the major sectors now troubling policy makers.

More recently it has become clear that superficial and hasty short-term measures are likely to be impossible to implement, or to aggravate problems in other sectors. What seems to be needed instead is a much more careful study of the role played by energy, particularly fuel energy, in industrial and developing societies. The first stage of such a study is to identify and disaggregate the ways in which energy is used, particularly its end-uses: not only how many kilowatt-hours or tons of coal equivalent, but at what temperature, for what specific purpose, and with what time-variation. No customer wants energy *per se*: he wants motion, or chemical reaction, or a certain temperature for a certain time in a certain place. A number of the contributors to Lindberg *et al.*, including Chesshire and Surrey in Britain

and Lonnröth in Sweden, have been pursuing studies of such disaggregated data, as have a growing number of others in many parts of the world, within nations and also within international organisations like the UN Economic Commission for Europe and the UN Development Programme. This data-base is expanding rapidly to parallel and complement that of Mangone *et al.*

The next stage in the study is to recognise that a given end-use objective will require some form of energy conversion system—a house, a motor, a boiler, a furnace—plus some form of controllable fuel supply to operate it. There is now a move afoot to restore the use of the word 'fuel', which has been unwisely allowed to fall into disuse. An energy conversion system, like a house, uses fuel energy—which can be controlled, and which, at least in industrial societies, must be paid for—to adjust natural energy flows: for instance, to maintain a higher or lower indoor temperature than that outdoors. A planner starting from scratch to design a system intended to achieve a given energy-related end-use objective must consider how much should be invested in the conversion system, and how much will thereafter have to be spent on fuel to operate it. More investment in the conversion system—heavier house insulation, for example—will mean less expenditure afterwards on fuel. It then becomes a matter of choice and judgment about the optimum balance between conversion system investment and anticipated fuel cost.

Thus stated, the problem is of course oversimplified, as a number of contributors, particularly Cook and Surrey, discuss. There is already an existing infrastructure of energy conversion systems whose continuing operation remains essential: building stock, transport systems, industrial plant. It is of course possible to upgrade or replace such systems over a period of time, but the total investment entailed is very large indeed and the feasible rate of improvement is limited. On the other hand, it is now abundantly clear that designing, constructing and commissioning new energy supply facilities—mines, pipelines, power stations and so on—is likewise going to require enormous outlays of capital and very long lead-times. Clearly, both types of measure—improved end-use efficiency and additional supply—are likely to be necessary for some considerable time no matter which approach is taken. However, there is already perceptible a divergence of views as to the direction preferred and the balance sought. In general, Mangone *et al.* typify the traditionalists, who tend to assume that the task of energy policy and planning is to expand various forms of energy supply to meet a 'demand' which is just that: autonomous and insistent, not open to influence. Most of the other contributors and commentators here represented recognise, however, that policy also influences so-called 'demand': building regulations, tariff levels and structures, asymmetrical access to capital as between large investors and small investors, and so on.

Perhaps the most rapid change visible since the advent of 'energy policy' into the public arena has been the evolving perception of so-called 'energy conservation'. Initially it was construed essentially as 'doing without': turning down indoor temperatures, accepting reduced access to vehicular mobility, even losing jobs. Gradually it has since become apparent that 'energy conservation' more sensibly interpreted means the optimal use of resources—fuel, conversion systems, capital, time and human skills—to achieve end-use objectives which may not even be readily identifiable as energy-related. Seen in this light, 'energy conservation' is in no sense a

noble sacrifice. It is on the contrary a highly-structured pursuit of self-interest. Consider, for instance, the driving force behind so many of the ill-conceived programmes set in motion after the 1973 oil embargo and price rises. National security, economic stability, and international financial soundness all suffered when oil supplies became unreliable. However, if a nation designs and improves its buildings, transportation and industrial processes to require smaller quantities of fuel, it simultaneously reduces its vulnerability to subsequent disruption through the interruption of fuel supply.

As Lindberg *et al.* and Cook and Surrey make clear, there is no unambiguously advantageous set of principles which will banish the uncertainties which now hover over energy policy, whether at the international, the national, the local or even the personal level. Hayes, however, emphasises that the choices now available by no means involve merely making the best of a bad job. The upheavals of 1973 which first launched the concept of energy policy have undoubtedly caused confusion and hardship. But they also revealed opportunities hitherto unnoticed. As these six books demonstrate, energy policy is now a fertile ferment of thought and action, virtually world-wide and spilling over everywhere into further fields. What it will look like in another five years is difficult to forecast. But that, after all, is one of its many fascinations.

REVIEWS

CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

The World Council of Churches in International Affairs. By Darril Hudson. *Leighton Buzzard: Faith Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1977. 336 pp. £5·40.*

IN an earlier book [1] Dr. Hudson quoted the Archbishop of Canterbury, at the time of the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, refusing to sign the 'Appeal from the Churches for Peace' on the grounds that it was 'for the Church to inculcate large principles—but not to take the place of statesmen as regards their practical working out'. For those whose professional or amateur interest lies in thinking about the translation of 'large principles' into the practicalities of world order, this book provides an extremely useful case study.

Or rather three case studies, for the author has chosen to illustrate the role of the World Council of Churches (WCC) as an international non-governmental organisation by detailed surveys, in three central chapters, of its evolving policies in the fields of racialism, development and disarmament. These are not surprising choices. The doctrines of the equality of men and women before God, the proper and just use of the world's resources and the *shalom* (or peace) which should obtain between and within states are central to Christianity.

The selection illustrates, however, the difficulties that have faced the World Council as it has tried to purvey a co-ordinated message to its own constituency and the world community. During the 1960s the main international agency of the Council, the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), suffered drastic reform and reduction in influence with the growing impact of representatives of the Third World and the decisions to locate the Council's work on racialism in the Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) and on development questions in the Commission for the Churches' Participation in Development. The diplomats of the CCIA have had to learn to live with the more prophetic, not to say confrontational, exponents of 'action/reflection' methods in the other two programmes. Dr. Hudson's conclusion that the Council has successfully helped 'white affluent Christians take seriously the perspectives of the other parts of the Church' (p. 118) is more soundly based than his view that the WCC has survived the diversification of responsibilities to remain 'a single body speaking on behalf of Protestant-Orthodox Christendom to world statesmen' (p. 57).

The lurid title of the chapter on racialism ('White Devils') belies the careful analysis of the evolution of the PCR and its associated Special Fund. But one wonders where Dr. Hudson's sympathies lie as between those who, in the words of the Reverend Garfield Todd (quoted on p. 113),

[1] *The Ecumenical Movement in World Affairs* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1969, p. 718.

shrank 'in a wave of pious hysteria' from grant aiding the humanitarian work of movements in Africa which were at the same time seeking self-determination through armed conflict, and those who saw in those grants recognition that 'all the legal defence funds and all the white legal organisations changed not at all the racial situation in Southern Africa' (p. 109) and that 'What you are being asked to do is to redeem Christianity' in the eyes of the black world (p. 113).

Dr. Hudson insists his book is not a theological study. But the efforts of the WCC to think through the inter-relationship of force and the pursuit of social justice, of emergency relief (or 'charity') and fundamental economic change, and of disarmament/arms control and peacemaking are all examples of contemporary theological method. The word should be rescued from political commentators'—and Sir Harold Wilson's—misuse of it.

For each of his case studies Dr. Hudson's method is to ransack the minutes of meetings of the CCIA, the Central Committee of the WCC and its related bodies. He then assesses the impact of decisions in terms of the WCC's constituency (where they have only such authority as they bear 'by their own truth and wisdom' p. 51), their coverage in the international press, and signs of their influence in the UN and its agencies. The last is the most difficult to judge, of course; but if the book as a whole has a weakness it is a failure to record adequately the changing international scene *pari passu* with the development of Christian opinion.

The book will be of value to those in ecumenical circles who wish for something of a management-consultancy report on the activities of their top international organisation. For others, its importance lies in the trend which Dr. Hudson makes abundantly clear—'the fact that the Council's immediate preoccupation with helping only the baptised has given way to concern for the whole community. . . . Its strength lies in its not speaking for powerful groups in society, as was the Church's custom in the past, but for the poverty stricken, the sufferers from discrimination, and those weary of war and injustice whether they are Christians or not' (p. 282).

British Council of Churches BRIAN DUCKWORTH

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

The United Nations Secretariat: The Rules and the Practice. By Theodor Meron. *Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 208 pp. £11·90.*

THIS study of United Nations' personnel policies roundly declares that the Organisation 'lacks a real tradition of management' (p. 173). A comprehensive personnel manual is only now in preparation; there is no suitable grievance procedure (the appointment of an 'ombudsperson' is recommended); the introduction of the principle of 'due process' has been left to the UN's cautious Administrative Tribunal; the situation of women in the Secretariat is unsatisfactory; in Geneva staff-management relations are poor.

But this is not half of it. Mr. Meron's chief fire is reserved for the effect on recruitment and promotion of the principle of broad geographical

distribution. The Charter, in Article 101, enjoins that it shall be paid 'due regard', this being by way of qualifying the 'paramount consideration' of merit. The author claims, however, that in practice this order of priorities has been reversed. This is because 'Practically all states regard the presence of their nationals in the Secretariat as serving their national interests and are active in pressing' (p. 46) their claims. Some 'names and numbers' follow. The Soviet Union goes 'particularly far' (p. 34), but the United States is not a great distance behind and France gives this area its assiduous and successful concern. Britain has recently become more active but continues to be 'one of the very few' countries which 'seldom approach the Secretariat with claims on behalf of their nationals' (p. 39). The developing countries, however, appear to have no such scruples, and Mr. Meron gives some surprising figures which show that it is some of them, and not the developed countries, which are 'grossly overrepresented' (p. 183) in the Secretariat.

All this adds up to a Secretariat which is becoming increasingly politicised. Balkanisation threatens, says the author, and with it the possibility of paralysis. It is a conclusion which is likely to elicit a good deal of regretful agreement, especially in the West. One wonders, however, whether it is not based too closely on an analogy with the domestic situation. It is arguable that, *pace* the Charter, a high degree of politicisation is inevitable in the UN Secretariat, given the nature of the constituency which the Organisation represents, and also that this does not necessarily imply ineffectiveness. For, by definition, a sizeable proportion of a politicised Secretariat will favour any action which the UN decides upon. Which is not to say that all is well, but simply that the outlook is perhaps not as bad as the author supposes.

Certainly, however, Mr. Meron has performed a most valuable service. Drawing upon his experience as a member of his country's mission to the UN, he has explored issues which, at least in print, are usually fudged or ignored. It might seem remarkable that a diplomat is willing to stick his neck out so far, and that he has been allowed to do so. But he belongs to one of those '"pariah" nationalities' (pp. 52 and 123) for whose members promotion prospects in the UN Secretariat are bleak. It is to be hoped that Mr. Meron and his fellow countrymen will take some comfort from the thought that this circumstance has facilitated the writing of the sort of book about the UN Secretariat which is extremely rare; one which is both scholarly and bold.

University of Keele ALAN JAMES

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat. By Lawrence Freedman. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 235 pp. £10·00.*

MILLIONS of words on American intelligence agencies have been published in recent years. Few have given serious attention, however, to the prime intelligence functions of informing decision makers about foreign events, estimating future developments and predicting the foreign consequences of American courses of action.

Dr. Freedman's book is an energetic attempt to answer the important and highly relevant questions of 'how intelligence estimates are constructed and how they are fed into the policy-making process' as well as how 'it is decided whether or not, and in what ways, the US would be vulnerable to specific developments in the Soviet force structure' (p. 6).

The author, a Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, bases his book upon a doctoral dissertation at Nuffield College, Oxford. Anyone dealing with such questions confronts the problem of evidence. Governments, ever sensitive about intelligence 'sources and methods', tend to keep secret most documents essential to such a study. Yet scholars have been aided by investigative journalism and Congressional investigations of American intelligence which have recently exposed a mass of new evidence. The author makes good use of this, supplemented by several months of interviewing in Washington, and a thorough review of secondary material.

This book focuses on three inter-related subjects: the American organisation for strategic intelligence, the process for creating intelligence estimates and a case-by-case review at various major periods since the late 1950s of Soviet strategic military power.

Freedman's description of American intelligence organisation is interesting, if somewhat impressionistic—indeed, sometimes gossipy—in its generalisations. Likewise, his treatment of the estimating process clearly reflects his interviews as the principal source. Nevertheless, he seems to capture the essence of the delicate balance among such variables as personality, politics, policy and hard information. Yet his analysis ultimately lacks a tightly coherent conception of the nature and function of strategic intelligence. The analysis suffers from lack of access to more than fragments of the actual intelligence estimates in question. Absence of such data has always made it difficult to progress towards a theory of intelligence. Until further progress can be made down the long road to theory, evaluations of the performance of intelligence agencies must remain speculative. Wanting better developed theories, judgments about intelligence 'successes' or 'failures' lack a clear frame of reference.

The author's detailed analysis of half-a-dozen cases, including the 'missile gap' episode, the debate over anti-ballistic missiles, and the strategic arms negotiations (SALT), serve as background for his inquiry. One of his questions was: how objective and policy-free are the intelligence estimates? Another was: under what circumstances are intelligence estimates influential in policy choices? These questions are as important as they are difficult to answer. Freedman's answer to the first is that military intelligence has tended to be slavish to armed service politics, whereas Central Intelligence Agency estimates have been more objective and independent of policy. The answer to the second question is given somewhat ambiguously. Indeed, the author has not always stated his ideas clearly. One might infer, however, that intelligence estimates are influential when they coincide with the policy preferences of decision makers. But the author's main point is stated with sufficient clarity: 'The process by which threats come to be perceived is a political process, in which the nature of the prevailing strategic doctrine in the US and attitudes towards the defence budget and arms control are as crucial as estimates on the evolving Soviet force structure' (p. 198).

A prevailing myth is that some objective 'intelligence' is attainable that

would solve all policy disputes. This book usefully explodes such a myth, by illuminating the reality that the American strategic intelligence process, in the real world, is a complex political process.

Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee HARRY HOWE RANSOM

Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. By Patrick M. Morgan. *Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1977. 215 pp. (Sage Library of Social Research 40.) £8·50. Pb: £4·50.*

THE concept of deterrence has played an important role in both the theory and practice of postwar American strategy and foreign policy. Along with associated concepts such as 'containment', it conveyed a sense of both objectives and methods. Deterrence sounds suitably non-aggressive, aiming to maintain existing boundaries rather than to expand, yet equally suitably tough, relying 'realistically' on a preponderance of military strength rather than diplomatic accommodation. While it was no more than a description of a certain sort of tactical posture the concept was useful if limited. Once elevated into the centrepiece of American relations with the East it became crude and unsatisfactory. It was insufficiently flexible to cope with the variety of political and military challenges the United States has had to face in the modern world. As the Russians caught up in nuclear power, it began to appear less impressive as a strategy, being based on retaliatory threats that lacked credibility. These weaknesses were covered up until the mid-1960s. America still seemed to be ahead in most of the key indicators of military power, it had shown itself to be resolute in holding the line against communist advances, and the writings of the new strategic theorists, particularly Thomas Schelling, served to extend the concept at an intellectual level into something more flexible and agile than it could ever be in practice.

In an America less self-confident after the experience of Vietnam, the whole notion of deterrence has been subject to a critical re-examination. In 1974, Alexander George and Richard Smoke published their admirable analysis of the part played by deterrence in a collection of postwar crises,[1] indicating its limited value as an instrument of foreign policy. We have had to wait for this admirable book by Patrick Morgan for a thoroughgoing critique of the intellectual underpinnings of the concept. Drawing on the work of George and Smoke, Morgan provides further argument for assigning deterrence a much more modest role in both policy making and conceptual frameworks.

He begins by narrowing the concept down to refer solely to relations between governments that involve threats of retaliation to prevent a military attack. Two types of deterrence are noted: *General Deterrence*, in which opponents maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack, and *Immediate Deterrence*, when one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it. In his analysis, Morgan concentrates overwhelmingly on the latter form of deterrence. As is usual in works in this area, he embarks on a discussion of the import-

[1] Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

ance of the assumption of rationality in decision makers, observing with patent relish that in a world of perfect decision making (in which each side has all the necessary information on the capabilities, intentions and calculations of the other) deterrence would not exist. If the deterrer is capable of mounting sufficient retaliation to dissuade his opponent from mounting an attack, the opponent, knowing this, will not bother with his attack. If the deterrer knows he cannot mount the necessary retaliation, he will adopt any strategy but deterrence. The theory therefore depends on the recognition of uncertainty and imperfection.

In fact, in a situation of mutual assured destruction where a massive retaliation might well result in a response in kind, classical deterrence theory came to rely on the possibility of irrationality. In order to make opponents aware of a risk of retaliation that could not be expected from rational men they had to demonstrate that such rationality could not be guaranteed. In order to arrive at a more satisfactory basis for theorising. Morgan develops a notion of *sensible* decision making, in which those responsible are resigned to unsatisfactory circumstances but do the best they can.

On this basis the aim of deterrence is to encourage a 'sensible sort of restraint' amongst opponents. However, 'the crucial point is that deterrent threats alone do not dictate the presence of sensible decision-making by an opponent, and its prior existence cannot simply be assumed'. Its incidence is determined by factors of personality, political and bureaucratic structure and the general international situation.

This is a stimulating work, and will be of immense value to students seeking to sort out their own ideas in this crucial area of strategic theory. One can note that this is yet another contemporary book on international relations that seems to find it necessary to take up an inordinate amount of space in order to establish that decision makers are reasonably thoughtful human beings operating with inadequate and often confusing information while being subject to a multitude of political and organisational pressures. At least Morgan makes the point in a lively way. To this reviewer, and one suspects to Morgan himself, the main weakness of the book is the lack of attention devoted to general deterrence. It is the failure at this level to regulate an adversary relationship that makes immediate deterrence necessary. Perhaps the main point is that it is difficult to recover a deteriorating situation by making these general threats, which have already failed to impress the opponent, more specific and urgent.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

The Game of Disarmament: How The United States and Russia run the Arms Race. By Alva Myrdal. *Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1977. 397 pp. £9·95.*

FOR twelve years, from 1962, Alva Myrdal was Swedish Minister for Disarmament and Ambassador to the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). This period saw the negotiation of all the so-called arms control treaties that have been concluded since the end of the Second World War, as well as of the single measure of disarmament. Towards the end of it. Mrs. Myrdal told the CCD, quite rightly, that: 'We

have accomplished no real disarmament . . . we can see hardly any tangible results of our work . . .' (p. xxiv). On leaving office in 1974, she set out to record at length the chronicle of failure and to convince her readers of the horrifying character of the arms race, new weapons and modern warfare. In this endeavour she had two particular objectives: to study the policy questions of disarmament from an international point of view (p. xi); and 'to sketch an international strategy for reaching agreements that will lead to more disarmament and arms regulation measures, saving resources that are now wasted on weapons, reducing the use of violence in human affairs' (p. xvii).

The descriptive parts of the book are certainly valuable as an introduction to the issues and the reader is given useful guidance on getting into the technical literature. Most of the sources used are the papers of the UN and CCD (in many cases, Mrs. Myrdal's own speeches) supplemented by the works of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the reader familiar with these will not find much that is new in the book. As a work of popularisation of these materials, the book has merits. These merits are not enough, however, to make it a good book.

The principal weakness is that the only explanation Mrs. Myrdal has to offer for the failure of the disarmament negotiations is a conspiracy by the super-powers to use them as a means of managing the arms race. The nature of the conspiracy is never exactly stated. Sometimes, as in the case of the agreement to proceed to the negotiation of a Biological Weapons Convention, it is presented as an actual understanding between the Russians and the Americans (pp. 271–72). At others it appears as a consequence of their character and aspirations, both 'blindly driven by their desire for world hegemony'. In support of these assertions there are periodic references to the American military-industrial complex (of which there is assumed to be a Soviet equivalent) and to technological imperatives: but Mrs. Myrdal shows no great curiosity about why the American and Soviet governments behave in a way which renders the results of disarmament negotiations negligible. Perhaps this is because the explanation to her is obvious: these governments act against their own best interests because they are foolish, and against the interests of mankind because they are immoral. They persist in these courses because uncaring and impotent publics have not found ways of preventing them. Mrs. Myrdal's solution to the problem is as simple as her definition of it: hope of reversing the trend towards greater and more dangerous armaments 'must be built by untiring efforts to educate peoples and governments to recognize their true interests'.

This approach to the problem of peace and disarmament is squarely in the irenicist tradition and it is surprising to find that Mrs. Myrdal is so unfamiliar with it that she does not recognise her own indebtedness and even supposes that Rousseau elaborated pacifist doctrines (p. 229). Public education as a means to the attainment of disarmament is all very well up to a point. That point is reached when everybody has been educated—each body of national opinion in its own way—and it is found that the substantive issues remain, substantially unaltered.

With the UN Disarmament Conference upon us this year, it is fair to assess Mrs. Myrdal's policy proposals in the conditions of today, and to suppose that she does not intend them to be put off to a too far distant future. Her first suggestion is that the objective of general and complete

disarmament should be abandoned in favour of limitation and reduction of specific arms and preparations for war as part of a comprehensive programme (p. 114). This seems sensible: indeed it looks very much like what has been happening in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks for some years. Mrs. Myrdal does not discuss these, even though study of them suggests that disarmament presents intrinsic problems which cannot be dissolved by goodwill. The first step in her comprehensive programme would be unilateral reductions in the two main nuclear arsenals, initiated by the United States. The justification for this initiative would be that a retaliatory capability calls for enough nuclear weapons, not for as many weapons as the other side. Mrs. Myrdal guesses that the political effect of this gesture would be to encourage the other side to follow suit, thereby initiating a downward spiral in holdings of nuclear weapons (pp. 121–22). And that is really all she has to say on the subject.

One expects more from an experienced diplomat who has been so closely involved with the work of SIPRI. Granted that Mrs. Myrdal has a low opinion of the value of the theoretical work done in the field of peace research (p. 320), one ought to do more than guess about the possible effects of such a dramatic move. In particular, one should consider the possible bad outcomes, as well as the possible good ones. Mrs. Myrdal describes the Soviet Union as being blindly driven by a desire for world hegemony. If that is not a mere rhetorical flourish, why does she expect the Soviet Union to start to behave in the manner of the modest, all-seeing Swedes?

There are many points at which Mrs. Myrdal's passion for peace in every form and in every place involves her in inconsistencies which cut her argument to the bone. When she is considering the propensity of the super-powers to arm themselves to excess, she calls in American authorities to testify that very small arsenals of nuclear weapons may be regarded as sufficient to deter an attacker (p. 117); but when she comes on to discuss non-proliferation, and she wants to castigate the British for maintaining just such a very small arsenal, she dismisses the British motivation as 'pathetic' (p. 165). She demands that the UN should agree upon a standard for minimum nuclear deterrence (p. 135) without considering how such a standard might act as an inducement to threshold states to equip themselves with the hundred or so warheads that the UN would certify as constituting an adequate nuclear shield.

I have said that this is not a good book. I am tempted to add that it is on balance a bad and pernicious one. The fact that its criticisms of official American policy are so weak may lead some to suppose that American policy is accordingly all right, which it emphatically is not. For Mrs. Myrdal is right to say nothing has been achieved of any lasting value in the disarmament field. What she does not seem to realise is that as yet we understand very little about why this is the case. There is certainly a need for policy studies of what ought to be done, but there is even more urgency in the need for studies of actual disarmament-negotiating behaviour, so that we can understand why such negotiations characteristically produce outcomes which are not in the general interest.

There is one suggestion by Mrs. Myrdal that I wholeheartedly endorse: that is that the non-aligned states should not content themselves with waiting for the super-powers to reach agreements, but should see what they can achieve among themselves (p. 290). I hope that the Swedish govern-

ment will pursue this line vigorously in the UN Conference, and that we shall see Iran hastening forward with proposals for the regulation of the arms trade, closely followed by Egypt with a proposal for a complete ban on the possession of chemical weapons. But I fear that this is as likely as an Angolan or Ethiopian call for a complete ban on foreign troops in Africa.

University of Glasgow C. M. MASON

Arms Control and Technological Innovation. Edited by David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf. *London: Croom Helm. 1977. 366 pp. £9·95.*

THE courses of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts, in Italy, have become annual events, and so have the collections of papers presented at them. The strength of these books lies not in their sustained focus on a single theme but in the sheer diversity of the perspectives of the contributors and the topics they wish to discuss. Economists, historians, natural and social scientists, lawyers, all have their say. Ostensibly, the theme of this collection is the relationship between arms control and technological innovation. Under this general heading we are provided with a clear and useful guide to the new technologies from Kosta Tsipis, detailed discussions of their application in Europe, essays on the arms controllers' preoccupations, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and non-proliferation, at varying levels of abstraction, critiques of aspects of Western strategic doctrine, including one from a former Soviet general, a sharp little analysis by Istran Kerdel (a Hungarian) of the 116 wars that took place in the three decades after the Second World War, considerations of the political economy of the arms race, and much else.

It is impossible to provide an overall review of twenty pieces which diverge so much in form, context and quality. One can only note that there is enough that is provocative and enlightening in this collection for the participants to have had a thoroughly good conference.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Arms Control and European Security: A Guide to East-West Negotiations. By J. I. Coffey. *London: Chatto and Windus for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1977. 271 pp. (Studies in International Security 19.) £10·00.*

ON moving away from the dreamy rhetoric or self-righteous polemics that characterise much of the public debate, such as it is, on arms control, one can soon get bogged down in a mire of computations of force structures, technicalities of contemporary weaponry, contrived negotiating positions and a mix of political, economic and strategic aspirations that are often self-contradictory. Professor Coffey offers us a guide through these complexities which is reliable and careful although in consequence, one has to admit, not very exciting. One problem is that his approach necessitates a detailed examination of proposals which, as the author often recognises, have little chance of being implemented given current political realities. After almost five years of negotiations on force reductions in Europe,

there has been little progress beyond the restating of incompatible positions and a sorting out of a preliminary data base. There is no agreement yet on the acronym to be employed—MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) or MFR (Mutual Force Reductions). At least the section on these negotiations, because of the snail's pace at which they are conducted, is less dated than the section on the faster-moving Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) though the question of enhanced radiation weapons (neutron bombs), which has added a new twist to the argument, is too recent to appear in the book.

It would have been helpful if a greater attempt had been made to place the various negotiations in their respective political and historical contexts. For instance, the origins of MBFR can only be understood in terms of the Congressional pressure in the early 1970s for American troop withdrawals from Europe. The author uses criteria derived from various concepts of European security to assess alternative proposals, but this is more for evaluative than exploratory purposes.

These negotiations are now a feature of international life and others are being mooted. There is need for work on the substantive issues under discussion and the areas where genuine agreement may be possible. We should be grateful to Professor Coffey for his patience and lack of cynicism in taking on this task.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Armies and Politics. By Jack Woddis. *London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1977. 309 pp. £6·00.*

STATISTICALLY at least, democracy as most of us in Britain know it is now the deviant. Other more or less authoritarian forms of government constitute the norm. The most common are military regimes, personal dictatorships or oligarchies, now affecting about 30 per cent of the world's states as compared with 12 per cent in 1960. In some of these countries under army rule the population is more free and equal than in others. Not surprisingly—for he is head of the International Department of the British Communist Party—this is Jack Woddis's central theme.

To judge by the argument in this book communist orthodoxy—perhaps it is now 'Eurocommunist'—has shifted considerably in its attitude to the military. Almost gone is the view of the army simply as the repressive agent of the capitalist state. It is after all only one of a number of social institutions reflecting the society and the particular sections from which it is drawn. As such it is capable of transformation into what not only Jack Woddis would describe as a progressive force.

The book's great merit is that it encourages a relatively objective assessment of the performance of the military when in power. Instead of treating army intervention in politics as invariably malign, the author attempts to establish criteria by which the military role in the development of 'stable' social and political systems can be evaluated. There is a heavy emphasis on the importance of the popular will and on 'grass roots' political communication. An interesting aside relates to Allende's failure in Chile,

which Jack Woddis attributes partly to his alienation of important interests which created a climate facilitating military intervention.

The best chapters are those on the Sudan and Indonesia which throw interesting light on the author's perception of the extent of communist involvement there. Another, entitled 'Why Progressive Military Coups Take Place' (p. 74), relates the action of the young officers in Nigeria in 1966 to 'the mass actions of the Workers' which 'had already weakened the regime'. Predictably perhaps, there is a tendency to overstate the influence of external forces like the CIA on the attitudes of officer corps in developing countries.

The final chapter, 'Lessons for Britain—Warnings from Northern Ireland', was worth attempting, but seems simplistic in its view of the possibility of grooming the army here for an interventionist role. The writer assumes too great a socio-political distinction in the British situation between a conscript and an all-volunteer army.

It is interesting too that in his comment on Frank Kitson's book, *Low Intensity Operations*,[1] Jack Woddis appears to ignore the passage in which the consequences of a government's loss of popular support—and thereby of its legitimacy—is discussed. Even so this is a refreshing book—a stimulating contribution to a literature which is now proliferating almost as fast as its subject.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

Storm over the Multinationals: The Real Issues. By Raymond Vernon. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 260 pp. £10·00.*

Foreign Investment, Transnationals and Developing Countries. By Sanjaya Lall and Paul Streeten. *London: Macmillan. 1977. (Publ. in USA by Westview Press, Boulder.) 280 pp. £10·00.*

IT is very difficult to contribute anything new to the multinational company (MNC) debate. Successful books now have to be either narrow empirical studies or extensive well-structured surveys of the debate, illuminated by the insights of experienced authors. Both books under review fall into the latter category, though Lall and Streeten have grafted the presentation of results from an extensive UNCTAD study on to their particular *tour d'horizon* of the literature. The two volumes are, in fact, nicely complementary. Vernon has produced a sophisticated apologia for the MNC. Lall and Streeten concentrate more critically on the economic arguments for and against these companies doing business in the Third World. Both are serious works.

Vernon's book is best described as a good round-up of the analyses and literature which have sprung from the best of the world's business schools. Where it is less successful is in meeting and destroying the arguments of the critics. It is particularly good in the earlier chapters when Vernon introduces the established wisdom on the dynamics of MNCs, the role that technology plays in their development, the extent to which they genuinely compete with each other and their search for long-term survival by recourse to devices such as offshore sourcing—i.e. locating labour-intensive

[1] London: Faber, 1971.

operations in cheap labour countries. In these sections, it is difficult to fault him. Whenever one thinks he might have overlooked some pertinent argument, one immediately finds him covering exactly the points one had in mind. In addition, he has obviously enjoyed refuting some of the more commonly-held misperceptions, such as that the MNCs are usually in industries which are becoming more concentrated. On the contrary, he demonstrates how concentration indices are falling for an impressively wide range of industries, suggesting that the American challenge of the 1950s and 1960s has failed to contain the more recent thrust of, first, West European competitors, then those from Japan and the leading industrial powers of the Third World.

Strangely (because he has been director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs) Vernon becomes less convincing the further he moves from strictly economic to political issues. Much of his argument is still unexceptionable, but he is far too hurried in his analysis of the dark side of the record. As it happens, I tend to accept his conclusion that the importance of MNC skullduggery can safely be played down, but his arguments are perfunctory. This is disappointing, particularly as the title of his book suggests that he has aimed to disperse all unfounded charges against the MNCs. Obviously, there are opponents of those companies who will not be swayed by any arguments but, in relegating *causes célèbres* such as the ITT-Chile affair, to single footnotes, he has missed his chance to convince the many people who read their newspapers and genuinely want guidance about how much importance they should give to tales about corporate bribery and worse This is a pity, but still leaves this book a useful addition to an overcrowded literature.

As development economists, Lall and Streeten come from an intellectual tradition which is generally more hostile to the MNCs ('transnationals' in their usage) than the business school tradition from which Vernon stems. One can trace their different approaches when the two books deal with the same evidence, particularly that of Constantine Vaitsos[1] on the use of transfer pricing mechanisms by companies doing business in Colombia. Vernon rather brusquely dismisses this work as being unrepresentative because of the tightness of Colombian controls on profit remittances by drug companies, while Lall and Streeten take it as one piece of evidence about MNC's transfer pricing policies within the Third World. They accept that the case may be unusual, look for whatever other evidence there is about the scale of transfer price manipulation in other less-developed countries, and conclude that at any rate Third-World governments should treat the phenomenon as a significant policy problem.

Although they are more critical of the MNCs than Vernon, Lall and Streeten respect the evidence. They too provide an excellent review of the literature in their more restricted area of analysis. They limit themselves more firmly than Vernon to the economic evidence, though they are at pains to argue that a purely 'economic' approach to these problems is no longer adequate. What is particularly interesting is that they go on to analyse the impact of a wide sample of investments in Jamaica, Kenya, India, Iran, Colombia and Malaysia, trying to isolate the impact of MNC investment as compared with that of local competitors. They are strongest in their

[1] *Intercountry Income Distribution and Transnational Enterprises* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1975, p. 402.

analysis of investments in India and Colombia, and they studiously try analytical approaches which may improve on the sophistication of the classic Little-Mirlees cost benefit approach. But their conclusions are pretty inconclusive. They suggest that around 60 per cent of the MNC investments under scrutiny produced net benefits to the local economy, while just under 40 per cent had negative income effects. The inconclusiveness of these general results is not the fault of the authors, who are always clear and interesting to read and have undoubtedly developed our thinking about how to analyse the impact of specific MNC investments. Ultimately, however, their empirical work tends to suggest that the MNCs and their indigenous competitors are often surprisingly similar in the problems they create for national authorities. Although they do not specifically draw this conclusion, Lall and Streeten come close to demonstrating that a good part of the strictly economic problem of MNCs in the Third World is a general political problem of weak central governments trying to direct and control industrial developments from all sources—be they indigenous or foreign.

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

World Food Prospects and Agricultural Potential. By Marylin Chou *et al. New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 316 pp. £13·40.*

FUTUROLOGY can be fun. It also has to be handled responsibly if it is not to create false impressions about world prospects during, say, the next 200 years among those of political influence and public concern. Those partial to long-term forecasts will be familiar with a previous volume published in the Hudson Institute's series on 'Prospects for Mankind' [1] which, like the one under review, was written by its director, Herman Kahn and some of his associates.

In the new volume the authors look at the prospects of food and farming in the next two to four centuries—a brave undertaking indeed. For many years past, laymen and specialists have been fed on gloom and despondency, though on some occasions the news coming from the lands of the 'green revolution' made their diet more palatable. Now to be faced with global issues projected into the far distant future must come as a welcome relief, particularly when the prospects are presented as promising. The authors undoubtedly put their emphasis in the right places when they say that 'the world food problem [which they put in inverted commas] is largely regional and national rather than global, short- and medium-term rather than long-term, and institutional rather than reflecting lack of resources and technology' (p. 9). However, even in such a situation an awful lot of people are bound to remain victims of the 'world food problem'. The assessment is also right in stressing that the tropics provide an important key to increased food production. Where the reader may be unable to shake off a certain feeling of doubt is when the authors, chiefly trained in the ways of the natural sciences, 'focus on scale-neutral, non-political tech-

[1] H. Kahn, W. Brown and L. Martel, *The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for America and the World* (New York: Morrow, 1976; London: Associated Business Programmes. 1977).

nologies' (p. 68), making only the briefest of reference to social, political, economic and institutional constraints. No thought seems to be given to such ingredients of change as social reform and political revolution. Yet traditional institutions such as, say, caste or patron-client relationships may not be susceptible to change fast enough to open the gates to the options offered by physics, chemistry and biology.

To be sure, the opportunities provided by photosynthesis, nitrogen fixation, genetic manipulation, hydroponics or single-cell protein culture are infinite. Yet the vision of the future, as presented here, is determined chiefly by the experience of the New World. Unhappily, the enterprise of the American scientist and technical practitioner is bound to encounter today—and probably for a long time to come—almost insuperable cultural and institutional barriers when it is applied in Asian or African conditions. All too rarely have the authors confronted American experiment and experience with Asian or African reality and possibility. Thus, it is hardly correct to claim that 'home gardening has become a worldwide art and science' (p. 96). On the contrary, outside the Sino-Japanese cultural orbit, home gardens are the exception rather than the rule. More important the authors' conviction that primary reliance should be on market forces invariably comes to grief where control by, rather than of, nature is still the order of the day. It is true that many of the governments of newly independent countries look with suspicion, if not contempt, at the private entrepreneur, but where technical skill is in short supply and foreign aid is handled by public authorities, a mixture of central control and private initiative often becomes the only workable pattern. It may well be in operation in the next century, however much a greater reliance on market forces may be desirable.

In view of these reservations, the authors' scenario, whereby 15,000 million people can be expected to be fed sufficiently 200 years from now, must seem somewhat optimistic. Abundance of food supplies is not only—and not even primarily—'a question of whether we manage or mismanage what we have' (p. 313). A great deal more than scientific advance and technical management will be needed to keep farm output in step with the requirements of the world's consumers, even if their numbers increase at declining rates. In future studies of food and farming, futurologists might do well to take into account the findings of the wisest of their colleagues working in the less predictable areas of the social sciences.

St. Antony's College, Oxford W. KLATT

Food Production and Consumption: The Efficiency of Human Food Chains and Nutrient Cycles. Edited by A. N. Duckham, J. G. W. Jones and E. H. Roberts. *Amsterdam, Oxford: North Holland Publishing; New York: American Elsevier. 1976. 541 pp. Fl.120.00. $48.95.*

BOOKS about agriculture or energy have scarcely been required reading outside their respective specialties. Yet energy conservation and population growth are today inseparably linked with the conduct of international affairs in a global community which has, however belatedly, recognised some of the implications of its dependence on non-renewable resources. It follows therefore that research into resource distribution, allocation and exploitation has assumed a crucial importance, direct or indirect,

for those who influence or formulate policy at the higher levels of government. Many unduly alarmist and essentially unsound arguments were advanced in the wake of the 'energy crisis', and the spectre of Mathusianism has continued to trouble the more vivid imaginations. Although the 'eco-doomsters' must be credited with popularising the issues of man's responsibility for nature and his place in a global community, the real task of solving problems of hunger or social justice depends more on science than rhetoric.

This book, although intended primarily for scientists and technologists concerned with food and agriculture, deserves to be read widely for the clarity and simplicity of its lessons for the future. Its central theme is the application of the concept of efficiency to the complex systems which make up human food supply and consumption processes throughout the world. From a strategic angle this is as much the task of governments, in their attempts to improve the efficiency of national food chains and nutrient cycles, as it is of unfashionable sciences concerned with separate links in such chains. But probably the book's most important contribution is in shifting the basic measure of value and evaluation from money to energy—that is, by considering the 'energy cost' in the whole operation of producing, processing and distributing food, and forcing those who take for granted the high-input/high-output farming systems of the West to consider the justification of continuing them or of diffusing them more widely in the developing world.

A book of twenty-nine chapters from thirty-one authors can only be briefly outlined here, although fortunately it can be read in part or whole, by layman or specialist. The first part introduces the concept of human food chains and discusses the definition and measurement of their efficiency in converting the four basic resources into the human diet. The likely development of the world's food problem from the present day to 2000 AD is outlined against the fact that the world's population still has an abundance of land, with but 10 per cent under cultivation globally. Under the title 'Ecological Aspects', the second part provides a clear exposition of that much used, but less understood, term 'ecosystem', and the nature of energy flows and the cycling of natural resources within or between such systems. Regarding agriculture as a modified and managed ecosystem, it considers those environmental constraints which impede the efficiency of farming systems. By far the largest part of the book concerns the 'Biological Components' of efficiency, starting with that of the photosynthesis at the cell and leaf level and progressing step by step through the plant, the whole crop and the conversion of feed energy into animal products to such topics as household consumption and farm wastes. (The quantity of dry matter in fibrous farm wastes, straw, and so on, exceeds the world production of grain dry matter.) Chapters such as those on technological systems of food production or on the industrial energy inputs in high-output farming systems, provide a summary of specialist research findings normally closed to the layman. Even if he finds some of the technical presentation obscure, the importance of describing and measuring each step or link in food chains and nutrient cycles is clear.

The fourth part turns to the influence of social and economic factors on the acceptability and adoption of scientifically feasible solutions, and considers the problems of accelerating the pace of scientific and technical

change. The final part, 'A Strategic Synthesis', is intended explicitly for the 'policy-maker and administrator'. It is so good that one wishes it could be reprinted and circulated in those house journals of the supra-national organisations, which presumably are perused by the decision-makers. It summarises the likely biological and economic demand for food at global levels and their effects on the use of resources. It collates information on such subjects as the 'net photosynthate' at each link in the world food chain, on the production and consumption of food and protein in the developed, developing and centrally planned economies, in total and per caput, and on fertiliser consumption, tractor use and support energy. Today only 0·4 per cent of the net photosynthate that could be formed on cultivable land is ingested by the world's population. Although the human food chains are highly complex and inefficient, by using a systems approach the points of inefficiency can be readily identified. For the authors no insuperable biological problems in feeding the world up to 2000 AD are foreseen. The outlook for the next century is less certain, but this exemplary book fully justifies the authors in hoping that their studies will help to suggest better strategic management of human food chains and nutrient cycles for the future.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne J. A. HELLEN

Population and Development: The Search for Selective Interventions. Edited by Ronald G. Ridker. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future. 1977. 467 pp. £16·85.*

CAN any steps be taken to accelerate the decline in fertility in developing countries? What lessons can administrators and politicians learn from the researches that have been carried on during the last thirty years and on which so much time and money have been spent? These questions led Resources for the Future to invite contributors to this volume to survey the connections that have been established between a number of social and economic variables on one hand, and changes in fertility on the other. The factors considered are the level and distribution of incomes, the economic value of children, the effect of education (which is discussed both from the economic and the sociological point of view), the consequences of changes in health, nutrition and mortality, the influence of changes in the status of women and the amount of gainful female employment outside the home, the role of the mass media, the availability of consumer goods and the importance of residential location.

It must be said at the beginning that policy makers will find many of the contributions to this symposium heavy going. Many of the authors are professionol economists who bring the full formidable formal apparatus of their dismal science to bear on the problems that they discuss, so that much of the argument is highly technical. But even those readers who have had the benefit of an economic training will not find many helpful prescriptions for action in the book. The editor himself states in his introduction that 'there is no sense in pretending that we have adequate answers to policy questions, when most authors feel a desperate need for better data and sharper research tools'. Indeed, many of the papers end with a plea for further research rather than with recommendations for specific action to be taken.

It is, of course, well known that in many countries social and economic development has been followed by a decline in fertility. But the complex nature of the interaction between the different variables which make up the development process has meant that the mechanism which links changes in any one specific variable with changes in fertility is only imperfectly understood. It would in any case be difficult to change particular variables in isolation without affecting others. Thus, the level of incomes, the standard of education and the status of women—to mention only three of the variables studied by contributors to this volume—act and react on one another as well as on fertility.

The editor, in his perceptive essay assessing the different contributions, of course, recognises this. ' A group of closely related and mutually reinforcing changes ', he writes, ' are likely to be much more effective than a piecemeal approach '. And again, later: ' After this review it should be clear that it is impossible to provide anything like a ranking of the various approaches to population policy according to their likely benefit-cost ratios'. The conclusion would, therefore, seem to be that it is necessary to press ahead with development policies in general, if fertility is to be reduced.

The principal value of this collection of essays is, therefore, that they give a summary of research results and of the present state of the art in the various fields which they describe. Their scope is wide-ranging so that mention of particular topics is likely to reflect the interests of the individual reviewer. Personally, I found Eva Mueller's essay on ' The Economic Value of Children in Peasant Agriculture ' and Ruth Dixon's contribution on ' The Roles of Rural Women: Female Seclusion, Economic Production and Reproductive Choice ' the most interesting. Dr. Mueller shows that in the agricultural societies which she studies, a child's consumption between the period of its birth and its own marriage is likely to exceed its productive contribution. Although she stresses the uncertainty of the data on which her conclusions are based, different approaches appear to yield the same result. Dr. Dixon, who discusses mainly the situation that is found in Hindu and Moslem countries, traces the effects of social dependence and individual powerlessness of the women of those countries and makes some interesting suggestions about the possibility of women's co-operatives overcoming some of these difficulties. There are many other interesting points in the other contributions to this symposium, which will make it of interest to students of demographic and social policy.

Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, London E. GREBENIK

A World Geography of Human Diseases. Edited by G. Melvyn Howe. *London: Academic Press. 1977. 621 pp. £24·00. $46.90.*

WITH the increasing frequency of exotic diseases imported into the developed countries and the spread of the ' diseases of civilization ' to the developing countries, the changing distribution of global mortality and morbidity rates, like the routes of epidemics and pandemics, has become a key factor in disease surveillance and eradication. This book is a timely reminder that in an age of rapid transport and mass movements of people disease does not respect frontiers; that health hazards may change despite advances in environmental sanitation, but still remain ubiquitous and take on new forms in the stressful, polluted and man-made habitats which epitomise ' development '; that diseases are not to be prevented, rather

than cured, without renewed attention to disease ecology and a willingness to accept the need for multi-disciplinary approaches to alleviating environmentally-caused suffering.

Written largely by medical specialists, this book provides a readable synopsis of the state of knowledge of the main diseases of mankind, ranging over the classic infectious cases like cholera, malaria and smallpox to the non-communicable group, from cardiovascular disease and malignant cancers to industrial, mental and deficiency diseases. It is generously illustrated by maps, many at the world scale, and tellingly demonstrates the global variability and spatial patterns of disease. This latter aspect is important, for with it the editor has justified his ambition to provide a twentieth-century version of August Hirsch's monumental *Handbook of Geographical and Historical Pathology*, published in 1860 and 1864, a pioneer study of diseases in their specific environmental (geomedical) context.

Although we know so much more today about disease aetiology and the natural and man-made environments in which human diseases are ' triggered off ' by various organisms, vectors, stressors and so on, few medical scientists have attempted such a global or regional survey. This is regrettable on many counts, not least because the world has been integrated over the past century into a single interdependent, yet ultimately far more vulnerable, unit. Death ' control ', has preceded birth control with serious demographic consequences. Thus, many acute infectious diseases have apparently been checked, by immunisation, antibiotics, healthier nutrition and public health measures. Yet the lessons of history illustrate the disastrous consequences of world-wide epidemic outbreaks from residual reservoirs of infection, often in animal populations. World health depends upon the containment of such diseases, for none, with the recent and doubtful exception of smallpox, has ever been eradicated. Similarly, the Western degenerative diseases have reached ' epidemic ' proportions and are spreading, notably in Third-World cities. The map, like the weather chart, helps to record the rapidly changing ' climate ' of health and disease. Some features point to health hazards which have the potential destructive force of cyclones; others to global inequalities of life expectation and morbidity which are storing up long-term problems and tensions for the future.

Professor Howe and his collaborators are to be applauded for providing evidence which suggests that medical school curricula will need increasingly to include geomedical training to cope with the health problems of progressively more cosmopolitan communities and life-styles. It is a book which will become not only a standard work of reference, but also provoke debate on the major issues of world health and the provision of health services in the future.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne J. A. HELLEN

LAW

International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht. Vol. 3: The Law of Peace, Parts II–VI. Edited by E. Lauterpacht. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 614 pp. £30·00.*

THIS, the third volume of the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's collected papers edited by his son Mr. E. Lauterpacht, embraces five major topics

of international law, namely: 'States as subjects of International Law' (Part II); 'State Territory and Territorial Jurisdiction' (Part III); 'The Individual and International Law' (Part IV); 'Organs of International Intercourse: Diplomatic Intercourse' (Part V); and 'The Law of International Government, Administration and Co-operation' (Part VI). This volume follows in the sequence 'General Works' and 'The Law of Peace, Part I, International Law in General', to be found in volumes 1 and 2, of the 'Collected Papers', respectively.[1] A further volume is in course of preparation and it is much to be hoped that further volumes will follow.

The current volume contains more of Lauterpacht's hitherto unpublished writings than appeared in the earlier volumes. These writings include professional opinions, given to such bodies as the Jewish Agency for Palestine, unpublished lectures, one declaration and two separate opinions delivered as a judge of the International Court of Justice, and one important memorandum written for a wartime committee.

Of particular interest for many purposes is Lauterpacht's dissertation for his doctorate of political science which he submitted to the University of Vienna in July 1922, under the title, 'The Mandate under International Law in the Covenant of the League of Nations' (pp. 24–84). It may perhaps be hazarded, after reading this penetrating paper, that it was in part Lauterpacht's absorbing interest in the juridical nature of the Mandate that led him eventually to write his first monograph, *Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law*, after he came to England, which was published in London in 1927. The late Professor C. W. Jenks has described that monograph as 'one of the seminal works of contemporary international law.[2]

The successive phases of the judicial development of the law relating to the Mandate for South-West Africa (Namibia) in the period since 1945 gives a heightened relevance to this pioneer work written in the dawn of the Mandate era.

A powerful example of Lauterpacht's persistent argument that the device of recognition stands outside the arbitrary dictates of politics and within the regime of international law, is to be found in his article in *The Times* of January 6, 1950, the day that His Majesty's government announced the recognition of the government of the People's Republic of China (pp. 114–18).

The prophetic nature of much of Lauterpacht's thought is nowhere more convincingly demonstrated in this volume than in the lecture he delivered on May 8, 1950 to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, on the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversary, under the title, 'State Sovereignty and Human Rights' (pp. 415–30). Doubtless the audience was fully acquainted with that 'hardness of the heart' and 'darkness of the mind' which had but recently produced the supreme denial of the 'dignity and worth of the human person' (preamble to the UN Charter). In this lecture Lauterpacht juxtaposed 'the three essential issues of international law'—'the political integration of mankind in the direction of the federation of the world, the curbing of the pretensions and aberrations of the doctrine of

[1] *Vol.1: The General Works* (1970), reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1972, p. 95. *Vol. 2: The Law of Peace*, Part I: International Law in General (1975), reviewed Jan. 1976, p. 102.

[2] *British Year Book of International Law, 1960*, Vol. 36 (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1961), p. 3.

sovereignty' and the effective protection of human rights. In his view, the rights of man were destined to play a significant part in the move towards a 'comprehensive federation of the States of the earth' (pp. 429–30).

For the historian and student of international organisation as the creation of international law, Lauterpacht's memorandum on 'The Principles of International Organization' is likely to be of perennial interest. It contains his formulation of those principles the majority of which eventually found their permanent habitat in the Charter of the United Nations. The editor thinks this paper was written some time in 1942 or early 1943. Such evidence as there is points to its compilation for some British committee all traces of which have disappeared. It looks as if this committee was engaged in 1942 and 1943 in doing analogous preparatory work to that being done by the American Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy in the State Department, then under Secretary of State Cordell Hull. In this memorandum Lauterpacht advanced ten principles for the future international organisation envisaged when peace came. These principles were: (i) universality; (ii) continuity; (iii) prohibition of armed force; (iv) obligatory rule of law; (v) collective security and enforcement of the law; (vi) peaceful change and international legislation; (vii) majority rule and the rejection of unanimity in international legislation; (viii) international recognition and protection of the rights of man; (ix) co-ordination of international administration; and (x) the constitution of the international organisation to be independent of the peace settlement (pp. 462–503). The profundity and practicality displayed by Lauterpacht in his formulation of these principles dispels any facile suggestion that we are confronted with an academic dreamer planning an ideal world that was unrealisable.

This volume of collected papers is but part of the extensive storehouse of international law thinking by a man who has a valid claim to be considered as the leading British publicist of the century. Each of these volumes of writings tends to enhance his stature and to strengthen that claim. Posterity will have cause to be grateful to the editor of these volumes for his patient and scholarly exposition of the work of a very great 'scholar, prophet and judge'.

University of Sussex G. I. A. D. DRAPER

International Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals. Vol. 3: International Constitutional Law. By Georg Schwarzenberger. *London: Stevens. 1976. 680 pp. £26·00.*

THE third volume in Professor Schwarzenberger's series on International Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals[1] is concerned with 'International Constitutional Law'. One might be forgiven for doubting whether there is a sufficiently uniform and established set of rules for the term 'constitutional' law to be applied. Those doubts remain after reading Professor Schwarzenberger's book, but despite this, the volume contains a great deal of material which is an essential part of any international law library.

As in the earlier volumes, it is important to understand the author's

[1] Vol. 1, 1st edn. (London: Stevens, 1945). Vol. 2 (1968), reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1970, p. 794.

methodology, and particularly to bear in mind the limitations specified in the title that he has imposed on himself. The reader has to go back to the Introduction to Volume I for an explanation of the author's inductive approach and the reason for the particular study of international law as applied by international courts and tribunals. This approach might be briefly summarised as the study of international judicial decisions, based on the assumption that they are most likely to be impartial and legally objective statements of the law. These are, however, critically appraised in the light of the rules which are being judicially applied, since the law-creating, as opposed to law-determining, process belongs exclusively to treaties, international customary law and general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.

Even if one accepts Professor Schwarzenberger's fundamental hypotheses, this approach obviously suffers from the basic limitations inherent in the fact that there are only a relatively small number of judicial decisions and they cover a restricted subject-matter. The result is a book which contains some fascinating and detailed information and some real analytical insight, but which is highly selective and very much a product of the author's own individual style of presentation.

The selectivity, which is an inevitable result of the framework of the book, results in various imbalances. For instance, while the treatment of the General Assembly runs to six chapters, the Security Council is covered in only one. The Secretary-General and Secretariat are given the grand total of eleven chapters. Often the approach excludes detailed examination of important issues. For instance, the purported power of the Secretary-General to accept responsibility for the establishment and direction of a United Nations peace-keeping force is only touched on. Sometimes the approach leads to classifications and the selection of headings within topics which appear to be unnecessarily arbitrary. In the event, the result is unevenness in the treatment of the subject as a whole.

These criticisms stem from the limitations which the author has placed on himself, and in his view such limitations are subordinate to the major purpose of the book which is to provide a systematised and critical examination of international law as applied by the most impartial law-determining agencies available. Within these limits, the book provides an invaluable source of information not easily found elsewhere, including a detailed and unique account of the relationship between the United Nations and its staff, through the decisions of the Administrative Tribunal.

The author has succeeded in his original intention of making this series of volumes something more than a mere digest of international decisions by subjecting them to detailed and hard-headed critical analysis. Professor Schwarzenberger is dedicated to exposing unarticulated 'metalegal' judicial reasoning as, for example, in his clear and perceptive analysis of the Court's treatment of the South West Africa question. This aspect of his work in large part compensates for the deficiencies resulting from the limitations of his general systematic approach.

University College of Wales ILONA CHEYNE

SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941–1945. By Christopher Thorne. *London: Hamish Hamilton. 1978. 772 pp. £15·00.*

THE present reviewer was in Australia when Professor Thorne published the first fruits of some of his research for this book in the form of newspaper articles which revealed, for the first time, some extremely adverse comments by prominent Americans, including General MacArthur, upon the Australian political scene and upon the qualities of the Australian fighting man during the Second World War. He well remembers the furore caused by these articles, and so, evidently, does the author himself, for he refers to the incident in his preface and girds his loins for more trouble to come. '. . . I have little doubt', he writes, 'that some of the opinions and items of evidence which are proffered in the pages that follow will give rise to not only disagreement but even resentment on the part of certain readers' (p. xii).

Those most likely to be offended, Christopher Thorne believes, are devotees of Churchill and Roosevelt and firm believers in the 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States. In spite of his tremendous achievement in rallying the nation in 1940, Thorne argues, as time went on Churchill became more and more of an obstacle to the evolution of a policy which would take account both of the realities of Britain's postwar position and of the rise of Asian nationalism. For his part, President Roosevelt was full of half-baked ideas and obsessions concerning the Far East and increasingly lost grip on the situation as his health deteriorated. As for the 'special relationship', Britain and the United States disagreed so often and so profoundly over strategy and war aims in the Far East that they were only 'allies of a kind' (p. 725).

Not all of this is particularly new or particularly shocking. There must, after all, be few who continue to entertain Churchill's illusions about India or Roosevelt's about China, while anyone with a nodding acquaintance of the subject will hardly be surprised to learn that Britain and the United States did not always see eye to eye over the future of the European colonial empires in the Far East. The radically different way in which each country viewed the other's role in the fighting in the Far East even impinged upon popular consciousness at the time, when Errol Flynn's exploits in *Objective, Burma* outraged the sensibilities of British cinema audiences, who felt that the British contribution to the war there had been ignored.[1]

What Professor Thorne has done, however, is to spread his net to include less well-studied aspects of the subject, such as the role of Australia, and to write an integrated volume in which British and American policies towards various parts of the Far East are looked at in relation to one another and against the background of the war as a whole. He also shows how, in spite of their disagreements, Britain and the United States were 'allies of a kind' in a completely different sense: namely, that they were united, and seen by Asians to be united, by racialist assumptions, frequently enunciated in private if not in public, of white, European or Anglo-Saxon superiority. It may indeed offend some readers to see

[1] Curiously, Professor Thorne does not mention this episode, although it provides strong support for one of the points to which he repeatedly refers.

Churchill and Roosevelt portrayed as racists, but that is what the record presented here shows they were.

Even when he deals with familiar facts or themes, Christopher Thorne does so in more detail and with a much greater weight of supporting evidence than any previous historian. He does not confine himself to the content of particular policies, but shows how they evolved over time, how they sometimes reflected disagreements within one country's bureaucracy which were at least as great as those between that country and its ally, and how the stereotypes in terms of which Britain and the United States tended to regard each other were often inaccurate and unfair. In sum, this book is a truly remarkable achievement, which will reinforce the author's already established reputation as one of the world's leading authorities on the international relations of the Far East in the present century.

If a criticism can be made, it concerns the book's length, which, with over 700 pages, approaching 400,000 words and buttressed by approximately 3,500 references, may deter some readers. It may also cause them, on occasions, to lose sight of the wood for the trees. A case in point is the importance, for an understanding of Roosevelt's China policy, of his fear of a Soviet-American clash in China after the war. Christopher Thorne is well aware of the importance of this factor, as a number of references scattered through the text bear witness, but a more concise treatment would have brought these references together and given them greater impact. Professor Thorne is, of course, perfectly capable of presenting his ideas in a much more concise form. Thus, he summarised the fruits of his research on Indochina in an excellent article in the *Pacific Historical Review* for February 1976. If he had dealt with other areas on a similar scale, the result would have been a shorter, but perhaps an even more effective book.

University of Leicester GEOFFREY WARNER

Churchill and the Admirals. By Stephen Roskill. *London: Collins. 1977. 351 pp. £8·50.*

NOBODY understands the higher direction of the war at sea better than Captain Roskill. His several volumes in the official history of the Second World War, his studies in naval policy between the wars and his substantial biography of Lord Hankey place him in a special category. He knows his way round the documents and—important for this new book—he knows the men. Here is a firm base from which to explore the love-hate relationship between Churchill and the sailors.

The centuries-old supremacy of the Admiralty has instilled in its officers a natural sense of superiority not less than Lord Curzon's, a sense shared by Roskill himself. The undisclosed major premise of his book is that in nautical matters the presumption must be that the Navy is right. Since Churchill, from the days of his exhilarating partnership with Lord Fisher, always assumed that he understood the Admiralty's business better than the seadogs themselves, clashes and suspicions, misunderstanding and injustice were bound to occur. And there was another difficulty which Captain Roskill illustrates with abundant examples. For Churchill the Navy was an offensive weapon. He liked the attackers, 'Elizabethans' like Beatty and Keyes. More perceptive sailors, who understood that managing a fleet is not

like hunting with the Quorn, were suspect and suffered. Churchill's indeed his loss, of confidence in true seamen like Cunningham and T is his failure, as Captain Roskill brings out, rather than theirs.

Yet as we are led through the famous *causes célèbres* once again loss of *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, convoy PQ17, the delay in prov long-range aircraft for the Battle of the Atlantic and so on—some re able doubts arise. As a witness for the prosecution Captain Roskill's mand of the damnatory evidence is absolute. Good stories, apt docun and shrewd analysis build up a powerful case. The book, as migh expected, is immensely readable. But what about the case for the acc

In a final chapter Roskill pays glowing tribute to Churchill's condu the war, but it is perhaps a limiting factor that in the rest of the book sometimes gets the impression that naval affairs are being considere *vacuo*, as though all the other pressures and problems of the world co were not simultaneously bearing on the Prime Minister. General W remark that 'war is an option of difficulties' applies to Churchill special force. And as we have been able to mention the Ultra intellig since 1974, it is strange that Churchill's management of his admirals i evaluated in the light of the immense amount of exact information a the enemy that reached him from Bletchley Park. Nor was the Adm always right. If Churchill is to be excoriated for not providing en long-range aircraft for the Atlantic battle, the admirals have equal answer for their insistence on the prolonged and utterly futile bombin the U-boat pens. What, moreover, are we to say of their judgme retaining until 1943 the convoy codes which the Germans were happily disastrously cracking?

Captain Roskill has presented eloquently a formidable bill of attai but the more formidable figure of Churchill is probably chucklin Valhalla as he repeats to himself the words of his father, Lord Rand 'All great men make mistakes'.

RONALD LEV

Roosevelt and Churchill 1939–1941: The Partnership that saved the ' By Joseph P. Lash. *London: Deutsch. 1977. 528 pp. £6·95.*

THIS is a valuable, well-informed and very thoroughly researched book it is neither quite the book that the title suggests, nor as good a book might have been. One comes to the end of 500 pages with the feeling the author should either have given a different title to the book, or given the title, he should have written a different book. Now tha documentary evidence is nearly all available, there is a need for a thor and perceptive study of the relationship between these two extraord men. Much further light needs to be thrown on their personalities, es ally that of Roosevelt, who remains, in spite of the millions of words wr about him, something of an enigma. Was he a deep as well as a de man, or was he, as Dean Acheson and others have suggested, an essen shallow personality, both intellectually and psychologically, distingu from other politicians mainly by his strength of purpose and ski political manoeuvre?

And as to the relationship with Churchill, how much real trust was between them? How much was admiration tempered by jealousy?

Churchill really the man best qualified to establish a satisfactory relationship with Roosevelt, as has often been assumed? Or were the temperamental differences between the two men, on top of the well-known divergence of political outlook and objectives, sufficient to justify Mr. Lash's comment that Churchill was 'the British leader most likely to misjudge the psychology both of the American public and its President . . . the greatest asset to Anglo-American relations, but also, on occasion, the greatest menace, because of his impetuosity and impatience, the fixity with which he held to his ideas and his inability to put himself in the other fellow's shoes' (p. 318)? In fact, the weight of Mr. Lash's evidence tends partly to contradict his conclusion, since one is left with an impression of Churchill's considerable patience and understanding of Roosevelt's difficulties. But such questions are only fitfully illuminated. In a book so packed with detail about the American political background and many aspects of inter-Allied diplomacy, it is the classic case of not being able to see the wood for the trees—or, to vary the metaphor, not seeing clearly enough the shape of the two tallest trees, for the mass of timber surrounding them.

In fact, Mr. Lash has chosen to write a different kind of book from that indicated by his title. He has written a comprehensive and detailed history of Anglo-American relations, and indeed of American diplomacy in general, during the two years of American 'neutrality'. At its most effective, this is a study of presidential leadership, faced at the outset by 'balky War and Navy officials, a Congress which at key points was controlled by isolationists, a cautious State Department and an unpredictable international situation' (p. 152); to which one might add, an overwhelmingly isolationist public opinion. Yet so successful was it, that twenty-one months after the outbreak of war Hopkins was able to assure Churchill 'if the President decided that the time has come to make war on Germany, the vast majority of the population, of all parties, would endorse this action' (p. 383). The key to this success, as Mr. Lash brings out, was Roosevelt's instinct that he must seem to be following public opinion as much as leading it: acting under the pressure of public opinion, not the pressure of the importunate British and Russians. It was a strategy which incurred much criticism from the more zealous pro-war members of his administration: but one justified by results.

Mr. Lash has shown in his previous book on the Roosevelts [1] that he has a discerning eye for personal relationships. One must conclude, however, that he has written an instructive and useful book, but not the one he might have written and which he was, perhaps, best qualified to write.

University of Reading KEITH SAINSBURY

In the Year of Munich. By Roy Douglas. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 155 pp. £7·95.*

IT takes spirit to write another book on Munich, and more to write a short one. There are already so many monographs, and the politics and diplomacy of the period need careful unravelling. But Dr. Douglas does a worthwhile job well in this book.

[1] *Eleanor and Franklin: The Story of their Relationship based on Eleanor Roosevelt's Private Papers* (London: Deutsch, 1972).

He confines himself mainly to Britain's role in the six months either side of September 1938 and elucidates it in terms of the information and the alternatives apparently available to the government at the time. As a qualified barrister, he uses the abundant evidence now accessible in published or archival form to assess particularly Chamberlain's record, on the proper legal basis of presumption of innocence. It is a rather refreshing approach.

What emerges is a documented analysis of Chamberlain as a well-intentioned man coping with an impossible task, often leading, but not always getting his own way. Among the points made are the impact of the despondent military appraisals on his developing policy, the influence of 'appeasers' who surrounded him no less on the left than on the right, and his difficulty in predicting then what Hitler was later seen or thought to have had in mind. In the end, Dr. Douglas assigns such blame as he finds to the Versailles peacemakers who failed to reckon with the economic nationalism of the new powers.

However, it is possible to argue that Chamberlain was less reactive in his policy: that his visits to Hitler and the Runciman mission, for example, were moves positively intended to prepare the way for his own vision of a peaceful four-power Europe. It is also possible to argue that, while tougher action by Britain in 1938 would admittedly have led to an eventual war, it would have been with Czechoslovakia as a base and an arsenal for the Western powers. And a final judgment on the British government ought probably to consider not just what it thought other powers were up to, but what in fact they were up to. But even in such a context, Dr. Douglas's book should be welcomed as a timely stimulus to fuller discussion.

New University of Ulster, Coleraine W. V. WALLACE

Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War. By W. M. Carlgren. Trans. by Arthur Spencer. *London: Benn. 1977. 257 pp. £8·75.*

As the sole Nordic country to keep out of the Second World War, Sweden has a distinctive chapter to contribute to its history. Professor Carlgren, who has been both civil servant and academic, is now Head of Archives at the Swedish Foreign Ministry, with published studies on Balkan politics, German-Swedish relations and Dag Hammerskjöld to his credit. The present work is a condensed (and well-translated) version of the Ministry's sponsored publication, *Svensk Utrikespolitik 1939–1945*[1]; being based on the same official documents, but omitting the governmental reports and parliamentary debates.

In so far as the book's principal theme is indeed the maintenance not only of Swedish neutrality but also of reasonable freedom of action in difficult circumstances, Professor Carlgren seems justified in his summing up that 'all in all, Sweden, when her exceptionally exposed and weak position *vis-à-vis* Germany is taken into account, got off lightly' (p. 227). German interest in Sweden throughout the war appears in fact to have been essentially negative. For the Western Powers Sweden was primarily an economic rather than a strategic target: Allied plans for opening a new front in the North, in 1940 and again in 1944, being basically so motivated.

[1] Stockholm: Allmänna Förlaget, 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1974, p. 647.

The Soviet Union's main concern throughout was the indirect one of Finland's position—a concern that was to evolve from an initial determination to absorb that country to eventual readiness to settle for the present special relationship.

In all these contexts, not least the Finnish, Sweden played an active, if circumscribed, role, one preoccupation of which was certainly to ameliorate the plight of its less fortunate neighbours: and Professor Carlgren's balanced, informative account contains much of value to the historian, even if it appears to call for no basic reappraisal of conclusions that an abundance of other material about the war in the north has now made possible. He quotes in full (pp. 12–14) a circular instruction drafted, though never actually sent, by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to its diplomatic missions in 1939, containing the following passage: 'The prospects for the maintenance of neutrality must be considered to lie in the fact that it will be to the interest of both coalitions involved in the conflict that Sweden should not be dragged into the war; in the fact that the Swedish military establishment is of a size sufficient to command respect; and, finally, in so strong an internal unity in Sweden that any foreign interference is ruled out.' As the author comments, these judgments proved substantially correct. (Where Swedish opinion seems to have been less realistic, indeed remarkably short-sighted, was in the 'overwhelming relief' stated to have been occasioned by the belief that the Nazi-Soviet Pact, while making inevitable a German attack on Poland, would nevertheless generally ease the pressure on Finland and thus 'not give rise to a Great Power War in the Baltic'—shades of Tilsit!)

If the preservation of Swedish neutrality was not free of unwelcome concessions, it is as well to recall that neutrality is a status which tends to be as much disparaged by belligerents as it is lauded in peace-time; and that Sweden simply succeeded in achieving what every other Allied country, with the exception of the British Commonwealth and France, had likewise attempted, until attacked.

There is plenty of specific British interest in the book, notably from the economic warfare aspect. A short section on the controversial Prytz/Butler conversation in June 1940 (pp. 73–76) leaves this episode still open to intriguing speculation—did it betoken the existence, however briefly, of a 'peace' faction in the British government? And did it decisively affect the Swedish government's compliance with German demands for troop transit to North Norway? (The orthodox Swedish view, implicitly endorsed by Professor Carlgren, has been that it did, although published Foreign Office papers suggest that such a decision may in principle already have been taken.)

MICHAEL F. CULLIS.

WESTERN EUROPE

Decision Making in the European Community. By Christopher Sasse, Edouard Poullet, David Coombes and Gérard Deprez. *New York: Praeger for the European Community Institute for University Studies. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 352 pp. £18·40.*

THIS is an interesting, often informative, but ultimately disappointing book—or rather, books, since its three sections are by different authors and

relate only loosely to each other. Their focus of attention is not, as the title would suggest, the decision-making process in Brussels. Their concern is with the Community's 'institutional machinery', which as Max Kohnstamm notes in his preface, 'was thought to be the most valuable and original aspect of European integration' (p. vi). This original construction has nevertheless failed to produce the decisions which the original objectives of the Community enterprise demanded and which the unending succession of plans and meetings might lead the observer to expect. How far, the authors ask, are institutional inadequacies responsible for this failing, and to what extent within the present disillusioned climate can institutional adaptation contribute towards a renewed impetus and towards the resolution of the Community's 'crisis of legitimacy'?

Professor Sasse's contribution was originally separately published in German as *Regierungen, Parlamente, Ministerrat.*[1] It is offered here as 'a kind of interim report' (p. 7) on the participation of national governments and parliaments in the procedures of the Community, together with a discussion of various proposals for improving the workings of the Council of Ministers and its associated structure of committees. The chapters on governments and parliaments vary considerably in the amount of information given for each country. Germany is discussed at far greater length than any other, with a succession of references to Community regional policy which might usefully have been drawn together into a case study; the Netherlands receives more attention than France. The short sections on Belgium and Denmark are excellent, while those on some of the larger countries add little to the existing literature.

Poullet and Deprez provide a study of the bureaucratic structure of the Commission, together with some proposals for strengthening its role and 'enhancing' its 'legitimate powers' (p. 233). Their discussion of the internal functioning of the Commission provides some interesting information not easily available elsewhere, stemming from an unpublished report prepared for the Commission. It would have been useful to have developed this chapter at greater length, illustrating its arguments in greater detail. The chapter on 'The future development of Community institutions' is less novel, rehearsing a number of proposals from a perspective close to that which inspired the members of Professor Hallstein's Commission before 1965.

David Coombes attempts a more modest task, addressing himself primarily to the problem of legitimacy for Community decisions and for the institutions as such. His discussion of the operation and effectiveness of the European Parliament so far is constructively critical; he is sceptical that direct elections alone will transform it into a powerful and prestigious body. 'For the foreseeable future', he notes, 'the national parliaments are likely to have the more interesting and constructive role to play in resolving the Community's crisis of legitimacy' (p. 305)—though there are important and unavoidable obstacles in the way of national parliaments controlling and legitimising Community decisions through holding the member governments, and so the Council of Ministers, to account. His sceptical conclusion is that there is no institutional short-cut to European Union, no way round the solid resistance of national governments to further transfers of political authority to the Community. 'The initiative and the

[1] Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1975.

solution thus lie with the member states themselves rather than with the Community's present institutions' (p. 332).

This is a realistic but sobering conclusion to a series of studies devoted to those institutions. Professor Coombes's essay, the most successful of the three, cuts through the paper tangle of plans for extending the European Parliament's budgetary powers or strengthening its links with the Council of Ministers, and throws the problem of institutional progress back at the member governments themselves. A useful discussion—but still a disappointing outcome to a study generously funded over a number of years.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

Energy and the European Communities. By N. J. D. Lucas. *London: Europa for the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. 1977. 175 pp. £6·50.*

AN intriguing sense of *déjà vu*, of historical lessons passing unnoticed, haunts the reader of this intelligent and perceptive book on the trials of Europe's energy policy (wisely, the author refrains in the title from any indication that there is a European energy policy). One cannot help but draw parallels with the present when following Lucas's clear analysis of the historical evolution of European energy policy, of the early achievements and the crucial turning points, which led not only to a halt to European energy integration, but also to a dismantling of some of the early successes. Thus, through the decidedly, but soberly, Federalist pen of the author, one is drawn into a European tragedy of sorts.

Lucas argues that the natural differences in resource endowment between members of the Community need not have been an obstacle to progress towards a European energy policy—indeed, he sees such diversity as an essential stimulus towards common policies, although he also recognises that energy resources are less amenable to supranational policies than, say, manufactured goods. But the opportunity to mould a common energy policy was missed in 1957, when the decline of coal in the Communities' future energy supplies was becoming evident. Against good evidence and experts' advice, the European Federalists put their faith into nuclear energy, instead of petroleum. Thus the Communities found themselves with an elaborate institutional framework for an energy source which remained marginal (Euratom), while no common policies and mechanisms were developed for the fuel which was to swamp European energy markets very rapidly: petroleum. The faith in nuclear energy was, as the author shows, prompted by a coincidence of the attitudes of the European Federalists (who saw nuclear energy as the means to push forward with European integration) and of some national governments, particularly France whose nuclear ambitions were not unrelated to its defence policy. The Suez crisis injected a sense of urgency. Between 1957 and 1973, the Communities were thus more and more pushed out of energy policies, and there was little institutional resistance to the reassertion of national predominance in energy matters. After 1973, it was essentially the difference of approach between member states which argued for the formulation of an internal energy policy before an external policy, and those advocating the opposite sequence. The result, so far: little progress with either.

After his historical analysis, Lucas presents a detailed assessment of the

formulation of energy policy in the Commission. He concludes that the Commission has given priority to political considerations; but although he sympathises with the need for skilful political mobilisation of support from member states, the author notes that all too often the Commission has taken the path of least resistance, pre-empting national objections in its proposals. His second criticism is the often blatant lack of technical soundness of the Commission's proposals, in particular with regard to nuclear energy. The third section of the book deals with the Commission's present perceptions with regard to the major fuels; and the last part offers an evaluation of the major concerns of European energy policies. Here Lucas professes considerable scepticism about the future role of nuclear energy on two grounds: first, economically, nuclear energy development depends to a considerable degree on electricity demand—yet a substantial further increase could only come from domestic heating, where electricity does not seem to be competitive with other sources of energy. Second, there is the danger of nuclear proliferation which Europe has not yet sufficiently considered.

Lucas's alternative to nuclear energy is chiefly conservation and the more rational use of energy (for example, through industrial co-generation of electricity), as well as the development of synthetic natural gas production based on imported coal. Here one misses an assessment of the costs of coal gasification, and a more thorough analysis of the international availability of coal. Nevertheless, the author's cautioning about the future of nuclear energy seems well taken.

There is little to object to in this well-written and perceptively argued book: some minor flaws (such as the insistent reference to Sicco Mansholt as Signor Mansholt, and some other small inaccuracies) do not impair the overall quality of the argument. The bleak conclusion that progress to a European energy policy will be difficult thus rests on solid ground. The only hope seems to lie in the strong challenge of the world energy picture, which might yet force a more coherent external energy policy from the Nine, and thus also push forward the integration of national energy policies in Europe. The year 1973 seems to mark a turning point for European energy policy: away from half-hearted attempts to formulate a common internal approach, and towards greater emphasis on an external energy policy. So far, little has happened in this respect, too—but the pressure will be mounting.

Trilateral Commission, Paris HANNS W. MAULL

European Social Policy: Today and Tomorrow. By Michael Shanks. *Oxford: Pergamon Press. 1977. 105 pp. Pb: £2·75.*

THE former Director-General of Social Affairs at the EC Commission has produced a short and very readable book on a very neglected corner of Community affairs. It is, to my knowledge, the first such book in English and therefore very welcome.

It is in fact doubly welcome. For while giving a concise description of what the Community has done in 'the social field' it debunks the lingering notion that social policy is somehow a self-contained 'chasse-gardée', safely to be left to the ex-trade unionists in the Commission to fix with their erstwhile colleagues outside and thus keep organised labour—or its

representatives—loyal to the Community cause. Michael Shanks traces the graph of activity in this sector which, not incorrectly, shows a peak when he was in office. He has, however, decidedly *not* written an apology for his trusteeship. He rightly ascribes this movement to underlying political causes—initially the push from the Paris Summit in 1972, motivated by the then growing concern with qualitative limits to economic growth, then the backlash as the mid-1970s stagflation concentrated minds first on cutting out frills and later on job-creation before all else.

Job-creation is, of course, at the heart of social policy. But conditioned as it is by so many factors, those with which 'social policy' has been charged tend everywhere to be the technical ones—and nowhere more so than at Community level. For Michael Shanks the essential role for social policy in Europe is the part it can play in holding together a 'social contract' for European growth and prosperity. In his view, to do this a system of EEC little Neddies is needed.

Certain existing joint employer/trade-union committees in a very few sectors (fewer than the book leads one to believe) could prefigure this. Unfortunately Mr. Shanks fails to delve further into this theme. He has little to say on employer attitudes and what he says seems wrong: employer opposition to joint committees is rooted more in anathema to planning in general than to collective bargaining, on the continent anyway. He is concerned to involve groups like consumers and family organisations in Community social policy, but his chosen solution appears to rule them out. He wants to find a role for the EEC's Economic and Social Committee (Eco Soc)—where these interest groups are present—but keeps it well clear of these key fields. Instead he indulges in a long diatribe on Community institutions in general, rather in the style of an English leader-writer who has never set foot in Brussels.

Englishness and factual errors are in fact the chief weaknesses of the book. It is rather as if everything worthwhile started when Britain joined. No one could divine from this essay that trade unions were, on the continent, amongst the Community's strongest supporters in the early years. Economic and monetary union—assimilated astonishingly to the Snake—was, we are told, invented by the 1972 Summit: so much for the Werner Plan, etc. The European Coal and Steel Community is in fact *wholly* financed by the levy—or was until 1978: its consultative committee is *not* tripartite (not in Community terminology that is). ECOSOC groups do not 'function independently'. Company law harmonisation owes far more to Professor Sanders than to Servan-Schreiber, etc.

These defects are sufficiently numerous for one to hesitate to recommend the work as a text-book. Yet it is an invaluable review of what the Community has succeeded in doing in this field, especially in the period 1973–76, and it is stimulating in many of its perceptions for the future. Particularly noteworthy is the emphasis laid on the 'catalytic' role of the Commission (curiously enough the author does not ascribe this role to the *Community*, although this would surely be correct and correspond more to the author's own outlook).

'Social policy is not just about jobs, it is about life' writes Michael Shanks. His book reminds us that behind the power politics and technicalities, the Community is a living body, concerned more and more with the problems of living together.

EEC Economic and Social Committee, Brussels DIARMID MCLAUGHLIN

Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in Europe and America. By Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo and Carolyn Teich Adams. *London: Macmillan. 1976. (First publ. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975.) 296 pp. £7·95. Pb: £2·95.*

THREE AMERICAN academics have provided in this book a useful collection of comparative studies of aspects of social policy in the United States and selected West European states: most often Britain, West Germany and Sweden, but more selectively also France, Denmark and the Netherlands. Successive chapters examine health care policy, public housing and structural reform of secondary schools; the clash between public and private priorities in transport policy; the conflict between local autonomy and central direction in education; problems of urban planning; and the use of taxation and of direct income supports as instruments for ensuring a desired distribution of income.

The result, pulled together in a concluding chapter, is a stimulating and competent discussion of the importance of institutional, ideological, political and social factors in shaping policies in different countries. It is perhaps a little too broad in its scope for the specialist reader, interested primarily in the subject matter of only one or two of its chapters; such specialists will already be familiar with the expert literature on which these chapters are based. By the same token, however, it is an excellent book for the student of public policy, and should find a ready market among the growing number of courses on public policy in universities and colleges in Britain and abroad. Its authors are clearly writing first and foremost for an American audience, drawing conclusions from their European examples to apply to a fuller discussion of the distinctive constraints on social policy formulation and implementation in the United States. But European readers will also find much in this volume to interest them in further comparison of the roots of policy in different Western democracies.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

L'Etonnement d'Etre: Journal (1939–1973). By Hervé Alphand. *Paris: Fayard. 1977. 614 pp. Pb.*

HERVÉ ALPHAND is one of France's most distinguished diplomats of the postwar period, ending a career which included nine years (1956–65) as ambassador in Washington with seven years (1965–72) as *secrétaire-général*, or permanent head, of the Quai d'Orsay. His book is not a diary in the sense of a daily or semi-daily record, for there are frequent gaps of several months, and in one case, between August 1956 and July 1958, one of almost two years. The entries do, however, purport to be contemporary, and on at least one occasion (p. 49), the author specifically draws attention to an inaccurate rumour recounted in the text as an indication of the diary's authenticity. Nevertheless, he does admit that he has omitted 'passages which could appear much too personal in nature' and that he has corrected the style (p. 7). One wonders how far this 'correction' has gone, for it is somewhat disconcerting to read, in the entry dated May 10, 1950, that 'England, in spite of Monnet's efforts in London, refuses to

join us [i.e. in the Schuman Plan]' (p. 217), when Britain's refusal did not in fact take place until June 2!

But for the most part the entries seem authentic enough, and they are both important and fascinating. Indeed, there is so much of interest that the reviewer hardly knows where to begin. One could mention the account of the end of the European Defence Community in 1954 and the shabby treatment of the author, one of its strongest supporters, by Pierre Mendès-France, or President Pompidou's lifting of the veto upon British entry into the EEC in 1971. Of the latter, Alphand writes that 'the decision was taken by [Pompidou] and the British prime minister, Heath, during the course of negotiations that were prepared and conducted in the greatest secrecy, Maurice Schumann [the French foreign minister] and myself being excluded' (p. 553).

It is doubtless to Alphand's accounts of his many conversations with General de Gaulle, however, that most readers will turn. These extend over a long period, for Alphand was one of the first senior French civil servants to join the Free French Movement (in 1941). One of the most interesting passages tells of a conversation in October 1943, in which Jean Monnet also took part, and which not only shows how far back the differences between French federalists and Gaullists over European unity go, but also demonstrates the preoccupation with Germany common to both. 'Monnet develops his idea of a completely unified Europe composed of equal states' Alphand writes. 'In these circumstances, Germany can be divided. A kind of Lotharingia is set up, with European heavy industry under international control and no more tariff barriers. De Gaulle finds this conception unrealistic. "You must take account of traditions", he says. "You will never put Frenchmen and Germans in the same unit after this war. At the most, you will be able to create an economic grouping in western Europe comprising France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, possibly the Rhineland and possibly Italy. This grouping would be allied to Russia and Great Britain. The latter will not be able to join this union, torn as she will be between Europe and her empire. It will therefore be made without her. France could play an important role in all this, not an entirely unimportant consideration when one is a Frenchman," he added maliciously' (pp. 168–69).

The book is not all high politics. As befits a good diary, even one as fitful as this, there are plenty of amusing anecdotes, and who can fail to warm to a man who admits that he finds the poetry of St. Jean Perse (Alexis Léger), a Nobel prize winner and one of Alphand's predecessors as permanent head of the Quai d'Orsay, more comprehensible with an English translation, and believes that its rendering into Swedish by Dag Hammarskjöld 'must be the ultimate in obscurity' (p. 341)?

University of Leicester GEOFFREY WARNER

Political Parties and Elections in the French Fifth Republic. By J. R. Frears. *London: C. Hurst. 1977. 292 pp. £8·60. Pb: £3·60.*

THIS book follows the programme implied in its title, i.e. it describes the main French political parties and the way in which they interact; it also gives an account of the different types of election in which they participate and assesses their performance in these. There is little discussion of

other aspects of the French political system, so presumably the book was not conceived as a textbook for intending students of French politics. Its major strengths are its clear descriptions of the different levels of the electoral system, of the internal structure and organisation of the parties and of their electoral support; party press and other propaganda outlets could perhaps have been dealt with more fully in so specialised a work, especially the plethora of material associated with the Socialist Party. This information is backed up by useful tables, easily readable in the main, and the whole is fairly up to date. The author can hardly be blamed, for instance, for failing to guess the imminence or the extent of the current feuds inside the Left and Right in France.

Where the book disappoints is in its reluctance to get to grips with the crucial question for any parties, i.e. the nature of their connection with those group, class or fractional interests which, inevitably, they represent. True, this representation is a complex and oblique process; but in a work devoted to parties, more attempt should be made to analyse it than seems to be the case here. Pierre Birnbaum has recently put forward stimulating hypotheses about the class nature of Gaullism and Giscardism that could have been used. But the author seems content to accept much of the Right's ideology at face value (*cf.* his endorsement of the famous Gaullist 'third way' between capitalism and communism) instead of trying to see Gaullism in terms of what many believe it to have been—an attempt to develop an autonomous state capitalism, resisting the hegemony of the French private sector and of American capital alike. Similarly, the author is enthusiastic about Giscard's much proclaimed desire to reform (p. 65 ff.), but he always writes that Giscard 'wants to' rather than 'has done'. Why, one wonders? Perhaps the sociological bases of Giscardism are fundamentally opposed to even the rather cosmetic type of change that the President proposes?

As regards the parties of the Left, some of the writing is even more uncritical. Surely in 1978 membership of Communist parties can be explained other than by the 'abnormal personality traits' (p. 146), dear to American political science? In the account of the building of the new Socialist Party, why is so much of the credit given to the late-comer François Mitterrand, and none to the left-wing Socialist group CERES, who began the hard task of reconstruction inside the old SFIO (French section of the Workers' International)? Chevènement's works, essential for the understanding of an important part of the French Left, are not even mentioned in the bibliography.

The author's desire to dissipate some stereotyped views of French politics leads him to some hasty généralisations of dubious value. The recent fuss over the *Loi Guermeur* shows that the controversy about state aid to Catholic schools is far from dead (p. 8). Aron's view that 'the Algerian settlement was the final proof of de Gaulle's political genius' (p. 18) is left unqualified; what role, one wonders, did the FLN play in achieving the settlement? But if one believes that the French *colons* 'had made Algeria more like an exotic region of France than a colony' (p. 17), then presumably history can be treated fairly lightly—even to the point of asserting that manhood suffrage in France dates from 1849 (p. 255). Who, then, voted for Bonaparte in 1848?

On a less important level, the author shows an irksome predilection for pompous literary quotations at the end of chapters, although he is never

slow to criticise the verbal excesses of others. Spelling mistakes, especially of names, are more frequent than they should be (Fontan*ent* p. 223, Schwartzen*burg* p. 56). But the work is not without humour (or perhaps the author knows something that others do not); on page *118* the leader of the Socialist Party is referred to as Françoise Mitterrand. Who said the French Left was sexist?

University of Reading DAVID HANLEY

The French Polity. By William Safran. *New York: McKay. 1977. 332 pp. $12.50. Pb: $6.95.*

THIS is a straightforward textbook treatment of the French political system. Starting with the historical, economic and social context, it moves on to the constitution, parties and pressure groups, then to the executive, parliament and the administrative and legal systems, to conclude with planning, foreign policy and reflections on Giscardism. The approach is mainly institutional, the analysis sober, conventional and generally lucid. If Professor Safran has little to say that is new or striking, much of what he says is said judiciously and economically. It is unfortunate that the book was completed too soon to take account of the revitalisation of the Gaullists, the disruption of the left-wing alliance or, of course, the outcome of the 1978 elections. But these are the apparently inevitable hazard of writing about contemporary French politics. Through much of the book one is tempted to say that this is an unexciting account that one would be happy to see in student hands. But then along comes a passage which makes one flinch or wonder just how sound Professor Safran's grasp is. The (*Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité* (CRS) really are *not* 'akin to the American National Guard' (p. 242); M. Goguel has been a member of the Constitutional Council—rather than secretary-general of the Senate—since 1971 (p. 201); the refusal to recall Parliament in 1960 was far more a Presidential than a governmental act (p. 204)—and whether it can be labelled baldly 'a blatant contravention' of the constitution is arguable. The Preamble to the constitution has a firmer standing than is suggested (p. 67); the assertion that 'the British Parliament has continued to be an effective decision maker' (p. 175) will raise not a few eyebrows, along with references to depoliticisation (p. 106), the 'progressive disintegration of the UDR' (p. 117) and the acceptance of Poniatowski's dubious claims about the disciplining of prefects (p. 221). More substantially, I found the discussion of relations between President and Prime Minister (pp. 147 ff.) inadequate, and at times misleading—the treatment of the 'Achilles heel problem' is particularly cursory—while the section on the Constitutional Council (pp. 190–94) takes virtually no account of the 1974 reform. In short, a generally adequate account marred by some bad howlers, and weaknesses in discussing potential constitutional development.

University of Keele MARTIN HARRISON

France 1848–1945. Vol. 2: Intellect, Taste and Anxiety. By Theodore Zeldin. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1977. 1202 pp. £15·00.*

THIS book completes a work the first volume of which was reviewed

earlier.[1] The emphasis on values, ambitions, emotions, ideas and relationships in the first volume is sustained throughout the second with a selective rather than comprehensive approach.

Volume Two is in three parts, the first dealing with various national and provincial French characteristics identified partly through attitudes towards foreigners, and partly through the education system examined critically within the wider context of social culture, but nevertheless with closer attention to intellectuals than to politicians or voters. Thus we have Franco-British relations assessed by reference to Voltaire, Guizot and Taine rather than to Delcassé, Briand, Blum and the men who fought alongside the British in two world wars. Potentially interesting accounts of French travel within France to state-owned spas are marred by superficial impressions that this experience included most Frenchmen because 'prices suited all pockets' (p. 94). We have a vague reference to the Cartesianism of Foch (p. 223) rather than any substantial evidence of his assessment of French interests in relations with the British or Germans, and there is no systematic discussion of whether or not the Rhine should become a French frontier.

Part Two deals with taste, artistic or otherwise, fashion, humour, eating and reading habits. A study of tensions in social life is balanced by a study of the intricate techniques used by *homo ludens* to avoid or break tensions or at least to render them creative. This section of the book culminates with a discussion of alcoholism, thereby escaping from conclusions.

Part Three considers various aspects of the individual and collective lives of Frenchmen with an emphasis on anxiety. Particular causes of anxiety are identified to include hierarchy, religion, technocracy, gerontocracy and hypocrisy. This makes for an interesting study of the French version of Everyman, but distorts more than it clarifies. Why discuss the Vichy regime under gerontocracy? Because Pétain was 84? What about Laval, Darlan, Doriot and Déat? To imply that Vichy was a senile dependence on the past would be to ignore the research of Paxton.

The book as a whole is of social and cultural interest, but political forces and leaders are rarely given systematic analysis. There is no mention of Joffre, Weygand, Laroche, François-Poncet, Coulondre, Noël, Bonnet or Flandin. Those readers looking for the mainstream political, diplomatic and military affairs of France between 1848 and 1945 will have to seek elsewhere.

University of Reading NEVILLE WAITES

Les Maîtres Penseurs. By André Glucksmann. *Paris: Grasset. 1977. 324 pp. F 45.00.*

IT is now almost a decade since *les événements* of May 1968 and a new generation of '*philosophes*' has been busy analysing and dissecting the naïveté of their past commitments to the goddesses of Revolution, Progress and Marxism. Their disappointed hopes and frustrations have produced an almost aggressively apolitical mood among the post-1968 generation. They are bored by the barricades, disdainful of the communist classics and

[1] Vol. 1: Ambition, Love and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1975, p. 416.

deeply distrustful of omniscient savants who claim to know the way to universal happiness. Part of their *désillusion* can undoubtedly be attributed to the impact of Russian dissident writers like Solzhenitsyn, Pliouchtch, Amalrik and Bukovsky. The belated discovery of Gulag by the new generation of French intellectuals awoke them with all the power of a delayed explosion from their 'dogmatic slumber' (Bernard-Henry Lévy).

Perhaps the most sophisticated of all the ex-*contestataires* who have re-read their Marx in the cold light of Gulag, has been André Glucksmann. In *Les Maîtres Penseurs*, Glucksmann has switched the focus of his assault to a relentless confrontation with the heavyweights of nineteenth-century German philosophy. This last flowering of Western metaphysics is the mirror through which Glucksmann now reinterprets the evils of European colonialism, of Vietnam, the 'science of Revolution' and the Gulag Archipelago. Order, Authority, the State—the strategy of universal domination—all are ground down and passed through the encyclopaedic logic-machine of the *maîtres penseurs*. In quick-fire succession, Fichte, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche step into the ring to be effortlessly out-manoeuvred and out-finessed by Glucksmann's Socratic irony and Rabelaisian wit.

The indictment is, however, a serious one. Gluckmann's former idols stand nakedly revealed as the accomplices of Moloch-Leviathan—the *maîtrise du maître* sows the intellectual seeds not only of Gulag but of all the great Final Solutions of the twentieth century. The root of totalitarianism lies in the cult of the State and the myth of *le Savoir total* perfected by Hegel and his German disciples. Germany was the experimental laboratory of ideas in which the logic of Europeanisation reached its final consummation. The Wagnerian twilight of the gods has been realised in the twentieth-century nightmare.

It would be tempting to read this parricidal assault on the German ideology as an illuminating case study in the mechanisms of Oedipal revolt. No doubt its harsh indictment of the German philosophy which has dominated postwar French Marxism, partly accounts for its success in the Parisian literary milieu. Yet for all his acrobatic attacks on Hegelian pseudo-science, Glucksmann never really frees himself from the hyper-intellectualism of the *maîtres penseurs*. Swimming in the dizzying circle of his own abstractions, Glucksmann abandons any rational explanation of historical events and dissolves philosophical reason into a new irrationalism. With *Les Maîtres Penseurs* the anarchist revolt of the angry young men of 1968 appears to have come full circle. All that remains of their Utopian socialism is a visceral anti-*étatisme*. In its place stands the spectre of the omnipotent *maître* who embodies the myth of an absolute, universal power. This nebulous concept appears to be little more than a paper tiger constructed by the new philosophers to rationalise their own feelings of impotence and confusion. Reality is reduced to the *discours* of the great nineteenth-century German thinkers and their 'imperialistic' aspiration to dominate the totality of the external world.

But totalitarianism is not Fichte, Hegel, Marx or Nietzsche and the seeds of Gulag or Vietnam are not only in our heads. Nor can the State be reduced to the sum-total of its repressive functions. Glucksmann never really escapes the metaphysical trap of universalising the particular, which

he describes in the *maîtres penseurs.* In the final analysis, his critique for all its ingenuity and insights, turns on itself in a self-revolving circle of disenchantment and ahistorical pessimism.

ROBERT WISTRICH

Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany. By Paul Gordon Lauren. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1976. 294 pp. $11.00.*

THIS is a thoroughly researched and careful study of the emergence of 'modern' foreign ministries in France and Germany between the 1890s and the 1920s, drawing on French and German archives as well as a wide range of other primary and secondary sources. As such it should bear comparison with Zara Steiner's parallel study of *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914.*[1] Unfortunately, however, its structure and approach fall short of such a comparison.

The thesis of the book is that a succession of changes in the domestic and the international environment around the turn of the century transformed the context of diplomacy, giving rise to pressures for administrative change to which the Quai d'Orsay and the Wilhelmstrasse were forced to respond. The central focus is on administrative reform: on the French reforms of 1907, and the guiding influence of Berthelot both in those reforms and in the years thereafter, and on the German reforms of 1919 and the 'dominant' role Schüler played in them. Interwoven with this, sometimes without too much respect for historical order, are threads drawn from parliamentary and public criticisms of foreign ministries and diplomacy during the first two decades of this century, and accounts of other adjustments in administrative capacities and structures during this period.

One has the uneasy feeling in places that a series of developments which stemmed from differing domestic or external factors are being squeezed too deliberately into a preconceived framework. The concept of 'twentieth-century diplomacy' is liberally used but not precisely defined. At times the author appears to attribute undue significance to the beginning of a new century; by contrast, he underplays the shock of the First World War on developments in diplomacy and in administrative practice. Part of the difficulty, one suspects, comes from the transference of concepts about bureaucratic politics and administrative inertia from the extensive literature about American foreign policy in the 1960s to the rather different international, administrative and political context of continental Europe fifty years before. Rather greater attention to contemporary developments within the British Foreign Office, and to parallel reforms and innovations in domestic ministries in Paris and Berlin, would have placed the discussion rather more firmly within a comparative framework, and enabled the reader to assess more critically the novelty of the innovations of both foreign ministries in diplomatic practice and coverage, and the degree to which they 'demonstrated an ability to respond creatively to the rigorous demands of twentieth-century diplomacy' (p. 208).

Nevertheless the interested reader will find in this book some fascinating

[1] Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1971, p. 108.

information, and some salutary reminders of the antiquity of 'modern' diplomacy and the circularity of administrative reform. The Quai d'Orsay reforms of 1907 were intended, we are told, to integrate previously separated political and economic responsibilities into a geographically-based structure, as—following them—were the German reforms of 1919: a pattern reversed after the Second World War by the greater emphasis placed upon functional divisions, which has in turn been criticised by a committee set up to propose measures for restructuring the Quai d'Orsay, which has recommended greater 'géographisation'. The reader can only regret that such insights are not drawn out more fully and meticulously, since it is evident from the wealth of material on which the author draws that he had the information at his disposal to provide us with a more thorough historical analysis.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945–1976. By Geoffrey Pridham. *London: Croom Helm. 1977. 371 pp. £9·95.*

IT is surprising how little we know about West German political parties. This remains true of the Social Democrats and Free Democrats, but now, with Geoffrey Pridham's book, the student of German politics, and indeed of political parties in general, is at last provided with a very reliable work (in English) on the Christian Democrat CDU/CSU.

The first part of the book looks at the historical development of the CDU/CSU since the Second World War. Born as a part of government, it had problems of accommodating to an opposition role after 1969. The party had always been concerned to provide electoral majorities for government and to emphasise the personal authority of its leadership. Under the stimulus of maintaining a majority for Adenauer, it developed as a *Volkspartei* mobilising centre-right forces which had been traditionally divided. Herein lay its great contribution to postwar political development. Its heterogeneity encouraged a pragmatic outlook in its leadership and as Biedenkopf noted, when General Secretary of the CDU, an unwillingness to think in programmatic terms. However, once in opposition its problems of reconciling internal difficulties over policy and of overcoming vested interests in the party machinery became more apparent. The party's central problem was achieving self-reliance, and this was in turn dependant on its ability to reorganise into a professional party machine (as the CSU had done from the mid-1950s in Bavaria) and to resolve its leadership problem (in the context of a qualitative change in the CDU's relationship to the CSU).

Pridham traces, in considerable depth, the changes in the CDU/CSU, beginning with the period of Adenauer's ascendancy, the decline of Adenauer and the question of party reform, the period of transition under Erhard and Kiesinger, and the problem of adjustment after 1969. The second part of the book is a rich source of information on party organisation, membership, the ancillary organisations and electoral campaigns of the CDU/CSU; it can be used with profit by German specialists as well as by those with a comparative interest in political parties. There is also a useful chapter on the CSU and its relation to the CDU.

This reviewer's reservations are not intended to detract from the overall

value of the book. It would, however, have been useful to know more from such a 'depth' study about the regional organisation of the party and about such notable figures at the state level as Altmeier and Filbinger; in its emphasis on the 'internal' aspects of the CDU/CSU, the study does at times lose sight of the wider party and political system in which the CDU/CSU operates (for example, much more information is needed on the Bundesrat, especially the CDU/CSU's attitude towards it after 1969). The conclusion, which focuses on the book's central theme—the effect of the government and opposition roles of the CDU/CSU—does beg some questions. It is difficult for the British observer to be persuaded that relations between the major parties in Germany are so 'polarized' and 'antagonistic'. One suspects that more attention might have been given to the creation by the institutional framework (for example, the federal system and the Bundesrat, and the strong committees of the Bundestag), of opportunities for a constructive role in shaping legislation. These opportunities do on occasion inhibit resort to outright opposition just as they militate against 'unilateral' government.

University of Liverpool KENNETH DYSON

The Diplomacy of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: A New Era in East-West Politics. By Honoré M. Catudal Jr. *Berlin: Berlin Verlag. 1978. 335 pp. Pb: DM 30.00. $14.95.*

THIS is a useful account of the four-power negotiations on Berlin leading to the four-power agreement of September 1971, the complementary East German-West German and East German-West Berlin negotiations, and the final drama of ratification of the West German agreements with the Soviet Union and Poland in the Bonn Parliament in 1972. It is lively and lucid. There are several appendices, one setting out a detailed comparison of the Western and Soviet draft agreements presented in February and March 1971, another giving the text of related diplomatic documents (in so far as these are public). There is also an interesting foreword by the American ambassador, Kenneth Rush, who played a major part in the four-power negotiationss in Berlin.

The ambassador, who has clearly done all he could to help Mr. Catudal, lays his finger on one of the serious difficulties of writing a detailed historical account of a complex international negotiation within a few years of the event. 'Most of the official record', Mr. Rush writes, '. . . particularly of my private talks with [Soviet] ambassadors Abrasimov and Falin and other Soviet representatives, remains highly classified and has not been accessible to him [the author]. In turn, we who know all or part of the record have of course been restricted in what we could disclose to him.' The ambassador adds that his strong recommendation of the book should not be interpreted as blanket endorsement of all the facts or all the interpretations (p. 21).

Mr. Catudal acknowledges at the start the handicap of not having access to all the documents, but feels he has overcome it by showing the first draft of his book to key participants (mainly, it would seem, American and West German, certainly not Soviet) and getting their comments. This kind of 'oral history', as he calls it, is valuable but is not, as he also

admits, without pitfalls. His interpretations of causes and effects therefore have to be taken with a certain caution.

It is, for instance, tantalising when he quotes 'a well informed inside source' for the rather surprising statement that Dr. Kissinger was opposed to the four-power talks 'from the very beginning' (p. 96). But he does not state the motive for Dr. Kissinger's reported opposition. He then quotes Mr. Rush himself for the statement that 'the bureaucracy' (which clearly means the State Department) had a 'negative attitude' and that he therefore kept his private talks with Ambassador Abrasimov 'confidential', in order to stop 'the bureaucracy' trying to sabotage them. Mr. Rush is also quoted as saying that President Nixon, on the other hand, gave him full support, and told him to keep in touch through Dr. Kissinger and to by-pass 'the bureaucracy' (p. 103). Later, writing of the final marathon sessions of the four ambassadors, Mr. Catudal quotes 'one insider' as saying that 'Rush wanted to prevent the bureaucracy from interfering. Up to then it had been trying to control every move he made.' Mr. Rush therefore, according to 'the insider', wanted to complete the negotiations 'before the bureaucracy could react'; in consequence, when agreement was actually reached, 'the State Department was in an immediate uproar. Bill Rogers [US Secretary of State] was upset'; Rush had to hurry back to the United States, saw Nixon at San Clemente, and Nixon 'quickly approved the agreement, and so that was that' (p. 190).

This glimpse of the inner workings of American diplomacy is interesting but may perhaps be a rather partial and one-sided view. On the other hand, when it comes to reporting friction between the United States government and Chancellor Willy Brandt, Mr. Catudal in one case has to rely on the *Washington Post* (pp. 139–40), and in another gives no source at all (p. 152).

In spite of these minor difficulties this account of the complex negotiations and their inter-relationship with Nixon's wooing of Moscow and Peking is interesting and on the whole inspires confidence, even if rather heavy weighting is given (probably correctly) to the American role. In setting the negotiations in a deeper historical perspective the author makes the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961—or at the very earliest, the start of Kennedy's presidency—his point of departure. It might have been illuminating if he had gone back to the earlier four-power negotiations on Berlin in 1959–60 and compared the kind of agreement which then seemed possible (at least to the British) with the agreement actually reached in 1971.

ELISABETH BARKER

The Emergence of Political Catholicism in Italy: Partito Popolare 1919–1926. By John N. Molony. *London: Croom Helm; Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. 1977. 225 pp. £7·95.*

THIS book tells the story of the Partito Popolare, founded in January 1919 by the Sicilian priest, Don Luigi Sturzo. The party secured a phenomenal success—100 seats—in the elections of November 1919, held only a few days after the Vatican had lifted the *non expedit*, thus after almost fifty years officially acknowledging the right of Catholic citizens to play a role in Italy's political life. The new party held the balance in Parliament for

the next few years. But after the murder of Matteotti in 1924 it lost its leader, Don Sturzo, who had to go into exile; two years later it was suppressed together with the other anti-Fascist parties. By then its political secretary was Alcide De Gasperi, who was to become the leader of its postwar successor, the Christian Democrat party.

When the author met him in Rome in 1952, the 81-year-old Sturzo, then returned from exile and about to become a Senator in the Italian Parliament, was quick to say that he had not founded a Catholic party—'it was a party of Christian inspiration with no direct ties with the Church', he said. As long ago as 1908 Sturzo had formulated the ideas for such a party in a speech at Caltagirone which was to become the 'magna carta of both the Partito Popolare and the Christian Democrat party' (p. 32). There is a familiar ring about the Partito Popolare's internal divisions: the party was inhibited by its right-wing adherents from forming any parliamentary alliance with the Socialists, while its anti-Fascist stance alienated some powerful right-wing support and, eventually, the approval—which had always been tentative—of the Vatican.

John Molony, who is Professor of History at the Australian National University, tells in detail the tortuous story of the Partito Popolare's difficult relations with the Vatican and its secular arm, Catholic Action. His book, the fruit of a study leave in Rome in 1974, brings together material from his researches into the archives of the Istituto Sturzo as well as into the extensive Italian literature on the subject covered in his bibliography. He also had the advantage of consultations with an eminent survivor of the Partito Popolare period, Giuseppe Spataro. Besides its use for students of that period, the book has a topical interest in highlighting some of the parent party's problems which, in different terms and circumstances, face the Christian Democrat party today.

MURIEL GRINDROD

Rural Catalonia under the Franco Regime: The Fate of Regional Culture since the Spanish Civil War. By Edward C. Hansen. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 182 pp. £8·00.*

RECENT moves to reconstitute Catalonia as a partially autonomous political entity, within the Spanish state, gives to this volume a degree of topicality. It is largely based on anthropological field-work, carried out in the 1960s, which was concerned to assess the impact of the Franco regime's political and economic policies upon the distinctive culture and institutions of rural Catalonia. The study, however, sheds some light on long-term trends whose significance may extend well beyond the demise of Spain's now defunct dictatorship.

The book focuses principally on three Catalan institutions which have traditionally formed an integral part of the region's special economic and cultural arrangements. The institutions in question are the characteristic Catalan share-cropping system, the region's pattern of property inheritance, and the vigorous voluntary associations long associated with Catalonia's rich civic life. Professor Hansen's main thesis is that political repression and state-sponsored economic 'modernisation' have led to an enfeebling of these institutions and a corresponding erosion of the distinctive Catalan identity. In particular, it is argued that the Catalan bourgeoisie, which spearheaded the region's economic development and

regional political movements, has become dependent on a much more significant state machine and lost much of its autonomous bargaining power. Equally, it is maintained that economic changes, the growth of tourism and the advent of a mass consumer society are profoundly modifying Catalan social structures, values and expectations.

The case is persuasively argued on the basis of a substantial amount of field-work. It makes an interesting and useful counterpart to Davydd J. Greenwood's study of Basque culture.[1] It seems legitimate to ask, however, if the Catalan regional identity has not proved to be much more resilient, in face of political and economic changes, than the author is willing to concede. For example, he may not have given sufficient weight to the role of Catholic organisations in sustaining the regional movement during the Franco era. Above all, he neglects the vitally important role played by the local language in sustaining the Catalan cause. This is a serious omission, for the vitality of the local language and culture does much to explain the persistence of nationalist sentiment and of demands for regional autonomy. The recent voicing of such demands is clearly at odds with some of the conclusions presented in this book. Nevertheless the study performs a useful task in pointing to substantial and little-known changes in Catalan society which might yet have significant long-term political consequences.

University of Manchester K. N. MEDHURST

Greece and the British Connection 1935–1941. By John S. Koliopoulos. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1978. 315 pp. £10·00.*

Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective. Edited by Theodore A. Couloumbis, John A. Petropulos and Harry J. Psomiades. *New York: Pella. 1976. 171 pp. $6.00. Pb: $4.00.*

DR. KOLIOPOULOS's scholarly study covers Anglo-Greek relations from the restoration of the monarchy and return of King George II to Athens in 1935 to the fall of Greece in the spring of 1941. The intrigues characterising internal Greek politics during the Metaxas dictatorship which spanned most of this period were to be found also on the international level, as alignments were drawn and strengths tested for the coming conflict. It is apparent that the British Foreign Office's Mediterranean policy, after the Abyssinian crisis, was principally concerned with containing Mussolini and that it pragmatically supported Metaxas in the belief that this ensured a friendly, if not effective, ally. It is also evident that many influential British politicians and diplomats believed that what was best for Greece was an omnipotent, pro-British, story-book-type king. This sentimental approach lasted until the bitter end, as is shown by one of the last cables to be sent home by the British Minister in Athens as the German army advanced: ' President of the Council has just committed suicide after telling the King that he had failed him in the task entrusted to him ' (p. 281).

It was an interesting period and the populism of Metaxas, combined with his passive acceptance by the electorate, evokes memories of the recent regime of the Colonels. One is struck by the extent of prewar British economic penetration, with the Cable and Wireless Company controlling

[1] *Unrewarding Wealth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1976).

external and internal communications (thus permitting the Foreign Office 'to intercept a large number of foreign Government messages', p. 66), the Electric Transport Company controlling the supply of electricity and electrically-powered transport and with British insurance companies heavily involved. What is perhaps most striking is the concentration of power. Dr. Koliopoulos comments that Anglo-Greek relations 'were conducted by a limited and close network of men on a more or less personal basis' (p. 294), and over 69 per cent. of the index entries are personal names. That there were a number of factors other than the opinions of the King and his coterie to which Greek and British diplomats should have turned their attention is attested by the tragic subsequent civil war. It is perhaps a characteristic of official papers and private memoirs, on which the author has relied heavily, that they serve as much as a chronicle of the blindness of those in command as of the events of history.

The study by Professors Couloumbis, Petropulos and Psomiades on foreign interference in Greece views this prewar period as one of insignificant foreign intervention compared with 'earlier history and with the post-World War II era' (p. 96). The authors feel so strongly about postwar American penetration of the fabric of Greek society as well as of Greek political life that the reader is left with no choice but to agree or disagree with their thesis as a whole. Their discussion of the nineteenth century is less polemical and the chapter on indebtedness, bankruptcy and international control gives some very interesting material on Greek foreign debt up to the First World War. This information, when combined with Dr. Koliopoulos's description of the struggles of the Council of Foreign Bondholders to recover their money in the late 1930s, provides considerable insight into the causes and effects of defaulting debtors among developing countries today.

Chatham House JUDITH GURNEY

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory. By Jerry F. Hough. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1978. 275 pp. (Russian Research Center Studies 77.) £11·55.*

How exciting it is to review a book that is so clearly a milestone in Soviet studies. Professor Hough seeks to show how we in the West can best understand the Soviet Union and learn from it to enrich ourselves. More specifically, Part I examines the Soviet political system through conventional Western notions of what a political system is; Part II indicates contributions that Soviet experience can make to social science theory. Where the book is innovative is in its critical rethinking of many fundamental assumptions about the Soviet Union in contemporary Soviet studies and Western official thought. In the author's opinion, both 'comparativists' and 'area specialists' concerned with communist studies have mostly confined themselves to a ghetto within the social sciences. What is more, they 'generally have used the Soviet system for little more than a foil against which to highlight the virtues of Western political systems or non-Communist models of development' (p. 1). He censures the totalitarian and various 'command society' schools for positing a model essentially

of a passive society dominated by an elite determined to maximise its own power and transform society on the basis of its own ideological perceptions. This has led to the asking of misleading questions and concentration on secondary subjects; students have been encouraged to 'explore mobilisation rather than participation, what is censored rather than what can be said, the regime's policy rather than the policies pushed by societal forces' (p. 14). That is certainly true. If anyone doubts the sterility of such approaches, he has only to ask most educated Westerners what Soviet authors other than dissidents they have read and what insights their reading has given them into the dynamics of Soviet development.

Professor Hough's view is that Soviet society may best be understood through the model of 'institutional pluralism'; he asserts that Soviet society is not inert and passive but participatory in almost all senses of the term' (p. 5). That may be heretical enough to many Sovietologists, but he maintains further that popular participation and institutional pluralism to some extent stem from the ideology itself. We should therefore see the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War and success in carrying through collectivisation of agriculture as resting on forces in society which gave significant popular support to Soviet policies. So think again, you Sovietologists, and sense 'the reality of great participation rather than the myth of an apolitical Soviet population, a sense of the richness of Soviet within-systems politics instead of an abstract frozen system' (p. xi). The Communist leadership, after all, is the representative of industrialising, modernising forces in society rather than a self-appointed usurping elite.

If all that were not iconoclastic enough, Professor Hough then proceeds to examine areas in which Western social science can benefit from Soviet experience. Hence the book's title. In his own words: 'The political theory relating to the industrial world has primarily been the theory of American area studies and to a lesser extent of Western area studies. If the experience of one third of the world is integrated into it, many changes will be required, and those who are studying the Soviet Union should not shy away from the responsibility and the excitement of tackling this task' (p. 15). The implications which stem from that are far-reaching indeed: students who learn a strange language and culture would actually be expected to apply their knowledge through mastering communist social science literature; social scientists would have to test their theories against the experience of the entire communist world and face up to phenomena that challenge many of their fundamental ideological and empirical assumptions about the sources and exercise of power. Professor Hough is not going to be popular among those who prefer the cosy consensus of their own ghetto, who prefer theories and models that reinforce their own prejudices.

It has to be said that some of the material in this book is neither new nor original. Five of the eleven chapters have appeared in print elsewhere; and some of the author's views have long been popular, albeit with a minority group, outside the United States—earlier in the work of Deutscher and Schlesinger and latterly in that of Lane and Churchward, all of whom have stressed the participatory nature of Soviet politics and the contributions that Soviet social science could make to social science generally, especially to our understanding of the development of modernising societies. What is significant about this book is that it is published by a leading American scholar in an erstwhile conservative series. It also comes at a time when Soviet studies are in the doldrums and are seeking a way

ıt of the impasse into which the various party-society relationship schools ıve taken it. So Professor Hough's book is both timely and momentous and ıght to be compulsory reading for social scientists as well as students f Soviet society. Moreover, if politicians ever take note of the work of ıen of progressive ideas and if competition with the Soviet Union really the fulcrum of Western foreign policy, the book could well make a ɔsitive contribution in helping to shape the world in which we live.

'niversity of Bradford JAMES RIORDAN

'he Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU: Assessment and Context. Edited by Alexander Dallin. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1977. 127 pp. Pb: $5.95.*

r is now two years since the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the Communist 'arty of the Soviet Union was held in March 1976. This book, containing ine essays on the more important aspects of the Congress, will be found) be a useful, reliable reference work to the proceedings. With a few xceptions, all the contributors are professors of political science in ımerican universities. Individual preferences will of course vary, but the ssays I found of most interest were those on 'The Soviet Economy 'efore and After the Twenty-Fifth Congress' by Professor G. Grossman, The Military in Soviet Politics: From the Perspective of the Twenty-Fifth 'arty Congress' by Professor R. Kolkowicz and the analyses of Soviet olicies towards the non-communist world (Paul Marantz) and towards ommunist states and parties (Jan F. Triska).

Professor Grossman's expert analysis reveals that the state of the oviet economy (at the time of writing, 1976) was far from satisfactory. lut in his opinion, in spite of various negative factors, such as the slowing own of overall growth and especially—as anticipated—of consumption, and he present strong emphasis on centralism in planning and management, he industrial basis of Soviet power will continue to grow at a pace that ʻould be creditable for any advanced industrial power. The extent to which he ambitious Ninth Five Year Plan (1971-75) counted on Western conomic assistance in the form of credits, technology and capital-goods mports is also stressed and the economic benefits thus gained from the ioviet post-1970 policy of detente. But, on the Western side, this major rump card has not brought the political rewards that might have been xpected if the hand had been played more skilfully.

Professor Kolkowicz's interpretation of the military's role in Soviet ›olitics, I found penetrating and convincing. The fact that it was subdued ıt the Congress does not, in his view, indicate any reduction in the nilitary's basic institutional and political role. It is firm and may be ncreasing, he believes. The argument on which this conclusion is based is oo technical for summary here but should be read at first hand.

Brezhnev's performance at this Congress gets good marks from several contributors. Paul Marantz finds that he adopted 'a calm, pragmatic and business tone in discussing relations with the noncommunist world' and that the ideological element was reduced to a bare minimum (p. 89). Paul Cocks sees him as 'a man with a vision and the broad outlines of an action plan' (p. 50). Professor Triska suggests that the emphasis in Brezhnev's speech on proletarian internationalism and the large foreign

contingents present at the Congress was in fact a device to conceal his certain worry about the growing differences and disagreements between Moscow and the most important West European Communist parties, which were revealed more clearly than hitherto at this Congress. In spite of the Russians' efforts to mask these disagreements, they were unmistakable, in greater or lesser degree, in the dissidents' speeches. 'The five thousand Soviet delegates had never heard anything like it before' (p. 96).

Students will no doubt welcome the appendix tables giving a breakdown of various aspects of the CPSU Central Committee (1976).

VIOLET CONOLLY

The Technological Level of Soviet Industry. By Ronald Amann, Julian Cooper and R. W. Davies with Hugh Jenkins. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1977. 575 pp. £20·00.*

IT would be a brave reviewer who tried to pass a quick judgment on the detailed competence and accuracy of this book, with its 570 pages, 200 tables and 40 figures. It is written by ten authors and ranges over nine major industrial sectors from electric power transmission to machine tools. Certainly there is nothing at present available to compare with it in breadth. Perhaps the three volumes by Sutton [1] are closest in scope, but they of course have quite a different focus in the transfer of technology from West to East.

The industries covered are iron and steel, machine tools, high voltage electric power transmission, the chemical industry, industrial process control, computer technology, military technology, rocketry and the quality of machine tools and cars. We are told they were selected because they were representative, in that they reflected high priority, successful and unsuccessful industries. Perhaps there was a little more entrepreneurship involved, in that they were also influenced by the specialisms and experience of the researchers.

A detailed case study has been built up for each industry. Although there is variation in the depth to which they are analysed, they follow the same pattern; an introduction to the basic technology of the industry, a review of the current Western data, a search of the Soviet technical literature, discussions with Western industrial specialists and finally exchanges with other Western Soviet specialists. At the same time, the treatment of each industry follows the interests of the individual authors and this lends a pleasant variety to the volume as a whole. For example, where the machine tool and chemical chapters lean towards an economic analysis, the electric power chapter leans towards the technical.

A good introductory chapter serveys the possible approaches to the comparative assessment of technology and its rate of development. This quite rightly stresses the very complex nature of technical progress, although I feel it ignores some of the current Western industry-based findings, such as the work of Langrish and his colleagues. I am not convinced of the validity of the industrial innovation model used by

[1] *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development*: Vol. 1 1917–30 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1968), reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1970, p. 369; Vol. 2 1930–45 (1971), reviewed April 1972, p. 329; Vol. 3 1945–65 (1973), reviewed Oct. 1974, p. 651.

researchers, the traditional one of first, research, second, experimental development to prototype, third, commercial production and finally diffusion. This may be adequate for an industry such as chemicals and perhaps also for some key innovations such as float glass, but is not relevant to the basic innovation which takes place in much of manufacturing industry. There is also an undue stress placed on the importance of research and development as a generator of innovation. Perhaps these assumptions stem from the specific industries which were chosen for study. No major attempt is made to distinguish between the relative importance of the major incremental jumps which contribute to technological advance and the myriad of less dramatic, but perhaps equally important, small improvements which take place. The aim in this study of course is not the measurement of level of technology but its comparison, and in each case the bench mark which is used in the current state of Western technology.

The text gives many insights into the Soviet economic system. For example, the average weight of a Soviet machine tool today is 3,200 kilos, while the average weight of an American machine tool is 1,200 kilos. One is immediately provoked to ask why? Another curiosity is that the Soviet machine tool industry has 2½ times as many machine tools under ten years old as has the United States. The likely explanation is that most enterprises in a planned economy have a closed cycle of production. Because of the great economic premium which attaches to a closed cycle, enterprises will hoard capital equipment rather than place themselves in risk of shortage. Finally, in spite of this surfeit, machine tools are still in short supply. A second curiosity is that, while in the United States in 1960 sales of second-hand machine tools were equivalent to 50 per cent of the industry's output, in the Soviet Union such sales were nil. These facts point to the radical differences which exist in the operation of the economic system and its effect on manufacturing capabilities.

The picture emerges from this study of just how inter-related the different sectors of an industrialised economy are, and of how difficult it is to force the development of any one preferentially. Weaponry, machine tools, and process control are highly dependent on the electronics and computer industries for their progress. The broad conclusion which is drawn is that for the technologies studied there is no evidence of a substantial diminution of the technological gap between the Soviet Union and the West during the past fifteen to twenty years. The authors also admit that their selection of industries, if anything, is likely to be biased in favour of the Soviet Union. Overall, this is a very detailed competent piece of work which will be of great value to government, industry and academics.

University of Glasgow C. C. GALLAGHER

Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union: Six Studies. By Murray Yanowitch. *London: Martin Robertson. 1977. 196 pp. £8·85.*

THE preface to this book states that it has two basic purposes (p. xiv). First it aims to 'present in reasonably systematic form some of the evidence bearing on the unequal position of the principal social groups in the distribution of rewards, opportunities and decision-making power, as

well as the male-female differentials in work and family roles'. Its second concern is with the significant fact that a number of controversies relating to inequality in the Soviet Union have emerged as public issues in the post-Stalin period and Yanowitch wishes to 'examine these controversies for what they reveal about the tensions, grievances and conflicts generated by the deep social divisions which are continually reproduced in the Soviet Union'. These two aims fairly indicate both the content of the book and the author's own critical attitude towards Soviet society.

To achieve his two purposes Yanowitch presents six chapters, each considering one aspect of his topic. The first is called 'Soviet conceptions of social structure' and it illustrates the increased sophistication in recent Soviet writing on social stratification, which now both categorises Soviet society into different strata and attempts to explain related inequalities in comparatively non-simplistic ways. Soviet sociology, however, is still limited in certain directions: economic and cultural differences are discussed whereas directly political ones are ignored.

Four of the remaining five chapters each choose one practical aspect of social inequality and provide information on it from a variety of recent sociological surveys. The aspects chosen are income differentiation (dealing briefly with differences in earnings and living standards among various social groups in both urban and rural areas), social inequality in access to schooling, hierarchy at the workplace with the connected theme of participation in management and, fourthly, sexual stratification. This latter suggests an interesting comparison between power relationships within the family and those in society as a whole. The remaining chapter, 'Some aspects of Soviet mobility', considers such theoretical problems as the concept of social mobility in Soviet Marxism as well as practical questions such as inter-generational mobility and mobility in the countryside.

This book presents much material that is of interest. It must be viewed, however, as a collection of separate essays rather than a fully rounded work on the title theme. Much factual information is brought forward to illustrate the specific aspects of the topic chosen but discussion of it is fairly brief. The absence of any concluding chapter seems to demonstrate the author's relative lack of concern for detailed analysis of the data presented. Despite these limitations, the student of Soviet society will certainly welcome this book. Much of the material has not been made available in English before and it is presented in a systematic and readable way.

FELICITY O'DELL

Manipulating Soviet Population Resources. By Jeff Chinn. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 163 pp. £10·00.*

ALTHOUGH Western scholars have studied the changes and developments in Soviet population statistics for many years, it is only comparatively recently that they have started to produce scholarly work relating such developments to underlying socio-economic and political factors. As a result of a growing volume of Soviet literature on the subject and of an official concern over the causes and consequences of a national labour shortage, the necessary information is now becoming available. The

present work is a welcome addition to the Western literature. As the title suggests, it concentrates in particular on Soviet population policy and has special reference to the urban demographic situation and to the role of women in that situation. Professor Chinn rightly points out that a demographic approach to social study will inevitably lead to a wide-ranging insight into many aspects of society, since demography interacts with so many other economic and social variables. A perusal of the pages of this book will thus throw light on many aspects of Soviet urban life, including demographic structures, the role of women, education, income, housing services, abortion and divorce, all of which affect or interact with demographic behaviour.

In terms of population policy, the author is particularly concerned with two facets: policies directed towards the spatial redistribution of the population and especially to controlling the sizes of the largest cities, and policies directed towards raising the birth rate, particularly in cities, to counteract a serious and worsening labour shortage. On the first set of policies, the author is fairly optimistic, believing that Soviet policies have been fairly successful in controlling the biggest cities and in directing development elsewhere, although many cities continue to grow as their service and ancillary spheres expand. This writer, however, does not share the author's optimism, considering that urbanisation is not as easily controlled in an industrial economy as he appears to suggest but simply takes on new forms. After all, the largest cities in the West are also growing very slowly if at all, and this is not the result of the draconian measures adopted in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, spatial inequalities persist and prosper.

On the second set of policies it is, however, difficult not to agree with the author's position—that efforts to raise the urban birth rate by improving living conditions and related measures are likely to be counterproductive since the process of modernisation itself induces small families. Soviet policy makers would probably find it more profitable to tackle the labour shortage by concentrating on industrial and agricultural efficiency. In conclusion, Professor Chinn has provided us with a useful and wide-ranging survey of a major segment of Soviet demography. What we need now are more detailed studies within the broad panorama he paints.

University of Birmingham DENIS J. B. SHAW

International Trade under Communism: Politics and Economics. By Franklyn D. Holzman. *London: Macmillan; New York: Basic Books. 1976. 239 pp. £10·00.*

Comecon and the Politics of Integration. By Henry Wilcox Schaefer. *New York: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 200 pp. £6·25.*

Direct Western Investment in East Europe. By Iancu Spigler. *Oxford: Holdan Books for the Centre for Soviet and East European Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford. 1975. 346 pp. (Papers in East European Economics 48.) Pb: £6·00.*

THE economist shares interest in two of the books under review with the political scientist; he shares Spigler's monograph with the businessman. Their common topic is the monopolisation by government agencies in

Comecon member states of foreign trade and of foreign capital flows. Within a capitalist system issues of detail in commercial relationships between state-trading entities and of investment by one transnationally in another would not reach the political climaxes that Schaefer's work describes. If bank lending and capital markets had always regulated foreign investment in eastern Europe, Spigler would not have investigated the new openings for both brought by Hungarian and Romanian legislation. 'The interesting question' for Holzman 'is how those who manipulate the controls actually determine what and how much is to be exported and imported in a situation of disequilibrium prices and exchange rates' (p. 33): if prices and the exchanges were determined by supply and demand, political analysis would be superfluous. All three books concentrate on the European members of Comecon: they are Schaefer's sole topic; Holzman touches on the Asian socialist states but Albania and Cuba claim brief attention only as clients for aid; and Spigler puts the investment legislation of the 1970s into the perspective of East-West trade and lending since Versailles.

Holzman conforms to his general series title, 'The Political Economy of International Relations' (under the editorship of Benjamin J. Cohen) and Schaefer to his explicit theme by considering the effects on commercial intercourse of all-pervasive political controls. Because they take for granted the domestic economic goals posited by the political leadership, they concentrate on the international clash of those goals when translated into economic objectives—both 'intrabloc' and 'East-West' in the two main divisions of Holzman's book and in members' groupings and regroupings for and against integration in Schaefer's. Both books lack, however, a reasoned exposé of the potential complementarity of the Comecon states; the reader concerned with outcomes in international relations would have welcomed an analysis which either avowed that integration was being imposed on a group of disparate economies for political purposes, or assessed the complementarities that swept economics on a favourable political tide. Many relevant considerations are cited throughout each book: Holzman shows resistance to integration among Comecon members in 'the unwillingness of these nations to allow existing enterprises, industries, and sectors to be outcompeted and scrapped' (p. 62) and its obverse, anxiety to trade with the West because of their technical backwardness as a group, or 'because of the trade difficulties created by non-scarcity prices, non-market mechanisms and non-functioning exchange rates' (p. 16). Rivalry over complementarity under Comecon integration finds its due place at the peak of the dispute of 1962–64 between Romania and the rest, though Holzman diminishes the strictly economic considerations by asserting a political criterion, 'the major integration issue was supranationality versus national sovereignty' (p. 99). Since the gains from integration were to be derived by supranational resource allocation, the prime mover in the conflict ought to have been the economic prognosis. Schaefer takes up his narrative from the abandonment of the Soviet supranationality proposals but has his own 'chicken and egg' problem, since the political safeguards of 'interestedness' and 'unanimity', written into Comecon's Charter, 'proved a continuing barrier to the development of closer economic ties' (p. 4).

For both authors, the pressures for domestic economic reform are intimately related to the mode of intra-Comecon relations. Recounting one

particular stage in the inter-member discussions (of 1970), Schaefer writes how a 'leading Hungarian authority, Bela Csikos-Nagy, reiterated the broad Hungarian position, arguing that the need for financial, particularly price, reform was closely linked to the principle of mutual advantage . . . and . . . reasserted the need for relying heavily on world market prices and for a preferential tariff system for Comecon' (p. 115). Holzman offers the general overview, while Schaefer provides the detailed expositions that constituted the negotiating stances of the seven Comecon members. If there is a criticism of the blow-by-blow account in the political circumstances created by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it is that Schaefer accords equal weight to Western journalists' reports (for example United Press International from Vienna, p. 58) as to pondered articles published by East European ministers in the Central Committee organ. Reference must be made to Axel Lebahn's *Sozialistische Wirtschaftsintegration und Ost-West-Handel im sowjetischen internationalen Recht* (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1976, pp. 351–399) for the definitive analysis and documentation of intra-Comecon legal relations.

Spigler is also a source-book, for his interpretation of the Romanian concession of 1971 to admit Western equity capital is replete with legislative and commercial documentation. By the time he wrote, five firms with 49 per cent foreign participation had already been established and, having himself recent experience in a large British firm with important Romanian orders, he was able to look with the eye of the businessman as much as of the economist. Somewhat less direct experience was available from Hungary (Poland legislated still more recently), but he has brought together under relevant heads (planning, management, trade, pricing, labour and wages, capital budgeting, finance and taxation) the chief provisions of the new regulations for both countries. He concludes that 'a close study of the Hungarian and Romanian legislation on foreign investment shows that the Eastern side would acquire such a position in a corporation which could give it more rights and perhaps less obligations than the Western investor would have' (p. 89). The book is as much an informed warning as a guide to new commercial opportunities. Both he and Holzman perceive the problems of continued loan finance for West-East technology transfer: after observing that 'there is a limit to how much technology the USSR can afford to import from the West, even with fairly liberal credit', Holzman adds his conclusion 'that if the Soviet growth rate continues to decline, and no solution other than a radical reform appears feasible to correct matters, then the Soviet leaders may opt for such a reform' (p. 207). With a 1977 national income growth of only 3½ per cent, that reform might be on the cards.

St. Antony's College, Oxford MICHAEL KASER

Communist Power in Europe 1944–1949. Edited by Martin McCauley. *London: Macmillan for the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London. 1977. 242 pp. £10·00.*

THIS is a collection of essays from a symposium organised by the School of Slavonic Studies in London. As usual with symposia, this is not a systematic look at Europe and communism between 1944–49, but it does

cover quite a lot; in fact it appears to be the only academic, as opposed to journalistic or memoir, introduction to the cold war. However, Dr. Radice's essay does not fit into this formula unless we extend it to include the economic development in German-occupied Eastern Europe during 1940–45. But the rest fits in well: David Kirby's analysis of the Soviet takeover in the Baltic states in 1940 is with hindsight a pre-history of the cold war. Takeovers were subsequently attempted in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, and succeeded; while in Finland, France, Italy and Greece they failed. In his contribution on Poland Norman Davies argues that there the takeover occurred in 1945, when the Red Army drove out the Germans. If this was so, it certainly seems an incredible way of testing Polish sovereignty and independence to hold an election in such conditions. Even then the Polish election in 1947 appeared to at least one British politician like a typical election in Georgia, USA, and therefore not worthy of an international protest.

In Czechoslovakia all was supposed to be different: Beria guaranteed internal freedom and non-interference to Fierlinger; and Stalin to Beneš. Even Gottwald believed in a 'Czechoslovak way to socialism' until 1948. Vladimir Kusin does not define this Czechoslovak way as politically pluralist and economically 'nationalised', but he obviously means that it attracted wide popular support. In any case, it ceased to matter once the Communists were in power and Europe plunged into a cold war. George Schöpflin shows that in Hungary communist power rested on the Red Army's presence and nothing could upset this power once the cold war had started. Bela Vago demonstrates that in Romania the Communists could be kept in check while the grand alliance lasted, though even then Soviet intervention invariably favoured them after Romania's *volte face* in 1944; but nothing could stop them after the wartime alliance fell apart.

Martin McCauley, the editor, deals with the German Democratic Republic and shows that there the Red Army handed over power to hand-picked Communists who were not quite sure how they should wield it. However, the cold war once again resolved their doubts and confusion. In Finland A. Upton finds that Stalin was able to exert his influence directly without the intermediary of the Communist party, and Finland has been able to maintain its precarious independence ever since. Both in France and Italy the Communist parties staked their claims to power irrespective of Stalin's wishes and designs, and were subsequently ejected from power by their coalition partners. In Greece, Richard Clogg asserts that the Communists only just missed their chance in 1944 and afterwards had no hope of seizing power by force. Elisabeth Barker discusses Britain's relations with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary in 1944–46, basing herself entirely on the now available Foreign Office documents. Professor Seton-Watson winds up the book by putting all these disparate papers into a historical perspective. Although it is a pity that many other European countries were left out, the book is an excellent example of academic research on communism in Europe and the beginnings of the cold war in that area of the world.

University of Manchester JOHN BRADLEY

The Albanians: Europe's Forgotten Survivors. By Anton Logoreci. *Londo Gollancz. 1977. 230 pp. £8·50.*

THIS valuable account of the Albanians, concentrating largely on mode Albania, contains many little-known facts which help to explain why Env Hoxha has managed to remain in power since the end of the Secor World War. During the Italian occupation Hoxha was able, with Titc help, to organise an Albanian (Communist) Party of Labour and a stroi guerrilla force. The people's republic of Albania which emerged aft the war had therefore to be on friendly terms with communist Yugoslavi but Hoxha successfully opposed Tito's plan to include Albania in feder Yugoslavia. After Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 19 Albania became a Soviet satellite and had to agree to the building of Soviet submarine base on the island of Sazan (Saseno). In 1951 an Angl American project to overthrow Hoxha failed because Kim Philby betray the planned rebellion to Moscow (pp. 107–109).

Mr. Logoreci describes the growth of mutual distrust between Khrus chev and Hoxha after the Russian leader's visit to Belgrade in May 195 Khrushchev tried to reassure Hoxha and dissuade him from an allian with China by writing off the credits of $105 million which Albania h received from the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1957 and by promisir food supplies as well as more technical aid. But he returned from a twelv day visit to Albania in May 1959 convinced that Hoxha could not t trusted. Khrushchev gave an interview to the leader of the Greek Liber Party, Sophocles Venizelos, in which he promised to take up with Hoxt the question of granting cultural autonomy to the Greek minority southern Albania. The interview, according to Mr. Logoreci, 'was clear meant to infuriate the Albanian leaders'. Hoxha contained his anger f the time being, but in November 1960 he denounced Khrushchev at tl Moscow meeting of Communist parties and in the following year he brol off diplomatic relations with Russia and began a period of alliance ar close economic collaboration with China. In 1971, he followed China example and resumed diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.

Although highly critical of Hoxha's totalitarian system, Mr. Logore recognises that under his regime the country has made important advanc in industry, education, social welfare and public health. He concludes th the 'icy indifference of the rest of the world' towards Albania is tl 'great tragedy' of its people.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The Middle Eastern Economy: Studies in Economics and Economic Histor Edited by Elie Kedourie. *London: Cass. 1977. 185 pp. £8·50.*

THIS book contains a collection of papers on a wide variety of topics whic range from Turkey to Iran, migrant workers in 1972 to the formation the Bank Misr in 1920 and from demography to economic history. It not, as the title states, about the Middle Eastern economy. Three pape deal with Egypt, one with Soviet Central Asia, one with Iran and two wit Turkey.

Justin McCarthy's lengthy consideration of demographic developme in Egypt in the nineteenth century is painstaking and thorough. He dea with the social and political environment and concludes that the mo rapid population growth rate after Muhammed Ali's rule was largely consequence of a more stable social environment rather than improvemen in medical facilities. Analysts of this topic would do well to consult th paper, if only to learn from McCarthy's treatment of the sources.

Reading the paper that follows on the background to the establishme of the Bank Misr, the Egyptian Federation of Industries and the Egypti General Agricultural Syndicate, one is impressed by the business acum of middle-class Egyptians in the 1920s. Egypt's bankrupt economy of tod is hardly reconcilable with the determined efforts to achieve financial ar economic development made by entrepreneurs such as Tal'at Harb, Yus Nahas, Levi, and 'Ali Manzalawi in the 1920s.

Francis Newton presents a summary of available data on econom development in Soviet Central Asia. The quality of the sources the auth works from are inevitably very limited, even though in quantitative tern they are, he reports, voluminous. The story is reasonably predictabl The area under discussion is on the periphery of the Soviet Union ar contains valuable mineral and agricultural resources. But the inhabitan are relatively few and of an independent mind. Colonisation produc both an improved standard of living and sporadic outbursts of disconter All is not well on the economic front, however, as unemployment h grown and drought has affected the farmers. One interesting point is th Uzbekistan possesses natural gas, at present piped to Western Russi and gold, mined in unspecified quantities. Are the inhabitants, the auth speculates, tempted to feel their mineral resources have achieved less f them than if their republic were an independent state?

For the students of rapid economic development, the Iranian econom is at once fascinating and frustrating. One suspects that Iran and Sau Arabia are experiencing a scale and pace of economic development u precedented in modern times, and yet the sparseness of data at tim reduces analysis almost to the banal.

The authors of the article, 'Recent Economic Growth in Iran', I Askari and S. Majin, confine their discussion to the period 1960 to 197 In their eight-page survey of agriculture, industry, employment, revenu expenditure, imports and economic development analysis is superfici Moreover, the reader begins to perceive a certain numbing of the critic faculties as he confronts thirteen tables, many of which are taken fro previous National Plans, the Europa Yearbooks or Central Bank report There does not yet exist a good account of contemporary econom development in Iran, and with so few particular references, this artic is hardly a useful place to begin such a work.

Tansu Ciller's paper on Turkish labour migration has the formidab advantage of being written from 'A Turkish Perspective'. Two maj drawbacks are that it appeared in 1977 with very dated references, ar does not mention several important studies which answer questions tl author raises. She does not use empirical data after 1972, when Turki worker migration was exploding only to terminate shortly afterwar More seriously, in the light of recent research, Tansu Ciller comes dated conclusions on most of the points she raises when evaluating tl benefits of Turkish migration. Somewhat ironically, as it now appears, sl

quotes Wolfgang Baumann of the Federation of German Industries as saying that German industry 'could not exist without migrant workers' —but then, that was in 1973.

University of Durham CLIVE A. SINCLAIR

The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East. By David Hirst. *London: Faber. 1977. 367 pp. £6·50.*

MR. HIRST, who is the Middle East correspondent of *The Guardian*, has written a good and well-documented history of the Arab-Jewish dispute since its start in the 1880s, using Hebrew, Arabic and English or American sources. 'From the very outset, it has been shot through with continuous violence.' He argues that the literature on it, particularly that written for Americans, has been overwhelmingly Zionist in sympathy, and sets out to redress the balance.

There are three parties to the dispute—the Arabs, the Jews and (till 1948 when they withdrew in ignominy and to save their own skins) the British. None is guiltless. Arab violence, beginning in loss of temper and indulgence in mob hysteria, was at first quieted by an aristocracy that put faith in the British sense of justice, but finally abandoned that faith; violence exploded in 1936–38. Jewish violence was at first retaliatory, but gradually, as Jewish numbers increased, became the well-organised terrorism that survives to this day as an army and security police technique. Nor are the British blameless. Incidents cited in 1938, when they conquered the Arabs, and again in 1946–47 when they struggled with the Jews, show that British soldiers were guilty of retaliation just as violent as that perpetrated by the Israelis today.

Mr. Hirst points out the degree to which fortuitous circumstances contributed to Zionist success. Chief of these was the Holocaust, with its heart-rending appeal to foreigners, but another was 'the incompetence and irresponsibility of the Arab leaders, the frivolity and egoism of the privileged classes' (p. 78). Zionism was thereby enabled to give a nod and a wink to feats by extremists, such as the blowing up of the King David Hotel in 1946 (p. 108) or the massacre at Deir Yassin in 1948 (p. 124). (These are two of the few assertions that are not documented.)

The British were never wholly honest or single-minded about the insoluble conundrum into which the Balfour Declaration developed. Both Lloyd George and Balfour admitted that 'national home' was a euphemism for a Jewish state, but after the Second World War even Winston Churchill, himself a Zionist, was obliged to concede in the House of Commons that 'the claims and desires of the Zionists latterly went beyond anything that was agreed upon by the mandatory power' (p. 120).

Inexorable in their determination to own the whole of Palestine as far as the Jordan, the Israelis maintained a technique that was set out in so many words by one of their spokesmen, General Harkabi, during the October War of 1973:

> We must define our position and lay down basic principles for a settlement. Our demands should be moderate and balanced, and appear to be reasonable. But in fact they must involve such conditions as to ensure that the enemy rejects them. Then we should manoeuvre

> and allow him to define his own position, and reject a settlement on the basis of a compromise solution. We should then publish his demands as embodying unreasonable extremism (p. 60; from the Israeli newspaper *Maariv*, November 2, 1973).

The technique is still being practised, with embellishments by Mr. Begin.

ELIZABETH MONROE

Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis. By Galia Golan. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 350 pp. £9·00.*

Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship since the June War. By Alvin Z. Rubinstein. *Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1977. 383 pp. £20·10. Pb: £8·10.*

THESE two books represent the latest, and in many ways the best, contributions to the growing literature on Soviet involvement in the Middle East. Dr. Golan has relied heavily on Soviet, Arabic and Western primary sources for her account of Soviet involvement in the Middle East from Egypt's expulsion of Soviet experts in 1972 to the disengagement agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1974. The book also contains 100 pages of appendices, footnotes and bibliography, reflecting a generosity on the part of the publishers which is rather uncommon these days. Dr. Golan has set out to record and analyse Soviet behaviour in the Middle East during this crucial period, and she has achieved her objective with admirable clarity and insight. Her judgment is almost always restrained and balanced and she avoids drawing conclusions unless fully justified by facts. In particular, Dr. Golan deals sensitively with the dilemma faced by Soviet leaders in trying to reconcile their often conflicting objectives of strengthening detente while promoting their strategic, ideological and economic interests in the Middle East. She concludes that although Soviet interests in the Middle East ultimately necessitated the massive rearming of the Arabs during the October War, nevertheless the Russians' commitment to detente made them want to prevent the outbreak of war, call for an early ceasefire once it had begun, and make every effort to prevent a direct clash between the super-powers during the course of hostilities. Except for the reservations expressed below, this book deserves to become the standard reference book on Soviet behaviour during this period.

Professor Rubinstein's objectives are rather more ambitious than Dr. Golan's. By using Soviet-Egyptian relations between 1967–75 as a case study, he is seeking to test a number of hypotheses about the correlation between the interaction of two states (specifically a great power and a non-aligned Third-World state) and the influence which the great power, as the result of that interaction, is able to exert on the Third-World state. In particular, he is trying to discover the reasons why the Soviet Union's increased level of involvement in Egypt after 1967 did not give it greater influence over Egyptian domestic and external policy. But the study would have been far more interesting if Professor Rubinstein had analysed the correlation between interaction and *inter*dependence. Then, for example, he would have been able to analyse more fully the reasons why the Soviet Union was willing to rearm Egypt in 1973 after having been expelled in 1972.

In examining the two books' treatment of the October War, certain problems of detail emerge. In both, the treatment of the Soviet airlift to the Arabs concludes that on October 10 the Russians began resupplying the Arabs, while Israel had to wait for some days for similar support from the United States. Such an interpretation of course leads to the conclusion that it was the Soviet Union and not the United States which put detente in jeopardy during this period. Yet Dr. Golan concedes that the American press had been carrying reports of an American airlift before the Soviet effort began (p. 93), although she neither confirms nor denies the veracity of these reports. For his part Professor Rubinstein says that 'on October 9, Nixon had permitted El Al to take on several loads of spare parts and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment' (p. 269). Again no explanation is offered for this apparent contradiction. Yet despite these comments, both authors are to be congratulated on producing exceptionally well-researched and well-informed studies.

University of Southampton. KAREN DAWISHA

Politics and the Military in Israel 1967–1977. By Amos Perlmutter. *London: Cass. 1978. 222 pp. £8·50.*

THIS book is a sequel to Professor Perlmutter's earlier volume which dealt with the Israeli army from 1948–1967.[1] In the new work he is primarily concerned with the interaction of three posts and their incumbents, which dominate national security in Israel: the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff.

In terms of civil-military relations in a Western context, Professor Perlmutter's views are optimistic. He concludes the main text of his book as follows: 'In the US and Israel military influence is restricted to the making and implementation of national security policy. In the political-electoral arena its influence, *per se*, is prohibited and nil. The role of the military in supporting the American and Israeli regimes is non-existent' (p. 208). When he considers in an epilogue, the Entebbe operation, he goes on to describe 'as a rare combination in any modern polity' what he terms 'a professionally autonomous but politically dependent military establishment' (p. 212).

On the whole a convincing case is made to justify the view that civil-military relations in Israel are balanced and efficient. The author's insistence on comparisons, especially with the United States, does, however, raise some doubts. It would be better to emphasise the unique qualities of the Israeli case and leave them at that. Professor Perlmutter is inclined to protest too much. In his hands, the bulk of Israeli officers become paragons of social virtue—a technocratic professional elite which is also expert in personal therapy. The claim (p. 193) that they above the rest of the elite have 'demonstrated the greatest dedication to the public interest as well as remarkable personal integrity' has been heard in many countries in justification of a military takeover. The fact that, while senior

[1] *Military and Politics in Israel* (London: Cass, 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1970, p. 177.

military personnel have become prominent in politics, the Israeli army has not acquired a political will of its own, is clearly due to a series of practical safeguards and especially to the fusion of military and civilian interests in the heat of a chronic battle for national survival.

Professor Perlmutter's new book is full of insights, though these are sometimes obscured by his assumption of too great a knowledge on the part of the reader of the factions, military and civilian, in Israeli history. There would, however, be considerable benefits to be gained from a complementary account of the Israeli army seen strictly from the outside.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion. Vol. 2 1929–1939. By Y. Porath. *London: Cass. 1977. 414 pp. £13·50.*

DR. PORATH's second volume [1] takes his painstaking survey of Palestinian resistance to the British mandate down to the White Paper of May 1939. The main themes are the continuing rivalry amongst local notables and traditional leaders, exacerbated by the ruthless ambitions of the Mufti of Jerusalem and leading by 1935 to the formation of the opposing National Defence (Nashashibi) and Palestine Arab (Husseini) parties; the efforts to arouse Arab and Islamic sympathies outside Palestine; unsuccessful attempts to end or limit land sales to Jewish settlers; the two distinct phases of the Palestinian revolt (April–October 1936, and late 1937–1939), and the involvement of Arab states in the discussions that preceded Britain's drastic modification of its policy. The author's extensive researches do not greatly modify these familiar outlines; but he has unearthed a good deal of striking illustrative detail at various levels, from Cabinet minutes to the secret reports made to the Jewish Agency's Arab Bureau (set up after the riots of 1929) by informers who infiltrated the terrorist bands in the years of the revolt.

What emerges from the investigation—and again, this is not new—is that, throughout this period, the British government could only be swayed in its Palestine policies by bringing to bear powerful extra-Palestinian forces. Fear of widespread anti-British repercussions in other Arab countries, not the local impact of the extensive guerrilla terrorism of 1937–39, led Chamberlain's government to foreshadow the ending of Jewish immigration; General Haining, the GOC, was anxious to inflict a decisive military defeat on the rebel bands and, with the availability of reinforcements after the Munich crisis, could probably have done so quite soon. Dr. Porath confirms the conclusions of Michael Cohen and others who have argued that it was above all the prospect of having to deploy military forces simultaneously in Europe and the Far East that made the Cabinet decide on appeasing pan-Arab sentiment on the Palestine issue.

How far the earlier formulation and mobilisation of that sentiment was due to Palestinian efforts remains unclear. The Mufti and his associates had been trying to enlist Arab and Islamic concern all through the decade, but their methods sometimes made for hostility and suspicion rather than

[1] Vol. 1: *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement: 1918–1929* (London: Cass, 1974). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1975, p. 109.

support. The Greater Syrian projects of Nuri el-Sayyid, and reactions to these in Egypt, were probably more influential in bringing about the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Congress on Palestine in Cairo (October 1938), which helped the British to the conclusion that the only solution was to abandon partition and sponsor a Palestinian state two-thirds of whose inhabitants would be Arab. A success story, then, in its way; but a very indecisive one, since wartime developments were to help the Jews to emulate Palestinian tactics with greater success—bringing far weightier external pressures to bear on the Palestine situation, and eventually launching a much more disciplined and united guerrilla movement. Dr. Porath would seem to agree with those, such as Professor Kedourie, who hold that by involving the ambitions and rivalries of the Arab rulers in their problem, the Palestinians merely compounded their misfortunes; but he shows how the tactics of their own leaders (the Mufti's enthusiasm for the Dictators is strikingly illustrated from German consular archives) had not left them with much choice.

Like its predecessor, this volume by an Israeli scholar is remarkably dispassionate in tone; in general it shows a very fair judgment and a good understanding of the fears and resentments that were building up amongst Palestinian Arabs of all classes in the years that followed the 'Black Letter' of 1931 and the greatly increased Jewish immigration after 1933. It leaves some questions unasked—in particular, why were more concerted and energetic efforts not made to influence League of Nations opinion? The English, though often inelegant, is always intelligible, despite a consistent misuse of 'convince' for 'persuade'.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

Iran: An Economic Profile. By Jahangir Amuzegar. *Washington: Middle East Institute. 1977. 280 pp. $12.95.*

Iran: Past, Present and Future. Aspen Institute-Persepolis Symposium. Edited by Jane W. Jacqz. *New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. 1976. 481 pp. Pb.*

Iran at the End of the Century: A Hegelian Forecast. By Robert E. Looney. *Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 155 pp. £9·40.*

THE recent unrest among traditionalist Iranian forces has reminded us that Iranian society is very much more complex than foreign observers usually conceive. Defenders of the Shah's record tend to assume that continued fast economic growth will win the loyalty of all but the most militant Marxists. His radical opponents, while justifiably raising questions about the regime's human rights record, tend to gloss over the fact that traditionalist forces also have their complaints. To the latter's concerns about the social strains inevitably accompanying rapid industrialisation are added unease with the reforms which have been initiated in land ownership, the position of women and the economic rights of workers. It is, however, difficult to find genuinely probing books about Iranian society for the simple reason that authors tend either to be too close or too opposed to the present regime to carry out the empirically-based analysis needed to make sound judgments.

Amuzegar's book is a classic example of the limits of even the very best 'establishment' analysis. He has twice been a member of Iran's Council of Ministers, is Ambassador-at-large, an Executive Director of the IMF and the author of earlier books on Iran. He has produced what is undoubtedly a most comprehensive description of the Iranian economy, having chapters on everything from monetary policy to the distribution of natural resources, from the non-hydrocarbon-based industrial sector to manpower policies. This is in fact an essential source-book for anyone wanting to study or do business with Iran, being extremely comprehensive in its mastery of official and unofficial information, as well as being written logically and clearly. He does, however, state that this is a descriptive, not prescriptive, book and this does cause some disappointment. He sensitively points to bottlenecks in areas such as agriculture and education, but moves on, leaving the reader unclear whether these are inevitable or not. Again, he gives defence expenditure no more than a couple of mentions, when surely this deserves a chapter to itself, given its implications for Iranian economic growth. These caveats aside, this is a good book.

The well-produced volume from the Aspen Institute presents the papers and edited discussions of a conference held in Persepolis in 1975. The papers are almost uniformly by Iranians, ranging from lowly academics to ministers and the Empress Farah herself. As such, the volume is an accessible way of introducing oneself to the work of the Iranian elite—and the standards are generally high. Once again, the papers range widely from agricultural development, income distribution and the country's leadership problems to such topics as Iran's foreign policy, international economic prospects and cultural identity. Some of the papers are stronger than the comparative chapters in Amuzegar's work (I particularly liked Ajami's chapter on the agricultural sector); but what makes this a useful complement to Amuzegar's book are the edited accounts of the discussion periods when the Western participants raised most of the questions which Iranian authors are nervous about putting into print, such as the impact of military expenditures, the adequacy of the country's educational system or the problems created by one-party government. Obviously, the summary of the discussions are too brief, but most of the important questions are raised forcibly, which is at least a healthy step forward.

Looney has written a volume apparently aimed primarily at Iranian planners. He points to limitations in the country's planning procedures, sets up his own model of a surprise-free Iranian transition to the year 2000, argues that growing tensions between the Shah and the Iranian intelligentsia must be bridged and that there is therefore the need for a Hegelian approach to development planning in Iran—that is, the arguing out of antithetical representations of Iran's development problems so that decision makers such as the Shah are better informed about the inconsistent assumptions underlying conventional thinking on such problems. I have not come across such an approach before. One would probably need to be a particularly dedicated Iranian planner, or a specialist in general development planning, to get the most out of this book.

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics. By Arthur Jay Klinghoffer. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1977. 389 pp. $20.15.*

In the Direction of the Persian Gulf: The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. By A. Yodfat and M. Abir. *London: Cass. 1977. 167 pp. £8·95.*

It is one of the ironies of history that the Soviet Union was the leading foreign supporter of King Abdul Aziz as he struggled to create the state which is now known as Saudi Arabia. In 1931, the Russians went as far as to send 100,000 crates of petrol and kerosene (Yodfat and Abir, p. 30). The fact that this initial support was later to turn to hostility, as the Saudi monarchy emerged as the bastion of Arab conservatism, is somehow symbolic of Russia's general policies towards the Middle Eastern oil-producing areas. Oil has been only one of the issues which have concerned Soviet leaders, and their policies, often hesitantly applied, have proved less effective than anyone has had a right to expect. Of course, the signs are that oil has moved sharply up the Soviet list of priorities in recent years, but this should not lead us to believe that, historically, oil has been the prime mover in the Soviet Union's thinking about that ring of countries just over its south-eastern border, which happen to be sitting on a particularly high proportion of the world's oil reserves.

Of the two books under review, Klinghoffer's is clearly the more ambitious. He ranges the world, analysing how oil has fitted into the Soviet Union's relations with countries as diverse as Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba, Japan, Czechoslovakia and—particularly fascinating—Israel, in the early years of its existence. He goes for extreme breadth of coverage, thus risking some superficiality and over-dependence on the inevitable secondary sources. But he skirts all the worst dangers of being so ambitious and is always adequate (often very good) in his description and analysis of an extremely diverse range of relationships.

The result is a successful contribution to that much neglected area, Soviet oil diplomacy, which generally only merits passing references in the standard oil industry histories. I would go further and suggest that, providing one overlooks the occasional grating repetition and the too obvious reliance on judgments by other authors, there is no one studying the history of the oil industry who is not going to learn something new from Klinghoffer's book—be it on the Cominform's use of the oil weapon against Yugoslavia from 1949–54, or Romanian and Soviet contributions to Israeli oil needs in the 1948–56 period. There is an added bonus that on more recent issues—such as the politics of East Siberian oil and gas or Soviet policies towards the Indian Ocean—his judgments are sober and non-alarmist. He sees the selective use of Soviet oil pressures, but suggests the Soviet Union will move cautiously as befits a country which both has to maintain its reputation as a reliable exporter of hydrocarbons and at the same time increasingly rely on growing imports of oil and gas from the Middle Eastern producers.

Yodfat and Abir are more hawkish, starting their book with the report of Molotov's demand in November 1940 that the Germans should accept 'the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf . . . as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union' (p. ix). Unfortunately, their book goes on to convince one of the extreme tentativeness of Russian policy makers, both before and after the Revolution, towards the Middle East, almost up to the present day. Of the

Nasserite era they conclude: 'No clear Soviet policy or conceptions existed for the Middle East—much less for the Persian Gulf' (p. 58), and they show just how unsuccessful the Russians have been in filling the vacuum left by the British withdrawal from the region. Of course, Yodfat and Abir are correct to point to the growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and, after admitting the extreme difficulty of analysing Moscow's intentions, to speculate on what this expansion could mean for Western security. At the same time, they usefully point to the Soviet use of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen as a 'proxy' (now obviously joined by Ethiopia) in Russia's campaign against the pro-Western regimes of the major oil-producing states. What they do not do is prove that there is any coherent Soviet policy of expanding into the oil-producing Middle East, and they strain credulity somewhat by giving credence on their final page to the argument that the Arab oil producers are playing into the hands of the communist world by keeping the price of oil high and thus helping to erode Western power. The overwhelming impression left by the two authors is of Soviet opportunism—and here their book certainly makes its case.

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

Oman and its Renaissance. By Donald Hawley. *London: Stacey International. 1977. 256 pp. £20·00.*

Oman: The Making of a Modern State. By John Townsend. *London: Croom Helm. 1977. (Publ. in USA by St. Martin's Press, New York.) 212 pp. £7·95.*

THE story of Oman over the past decade has all the ingredients of a fairy story. At first, like some beautiful princess, the country seemed as though placed under a spell by its despotic and parsimonious ruler. And then came the handsome young prince who overthrew his wicked old father, slew the red dragon, came into a vast fortune, and awoke the princess from her long sleep. And everyone lived happily ever after . . .

Omanis can hardly be blamed if they see their recent history in some such terms, nor can the present rulers of the country be expected to do other than convey to the world an impression of smooth, irreversible progress. In many ways Oman has been physically, socially and psychologically transformed since Sultan Qaboos deposed his father, Sultan Sa'id, in a palace coup in 1970. The visual impact of these changes is vividly presented in the lavishly produced book written by Britain's first ambassador to Oman, Donald Hawley. The author is not primarily concerned with recent politics; indeed, being a serving diplomat, he has left the final chapter on Oman's 'Renaissance' to be composed by the publisher's staff. Yet, with its wealth of historical, geographical and cultural information, this work conveys an image of Oman and its people which the Omanis themselves will find eminently acceptable.

Unlike Sir Donald Hawley's volume, John Townsend's modestly produced study will probably not be found on the coffee tables of *sayyids*, *walis* and leading officials, but one hopes for their own sake they will read it and reflect upon it. Indeed one might guess that it has been intended for the eye of the Sultan himself, every chapter being prefaced by a quotation from Machiavelli's *The Prince.*

Mr. Townsend has set himself two tasks: to write the political history of Oman both before and after the 1970 coup; and to analyse and discuss the progress achieved, the mistakes made and the problems to be faced. He is well qualified to do this, having served both the old Sultan and the new, and in particular acted as Economic Adviser to the government of Oman during 1972–75.

On the historical side, Mr. Townsend has much of interest to say on the subject of the old regime, the circumstances leading to the 1970 coup (and what part the British played in this) and the makeshift arrangements which followed it and which led to some unfortunate policy decisions. Most new regimes may be expected to get off to a shaky start, but it is the author's conviction that certain weaknesses and faults in the present government of Oman are of a more fundamental character and could well have grave consequences unless rectified. Chief of these is the unwillingness or inability of the Sultan to devolve his powers or to take adequate steps towards setting up a rational, integrated system of government and administration. In consequence, the author maintains, decisions involving vast expenditure have been taken, without proper study and planning, either by the Sultan himself, or by any member of the government able momentarily to gain his ear and signature. Lack of an overall financial policy is a glaring fault, particularly when oil production, on which the country's economy is now almost wholly based, is bound to decline steadily.

So far, continuing affluence has masked the maladministration and extravagance, but failure to plan ahead, and in particular to invest in alternative sources of income could, unless some rich neighbour like Saudi Arabia were to come to the rescue, lead to a growing disappointment of expectations amongst the people. In such circumstances, the author concludes, the result is likely to be growing public unrest, particularly as the Sultan has hitherto shown no apparent desire to establish any useful contacts with his subjects such as consultative councils. This is the more regrettable as such councils, unlike many features of modern government, could readily be accommodated within Arabic tradition.

The author is not unfairly critical, for he acknowledges the considerable achievements of Sultan Qaboos: his success, for example, both in defeating the Aden-backed People's Front for the Liberation of Oman, and in bringing his country out of isolation and away from dependence upon an archaic British connection. But if he has written as a critic it is to present a corrective to that favourable and optimistic picture which many friends of Oman now have, and which Sir Donald Hawley's book—although this may not have been his intention—appears to confirm. Certainly, to get a rounded impression of the country one should read both these excellent books together.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth BRIAN PORTER

A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962. By Alistair Horne. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 604 pp. £8·95.*

ALISTAIR HORNE has followed his trilogy of books on Franco-German

conflict[1] with another study of France at a period of extreme crisis for the state, the Algerian War of 1954–62. He has, perhaps, little new material to contribute to the pile of specialised monographs and partisan literature which has already accumulated, but standing at a distance of fifteen years from the conflict he has achieved a skilful synthesis of many points of view. The title he has chosen indicates his anxiety to avoid commitment by calling it a war of independence or a revolution. He begins with the Sétif incident of 1945 and, after a retrospective look at France's involvement in Algeria, continues the narrative of events until the Evian agreements, and in a brief conclusion discusses the career of Colonel Boumedienne himself.

Into this narrative are woven descriptions of the terrain, of social problems and change, both before and during the war, and the differing attitudes of groups and individuals in the three-sided conflict between Moslem, 'pied-noir' and metropolitan Frenchmen. The vastness and diversity of the land contributed to the length of the struggle. The FLN found it difficult to organise their nationalist movement, while as late as 1957 the French were able to create 'harki' units of 'loyal' Algerians (pp. 254–255).

Many interests were involved in Algeria. The 'pied-noir' community varied from the rich French 'grand colon', like Henri Bourgeaud, 'the archetype of a paternalist seigneur' (p. 57), to the substantial groups of poor Spanish, Italian and Maltese immigrants who set up small shops, or were employed as low-paid workers. 'If there was one common denominator for the "pieds-noirs", they were, in the expression coined by the French army, "méditerranéens-et-demi". It was an important factor in understanding their motives and behaviour from 1954 onwards' (p. 51). Both 'pieds-noirs' and Moslems tended to crowd into the towns, for rapid growth of population from the mid-1930s onwards was, and is, one of Algeria's most intractable problems.

Mr. Horne, with his knowledge of French history, is adept at putting the events in Algeria in the context of uncertain politics, falling governments and postwar financial malaise in France itself. He shows how the best-intentioned politicians, Guy Mollet for example, came back from Algeria unnerved by their reception and by the hopelessness of the problems. He also illustrates how the growth of violence on both sides hardened opinion on both sides. Mr. Horne debates the whole question of torture in the war with fairness (pp. 195–207), and while he finds it difficult to assess the evidence on both sides, he shows what effect torture and rumours of torture had on opinion in France and Algeria.

Much of the book's vividness is due to the introduction into the narrative of brief biographies of the main participants. Least successful, perhaps, are those of the Algerian nationalist leaders, for with their dislike of the cult of personality, they stressed the group rather than the individual, although differences in temperament undoubtedly contributed to the hostility between Ben Bella and his colleagues. Understanding is given even to the commanders of the OAS, the secret anti-Gaullist organisation. Mr. Horne sees the fate of Maurice Challe 'than whom no more

[1] *The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916* (London: Macmillan, 1962); *The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune 1870–1* (1965); and *To Lose a Battle: France 1940* (1969), reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1970, p. 119.

estimable and honourable officer could be found in any army' as one of 'the great human tragedies of the Algerian war' (p. 443). De Gaulle, in spite of able delineation, remains an enigma, and it is still not clear whether he led, or was led by, events.

If Mr. Horne has any personal angle, it is perhaps his regret at the loss of 'the light of hope of a "third force", of moderation and liberalism, that had flickered up occasionally during the war' (p. 518), as he shows in his moving account of the death of Mouloud Feraoun when peace negotiations had begun. This is a marvellously controlled yet exciting book which deserves the respect of specialists as well as the wide general readership it will undoubtedly win.

University of Aberdeen ANN WILLIAMS

AFRICA

Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa: The Role of the Courts in Government. By B. O. Nwabueze. *London: C. Hurst in association with Nwamife Publishers, Enugu and Lagos. 1977. 324 pp. £9·50.*

THIS is a worthy successor to Professor Nwabueze's earlier books in this series, *Constitutionalism in the Emergent States*[1] and *Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa.*[2] It is a work of careful scholarship, clearly and succinctly written and presented in a way that is intelligible to the non-specialist reader; it also includes a wealth of relevant case material. I particularly liked chapter VII: 'The Judiciary in a Revolutionary Situation', in which the author discusses the legal validity of Uganda's 1966 constitution (which replaced the independence constitution of 1962) and compares the situation in Uganda with that which arose in Pakistan in 1958. In the same chapter, he explains how, after the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence, judges of the (Rhodesian) High Court both affirmed that the rebel constitution had become the constitution of the country and upheld the legality of the rebel regime carrying out the execution of persons sentenced to death. He also discusses events in Nigeria after the 1966 coup, the point at issue being whether the handover of power by the civilian governments to the military was a revolution or a change of government under the constitution; the Supreme Court held that the military government was a *constitutional interim government,* with an obligation to preserve and uphold the constitution.

In chapter X on 'Judicial Review and Democratic Government', Professor Nwabueze argues that 'the courts are well placed to distil principle out of society's fundamental presuppositions', thereby providing a touchstone for judging the constitutionality of actions of the legislature and executive; in this way the court 'serves the ends of democratic government'. He also believes that 'policy in its widest sense should be among the factors informing judicial decision' (pp. 233–234). In his chapter on the 'Independence of the Judiciary' (ch. XII), he argues that the

[1] London: C. Hurst in assoc. with Nwamife Publishers, 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1974, p. 103.

[2] London: C. Hurst in assoc. with Nwamife Publishers, 1975. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1976, p. 297.

support of the public as well as the political leadership is necessary to secure the independence of the judiciary. He shows how this support was lacking in Zambia in 1969 when demonstrators stormed the High Court in Lusaka after the quashing of the sentence imposed by a magistrate's court on two Portuguese soldiers. The author concludes his study by giving reasons for what he regards as the inadequate performance of the judiciary in Commonwealth Africa (ch. XV). He maintains that English legal training is less relevant for judges, in handling the problems presented to them, than exposure to the American legal system. He believes that the remedies, which are already being adopted by many of the countries reviewed, lie in establishing a local legal educational system, the indigenisation of the Bar and Bench, and the introduction of a comprehensive legal aid scheme.

A political scientist might take issue with Professor Nwabueze when he points to 'the pronounced tribal character' (p. 280) of Nigeria's post-independence politics, for, as Richard L. Sklar pointed out in 1967, 'there is often a non-traditional wolf under the tribal sheepskin'. However, he will find this book a valuable source of reference for the role of the courts in government.

University of Manchester WILLIAM TORDOFF

Development Paths in Africa and China. Edited by Ukandi G. Damachi, Guy Routh and Abdel-Rahman E. Ali Taha. *London: Macmillan for the International Institute for Labour Studies. 1976. 251 pp. £10·00.*

THIS lavishly bound book, published for the International Institute for Labour Studies in Geneva, contains a number of country studies. The African countries covered are Tanzania (Guy Routh), Ghana and Nigeria (U.K. Damachi), Kenya (Frances Stewart), the Sudan (Abdel-Rahman E. Ali Taha) and Zambia (Charles Harvey). The book concludes with a study of China by Norman Scott. A balanced introduction is provided by the editors. Five of the studies derive from talks prepared for an Internship course on the theme of labour policy development which was held at the Institute in Geneva in 1973. The course was designed to contribute to the development of a group of young leaders from the trade union organisations, employers' associations and government, mainly from developing countries.

In their different ways, the country chapters each provide a succinct interpretation of the recent economic history of a group of countries which share certain common characteristics but which present striking contrasts in their natural endowments, economic and social structures and development policies. Each of the countries has certain unique features which give it interest for the student of development. The studies presented are generally broad and provide a picture of the economic structure of each country as a whole and its recent development with special attention to development plans and policies, usually giving some emphasis to labour policy.

The development policies of most of the African countries considered can be characterised as one of dualism—that is, a policy of concentrating resources on a small part of the economy as a whole and largely

neglecting the rest. It is a policy whose effects are most obviously seen in industry, but it can also be seen at work in agriculture. This approach plainly has many defects and it is the source of many of the problems —of unemployment, underemployment and poverty—which have accompanied the process of economic development even in those countries where growth has been relatively rapid. This aspect is emphasised particularly by Frances Stewart in her study of Kenya, but its results can be seen at work throughout Africa. Of the countries included in this book, it is notably Tanzania which stands out as having made determined efforts to correct imbalances. Routh's chapter discusses these and provides a brief account of the 'ujaama' rural development programme up to 1972. Regrouping has gone much farther since then. However, there are so far few signs of major improvements in agricultural output having resulted.

Young reviews the policy options for Zambia and considers these to have changed little since independence. He suggests that the rural sector has the best chance of providing alternatives to copper for export. Abdel-Rahman brings out clearly the problems of making a pragmatic socialism work in the Sudan and the effects of political instability. Damachi's two chapters on Ghana and Nigeria attach much importance to the detrimental effects of instability and are particularly useful on labour policy.

Strong on identifying weaknesses, the book is fairly light on discussion of possible strategies for improvement. The chapter on Kenya does, however, conclude with a brief consideration of alternative strategies. Frances Stewart regards price reform, often advocated to overcome factor price distortions, as unrealistic; ineffective because of the absence of an alternative technology; and possibly counterproductive if confined to the modern sector. The policy of redistribution in the course of growth, advocated by the IBRD/ILO, is also condemned as unrealistic and ineffective. It is not clear how far the writers of other chapters would share these views for the countries they discuss. And if so, what then?

In this connection, several chapters terminate with a ritual reference to the lessons which might be learned from Chinese experience. There are, of course, immense structural and other differences between China and African countries which may affect the transferability of 'the Chinese model'. Although Scott does refer to these, he nevertheless seems to suggest that because China's *problems* are in many respects the same as those of African countries, the differences do not matter. Intrinsically this is an unconvincing standpoint, and certainly little support could be found for it in the writings of other notable analysts of China.

The book is a useful introduction to a study of the economies of African countries. The bibliographies and full notes make it possible for the reader to probe further into aspects of the many subjects covered on which additional enlightenment—and alternative views—are sought.

University of St. Andrews PETER ROBSON

South Africa: A Modern History. By T. R. H. Davenport. *London: Macmillan for the Managers of the Cambridge University Smuts Memorial Fund for the Advancement of Commonwealth Studies. 1977. 432 pp. £10. Pb: £4·95.*

THE first of the tables at the end of Professor Davenport's history sets out

in separate sequences, Heads of State, Boer and British; Governors and Governors-General; Prime Ministers and imperial High Commissioners, a formidable array, but one that is nevertheless, if not in length, then in its likely impact upon the reader counterbalanced by other and less familiar lists interspered among them—those of the rulers of the principal African Chiefdoms until their overthrow in the nineteenth century. This departure from traditional practice in the appendix to a general history of South Africa is in itself indicative of Professor Davenport's purpose, which is to write the story of all the peoples of South Africa, indigenous and settler, European, Bantu and Coloured, in the perspective of a thematic unity that derives from economic and social association, or conflict, and whose contours are not ethnic but geographic. If this book, comments the author in his Preface, 'is to be labelled as the product of a school of thought', his hope is that it be classified 'as sharing the basic premises of the liberal Africanists . . .' (p. xiv). One of those premises is implicit in its design—that South Africa, despite its divisions in the past and its partition potential in the future, has reality and may profitably be studied as a unity.

Such comprehensive reappraisal in a long perspective—Professor Davenport's history while heavily weighted towards the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries recounts what happened in recorded time—has imposed difficult questions of arrangement and testing demands on historical judgment. Not everyone will subscribe to some of Professor Davenport's more drastic revisions— Cecil Rhodes, for example, with his four indexed references, seems more than cut down to size. In respect also of subjects of interest overseas, for example, South Africa's policies in respect of war or Commonwealth, Professor Davenport assesses the field of existing knowledge, but while clear in his conclusions refrains from being drawn into controversies, or drawn too far. The heart of his contribution, indeed, lies elsewhere—in continuing reassessment in changing contexts of the causes and nature of the conflict between the races within South Africa. He writes with few illusions—apart from liberal illusions, if such they prove to be, of unity—and dispels some of those cherished at a distance. Thus it was not the Boer republics but the British-manned, Lagden Native Affairs Commission, the appointment of which reflected Milner's concern with social planning, which in its Report, published in 1905, introduced new rigidities into South African thinking about race relations, which 'had an immense influence on later political debate' (p. 152) by formalising the idea of segregation in territorial terms.

Nor does Professor Davenport's sense of historical perspective fail him when he treats at length and in depth the second and this time Afrikaner-dominated phase of social engineering under the post-1948 Nationalist regimes. Its theoretician was Dr. Verwoerd, who shifted Nationalist thinking from crude notions of separation and subordination within a single state to seemingly sophisticated concepts of a commonwealth of Bantustans, the realisation of which, as he himself conceded, could lead only to partition by way of fragmentation. He relied, as had enlightened despots at other times, upon popular, in this case, Bantu, appreciation of such 'enlightened' concessions from above to obviate the risks inherent in such devolution of authority however circumscribed.

On the whole Professor Davenport has responded magnificently to the self-imposed challenge of writing a general history in reasonable compass,

reflecting in its overall design as well as in detailed treatment, the newer revisionist conspectus on South Africa's rich yet deeply troubled heritage. This is a book to be read and pondered by anyone interested in South Africa's future as well as its past.

St. John's College, Cambridge N. MANSERGH

British Business and Ghanaian Independence. By Josephine F. Milburn. *London: C. Hurst. 1977. 156 pp. £8·00.*

THIS short book examines the connections of British businesses—or, rather, of the United Africa Company, Cadburys and John Holt—with political and economic change in Ghana from 1937. It is based largely on records of the three companies, collections of private papers at Rhodes House and interviews with businessmen and former colonial officials. Nearly half the book is concerned with the period between the cocoa hold-up of 1937–38 and the Accra disturbances of 1948, including the establishment of the statutory monopoly of cocoa exporting. This section brings out strongly the willingness of established businesses in the Gold Coast to connive at official regulation of economic life, a kind of *trahison des brasseurs d'affaires.* A chapter on Africanisation of the companies' senior staff is also of some value. Information in later chapters on more general issues in the period since 1951 is too fragmentary and superficial to be of much interest.

Professor Milburn finds the companies to have been 'watchful observers' (p. 94) rather than active participants in political change, to have adapted to independence rather than either resisting or encouraging it. There seems no good reason to doubt this conclusion.

Regrettably, she also attempts an evaluation of the companies' economic role by an idiosyncratic schema in which 'exploitation' denotes accrual of profits abroad (including profits from distributing and processing Ghanaian products abroad) and 'innovation' means 'bringing economic and/or social benefits to the internal society' (p. 2), such as by reinvesting profits in Ghana. No data on profits are provided but, not surprisingly, she considers exploitative and innovative elements to have been generally combined. She is even further out of her depth in stating the requirements of political stability in Ghana; apparently economic problems could be brought under control by 'rational systems of internal and international marketing' (p. 113), such as the International Cocoa Agreement, a West African economic union and a marketing board modelled on New Zealand dairying.

The book is badly written and produced. The notes seem to have been constructed for the author's benefit rather than the reader's. There are alarming patches of ignorance, sometimes revealed by turns of phrase. How many students of West Africa would recognise 'the Coast' as an abbreviation for the Gold Coast and 'Coastal trade' as a reference to the external trade of the Gold Coast? The author needed, but evidently did not obtain, expert criticism in the ten years or so in which the book has been in the making. She spent too much time with retired businessmen and officials and not enough with her academic colleagues.

University of Birmingham DOUGLAS RIMMER

The Economic and Political Development of the Sudan. By Francis A. Lees and Hugh C. Brooks. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 172 pp. £8·95.*

THE economic and political development of the Sudan is of interest to students of the Sudan as well as students of political and economic development. This work will probably be of greater value to the former, but its style and structure might disappoint both. To begin with, the inclusion of the word 'political' in the title is unjustified since the authors have practically nothing to say about the country's political life.

On the economy the book tends to be largely descriptive rather than analytical, often giving the impression that one is reading the authors' working notes and records rather than their analysis. As such it may still be useful as a compendium of reports, articles, etc. on the Sudan economy. In a good many parts, however, its style reads like an almanac written by a committee of Sudanese civil servants advised by an American business consultant as an exercise in international public relations. The descriptions are sometimes unnecessarily obscure or pedantic. How else could one describe statements such as this one: 'The Sudan is an open economy, and volatile export revenues lend a degree of instability to bank deposits and money incomes generated by exports. Import requirements inflate loan demand as goods in transit are inventoried' (p. 84). To describe the economy as open without explanation is meaningless; in the context of elaborate and cumbersome restrictions on foreign trade and transactions, the adjective could be very misleading.

Frequently figures quoted seem to be taken at face value without probing, or sometimes even without adequate interpretation. Perhaps the one obvious exception to this is where the authors question the estimates indicating a negative average rate of growth of per caput gross national product during 1960–73 on account of a four-fold growth in agricultural output in the twenty years ending in 1975; the latter set of estimates, however, are accepted without investigation. The authors project a rosy picture of economic achievement and prosperity in these twenty years without even attempting to support such a claim which, if anything, runs counter to the (admittedly scrappy) data available.

The drama of 'the economic and political development of the Sudan' since its independence has yet to be written, hopefully on the basis of first-hand experience richer than the occasional visits made by the present authors, whose book discloses rather than satisfies the need for such a work.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London A. K. SELBY

The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955–1972. By Edgar O'Ballance. *London: Faber. 1977. 174 pp. £5·50.*

Politics in the Sudan: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation. By Peter K. Bechtold. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 359 pp. £15·30.*

Sudan under Nimeiri. By Anthony Sylvester. *London: Bodley Head. 1977. 224 pp. £5·00.*

AT a time when the strategic position of the Sudan in the Horn of Africa makes it desirable that there should be more understanding of this country,

it is encouraging to find new books on the subject. Each of the books reviewed here adds to our understanding of the Sudan, but none of them presents as profound or well-rounded an analysis as is really required.

Edgar O'Ballance examines the development and course of the conflict in the Southern Sudan, and the process by which reconciliation was brought about. His presentation of the conflict is set within the context of general political developments in the Sudan. The unfolding of events is traced through chapters covering the 1955 mutiny in the Equatoria Corps, developments over the first three years of Sudanese independence, the rise of Southern nationalism, the emergence of the Anyanya, the 1965 Round Table conference, the Anyanya activities in the mid-1960s, the rise to power of Major-General Nimeiri, the policies subsequently pursued by the Nimeiri regime, the emergence of Joseph Lagu as the overall Anyanya leader, and the attainment of a settlement in 1972.

To understand the nature of what happened in the Southern Sudan, we need to understand the political dynamics of the Southern resistance. Unfortunately Major O'Ballance does not provide a coherent explanation of these dynamics. The two most prominent characteristics of the organsation of the resistance were its disunity in the mid-1960s and its unification under Joseph Lagu in the late 1960s. Neither of these characteristics is adequately examined or explained. The only explanation which is given for the unification of the resistance under Lagu is Lagu's impressive personality. Major O'Ballance fails to mention that Israeli military support was being given to Lagu, and that all other factions of the Anyanya became dependent on him for the weapons that they so badly needed. The paradox is that the unification of the movement around Lagu made negotiations with the central government possible, and this brought about the very outcome which the Israeli government had sought to prevent—the welding of the Sudan into a united state, in which the different cultural groups which make up its population could work and live together.

Considerable information on the conflict is gathered together in this book, and much of the information is accurate and valuable. Nevertheless, the writer appears not to have cross-checked his sources thoroughly. The account of political developments in the Northern Sudan seems to be based largely on interviews with Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub, the previous prime minister, and as a result the assessment of developments is somewhat partial. Some information, apparently taken from the press, is highly misleading. He tells us on page 95, for example, that in 1967 the Umma Party, National Unionist Party (NUP) and People's Democratic Party (PDP) joined together to form the Unionist Democratic Party. In fact there was no UDP party, the new party formed by the NUP and the PDP was called the Democratic Unionist Party, and the Umma Party did not join it.

Peter Bechtold does make a start towards serious analysis. He states in the introduction that his book's object is to identify the main actors and components of the Sudanese political system, to examine the ways in which these inter-relate and interact, and to isolate and illuminate the chief public issues of recent years. The first section of the book looks at the social forces in the Sudan. Class groupings, functionally-differentiated groupings (trade unions, the military, the intelligentsia, etc.), and traditional groupings (based on tribe or religion) are examined briefly. Little statistical material

is provided to give substance to the categories, although such material is in fact available in government reports and surveys.

The second section of the book examines the political changes which have occurred since independence. Surprisingly, however, Bechtold does not analyse the changes in terms of the social forces dealt with in the first section. The account of political changes is simply historical narrative, drawn largely from secondary sources. Contrary to what has been promised in the introduction, the historical events are not placed within a framework which identifies the main actors and components in the political system or explains how they have inter-related and interacted. The only area in which significant new information is presented is that relating to the conduct of elections in the Sudan.

The third section of the book seeks to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the different regimes which have existed in the Sudan since independence. The basis for assessment is governmental performance, both in the domestic and foreign-policy fields. As the book has no coherent framework which might explain the causes of events, however, the conclusions which Bechtold comes to are rather superficial.

Anthony Sylvester writes with the enthusiasm of a believer. He is evidently impressed by the achievements of the Nimeiri regime, and he ably portrays them. He presents new and interesting material concerning agricultural development, the functioning of local government, programmes being carried out in the South, and education and transport. While the book cannot be taken as an objective assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the regime, it does present an image of it which is both informative and possessed of some insight. The author has carried out a large number of interviews with President Nimeiri, and his account of these interviews adds to what we know of the thinking and character of the Sudanese leader.

University of Reading TIMOTHY C. NIBLOCK

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

Indira Gandhi's India: A Political System Reappraised. Edited by Henry C. Hart. *Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1976. 313 pp. $18.95. Pb: $6.95.*

THE thread which connects this collection of ten essays is Indira Gandhi's India, but it pays insufficient attention to the conditions and emphases in different states, particularly the wide variations between north and south. The choice of topics, as in all collections of this kind, seems a little arbitrary. The editor says that the eight contributors 'join in skepticism that the emergency was necessary' (p. 27).

In June 1975, the President of India proclaimed a formal state of emergency, and, according to Henry C. Hart, India changed from 'quasi democracy to quasi dictatorship' (p. 1). In explaining this change, theorists of the Communist Party (Marxist) held that the industrial military complex ruling India had decided that a more authoritarian regime was needed to strengthen capitalism. If it had not been Mrs. Gandhi, it would have been somebody else. Her personality, character, education and ambitions were of no importance. She happened to be the most efficient tool to hand. Henry C. Hart takes the directly opposite view.

His thesis is that what happened in India was in 'significant part the projection of a single human being—Indira Gandhi'. Howard L. Erdman says, in his essay on the Indian industrialists, that on the whole industry was pleased with the measures taken under the emergency and that statements of support for Mrs. Gandhi from industrialists 'were more than a ritual exercise' (p. 145).

In defence of the emergency, Indira Gandhi said that the arrests of her political opponents and press censorship were necessary, because of siren appeals made to the military (and police) to mutiny, particularly by Jayaprakash Narayan. In writing of the military, Stephen P. Cohen points out that its outstanding quality was 'a passivity that contrasts sharply with an obvious potential for intervention' (p. 208). There is no evidence that the generals supported or opposed the emergency, or its ending (despite Moraji Desai's plans to enforce prohibition in army messes, with the prospect of drinking loyal toasts in lime juice).

Stanley Kochanek describes Indira Gandhi's manipulations in her attempt to create a new political process at every level. 'First, it involved an unprecedented centralization of power in party and government with the prime minister at the top of the decision-making pyramid. Second, Mrs. Gandhi made a major effort to modify the federal character of party and government by strengthening their unitary tendencies and thereby reinforcing the centralization of power. Third, she tried, unsuccessfully, to change the support base of Congress from above, by recruiting under-represented sectors of society' (p. 95).

The impossibility of achieving Mrs. Gandhi's last aim is illustrated by F. Tommasson Jannuzi who, writing on India's rural poor, points out that to millions of landless labourers, share-croppers and small farmers struggling for subsistence, the emergency was a remote happening, with no immediate discernible bearing on their lives, unlike the sterilisations, forcibly carried out in some of the villages of the north. Fortunately for Mrs. Gandhi, sterilisation, like her other social policies, was talked about but not implemented in the south of India. In the rural areas of the southern Congress states, her popularity thus remained high, as shown in the results of the 1977 general election. Mrs. Gandhi lost the election in the north of India. The Janata Party, with Moraji Desai, came to power and 'quasi democracy' (p. 27) with a new Mahatma Gandhi slant was restored.

Robert Frykenberg, stressing continuity rather than change, sees the despotic potential of Indira Gandhi's Raj as derived from 'the imperial structure and from the now loose-jointed, now monolithic party which rules that structure' (p. 65). Now that the Janata Party has replaced the Congress Party, India is ruled by a coalition, which is neither loose-jointed, nor monolithic, but is held together by the compulsions of power and the haunting opposition presence of Indira Gandhi.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London HUGH GRAY

Letters of Main Fazl-i-Husain. Edited by Waheed Ahmad. *Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab. 1976. 672 pp. Rs 75.00.*

THE Research Society of Pakistan has done well to publish the letters of a political leader who counted for a good deal in the decade before pro-

vincial autonomy, but is little remembered today. Perhaps his most important achievement appeared to be the establishment of an alliance between the Moslems and the Jats in the Punjab—but alas, it did not survive him more than a few years. It is indeed doubtful if any other leader could have brought about even a temporary rapprochement, though it was helped by the fact that the Jats lived in the East and the Moslems mainly in the West of the Punjab, so that, as Percival Spear points out in the preface, in normal times there were not many causes of friction.

Another important activity of Sir Fazl-i-Hussain was a kind of unofficial direction from India of the Moslem delegates to the Round Table Conferences. Perhaps his most difficult task was to persuade them to speak with one voice and not to be afraid of speaking frankly. He cannot be called a communalist, but he was determined to see that the Moslems obtained the protection that they needed. His letters throw interesting sidelights on the confused and intricate subject of Punjab politics. They also reveal the depressing inability of Moslem Punjab politicians to work together. Even when they were not separated by differences of policy, their relations were always bedevilled by personal jealousies.

It is a pity that these letters were not better edited. Some of them deal with trivia and could well have been omitted; others need factual footnotes to elucidate them for readers today. How many students will know, for example, what the Vartman judgment was about? Again, in one letter reference is made to the transfer of Pusa to Delhi, but it is not until a later letter that it becomes clear that 'Pusa' means an agricultural research institute. These blemishes in the editing do not, however, alter the fact that this work will be of value to students of this period.

P. J. Griffiths

A Young Man's Country: Letters of a Subdivisional Officer of the Indian Civil Service 1936–1937. By W. H. Saumurez Smith. *Salisbury: Michael Russell. 1977. 112 pp. £4·95.*

Few of the younger generation in Britain today have any idea of what the Indian Civil Service was or did—indeed a young friend of this reviewer was recently puzzled to think how an Englishman could have been in an Indian Service at all. The majority of the members of that Service spent most of their lives, not in dealing with high affairs of state in Delhi or Simla, but in carrying on the day-to-day administration of the mainly rural areas. It is not easy for the ordinary English reader to understand what this meant, since there is nothing in Britain corresponding to the paternalism, or the concentration of authority in an individual, which characterised the administration of India.

Mr. Saumurez Smith's simple, unpretentious letters well illustrate the day-to-day life of a young civilian. In formal terms, the maintenance of law and order and the collection of revenue may have been his most definite responsibilities, but perhaps of greater importance was his concern with what today would be called welfare. Schools, hospitals, agricultural improvement, emergency measures in times of floods or epidemics—all fell within his purview. A good District Officer identified himself with his district and felt personally responsible if things went wrong.

The great merit of these letters is that they were not written with an eye to publication, but were the ordinary family letters of a young man 6,000 miles from home. They are to be commended to anybody who wants to know what the Raj was really like.

P. J. GRIFFITHS

The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present. By Douglas S. Blaufarb. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1978. 356 pp. $12.95. £9·75.*

MR. BLAUFARB was a CIA officer working on one of the prime purposes of the Agency, namely helping decolonised governments to resist the efforts of the Soviet KGB to put communist parties into power in succession to the colonial governments ('national liberation' in Lenin's phrase). After his retirement he became a Rand Corporation analyst. His book analyses the achievements and failures of the 'counterinsurgency' effort during the years he was in the service. Naturally, the heart of the book is Vietnam, but he takes in both related efforts in Laos and Thailand, and, by way of introduction, the Philippines and Malaya; in his conclusion he adds a few observations about American help to governments in Latin America against guerrillas.

Mr. Blaufarb does some healthy debunking of misconceptions—for example, that Ngo Dinh Diem's 'strategic hamlets' were invented by the British Advisory Mission, or that Operation Phoenix (in his own time) was a piece of senseless madism—but at other times he falls for the blarney himself: he attributes communist victory to 'a few thousand ragged jungle fighters' (he has not read the memoirs of General Van Tien Dung [1]) and gives credit to the voguish pseudo-sociology about villagers' yearnings for 'the mandate of heaven' and 'fire in the lake' that used to be fed to apprehensive American conscripts at Yale by their *guru*, the late Professor Paul Mus. His most original chapter is about Laos. In it he points out that the 'secret war' was anything but secret (what war can be?) and attributes to the Meo leaders, Vang Pao and Touby Lyfong, the initiative in evacuating 125,000 hillsmen from territory invaded by the North Vietnamese and their Lao puppets, at the cost of a standing food crop; they acted without prior offers of American help, in the presumed expectation that they could *buy* food with opium planted in the wilderness. I cannot judge the veracity of this assertion that here was 'a people's counter-insurgency', but it is consistent with the initiative of Lon Nol and Sirik Matak in deposing Sihanouk which also is commonly, though erroneously, put down to the CIA.

Mr. Blaufarb is right that Ho Chi Minh's people's war differed from Mao Tse-tung's in its exploitation of public opinion in France and America (one reason is obvious); but he is wrong in supposing Ho learnt how to do this on a youthful visit to the United States (certainly invented): Ho learnt it at the Lenin school in Moscow (KUTV) and while working for Willi Münzenberg at Canton in 1925–26, practised it in Hongkong in 1931–32, and perfected it in dealings with Mr. Blaufarb's precursors of the Office of

[1] *Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam* (New York, London: Monthly Review Press, 1977).

Strategic Services (OSS) in 1945. Stalin did *not* disapprove of Mao's flight to the rural areas in 1927, abandoning the proletarian masses; on the contrary, he telegraphed to the Chinese Communist Party, instructing it to do that very thing and, shortly after, adopted 'ruralisation of the struggle' as a general Comintern slogan. It is on the communist side generally that this book is weakest: how can one assess a defence without considering the strategy and tactics of attack? But even in the author's own agency, *was* the purpose of American counterinsurgency the establishment of governments in its own image and likeness, not simply the Yalta formula and the Truman doctrine—self-determination by ballot box instead of sword, even if the masses (improbably) did vote communist?

University of Kent DENNIS DUNCANSON

China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead? By Selig S. Harrison. *New York: Columbia University Press for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1977. 317 pp. $13.70.*

CHINA joined the ranks of the surplus oil producers at the politically convenient time of the Middle East crisis when the control of the world's oil supplies moved—temporarily, if not permanently—from the boardrooms of the 'Seven Sisters' to the head office of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. At that critical moment the People's Republic of China was able to offer Japan, the country most dependent upon Middle East supplies, its first shipment of oil from Taching. Others soon followed. Since then the search, inland and offshore, for oil and gas has been intensified, and so has the speculation about China's role in the Asian and world markets for hydrocarbons. Public comments have ranged from the informed to the absurd. Whilst China is no longer referred to quite so readily as a 'second Saudi Arabia', the significance of its oil explorations cannot be denied.

In the past, most serious writers on the subject have confined themselves to recording the technical and economic aspects of China's development. Two studies—one by Chu-yuan Cheng and the other by Vaclav Smil—dealing respectively with the growth of output and export potential of China's petroleum industry and with China's overall energy balance at present and in the future, give the best assessments to date.[1] Selig Harrison has added his own appraisal of the implications of China's entry into the world politics of oil. His study, sponsored by the International Fact-Finding Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is a valuable addition to the literature on the subject. In fact, it puts into its proper perspective much of the technical detail which without political interpretation is bound to be misunderstood. In the course of his study Selig Harrison, a highly experienced staff member of the *Washington Post*, the author of a much-quoted book on India[2] and also a senior academic at

[1] Chu-yuan Cheng, *China's Petroleum Industry* (New York: Praeger, 1976), Vaclav Smil, *China's Energy* (New York: Praeger, 1977). For a review of these and other books on the subject see 'Learning from Ta-ch'ing', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 3, Fall 1977.

[2] *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1960). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1961, p. 118.

Johns Hopkins University and at the Brookings Institution, left no stone unturned. In the best journalistic and academic tradition he interviewed hundreds of professionals and brought to light documents and papers which some of the leading actors might have preferred to accumulate dust for the next thirty years.

The author's labours resulted in a highly readable book starting, like a thriller, on New Year's Eve 1970, at a meeting hastily called at the US State Department's Operations Room. While high drama is rarely far from the centre of the narrative, the reader should not underestimate the author's concern for the maintenance of peace in the Far East, and thus in the world as a whole. Being aware of the danger of conflict on the high seas, he understandably concentrates on China's interest in the oil reserves buried under the waters of the Yellow, East China and South China Seas (well illustrated in some good maps). Many of these riches are expected to be on China's continental shelf within easy reach of the coast. What is less certain is where China's claims end and where other nations of the Western Pacific have justified claims of their own. As the international debate on the law of the sea has demonstrated, there is room for unlimited arguments and disputes. No agreement has so far been reached on the extent of a country's continental shelf beyond the 200 miles generally regarded as the line limiting in future the claims on the resources lying on or under the seabed. Neither is there any clarity on the meaning of such terms as the natural prolongation of a country's territory into and under the sea, nor on the median line determined by certain base points, such as islands.

In the East China Sea, the continental shelf extends well beyond 200 miles and thus brings China into conflict with Japan over drilling rights off the Senkaku (Tiao-yü T'ai) islands and in the Okinawa Trough. In the South China Sea, disputes over the rightful ownership of the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Archipelago involve Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines.[3] In the Yellow Sea, China refuses to recognise South Korea as a legitimate state, but the central area of conflict lies, of course, in Taiwan's claim to all territories which belong to China. There is thus ample scope for dispute, if not open hostility. Whilst stating and re-stating its maximum claims, China has on the whole kept a low profile and has so far concentrated on drilling operations in the shallow waters of the Po Hai. The United States government, conscious of the potential for conflict, has discouraged the activities of oil companies, some of which have tried to force the pace of exploration and thus to counter American attempts at avoiding a showdown between rivals, and between Peking and Taipei in particular. Here Selig Harrison is at his best in getting at the facts.

The author leaves no doubt that more than the control of the oil resources is at stake. The danger of conflict is closely tied to political and military considerations of the powers in the area. Any change of the status quo could have incalculable consequences. If the United States tried to defuse the explosive situation by withdrawing its recognition from Taiwan, this would lead to claims and counter-claims by Mainland China (instead of Taiwan) and Japan in the Senkakus and to conflicts over Japanese and

[3] For a detailed assessment see Dieter Heinzig, *Disputed Islands in the South China Sea* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1976).

foreign drilling concessions in the area. In the South China Sea, the Soviet Union gives encouragement to Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, thus hoping to sow discord with China, its main rival in the sea lanes leading from Vladivostok to the Strait of Malacca and beyond. The author leaves no doubt as to what he would like to see happening during the present period of China's studied vagueness on issues of the law of the sea and all that entails in the area of potential conflict. In view of the enormous cost of deep-water exploration and development, he hopes that the countries concerned will 'consider collaborative ventures and revenue-sharing in disputed areas' (p. 262). He does not even exclude the possibility of oil functioning as a lubricant in some future compromise between Peking and Taiwan—a view apparently shared by some influential persons in Taipei. The search for a way out of a potentially explosive situation, Selig Harrison concludes, will indicate 'whether the region is emerging as a coordinated power centre under Chinese leadership' (p. 264). This is, of course, not the only scenario possible. The major rivals in the search for oil in the Western Pacific ought to read with care the author's analysis, even though they are unlikely to agree with the remedies he suggests.

St. Antony's College, Oxford W. KLATT

China's Economic Revolution. By Alexander Eckstein. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 340 pp. £12·50. Pb: £4·95.*

China's Economy and the Maoist Strategy. By John G. Gurley. *New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1976. 325 pp. $15.00. £8·45.*

THE many books and articles written by Professor Eckstein during his lifetime are a valuable legacy to the field of Chinese economic studies. It is fitting that in his last book he should have provided so admirable a synthesis of the themes introduced and developed in that earlier work.

The opening chapters are largely by way of introduction. In them Eckstein examines China's economic heritage, showing how the country's past was at once a constraint and a spur to economic development after 1949, and gives a survey of the development strategies adopted during these years. Here the author follows what has become a standard periodisation, distinguishing the Stalinist approach of the First Five Year Plan, the more distinctive Maoist strategy of the Great Leap Forward and the 'agriculture-first' policy adhered to since 1961–62.

The third chapter contains an admirably clear account of China's institutional and organisational framework. The extended treatment of the organisation of enterprises is likely to be particularly useful, for less has been written on this aspect (at least at so general a level) than on developments in the rural sector. The same lucidity is apparent in the following chapter on the resource allocation system, which again has a long and useful discussion of the planning and allocative mechanisms of the modern industrial sector. The theme which exercised Professor Eckstein in some of his earlier work—what he called the 'interplay between scarcity and ideology'—is in evidence here, as he shows how the various instruments of planning (indeed, the role of planning itself) shifted over time in response to changing conditions. Particular emphasis is laid on the move away from a 'centralised command allocation system' towards more decentralised methods.

One of China's major achievements has been the containment of inflationary pressure in an expansionary climate engendered by high investment and government expenditure. In an analysis of China's monetary and fiscal policies and its budgetary system, the author shows how the government has pursued essentially cautious financial policies while simultaneously permitting a significant expansion in the scope of the budget.

In contrast to these excellent accounts of important aspects of China's economic system, it has to be said that the following chapters, which examine the relationships between economic development and structural change and foreign trade, are weaker. In part this may be because these are areas in which much easily accessible work has already been done. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of Eckstein's approach is his use of historical data to lend a less well-known perspective to post-1949 changes.

The final chapter is, however, full of interest. In it Eckstein tries to identify the distinctive characteristics of the 'Chinese development model', to assess its success and to consider its transferability to other contexts. The rationalisation of the Great Leap strategy (in economic terms, a direct response to China's particular resource endowment), the emphasis on 'self-reliance' and the institutional framework, with its delicate balance between private and collective activities, normative appeals and material incentives, and centralised and decentralised decision making and management, are what give the model its distinctiveness. As for the author's assessment of its success, he draws a distinction between various aspects of the Chinese performance. In terms of price stability, China's success has been outstanding, although other indicators have been characterised by marked fluctuations. The growth record is impressive by pre-1949 standards and by the historical experience of today's developed countries—though less so when set against some of the less-developed countries. And while China has moved towards a more egalitarian society, Eckstein is careful not to exaggerate its success in this direction.

But overall the assessment is a favourable one. That is not to say that the major achievements could not have been gained by other means, though perhaps at the expense of goals such as self-reliance or more equal income-distribution. Nor is it to say that China's experience can be emulated elsewhere: quite apart from differences in initial conditions, Eckstein emphasises the interdependence of the various elements (economic and otherwise) which constitute China's distinctive approach. Hence his doubt that " . . . elements of the model or the model itself can be transferred without adopting the essential features of this system as a whole' (p. 317).

It will be clear that this book breaks little new ground: new facts are not unearthed, nor does the author offer interpretations which will startle anyone by their originality. There are some minor weaknesses too: the empirical foundation is sometimes weak, some issues are treated very cursorily and there is an occasional tendency to repetition. But as an 'interpretative synthesis' (Eckstein's own words), the book is outstandingly successful. As such it will be useful for many years to come as a textbook for any course on China's economic development. Within his framework the author focuses on the most important elements of the economic system. His analysis of that system's implementation and effectiveness is never facile and an attempt is always made to show the linkages and complementarities which have characterised the development

process. In this way, Professor Eckstein builds up a coherent picture of the working of a very complex economy. The use of historical and international perspectives is another attractive feature, as is the attempt to relate Chinese development to the body of development theory (even if this is sometimes rather sketchy). In short, the book is one which all serious students of the Chinese economy will not want to be without.

Professor Gurley's book can be dealt with more briefly. It seems to have been prompted mainly by his dissatisfaction with much existing work —in particular, with its alleged bias against China and what he calls its 'narrow empiricism'.

While we may agree that there is room for many and varied interpretations of China's economic changes during the last thirty years, Professor Gurley does little to add to our understanding of the period. His claim to provide a 'reasonable account' of modern economic development in China falls sadly wide of the mark, for far from the 'reasonable' account we are promised, it turns out to be as distorted, partial and biased as those other works which he would condemn on these very grounds.

Almost a third of the book consists of a series of book reviews—an approach which may strike some as meretricious and which is certainly no substitute for serious academic research. Any value these pages might have held is in any case vitiated by the author's tendency towards exegesis rather than criticism. For the rest, several chapters have already appeared elsewhere. The most substantial contain accounts of the development of the Maoist approach to development and description of rural development up to 1972. There are shorter pieces on the financial system, the role of prices and profits and the relevance of China's economic model in today's world.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London ROBERT ASH

Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution: Dynamics of Policy Processes. By Byung-joon Ahn. *Seattle, London: University of Washington Press. 1977. 392 pp. (Institute for Comparative and Foreign Area Studies, Publications on Asia 30.) £11·25.*

THE Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution formed together the dramatic stage in the revolutionary history of China in much the same way as did the collectivisation of agriculture and the purges in that of the Soviet Union. They are associated with intense political struggle between a newly established leadership and a faction trying to overthrow it unsuccessfully. Historians will long be tempted to try to explain in each case the causes and results of the struggle as each new series of subsequent events produces fresh evidence. In almost a decade of work at Columbia University, Professor Ahn assembled the known historical evidence for the period 1949–76 (including the death of Mao) and here he has tried to describe 'how the Chinese perceived a public problem, defined alternative options to solve it, made an authoritarian decision, implemented it, and evaluated its consequences'. In other words, he tries to see what happened through Chinese eyes.

He has diligently combed the vast documentary sources published over the years by scholars, mainly in the United States, and supplemented them

with the results of interviews with refugees in Hongkong in 1969–70. The crucial period is 1958–66, centring on the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. These are, however, only intelligible in the light of two processes which have recurred throughout the longer period. These distinct processes are connected with policies consciously operated by the political leaders. The first is aimed at the transformation of social structures and human attitudes, leading to greater equality and involving the mobilisation and participation of millions of people throughout the country. This is characterised as the transformation stage. The second is the development of the economy by a rational allocation of resources to promote efficiency, operated by a relatively small number of professional bureaucrats, and highly centralised through formal institutions and by regulation. This phase is described as consolidation. Transformation and consolidation alternated most violently during the 1958–62 period but Professor Ahn, in an epilogue in which he attempts to assess the significance of the death of Mao, suggests that the impetus which Mao gave throughout his life to the direction of change in China will mean these phases will continue to mark its future history. The current projections of it in China up to the year 2000 seem to bear this out.

The three appendices include a useful glossary of terms, a list of personalities and a detailed account of the changes in the rural communes from 1958 onwards.

Professor Ahn leaves the reader in no doubt that the Great Leap Forward was in general a failure, but at the same time he conveys the sense in which there has been a total transformation of Chinese society and the immensity of its scale.

University of Leicester M. HOOKHAM

Japan faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era. By Chae-Jin Lee. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976. 242 pp. £9·35.*

China and Japan: A New Balance of Power. Edited by Donald C. Hellmann. *Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 305 pp. £10·65.*

China and Japan—Emerging Global Powers. By Peter G. Mueller and Douglas A. Ross. *New York: Praeger for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 1975. 218 pp. £9·10. Pb: £3·30. $5.95.*

THESE three books are, as the titles suggest, concerned with the recent and present international positions of China and Japan and with the factors that influence the foreign policies of the two countries. The perspectives of the various authors, however, are very different as are the objectives of each book. Chae-Jin Lee has the comparatively simple task of tracing the development of political and economic relations between Japan and China from 1949 to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972. The contributors to Hellmann's book are mainly concerned with past, present and particularly future relations between Japan and China and the United States. Moreover, the book may be said to have semi-official status, for drafts of the papers in it were originally presented in February 1975 to a meeting of the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, and

the book is published as Volume XII in the series, 'Critical Choices for Americans'. Peter Mueller and Douglas Ross, two young Canadian scholars, neither of them specialists on China or Japan, aim to bring a fresh perspective to the task of attempting, in their own words, 'to define the roles of the People's Republic of China and Japan in the course of political evolution in east Asia over the next decade' (p. xii). This work too may be labelled semi-official, for it started out in 1972 as a short paper commissioned by Canada's Defence Research Board, and has now been published with the blessing of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

Of the three books, the most coherent and satisfying to review is *Japan faces China*. The author has produced a brief but nevertheless thorough account of relations between the two countries. Two chapters deal with the record from 1949 to 1972, and a third chapter, 'The Politics of Economic Cooperation', looks in more detail at trade relations. Lee suggests that the pattern of relations may be viewed in a cyclical way, a period of political friction alternating with a period of relative relaxation. He identifies six major periods: (1) formal estrangement, 1949–52; (2) gradual relaxation, 1953–57; (3) total collapse, 1958–62; (4) limited adjustment, 1963–65; (5) extreme hostility, 1966–70; and (6) comprehensive reconciliation, 1971–72. Lee is stronger on the Japanese side, which is perhaps not surprising given the difference in source material available, and he is particularly good on the Japanese domestic political scene and how relations with China were affected by stresses and divisions within the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party and between that party and its main political opponents.

Hellmann's contributors read like a roll-call of contemporary authorities on Japan and China, and they have put together a first-class set of papers. Apart from an introductory chapter by Hellmann, there are three chapters on Japan—Donald Hellmann again, Chalmers Johnson and a joint paper by Gary Saxonhouse and Hugh Patrick; and three on China—by Dwight H. Perkins, Thomas W. Robinson and Michael Oksenberg. Within the limits of a brief review, it is perhaps unfair to pick out particular contributions from a generally balanced and thought-provoking collection, but Donald Hellmann in his paper, 'New Myths, Old Realities', stresses some of the trends in Japanese domestic politics which will be particularly important in shaping Japanese foreign policy in the next decade and which American policy makers will ignore at their peril; Gary Saxonhouse and Hugh Patrick provide a very realistic appraisal of American-Japanese economic relations in their paper, 'Bilateral Tensions and Multilateral Issues in the Economic Relationship'; and Dwight Perkins, in 'The Constraints on Chinese Foreign Policy', concentrates on the future state of the Chinese economy, especially as it is likely to affect major instruments of foreign policy such as trade and military power, and argues convincingly and controversially that China's capacities for political, economic and military influence among the nations around its borders are low. Finally, Thomas Robinson surveys the 'Political and Strategic Aspects of Chinese Foreign Policy', particularly as these affect the United States, and includes two interesting case studies, on China's policy towards the Third World, and on Chinese nuclear strategy from 1965 to 1985.

Mueller and Ross do succeed in looking at China, Japan and East Asia from a fresh perspective, and they have many interesting things to say,

especially on the military capabilities of the two countries and on Sino-Japanese-Soviet relations. Moreover, they provide a mass of information, and the book concludes with a good bibliography. However, on a number of other counts the book is rather less than satisfactory, and it can only be recommended with reservations. As mentioned previously, the authors are not specialists on either Japan or China, and this absence of expertise occasionally leads to a lack of sureness of touch both in their analysis of the positions of the two countries, and in their comments on power relationships in East Asia in general. They also make some odd and generally unsupported statements. For example, referring to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972, they say that 'Peking has weaned Japan away from the United States . . .' (p. 121), although in all fairness they do go on to some extent to qualify this astonishing comment. All books of this kind are liable to date very quickly, but one expects them to be up-to-date at the time of publication. This book was published in 1975 (in Britain in August), but from internal evidence one can conclude that the text was completed in 1973 and never properly revised, although there is a 'Postscript' by Douglas Ross looking at the significance of a number of events in 1973 and 1974. The Portuguese revolution began in April 1974, but both in the main text (p. 66) and in the Postscript (p. 174) the authors' discussion of China's policy in Africa gives the impression that at the time of publication of the book the Portuguese were still in control of Angola and Mozambique and had no intention of giving up that control.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth DAVID STEEDS

Labor and the Constitution 1972–1975: Essays and Commentaries on the Constitutional Controversies of the Whitlam Years in Australian Government. Edited by Gareth Evans. *London: Heinemann. 1977. 383 pp. £12·00.*

Australia at the Polls: The National Elections of 1975. Edited by Howard R. Penniman. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1977. 373 pp. (AEI Studies 142.) Pb: $5.00.*

BOTH these books were published in the wake of Gough Whitlam's dismissal as Prime Minister by the Governor-General of Australia, Sir John Kerr. Since their publication there have been new developments in Australia, Gough Whitlam lost the 1977 election and retired from the leadership of the Australian Labor Party. Sir John Kerr resigned from the Governor-Generalship and was replaced in 1978 by a professor of constitutional law, Sir Zelman Cowan. Kerr was then appointed Ambassador to Unesco in Paris by the Liberal government only promptly to resign after charges of a political pay-off for services rendered in the 1975 dismissal. Gareth Evans, the editor of *Labor and the Constitution 1972–1975*, was elected to the Australian Senate, having gained the coveted number one position on the Victorian Labor Party ticket. But these changes have not affected the importance of the issues which the books raise. Although the principal actors, Whitlam and Kerr, have left the stage, the constitutional and political precedents set by the Governor-General's dismissal of the properly elected Prime Minister of the day remain.

Labor and the Constitution 1972–1975 is essentially a lawyers' book; *Australia at the Polls* is essentially for political scientists. The first examines not only the legal ramifications of the 1975 dismissal, but all the major constitutional issues of the Whitlam years in government. The second concentrates upon the election campaign after the 1975 crisis, as well as the constitutional issues raised by the dismissal. Thus the 1975 dismissal is the essential core of both books but their overall dimensions are wider and different in nature.

Labor and the Constitution 1972–1975 is a collection of papers delivered at a seminar at Melbourne University to commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Australian Federation. The authors include most of the leading academics on Australian constitutional law. Each paper is then commented upon by ministers, law officers, public servants and political scientists. The final chapter is written by Whitlam himself. The result is an extremely thorough, balanced and detailed examination of the Whitlam years in Australian government.

The whole range of constitutional and governmental issues is examined in four parts. Part one deals with Labor's approach to the federal structure of the Australian government. The papers discuss whether Labor has modified its overall policy of centralisation; its wide-ranging attempts to utilise its powers under Australia's written constitution in commercial regulation, welfare spending, resource development and human rights; and finally its abortive attempt at constitutional reform through referendum. Part two examines the impact of Labor on the institutions of government—the judiciary, the executive and the legislature. Part three deals with the crucial issue of the power of the Governor-General to dismiss the government of the day if the Senate refuses to pass a bill granting supply for the government. It also discusses the technical question of the double dissolution of the two houses of the Australian parliament. The final part, which is perhaps of the greatest interest, is Whitlam's own retrospective survey of all the major constitutional issues raised during his term as Prime Minister.

Australia at the Polls is an examination of the 1975 dismissal and the ensuing political campaign in a collection of papers written mainly by Australian political scientists. It is primarily a book for those not well versed in the Australian political system. As an American publication it assumes no background knowledge of Australia, its federal structure of government, or its peoples and parties. The Australian political system in general is examined along with each of the political parties and their role in the 1975 elections. The appendices and diagrams are excellent, providing clear tables on the working of proportional representation and the results of the elections. Of particular interest are the chapters on the media and opinion polling. The newspaper magnate, Rupert Murdoch, was a central figure in a bitter campaign against Whitlam, causing his journalists to take unprecedented strike action.

The effect of the election on Australia's foreign policy is also analysed. Whitlam established a more independent image of Australia. It remains to be seen whether the Fraser government will return fully to the old policy of close alignment with the United States and Britain. The final chapter analyses the voting patterns and makes predictions for the future election—which is now over. The prediction that it would be difficult for Whitlam to be re-elected has proved true. Despite a series of scandals and a poor

economic record, the Liberal coalition was returned with only a slight decrease in its majority. The constitutional significance of the 1975 dismissal has not proved the key to election success.

As David Butler, in his introduction to *Australia and the Constitution 1972–1975*, states: 'The interest of the crisis is not narrowly Australian. There are lessons for every country that has any vestige of responsible parliamentary government.' Nor should the 'interest' be purely legal or purely political. One of these books should not be read only by lawyers and the other by political scientists. The two disciplines necessarily overlap and any student of democratic government, whether he be legal or political, should study both books.

Queen Mary College, London PAUL D. ELLIOTT

NORTH AMERICA

The Cloud of Danger: Some Current Problems of American Foreign Policy. By George F. Kennan. *London: Hutchinson. 1978. 234 pp. £5·95.*

IT has to be said that this is a surprising book, containing a curious admixture of innovative thinking in the context of assertive judgment that is sometimes disturbing. George Kennan, a most distinguished historian and commentator on contemporary policies as well as a most effective former foreign service officer, states that in this volume he is attempting to draw together the views he has expressed in articles and speeches into something that might be called 'a grand design of American foreign policy' (preface). His concept of foreign policy appears to be of a construct that is better built by professionals independent of the social and political fabric of the nation. This leads him to the view that the influence of Congress on foreign policy making limits the reactive powers of the Executive branch, 'reduces privacy of decisions' and inflicts upon the policy-making process 'a high degree of cumbersomeness and inflexibility' (p. 6). Congress is also vulnerable to lobbies and pressure groups, and these have frequently proved more influential than 'the views of highly competent persons in the Executive branch, who, in contrast to the lobbyists, had exclusively the national interests at heart' (p. 7). Although he is careful to express his commitment to the democratic process, he leaves a lingering impression that he would really prefer the professionals to be left with the task of practising the profession of diplomacy.

There are also traces in his writing of the old myth of great-power superiority, and he seems to regard the proliferation of new nation states since 1945 as a 'prodigal scattering of the status of sovereign independence' (p. 30) and a debauching of the concept of sovereignty.

Surprisingly, and provocatively, he sees no vital American interests in Latin America outside Central America, or in South and South-east Asia (pp. 67 and 92), and so apparently rejects the Brzezinski concept of an interdependent world with an in-built American interest in global stability. He argues for a pruning down of 'unnecessary or marginal involvements and the paring down of America's commitments' (p. 122). Such remarks, particularly in the context of earlier discussions of, for example, Namibia, where he claims that it is difficult to see any reason

why the United States should adopt 'any position at all with regard to the future of the territory' (p. 76), almost suggest the advocacy of a type of neo-isolationism. There is considerable discussion of European neurosis about the danger of Soviet attack, despite the fact that General Alexander Haig is one of the foremost spokesmen for the necessity of re-building Nato forces in the light of Soviet troop and weapons concentrations in the East. The European welfare state is accused of 'smug materialism and cultural inanity' (p. 128) and European concern with economic and financial matters is said to be likewise a characteristic of the welfare state, concerned with the price of wine and carrots to the detriment of focus upon larger issues which are suggested to be political and diplomatic questions existing independent of the realities of economic survival (pp. 137–38).

There is healthy cynicism in this book in the discussion of the frailties of summit diplomacy (p. 48), in the emphasis upon the need for formalism rather than 'chumminess' (p. 105) and on the traditional Russian interests of the Soviet Union that are independent of ideology (p. 168). Indeed the whole discussion of relations with the Soviet Union that occupies the latter chapters is suffused with an instinctive understanding that is impressive and persuasive. But the patrician tone of the whole analysis is disturbing, particularly in that, projecting the experience of his Wisconsin ancestors, much is made of the virtues of self-help and the Protestant work ethic. It is suggested that if only underdeveloped countries showed similar virtues they would likewise prosper (pp. 38–9). The unequal share of the world's resources consumed by the United States should perhaps suggest that the mechanisms of the international economic order are also worthy of consideration. In a short closing chapter summarising his global concept of American policy, Kennan makes a beautifully articulated advocacy of prudent restraint based on sensible realisations of the limits of national power. Herein lies the core of his position and, unencumbered by the *obiter dicta* that accompany the development of the argument, it is a refreshing view and one not in fact alien to the thinking of the present Administration.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

China and America: The Search for a New Relationship. Edited by William J. Barnds. *New York: New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1977. 254 pp. $15.00.*

THIS publication of the Council on Foreign Relations claims to be the first in-depth study of Sino-American relations since 1971. Its theme is 'normalization' and the continuum of expectations stemming from the Shanghai communiqué of February 28, 1972. At the minimum, 'normalization' means the re-establishment of formal interstate relations, complicated as they are by the 'one China' formula which has inhibited the setting up of fully-fledged embassies. At the maximum, it suggests the revival of that special 'co-operative' relationship once celebrated by Americans in both sentiment (the Pearl Buck syndrome) and rhetoric (the Open Door notes, and all that they did and did not imply). It is perhaps ironic that the calculated opportunism of the Nixon-Kissinger demarche rekindled this *presumed* relationship which continues to be

one-sided or, in the authors' favourite word, 'asymetrical'. While 'America *as* America is hardly a major pre-occupation of the Chinese people' (p. 45), there is 'in America today greater interest in China than in any other foreign country' (p. 118). Hence the current of expectations unfulfilled which runs through this book, prompted as it is by 'an awareness that after a few years of steady movement toward establishing a new and more constructive relationship', progress has 'slowed dramatically if not ground to a halt' (p. ix).

From the Chinese standpoint, 'normalization' is not something to be brought about step by step through the momentum of trade and cultural exchange. Alexander Eckstein and Lucian W. Pye are realistic enough to acknowledge that neither can have more than a 'limited impact' on political relations; they are 'a symbol rather than a major motivating force'. Trade increased rapidly from 1971 to 1974, coincident with a grain shortage, but fell back in 1975 and 1976; it is only 10 per cent of United States trade with Taiwan or South Korea, and it is far less than China's trade with Western Europe. Cultural exchanges have been 'facilitated' but the interaction of 'the Middle Kingdom Complex' with 'Marco Polo-itis' means that American cultural demand exceeds Chinese cultural supply. The political crux of bilateral relations is of course the tangled issue of Taiwan, here elucidated by Ralph N. Clough. It is the kind of issue on which the marking of time is apt to seem the wisest option, but a number of 'extraneous' factors have also contributed to the lack of 'forward movement', among them governmental instability in both countries, and the reluctance of Nixon and Ford to back away from Taiwan in the aftermath of Watergate and the Communist victory in Vietnam. The Taiwan tangle does not, however, represent the *substance* of Sino-American relations.

In political terms the bilateral relationship is less important for its own sake than for what it can contribute to the consolidation of a 'four-power equilibrium' in East Asia, and the strengthening of both parties in their relations with the Soviet Union. Akira Iriye points out that 'the United States has rarely been an independent variable in Chinese foreign policy' (p. 44). It is also the case that the political importance of China to the United States has been a function of the balance of power (or perceived threats to that balance of power). In this sense 'normalization' has already occurred. Paradoxically, the one period when the United States did achieve an intense bilateral relationship with China, when China did become an 'independent variable', was during the period of unremitting hostility and non-recognition from the Korean War to 1971. The 'bedrock' of the present relationship is the 'common agreement that the Soviet Union is the major antagonist of each country' (p. 8), and future relations are likely to develop within this trilateral context. 'Triangular diplomacy' does not necessarily lead to closeness (which could be construed as a 'high risk' policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union), but neither does it preclude the possibility of a further bout of 'normalization'. Carter has reassured the American public that relations with China constitute a 'central element' in his 'global policy'.

University of Manchester D. J. S. MORRIS

LATIN AMERICA

Latin America: Struggle for Progress. By James D. Theberge and Roger W. Fontaine. *Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 205 pp. £8·75.*

THIS is the last in a series of fourteen volumes, 'Critical Choices for Americans', produced under the auspices of a commission established by Nelson Rockefeller, subsequently Vice President of the United States, to examine options for United States policy at the beginning of its third century of independence. Since the Republicans did not win the Presidential election of 1976, it is now largely of historical interest, and as it was intended for a mass readership it is, though accurate, not as informative as one could wish. In some respects it tells us more about the United States than about Latin America.

Its senior author, James Theberge, formerly Director of Latin American Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, withdrew from the project in June 1975 on being nominated United States Ambassador to Nicaragua, a country which—perhaps understandably—does not figure in the book. An international economist, it is natural that the work he has helped write is overwhelmingly concerned, even obsessed, with trade and economic relationships, and hence with the role of the 'big four': Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. The smaller states, except for Cuba, on which his co-author and successor at Georgetown is an expert, and which is here assessed as 'a ward of the Soviet Union' (p. 11), are treated as peripheral, despite the fact that the recent history of Latin America suggests that his approach is a policy maker's recipe for disaster.

Other conclusions follow logically. The United States has no interest in promoting better relations with Cuba, and, on the contrary, should follow President Ford's tough line and directly oppose Cuban intervention in Africa or anywhere else (pp. 107–108). Venezuela, though previously neglected, is the most important object of United States friendship because of its economic strength (p. 117). (It receives special extended treatment in an appendix by Philip B. Taylor, Jr., which is worth attention in its own right.) Mexico, it is felt, will inevitably confront problems of over-population; its points of disagreement with the United States, though minor, are so many that the United States would do well to seek a comprehensive settlement (p. 113). Brazil, it will not be wise to push too hard either on human rights or the return to civilian government; nor should it be accepted as it is, but incorporated actively into the Western community (pp. 125–126). Argentina will have to sort out its own problems (p. 137).

And the rest? Chile is seen as one of 'our remaining friends in the hemisphere' (p. 53), though it is at least recognised that in it, as in Argentina, Peru and Uruguay, military-authoritarian rule has ended a 'comparatively liberal-democratic' government. Violence and abuse of human rights 'are nothing new'. 'As long as Latin American governments face violent attacks on their authority, grave violations of human rights will occur as official efforts are made to destroy insurgent groups and reestablish domestic peace' (p. 39). A Panamanian settlement may raise more problems than it solves (pp. 95–98). The Organisation of American States (OAS) may have to be abandoned (pp. 60–61). And no prescriptions

are offered for Guyana, the Falklands or Belize, which is termed 'British Honduras' on the map. These prospects may be 'realistic'—or at least may have seemed so in 1975—but they are hardly inspiring. One is left with the strong impression that Latin America, last in the series, is last in the priorities even of liberal Republicans, and perhaps it is just as well that it is.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

The Inter-American Development Bank and Political Influence: With Special Reference to Costa Rica. By R. Peter DeWitt Jr. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 197 pp. £12·40.*

THIS book represents an attempt to test through a case-study approach the basic propositions of 'dependency theory'. By contrast with most writings on 'dependency', this one is mercifully down to earth and jargon-free. Those who find the 'dependency' approach useful will find the book worth a quick (but expensive) read. It also has some general interest as a country-aid study despite the author's polemical, 'goodies versus baddies' approach. Although Costa Rica is a somewhat insignificant country, its aspirations to social democracy make it an interesting one, where it is worth looking at the interaction between political ideals and external interests.

The author's argument has several steps. First, United States aid policies in Central America are overwhelmingly geared to US commercial and military interests. Second, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) acts as a vehicle for these interests. Its lending policy, for example, is closely linked with US procurement, US direct private investment and the export of raw materials to the United States. Both propositions are well supported by statistics and anecdote. Third, he argues that the IDB's strategy—based on 'infrastructure' and 'productionist' projects—is bad for Costa Rica. Although some good examples are given, such as the encouragement of beef production for export at the expense of grain for local consumption, there are a good many of unsupported and often wildly extravagant assertions. The IDB's 'development strategy' is blamed, inter alia, for unemployment, inflation, balance-of-payments problems, loss of tax revenue and maldistribution of income.

Finally, it is argued that in the absence of the IDB, and US influence, Costa Rica would run its affairs more sensibly. Later the author gives the lie to his own argument. Costa Rica, despite its social-democratic image, is, he claims, ruled by a self-serving elite whose aspirations broadly correspond to those of its aid donors. Nowhere does he produce any evidence that Costa Rican administrators made any serious attempt to challenge the maldistribution of IDB aid or put forward a more acceptable strategy. Moreover it is totally unclear what will be the mechanism by which Costa Rica can be brought to accept what he describes as a 'feasible alternative model of development' consisting of 'diversifying primary product exports, developing and controlling natural resources, industrialising with national ownership, developing nationally owned industries . . . preferences for Third World manufactured goods and higher prices for primary exports . . . priority for social investment'. It is particularly

difficult to see why the hitherto exploiting foreigners should suddenly fall over backwards to help with preferences and export prices. And his recommended mixture of nationalism and 'welfarism' has been tried elsewhere—Sri Lanka is a good example—with unhappy results.

Underlying both his diagnosis and prognosis is the author's firm belief in the dominating influence of external 'dependency'; the conviction that Costa Rica's problems and policies are mainly explained by its unequal relationship with the United States. The Americans no doubt have a lot to answer for, in Costa Rica as elsewhere. But so do the Costa Ricans. Nowhere does DeWitt mention the fact that Costa Rica's 4 per cent rate of natural population growth is probably the world's highest, a major contributory factor to unemployment and to strain on welfare services. Nor, on the other hand, does he acknowledge the country's independent achievements, notably that of being able to survive as a parliamentary democracy, without an army, and surrounded by military dictatorships.

Overseas Development Institute VINCENT CABLE

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The World of Learning 1977–78. Vols. I and II. 28th edn. *London: Europa. 1978. 2,036 pp. £24·00 (UK).*

THIS directory has a well-earned reputation for being accurate, comprehensive and up to date, and librarians and research workers will welcome this latest edition. It might, however, be useful, particularly with the countries which have a large number of entries, either to have more cross-references or to list at the beginning of the countries the sub-sections used. For example, there is an overlap between learned societies and research institutes in the United Kingdom. Chatham House is under the first but the International Institute for Strategic Studies is under the second, though both have members and a research programme.

Chatham House D. H.

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1977. Edited by Richard F. Staar. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1977. 612 pp. $30.00.*

THE greater part of the eleventh edition of this annual is a country-by-country survey of communist parties in 1976 together with some details of each party's origins and present set-up. Where the party is in power more information is given on events in the country. Then follow a section on international communist front organisations and a select but reasonably comprehensive bibliography of books published in 1975 and 1976. The material is clearly set out and each article is signed. The volume should prove very valuable in any reference library specialising in political affairs.

Chatham House D. H.

Middle East Annual Review 1978. Edited by Michael Field. *Saffron Walden: Middle East Review Co. 1977. 428 pp. Pb: £11·50.*

THE first third of this review contains chapters on specific topics. Among them are oil, trade, civil engineering and finance. Then follow country-by-

country surveys written by academics or members of the staff of the *Financial Times* or other newspapers. A warning note is given on the reliability of Middle East statistics. It is a pity that a great deal of up-to-date information, which would be especially valuable for businessmen visiting the area, is interleaved with so many advertisements. This makes the whole difficult to use and also of course gives a false impression of the amount of actual text.

Chatham House D. H.

The Middle East and North Africa 1977–78. 24th edn. *London: Europa. 1977. 936 pp. £16·00.*

THE latest edition of this reference book maintains the high standard of accuracy and the breadth of coverage set by the earlier volumes. In addition to chapters on general topics, there is a section dealing with regional organisations, including United Nations peace-keeping forces, and country-by-country surveys which include bibliographies and a great deal of factual data. It is useful to have collected in one place the most cited documents on Palestine from the declaration of the first World Zionist Congress in 1897 to the second interim peace agreement between Egypt and Israel of 1975 with a note on later developments.

Chatham House D. H.

The Far East and Australasia 1977–78. 9th edn. *London: Europa. 1977. 1,251 pp. £24·00.*

ALTHOUGH entitled the Far East, this annual volume covers the whole of Asia including Soviet Central Asia. There are seven general articles, mainly on economic subjects, followed by a section on regional organisations. The country-by-country surveys give useful information on the economic and political backgrounds as well as statistics, summaries of constitutions and directories of the government, political parties, press and industrial organisations. The final section is a who's who.

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VIRTUE UNREWARDED: CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY AT MID-TERM

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APPROACHING two years in office is still too early to be categorical about a President's chances of success or failure in foreign policy, but time enough to attempt a first approximation of his style and assumptions as a foreign-policy decision maker. And with Jimmy Carter, it would appear that *le style, c'est l'homme même*. So far, both in substance and in manner it has seemed more Carter's policy than Vance's or Brzezinski's. In fact the way diplomatic tasks have been divided not only between those two, but among Young, Mondale, Warnke, Brown, Atherton, Clifford, and even the President's wife, mother, sister and son, have made clear his determination not to be overshadowed by any Kissinger-like ' lone ranger ' from among his own advisers. From that point of view there is certainly safety in numbers. Partly because of this, but also visibly because, rather than in spite of, its base in the President's own personality, American foreign policy in these two years has often seemed reminiscent of that well-known cowboy who jumped on his horse and rode off in all directions—many of them, it has seemed, circular, taking him back to square one.

A foreign-policy maker must be judged by what he did with what he inherited. The situation bequeathed to President Carter was far better than that inherited by Nixon or Johnson or Kennedy. Those Presidents all faced wars or immediately pressing crises. Carter was luckier: no war, no immediate major crisis, a Western alliance in good working order, promising lines of rapprochement out to the two potential adversary powers, an advantageous situation for the United States in the overall world balance, more influence in the Middle East than the United States had had for thirty years. What he has done with that substantial legacy from his Republican predecessors has been notable for virtuous sentiments rather than for good understanding or successful outcomes. In fact one might see his policies as a study in virtue not only unrewarded but even proving counter-productive.

The defenders of his policies would reply to such criticism by producing lists of the President's objectives, which are indeed irreproachable. But that misses the point. Drawing up lists of irreproachable general objectives is not actually one of the more difficult aspects of

foreign-policy making. First year students do it with considerable éclat: editorialists and columnists can readily do it whenever they are short of hard news. The difficult part is devising the strategies and tactics which will move the real world of independent sovereign decision makers and unreasonable, intransigent constituencies in the desired directions. And that is where results have seemed dismaying.

Examining the central reason for this impression involves consideration of what is usually called 'signalling'. Any new American administration, as it takes office one quadrennial January, has to be seen by the outside world as a vast transmitting system of signals. And America is so important to the rest of the world—adversaries and non-aligned as well as allies—that during the new President's first six months of office, those who advise decision makers in other capitals, Moscow and Peking and Tokyo and Bonn, will be hard at work establishing interpretations of the new men. Even second and third echelon appointments, not just the main ones like Vance, Brzezinski and Young, will be read as signals, alongside, of course, past and contemporary statements by the President himself and his advisers. If the signals originating in this enormous transmitting-system come to seem excessively ambiguous, uncertain or confused, its 'audience', the policy makers of other powers, are rather in the situation of drivers in a complex traffic pattern when the lights are out of kilter. They are thrown back on their own individual devices: caution, or passivity, or initiative or opportunism as their circumstances or temperaments may incline. The outcome can sometimes be good, but the potentiality for disaster is high. I would argue that episodes as disparate as Sadat's peace initiative, Soviet and Cuban adventurism in Africa, and various aspects of French and German policy may all be interpreted as responses to the perceived uncertainties in American signals since January 1977.

In the first six months of the Carter administration, what seemed chiefly to emerge from the signals was an ambitious new messianism in American foreign policy. By messianism I mean the assumption that America has a special duty to *redeem* the world. And one should really say revived rather than new, because historically that has been quite a familiar American tradition, although it was played down during the previous administration. It is compatible with either an isolationist or an interventionist stance in actual policy. In its isolationist mode it presents America as a sort of model above the battle: 'too proud to fight'. In its interventionist mode it has America *leading* the battle, and always, of course, on the side of the angels. It may seem instantly obvious that President Carter's has been the interventionist mode, but I would argue that his policy has been subject to a certain ambivalence between intervention and withdrawal,

and that this is one of the reasons why the signals have seemed ambiguous.

If the messianism in the Carter style had been overtly used in the service of a blunt anti-communism, as with John Foster Dulles, it would have attracted instant criticism from the liberal commentators who normally brood over developments in American foreign policy. But in fact it has been used in the service of objectives and propositions very hard for liberals to quarrel with. America, the President said, would seek the observance of human rights everywhere; would maintain close consultation with its Nato allies; would cease to be so unduly preoccupied with communism; would engage in a 'meaningful dialogue' with the Third World; would work at securing an overall settlement in the Middle East rather than mere step-by-step gains; would insist that the white-ascendancy regimes in Southern Africa should bow to enlightened public opinion; would curb arms sales and discourage their use for political ends; would prevent nuclear proliferation and reduce (not merely control) the great nuclear stockpiles of the dominant powers. 'Linkage' would be abandoned, openness and candour would be the order of the day, and American foreign policy would be based on 'optimism in its historical vision'.

It may seem a little flippant to say that the basic signal transmitted was that the Gods of the Copybook Headings, as Kipling called them, would be in control. But being for such objectives is in the same class as being against sin: a hard position to argue with. That was especially the case early in 1977. There was a sense in which the ambitious (morally and diplomatically) view of America's role in the world taken by the Carter administration was an inevitable consequence of the attributes and circumstances which brought the President to power. After the murder of John Kennedy in November 1963, American politics generated in Americans at large an unconscionable degree of grief, self-doubt, self-criticism, anger, disenchantment, guilt, resentment, anguish. The drama of Vietnam and Watergate went on so long, so much blood was spilled, so many corpses left on or just off the stage, that when finally the drama had its moment of catharsis in the downfall of Richard Nixon in August 1974, the audience required also a moment of resolution with the emergence of 'a new face', untouched by the sordid affairs and discredited assumptions of Washington. (And yet, be it noted, looking adroitly like the 'lost leader', John Kennedy, resurrected. Carter's deliberately-cultivated Kennedy hair-style, and reminiscent grin successfully undercut what otherwise would have been Teddy Kennedy's rival appeal.) His great asset as a domestic political leader was that he made Americans feel reassured about themselves and their society again. And, accidentally or by calculation, he seems to have managed this task by encapsulating

in his *persona* various images of an earlier America, fondly remembered—Tom Sawyer as a 'born again' Baptist, a Southerner who yet was highly acceptable to black Americans. So that the rise of Jimmy Carter, the man who bucked the machines, a real-life Mr. Deeds gone to Washington, was in itself a reassertion (even, it seemed, a proof) of the essential virtues of American life, after so long a time when those virtues had been made to look doubtful and flawed. America's friends and allies in the rest of the world had considerable reason to be glad of that, since a degree of American moral self-confidence is basic to the essential mechanisms for the survival of the West.

Yet in international politics, an insistently proclaimed high-mindedness in the new leader of an alliance may not necessarily be conducive to the right or desired reactions in either allies or adversaries. To allied decision makers, most of whom at the time of Carter's arrival had had long experience of the grey compromises of actual diplomacy, it could be read as unrealism, inexperience, lack of understanding, naiveté. To adversaries it could be read as a golden opportunity. Something of these two reactions has to be seen in the subsequent development of events.

The super-powers in Africa

It may be easiest to illustrate this if we consider American relations with the Soviet Union, especially in respect of Soviet adventurism (with Cuban help) in Africa. Let us start with the almost technical-seeming issue of the ostensible renunciation of linkage. It is quite easy to see why the concept was initially disavowed: in order to be able to maintain that there was no incongruity between campaigning against the disregard of human rights in the Soviet Union, and at the same time seeking a new SALT agreement with the policy makers in Moscow. But the US President is not omnipotent: he cannot debar the policy makers of *other* countries from making linkages, which is an entirely normal, standard, traditional mode of diplomatic bargaining. He can only prevent *his own* negotiators from explicitly doing so, thus inflicting an entirely gratuitous wound on American diplomacy. In fact, by about March 1978 the President had had to reverse himself on this as on a number of other issues, and was linking Soviet policy in Africa (in his letters to Mr. Brezhnev) with other Soviet-American prospects. But by that time a good deal of damage had already been done.

Before that time, indeed, American policy in Africa and statements about African events must be seen as a positive series of 'green lights' to the Russians and Cubans—unconscious, no doubt, but *all the more credible and reassuring to them for that reason.* If you send *deliberate* signals to an adversary he has to ask whether they are deceptive,

whether they conceal some sort of trap. If they are clearly *not* deliberate, they can with the more certainty be seen as an invitation to make hay while the sun shines. It is true that the series of 'green lights' began before Carter's time, when between December 1975 and January 1976 Congress insisted on cutting off funds for continuing even a small-scale American effort to maintain support for Unita and the FNLA in Angola. But even so, the victory of the MPLA was not then, or even a year later, conclusive. Russian and Cuban contingency planning would initially, early in 1977, have needed to take into account the possibility that the Cubans might be given cause to want their forces closer to home; and that the Russians might find that their sponsorship of such adventures had its costs in the direct Soviet-American relationship.

If there had been a conscious and deliberate decision to reassure them that there need be no fear of such penalties, the denunciation of linkage and the series of statements by Andrew Young on the alleged 'stability' being created by the Cubans could hardly have been bettered. One may even see Young's status in the Carter administration as a green light in itself to the other side. He is the voice of the President's concern with Third-World opinion, and in many ways successful in that role. But in effect the effort he symbolises to conciliate the Third World, especially the black African states, precludes most of the diplomatic and military efforts that could otherwise be made to obstruct or raise the cost of Soviet and Cuban activities, and thus gives them the assurance that these will remain 'low-risk, low-cost options'.

Andrew Young has often been quoted as arguing that these African involvements are so many potential Vietnams for the Russians and Cubans. But that seems a clear case of the misleadingness of arguing from purely American experience. Vietnam went the way it did because the United States is the way it is: an open society whose government is infinitely vulnerable to the pressures of organised opinion. Havana and Moscow are not at all like Washington: there will be no marches on the equivalent of the Pentagon and the White House in either city. Nor is South Africa at all like Georgia, even Georgia twenty years ago. If there are any analogies between that unhappy country and the American south, one would have to find them about the time of the Civil War. The effort to hurry the Afrikaner political elite along the path to racial equality, however morally justifiable, could have an outcome at least as bloody as that precipitated by the Confederate political elite. Thus the new much-praised activism of American policy in Africa may yet prove potentially more dangerous than the old gradualism and relative inattention. And not only to Western strategic or economic interests: if events are hurried towards the

great race war which is obviously a possibility, most of the dying will be done by Africans.

A warning foretaste of the effects which ill-considered zeal for change can have in a complex situation is illustrated by the developments in the Horn of Africa, where, in my view, the successful Russian 'reversal of alliances' as between Ethiopia and Somalia seems to have been facilitated and perhaps even induced by American policy changes. The situation President Carter inherited was a cold-war 'stand-off', not without its strategic advantages for the West. The Americans had had close connections with Ethiopia since the 1950s. The Russians had cultivated the Somalis since the early 1960s, and through arms-supply and other aid had secured facilities at Berbera, and other forms of influence. But that particular cloud was mostly silver lining, from the point of view of Western interests, because the Soviet base at Berbera was really the only reason why it was politically possible in Washington in the early 1970s to get Congress to agree to the far more secure and ambitious Western facilities in Diego Garcia.

The Republicans were frequently reproached for turning a deaf ear to Saudi wishes to take over the sponsorship of Somali nationalism from the Russians. An American ambassador even resigned on the issue in 1976. But there was a point to this foot-dragging. Somali nationalism has long been a potentially explosive force in the area, since its full objectives cannot be attained without dismembering both Ethiopia and Kenya, and taking over Djibouti. However justifiable these objectives may be in ethnic terms, they could not be secured without immense and bloody disruption of the whole area. And to put it cynically, another Arab government, such as the Saudis, seemed less likely to restrain the Somalis than a great power like the Soviet Union, which was not by any means about to place Arab nationalist objectives among its first priorities. So in effect, from a Western point of view, the Soviet presence in Somalia was in several ways the lesser of two evils.

But early in the Carter administration the restraints previously imposed by Washington on the Saudis seem to have been lifted. And about the same time the American tie with Ethiopia (which by now was under the control of the Dergue, a particularly bloody-handed congeries of squabbling Marxist factions, not notable for their concern for human rights) was disrupted. Now the fact that the Somalis had been able to find an alternate paymaster in Saudi Arabia made the Berbera base less secure, and therefore less valuable, to the Russians. And at almost the same moment the Ethiopian regime had been given urgent reason to seek a new source of arms, the American supply having been cut off at a time when the Somali attack was clearly impending. So altogether, as I said, the Americans had provided the Russians with both motive and opportunity to effect their reversal of

alliances, cutting their losses in Berbera for the sake of the great new air base they are reported to be building in Ethiopia, plus the chance of new naval facilities they seem now to have received in the Red Sea ports, including Aden. There seems to have been a rash personal message from President Carter to the Somali leader Siad Barre (via the latter's personal physician, who is an American), which the Somalis took as offering encouragement and even a promise, followed by an almost instant American withdrawal when the Kenyans started sending cables of protest. So altogether the Ethiopians, the Somalis and the Kenyans all had reason to regard Washington with anger or resentment. And the Eritreans may have most reason of all to mourn all this, for once the Ethiopians had disposed of the Somali attack they could turn their plentiful new Russian weapons against the Eritreans, and perhaps finally dispose of their liberation forces. (The Russians have given Ethiopia more weapons in a few months than Washington gave in twenty-five years.)

Of course, Moscow may still possibly lose its gamble: it is now charged with betrayal by the Somalis and potentially could be by the Eritreans as well; and the Ethiopian leaders have allegedly already had reason to distrust its intentions. But on the evidence at the moment of writing, Soviet policy makers could conceivably end up in a 'winner-takes-all' situation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea: a reconstituted Ethiopian empire under a Marxist management which will be wholly dependent on Russian and Cuban aid for its survival. And as I said, it seems to me they will owe a good deal of these large strategic gains (the largest probably since the consolidation of the relationship with Cuba in the late 1950s) very substantially to ill-considered Carter initiatives.[1] But in human terms, the greatest cost of the change is again potentially in African lives. The status quo ante Carter may thus be seen to have had its advantages, both for the West and for the local peoples.

Setback to detente

The inevitable obverse of the Soviet 'forward policy' in Africa has been a sharp erosion of the detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. But one has to say that the omens for the detente, *as seen from Moscow,* were unfavourable from the moment the President's appointments were published. Dr. Brzezinski had already put himself on record, with all his usual vigour and clarity, as to the points

[1] For reasons of space, and because they are relatively more familiar, I have omitted any consideration of the Carter administration's policies vis-à-vis Rhodesia. But they seem equally ill-considered. See Charles Douglas-Home's article in *The Times,* June 30, 1978, for a detailed account.

on which he differed from his predecessor in this matter, and what he would hope to do about it:

> Brezhnev too prefers a limited, strictly compartmentalized non-basic detente especially in the economic and strategic fields which are of course inter-related and in which the Soviet Union is extremely vulnerable . . . the Soviet leaders fear a truly comprehensive detente. *They see in it a challenge to their legitimacy and thus to their very existence, and I must say their fears are justified. They are right in diagnosing the danger to them, they are wrong, however, in not realizing that their resistance to change is at odds with the facts of life at the end of the twentieth century* . . . Nixon and Kissinger prided themselves on being less ideologically motivated and more pragmatic than the Kennedys . . . [This] denies American foreign policy an asset which has made that policy so appealing to many people throughout the world . . . it seems to me that we should insist that certain forms of Soviet behaviour, none of them strictly economic, are themselves incompatible with better economic relations.
>
> First: ideological hostility...
> Second: the secrecy surrounding Soviet strategic planning . . .
> Third: indifference to global problems...
> Fourth: the Soviet disregard of human rights...
> Fifth: reciprocity of treatment...
>
> These, then, are some of the areas of strain . . . it is here we could use our economic leverage to best advantage. The Russians will not accommodate us willingly . . . some realistic encouragement of pluralism via nationalism and separatism may be our best answer to the Soviet challenge on the ideological front . . . My hope would be that after the disappearance of the Soviet state, a combination of residual socialism and internationalism would mitigate the power-oriented ambitions of extreme Russian nationalism . . . it has to be our objective to promote, no matter how marginally, that more acceptable alternative.[2]

Talk of the possible disappearance of the Soviet state is heady stuff, especially as broadcast to dissidents in Eastern Europe (you have to be relatively dissident to bother to listen to Radio Free Europe through the jamming). One can see why hackles rise in Moscow at the mention of the National Security Adviser's name. In essence what Dr.

[2] These quotations are from a long interview with Dr. Brzezinski in G. R. Urban (ed.), *Detente* (London: Temple Smith, 1976), pp. 262–280. The interview was originally broadcast to Eastern Europe, on Radio Free Europe. I have had to leave out the interviewer's questions, for reasons of space, but there seems to me no doubt that the phrases I have quoted are those which would leap to the eye of an analyst in Moscow, which is the point I am making here. Italics added.

Brzezinski was saying was that he could and would try to impose a much tougher bargain on the Russians than his predecessor did, for the assumed benefits to them of detente.

But it takes two to make a bargain, and it is not clear how the Soviet leadership could regard detente *on Dr. Brzezinski's interpretation* as any kind of bargain at all. One can almost hear his opposite number in the Kremlin, Mr. Brezhnev's chief diplomatic strategist, in his first post-Carter *tour d'horizon*: We must reduce our expectations of advantage to be secured from detente with the Americans. The hardliners in Congress (Senator Jackson and the others) have already undercut its economic benefits. The new men in the White House have disclosed ambitions to use it to lever us into unacceptable concessions. Moreover opportunities for the enhancement of Soviet influence are opening rapidly in Africa. If we pursue them, we must expect a very rapid erosion of detente. But since the benefits of that option have been reduced anyway and look doubtful for the next four years, the extra loss becomes marginal. Our logical option is therefore the African one.

One must bear in mind the always-valuable distinction between operational and declaratory policy. Soviet *declaratory* policy remains to reaffirm attachment to detente: a stance which provides some public relations benefits and has no costs. An actual *operational* policy of safeguarding detente would entail heavy ' opportunity costs ', from the Russians' point of view, in the matter of restraining their policies in Africa. There is no reason why they should choose that operational policy unless either the rewards from detente look real and substantial, or the penalties from its erosion look very dangerous. The signals from Washington in early 1977—Mr. Carter's rhetoric, Dr. Brzezinski's writings, Congress's attitudes—all made it clear that the ' rewards ' side of the potential bargain was much less than could prospectively be secured for the Soviet national interest through the alternative option. So it was not surprising that the first six months or so of the Carter presidency saw a rapid erosion of the relationship. Since about mid-1978 (Dr. Brzezinski's visit to China) the potential ' costs ' to the Soviet Union of allowing a further erosion of detente with the Americans have been vigorously signalled. Rather heavy-handedly, in fact. Not only is ' the China card ' being clearly flourished, but the ' East European card ' is being carefully allowed to peep from the American shirt-sleeve.[3] There is, I suppose, always a chance that such signals may be effective, but they carry grave dangers and potentially heavy human costs, especially on the East European side.

Both the African policies of the Carter administration and the

[3] See, for instance, a story in *Time*, June 12, 1978.

erosion of detente with the Soviet Union have necessarily affected the President's relations with his West European allies in Nato. These are the most ' special ' of the President's personal diplomatic contacts, in the sense that they test his ability in face-to-face encounters to convince the European leaders, not of his goodwill (which has never been in doubt) but of his understanding, competence, capacity, and authority to be the chief decision maker for the West, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and also vis-à-vis the Third World, which is increasingly able to damage Western interests even without any Soviet involvement. One would not, on the reports, say that he has done particularly well on this front. The West German Chancellor, the British Prime Minister and even the French President are not likely to reflect publicly with any undue candour on their American confrère. But there have been some ' off the record ' leaks, especially from Germany, about the time the neutron bomb issue was being debated. Mr. Callaghan has been moved to some public irritation on Africa policy, and M. Giscard seemed to be implying some sympathy with Mr. Brezhnev when he reported the latter's remark that Mr. Carter had broken the conventions of detente. Policy makers at this level have too much diplomatic experience, and too much at stake in the relation with America, to let the alliance be overtly ruffled. The French have seen in the situation a new chance to bid for Western leadership, especially in Africa, and have taken that chance, with mixed results, in Zaire. The British government will wait it out with patience, though Conservative spokesmen have taken to making disobliging remarks about Mr. Carter in public. The Germans, who are more vulnerable and discommoded than anyone else by the erosion of detente, have had reasons for grumbling more audibly than most, and have done so. As a result, they are currently the object of both French and Soviet wooing, which is ill-omened for Nato.

The search for peace in the Middle East

The other area of American policy most important to the Europeans is the Middle East. Here again one has to contrast good intentions with somewhat dismaying outcomes. In the period before the Israeli general elections, Mr. Carter spoke (with his usual blend of optimism and not-quite-adequate understanding of the nuances in diplomatic language) of an ' overall settlement ' and a ' Palestinian homeland '. Benevolently intended phrases, no doubt, and whether they actually contributed as much as the defeated party says to the victory of Mr. Menachim Begin in the Israeli elections is a moot point. Naturally Mr. Begin himself is eager to endorse the Opposition's argument on this, for it enables him to claim that the election showed how wholeheartedly the Israeli people are behind his policies. But the damage was compounded

by what subsequently happened in Washington. After the first meetings, the President glowingly pronounced on Mr. Begin's alleged reasonableness, thus enhancing his prestige and his already great self-assurance, and leading the Israeli electorate to suppose that he (and they) could get away with his policies—especially as Mr. Carter seems to have said (presumably in pursuit of his general hope for sweetness and light in international politics) that he ruled out restriction of either arms supply or economic aid as modes of pressure on Israel. The impression that Mr. Begin derived from the meeting may reasonably be deduced from the fact that within hours of his return home he legalised some existing illegal Israeli settlements on the West Bank, authorised more, and in general pushed on with the process of annexation of the West Bank—which in his particular variety of messianism is of course Judea and Samaria, the heart of the promised land of Israel.

In the weeks of tussle between Israel and the United States which followed (and continue), Mr. Carter in effect invoked back the Russians, in the Vance-Gromyko statement of October 1977, to help bend the Israelis. But that was hardly more welcome to President Sadat than to Mr. Begin. If the Russians return to a major role in Middle East affairs, his own prestige and even survival will be on the line. His own peace initiative, with the journey to Jerusalem, was certainly a spectacular way of shoving the Geneva Conference (and thus the Russians) back on to the sidelines. But it was a dangerous enough gamble, for the prospect of settlement as well as for his own standing in the Arab world. Less compromise-oriented Arabs can now argue that he conceded every point, and got nothing for it, and that this demonstrates beyond doubt that moderation and diplomatic bargaining will achieve nothing: only war will wrest Arab territory from Israeli hands. Sadat's only consolation is that he has made some dint in American and Israeli opinion. Against that gain one must set the damage to the moderates' case in Arab eyes. President Carter's rather frequent personal statements throughout this episode were far from helpful. As James Reston acidly noted, his was an even-handed policy in the sense that he confused Begin on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and confused Sadat on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays.[4] The outcome of the Camp David meetings had not become clear enough, at the time this article went to press, to indicate whether a settlement could be worked out, but the omens did not seem favourable at the preliminary stages of peace negotiations.

In the crucial question of nuclear proliferation, one could also make a case against the Carter policies. Secret diplomacy and consensus persuasion had earlier set up the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and that

[4] *International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 7, 1978. See also an article by Stanley Karnow, 'Carter's pursuit of Middle Eastern Peace', *ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1978.

in itself was a considerable success, and the potential beginning for other successes. But candid, open pressure in the Carter period, mixed with sudden retreats, has proved counter-productive or at best ambiguous in its outcomes. The Indian case offers an almost comic example. It was in fact the Indian explosion of 1974 which led to the setting-up of the Group (sometimes called the London Club) and in the wake of that explosion various unpublicised and carefully unavowed obstacles were placed in the way of Indian weapons development—' mysterious ' delays in the American pipeline on nuclear fuel, for instance. When Carter was in India, he discussed the matter with Mr. Desai, and got no change out of him, which led to the incident of Carter's instructing Vance (by misadventure, close to an open microphone) that there must be a ' cold and very blunt ' letter to Desai after the effusive bonhomie of the Indian visit was over. But he also removed the inhibitions on the American heavy water and nuclear fuel supply, thus seeming to signal to other threshold-nuclear powers that they could push on with their test explosions without incurring serious American penalties. And after the visit, the Americans in fact wrote a warm diplomatic note: it was Mr. Desai who wrote back a ' cold and blunt ' reply, and carefully publicised the fact in India! So that domestically, for Indian opinion, the signal was that Delhi had stood up to the Americans on this matter, and put them in their place. And internationally, that signal may be read by other threshold-nuclear powers as meaning: if the Indians could push ahead, and, as we see, escape serious long-term American penalties, why not ourselves? The countries which are to some extent in commercial competition with the United States in the nuclear technology business—West Germany, France, Japan, Britain and others—have been inclined to see the heavy-handed pressures of the last two years as disguising a would-be economic monopoly for American enterprises.

Balance sheet on human rights

For many people, any accident-prone quality in the Carter style of diplomacy is wholly redeemed by his efforts on behalf of human rights. If the actual situation of the oppressed (whether in communist party-dictatorships or military and personal autocracies or systems of racial discrimination) had improved in measure with the flow of rhetoric on this matter one would have to agree, whatever the collateral diplomatic damage. But the evidence seems to be to the contrary. Save in weak dependent states in Latin America, the decision makers of the systems whose practices are most pernicious, and who feel themselves most vulnerable to criticism, have reacted with irritation and defiance. The two especially conspicuous areas in which the conventions of Western liberal feeling are disregarded are South Africa and the

communist world as a whole. In South Africa, Mr. Vorster in effect won his landslide victory in 1977 by running against Jimmy Carter. Whatever factors operate for beneficent change in apartheid, direct pressure in the style of the Mondale and Young visits is not one of them. As to the Soviet Union, the situation of the dissidents was reported after a year of the Carter campaign to be worse than it had ever been,[5] and there has been no indication that it has improved since. The issuing of exit visas for Jewish would-be emigrants, which had been raised to 35,000 a year in the period when the matter was carefully *not* being aired in public, has dropped to a fraction of that number.

In the case of China, where in fact the system of government control is far more complete and pervasive than in the Soviet Union, the diplomatic relationship has been shielded as far as possible from the human-rights campaign, at the cost of creating one of the several gaping inconsistencies in it. But even there, the President is to some extent the prisoner of his own rhetoric. For when he ventures to make the so-far delayed move towards normalisation, the Congressional opponents of any such move will be able to use his own arguments, as they protest the 'abandonment' of Taiwan to the government in Peking, whose concepts of the relation between the citizen and the state are never going to be at all like those cherished in Washington.

The West, on whose success in history depends the survival of the liberal political values which are what most people (apparently including Mr. Carter) mean when they talk of human rights, has been, whether one likes it or not, helped to maintain its general ascendancy by alliance with many societies whose grasp of the concept is tenuous or embryonic: for instance Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brazil, and Zaire. The campaign seems likely to increase the internal frictions and external pressures to which those regimes are vulnerable, without doing much for the oppressed. So though it is absolutely desirable that all governments should observe human rights, and more or less inevitable that Western liberal policy makers should equate human rights with Western liberal values, the desirability of one of the super-powers mounting a human rights campaign as part of its diplomatic strategy is open to doubt. What is most worrying about its results is that it has tended to transform public perceptions of the complex battles of international politics—which are both between competing power-systems and between competing systems of values—into an apparently simple conflict between the children of light and the children of darkness. It has thus worked as a kind of moral rearmament campaign for Western—particularly American—opinion. But the climate of opinion so created makes the

[5] *The Times*, Jan. 31, 1977.

diplomatic bargaining—as over SALT—and its ratification far more difficult. To assume that diplomatic cordiality between the United States and the Soviet Union could survive a campaign to which they were inherently so sensitive is rather like assuming you can kick a powerful neighbour sharply on his gouty big toe and still expect his continued co-operation in schemes of mutual advantage.

One could argue that Mr. Carter's frictions with the Soviet leadership, and with the decision makers of many traditional American allies (not only in Europe) have been offset by some gain of American popularity in various Third-World countries. There is certainly the Panama Treaty. Its negotiation was mostly the work of earlier administrations, its ratification was by a hairbreadth, and the regime it was concluded with is hardly a model democracy. But it is something to have it on the books. Not many of the other early objectives have been attained. Arms spending by the West is to go up, not down. (Quite sharply up, if one believes the Nato undertakings.) Arms sales by the United States have risen, not fallen, and was there ever a more directly political arms sale than the Middle East package to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt? (Along with the concomitant decision on the Kfir for Taiwan.) The North-South dialogue seems to be about where it was.

All the morals of this two-year story seem to be distinctly amoral. As someone once said, it is just as well that virtue is its own reward, because it does not attract many others. Perhaps no one ever mentioned to Mr. Carter Talleyrand's famous injunction to novice diplomats: '*Surtout, pas trop de zèle.*' But one might present it more analytically as a case study in the inevitability of linkage—or of the costs of on-the-job training for Presidents.

Finally we must ask: ought we to expect these problems to disappear in the remaining two years of this presidential term? Obviously the President must look for foreign-policy successes in the long run-up to his possible re-election, but that does not mean they will readily come. The sources of the ambiguity in signalling that we have looked at have been threefold: the President's own personality and assumptions, the multiplicity of the advisers and spokesmen he uses, and his situation vis-à-vis Congress. In the forthcoming period there will be yet another: the rival shadow presidents, Republican and possibly Democratic, who are bound to emerge rather earlier than usual because of Carter's low standing in the polls. On the other hand, the initial messianism has largely worn off, and a SALT agreement very close to the one which would have been attainable in 1976 seems again in sight, or possibly a breakthrough in the Vienna talks on conventional arms. Whether either could be ratified in the climate of international opinion which now obtains is something only time can show. A temperate pessimism seems in order.

ADAPTING ECONOMIES TO STRUCTURAL CHANGE: THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT*

William Diebold, Jr.

THE history of the international economic system since the end of the Second World War is largely a story of structural change. The main pieces are familiar: the reshaping of Western Europe, the modernisation of Japan, the growth of Canada, the internationalising of the American economy and the changes in world trade that went with these developments. Industrialisation and even faster growth have brought major structural changes in the communist economies that have not been as fully reflected in their external trade. The rapid though uneven growth of the developing countries and the surging industrialisation of some of them have changed the world. That classic of tropical ports, Singapore, has become an industrial city. Hongkong produces most of what it exports instead of serving only as an entrepôt. Korea competes with Japan. Brazil is a factor to be reckoned with in world markets, not only for coffee but for soy beans, shoes and steel. Statements about how the speed of communication and travel has shrunk the world are no less true for being banal. Technological changes have not only altered how industries work but what they make. There is now mass production of any number of things that did not even exist a few decades ago. Agriculture in the United States and other places has become a capital-intensive activity with one man feeding many more than before. Old truths have died; every schoolboy used to know that to make steel a country had to have coal and iron fairly close together. In our most highly ' industrialised ' countries, fewer than half the workers are engaged in industry (and in the United States only 29 per cent. in 1975).

These structural changes have not simply coincided with great growth and unprecedented levels of income in the democratic industrial countries—they have made that prosperity possible. New technology, shifts in the use of resources within countries and changed patterns of world trade were prerequisites for the levels of production, consumption and leisure that prevailed in the Western world up to 1973. Looking back over these great changes one can reasonably see them as having taken place without traumatic disturbances and with little lasting damage to

* This article is based on a paper prepared for the Bilderberg Meeting at Princeton, New Jersey, April 20–23, 1978. It appears simultaneously in German in *Europa Archiv*, Verlag für Internationale Politik, GmbH (Bonn).

significant groups or areas. Governments have helped to limit that damage and have played some part in furthering the process of structural change. But the underlying dynamism seems to have had deeper causes. The nature of Western society favours change in ways that one may not see altogether clearly but that are identifiable enough in parts. The parts include technological innovation and the private economy's use of it to meet demands, exploit opportunities and make money. Governments have provided security, not done too badly in managing their economies, at least until the last few years, and removed some of the obstacles to change, not least by the unprecedented liberalising of international trade and payments. Those who see matters this way are saying, more or less explicitly, that structural change is on the whole good and that it mostly takes place without great damage or much purposive guidance by public powers. That view is not to be forgotten as we wind our way through an inquiry that will more often than not be concerned with less optimistic views of what is wrong and whether or not it can be set right.

The same facts of postwar history can be viewed differently. Governments, it can be argued, had a much greater role in promoting change: Japan's industrial policy, the guidance of the French *Plan* and the research and development undertaken by the government of the United States. Structural changes did not come about smoothly nor were they altogether welcome. Japan's rise was resisted by trade restrictions and that country is not yet fully accepted in the West. Do the agricultural policies of Europe and North America, with their costs and disputes, fit the picture of flexible societies? Though the industrial countries have helped the growth of the developing countries in some respects, they have hampered it in others. Development is financed, but access to markets is limited. Potentially an innovative device for orderly transition, the cotton textile agreements—now fifteen years old—were extended to woollens and man-made fabrics when they proved not restrictive enough. That pernicious combination of inflation and unemployment called stagflation can hardly be explained except by structural problems, at least in labour markets and probably elsewhere as well. There is a widespread sense that the recession of the mid-1970s is more than a conventional cyclical phenomenon slightly enlarged and may reflect the accumulation of difficulties partly hidden over a period of years.

These doubts about the optimistic, easy-going, rather comfortable view outlined above raise further questions. Is the point only that structural change is not necessarily always benign? Or is the emphasis on the resistances to change that have piled up over the years? Does the analysis argue for more or less government intervention—or simply different policies?

The present situation

Recessions are the best of times and the worst of times for coping with structural issues. On the one hand, trouble brings to the surface difficulties that are often concealed in periods of high demand and makes people think they should do something about them. On the other hand, to do something about long-term problems when immediate issues are so urgent is extremely difficult. The margin for adjustment is thin. Rationalisation—to use an old-fashioned term—is apt to mean reducing the number of jobs, which is anathema to governments during recessions. Moreover, steps taken to deal with pressing problems—say to avoid the failure of a major enterprise—may mortgage the possibilities of reshaping the use of resources in the same field later on. Nor can one find much in a recession that helps to distinguish structural problems from cyclical ones, something that is sometimes easy and sometimes very hard indeed to do.

As a word becomes fashionable, it loses precision and accumulates meanings. Nowadays 'structural' is sometimes used to mean 'big' or 'prolonged', or 'intractable'. Serious structural problems [1] are likely to be all these but there is something else that distinguishes them from the difficulties, however great, that one may reasonably believe to be passing. The essence of the matter is that structural changes involve relatively lasting shifts in the way resources are used. The shift may be cause or effect; the problem may come from accepting or resisting the change. Inevitably, other sets of relations are affected and they have to be treated as part of the structural problems as well. Thus, for example, large changes in a country's balance of payments may be the symptom either of structural change, or of failure to adjust to structural change, or they may be signs of wrong macro-economic (or cyclical) policies, at home or abroad. Uncertainty about what is temporary and what is lasting is in itself part of the problem.

Looking at the current recession, one can be sure that some of the unemployment of people and resources is cyclical and will disappear once aggregate demand is again high enough. But the earlier experience of shortages in skilled labour, accompanied by the heavy concentration of unemployment among minorities and youth, in the United States pointed to structural problems. Something of the same sort seems to be appearing in Europe and Japan. The lag in investment that is both cause and effect of slow recovery is surely attributable in part to uncertainty about where expansion of capacity is warranted and whether modernisation is likely to pay in one field or another. The

[1] And we are only concerned with the serious problems; our economies adjust reasonably well to relatively small and step-by-step changes. For instance, we need not concern ourselves about most changes in relative prices even though they change the structure of prices and may reflect other structural changes as well. But the change of one price, that of oil, is one of our central structural issues.

structural consequences of the world's new energy economy will take time to work out fully. They concern not only adjustment to higher costs and energy saving, but the location of some industries (most obviously petrochemicals), the stimulus to alternative energy sources, changed patterns of demand in producing and consuming countries and the accelerated development of the oil-exporting countries. The Commission of the European Community has no hesitation in speaking of a 'worldwide structural crisis' in steel, shipbuilding and textiles and few observers would question that judgment.[2] More open to debate is the question of how many other industries may also suffer from underlying structural difficulties and when and how these may show themselves. Will automobiles be next?

The international impact of these structural problems intensifies the pressures to foster exports and shut out imports that already come from cyclical factors. The recession heightened the concern in many countries over balance-of-payments difficulties that had started with the rise in the price of oil. But the protectionist pressures of recent years are in some respects different. They stem from the problems of particular industries and areas, not from generalised concern with the balance of payments. Their political impact is sharper. When the oil crisis started, fear of the consequences led to the adoption of the OECD pledge not to resort to beggar-my-neighbour measures which has been remarkably well kept (partly, no doubt, because of reasonably good experience with recycling). The pledge was renewed in June 1978 in spite of the new protectionist pressures. But it is worth speculating why they were most strongly felt, not when the recession was worst, but after there began to be some improvement.[3]

Part of the explanation, no doubt, is simply the continuation of difficulties over an uncomfortably long period of time. Partly, however, it seems as if the persistence of the recession has persuaded many people that full recovery to pre-recession levels is not possible—or at least will take a very long time. There is a connection with the spreading view about the probability of slower growth in the future than in the past thirty years and the sombre thoughts likely to accompany that prospect. There is also a related set of attitudes towards what is acceptable or desirable in the economic life of the advanced industrial coun-

[2] *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No. 11, 1977, p. 9.

[3] Another recognition of the danger is the effort leading governments have made to carry through the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN). The success of these 'efforts' will mean much, but one should note two possible qualifications. (1) If there is little or no liberalisation in the most troubled sectors, such as textiles, steel, and most agricultural products, then the results will do little to help the basic structural problems. (2) While further tariff reductions are valuable, the long-term meaning of the Tokyo Round will depend on what it does in at least starting a process of dealing better than in the past with non-tariff barriers and trade distorting practices, such as government procurement, subsidies, escape clause actions, etc.

tries that are not altogether new but seem to have gained strength as time has passed. All this taken together is only inadequately described as 'protectionism', though it has profound implications for trade liberalisation and long-term structural adjustments.

One of these attitudes may seem implausible at the moment but was quite common before 1973 and will probably reappear. This is the feeling that the Western industrial world has reached a level of such prosperity that the cost of maintaining a certain degree of inefficiency in each national economy is not only quite bearable but preferable to the political and social effort of making further changes that will be resisted by significant parts of the population. The same conclusion is reached by people who believe that the gains that might be obtained from a further liberalisation of world trade are small. Some think this is because the biggest barriers were those removed in the past. Others argue that at the present sophisticated level of technical advancement countries do not gain much from specialisation or further steps in the international division of labour. Everyone can do about as well as everyone else with the same technology, is the reasoning.

While not many people will make an explicit argument that everyone should always be allowed to go on doing what he has always done in the same place he has always done it, there can be no doubt that something like that attitude is implicit in a good bit of social and political behaviour. Perhaps too much has been made of the unwillingness of people to move from place to place, and too little attention given to the consequences of the perfectly natural wish of working men to keep doing what they know how to do best. Obviously, millions of people have changed their work and responded to improved opportunities—but the resistance can be strong. If remuneration and productivity were always closely linked, labour would move from industries where comparative advantage was being lost to new, higher paying activities. Or at least, new workers would stay out of the declining industries. But as recent GATT and ECE studies have emphasised, strong pressures have grown up to retain established patterns of wage differentials. There is also a natural tendency of unions to gear wage demands to costs of living rather than to a worker's productivity. The combination not only slows the shift of labour but contributes directly to inflation, thus setting in motion one more of those vicious circles that are becoming so familiar.[4]

[4] GATT, *International Trade 1976/77* (Geneva, 1977). Richard Blackhurst, Nicholas Marian and Jan Tumlir. *Trade Liberalization, Protectionism and Interdependence* (Geneva: GATT Studies in International Trade, Nov. 1977), No. 5. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), *Structure and Change in European Industry*, prepared by the Secretariat (New York 1977). All three of these reports deal with a number of problems touched on in this paper. They are the sources for otherwise unattributed figures in the paper.

The problem is not just with labour; capital and management also ask for protection and like to go on doing things as they have before. It was said of Britain between the wars that 'the historical evidence . . . suggests that the stickiness of capital rather than the stickiness of labour was most responsible for the rigidity of the economic structure.[5] Whether that has also been the case in recent times and other countries would require further study. It is probably true, however, that in looking for an explanation of structural difficulties 'any attempt to fasten exclusive responsibility upon one factor of production rather than another will almost certainly be misleading . . .' as the author quoted goes on to say. The reluctance of business to invest in an industry in structural difficulties may help to bring about change, but it can also worsen the problem by denying the means of reorganisation.

Another source of resistance to structural change is the belief that a country will lose the capacity to produce some things it has always produced for itself. This is an old fear that hardly needs to be elaborated on. We ought, however, to keep a few facts in mind. It is now generally understood that the reason the creation of the Common Market did not have major disturbing effects is that the expansion of trade took place through specialisation within industries rather than by the replacement of one industry by another. While some of the shifts in world trade have had greater impact and some activities have disappeared entirely from the old industrialised countries, the more usual results involve shrinking certain activities, expanding others, reorganising, and competing in different ways.[6] Arguments that national security requires domestic capacity to produce certain things are familar, but there is room to doubt how much protection can be justified on those grounds when almost every country lacks some essential ingredients. To preserve a way of life, to provide diversity, or to foster some other values than economic efficiency is every society's right, but then it must accept the costs and ought to minimise the burden on others. Change may be costly but so is the failure to change. There is not much doubt that such issues are not being looked at very analytically. It is no great distortion to say that quite a few people seem to be acting tacitly on the assumption that their national economy ought to produce at least

[5] Allan G. B. Fisher, *Economic Progress and Social Security* (London: Macmillan, 1945), p. 76.

[6] Much depends on how broadly one defines an industry. After that there are several factors too often forgotten when we talk sweepingly of an industry as a whole or categorise it as labour-intensive or capital-intensive. In almost any national industry there will be a substantial range between the most efficient and the least efficient producers. Many things can be made by a variety of technologies, some of which provide the industrialised countries with the higher productivity per worker that has traditionally been their offset to wages many times the level in some new producing countries. Some industries thrive only near their markets even if costs of production there are much higher than abroad. The industrial countries maintain a large comparative advantage in some labour-intensive industries provided the labour is of such skill and quality that it is really human capital.

something of almost everything. This is a luxury few countries can indulge in; most have had the possibility taken away from them by nature or by accepting interdependence with its economic gains and accompanying vulnerabilities.

If we take all these observations together (and if they are sound), the structural questions that face the industrial countries have to be thought of in terms much broader than those of international trade and protectionism. We seem to be dealing with a set of attitudes about our mature, rich societies that favours preserving them much as they are (or were before the recession and the oil crises). In that case, many of the key issues that face our countries concern, on the one hand, the consequences of pursuing the kind of conservative course suggested by these attitudes and, on the other, the requirements of a different course of action that would aim to make—or at least facilitate—larger structural changes. It requires no novel insight into the ways of our societies to suggest that neither the one nor the other course will be clearly and consistently chosen and pursued, but a short paper must simplify.

Consequences of the new conservatism

It is easier to delineate this alternative than the other, but even here the issue is blurred by what seem to me to be some misconceptions. For instance, it is widely believed in Western Europe that slower growth will be accompanied by substantial structural unemployment. Of course it may be, but there are reasons to reject the inevitability. In principle it should be possible to maintain full employment—however defined—at any level of growth. Considering how heavily Western Europe has depended on imported labour during these decades of rapid growth, it would appear that there was a considerable margin for adjustment to a slower pace. The real danger, one might think, is that before too long growth would be held down by a lack of labour. Opinions differ as to how many people may move from agriculture to other employment in Western Europe in the next two decades, but there is at least some labour reserve there. One sixth of the manufacturing work force of ten Western European countries is employed in three poorly paid, relatively low productivity industries: textiles, clothing and footwear and leather products.[7] If many of these people could be transferred to higher productivity industries and not replaced by new labour the contribution to production would be substantial.

The expectation of structural unemployment is also linked to the unwillingness of Western European workers to take the poorest paying

[7] ECE, *op. cit.*, p. 92. The figures refer to 1968–70 and vary from 27·5 per cent in Italy (higher than Yugoslavia) to 9·6 per cent in Sweden. In 1958–60 the average was one fifth.

and most menial jobs and the probably related inability of people leaving universities to find employment commensurate with their education. The former difficulty points towards the continued immigration of a class of resident helots; the latter possibility sends out a variety of alarm signals with disturbing historical echoes. Comparable problems exist in the United States, though with important regional differences. Much of the immigration is internal (from Puerto Rico and the south) and the expectation of the experts is that instead of becoming an intellectual proletariat the college graduates will mostly take less good jobs and in the process 'bump' other workers downwards (which may sharpen the competition for the lowest jobs).[8] Inevitably these possibilities pose two quite basic questions. What kind of social security or minimum income should the modern industrial society provide? What is to be expected, in the emerging post-industrial society, of the service sector to which both the unemployed university graduates and the illiterate garbage collectors belong? Much of what has been said on this popular subject is misleading since there are very few generalisations about economic behaviour that apply equally to bankers, barbers, ballerinas and bureaucrats. Most of the statistics people have to work with are also confusing. But the topic is a vital one.

If the new conservatism means that no structural change is possible, then long-term structural unemployment is probably inevitable, along with a higher tax burden for the better-off. If the stress is on people persisting in traditional work and the maintenance of 'normal' differences, then there will also be an additional force making for inflation for the reasons set out above. To maintain existing patterns will require not only protection against imports but, probably, measures to restrain domestic competition and the introduction of new labour-saving technology so as both to protect traditional jobs and maintain incomes regardless of productivity. The cost and difficulty of such measures may be the principal safeguard against the stagnation that would otherwise be the consequence of this course of action.

If the industrial countries combined minimal change in industrial structure with slow economic growth, they could hardly avoid losing competitive advantage in one branch of industry after another to producers that accepted a faster pace of change, whether they were developing countries, Japan, other industrial market economies or, in some sectors, communist countries. Thus the conservative course will create balance-of-trade problems and cut down the income to be divided. While a shrinking population will reduce the impact on

[8] US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *US Long-term Economic Growth Prospects: Entering a New Era* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 5, 39–45.

individual incomes, expectations of improvement will intensify the struggle for the social product (to paraphrase the title of Helmut Schmidt's article in *Foreign Affairs* [9]). This will throw sharply into focus policies concerned with equity, minimum living standards and the provision of public goods. Each society will have to take care of these problems for itself, but for all of them it is true that concern with fair shares puts a new emphasis on the amount there is to be distributed and therefore on efficiency in production, and that that in turn concerns the international division of labour as well as the productivity of domestic producers.

There is, in short, a contradiction between maintaining customary levels of income and resisting structural change in the national economy. To resolve it, the new conservatism would have to become the new egalitarianism, redistributing a static or declining product among a static or declining population (minus what had to be paid to imported workers). At least so far as the United States is concerned, this is so implausible as to need no further exploration. One would assume it was also true of most European countries unless they greatly improved their ability to live as *rentiers* (Norway from its oil?) or lowered expectations in the face of a Malthusian menace. The avoidance of these consequences through increased productivity perfectly paced to permit a static pattern of employment and no loss of income can also be dismissed, though it is clearly the right target for any government committed to keeping at least a facsimile of the status quo.

Even if the internal problems created by the new conservatism could be resolved, would the industrial countries be able to live with the external effects? What these are is implicit in what has already been said. The most obvious is the refusal to give ground to foreign producers in relatively inefficient industries and hence more protectionism—probably over a wider range of products as time passes. The importance of this stance to the developing countries is clear if we simply recall that 35 per cent. of what the non oil-exporting less-developed countries (LDCs) sent to the OECD countries in 1976 was manufactured goods.[10] As some of this flow comes from plants established by multinational corporations producing for the OECD market, there would be some tendency for foreign investment to decline as well (if the conservative policy were general in the OECD countries). Development lending by the World Bank and other institutions would have to take account of this limitation of markets. There would be further repercussions as LDCs lost purchasing power for the products of Europe and North America. In capital goods required for development, the old producers would hold their advantages longer than in other fields.

[9] 'The Struggle for the World Product', April 1974.
[10] GATT, *International Trade 1976/77*, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

There would be some compensatory factors for the LDCs. The industrial countries would become increasingly uncompetitive over a wider range of products, leaving room for LDC industries at home and abroad. The effort to keep up OECD exports might also create pressures for generous financing of the sale of capital goods and then to forgive debts or roll them over. Food supplies might remain relatively plentiful and cheap if the new conservatism led to a continuation in the Community and the United States of farm policies that tended to produce surpluses as a result of limiting pressures for change on farmers and slowing the growth of the domestic market for their products. One could spin out these possibilities further; think of the implications of China's embarking on a major development policy using outside resources but paying its way as much as possible. It can all be summed up, however, by saying that pursuit of the kind of new conservatism sketched here would move fairly far towards trying to insulate the countries that practised it from structural change in the world economy and would reduce their ability, and probably their will, to contribute to the improvement of the position of the developing countries in the world economy, either through the transfer of resources or the opening of new opportunities for the developing countries.

Very likely all this is a caricature. Certainly few advocates of the different views put together here want the results I have sketched. It has not been my intention to bias the argument, but it is hard to avoid most of the conclusions suggested unless one assumes that people would change course once they saw what was happening.

The requirements of accepting change

If the West is to adopt the opposite course, it will also face many difficulties. Simply to say we should accept structural change as necessary or desirable would be to wish away the basic problem we now face. Instead, we need to see what would have to be done to find ways to: (1) make structural changes more acceptable by easing the burdens and dislocations that go with them; (2) facilitate and induce desirable structural changes where they encounter obstacles; (3) cope internationally with problems that cannot be confined to national borders; and, finally, (4) provide some rational way of dealing with the cases in which a society accepts the economic cost of preserving some of its structures and ways of doing things but should not thereby put burdens on other countries or stand in the way of their achieving their different goals and values.

It would be foolish to try to write so ambitious a programme in one short paper. This section merely sketches a few central but rather difficult issues that our countries will have to face sooner or later. Let

us accept for the sake of argument the widely held belief that for some time to come growth will be slower. The OECD countries can live quite decently with that prospect but they ought not to do things that block growth in the poor countries. And if growth is faster than expected—the conventional wisdom has been wrong before—the problems of structural adjustment will be easier to deal with.

It can be taken for granted that governments need means of easing adjustments and helping those hurt by the resulting dislocation. The deficiencies of most national systems are real enough, but the principles are clear. The American measures work better than they used to do, but are quite inadequate for the problems, partly because import competition is treated differently from other sources of change. Internationally, there is a need for better international surveillance of the use of safeguard clauses and more pressure on a country to use the time granted for adjustment. The Multilateral Trade Negotiations are supposed to deal with these issues and we need not explore them in detail.

A much less discussed aspect of adjustment assistance—which also pertains to regional policies—is how to decide what to do with labour and other resources that are helped to move out of declining industries. If there were one sick industry and all the rest were thriving, one might think the market would take care of the matter so long as the workers were given extra help and, if necessary, retraining. But if there are a number of industries in difficulties and the government has to encourage new investment by tax relief, loans or something else, it must also have some responsibility for being sure that the new activities do not soon become a renewed problem in structural adjustment. Are official lists of rising and falling industries enough—the one to be encouraged and the other not? How good are we at this kind of thing? In the early 1960s many thought that the future of American cotton textile workers would be assured if they were trained to work in electronics plants.

If, as is often the case, the same industries are giving trouble in a number of countries and they all 'adjust' by moving into the same new fields, they may have embarked on new collision courses. Increased new competition in the world market is one thing, government-aided investment in surplus capacity and then in forcing exports is another. If adjustment takes place within an international industry, questions come up about the degree to which what is done in one major centre could possibly be co-ordinated in some fashion with what is done elsewhere. To be concrete: the Community's plans for its steel industry seem to look towards adjustment in capacity and structure over a period of years; similar possibilities for the United States are suggested by

passages in the Solomon report.[11] Unless each of these processes takes account of the other they may simply set the stage for another round of difficulties. And that will surely happen if the Japanese are not brought in. If the evidence of structural difficulties touched on earlier is sound, steel will not be the last of the industries to cause trouble. Clearly, the possibility of fitting national industrial policies together internationally—for which we are now totally unequipped—needs serious exploration.

Many people will draw back from such suggestions because they will see in them 'planning', and international planning at that. They are not altogether wrong. The logic moves towards planning. One may not like that, knowing how badly equipped our governments are to determine the best use of resources. And one may totally reject thoroughgoing planning and anything approaching a command economy. But can it really be sensible to say we shall act only on the negative and leave the positive to take care of itself? It is also not altogether fair to saddle this approach with the charge of total planning and its horrors. The prescription applies to specific cases, those for which other means have failed. There might be only one or two of them at a time. It is true, however, that sector agreements among governments concerning major industries that they are all reluctant to abandon to market forces have a strong family resemblance to cartels—or will have if they are not subjected to a certain play of market forces, from inside or outside.

Little is gained by repeating the virtues of market forces; unwillingness to accept them is what causes governments to resort to protectionist measures in the first place. Nor is it altogether clear that market forces are adequate to do all the expanding and contracting of industries and their sensible relocation that is called for by long-term needs. Some thirty-odd years ago a prescient student of these matters said:

> The most feasible and also the most constructive alternative to restrictive intervention by the State is not non-intervention (*laissez-faire*), but intervention of a more constructive kind—namely, a positive programme of industrial adaptation. Such a programme would be designed to assist industry and labour in reorienting themselves, so that they can take maximum advantage of new opportunities. In this way the enterprise and initiative of citizens will be preserved and will be exerted in the most promising directions The results of such a programme, assuming that it is successful, might well be in many (but not all) respects similar to that which the automatic market system would accomplish if it were

[11] Report to the President, *A Comprehensive Program for the Steel Industry*. Anthony M. Solomon, Chairman, Task Force (mimeographed).

> able to function with the theoretical perfection assumed in older text books. But the process of adjustment ought to go forward with more attention to the human problems of the individuals directly involved and with less infliction of suffering on particular groups.[12]

We do not seem to have moved very far in the direction that Eugene Staley pointed. We lack an approach to industrial adaptation that gives priority to the public interest and keeps both the benefits of private initiative and the pressure of competition. If we do not wish to get involved in comprehensive planning or rely entirely on market forces, our mixed systems will have to produce some combination of regulation and government-business co-operation.

It might be said we have had a good bit of experience with such measures in the last few decades: France's *Plan*, Japan's industrial policy, and even Germany's *Konzertierte Aktion*. But in all these countries we find serious doubts that such methods will be effective in dealing with new problems—or are coping adequately with those of today. One wonders if these breakdowns reflect a deeper inability of governments, business, and labour to deal with structural change.

If the emphasis is on government co-operation with business, the United States is probably worst off among the major OECD countries. Its history, traditions and laws make government-business co-operation a rarity and severely limit co-operation among business firms. Officials and businessmen both feel that something should be done, but often turn out to mean quite different things. Both cyclical and structural difficulties have stirred a new interest in better means of consultation and the inclusion of organised labour in the process. It is far from clear whether anything will come of this interest, but a better test case than usual is the Solomon Committee's proposal for 'a tripartite committee of industry, labour and government representatives as a mechanism to ensure a continuing co-operative approach to the problems and progress of the steel industry'.[13]

Many people are suspicious of government-business co-operation for fear of bureaucratic dictation, corporatism, undue business influence on public policy or simply too much distortion of market forces. Others doubt its effectiveness. An alternative approach, or perhaps a supplementary one, is to try to make markets work better. At one level one encounters deep differences among traditional views of what is desirable in competition: old-line American anti-trust versus Community merger policy; arguments that assume classical atomistic competition versus the imperfect but very real competition of oligopolies; the ques-

[12] Eugene Staley, *World Economic Development: Effects on Advanced Industrial Countries* (Montreal: International Labour Office, 1944), ILO Studies and Reports, No. 36, p. 177.
[13] Solomon, *op. cit.*, p 35.

tion whether monopolies are inherently bad or only when they abuse their power; the view that government corporations can stimulate competition versus the assumption that they will stifle private activity. These and other disputes all have a history that may be coming to life again, in part because some of the complaints of developing countries, especially about technology transfer, revive old complaints about restrictive business practices while the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has demonstrated that cartelising impulses do not always go wrong.

A different approach to improving markets concerns international trade. How much can be done to overcome structural difficulties by the further removal of trade barriers? Quite a lot, is one answer, when one realises that some of the main difficulties come from cases in which trade has remained quite restricted. Very little, is another answer, if we take the view that the reason for this is that the freer flow of trade has brought on pressures for faster change than is politically and socially acceptable—or that it is feared that this would happen. Those who say free trade has had its day confuse the issue. Trade without tariffs and quotas is not free trade and even tariff-free trade is fairly exceptional. There is no doubt, however, that 'fair trade' rises in importance along with the volume of international trade. But there is no agreed definition of fair trade; that is something that can only be worked out by the international community as it makes rules on subjects far more complicated than tariffs and quotas, *i.e.*, on subsidies, government procurement, tax concessions, pricing practices and so on. This will only be done piecemeal and with difficulty but, if it is not done, the present degree of freedom of trade is not likely to survive. The subject leads too far afield to be pursued here, but I suggest that the deeper one gets into the matter of fair trade, the closer one will come to other efforts to deal with structural problems and vice versa.

In the minds of many people the only constructive approach to the stubborn problems of structural change is a positive one. Instead of resisting, defending and easing adjustment, the government should promote change. In addition to what is done by macroeconomic policy to keep up aggregate demand, check inflation and maintain stability along with growth, the government should find ways of encouraging those kinds of activities that have a promising future. Financial aid and measures directing the flow of investment capital are likely to be the means. The targets have often been the creation of high technology industries, those incorporating new methods and calling for skilled labour and those creating the kind of demand that the rest of the economy is adept at filling. But how successful has experience been? We are back, in part, at the earlier doubt of whether our governments are very well equipped to make these choices and forecasts. To get

around that difficulty, some would recommend a stress on research and development, with heavy government aid, on the theory that the process will point the way to new goals and provide means that entrepreneurs could turn into new industrial ventures that would assure competitiveness by being ahead of the rest of the world. This is not the place to go into the fascinating questions about the design and conduct of governmental programmes for science and technology but one has to insert a small note of scepticism as to whether our experience with efforts of this sort that are directed to problems of industrial advance is greatly encouraging.

Where positive measures have stimulated the building of new industries is in the developing countries. Much of the stimulus comes from private investment and publicly financed development agencies, national and international. That these activities have contributed to the problems of industrial adjustment all over the world is obvious. There is no need to repeat things said earlier about the links, but one looks in vain for promising efforts to match up processes of growth and decline. The World Bank seems an obvious centre. So are the multinational corporations. Governments, in developing and industrial countries alike, seem to be getting more sophisticated in finding ways to ensure that the behaviour of the multinationals contributes to the results the countries want—but that is not very often to help solve the problem of structural change. Sometimes a large firm is sufficiently diversified so that it is in expanding and contracting industries at once, and so might help to balance a process of adaptation. Businessmen are not likely to welcome this role, but some such activity might turn out to be part of the price of avoiding greater restrictions. The field seems open for imaginative invention that will use both trade and financial measures to ease these difficult but desirable transitions. Good ideas on this subject are hard to find and every course that looks at all practical carries with it considerable risks.[14] One of the clearest is an increase in divisions among the industrial countries as each tries to work out its own arrangements with selected developing countries—including OPEC and the raw material producers.[15]

Vital as the international problems are, they can only be coped with if each country—or at least the major ones—can overcome its greatest domestic difficulties. Job security in some form seems essential if there is to be political and social acceptance of better adaptation to

[14] The statement is based on experience with work on these subjects in the 1980s Project of the Council on Foreign Relations for which I have written *Industrial Policy as an International Issue* (McGraw Hill for the CFR forthcoming). The Trilateral Commission and the Atlantic Institute have also begun consideration of some of them. I owe a debt to many people involved in these activities for ideas in this paper.

[15] Still another kind of structural change is under way in the international raw materials industry involving not only the use of resources—the location of processing plants—but also ownership, control, the organisation of markets and, in many cases, the elimination of vertical integration.

structural change. But as the discussion of the new conservatism sho to insist on no change in employment means that in the long rur security becomes little more than the chance to finish off one's ca in a declining industry in a depressed area at low wages. The Japa have managed extraordinarily well to combine 'lifetime employm and worker willingness to do different jobs without loss of pay. ' their system is coming under strain in recession is natural, bu strengths ought to be looked at in the West and not dismissed as sin something peculiar to an exotic society. The Swedes are everyc example of the effectiveness of an active labour market policy free society and the figures are impressive. Between 1958–60 1968–70 they reduced the share of their manufacturing employr in three labour-intensive industries from 14·2 to 9·6 per cent., ' fairly well ahead of all other Western European countries (ex Norway which is close). What is possible in one country is not alv possible in another, but there is a common problem. And if the an: is not to provide job security plus adaptation then it must be s form of maintenance for the unemployed at the expense of those jobs. Then the vital question is who is to fall into which category. of the awful things about job security in times of recession is that tc extent it is provided it reduces security for those who have no j which just now means the young.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to provoke discussion and thou Its method has been to point to difficulties, very many difficultie: the paper had been longer so would the list, as there is no assura of a happy ending if one only reads far enough. Whether challenges inspire effort, or the possible gains seem worth working becomes almost a matter of personal chemistry. The failure to at the problems of structural change has reasonably predictable glo results. It would be irresponsible to argue that therefore an effoı attack them was bound to lead to something better—but it might.

'SYMBIOTIC INSURGENCY' IN VIETNAM TEN YEARS AFTER

Dennis Duncanson

A DECADE has passed since Chatham House published my *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*[1] as its one treatise on the second Indochina war in succession to Donald Lancaster's *Emancipation of French Indochina*[2] on the first. On all hands the book was acknowledged, graciously or grudgingly, to be important for discussion of the obscurities and of the rights and wrongs of what was fast becoming the decisive campaign of the cold war. But publication fell ten days before the communists' 1968 New-Year offensive; as a result, although the book stopped short on the eve of that spectacular event (which brought the phase of the struggle it covered to an end), the reviews of it reflected a swing in Western, especially American, public opinion 'against the war'—against conscription to man the televised shot and shell. Two thirds of the five-score reviews were complimentary, but the proportion of critical ones was greater among those which appeared later, after the peace talks had got going in riot-torn Paris, than among those which appeared early.

The book was not primarily about the communist movement in Vietnam but an account of the country's modern political development in face of the communist challenge for power, and of my five years' observation on the spot of the performance of American technical assistants, civilian or military, drafted to succour South Vietnam's post-1954 administrations; ambitiously, I tried to place my observations in the wider political culture of the Sino-Vietnamese world, though not in the history of the international communist movement, fully explored for Chatham House in the recent past by the late J. H. Brimmell.[3] With such a controversial subject, it was natural for polemical reviewers to look first at which side I was on and to praise or blame me for my materialist analysis of Vietnamese Marxism-Leninism. Two critics found in my reason for not examining

[1] Dennis J. Duncanson (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the RIIA 1968). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1968, p. 827.
[2] London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1961. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1961, p. 403.
[3] *Communism in South East Asia* (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1959). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1961, p. 262.

the administration of North Vietnam (lack of information) a sign of anti-communist prejudice, whilst a third judged my remark that Ngo Dinh Diem had good points as well as bad (listed as to both nature and effect) clear evidence of bias: objectivity would have called for condemnation of him out of hand. In fact, some authors of multiple reviews implied that my stated distaste for the establishment of communist-party rule in Indochina made me less trustworthy as a witness than writers who desired a communist victory.

As a former colonial administrator and not a professional political scientist, I hoped for more professional criticism than was forthcoming; one eminent political scientist did consider the book approvingly in this framework, though only in a short newspaper article. But when it came to the 'learned journals', the young lady *critique* of the *Bulletin de l'École Française de l'Extrême Orient* barely hazarded her toe in the water when she charged me with 'mishandling concepts' (unspecified) and blamed me for using an English term she held to be invalidated by lack of a French equivalent, whilst the reviewer in *International Affairs* reproached me for writing from experience and pooh-poohed my statement that the Vietnamese communists had pressed recruits into guerrilla units, on a general political-science *ipse dixit* that conscripts always 'lack courage and tenacity', whereas the Vietcong had manifested both. Similarly in the field of history: the American *Political Science Quarterly* reviewer rejected my short explanation of the breakup of the T'ang empire in China because it contradicted the conventional historiography of Vietnam, and I was told by a professor of international history during a seminar I gave at an institute at Djakarta that my exposition of the decolonisation of Indochina, however strong my evidence, must be rejected because it carried damaging implications for the national myth of *Indonesia.*

My reason for returning to these questions is that, first, the construction of the edifice of communist power in Indochina has been a *chef d'oeuvre* of statecraft, meriting thorough analysis, and secondly, for such analysis, we have at our disposal today the perspective of ten years' more history, unwonted Party frankness—after years of secrecy and prevarication—about how victory was won, and a great accretion of documents that can be brought to bear as historical sources: for example, the pre-war French colonial-office files and countless captured Party communications. (I do not include the Pentagon Papers because they pay little attention to the enemy their authors were contending with.) We have the penetrating inquiries and research of authors like Drs. Race, Andrews, Sansom, Berman and Hosmer (quoted below), and I have myself come across sources which existed in 1967 but which I did not know about—for example, those that disclose the significance of Ho Chi Minh's detention in Hong

Kong[4] and the help that that leader received from the Office of Strategic Services in projecting himself to the Hanoi public in 1945.[5]

Not that new information always resolves old doubts: for instance, I advanced the suggestion that Ngo Dinh Nhu harboured an ambition to do a deal with Ho Chi Minh whereby he would succeed him as ruler of a united Vietnam; of Nhu's two closest confidants, now exiles, one endorses it and the other contradicts it. There are points that could have been made more of: for example, parallels between the policies of Ho Chi Minh and Ngo Dinh Diem over the marriage law, which the latter copied from the former, whereas his numerous foreign critics took it to be his sister-in-law's invention, inspired by despotic bigotry, and a contributory cause of communist militancy; or again, the highland settlement policies of 'ethnic assimilation', much criticised in the case of the South though not of the North working in the same direction. On the other hand, I could not know while I was writing that the ill-famed Law 10 of 1959, under which, most 'tyrannically' of all, Diem decreed military jurisdiction and inappellable capital punishment for aiding and abetting acts of terrorism, had its analogue in 'longstanding regulations' under Ho which punished similarly anybody who even questioned execution of 'revolutionary tasks in the South'.[6] Since the question is still not understood in discussion of Indochina, I ought to have gone deeper into the daunting 'no-win' difficulties of defence against 'no-lose' guerrilla warfare, as well as the political factors that rendered vain President Johnson's hope of finding a scale of punitive bombing against North Vietnam that would halt the intervention in the South without breaking Dulles's Geneva promise not to topple the communist regime by force. Marxism-Leninism itself puts in doubt the gallantry of 'freedom-fighting' invoked by my Marxist critics under both heads.

In reconsidering the battles of the 1960s it is appropriate to concentrate more on the revolutionaries than on the resistance to them. The Vietnamese Party has always honoured Lenin, but victory in 1975 evoked more fulsome tributes than ever to the Master, strict adherence to whose maxims and example had been the one key to progress from nothing to total power. In the light of later information and of these tributes to doctrine, there are five issues aired in *Government and Revolution* which deserve re-examination: 1. the directing hand behind the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; 2. the room for compromise, for neutralism or neutrality, and for a

[4] See Dennis J. Duncanson, 'Ho Chi Minh in Hong Kong, 1931–32' *China Quarterly*, No. 57, 1974, pp. 84–100.

[5] See *Lugano Review* No. 5 of 1975; also the testimony of Major A. Patti in the BBC broadcasts 'Many Reasons Why' of Sept. 18, 1977 and July 14, 1978.

[6] Reported as 'codified henceforward in a single decree' in *Nhan Dan* (The People), Hanoi, 21 March 1968.

'political solution'; 3. the generally-accepted communist claim to be the embodiment of Vietnamese nationalism; 4. the contribution made to communist victory by the wickedness of the Diem government and its successors; and 5. the validity of the concept of *symbiotic insurgency* which lay at the core of the book. By way of conclusion, I shall consider the people's war years I wrote about in the longer strategic history of the Vietnamese conflict.

Control of the NFLSV

The spontaneity of the insurrection in South Vietnam, 'contrary to Hanoi's injunctions', was asserted by the publicity of the international communist movement and also cogently argued, on circumstantial evidence, by Professors Devillers and Mus, as well as Kahin and Lewis[7]; I found on the American campuses I visited in the spring of 1968 that these writers' arguments had a strong appeal for American students of 'draftable' age attracted to the conclusion that the war was a bad thing for the United States to intervene in. Yet 'spontaneity' (akin to 'economism') in revolutionary action was totally repugnant to Lenin, whose revision of Marx turned instead on the principle of 'voluntarism'—that is to say, direction by a ruthless and secret 'conspiracy' nurtured outside the country[8]; the presumption therefore was not that the NFLSV was spontaneous unless a Hanoi link could be proved but the opposite. Today, in addition to the positive evidence about that link already included in *Government and Revolution*, we have a statement '*We* mobilised the masses to rise up and wage the revolutionary war' from the secretary-general of the Hanoi Party, Le Duan, successor to Ho Chi Minh,[9] besides one from the present foreign minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, that the formula, 'The North merely provides support for the South [was] used on a temporary basis' but was never true, since 'the North fought alongside the South at all stages of combat—in every campaign and every battle'.[10]

The story of the formal resolution of the Central Committee at its 19th plenum in 1959 to start up the people's war in the South again has become matter for boast, as has the development of the Ho Chi Minh trail by which men and weapons could be moved thither from the North. It is hard to think what the sentence in a newspaper article, 'The

[7] Phillippe Devillers, 'The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam', *China Quarterly*, No. 9, 1962, etc.; George McTurnan Kahin and John Wilson Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam* (New York: Dial Press, 1967), p. 120. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1968, p. 377. The late Paul Mus disseminated his ideas *ex cathedra* from Yale.

[8] *What is to be Done?* (London, 1902).

[9] *Tuyen Huan* (Propaganda), July–August 1972.

[10] *Mien Bac Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Trong Qua Trinh Thuc Hien Hai Nhiem Vu Chien Luoc* (How the Socialist North accomplishes its Two Strategic Tasks [that is, collectivisation of the North and unification of the South]), Hanoi 1976, p. 34.

Party must intensify its activities in the highlands of the North in order . . . to promote the influence of the North over the ethnic minorities of the South'[11] can mean if not that Hanoi was indeed responsible for the armed disturbances in the tribal areas of Annam as the Diem government complained to the International Control Commission; the military nature of the activities alluded to is borne out by the assertion, 'The People's Army has been the main tool of force of the dictatorship of the proletariat fulfilling the strategic tasks set by the Party for every stage of the revolution.'[12] The official 'founding' of the NFLSV (an entity not necessarily more substantial than a radio announcement) dates from after these military preparations; according to inside testimony, the Front was simply a device for concealing that the direction of them lay with the Party in Hanoi.[13] The contention of the South Vietnamese that the authority attributed in communist publicity to the NFLSV was in reality vested in the Central (i.e. pertaining to the Politburo) Office for South Vietnam, and that Maître Nguyen Huu Tho of the former was a front man for Comrade Pham Hung, 'member of the Politburo and secretary of the Party branch in the South', is borne out by the memoirs of the communist commander-in-chief.[14]

Neutrals, third forces, and coalitions

Already before publication, *Government and Revolution* had been criticised inside Chatham House for the opening remark, 'In the Vietnamese conflict there is no longer a neutral position', and several reviewers picked on this blunt challenge to wishful thinking as proof of the author's intransigence, if not cynicism. Again, Leninism provides general support for it: the object of revolution—in Vietnamese writing as explicitly as in Russian or Chinese—is to seat a communist party in power in the state permanently, not some object short of that, and any manoeuvre which derogates from ultimate attainment of full power is to be condemned as a 'strategic compromise'. The question is in part practical: what compromise is possible between total social control and an open society, between a collectivised economy managed by the Party and a free-market economy? What the Party *can* tolerate, however, and indeed must, is flexible *tactical* compromise over 'minimum programmes'—the better to make sure of the 'maximum programme' in the long run—with any

[11] *Nhan Dan*, April 19, 1959.
[12] *Ibid.*, Oct. 18, 1976.
[13] Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An*: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 122 and 158. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1972, p. 529.
[14] Van Tien Dung, *Our Great Spring Victory*, London and New York (Monthly Review), 1977, pp. 21 and 148 ff.

'neutrals' who may be available or can be talked into that position. It is not surprising that major victories like Geneva 1954 and the fall of Saigon have been followed by purges of thousands of front, and even Party, members for whom, as temporary allies, there was no further need. This basic doctrine, taken from Lenin's *Left-Wing Communism, an infantile disorder*, did not feature in discussion of *Government and Revolution*; I was at fault in missing an authoritative Hanoi declaration based on it: 'In resolute pursuit of our strategy, the Party has cleverly adjusted its tactics to take advantage of regional or temporary contradictions among the enemy and sow discord among them. We have joined up with anybody willing, winning over some and neutralising others, so as to isolate the imperialists from their most dangerous lackeys and thereby concentrate attacks and pick them off. Our founding of [various fronts] and [coming to terms with the French] in 1946, as well as our current NFLSV policy of declaring the aims of independence, democracy, peace, neutrality and that sort of thing—all these have been skilful applications of Leninism'.[15]

Like the Geneva Agreement of 1954, the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement was to belong in this framework, and with it the fate of the Saigon 'Third Force', which did not exist but had to be recruited 'with perseverance'[16] before the Party was willing to take part in the elections for the coalition government prescribed in the Agreement; the few 'willing' neutrals turned out to be either crypto-communists like Maître (Mme) Ngo Ba Thanh[17] or self-appointed 'neutralists', like Maître Tran Van Tuyen, Fr. Tran Huu Thanh and the Buddhist National Reconciliation Force headed by bonze Thich Tri Quang (instigator of the immolations in 1963 in protest against Ngo Dinh Diem); after the revolution, the second group faced the same detention as the *I Shih Pao* Third Force in People's China in the 1950s.[18] The 'coalition government', which Hanoi offered Saigon at Paris as a 'political solution' to the war, was clearly to be understood as identical in purpose with Mao Tse-tung's offer to Chiang Kai-shek in 1945[19]—not a 'strategic compromise' of the Party's 'maximum programme', but a temporary 'tactical compromise' leading to the same result 'stage by stage'. In other words, all that was wrong with my 'cynical' opening remark was its incautious implication that there ever had been a middle road option available in the past.

[15] *Hoc Tap* (Study), Hanoi, September 1966.

[16] Hoang Quoc Viet (Politburo) interviewed by *Rinascita* (Rome), Nov. 16, 1973.

[17] Self-revealed after victory (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 1, 1975, pp. 20–21), and now, with the courts closed, an advocate of 're-education' for the defeated—interview in *New Times*, Moscow, March 1978.

[18] Report of André Tong, 'Le "Goulag" du Vietnam', *Est et Ouest*, No. 611, March 16–31, 1978, pp. 14–16.

[19] 'On Coalition Government', read to VIIth Congress of the CCP, April 1945.

Nationalism

While not denying the genuineness of nationalism and patriotism in some quarters, I was sceptical about such sentiments as an explanation of civil war, and especially about the communist claim to be moved by them; in consequence, one Marxist reviewer (among several non-communists) took me to task for 'lack of comprehension . . . that men can be Marxist-Leninists and at the same time nationalists'. Yet, according to Lenin, 'Marxism is irreconcilable with nationalism', and any reader of Marx can see why. In Vietnam, the Party has blown hot and cold over nationalism for forty years in step with the international communist movement, guided by Lenin's tactical exploitation of nationalist slogans as a pretext at certain times; but all through the second Indochina war, and still today, the ICP/VWP/VCP has had recourse to it, in the first place in propaganda directed at public opinion in the non-communist world (more willing to condone violence in the name of patriotism than in the name of class struggle), and in the second place at home, not as an appeal to people free to choose, but as a justification for imposing on the reluctant masses the rigours of a socialist transformation whose object is not so much their social or economic betterment as the maintenance of political control by the Party.[20] In a world of nation-states, even communist power is inevitably bounded by national horizons—'socialism in single countries'. The question who in a former land empire qualifies as a full nation-state and who simply as an 'autonomous nationality' exercised Lenin continuously on the eve of the October Revolution, has been fought over in Tibet, and underlies the post-victory war between Democratic Cambodia and Socialist Vietnam; but there is no evidence to support nationalist 'spontaneity' in these disputes on the part of the common people—they all smack of ambitious 'voluntarism' on the part of the power-holders.

Recruiters of guerrillas for the NFLSV in my time in Vietnam argued their cause on nationalist grounds; but so did recruiters of government forces, which greatly outnumbered the guerrillas. Therefore, either nationalism was irrelevant to joining up, or, if one postulates a 'true nationalism' identified with hatred for American intervention (not a factor before 1965), it was at most a minority sentiment not representative of the majority popular will. There were volunteers on both sides, including men drawn in by personal relations, 'gradual commitment', blackmail, capture and conditional release, accident, and so on—especially at the beginning—and on both sides

[20] That the majority of the South Vietnamese people did not want to be absorbed into the Socialist North has been admitted by prime minister Pham Van Dong, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 12, 1975. For the Party's motive in socialist transformation, see *Saigon Giai Phong* (Liberated Saigon), August 22, 1976.

'coercion went with persuasion'[21]; the exemplary brutality the communists sometimes employed in order to command obedience of every kind from hesitant South Vietnamese peasants, interwoven with the democratic centralism of their Party and the unit discipline of their guerrillas, were constantly talked about in my day and have since been fully documented by Stephen Hosmer.[22] As for the 'courage and tenacity' of pressed men, Nelson's tars had plenty of both; in Vietnam neither fighting force had a monopoly of either bravery or cowardice, but tenacity was a quality required continually of the defence, very rarely of the guerrillas, whose tactics, in both theory and practice, were only to attack when locally in overwhelming strength and to withdraw immediately the deed was done. Bourgeois chivalry is not a quality prized in people's war, for which the Horatian tag ought to be reworded 'Dulce et decorum est pro patria *caedere*'.

Grievances against the government

The shortcomings of Ngo Dinh Diem, his successors, and their American supporters were certainly not glossed over in *Government and Revolution*; nearly half of it was devoted to cataloguing them and their effect on the course of the war as I saw it. Several reviewers, however, Marxists and others, disliked the way I saw it. Little new information has come to light on the Diem period since 1968, but the question of social factors in revolution is too central to the discussion not to be raised at this point. Critics disliked my rejection of the original sin of all colonial rule and tended to adopt a providential view of politics in general: if a government falls from power it must be unpopular and guilty of social injustice; if its army suffers reverses, the soldiers' hearts cannot be in the war. My contention, on the other hand, was that the significant factor was not government wickedness so much as government inefficiency.

In the literature on South Vietnam, the principal grounds for public grievance are deemed to have been fourfold: exploitative land tenure, imprisonment without trial, suppression of village democracy under the regime of the strategic hamlets, and official corruption; yet, grievous though the latter two evils were, it is still difficult, in spite of more recent research, to substantiate a correlation between any of these and voluntary adherence out of disgust to the guerrilla forces. Circumstantial evidence tells against the argument that these factors were of help to communist recruitment for the following reasons.

[21] Lenin policy extolled at IVth Party Congress—Radio Hanoi, Dec. 2, 1976.

[22] *Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1970). See also Paul Berman, *Revolutionary Organization*: Institution Building within the People's Liberation Armed Forces (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books; Toronto, London: Heath, 1974), pp. 49–77. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1975, p. 294.

South Vietnamese in all walks of life knew well that initial rough-and-ready, perhaps brutal, land-to-the-tiller was certain to give way to collectivisation if Hanoi won the war; some peasants may have calculated that they would be better off then than they were under the Diem land reform, but one cannot assume that they were willing to risk life and limb to bring collectivisation to pass, and it was not surprising that Saigon's second (1970) land reform—so thorough that, after 1975, the Party found negligible scope for further distribution [23] —had no effect on the course of the war.

Diem certainly detained scores of political opponents who were not communists along with the hundreds who were; but these were urban intellectuals, not rural peasants recruitable as guerrillas, and the overwhelming majority, far from being 'driven into the communist camp' as many authors put it, remained after their release as opposed to Ho Chi Minh as Diem was. Here too, the existence of labour camps in the North was common knowledge, thanks to the individuals in the South who had been confined in them during the first Indochina war, so that no blows would be struck for Liberty by supporting Ho.

Strategic hamlets, introduced as an emergency measure in 1961, were similarly thought by foreigners to have alienated peasants to the communists on account of their restrictive regulations; but, whatever element of truth there may be in Professor Mus's historical sociology proving that Vietnamese peasants clung to 'self-determination' as keenly as Americans, the idea of the strategic hamlets had been copied from the Vietcong 'struggle villages', run on similar lines, so that it would be sillier than peasants usually are to seek escape from one by running away to the other. I hazarded no final judgment about the hamlets but did insist that the criterion for one must be the effect on peasants' minds rather than on their hearts.

Finally, communist corruption, revealed by Hanoi press campaigns against it, had likewise been sampled especially by individuals in the South who bought their way out of the Vietminh in the 1950s, so that a change of regime held out little prospect of a cure—and, incidentally, has brought none, as *Nhan Dan* continues to complain. In the frightening offensives of 1968 and 1972, the urban masses, though given a chance to rally to the communist side, flooded to the side of the government, either not caring that it was despotic, unjust and corrupt or not finding it so. The help the communists received from corruption came to them from the scope for blackmail and exploitation of venality it afforded them in pursuit of 'symbiotic insurgency'.

[23] *Vietnam News Agency* (Hanoi), June 25, 1977; even a 'remnant feudal landlord' family was lucky to have been left owning 22 acres—*Saigon Giai Phong*, August 19, 1976.

Symbiotic insurgency

I coined this term to explain the systematic 'cunning' which the Party told its members promised victory more surely than the gallantry supposed by their foreign well-wishers; I was sorry when the term did not catch on. The idea was that people's war in Vietnam had depended, down to 1967, on turning the resources of the defence against itself. If one had read Lenin, one did not have to be specially perceptive to detect what was afoot in South Vietnam: the 'self-reliance' the NFLSV made much of in its propaganda did not mean that the guerrillas counted for their food and supplies on voluntary donations from persons enthusiastic for their cause, but that the organisation infiltrated itself into the social fabric so intimately that it could divert taxes due from the peasants and tap resources allocated to them from the capital. *Government and Revolution* gave numerous examples of 'symbiotic insurgency' and showed how a steady state sometimes resulted in which local guerrillas and the security forces were in balance and acquired a common interest in the indefinite continuation of the struggle without decisive action; American 'aid programs', designed to buy peasant 'support' for the South Vietnamese government, frequently put the beneficiaries—if not properly protected first—more at the mercy of communist collectors than ever and therefore reinforced the NFLSV in whichever quarter the peasants' hearts might lie. The researches of Robert L. Sansom have brought additional evidence of the correctness of this view,[24] and it was confirmed incidentally in some of USAID's internal reports; the strategic hamlets provided a short-lived, though never total, interruption, but the facts were rather subtle for some reviewers and the implication repugnant to the native generosity of Americans. The good features of society in South Vietnam, and reforms wrought under American influence, were exploitable at least as much as the bad; for example, improvements in public communications made it easier for the NFLSV personnel to get round the country quickly just as it did everybody else, and it was the very openness of Saigon society to foreign pressmen that exposed public misdemeanours; improved provincial medical services got the wounded guerrilla back into the line the same way as the wounded militiaman.

There is no room here to go into the mixed motives and the myriad local loyalties and tensions, or the petty ambitions, which underlay the profession of an honourable popular cause, but the foreign dimension of symbiotic insurgency gained greatly enhanced importance from the change of mood of the American public in 1968. *Govern-*

[24] *Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press, 1970) especially pp. 316–327. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1972, p. 157.

ment and Revolution ended by noting that the United States government was 'continually under pressure from many quarters to negotiate and commit South Vietnam to some, or indeed any, settlement, much as France committed the State of Viet-Nam in 1954'. What I did not foresee was the degree to which that pressure was going to be manipulated by the international communist movement. Since victory, the Party leaders have emphasised with pride their magnificent achievement in 'the diplomatic struggle'. Foreign minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, for one, speaks with satisfaction of the Party's wisdom, first in thinking up the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Commission, and soon after in insisting on Paris as the site for peace talks—rather than Warsaw where the Americans had been conducting their discreet contacts with the Chinese since 1964—because the French capital had better facilities for propaganda in the Western world; by deliberately fostering the anti-war movement in the United States and on a world stage, the Party triumphantly applied the lessons of *Left-Wing Communism* and harnessed to its strategy the widest of all its many fronts of 'temporary, wavering or unreliable allies'.[25] Just as the NFLSV had once diverted sacks of cement from 'program-aid' to build themselves a military headquarters,[26] so now, in the spreading vogue among young people in the West for the Maoism of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, they perfected the lessons Ho Chi Minh had learnt from his one-time *chef de bureau*, Willi Münzenberg (architect of the Reichstag Countertrial)—casting Bertrand Russell in the same role as Albert Einstein, and similar persons eminent in their professions in the roles of Paul Robeson and the Very Reverend Hewlett Johnson—and timed their onslaughts on their co-nationals in the South to have maximum effect on the fortunes of the world-wide anti-war propaganda emanating from Paris.[27] Henceforth there was no tactic the United States could bring to bear against Hanoi without a proportion of its effect being turned to Hanoi's advantage. On this plane too, 'symbiotic insurgency' exploited the virtues (judged by bourgeois standards) of the open societies it was directed against—it would not have been practicable against totalitarian societies, least of all against North Vietnam itself.

People's war in the strategy of revolution

No master plan has governed Vietnamese communist action stretching over forty-odd years; what guided Ho Chi Minh and his Politburo was a strategic object (state power in Indochina—nothing less) and a doctrine of opportunist tactics for turning to advantage juncture after juncture, setbacks as well as partial gains. Ten years ago, like a number

[25] *Hoc Tap*, Oct. 1975.
[26] Duncanson, *Government and Revolution*, *op. cit.*, p. 364.
[27] So timed according to Liberation Radio, Oct. 23, 1969.

of other writers about these things, I contrasted as mutually exclusive the Bolshevik road to power of the Russian revolution and the 'protracted' rural road to power of the Chinese people's war; deeper knowledge of communist history and the dozen or so Vietnamese commentaries that have appeared since April 1975 lead me today to conclude that there is no real contrast—only the Party's adaptation to the moves of those it was attacking. The author of *What is to be Done?* (1902) knew nothing of the opportunities for 'turning imperialist war into civil war' of his *Left-wing Communism* (1920); Mao Tse-tung's supposed preference for peasants over proletarians dated from his flight from liquidation by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, and his choice of a rural refuge followed a telegram from Stalin telling him to do just that.[28] The Vietnamese used trade-union and popular-front methods like West European parties; Ho Chi Minh's August Revolution was more like than unlike the Bolshevik revolution, the first Indochina war after it failed an equally close imitation of Mao's civil war. In countries whose population is predominantly rural, all fighting forces raised in them have to be largely peasants; if one argues that the insurgency is for that reason a 'peasant uprising',[29] then equally one should call Ngo Dinh Diem's administration a peasant government.

Although in the people's war of the 1960s the Vietnamese communists were attacking people who had encountered them only during the ten-year phase of the long struggle and were not even helped by any relevant institutional memory, either native or foreign, the Politburo changed little from one decade to the next and, besides commanding all the initiatives, profited from organisational, propaganda and negotiating experience gathered during all the previous phases of the struggle. The later writings of Vo Nguyen Giap show that people's war was never envisaged as an end in itself but as a step in an escalation beginning with 'armed propaganda' and culminating in conventional warfare. The purpose of gradualness was consolidation of gains—securing whenever possible international guarantee for their irreversibility, as at Geneva in 1954 and 1962 and at Paris in 1973—and avoidance of a crushing reaction before the movement was strong enough to deter or fight it off. Every peace agreement the Party entered into opened up more than one road for further advance, domino-fashion [30]; if one road turned out to be blocked, another could be used. The dependence of the whole enterprise on help from bigger

[28] Hsiao Tso-liang, *Chinese Communism in 1927—City versus Countryside* (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1970), p. 27.

[29] Eric E. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), pp. 157–207.

[30] For my analysis of alternatives written into Geneva 1954, see *Government and Revolution*, pp. 223–225, and 'Two Vietnams or One?', *The World Today*, Vol. 25, No. 9, Sept. 1969, pp. 404–414; for an analysis of Paris 1973, 'The Ceasefire in Vietnam', *ibid.*, Vol. 29, No. 3, March 1973, pp. 89–97 and 'One Year of Peace in Indochina', *ibid.*, Vol. 30, No. 3, March 1974, pp. 93–100.

communist states is repeated in all the Hanoi analyses of victory, and the 'self-reliance' of the NFLSV amounted to creation, from outside South Vietnam, of an organisation that was not only locally 'symbiotic' but also capable of receiving and putting to good use weapons supplied by the Russians and the Chinese without compromising the helping hands.[31] It looks very likely that the Politburo hoped that the 1968 offensive would isolate the South Vietnamese forces and much of the urban population from their American defenders once and for all; the fighting capability of the NFLSV was sacrificed gruesomely in the attempt, but the demoralisation of the American home front which also resulted opened the road to even grander opportunities for 'revolutionary violence' and more spectacular blows for the world revolution to which Ho Chi Minh and his successor, Le Duan, have related all their victories. One *could* argue that the NFLSV/people's war phase of the struggle was historically justified because it drew the Americans in, by the stages recounted in *Government and Revolution*, and so prepared the ground for the final abandonment of the Truman doctrine, the triumph of the Zhdanov line (especially in Africa), and China's re-entry into the comity of nations.

Conclusion

If I could revise *Government and Revolution* today, I would provide more direct references for some of the points but would not change many judgments. However, the book refers to a line of political evolution that has become extinct—not simply the governments that stood in the communists' way but the whole culture of Sino-Vietnamese tradition and the public administration introduced by the French, passed on to the South Vietnamese with the independence granted under the Yalta formula, and subsequently denigrated by Marxists as 'neo-colonialism'. Only the technical and managerial skills which the South Vietnamese learnt during the 'escalation', principally from American teachers, live on, prized by the new regime where all else is obliterated.[32] What is needed now in order to fill out the history, it seems to me, falls under two heads: first, because Laos if not Cambodia counted for more in Party plans than I realised, a general history of the all-Indochina communist movement, written with the Party at the centre of interest instead of the periphery (as I saw developments from my point of observation in time and space); and, second, an investigation of the Party's psychological warfare which was its dominating instrumentality, perhaps from its origins, certainly since the Second World War.

[31] Race quotes a witness inside the NFLSV, *op. cit.*, p. 79. For the analysis as a whole, we have the review of a book by Le Duan (not available in the West) in *Hoc Tap*, Oct. 1975.

[32] *Hoc Tap*, Feb. 1976.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TO 1985

The following contribution continues *International Affairs'* series of articles prepared in connection with Chatham House's current programme on the external policy options facing Britain during the period up to 1985. They commit no one except their particular authors. Previous contributions appeared in the issues of October 1977, January 1978 and July 1978.

VI: BRITAIN'S EXTERNAL FINANCIAL POLICY

Christopher Johnson

EXTERNAL financial policy may be defined as policy with regard to the balance of payments, which is the account showing the commercial and financial transactions between any country and the rest of the world. In spite of sometimes obsessive concern with the balance of payments, external financial policy, whether in Britain or in other countries, is seldom discussed in terms of long-term objectives. There are a number of reasons for this.

(a) External financial policy is generally the responsibility primarily of the economic departments of government, and only secondarily is it dealt with by external affairs departments. This is not an accident of bureaucratic demarcation, but reflects the underlying fact that in most countries the balance of payments is regarded as of subsidiary importance compared with domestic economic and financial objectives, and does not give rise to independent foreign-policy aims, save in certain limited ways, for example aid programmes and overseas defence spending. This view was reflected, for example, in the report of the Central Policy Review Staff,[1] which gave as one of the two main objectives of Britain's overseas representation, 'to promote the country's economic and social well-being'.

(b) Countries have only a limited power to achieve specific objectives for their balances of payments, particularly in the short term. The responses of exports, imports and capital movements to domestic economic policy measures, which are themselves not decided for very far ahead, are notoriously unpredictable. Any

[1] *Review of Overseas Representation* (London: HMSO, 1977).

country's balance of payments also depends on what happens in other countries quite outside its control; for example, on domestic fluctuations in key economies such as the US and Japan, on changes in the pattern of world trade, and on sudden shocks to the international system such as the 1973 rise in oil prices.

(c) Countries do nevertheless seek to achieve certain objectives for their balance of payments from time to time, often of a broad and imprecise nature. The policy instruments used to achieve such objectives may be the same as those used in pursuit of domestic economic aims—the government's budget, interest rates, or money supply targets, for example. This makes it difficult, if not undesirable, to separate the conduct of domestic financial policy from that of external financial policy. Other policy instruments, such as exchange rates, exchange controls, import restrictions, and export promotion, are more specifically directed towards the balance of payments, but may in fact be used with the principal intention of implementing domestic policy objectives.

(d) The international system of trade and payments as it has developed since the end of the Second World War has imposed common rules of conduct on the countries of the free world. Although some of the rules, such as the Bretton Woods regime of relatively fixed exchange rates, have been wholly or partly relaxed under the pressure of events, the network of international commercial and financial obligations is still sufficiently strong to cause many countries to interpret external financial policy as the art of reconciling national economic objectives with adherence, amounting in some cases to not much more than lip-service, to the rules of the international game. External financial policy may become a constraint, irksome as applied to oneself but advantageous in its application to one's rivals, rather than a set of positive objectives.

In spite of these limitations on any analysis of external financial policy, the attempt can be made to set out certain objectives for any country's balance of payments, however much they may ultimately take second place to domestic economic objectives. Policy instruments which particularly affect the balance of payments can also be considered for the sake of the argument in isolation from policy instruments of more general application, without forgetting that they must interact with each other. Trade policy cannot be excluded from any analysis of the balance of payments, but it will only be dealt with here in a general way and not as it applies to particular areas or commodities.

In view of the nature of the international system described above, the interdependence of any country's external financial policy with that

of others must be taken into account. Each country seeks not only to pursue its own objectives, but to influence the objectives pursued by others, either in its own interests, or in the interests of wider international economic development. It may thus be imprudent as well as inconsistent for any country to preach one external financial policy to others while itself following a different one. One criterion for external financial policy as for foreign policy in general is thus Kant's 'categorical imperative': 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'. Such a principle is particularly appropriate to a country such as Britain which has always been in the forefront of policy discussions on the reform of the international financial system.

One of Kant's examples is, in a modern interpretation, particularly applicable to international finance. He uses the categorical imperative to justify the maxim that no one should borrow without intending to repay the debt, on the grounds that if everyone did so, promises to repay would become meaningless, and creditors would cease to lend. The mercantilist philosophy of trade is another example that might be cited of a maxim which cannot logically become a universal law. One country can have a balance of payments surplus, and accumulate gold or other reserve assets, but it is impossible for every country simultaneously to pursue this policy with success, since one country's surplus must be another country's deficit. (It is possible for some countries to enjoy an increase in reserves without others suffering a decrease, if gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), or other reserve assets are supplied in greater quantities, or increased in value. But the domestic inflationary consequences of such a reserve increase may be such as to nullify the value of the increase in real terms.) Another type of 'beggar-my-neighbour' policy excluded by the categorical imperative would be that of competitive currency devaluation, in which each country tries to make its exports cheaper than those of its rivals; it is logically impossible for one country's exports to be cheaper unless another's are more expensive.

The application of Kant's ethics to real international life must allow for the fact that different countries have different factor endowments, are in different stages of economic development, and have different perceptions of their role in the world. If therefore rules of external financial conduct are to have any chance of acceptance, they must be framed in a sufficiently flexible manner to allow for such differences. In practice there is, and will continue to be, a great diversity of balance of payments objectives as between countries, and of policy instruments used to achieve them. It is worth investigating, however, to what extent the different objectives are economically compatible and ethically consistent with each other.

The United States is the clearest example of a country to which it is difficult to apply any general rules of international financial conduct. The scarce currency clause of the Bretton Woods agreement enshrined in the system a measure of discrimination against the United States, with its own consent, in view of its outstanding economic strength. But it was never in fact invoked. The 'dollar gap' proved to be short-lived, and its place was taken by the opposite phenomenon, the world-wide outflow of dollars and their use as a reserve and as a vehicle currency. The growing use of the dollar as the main international currency has presupposed that the United States balance of payments on current account would be in deficit over the years, that the United States was the one country that was not free to alter its exchange rate, and that the dollar would retain its purchasing power thanks to a negligible rate of domestic price inflation in the United States.

These assumptions are no longer necessarily valid. But the United States is still an exceptional country, in the size of its economy and in the still increasing use of the dollar as the main international currency. The problem of the dollar is that the international financial community cannot agree on the extent to which the United States should be expected to conform to or diverge from the same rules of behaviour as other countries—nor indeed on what those rules of behaviour should be.

Britain's external financial policy can also be seen as conditioned by exceptional circumstances. Sterling has been an international currency, although on a much smaller scale than the dollar. But the problem of sterling, unlike that of the dollar, has been that Britain itself has not been able to decide until recently whether it wishes its currency to continue to play a world role. Britain has also recently become unusual in being the only case of a major industrial country which is about to become self-sufficient, on a net basis, in oil, thanks to the North Sea. (The United States is exceptional, in quite a different way, in being the world's largest oil importer, in spite of the oil discoveries in Alaska.)

North Sea oil, as well as making Britain a special case, appears to give the British government more room for manoeuvre than it has previously had in the postwar period in selecting and achieving domestic economic policy objectives unconstrained by the balance of payments in the short term. Even so, the external constraint, in mid-1978, seems to be re-asserting itself sooner than expected. It has been argued that the advantage of North Sea oil will hardly do better than compensate for the disadvantage of the OPEC oil price rise, and will not do much more than shift Britain's real income back to what it would have been under the pre-1973 regime of cheap oil imports. This is a sobering way of presenting the facts, but it looks backward, rather than looking forward and comparing Britain's present and future

position with what it would have been in the absence of North Sea oil, and with what it will be for other industrial countries not similarly endowed with indigenous energy resources.

It is tempting to exaggerate the degree of freedom conferred on Britain's external economic policy by North Sea oil, and official estimates of the value of North Sea oil have tended to prejudge discussion by regarding them as actual, or at least potential, gains to the balance of payments, rather than to the domestic sectors of the economy. It is both improbable that the proceeds of North Sea oil could be, and undesirable that they should be, pre-empted by one priority use in preference to all other possibilities. Some of the proceeds have already gone into improving the balance of payments, and it is an open question how much more should be channelled into a current account surplus, and how this should be allocated on external capital account as between private overseas investment, the accumulation of official reserves and the repayment of overseas debt by the private and public sectors, including the North Sea oil companies themselves. The claims of investment in British industry, and of a more immediate rise in consumption and living standards, have also been put forward. Natural economic forces beyond the control of any government will play, and have already played, their part in allocating North Sea benefits. Official policy objectives which take such trends into account have more chance of being attained than ones which presuppose complete freedom to allocate sums amounting to over 3 per cent. of the gross national product (GNP) to any purpose which on abstract grounds may seem desirable to the government of the day. If the whole of North Sea oil were to be put into a balance-of-payments surplus, Britain would be guilty of the same kind of anti-expansionary international financial policy of which it, together with the United States and other OECD governments, has not hesitated to accuse countries with large surpluses, such as Japan and Germany. The government's White Paper on the North Sea oil revenues cannot be regarded as a serious attempt to list or discuss the respective merits of their different possible uses.[2]

Balance-of-payments objectives

Balance-of-payments objectives may either be subordinated to domestic economic objectives, or take priority over them at periods of deficit requiring external financial assistance, or be chosen with some degree of autonomy from home policy. They may also be judged by their effects on a country's living standards.

(a) *Balance of payments versus domestic objectives.* The balance of payments may be seen in a negative way, as a constraint on the achieve-

[2] *The Challenge of North Sea Oil*, Cmnd. 7143 (London: HMSO, 1978).

ment of such domestic aims as economic growth, full employment, and price stability. Britain has on numerous occasions been compelled by balance-of-payments crises to sacrifice over-ambitious economic growth objectives. Deficits are more of a constraint than surpluses, since the factors which have brought Britain into deficit have often made it difficult to finance the deficit, save on conditions imposed by creditors with the aim of eliminating it. But more recently Britain has been made aware that a balance-of-payments surplus can also endanger domestic aims such as monetary targets and price stability.

A more positive view has sometimes been taken, that certain balance-of-payments objectives may contribute to the achievement of domestic aims. For example the doctrine of 'export-led growth' suggests that success in international markets is a more durable foundation than any other for economic expansion; but clearly not all countries can simultaneously benefit from a stimulus to demand originating outside their own borders. The converse of export-led growth is perhaps import-led price stability, from which Germany has benefited in the past, and from which Britain has recently benefited. The former policy characteristically relies on the instrument of currency depreciation, the latter on appreciation.

Flows of direct investment can also be regarded as a benefit to the domestic economy. The import of American and other foreign capital, investment goods and technological skill, has benefited Britain, particularly in exploiting North Sea oil, while the world-wide expansion of British international companies can be justified, among other reasons, on the grounds that it has improved their performance in the home economy, without affecting domestic output and employment adversely.

Conceived in domestic economic terms, the balance-of-payments objective might be that the surplus or deficit achieved, whether on current account or on current and long-term capital account ('basic' balance), should be such as not to interfere with domestic economic objectives, and possibly to further them in certain specific ways. It would be recognised that the exact out-turn of the balance-of-payments was impossible to control, and, within the broad limits set, a matter for 'benign neglect'. Such a policy would be consistent with an equilibrium in the balance of payments, either on current account or on 'basic' balance, taking one year with another. A pattern of recurring surpluses or deficits year after year, on the other hand, leads to accumulations of assets or liabilities which may ultimately become an embarrassment both to the country concerned and to the international community as a whole.

It is easier to state such a policy in general terms than to fix with any degree of precision the limits within which balances of payments may be allowed to fluctuate with equanimity, or the particular

definition of the balance of payments which should be chosen. It might be specified, for example, that any country's balance of payments could vary between plus and minus one per cent. of its GNP before any adjustment measures were to be contemplated. Table 1 (p. 616) compares one per cent. of GNP with the current balance of payments for a number of countries. Such a rule of thumb might lead to a rethinking of the current situation, in which the United States is thought by many to have a balance-of-payments crisis with a deficit of barely one per cent. of GNP, while Norway was until recently able to finance without much difficulty a deficit of 14 per cent. of GNP. If a one per cent. rule were to be applied to Britain today, what would it mean? With a GNP approaching £150 billion, Britain would be able to run a surplus of £1·5 billion (the Treasury's original forecast for 1978) or a deficit of the same order, with no questions asked. Japan's surplus of $10 billion in 1977 would be judged excessive, but $6 billion would be no more than one per cent. of its GNP—not a source of grave concern, provided that it did not continue year after year, as indicated above.

It has been assumed so far that the tolerance of one per cent. of GNP would be established in relation to a central point which would be equilibrium in the current account. However, if medium-term targets are set for a country's balance of payments which differ significantly from equilibrium—according to criteria to be discussed in the next section—then the one per cent. tolerance could be applied in relation to a long-term surplus of x or a long-term deficit of y per cent. of GNP. Table 1 shows that the one per cent. criterion, while it may be of the right order of magnitude for the five main industrial countries, is not appropriate either for major oil exporters, such as Saudi Arabia, or for expanding less-developed countries, such as Brazil.

(b) *Establishment of autonomous balance-of-payments objectives.* It is possible to be more ambitious than the minimalist programme outlined above, and seek criteria by which each country would set itself a medium-term balance-of-payments objective, which would only by sheer coincidence turn out to be exact equilibrium. The objective of equilibrium for all countries on current account fits in with the categorical imperative, in that it is logically possible for all countries to achieve it—provided that they all use the same statistical concept of equilibrium. Even if such an objective ever made sense economically, which is doubtful, it is now dangerous nonsense, as long as a small number of sparsely-populated Arab countries continue to accumulate most of the OPEC oil surplus.

How then should targets for surpluses and deficits be set? There is little to be said for the present chaotic situation, in which many countries incurring deficits either themselves take action to eliminate them, or are forced to do so by their creditors, in preference to seeking

international acceptance of them according to agreed criteria. It is perhaps fortunate that in many cases only lip-service is paid to the principle of full adjustment, and that the OPEC surpluses have continued to be mirrored in deficits, in industrial as well as in developing countries, rather than being eliminated by a culmination of world slump and energy shortage. Britain, while originally pursuing a policy of linked balance-of-payments and budget deficits in response to the oil crisis in 1974, later went along with the thinking of countries such as West Germany in seeking a balance-of-payments surplus—and a reduction of the inflation rate—at the expense of expansion in the home economy. The contrasting example of the United States shows that it is possible to reduce the rate of inflation while allowing output to expand rapidly, provided that the balance of payments is allowed to move into deficit.

The International Monetary Fund has published a set of balance-of-payments targets, worked out by two staff members.[3] This is vitiated by the fact that it sets objectives for capital movements, and allows them to determine current account balances, with some weird results. Since trade is the main component of most balances of payments, it seems more sensible to begin by setting objectives for the current account. Two criteria naturally suggest themselves.

In the long run, the more advanced economies can be expected to be in surplus, and the less developed countries in deficit, and any given country's balance-of-payments objective could be set by some indicator of economic performance, such as its GNP per head. The more advanced countries could be expected to be natural capital exporters, which would bring them more or less into equilibrium on the ' basic ' balance of current and long-term capital account. Similarly, the developing countries are natural capital importers, thus financing their current-account deficits.

Britain followed something like this criterion for nearly two decades after 1945, making in most years enough of a current account surplus to continue its historic role, befitting one of the world's most advanced industrial countries, as an exporter of long-term capital. By the mid-1960s, the current account surplus had vanished, and Britain's role as a capital exporter began to be shared by Germany and Japan. By the mid-1970s the current account was in heavy deficit, and the capital account was in balance, with capital imports, not only for North Sea oil, roughly balancing capital exports. Britain had sunk from top in the GNP table to some way down, and something close to equilibrium on both current and capital account might have seemed an appropriate objective.

[3] Andrew D. Crockett and Duncan Ripley, ' Sharing the Oil Deficit ', IMF *Staff Papers*, Vol. 22, No. 2, July 1975.

A relatively optimistic view of Britain's prospects of recovery as a major industrial power would go naturally with the belief that the nation should normally be able to achieve a surplus, however modest, on current account. Such an argument may be reinforced by the view generally accepted by governments, if not by all British citizens, that the country, in its role as one of the major powers, should be able to finance a relatively high level of official transfer payments for such purposes as military installations in Europe and overseas, bilateral and multilateral aid, and subscriptions to the budget of the European Communities. This is partly a matter of definition. If the current account is defined as excluding official transfers, then Britain needs a surplus on current account of about £1 billion which it does not need if the current account is defined, as it normally is, as including official transfers.

At this point the second criterion may be introduced. The first could be regarded as a human and capital resources one, but the second is to do with natural resources. In a sophisticated analysis, it might be possible to construct some complex indicator of each country's endowment of natural resources, but in present circumstances it will be sufficient to take oil as the sole criterion, in view of its pre-eminent importance in international trade. Countries with no oil, or net oil importers, would run deficits to the extent of their oil imports, and net oil exporters would run surpluses to the extent of their oil surpluses. (A more sophisticated version takes into account oil capital movements, transfers, and imports of equipment, as well as oil trade.) Countries self-sufficient in oil would, on this criterion, aim at current-account equilibrium. Unless there were to be large destabilising movements of official reserves, oil importers would then, as many of them already have done, import capital, while oil exporters would export capital, as many OPEC countries have done.

The simultaneous application of both criteria would give interesting results, which to some extent offset each other. Developing countries which export oil, such as Iran and Nigeria, would aim roughly at balance, as would some of the most advanced countries which import oil, such as Japan and Germany. Britain, which would aim at current-account equilibrium or a small surplus on the first criterion, would tip over from deficit to surplus on the second criterion in about 1980, being a unique example of a major industrial country approaching self-sufficiency in oil. Table 2 (p. 617) shows how the two criteria would operate on a compass diagram.

This highly simplified scheme may appear to give results for Britain's balance-of-payments objectives which are so neat and simple that they lack credibility. They are significantly different from the objectives which are apparently being pursued at present. Far from aiming at a

substantial surplus in 1977–79, while still in deficit on oil trade, Britain would on this reckoning aim only at a gradually diminishing deficit on current account, culminating in rough equilibrium by about 1980, the year when oil self-sufficiency is expected to be achieved, and moving into balance-of-payments surplus to repay external debt during the period in the early to mid-1980s when the North Sea will yield net oil exports, in the absence of official depletion constraints.

The United States would do almost exactly what it is doing at present, accepting a deficit of about $45 billion due to oil imports, but off-setting more than half of it with the surplus on non-oil current account which it might expect, as the world's most advanced economy, to accumulate. However, while American capital exports continue to be made by multinational corporations, corresponding to the non-oil surplus, capital imports need to flow from OPEC to the United States as the counterpart of its oil imports—and this is the main difficulty which the United States and Saudi Arabia between them have yet fully to tackle.

(c) *Debt repayment as a balance-of-payments objective.* A third criterion could be introduced. This would be based on the external balance-sheet of each country, taking into account all external assets and liabilities—direct and portfolio investment, banking and public sector loans of various maturities and official reserves. It could be argued that net creditor countries should aim at deficits on current account, or at least smaller surpluses than otherwise, while net debtor countries should aim at surpluses on current account, or at least smaller deficits than otherwise. In this way, national balance-sheets would not become so burdened with assets or liabilities as to jeopardise the political and economic stability of the world system.

The combination of the first two criteria should mean that few, if any, advanced countries continue to accumulate foreign assets at an embarrassing rate, or that, as in the case of the United States, the balance-sheet is rectified by the accumulation of national assets by foreigners. The growth of foreign assets by a small number of oil-producing countries could, however, create special problems. The piling-up of debt by some non-oil less-developed countries is also worrying, but has been accepted by creditors to the extent that the economic growth financed by the debt, together with inflation, has made it possible to service a debt burden rising in nominal terms.

A case can be made that Britain's external balance-sheet has deteriorated in recent years and that it has been mis-matched, with more short-term liabilities than assets. Figures published by the Bank of England showed that at the end of 1975 Britain's external liabilities had for the first time in many years become greater than external assets and have remained so since then. It may be agreed that Britain's external balance-sheet could be improved, but it is difficult to set any

target for the size and time-scale of any current-account surplus that this might require.

Britain has been more conscious of external debt than most countries. The Second World War debts became the 'sterling balances', held partly as reserves by overseas governments and partly as liquid financial assets by private foreign commercial interests. The sterling balances have, at times such as the 1974 oil crisis, enabled Britain to finance a larger balance-of-payments deficit on current account than would otherwise have been possible, but they have also been a source of instability because of sudden withdrawals, particularly by governments, as in the 1976 sterling crisis. Although some of the official balances have been converted from sterling into other currencies, and insured against further unpredictable withdrawals by the 'safety net' facilities made available through the Bank for International Settlements, the private balances have continued to increase, and have contributed to the large surplus on capital account in 1977. While Britain may no longer wish to take the risk of financing current-account deficits by issuing sterling claims on the public and banking sectors, the City of London may legitimately wish to take in sterling funds as the counterpart to credit issued in sterling to overseas borrowers; the extent to which the City banks may borrow short while lending at longer maturities may be regarded as part of the 'transformation process', subject to no more than the normal rules of banking prudence. It is ironic that the government's decision to phase out the role of sterling as a reserve currency coincided with a new-found strength of the currency, creating a fresh demand for it alongside the dollar and other major currencies. But sterling's fading role as a reserve currency is to a large extent independent of its role as a private store of value.

Debt repayment has also become a potential policy objective, in view of the large borrowings by the British public sector, mainly in foreign currency, to finance the balance-of-payments deficits of recent years pending the build-up of North Sea oil production which provides both the collateral and the means of repayment. It has been widely suggested that Britain should aim at a current-account surplus, such as it in fact achieved in the second half of 1977, for several years from now on, without waiting for complete oil self-sufficiency in 1980. Overseas debt imposes a greater burden on the country than national debt held internally, because the servicing of it is a drain on the future balance of payments. On the other hand, the proportion of the public debt held overseas, about 15 per cent., is a few points lower than it was in 1970, and North Sea oil makes it easier to refinance debt, as well as to repay it.

Debt repayment may be seen as similar in its effects on the balance of payments as overseas investment, and should be set against expected

capital inflows into Britain in the form of inwards investment and repayment of British credit by overseas debtors, rather than seen only in relation to the current account. The medium-term debts incurred by Britain in recent years total about $20 billion, which was exactly matched by the high level of the official reserves at the beginning of 1978. In so far as the reserves are not all earmarked for intervention in the foreign exchange market—discussed below—part of them can be, and already have been, used to repay overseas debt, particularly that incurred in stronger currencies than sterling such as the D-mark. Further accumulations of reserves due to larger than intended balance-of-payments surpluses might be used for debt repayment.

Balance-of-payments policy instruments—exchange rates

The main instruments which can be discussed are: exchange rates, exchange controls, import restrictions and export promotion. The use of one's currency as a reserve currency may be regarded as an instrument with which to finance a persistent balance-of-payments deficit; this has already been briefly discussed. The discussion is here confined to exchange rates.

Under the Bretton Woods system, exchange rates were fixed within narrow margins, and domestic policies of expansion and contraction of demand were the main instrument of balance-of-payments policy. Exchange rate changes occurred at infrequent intervals, with disruptive effects on capital markets, but were reasonably effective in bringing about balance-of-payments adjustment. The move to floating rates in the early 1970s was heralded as a new era in which countries would be able to pursue independent domestic policies, without the balance-of-payments constraint, since the exchange rate would move to whatever level was necessary to secure equilibrium. The general validity of this theory was quickly disproved when it became evident that changes in exchange rates could and sometimes did lead to virtuous or vicious circles in which imbalances were increased by the negative feedback effects of the exchange rate on the internal price level and on short-term capital movements. There was no way in which floating exchange rates could have solved the OPEC surplus problem, short of causing the price of oil in Saudi riyals, and the riyal/dollar exchange rates, to rise to a point where the West cut its oil imports in half.

Fixed exchange rates, or at least narrow margins of fluctuation around a central parity, are still used by many smaller countries linking their currencies with a major international currency. Some of the smaller European countries are thus linked with the D-mark in what remains of the European ' snake '. Few countries allow their currencies to float completely freely; both the United States and Britain, though at present floating the dollar and the pound, intervene to smooth out

short-term market fluctuations. Many countries use regimes intermediate between the extremes of fixed and floating rates, the two main types being the 'crawling peg' and 'managed floating'. The most suitable exchange-rate policy for any country must depend on the extent to which its currency is internationally traded and used as a vehicle for commercial and financial transactions.

Some kind of managed floating may be regarded as a practical compromise for many countries. Each would set a target zone for its exchange rate, chosen in the light of the expected inflation differential between itself and other countries, and the requirements of its balance-of-payments policy. The central bank would then intervene to smooth the currency's path towards the chosen target zone, using interest-rate policy to offset potential gains from arbitrage in forward foreign-exchange markets. Plans on these lines have been put forward by Mr. Wim Duisenberg, the former Dutch finance minister, and by Mr. Charles Coombs, former head of the New York Federal Reserve, and formed an optional part of the IMF guidelines of 1974.

A weaker, and possibly more practicable form of managed floating would be the reference-rate system proposed by John Williamson and others.[4] Instead of actively intervening to achieve a certain target, national monetary authorities would allow their exchange rates to fluctuate within fairly broad limits, but would intervene to prevent them going above or below these limits. The danger of currencies quickly moving to the upper or lower reference rates could possibly be avoided by allowing for gradual movement of these rates over a period.

British policy has been torn between two conflicting arguments about the exchange rate. One school of thought believes that the exchange rate should be allowed to float gradually upwards, making imports cheaper, and discouraging employers from raising wages by imposing a squeeze on their export profits; after a short period of adjustment, British exports would become at least as competitive at a higher exchange rate as they are now, thanks to the deceleration of costs and prices relative to other countries. The other school of thought believes that the exchange rate should be managed gradually downwards, so as to make British exports cheaper in real terms than those of other countries, thus providing a much needed stimulus to manufacturing output and employment in Britain. It is possible to adopt a compromise between these two points of view, but this does not necessarily mean choosing the simplest solution of managing the exchange rate at its existing level, whether in terms of dollars or the effective rate against all other currencies.

The special problem for Britain, as for the United States, is that

[4] John Williamson, *The Failure of World Monetary Reform, 1971–74* (Sunbury-on-Thames: Nelson, 1977). Ch. 8.

the scale of intervention required to carry through successfully a rigid management of the exchange rate at a particular chosen level may impose costs out of all proportion to the benefits. It was a curious coincidence that in 1977 Britain's intervention to keep sterling down was the main support holding up the value of the dollar, and the US Treasury Bills taken into the British reserves were almost enough to finance the American current account deficit of $20 billion. But since the pound, and with it the dollar, were freed in October 1977, the rise in the value of the former, and the fall in that of the latter, have not been as substantial as might have been feared or hoped.

Exchange-rate stability is regarded as desirable by many participants in international trade, since it reduces uncertainty and thus transaction costs. But as long as other currencies fluctuate against each other, complete exchange-rate stability for the pound is a meaningless objective, since a fixed rate against the dollar will mean a variable rate against the D-mark. The aim of official intervention policy might be to prevent the pound moving more than about 5 per cent. either side of some chosen path for the effective rate, but to allow it to fluctuate freely within those limits, as advocated in the 'reference rates' proposal outlined above.

Exchange-rate policy within the EEC is, however, subject to special considerations. The announcement by Mr. Roy Jenkins, the President of the Commission, of European Monetary Union as a long-term objective started a serious new debate, which culminated in the meeting of EEC heads of government at Bremen in July 1978. One course[5] favoured by many bankers with practical experience of 'currency cocktails', would be to institute a parallel currency with some such name as the 'Europa', which would coexist, and in certain conditions be exchangeable, with existing national currencies. Another course would be to extend the existing currency snake into a 'super-snake', within which all the Community's national currencies would fluctuate within narrow bands against each other, as an intermediate stage towards fixed exchange rates to be followed eventually by a common currency. These two proposals are not necessarily incompatible with each other. One of the attractions of either a parallel or a common currency would be that it could, if desired, be defined either in terms of a strong currency, such as the D-mark, or even in terms of constant purchasing power, linked for presentational purposes with a notional gold unit. A common or parallel currency, yielding a low, but real rate of interest, and linked with controls on the growth of money supply, might thus have an important part to play in reducing inflation rates towards zero, rather than just into single figures. This provides a good example of how

[5] The Chatham House group on external monetary policy did not have an opportunity to consider the EMU proposals discussed at the Bremen Summit.

external financial policy may be designed to achieve domestic rather than foreign economic objectives.

Conclusions

1. Britain should normally expect to be able to finance a current account balance-of-payments deficit, or invest a surplus, of about one per cent. of GNP, or about £1·5 billion. The balance-of-payments can be expected to fluctuate within these limits on either side of any chosen target, according to the needs of domestic economic policy, but action should be taken to prevent such imbalances growing or becoming persistent in one direction.

2. Britain's industrial performance is such as to warrant no more than an approximate long-term equilibrium in the current non-oil balance of payments, but the aim of industrial policy should be to improve it so as to achieve a surplus on non-oil account.

3. Britain's balance of payments on current account should more or less reflect its degree of oil self-sufficiency, reaching equilibrium in

Table I

Current Balances and GNP—Selected Countries

		1974	*1975*	*1976*	*1977*
		$ billion, current prices and exchange rates			
USA:	1% GNP	14.1	15.1	16.9	19.0
	CA*	− 2.3	+11.6	− 1.4	−20.0
Japan:	1% GNP	4.5	4.9	5.6	6.8
	CA	− 4.7	− 0.7	+ 3.7	+10.0
Germany:	1% GNP	3.9	4.2	4.5	5.1
	CA	+ 9.7	+ 3.8	+ 3.4	+ 2.3
France:	1% GNP	2.6	3.4	3.5	3.8
	CA	− 6.0	− 0.1	− 6.0	− 3.0
UK:	1% GNP	1.9	2.3	2.2	2.1
	CA	− 8.4	− 4.1	− 2.1	+ 0.5
Switzerland:	1% GNP	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6
	CA	+ 0.2	+ 2.6	+ 3.5	+ 3.3
Norway:	1% GNP	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4
	CA	− 1.1	− 2.4	− 3.7	− 5.3
Brazil:	1% GNP	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.6
	CA	− 7.5	− 7.0	− 6.6	− 4.8
Saudi Arabia:	1% GNP	0.3	0.4	0.4	
	CA	+23.0	+13.9	+13.6	

* CA = Balance of payments on current account.

about 1980 when self-sufficiency is 100 per cent., and surplus in the first half of the 1980s at least.

4. Sterling should continue to be used as an international banking currency, but the phasing out of its role as a reserve currency should continue in consultation with the foreign monetary authorities affected. It should be replaced if possible by the SDR or the Europa rather than only by the dollar.

5. The overseas debt of the British public sector should be reduced as the opportunity arises, but its repayment at the earliest possible moment should not be a prior claim on resources.

6. The sterling exchange rate should be allowed to fluctuate by about five per cent. on either side of a target path, with a policy of selective intervention to prevent it moving too far up or down.

7. Moves towards European Monetary Union should be welcomed as an aid to price stability, and as a step on the road to economic integration. But they are unlikely to make headway without a closer degree of political co-operation.

Table II

Balance of Payments Objectives in Two Dimensions

N-S axis = oil balance
E-W axis = GNP per head
NW and SE = balance of payments equilibrium
NE = maximum surplus
SW = deficit

ON PROMOTING DETENTE*

Bruno Kreisky

ON the occasion of the signing of the Final Act drawn up by the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, I voiced the opinion that it would be of no avail to belittle or even to ignore the fundamental differences between the political and social systems in question:

> So we are ready for confrontation and one reason why we welcome the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is that the principles it has laid down ought to permit such a world-wide confrontation by peaceful means. This is, at any rate, how we interpret the passage in the declaration of principles referring to the right of each participating state to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems.

This may have sounded like something of a challenge to the communist states and the reactions we got from some of their representatives were not over-enthusiastic. I might now go on and quote Khrushchev—who really has a much greater claim to be called 'the father of coexistence' than Lenin—and show that the idea of coexistence was never meant to include the ideological sphere. Since one might argue that the era of Khrushchev is a thing of the past, I should like to resort to an authentic interpretation. In February 1977, the journal *Der Kommunist* published an article, which was printed in the 'Daily Review' of the Novosti Press Agency under the title 'In the Forefront of the Ideological Struggle' and which contains some fundamental remarks on detente and ideological confrontation. The author, L. Tolkunov, expressly states that in the last quarter of the twentieth century this confrontation embraces all aspects of social life, but to a particular degree questions of ideology:

> One of the salient features of the present stage of international development is based on the fact that the last quarter of the twentieth century has begun and is proceeding in an atmosphere of deepening class confrontation between the forces of progress and reaction, socialism and monopoly capitalism. This confrontation embraces all aspects of social life but is particularly manifest in ideology—a domain where there is no, and cannot be any, peaceful coexistence, where the apologists for the moribund

* This is the text of a talk given at Chatham House on July 4, 1978.

system who are compelled to reckon with the ever more evident futility of attempts at putting military, economic and political pressure on the homeland of the Great October Revolution and the socialist community, are resorting to other means in order to postpone the inevitable defeat in the historical competition with the new world.

The author goes on to underline: 'As comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasised in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress, the positive changes in world affairs and detente create favourable opportunities for the broad spread of socialist ideas, but, on the other hand, the ideological contest between the two systems is becoming ever more acute, and imperialist propaganda ever more subtle'. Tolkunov arrives at the unequivocal conclusion that detente is restricted to the relations between states and does not affect the relations between classes and social groups. For the socialist camp a combination of political and ideological concessions is therefore out of the question.

I am quite sure that the strong emphasis on ideological aspects is the answer to the more assertive stand on human rights taken in particular since President Carter came into office. But it would be a fatal mistake to believe that the heightened ideological tension was provoked by it. It is my belief that even the most enthusiastic supporters of detente in Europe ought to be aware of the fact that there is no way of mitigating the ideological differences between communist and democratic states. All those who believe that a further relaxation of tension might entail some sort of convergence of the diverse systems are cherishing totally unfounded illusions.

When communist countries make increasing use in their economies of Western methods and procedures it has to be seen not as a concession to the Western economic systems, but only as part of their efforts to make their own economies more efficient. But to entertain the hope that with the help of the Helsinki Act and its Basket No. 3 one can wean the communist states from communism and persuade them to discard essential elements of their political power system, seems to me as unrealistic as the hope entertained by some people in the West that communists could possibly trade away communism in exchange for huge loans.

One thing we may be sure of, however—international detente may possibly be more conducive to a liberalisation that will certainly be limited, than the tense atmosphere of the cold war. This brings me to my first conclusion. I do not believe that the policy of respecting human rights pursued by Western democracies poses any dangers for detente: just as no such danger for detente is implied in the

efforts of communist states to prove to the world that their system is the best of all systems, while never concealing their intention of making the world ' safe for communism '.

This theory can only be upheld, however, if one is convinced, as I am, that detente is not the consequence of sublime human insight but simply the result of a state of military balance. In this context it may be irrelevant whether both sides have the same number of tanks—which, as everybody knows, is not the case. What counts, is the overkill capacity existing on both sides. Speaking before the American Physical Society, Professor Weisskopf, the great nuclear scientist, has recently stated: ' The Soviet Union and the USA assemble increasing numbers of bombs, and perfect their efficiency and their mode of delivery. More than 50,000 nuclear bombs are deployed and ready for use. Both powers now have the capability of destroying the other country many times over.'

The balance exists, though I do admit that at times it is very delicate. But the compelling picture drawn by Oppenheimer in the early days of the nuclear age is still valid today. He said that the super-powers were like two scorpions shut in a bottle. They can kill each other, but only at the price of their own lives. To my mind, this leads on to the next conclusion with regard to detente: if we accept that the prerequisite for detente is the balance of power, any shift in this balance will endanger detente. It follows that the policy of detente does not permit any unilateral disarmament.

May I now turn to the question of who benefits from detente?

In the West people frequently voice the opinion that detente benefits the communist states, offering them a certain amount of security and a certain closed season, urgently needed by them to fend off the results of internal differences, which, if they were under no outside pressure, would lead them into grave difficulties. This view, however, seems to be one of the great and recurring illusions of our time—quite apart from the fact that people in dictatorships can be requested to make much greater sacrifices for armaments than in democracies, where one needs the consent of parliamentary bodies. In his memoirs, the Soviet Ambassador Maisky recounts how, a few days after the outbreak of war between Hitler's Germany and the Soviet Union, he had talks with Lord Beaverbrook in which he brought up the question of a second front. Beaverbrook had listened attentively and finally said: ' That's all very well, but . . .'. Then he had paused, thrown him a searching look and added: ' May I be quite frank with you? Will you really fight? Won't things turn out as they did in France? '

Whatever one's attitude towards communist regimes may be, any hopes of bringing even one of them down by exerting pressure from

outside are highly delusive. This is no way to force to its knees a political regime that has weathered the Second World War, with German soldiers advancing far into the Soviet Union. The changes inside the communist states must remain the affair of the peoples concerned and cannot be brought about by external pressure. Apart from this, I might add that I personally am, as a matter of principle, against any exertion of outside pressure.

Certainly, the policy of detente is, even by definition, a policy that is useful to the Soviet Union. But I also contend that it is equally useful to Western democracies. The policy of detente in Europe would be quite unthinkable without the normalisation of relations, initiated by the Brandt-Scheel government between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. This normalisation was pursued by the Schmidt-Genscher government to include other communist countries and finally the German Democratic Republic.

Had danger of a permanent blockade of Berlin and along the line of demarcation dividing the two German states persisted in its original intensity, there would have been no detente in Europe. The realistic policy of the Federal Republic has thus greatly helped to advance the policy of detente, just as it was advanced, if I may mention this, by the state treaty concluded by the former allies with Austria. These two examples prove that the policy of detente is a tangible asset. Let me just recall the many fields of tension that existed during the cold war, which are no longer mentioned today because they have ceased to exist. And most important of all: how often in the history of this continent has there been more than a quarter of a century without war? In our century alone there were two devastating world wars within twenty-five years, one in 1914 and one in 1939.

Highly as I rate the positive aspects of the policy of detente—and personally I can see no negative ones—I cannot overlook the danger of stagnation. I should say that the policy of detente can be stabilised by broadening it and lending it ever more substance. As I have given a number of examples in previous statements and speeches, I should like to do the same today. The energy situation in Europe is marked by the fact that the industrial countries of Western Europe depend by up to 60 per cent. on energy imports. This situation will certainly be improved by British and Norwegian oil; but no fundamental changes will occur in the massive dependence of West European states. The East European countries too—with the exception of the Soviet Union—depend on energy supplies from abroad. On the other hand, it is generally known that the Soviet Union is one of the major oil producers in the world and that Poland has vast coal deposits. There can be no doubt that an all-European co-operation in the energy sector, which is not only imaginable but also feasible, may

well be realised and would constitute a strong link between East and West European economies.

Austria's annual imports of natural gas from the Soviet Union amount to 2,4 billion cubic metres. In 1976, OECD-Europe imported 21,6 billion tons of coal from Poland. In 1975, Austria concluded a contract with Poland on the supply of electricity, which is in several ways remarkable. Electricity of 400 megawatt for 4000 operating hours per year is supplied via the Czechoslovak network, with Poland undertaking guarantee of performance. This is the first time that the network of West-European countries has been linked up with that of COMECON countries. The co-operation promises to prove most advantageous; upon a Polish initiative, negotiations are now under way on a possible increase of the supply from the mid-1980s onward.

Or take another example: we are faced with serious transport problems that call for an all-European solution. I admit that this is much more urgent for a country situated in the heart of Europe and having but a few means of transport, than for you in the United Kingdom. One has to bear in mind that Austria, which has become a modern industrial country, is unable to transport plant machinery of 250 tons—and I am talking of a weight of 250 tons—complete from Austria, because we have no usable waterway. When VOEST, our largest enterprise, transports goods by water, they have to be trans-loaded from boat to railway at Regensburg, to be reshipped at Nuremberg. This is why we are looking forward to a rapid conclusion of the construction of the Rhine-Main-Danube waterway. You will realise how serious is the handicap of inadequate transport infrastructure to our economic development and how grave the disadvantages arising therefrom are for countries in the centre of Europe; for we are not the only ones. There are also Southern Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It is a problem affecting European democracies and European communist countries alike. To enter into concrete talks on how to solve these problems better and more rapidly is, to my mind, of great importance.

Or take a third example: the question of how much one can lend to the East. It has turned out that the indebtedness of the Eastern states has grown rapidly over the past years; but we tend to overlook the fact that the volume of West-East trade in goods has also risen from $15 billion in 1970 to about $57 billion in 1977. The Soviet economist, Bogomolov, expects the amount to rise to $80 billion by 1980.

This goes hand in hand with another interesting development. Ten years ago, two thirds of all trade of communist countries, i.e. the COMECON countries, was done inside their trading bloc. Now that the volume of their trade is much higher, this share has fallen to 50

per cent. In the same period, the Soviet Union has increased its trade with the West by 250 per cent.; trade with Austria, for example, has reached four times its previous value, with Great Britain it has doubled.

Estimates as to the amount of indebtedness vary. The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies estimates that in 1977 the indebtedness to the West amounted to about $46 billion. The Chase Manhattan Bank arrives at a slightly higher figure. When trying to compute the net debts, that is, debts minus cash deposits in Western banks, experts arrive at about $39 billion. Hungarian economists tell me that the real amount is much smaller. The wrong figures, they say, are imputable to the mistake commonly made in the West of adding up a credit agreement and its liquidation. I do not know precisely how matters stand, but there is an obvious link between a growing trade and the growing indebtedness it causes. The question is whether this is in any way dangerous.

Let me state quite explicitly: I do not consider this at all dangerous and the concern expressed in this connection appears largely unfounded if we keep in mind that in 1976 the net indebtedness of all COMECON countries amounted to 4 per cent. and in the case of the Soviet Union to a mere 1·8 per cent. Bearing in mind the enormous wealth of natural resources existing in the Soviet Union, ranging from oil to gas, coal, gold and other important raw materials, and knowing that a major part of the loans are used for the more rapid development of these resources which in turn have boosted trade with the West, I find the degree of indebtedness in no way alarming.

Again, the advantages are in no way one-sided. Increased economic co-operation between East and West could certainly benefit the economy of East-European countries, the more so since, in spite of considerable economic expansion in these countries, a decline in the rate of growth is now clearly discernible. In some countries the adverse development in agriculture and foreign trade caused the overall economic performance in the first two years of the current five-year period to fall short of planning targets.

Investment and consumption increased more slowly than in the first half of the 1970s, while East-West trade grew at a slackening pace. And, above all, exports to the Western industrial countries fell far short of expectations, as a consequence mainly of the recurrent crises in the economic development of the West. On the other hand, the growth of intra-COMECON trade was above average. The smaller countries especially became increasingly dependent on raw materials and fuel imports from the Soviet Union.

For all these reasons, a strengthening of the ties between West and East would be most desirable. The question to be asked in this context

is whether there has ever been among the participating states a serious intention of discussing concrete progress on these matters Belgrade. My own view is that this was never intended, since Belgrade Conference was, from the very outset, conceived as a co ference for non-policy-making officials. I would add in parenthe that in my opinion the West should now exert every effort to raise representation at the forthcoming Madrid Conference to the level foreign ministers. Only thus can we hope to further develop the pol of detente. At any rate, I am not so sure that the Soviet Union rea wants multilateral solutions in the context of an all-Europe co-operation. The Soviet Union has always regarded its trade policy an instrument of foreign policy and might not be inclined to renou this very flexible element in its policy. However, this should not prev us from advocating a constructive economic policy for Europe. If should prove possible, as a consequence of the policy of detente, reach a higher degree of all-European economic integration, t would be of remarkable importance for the economic development European countries. But it would also mean—and this is even mo important—that any deviation from such a policy would necessita increasingly heavy sacrifices and therefore become much less likely.

This brings me to a further conclusion: it is the West which tod has to come up with new and concrete proposals for co-operation w the East. It should not do so out of tactical considerations, b with an aim of more political substance. The essential element of t policy of detente, however, is disarmament, which I would even c its correlate. This is the very point where no tangible results ha been obtained. Everyone is waiting spellbound for the outcome of t Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). For only after a success conclusion of SALT II can results be expected—even if only homeopathic doses—from the mutual and balanced force reducti (MBFR) talks in Vienna.

The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarm ment has just finished its work by producing a document that ma might regard as disappointing. But this session has shown above that it is possible for smaller—and often less armed—countries participate much more actively in the disarmament debate. Beginni with the period of the cold war, and parallel to it, the Soviet Uni and other communist countries made persistent efforts, by putti forward a never-ending series of proposals for world peace and d armament, to present themselves as the true champions of pea And, what is worse, they quite often succeeded, in particular w Third-World countries. But this might be brought to a halt if t West—and many of the non-aligned nations—themselves began come forward with initiatives for realistic disarmament measures.

When we consider the fact that the world is now spending mor than $400 billion per year on armaments, it also becomes clear tha this debate will take on a dimension of domestic politics and wil therefore be pursued more vigorously.

It may sound like a truism that the policy of detente is indivisibl —but this is indeed so. Detente will be jeopardised whenever tension arise in other areas of the world, because the great powers wil invariably be involved in them. One such area of particular impor- tance to Europe is the Middle East. Unfortunately, the democrati countries of Europe have not yet shown the active interest that i imperative when dealing with the problems of this area—although I d understand that many European countries still have certain inhibi- tions in this regard because of the fate of European Jews.

My reflections on detente may seem very 'Austro-centric' influenced by the fact that I am looking at things from Vienna, tha is from the centre of Europe; and from your angle everything ma look entirely different. But although it may *look* different, it *is* no different. And if you ask me why we Austrians are so deeply com- mitted to detente, I would like to refer once more as a concludin remark to what I said in Helsinki:

> Our own distressing experience has taught us to understand th meaning of detente. In the presence of detente Austria will li in the heart of Europe, a flourishing community and safe home t her people. In its absence, we shall cower in the dark shadow o a line of demarcation passing through Europe and constituting a divide between its military and political systems. So you wil understand why Austria is ready to do her utmost, why, withou cherishing illusions, we are so sincerely committed to the idea o detente.

BOOKS

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: WHAT IS IT?

John White

A New International Economic Order: Selected Documents, 1954–1975. Compiled by Alfred George Moss and Harry N. M. Winton. *New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). 1978. (Distrib. in US by Unipub, New York.) 964 pp. (UNITAR Documents Series No. 1.) $38.50.*

A New International Economic Order: Toward a Fair Redistribution of the World's Resources. By Jyoti Shankar Singh. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 135 pp. £10·05.*

Beyond Dependency: The Developing World Speaks Out. Edited by Guy F. Erb and Valeriana Kallab. *Washington: Overseas Development Council. 1975. 250 pp.*

The New International Economic Order: Confrontation or Cooperation Between North and South? Edited by Karl P. Sauvant and Hajo Hasenpflug. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1977. 447 pp. $25.00.*

The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate. Edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati. *Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1977. 390 pp. Pb: £7·00.*

Issues and Prospects for the New International Economic Order. *Edited by* William G. Tyler. *Lexington: Heath. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 195 pp. £11·50.*

EVER since the developing countries first addressed themselves collectively to the developed countries, seeking a larger share of the world's resources, they have held firmly to a belief in unity. In 1974, after a decade in which their unity seemed to have achieved little, the developing countries expressed their frustration in the demand for a 'New International Economic Order' (NIEO). Many of the propositions of the new order were reformulations of old proposals. What was indeed new—and on this virtually all recent commentators seem agreed—was the political force behind the demand, imbued, in the aftermath of the OPEC countries' success in raising oil prices, with a sudden access of confidence in 'commodity power'.

The initial reaction among academic development specialists was confused and largely defensive, an attitude most clearly expressed in the writings of C. Fred Bergsten, who subsequently joined the Carter administration and who figures in one of the more recent works to be considered in this article. Over the years a liberal consensus had emerged. According to this consensus, there was a clear need for more and better aid, for

trading arrangements which would secure and enhance developing countries' export earnings, for participation by developing countries in decisions about international monetary reform, and for measures to strengthen the developing countries' hand in their negotiations with international companies. So the 'real' debate was about the development process itself and the domestic policies needed to promote it. But then suddenly the familiar international issues were back on the agenda again, not as issues for discussion, but as issues which the developing countries wanted settled.

The debate about the development process itself, and about the policies required to promote it, was in fact a debate in which the developing countries had not substantially participated. At the inter-governmental level—and the main point about the debate on a new order is that it is a debate between governments—discussion of the development process had been essentially between the governments of developed countries, conducted through their aid agencies, collectively represented in the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, through the international institutions that they support, such as the World Bank, and through the academic community which depends on their funds for research. The governments of developing countries, in contrast, have tended to regard their internal policies as their own affair, and have taken the view that the subject of international discussion should be international relationships. The call for a new order, in 1974, was in part a reassertion of that view against the propensity of the developed countries and their agencies to go deeper and deeper into the internal nature of the development process. What distinguishes the call for a new order from the other slogans of development which have appeared from time to time is that it emanates from the developing countries themselves. It is their own voice.

Many writers on the new order dispute that. The point is frequently made that the concerns expressed in the call for a new order are those of governments, not of peoples. Who else's concerns, one might ask, should one expect to hear expressed in inter-governmental debate?

Reacting against the elitist concerns of the call for a new order, some writers have tried to reintroduce the domestic policy issues which have dominated academic, as distinct from inter-governmental, discussion, as if the NIEO were merely the currently fashionable label for development. One of the books to be considered in this article, by Jyoti Shankar Singh, writing as a UN official, argues that the environment, food production, family planning and the role of women should all be considered as elements of the new order. But the NIEO is *not* just another meaningless slogan, to be used, like successive slogans relating to *domestic* policy (currently 'basic needs'), as an umbrella under which to discuss whatever happens to take one's fancy. It is a quite specific set of propositions. Any discussion of those propositions which purports to be serious must meet at least three tests.

First, since the NIEO was fashioned as a negotiating position by the developing countries themselves, not by their proxies in the international development community (a point well noted by Singh), discussion must start from the basic texts that lay down the terms of reference: the Economic Declaration and Programme of Action of the Fourth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries; the Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order adopted by the sixth special session of the UN General Assembly; the

resolution on 'Development and International Cooperation' adopted by the seventh special session; and the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation. One may criticise these texts, as most such international declarations can be criticised, on the grounds of their generality and bombast, but one may not ignore them, as most international declarations on domestic policies can indeed be safely ignored.

Second, since the call for a new order is both wide-ranging and specific, it is reasonable to ask that discussion should stick to the agenda: trade and commodities; financial transfers and monetary reform; science and technology; industrialisation and transnational enterprises; and collective self-reliance. The diversity of these issues is likely to be best served by multiple authorship. Significantly and appropriately, most of the work that has been published on the new order takes the form of symposia. There have also, of course, been numerous papers by individual scholars published in academic journals, but in the nature of the issues, such papers, like this review article, *cannot* be a substantive contribution to the debate.

Third, since the NIEO is a programme of action, one looks for some discussion of strategy. Neat quantitative analysis of the likely costs and benefits of, say, the proposed integrated commodities programme, though useful, does not go to the heart of the matter.

Satisfaction of the first test, adherence to the texts, has been rendered easier by the painstaking compilation, undertaken by the librarians of the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), of the principal documents leading up to and following after the sixth special session. The main UN resolutions are handily brought together in a special section at the end of Volume II, but the special value of this dauntingly massive collection (two volumes, 964 pages, seventy-seven items) is that it includes, starting with the communiqué of the Bandung conference in 1955, the most important of the declarations made by the developing countries collectively *outside* the framework of the UN system. At the seventh special session, it was Daniel Moynihan, speaking on behalf of the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who said 'We have heard your voices'. 'About time too', one might have replied. Yet there was substance in Moynihan's point. The voice of the developing countries speaking collectively is not, contrary to popular belief, heard in the UN. There it is distorted by the assumption of the need for consensus, and by the intermediation of good people in the UN secretariat, and more conspicuously in the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), who presume to speak on developing countries' behalf. But, in the absence of a permanent secretariat to record the declarations of developing countries when they do use their own voice, many of the relevant documents have been hard to obtain. UNITAR has remedied that deficiency. In doing so, it has shown how consistent over the years have been the developing countries' demands, thereby giving the lie to those who, like the writer of this article, have argued, on the basis of what is said through the intermediation of the international development community, that discussion of developmental issues has been swayed by passing fashion to the point of frivolity.

An illuminating sidelight is thrown on the UNITAR selection of non-UN documents by Jyoti Shankar Singh's essay, written from the point of view of someone inside the UN secretariat (since 1974. Singh has been with the UN Fund for Population Activities), but not so long

inside it as to have stopped observing it. This is one of the very few books to have appeared on the new order without multiple authorship. As such, for the reason already given, it adds little to the substantive debate. What it does offer is a perceptive observation *of* the debate. (For reasons which are not entirely clear, the Fund for Population Activities has been consistently a source of perceptive observation of UN processes, deploying a gentle irony against the prevalence of self-praise. Singh himself, without putting it quite like that, attributes it to the personality of Rafael M. Salas, the Executive Director.) The best things in Singh's book are the historical chapters on the sixth and seventh special sessions, both of which he attended, and in particular his charting of the shift in the American position towards conciliation, of which more later. As an observer of history, he has one telling, indeed devastating, point to make. Speaking of the commissions established by the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in 1975 (CIEC, also known as 'the Paris Conference' and as 'the North-South Dialogue'), he says:

> The bargaining that went into the creation of these commissions and the hard negotiations that lie ahead within the mandate of each commission are not particularly suited to the style of UN diplomacy; and in some ways, therefore, it would be best to leave these commissions to function on their own while building up and promoting a series of contacts between them and various UN organs and organizations (p. 49).

If the questions posed by the call for a new order are primarily questions of strategy, that is a major point on which to ponder.

* * *

Both the UNITAR collection and Singh implicitly raise the question how the developing countries' voice can best be projected. The point is taken up more explicitly in what might be described as the main-line literature on the new order, consisting of a sequence of symposia in which specialists in the various issues on the new agenda have joined the debate. An early and remarkable example was the North-South Dialogue project of the Overseas Development Council in Washington. The book that emerged from that project, significantly and perceptively sub-titled 'The Developing World Speaks Out', was publicised as being almost exclusively the work of commentators from developing countries. It would be easy, from a sceptical point of view, to argue that the claim was perhaps a little too glossy. Some of the contributors were familiar figures on the international circuit, whose claim to 'speak out' for the developing world is open to challenge, and it just happened that the only contributor from a developed country, Guy F. Erb, was also the director of the project and the principal editor of the volume that emerged. But those are carping points. Given that the main writing must have been done *between* the sixth and seventh special sessions, the book was remarkable for its recognition of what was going on, a recognition reflected in the editors' decision to devote a third of their space to the reproduction of the basic texts. And at the analytical level, even if some of the contributors were playing the old development game of being all things to all men, the book remains noteworthy for Ali Mazrui's keynote paper, challenging the easy assumption that in the aftermath of the oil crisis the industrialised countries would

acknowledge their growing interdependence with the commodity-exporting countries, and that this would suffice to generate the momentum for a settlement. Mazrui's paper does two things. First it *explains*, in moving terms, the solidarity of developing countries with OPEC, in spite of the damage done to them by the OPEC coup. Second it *argues*, with force, that the concept of interdependence offers little to developing countries so long as it remains embedded in hierarchical rather than equal relationships. One is reminded of, and anyone who discusses the new order in terms of consensus, interdependence and partnership should recall, Lord Malvern's offensive remark about the horse and the rider.

The conception of the Overseas Development Council's symposium, illuminated by Ali Mazrui's flash of feeling, was ahead of its time. The voice was still unsure, and the list of issues to be discussed was unclear. What was particularly unclear, and to some extent remains so still, was whether the call for a new order was a call addressed primarily to the *developing* countries, asserting, in the euphoria of 'commodity power', a new-found capacity for independent action, or whether it was merely a somewhat angrier reassertion of the old appeal to the developed countries for unilaterial concessions and preferential treatment. It could not be both. This was the point that had consistently been missed by the strategists of UNCTAD, with their commitment to a posture of confrontation from which it was hoped that a consensus would emerge. That strategy, stemming from a deep-seated and wrong belief in the ineluctable superiority of the developed countries' negotiating hand, was akin to the behaviour of a general who, observing the superior disposition of his enemy's forces, demands that the opposing commander should move off the high ground before the battle begins, to give him a 'fairer' chance of winning. It was this absurd strategy that rendered the 'unity of the 77' so ineffectual. There was nothing inevitable about the failure of the Group of 77. Nor was the failure attributable, as some have argued, to the Group's commitment to an appearance of unity, even at the cost of substance. It was a failure peculiar to the extraordinary strategy devised for the developing countries in the UNCTAD framework, which was not abandoned until the fourth UNCTAD in 1976.

The sixth special session of the General Assembly, in 1974, had suggested a more thrusting strategy, but it was not until the seventh special session, in the following year, that strategic thinking moved beyond the stage of declarations. This 1975 session produced a grudgingly agreed list of issues for discussion. The developed countries breathed a sigh of relief. Consensus had been restored. Conciliation had replaced confrontation. The debate had reverted to the UNCTAD framework, ensuring that the developed countries' interests were no longer seriously threatened. Much of the writing on the new order that has appeared since has been concerned with probing and questioning that interpretation of events, asking whether it is really true that nothing has changed, and that the NIEO can now be consigned to the graveyard of once fashionable slogans.

The best examination of that question, by a very long way, is the symposium edited by Sauvant and Hasenpflug. It meets all three of the tests listed above. Not only does it reproduce the texts, as chapters rather than as appendices, but it is organised in accordance with the new agenda provided by the seventh special session. It discusses the issues on the agenda in detail, and no others. And a carefully achieved balance of disciplines among the authors ensures that strategic choices are considered

in their historical and political contexts, not merely from the viewpoint of the neat abstractions of economic calculation.

Sauvant, in an introductory discussion, emphasises the significance of the emergence of the outline of a new order from a conference of non-aligned countries, not from a UN confrontation, and that theme runs through much of what follows. In particular, it permeates Catherine Gwin's excellent historical account of the seventh special session. On the alleged restoration of consensus, she writes, at the end of her account:

> In answer to the question of whether a significant new phase in North-South relations has yet begun, these observations suggest that what occurred was a *conciliation* without *reconciliation* of the basic issues and the fundamental principles at stake. To the developing states' demand for the more tightly managed NIEO in which collective decision-making directly takes into account problems of redistributing world economic opportunities, the developed states (led by the United States) have responded with some plans to reform and revitalize aspects of the existing international economic system, with principal attention to issues of efficiency and stability (p. 113).

Catherine Gwin's thesis is that the United States did not understand the motive force making for solidarity between the OPEC members and other developing countries, and therefore did not initially see the need to respond. In curious agreement with the UNCTAD illusion, the United States believed that the negotiating position of the proponents of the new order was weak and could be ignored. The more conciliatory tone of American statements at the seventh special session arose merely from a belated recognition that it was not as weak as all that, and that an appearance of consensus would be needed to keep the old order intact. If her interpretation of the outcome is correct, then the apparent progress achieved at the seventh special session, and more substantially at the subsequent fourth UNCTAD, may turn out once again to be spurious.

Sauvant's and Hasenpflug's other contributors are careful in their analysis and assessment of the specific proposals of the new order. As a book written by committed advocates of the new order, moreover, it is noteworthy for its fair consideration (by Charles Ries) of the criticisms that have been voiced by sceptics. Ries concedes the point already noted, that the NIEO is about states, not peoples, but goes on, correctly, to link the focus of much recent writing on the welfare of peoples with the increasingly interventionist stance taken by aid agencies.

At the more technical level, Wolfgang Hager on the integrated commodities programme, the key proposal in the new order and intellectually the most vulnerable one, offers a coolly non-committal assessment, which sharply makes the crucial distinction between measures to stabilise and measures to increase export earnings. On technology, Dieter Ernst, while fully committed to the well-established proposition that the multinational corporation is a singularly unattractive beast, provides a devastatingly destructive analysis of the proposed code of conduct for the transfer of technology, which he sees as a device consciously used to divert developing countries from their own more forceful efforts to build up their technological capacity: a view for which, ironically, he has some support from the current chairman of the Development Assistance Committee. (See the DAC 1976 Review, p. 22.) On exports of manufactures, Peter J. Ginman and Tracy Murray present a painstaking calculation of the very small

gains derived from the arduously negotiated Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).

The book is equally telling, though in a different way, in the three areas in which it is superficially rather weak. On aid, Mahbub ul Haq calls for yet another 'new approach'. Why, just when the aid agencies collectively are at least on the way to solving most of the problems that loomed large in the literature of the 1960s? It is a frivolous appeal, which leaves one wondering whether there is in fact anything serious left to be said on the subject. On self-reliance, also, the book has little to say, though on that there is certainly more that remains to be said.

But the main weakness, which was perhaps inevitable, is in the selection of texts, a question to which the editors clearly gave much thought. To cite the resolution of the seventh special session is fine, though in terms of their own thesis they should also have included earlier texts in which the developing countries' voice was more clearly heard. But they seem to have run into difficulty when it came to technical elaboration of such essentially political declarations. In practice, they rely heavily on UNCTAD. The UNCTAD secretariat's shoddy manipulation of statistics has been exposed and attacked often enough. The familiar criticisms need not be repeated here. But it is sad to see the editors of a good and serious book forced, by their admirable commitment to citing what has in fact been said, to rely on such stuff. To give just one example, which one can repeat without choking only because the point, though typical, is quite unimportant: UNCTAD tries to prove that regional institutions account for a growing percentage of multilateral financial flows by comparing the disbursement figures for 1961 (the year in which the Inter-American Development Bank made its first loan *commitment*) with 1973. Other such howlers, relating to more important issues, are less amusing. It remains a puzzle why the developing countries still do not have their own secretariat to prepare their negotiating positions, so that they, like Sauvant and Hasenpflug, are forced to rely on an organisation which was not designed to serve this purpose, and in trying to do so *must* pervert and distort the voices it transmits.

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The three books discussed so far (leaving aside for the moment the UNITAR collection) are written with feeling for the tone of voice in which the call for a new order has been made. The symposium edited by Jagdish Bhagwati is in a different style. Bhagwati is a symposiarch of exceptional experience, with sufficient standing, as the list of contributors confirms, to pull in some impressive scholars as his fellow symposiasts. Almost without exception, they turn out a polished performance, Bhagwati most of all, in his urbane introductory critique of the developing countries' strategy. Yet the book disappoints, and many readers will find themselves, as apparently did some of the participants in the workshop which gave rise to the book, wondering more about the reasons for this feeling of disappointment than about specific points being made.

Echoing a notable paper by Michael Lipton, published in 1972, on bargaining strategy for developing countries, Bhagwati's opening plea is for a cooler calculation of gains and losses from alternative proposals, and for a more hard-headed exploration of proposals that are saleable. But this exploration, unless someone else can improve on Bhagwati's considerable ingenuity in such endeavours, is likely to end up with nothing more than

mini-proposals, for a tax on the brain drain, for a tax on exploitation of the sea-bed, and other deft ways of effecting a disguised and therefore presumed acceptable transfer of resources to developing countries. Other contributors continue in the same vein. It is all very clever, very professional, and very insubstantial.

But one should read to the end, where contributions to the workshop's final panel discussion are reproduced. Harry Johnson in a rage, Ali Mazrui with regret, Paul Streeten in a considered recapitulation, and Charles Kindleberger with amused detachment, all in different ways make the same point. It had been a gathering of professional economists, doing the things that economists enjoy doing and do best, disregarding the agenda and fastening on such minor issues as offered scope for neat solutions, generally with the requirement that the solution should be consonant with economic efficiency.

Significantly and illuminatingly, confirmation of this judgment is to be found by going back to the only two really bad papers in the book, by John Edelman and Hollis Chenery on aid and by Gerry Helleiner on technology, in both of which a broader approach is attempted. The reason for their failure is not to be found in any slippage from professional standards: rather the reverse, for Edelman and Chenery exhibit their usual technical mastery of economic logic, and Helleiner exhibits his usual extensive knowledge of what has been written about the subject under discussion. And yet Edelman and Chenery devote twenty-one pages to 'proving' that aid would be more effective as an instrument for alleviating poverty if the following conditions were fulfilled: 1. if there were more of it; 2. if it were more concentrated on the poorest countries; and 3. if recipients made better use of it; and Helleiner argues enthusiastically for changing the world patent system and approves the proposed code of conduct for the transfer of technology, ignoring his own observation that any code would be full of holes and that the patent system has little relevance for many developing countries. Rage, regret, a considered recapitulation or amused detachment may be appropriate critical responses, but a more appropriate response for the collectivity of developing countries, wanting their voice to be heard, and wanting action, would be to look elsewhere.

It must be emphasised that this strong reaction is engendered by the book *as a whole*. Unwittingly—or perhaps wittingly, for among the contributors are C. Fred Bergsten and others who are close to American official thinking—the authors confirm Catherine Gwin's thesis. And yet there are individual contributions which are admirable. In addition to the final commentaries already mentioned, one might single out Harry Johnson's and Ian Little's trenchant exchange on the integrated commodities programme, John Williamson's lucid survey of the problems associated with linking Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to a transfer of resources, and Jagdish Bhagwati's own examination, with Isaiah Frank's and John Williamson's comments, of the scope for introducing greater self-restraint into developed countries' use of the escape clause of 'market disruption' to keep out developing countries' exports. What is missing is an overall historical sense of the process of which these issues are current manifestations.

William G. Tyler, the editor of the last of the symposia to be considered here, is less distinguished than Jagdish Bhagwati, and his team of contributors includes some unfamiliar names. With normal English sympathy for the underdog, one would wish, therefore, to be able to say that it is the

better book. It is not. There are, nevertheless, as in the Bhagwa symposium, some good things. The best is Tracy Murray's assessment (the impact of the GSP, but that is available in similar form in h contribution to Sauvant and Hasenpflug.

The basic ambiguity in the call for a new order remains. Is it primaril a call addressed to the developed countries, to get them to move the troops off the high ground, or is it primarily an exploration of developin countries' limited but significant room for independent manoeuvre? Th process of reading the current literature confirms an uneasy impressio already gained from reports of recent conferences, that it is reverting t the former, that Sauvant and Hasenpflug are right, and that at the en of the day there will be much bitterness. But it need not be so. It is surel significant that the scope for collective self-reliance is barely considere in the books discussed, certainly not with the rigour and care devoted t other issues, with the notable exception of one good paper in Sauvant an Hasenpflug (written, it must be wryly admitted, in view of the opinion already expressed, by the UNCTAD secretariat). And there is virtually n discussion of the sensitive and difficult question of the adjustments tha developed countries already need to make in view of the emergence of middle group of countries, in eastern Asia and Latin America, for whor in a sense the new order has already arrived.

To consolidate the elements of the new order already achieved, th developing countries need their own base, comparable to the base so effec tively provided for the developed countries by the OECD. The UNCTAI can then revert to its proper function as a conference. A final anecdot may illustrate what now, without such a base, goes wrong. There have bee several commentaries on the new order from semi-official groups in whic developing countries are strongly represented, of which one of the bette ones was the report of the Commonwealth Experts' Group under Aliste McIntyre. Recently, I asked what had happened to it. 'Well, the grou met. They produced a report. It was an agreed report. And now it' gone to governments. What more do you want?'

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PEACEKEEPING

Shelford Bidwell

The Peacekeeper's Handbook. Published by International Peace Academy. 1978.

IT is strange that when so much academic attention has been paid to the various uses of armed forces in international relationships, so little has been devoted to the actual activities of the multinational contingents raised under the aegis of the United Nations for peacekeeping purposes. They seem to be taken for granted. It may be because sometimes, especially in the Middle East, they seem to be part of a face-saving manoeuvre designed to provide a smoke-screen at that point in the unending war by proxy between the two super-powers when neither can afford to let its client arrive at a point of total defeat, or to allow the conflict to reach such a stage that their own armed forces may have to intervene, with all the dangerous consequences that might follow. It follows from this view that the composition of a peacekeeping force, apart from some guarantee of its neutrality, or its professional skills, seems irrelevant. Too much efficiency or zeal might be a positive disadvantage: all it needs to do to be effective is to exist. It is a means of imposing peace, by proxy, just as the conflict was by proxy.

The International Peace Academy (IPA), in effect a sort of staff college for peacekeepers, whose role is 'the development of skills and techniques for greater efficiency within peacekeeping forces', takes a loftier and more optimistic view. It sees peacekeeping (also *peace-making* and *peace-building*, terms of its own coinage) as a whole new dimension in the use of military forces and able to produce positive results.

'Peacekeeping' is, in fact, an ambitious description: the presence of 'peacekeeping' forces has never *kept* the peace, for the simple reason that they have neither the authority nor the military ability to do any such thing. Their function is restorative. What they provide is a pacific, disinterested, impartial agency which, at the moment when the belligerents feel so disposed, or are under pressure from their sponsors, can separate the two sides, demarcate truce lines, arrange the exchange of prisoners of war and report infractions of the truce agreement. They can exert a calming influence at the psychological moment when both sides are mentally and physically exhausted and only too ready to call a halt to combat. These are very valuable functions in themselves, and it is important not to blame and certainly not ridicule the various United Nations forces for their impotence in the face of, for instance, the determined aggression which brought about the Arab-Israeli clashes of 1967 and 1973, the prolonged cannonade along the line of the Suez Canal or the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. It is equally important, because it is unrealistic, to claim too much for an activity difficult enough in itself, but also hedged around with constraints designed to make it impossible for a permanent United Nations military agency to exercise even a hint of supra-national authority, or, indeed, even to exist.

This is all very well, as there are good political reasons, understood by all shades of opinion inside the United Nations, why this should be so, but it is very unsatisfactory from a military point of view, as the consequence is that there is no staff of the United Nations comparable to a national General Staff capable of contingency planning, training, organisation or the development of peacekeeping methods. The post of Military Adviser to the Secretary-General lapsed in 1969, when he was replaced by a military Liaison Officer. The Field Operations Service Department is purely civilian and concerned with the direction and administrative support of a United Nations force and it is formed ad hoc from United Nations contract personnel. No United Nations machinery exists to provide member states who, by virtue of their neutral or uncommitted stance are eligible for service, with guidance. As far as is known, no reports or despatches are made by force commanders evaluating their experiences. (Or if they are made, they are not circulated.) This is a formula to guarantee confusion, and there can be little doubt that in past operations there has been a good deal of it. Good military forces are eminently adaptable, but even the best cannot be committed to an unaccustomed operation differing so radically from their normal role without careful training and indoctrination *if this involves in some way the use or carrying of weapons.*

There is no difficulty at the extremes. If the question of enforcement arises as, for instance, carried out by units of the Indian Army in the Congo, the soldiers' task is straightforward. Objectives for capture or positions to be defended are indicated, or the troops are ordered to disarm or pacify indicated bodies of troops using military force, if necessary *à outrance*. To furnish observers, supervise elections or give aid in civil disaster are straightforward tasks, requiring only briefing.

It is the mid-positions that present difficulty: the use of 'minimum force', or the use of weapons for personal protection only, and this difficulty is redoubled if the belligerents have no stable government responsible for their actions, as seems to be the case with UNIFIL in the Lebanon at the moment. Indeed, it can be argued that these alternative roles are incompatible, not so much from the point of view of military expertise as from motivation. Even the sophisticated regular rank and file of the British Army, who have always been obliged to undertake multiple roles, find it difficult to switch from the instant, conditioned aggressive response expected in one set of circumstances to the extreme restraint required when acting 'in aid of the civil power'. It is in no way derogatory of the devoted contingents of UN peacekeeping forces to say that their rank and file may be simple, unsophisticated and politically unaware; trained only in discipline, weapon handling and minor tactics. On the negative side, they may not take kindly to giving way to the threat of force. (Who after all wants soldiers who allow themselves to be tamely disarmed or kidnapped?) On the positive side, they must be able to meet the high demands made on their patience and tact, which in turn requires more than an understanding of the goals and attitudes of both sides. 'A peacekeeping soldier will be required to adjust, in both attitudes and approach, to the situation in which he is involved and to the motivations and the cultural backgrounds of the people and groups who are the parties to the dispute' (p. 1/2).

These obstacles are by no means insuperable, once it is accepted that a proportion of training time must be given to the peacekeeping role, and it is accepted that other roles must suffer to some extent accordingly. (For

example, as the British Army in Germany devotes part of its training time, which is barely adequate to keep highly mechanised and technical formations at the topmost pitch of training, to its paramilitary and civil role in Northern Ireland. But there are many experienced officers who consider that where there is no obvious or immediate primary military role, a secondary one keeps all ranks busy and gives them a sense of a worthwhile mission; none more so than peacekeeping.)

These are the psychological factors. Soldiers, however, are practical people and, in a well-trained and disciplined force at any rate, their officers should have no great anxiety about the way their men will behave. It is not goals and ideals which bother them but precise details of their mission and the mechanics of achieving it. The mere mention of a new mission causes them to rivet their attention on a whole catalogue of factors: the chain of command, communications, logistics, transport, and all the minor tactics and techniques of the task they are likely to face. The apparently simple tasks of establishing a road-block, or traffic control point, or an observation post, cannot be left to be thought out on the spot by a junior NCO: they are full of pitfalls. How does one persuade a belligerent patrol that has clearly lost its way to return to its own territory, without a common language, and without threatening it with weapons? All this may seem small beer to those who are concerned with the larger issues of diplomacy and great-power rivalry, but a false step by the soldier could prejudice the whole operation.

The vicissitudes of the units of the various United Nations forces which in the early years threaded their way through the hazards of peacekeeping are seldom known in detail, but in the course of time a whole body of practical knowledge has been built up, largely by the 'Nordic' contingents and by the Canadians who have played a regular part. This has been codified by the International Peace Academy and published as a *vade mecum* in a stout cover with rings and punched pages, with room for additions and with all the information the staff, the regimental and the non-commissioned officer might require both for training and in the field, down to specimen forms for every sort of situation report with instructions on how they should be completed. (This may make the reader smile, but when under stress it is wonderfully composing to be made to collect one's wits and signal the facts; just as it is reassuring to the recipient to learn precisely what the nature of an incident is.)

The Peacekeeper's Handbook is a *tour de force*, and typically English, for all the internationality of its provenance. It begins with a perfunctory genuflection in the general direction of the non-violent theory of peace-keeping, but such airy stuff is dismissed by page 2: thereafter it is pragmatic and practical, beginning with a clear and simple exposition of how the United Nations is organised and how peacekeeping activities are legitimised and directed. The military reader will notice at once that it is so laid out that the subject matter can be used to construct a training course for say, a cadre of NCOs and junior officers and also as notes for lectures or discussion periods. It is always possible to criticise such manuals in detail, but a close reading prompts only the following comments.

Health and hygiene are duly mentioned, but require emphasis. It may not be convenient to keep inoculations topped up, but all potential peace-keepers should be warned of the more elementary hazards of foreign travel which can lay whole companies low with prostrating and undignified stomach ailments. Much seems to depend on the exact location of

demilitarised zones. It might be advisable therefore always to include an engineer survey section to run a traverse along boundaries and a supply of beacons, posts and flags to mark them.

The weakest part is the one on intelligence and information. The term 'intelligence' is not used, as it is presumed to have unhappy political connotations, only 'information', which fogs the issue, since 'information' by common definition is the raw material and 'intelligence' is the assessment. The author seems to think that all information sources are clandestine and therefore likely somehow to offend the belligerents, whereas in practice ninety per cent. of reliable information is overt or passive. Looking at the problem from military first principles it seems essential for the commanders of peacekeeping forces to have a clear picture of the situation before they can act, and this requires an adequate information flow from as many diverse sources as possible and a strong, properly trained staff to evaluate it, otherwise there is a real danger of the force becoming a mere symbolic presence. The crucial area for peacekeeping is on the frontiers of Israel, where both sides are equipped with advanced weapons, whose presence requires advanced methods of surveillance and highly trained operators and observers. For instance, only the trained observers of air defence units could hope to fill in the form on V/61 of the handbook, using only optical means. Item 4B is impossible to evaluate accurately by eye and 4C requires extensive and recondite knowledge. A start has been made to meet this need, although by bilateral agreement and not under United Nations authority, in Sinai. That is a permanent installation, but there are a number of locating and surveillance equipments designed for use with field forces. They are capable of being sited effectively in buffer zones and their use would in no way infringe territorial rights, any more than an optically equipped observer post. It would be well worth considering their use. They can detect and measure aircraft movement, the displacement of weapons into restricted areas and also the point sources of artillery and mortar fire, which might prove useful in a confused situation such as exists in the Lebanon.

Having made these comments it is only necessary to add that as a practical manual *The Peacekeeper's Handbook* is wholly admirable and no doubt will be even better when the final chapter on the law and international peacekeeping, not yet printed, is included. Where it is unsatisfactory is in the area of 'doctrine'; a better word than 'theory'. It is not so much that the doctrine is supported by false argument or analysis: it is not argued or analysed at all. The point of departure is an assumption, a matter of faith: 'The theoretical concept of international peace-keeping is that the control of violence in interstate and intrastate conflict is possible without the use of force or enforcement measures' (p. 1/1). This to be achieved by 'person to person, group to group relationships'. This may perhaps be effective, sometimes, in inter-communal strife, but it is not *argued.* As a general statement it is unlikely to convince anyone with experience of that most obdurate form of human antagonism. Nor can it have any bearing on the decisions of governments, with whom the peacekeepers have no form of contact.

In their arguments, the advocates of such idealistic methods of peacekeeping implicitly judge the effectiveness of these methods by the long periods of comparative peace, and so fall into the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*: whereas what really seems to have been the case is that the Arabs and Israelis (the theatre which must be the touchstone of any

peacekeeping exercises) are only capable of short bursts of high intensity warfare, and when political or military factors indicate that some advantage might accrue from full-scale offensive action it is begun without any respect or regard for the presence or absence of a United Nations peacekeeping force.

The doctrine on the use of force and 'enforcement' is ambiguous. Having been summarily rejected in the introductory chapter there is a long note, significantly in bold type (V/38), indicating that there are circumstances when force is justified—'when the UN forces are under direct attack from the forces of one of the parties engaged or from extremist elements . . .'—and the action in Congo/Katanga is cited. Apart from any inconsistency or departure from what appear at bottom to be the fundamentally moral principles adhered to be the IPA, this is historically naive. No pure question of peacekeeping was involved in the Congo. Rightly or wrongly, a military movement for secession was put down by military means without any reference to the population involved, for purely political reasons. (And the consequences in African affairs are with us yet.)

To say this is not to labour a point or belabour the IPA. The phenomenon of UN peacekeeping is likely to be a permanent and valuable feature in international relationships. The IPA performs a valuable service in encouraging it and studying how it can be made more effective in the most practical way. But, as the opening sentence of its manual says: 'Every endeavour . . . must be supported by a theoretical framework'. To put practice first is realistic, but what is wanted now is a rigorous analysis of all the operations undertaken to date to determine the extent of achievements and failures, and also to examine how they can be made more effective in the future as regards questions of principle and doctrine.

REVIEWS

CHATHAM HOUSE BOOK

Issues in Japan's China Policy. By Wolf Mendl. *London: Macmillan for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1978. 178 pp. £10·00.*

A SUBTLE gamesmanship and a striving for 'moral superiority' have traditionally characterised the competitive interactions of the two principal societies of East Asia. These qualities have been intellectually stimulating for some, but more often than not Westerners, accustomed to the more direct and more abrasive relations between the socialist East and the capitalist West, have found the admixtures of political style and culture between East Asian states and the external powers maddeningly frustrating. Chinese and Japanese policy-makers, on the other hand, as Dr. Mendl deftly indicates, have had more than their fair share of exposure to some pretty rough treatment both by postwar American administrations and by a series of Soviet leaders whose efforts at manipulation can hardly be regarded as at all sophisticated. Since their rapprochement in 1972, the two local powers have found overlapping causes for complaint about alien hegemony and opportunities to express a heartfelt wish for its early termination. The most recent expression of this has been conveyed in the determination of the Japanese Foreign Minister to bring the latest round of negotiations, beginning in July 1978, for a peace and friendship treaty with China to their final culmination 'without a break until a successful conclusion was reached'.[1]

In two introductory chapters covering the years from 1945 to 1971, the book demonstrates how largely the China question has figured from the outset as a central symbol of Japanese aspirations for freedom from the political straitjacket of American tutelage. Then follows an examination of the diplomatic revolution in Sino-Japanese relations prompted by Sino-American detente, of the increased significance of political over the economic issues that had been the core of relations before normalisation, and of the implications of the Chou-Tanaka accords for Japan's security relations with Taiwan and the United States. The two concluding chapters analyse current bilateral commercial and diplomatic relations, their implications for third parties, the potential room the rapprochement has given the Chinese for manoeuvre in Japanese domestic politics and, finally, the prospects for future co-operation or conflict in a rapidly changing domestic and international environment for both countries. The text is accompanied by some helpful statistical tables, a number of key documents and a comparative chronology of events from 1949 to 1976.

The relations of both countries with the two super-powers inevitably dominate, but surprisingly little space is given to the prospects, adumbrated by Michael Pillsbury as long ago as 1975,[2] of Sino-American collusion against the Soviet Union and the implications of a regional East Asian arms race for Japanese security. In a minor key, Dr. Mendl singles out the

[1] *The Times*, June 23, 1978.
[2] 'U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?', *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1975, No. 20, pp. 50–64.

impression made on the Japanese by the French decision to recognise the People's Republic and by the snook cocked at the Americans by President de Gaulle in the early 1960s, but leaves out the less obtrusive but perhaps no less influential approaches to the China problem pursued by the other major European states. Although there are many other specific items of interpretation that the East Asian specialist might wish to argue about, Dr. Mendl has nevertheless produced a highly informative and thought-provoking monograph which presents in lucid style a skilful selection of the key issues in the conduct of Japanese policy towards China. It sets a high standard of discussion within a dauntingly limited brief of under two hundred pages, which, given the inevitable spate of writing to come about the prospects for the world in the 1980s, succeeding authors will hopefully seek to emulate.

University of Sussex J. W. M. CHAPMAN

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism. By Hugh Seton-Watson. *London: Methuen. 1977. 563 pp. £12·00.*

HUGH SETON-WATSON is one of the last universal historians. He uses, that is to say, his vast detailed learning and command of many languages to look at history on a global scale and to make fruitful and interesting comparisons between widely different societies in all five continents. At the same time Professor Seton-Watson remains a historian in the British empirical tradition. He is not like Arnold Toynbee and does not try to elaborate or impose large historical laws, but rather by a careful accumulation of detail to suggest certain tentative and cautious general conclusions.

Seton-Watson's book can be read in two ways. At one level it is a world history containing an immense amount of information about the development of every kind of national movement. It is a book to which we shall continue to turn if we want to find out something about the history of the major nations and also about the growth of nationalism among, for example, the Quechua Indians in the Andes or about its survival among the Armenians. At another level, however, the book raises important general issues about the nature of the state, the definition of nationality and the relation between language, race and nation. At the same time it stimulates speculation about the nature of the present international system and the future of our political development.

Professor Seton-Watson examines the history of what he calls the 'old continuous nations' of Europe and of Chinese civilisation 'unique in its survival for almost four thousand years in the same land, which sets it aside from any other in history' (p. 274). He also deals with the growth of national movements among subject peoples and the attempts made to construct new states to replace the old multi-national ones—the Habsburg Monarchy and the Russian and Ottoman empires. He gives an account of the development of European nations overseas: Americans, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders and of the unique problem of South Africa, where Afrikaner nationalism, based on the belief that the Afrikaners constitute 'a small nation, forged out of a long heroic struggle against

heavy odds, not imperialists but victims of imperialism . . . not "white settlers" but the people of the country' (p. 375), confronts a growing black national consciousness the final political form of which is still uncertain.

Then there are the 'diaspora nations': Armenians, overseas Indians and, of course, the Jews, so that we are forced to reflect why some of them have a national homeland while others lack or have lost it. The success of the Jews in forging an Israeli nation derives from the fact—and this was perhaps the greatest contribution of Herzl to the Zionist movement—that the Zionist leaders realised that language and religion were not enough to form the basis of a nation unless there was also a clear attachment to a specific territorial base in which to form a state. This in turn contributed to the development of a new and bitter Arab nationalism: 'The Zionist triumph', Hugh Seton-Watson writes, 'was won by inflicting brutal injustice on hundreds and thousands who were guilty only of wishing to keep their homeland. The Jews, who had suffered the greatest oppression in human history, themselves became invaders and conquerors. They had no choice' (p. 405).

The whole book is marked by this gloomy and pessimistic view of the inexorable logic of history. While the author's heart is clearly with those optimistic liberals who believed that all problems had solutions and that nationalism, liberalism and progress were inevitably compatible, his head is all too aware of the suffering which national movements have caused. He has not perhaps given up all hope—and there are surprising suggestions of where solutions might be sought, as when he recommends that Black leaders in the United States 'might be well advised to study the ideas once proposed by Bauer and Renner for the Habsburg Monarchy' (p. 366), or that these ideas might have provided the basis for a solution of the problems of Nigeria. Hugh Seton-Watson also realises that in the world today there are two conflicting but irreversible forces at work: on the one hand, co-operation between states is bound to become closer as international agencies are formed to deal with economic and social problems on a world-wide scale. On the other hand, the demand for national self-expression and self-government is growing so that we cannot avoid asking what, for instance, the European Community would look like if Scotland or Catalonia or Brittany became independent. (Professor Seton-Watson incidentally is one of those Scots who has little sympathy for what he calls the 'crackpot fanatics' of the Scottish Nationalist Movement.) 'There must' the book concludes, 'be a balance between national cultures and interstate co-operation . . . if destructive civil war and nuclear holocaust are to be avoided. It may be that the vast bulk of the human race care not for any of these things. That does not absolve those who know and care from making an effort to explain them' (p. 483). It is an effort which has been impressively and successfully made in this book.

London School of Economics JAMES JOLL

International Organisation: A Conceptual Approach. Edited by Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom. *London: Frances Pinter; New York: Nichols. 1978. 464 pp. £11·50.*

THE twenty essays by thirteen academic contributors from several countries reflect the variety of the contemporary conceptual approaches to inter-

national organisation. The arrangement is commonsensical: the introductory four chapters outline the background, the subsequent eleven the major approaches, and the concluding four perspectives and evaluations.

The contributions are competent, but the lack of coherence in the theorising about this area of international interaction becomes painfully obvious. This is best demonstrated by the contents of the concluding four chapters which assess international organisation from the relatively unhackneyed perspectives of the Third World, international organisation networks (instead of the usual perspectives of the single institutions), non-governmental perspectives (a case study of the Anti-Apartheid Movement's action for arms embargo) and international organisation in world society. All these are quite interesting but not one of them takes us far enough towards what should be the objective of such a volume—an evaluation of the place of international organisation in the international system. This is not the fault of the editors but rather of the unsatisfactory nature of the conceptual approaches which, in turn, can be explained by the confused nature of reality.

While this volume is a useful interim reference work guiding us into the world of theory, it is hard to expect anything very definitive from the theorists until and unless the roles of both the global and the regional international institutions in our generation crystallise sufficiently to make more definitive theorising possible. There is, of course, a certain degree of circularity between the theorising and the establishment and development of international institutions, but not one of the contemporary approaches is sufficiently sweeping and convincing to explain the practical effects of the early experiments of functionalism and neo-functionalism.

University of Southampton J. FRANKEL

Problems of World Modelling: Political and Social Implications. Edited by Karl W. Deutsch *et al. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 1977. 423 pp. £10·80.*

THE papers collected in this volume were presented at a conference at Harvard University in 1976. In an introductory chapter Karl Deutsch states that the aim of both conference and book is ' to make a contribution . . . to developing simulation models of major, general trends in world economics, world politics, and world ecology . . . [and] to examine global characteristics at a sufficient level of disaggregation for them to be of use in studying regional development ' (p. 5). The editors warn that the book is incomplete. It is an early stage in an effort to gather into a coherent whole various kinds of knowledge about the political, social and economic development of the world.

The contributors are predominantly from the United States, but include five Latin Americans, one Indian and five assorted Europeans. Their treatments vary widely from models of single national states to global models and from the new international economic order to historical analyses of past power struggles, but with an emphasis throughout on method, information problems, and the potential use of models for purposes of prediction and control.

The structure of the book raises some questions. Some papers have comprehensive bibliographies, others have none. Some chapters are manifestly based on a great deal of thought, work and empirical research,

others appear to be extempore interjections during the conference. It is perhaps a problem of all such conference collections that the reader feels that there is a sub-text of interchange and exchange missing, which detracts from the coherence of the whole. But it is a fault of the editors that in the two concluding chapters, only one page is devoted to summarising the major concerns of the conference, and it does not adequately synthesise disparate ideas and approaches. The reader (and perhaps even the conference participant) does not feel he has taken a step forward in the accumulation of understanding and knowledge.

The book does not have the impact of imminent doom and collapse conveyed by previous controversial world models.[1] Carlos Mallmann, who reports on the Bariloche project, a Third-World perspective on global modelling, stresses that the restraints on the satisfaction of human survival needs are socio-political, and not material. P. N. Rastogi models four national societies and shows how relatively small improvements could avert their collapse. Chapters by Bennett and Alker, and by Bremer and Mihalka describe simulations which concentrate on power politics, avoiding problems of values. It is those papers which deal with values and the difficulty of modelling them, with problems of redistribution of wealth and resources, and with dependency, which are the most provocative and interesting. They are written by Senghaas, Cardosa, Jaguariba, Lafer, Mallmann, Rastogi, Keyfitz, Mendlovitz, Nordhaus and Russett.

While it helps if the reader is numerate, this book is relevant to all international relations theorists and policy-makers. The problems of systematically analysing the past and present so as to control the future are far from being solved. Data is difficult, sometimes impossible, to obtain. Most of the contributors are careful to insist that 'no model entirely captures the reality it imitates' (p. 27), and that 'present models are still more appropriately used as toys than as tools' (p. 380). Moreover, we are warned against 'the seduction of numbers' (p. 88) and 'semantic pollution' (p. 89). But we are left in no doubt about the importance of world models to us and our survival. Attempts to solve the problems, and to integrate pertinent information, even if not entirely satisfactory or coherent, can only be applauded.

University of Surrey MARGOT LIGHT

International Crises and Crisis Management: An East-West Symposium. Edited by Daniel Frei. *Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon House. 1978. 154 pp. £10·00.*

WRITING about the origins, nature and implications of international crises seems on occasion to suffer from a rather painful case of arrested development. The symptoms include three major tensions: first, between a study based at least initially upon one episode—the Cuban missile crisis—and the demands of a changing international system; secondly, between a study based very largely upon the experiences and responses of 'Western democracies'—often a pseudonym for the United States—and the suspicion that other types of regime may have other experiences and views to offer;

[1] See, for example, Jay W. Forrester, *World Dynamics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen Press, 1971); Donella H. Meadows *et al.*, *The Limits to Growth* (London: Earth Island Ltd.; New York: Universe Books, 1972. Report for Club of Rome); Mihailo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, *Mankind at the Turning Point* (New York: Dutton, 1974).

and finally, between the ideas that crisis, on the one hand, may be managed for purely selfish ends or as an instrument of policy, and on the other hand, for some more general good, for example the averting of nuclear disaster. A collection such as the one under review, which is based on a conference held in Zurich during 1976 and attended by scholars from both Western and Eastern ' blocs ', might therefore be expected to address itself directly to at least the first two of these symptoms.

Unfortunately, the papers collected here fail, with some honourable exceptions, to tackle the problems at anything but the most superficial and accidental level. The ' accidental ' nature of the collection is emphasised by the lack of any strong introductory or concluding synthesis; a very general three-page introduction is simply inadequate to pull together a dozen diverse papers, covering a controversial area of enquiry. Nor, on the whole, do the papers themselves display awareness of the changes and tensions pervading the study of international crisis; almost the only example cited by many contributors is that of Cuba. As has been noted, there are exceptions to this pattern: interesting chapters by Charles Herrmann and John Groom raise the problems created by new participants and new issues in crisis situations, and Coral Bell examines the pressures on ground rules and conventions produced by contextual change. The rather limited space given to each paper, however, means that these arguments are rarely fully developed.

Nor is very much made of the potentially fruitful confrontation between ' Western ' and ' Eastern ' positions. Indeed, as far as one can gather from the printed text, this appears to have been a *dialogue des sourds,* with ' Eastern ' contributors producing a series of manifestoes based on the virtues of detente, the Helsinki Declaration and Soviet peace policy, and ' Western ' participants equally incarcerated in their conceptual and theoretical jails. Any cross-fertilisation is essentially accidental, as for example in the pervasive contrast between ' Eastern ' stress on structures, declarations and formal commitments as the basis of crisis management, and the ' Western ' emphasis on situational and perceptual factors. The contradictions and confusions of detente itself are generally passed over, although they can be seen as an important element in the changing context and implications of big-power crises.

In addition to these problems of conception and content, the book suffers from astonishingly bad editing and presentation. Some of the more interesting pieces are clearly cut quite drastically, while the style of the others is wholly impenetrable. Least excusably of all, the editing—as well as allowing numerous misprints—has allowed the same heading to be given to two successive chapters (12 and 13). Despite the merits of a few individual pieces, one wonders how this book came to be published in its present form, especially at such a price.

Lanchester Polytechnic MICHAEL SMITH

The Permanent Alliance: The European-American Partnership 1945–1984. By Geoffrey Williams. *Leiden: Sijthoff. 1977. 407 pp. (Atlantic Series 10) Fl. 85.00. $37.00.*

THIS book is No. 10 in the Atlantic Series of studies on matters relating to Nato, and Mr. Williams held a Nato Fellowship while he was writing it.

The author comes to his task with impressive qualifications, having previously written about European defence questions and collaborated in a semi-official biography of Mr. Denis Healey. Unfortunately, this book is a disappointment. The reason may be detected in the preface, where Mr. Williams begins by explaining that he is not writing a history of Nato, and goes on with a sentence which is worth quoting as an example of the opaque prose which is to follow. ' While no attempt has been made to write this as a continuous theme, the discussion concerns the course of the Alliance in terms of military and political doctrines which, taken together in their application, constituted the erection of the European-American relationship '. In other words, it is easier even for the author to say what the book is not than to say what it is. The same problem confronts the reader. It is not a work of fundamental research, though it refers to published documentary material. As a work of synthesis, it often deals with matters which have been better treated elsewhere—notably, Raymond Aron has written on a number of the same subjects with far greater trenchancy, lucidity and elegance. As a work of analysis and discussion, it lacks a clear focus.

The focus of the book's argument was presumably intended to be the contrast between ' Atlantic ' and ' European ' views of the North Atlantic alliance, often represented by Britain and France respectively; but unhappily this is reduced to scattered references in a diffuse narrative-cum-discussion. This uncertainty of purpose and approach pervades the whole book. The opening chapter contains a sketch of events in Europe between 1945 and 1948, mixed up with a rapid review of Anglo-American relations from about 1900 onwards and an outline of United States foreign policy between the wars. Chapter 4, on the Suez crisis, gives an orthodox, if somewhat tortuous, account of the affair, but mentions Nato only occasionally, and provides no analysis of the effects of the crisis on the North Atlantic alliance. Four chapters on Vietnam mingle a narrative of well-known events with disjointed commentary on some effects of the war on British and French relations with the United States. Throughout the book, there are a number of interesting and thoughtful points. For example, Mr. Williams argues that the United States has usually regarded its Nato allies as equals, at least in principle; and has sought to persuade rather than coerce them, with the consequence that Nato has repeatedly settled for ' the lowest common denominator of agreed interests ' rather than for the best available policy (p. 295). But such points tend to be raised rather than examined.

The book suffers from a large number of misprints. Manhatten, Ottowa, traummas, sattelite, Soviet's (used as a plural)—such errors ought not to disfigure a serious academic work. But ' channel house ' (for charnel house) at least cheers the reader on his way.

University of Liverpool P. M. H. BELL

Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Vol. VII: U Thant 1965–67 and **Vol. VIII:** U Thant 1968–1971. Edited by Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1977. (Vol. VII) 633 pp. $34.40 (Vol. VIII) 709 pp. $46.90.*

WHEN U Thant succeeded to the vacancy in the Secretary-Generalship created by the death of Dag Hammarskjöld he was the first Asian to hold

this supreme world office, and there were many who expected, from the delicate negotiations which preceded his election and the provenance of the new leader, that his tenure of the office would usher in a period of oriental diplomacy on the 38th floor, 'oriental' being understood to signify everything from the sibyllic to the infirm. They could not have been more wrong. If the initial months were cautious and low-toned, they were even then marked by a firm assertion of the independence of the Secretary-General and, as U Thant settled into office, he soon displayed a confidence and clarity of utterance that many a Western stateman might have envied. By the time we reach 1965, the year with which these two volumes of his public papers open, we are in the presence of a Secretary-General fully in command of the delicate instruments of his office, explicit, forthright, downright even, when he judges the situation to require it. Realism, dedication and straightforwardness are the hallmarks of the utterances here collected and meticulously edited.

U Thant had no illusions about his job. In a BBC television interview in 1966 he said: 'It is not only the loneliest job in the world; in my view, *it is sometimes the most frustrating*' (Vol. VII, p. 237). And when he takes final leave of the General Assembly in December 1971, it is with the unsentimental comment that 'I would be less than candid if I did not tell you that I feel a sense of great relief bordering on liberation' (Vol. VIII, p. 692). Yet this sense of burden led to no evasion of the duties of the office; it resulted rather from the conscientiousness with which he discharged them. An especial strain, which can be sensed on almost every other page of these volumes, was the Vietnam War and the UN's impotence in face of it. In 1970 he goes so far as to say that 'for the last six years my one preoccupation has been the war in Vietnam' (Vol. VIII, p. 369).

In this, as in other areas, U Thant's ability to act was hampered by the deadlock of the UN's political organs. Even so, like a Houdini, he wriggled to win himself some freedom of action. He operated the useful fiction of the 'two U Thants', one 'as representative of Burma' with 'definite views on this subject', and another 'as Secretary-General' who 'has to be guided by the decision of the principal organs' of the UN (Vol. VII, p. 285). But, in whichever capacity, there were certain issues on which he did not hesitate to express sharp and controversial opinions. He regarded the 'tensions generated by racial discrimination . . . [as] much more dangerous . . . than the division of the world on ideological grounds' (Vol. VII, p. 234). He did not hesitate, upon occasion, to criticise the political organs of the UN. 'The General Assembly at its twentieth session should have taken a more energetic position on the United Nations peace-keeping operations' (Vol. VII, p. 193). He has no time for proposals of weighted voting or analogous devices for coping with the problem of micro-states. He vigorously and insistently defends his most critical action, the withdrawal of UNEF in face of the outbreak of the Six-Day War.

All in all these volumes are the record of a diplomat who combines caution and tact with courage and frankness. The result has been, in exceptionally difficult times, the maintenance of the office of Secretary-General essentially unimpaired in integrity and credibility. The world owes U Thant a great debt.

New College, Oxford H. G. NICHOLAS

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

Nuclear Weapons and World Politics: Alternatives for the Future. By David C. Gompert *et al. New York: McGraw-Hill for the 1980s Project/ Council on Foreign Relations. 1977. 368 pp. Pb: £5·20.*

THIS book is one in a series organised by the Council on Foreign Relations; it is concerned with the role and the management of nuclear weapons in the international environment of the next ten to fifteen years. The method adopted is reminiscent of that employed in the study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Europe's Futures, Europe's Choices*[1]: the study group identified four types of possible future regimes, embodying different sets of values, goals and premises, and, in describing them, discusses both the possibilities and difficulties that might arise in achieving them. They then compare the possible effects of these conceptions upon policy issues. A regime is defined as 'a system of international obligations, national force structures and doctrines that together govern the role of nuclear weapons in war, peace and diplomacy' (p. 6), and the four variants are sufficiently distinctive to provide the basis for a wide-ranging and, generally, very stimulating discussion.

The first regime is a projection of the current position, and is based upon the supposition that it will be possible to maintain the moderating and stabilising elements in the nuclear aspects of the present super-power relationship. The second model postulates a reduced dependence on nuclear weapons as a factor in maintaining a stable international security pattern, and is based upon a *mélange* of arms control prescriptions. The third model sees nuclear weapons as an intolerable menace rather than a manageable responsibility, and embodies the requirement to devise and enforce arrangements for the abolition of nationally-controlled nuclear weapons. The fourth regime is the most pessimistic and envisages a number of adverse and destabilising possibilities: 'it looks less at how we can improve conditions than at how we might attenuate the perils of a forbidding nuclear future' (p. 8).

Although the nature of the study inevitably means that the analysis is somewhat speculative, there is a fundamental and consistent purpose to the models, and to the discussion, that makes this an absorbing book. It is written with an impressive absence of technical jargon that also makes it pleasing to read, and it is well produced. The first and fourth regimes are, in some ways, the most immediately interesting projections, because they are the most directly related to our current predicament: the first assumes that most trends will be neither radical nor disruptive, while the fourth leans rather heavily on Murphy's Law, as it might affect both technology and politics. The second regime assumes a benign and constructive bi-polar dominance, with overtones of Tilsit, and raises, to my mind, some expectations about the concordance of super-power and non-super-power perspectives that are of particular interest to non-American readers. The third, as the authors themselves acknowledge, is the least interesting model, as it is the furthest from practical attainment.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

[1] A. Buchan, ed., London: Chatto and Windus, 1969.

The Limits of Military Intervention. Edited by Ellen P. Stern. *Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1977. 399 pp. (Sage Series on Armed Forces and Society XII) £17·50. Pb: £6·00.*

THIS is the twelfth volume of a series published for the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and represents the carefully sifted proceedings of two conferences and a seminar held in 1975 and 1976. The aim was to reassess the techniques and prospects of military intervention open to the United States in the light of the aftermath of the fiasco in Vietnam.

The team of authors, headed by Professor Morris Janowitz, the chairman of the Inter-University Seminar, is a strong one, understandably weighted in favour of the political sciences (ten) with only two sociologists, four specialists in strategic studies from the armed forces and a former head of Rand's Operations Department. As may be expected from any team of American academics, and such a strong team in particular, it is a thorough, exhaustive study, although somewhat uneven in quality. With all this wealth of talent the political essays are the less satisfactory because the approach adopted raises the question of whether the practice of international relations—essentially intuitive, pragmatic and differing widely from case to case—can, or need be, 'conceptualized'. Much of the argument is couched in a sort of 'sociologese' that defies translation, and where it can be penetrated such profundities emerge that in international relations it is as well to be familiar with the mode of thought and likely reactions of an adversary, and that much depends on the cybernetic system (in jargon 'C3') by which a complex governmental apparatus is informed and through which its decisions are transmitted.

The most useful essays are in Parts II and III, dealing with weapons and logistics. Michael MccGwire always illuminates the naval scene; there are good essays by Lewis B. Sorley on technology and mobility and by John R. Pickett on air-lift, limited to the purely United States capability—a parallel limitation of the Soviet one would have made it even more valuable. John F. Digby is an authority on new weaponry, but perhaps has too wide a definition of what constitutes a 'precision guided munition'. Some non-guided systems are, oddly, more accurate than guided ones, and the training and servicing time saved by the improvements in the latest weapons is marginal, for the greater part of the total training effort must continue to be in the sphere of motivation, whether the soldiers be guerrillas or regulars.

On balance, while many European readers may be baffled or irritated by the style, the verdict must be that the proceedings of this seminar are a welcome contribution to the literature on the subject.

SHELFORD BIDWELL

New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic. Edited by Christoph Bertram and Johan Jørgen Holst. *Oslo: Universitetsforlaget; Guildford: IPC Science and Technology Press under the auspices of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 1977. 193 pp. (Norwegian Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. 21.) £11·50.*

THIS volume contains the papers tabled at a conference convened in October 1975 at Reykjavik by the International Institute for Strategic

Studies and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The time and place were right. Speculation about the scale, direction and rationale of growing Soviet naval power was very much in vogue three years ago. The question of appropriate Western responses was commanding considerable attention, not least because of the need to assess correctly the impact of advancing naval technologies. That a fisheries dispute was raging between Iceland and the United Kingdom obviously brought an immediacy to evaluation of the potential effects on relations with allies and adversaries of unilaterally asserted claims to regulation, if not exclusive enjoyment, of offshore resource endowments.

No doubt this explains the sponsors' success in eliciting such excellent contributions to their symposium. The two pieces on the balance of maritime power in the North Atlantic—Philip Karber and Jon Lellenberg on United States Naval Forces, Robert Weinland on the Soviet Navy—contain not only commendably succinct accounts of present orders of battle, but also numerous shrewd observations, and a few provocative ones, on possible future developments. Anders Sjaastad and John Skogan have produced a workmanlike essay on the general security perspectives of the littoral states which is complemented by perceptive analyses of the specific concerns of particular countries written by Bjørn Bjarnason, Erling Bjøl, Nils Orvik and Finn Sollie. Such key issues as emerging arms control opportunities, evolving anti-submarine warfare technology and the security implications of the changing legal regimes at sea are expertly treated by Johan Jørgen Holst, George Lindsey and Professor Daniel O'Connell respectively. In sum, this is that rare phenomenon: a carefully-composed collection of uniformly sound contributions organised around a clear and coherent theme (which is admirably set out in Christoph Bertram's thoughtful introductory essay).

Even so, there are conspicuous omissions. Neither the role of the Royal Navy (and, indeed, other European navies) nor the British perspective on maritime security in the north is adequately dealt with, as though it were assumed that the United Kingdom could now be regarded as merely a rear area for continental European land/air warfare rather than being very much a front-line maritime power in the north-east Atlantic. And the absence of an authoritative analysis of what the projection of Soviet air power in the north implies for the security of northern waters is a major shortcoming.

It must also be said that someone slipped up in settling the timing of the publication of this text. It appeared in the early summer of 1977, when most students of international security affairs were preoccupied—as they have been since—with other things. The new United States administration tossed a whole set of issues into the arena of debate: human rights in East-West relations, the conclusion of a SALT II agreement, restoration of the military balance in Europe by initiation of a long-term defence programme for Nato, modernisation of the Alliance's theatre nuclear weaponry (leading to the *contretemps* over the enhanced radiation/reduced blast warhead). At the same time events in Africa demanded urgent attention. Nobody has been exercised about the North Atlantic these past twelve months and more. In consequence the book has not made the impact it might have done, and deserves to do.

However, as and when present preoccupations subside and the strategic problems of the North Atlantic again engage interest, there will be reason to appreciate the prescience of those responsible for this volume. Certainly

most of the 'questions for the future' raised by Johan Jørgen Holst in its penultimate chapter are as pertinent now as when they were raised at Reykjavik three years ago.

Centre for Defence Studies, Aberdeen DAVID GREENWOOD

RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1977–78. Edited by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. *London: Brassey's. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Seeley Service and Cooper, London) 430 pp. £12·50.*

THIS yearbook is now establishing itself as a valuable reference source for the latest developments in weapons technology. Chapters cover every type of air, land and sea weapon, discussing technological trends and the systems in the inventories of the major powers. They are written by professionals and their assessments are worth noting. The exception to this is a somewhat tendentious piece on strategic weapons, which gives undue credibility to some rumours concerning Soviet capabilities. The other half of the book is a collection of essays on diverse subjects, including pieces on the armed forces of India, Iran and Pakistan, Britain, China and Belgium, and attempts to assess the strategic importance of South America, the Falkland Islands and Africa.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Terrorism and the Liberal State. By Paul Wilkinson. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 257 pp. £7·95. Pb: £2·95.*

How does one evaluate a book whose layout in one respect resembles Machiavelli's *The Prince*; which starts off in a vein suggesting that one is about to read a scholarly work on the philosophical problems of the relationship between freedom and its necessary limitations in a modern liberal democratic state, but which rapidly changes (or degenerates) into a rather opinionated discussion of the problems and difficulties inherent in, among other things, the British government's attempts to suppress the bombings and shootings in Northern Ireland? Should it be judged as an academic treatise, and by academic standards, or as a latter-day piece of pragmatic Machiavellian advice to Messrs Callaghan and Co? In his introduction, the author appears to imply it is the former, for he states that there is a 'widespread desire for serious analysis and long-term thinking concerning the nature of terrorist phenomena', and that 'It has never been my view that it is improper or demeaning for academics to interest themselves in the urgent problems of the day' (p. ix). But this rather begs the question of how and why an academic qua academic should be better able to analyse the 'urgent problems of the day' than the proverbial 'man on the Clapham omnibus'. His claim must surely rest on the basis of his superior ability to collect, synthesise and relate together in new ways data on the phenomena under study, and it is against such criteria that I propose to evaluate this book.

Data can take four possible forms—statistics, events, interpretations or explanations of events and past philosophical wisdom. There is little new, hard data in this book. Few statistics are offered, and in at least one case (pp. 84 and 85), there is no obvious source for them. There are one or two references to little known terrorist events, particularly within the Soviet Union, and the interpretations and explanations of events have a visible and consistent bias to them. The initial promise of the book is of a scholarly discussion of the problems of the control of internal violence in a liberal democracy, drawing upon the writings of recognised theorists such as Mill, Locke, etc. Yet at an early point in the work (p. 22 to be exact), the author develops the habit of adding his own views to those of the established authorities, and gives the (perhaps unintentional) impression to the reader that they are necessary extensions of these past writings.

The book itself follows *The Prince* in being divided into many short chapters, some of only two pages in length. These chapters are grouped into three parts entitled 'Force, Violence, Order and the Liberal State', 'Internal Terrorism and the Liberal State' and 'International Terrorism'. The first part seeks to clarify concepts, make relevant distinctions and offer typologies. The linkage between chapters sometimes leaves much to be desired, but it is, in part, an unexceptional attempt to clear the conceptual and philosophical undergrowth in this area. The second and third parts are written in a different, more pragmatic vein, offering practical advice to governments on how to combat terrorism in general, and events such as hijacking, diplomatic kidnapping, etc, in particular. Yet much of the analysis in this section is so superficial and self-evident as to lack real value. The book contains neither summary nor conclusion, nor any real attempt to draw together the abstract ideas of Part I and the pragmatic advice of Parts II and III.

Terrorism is clearly an important subject, both because it challenges liberal democratic values, and presents states with practical problems. I fear this book neither digs deeply enough into the nature of the philosophical challenge, nor offers any new advice to governments. The basic idea of the book had, and has, great merit: it is a pity that the text did not undergo a longer gestation period and more rigorous editing to enable the elements within it to be effectively related. Is that asking too much of an academic writer?

University of Southampton JOHN SIMPSON

The Politics of International Economic Relations. By Joan Edelman Spero. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1978. 326 pp. £8·50. Pb: £3·95.*

THE shift of academic interest towards the economic issues of international relations can perhaps be explained in terms of changes both in the problems on the agenda and in the structure of world society itself. In order to make sense of these emerging problems and how they fit into international political economy, academics work assiduously at the economic frontier of international relations. Now after the academic pioneers come the settlers with textbooks rather than monographs to farm and consolidate, to cultivate the soil left when the pioneers move on.

Dr Spero's book provides that essential link between those whose original work deals with the parts, and is available therefore to rather small academic readerships, and that larger group of concerned citizenry whose numbers

grow, one must hope, with the expansion of higher education. Good secondary literature of this sort serves a most vital function yet it is somewhat undervalued and squeezed out, so that one has to choose either 'popular' works which oversimplify badly, or esoteric ones of learned length and detail. This book is neither 'popular' nor esoteric. It comes at the right time, provides a clear framework, summarises the relevant literature and appends an excellent bibliography which complements the full notes to each chapter. The book is concisely written to the point of terseness.

There are four parts of unequal lengths, an introduction dealing with links between politics and economics and a conclusion, 'Toward a New International Economic Order?', followed by bibliography and index. In Part I a sketch is given of economic liberalism under American leadership developing into a more pluralist global economic order. The bulk of the book deals in Parts II and III with interdependence in the 'Western' system and assymetry in 'North-South' economic relations. The North-South theme takes over 40 per cent of the book and Part IV on East-West economic relations only 40 pages, with 'East-South' relationships having no separate mention.

Within the three major parts there is an examination of trade, money, the multinationals, aid and oil. It is perhaps helpful for the undergraduate to look twice at the multinational—once within the Western system and once again as a constituent of the North-South system; there is a very brief mention of technology imports by the socialist bloc (pp. 266–68) but the East-West role of the large firm is not analysed. No doubt the emphasis on some issues rather than others comes from a healthy scepticism about the value of spending time and ink on the detailed examination of relatively empty boxes, but arguably the study of international political economy should embrace latent conflicts and the hidden agenda as well as the more familiar areas.

As an undergraduate text this work will be very valuable, always provided that the reader uses the notes and references and does not take the views expressed in the text as revealed truth! It would also be well if some of our more ethnocentric legislators could be persuaded to find time to read this very concise discussion of all sorts of interdependence. There is of course a price to be paid. Dr Spero, in order to be clear and brief, has had to impose her vision of order on the material. Specialists in the various issue areas will no doubt find their bit dangerously condensed and distorted but this fault must be weighed against the considerable merit of orderly discussion of issues not easy to pull together and not conveniently available for study elsewhere.

Bristol Polytechnic FRANK GARDNER

Commodity Conflict: The Political Economy of International Commodity Negotiations. By L. N. Rangarajan. *London: Croom Helm. 1978. 390 pp. £12·95.*

MR RANGARAJAN has taken time out from his career as a senior Indian diplomat with some twenty years' experience of economic diplomacy to write a most useful and scholarly contribution to international political economy and the North-South debate. It is academic in the sense that he uses rational argument and carefully marshalled data to answer basic

analytical questions concerning the poor record of commodity negotiations over the past thirty years. But it is also polemical, arguing that there is a grave danger in the current deadlock; that the confrontation between the importunity of the vulnerable Third World and the dogged resistance of the insensitive industrialised world (combined with the isolation of the centrally-planned economies) threatens the health and stability of the whole system. It therefore ends with a proposal that the deadlock might be broken by agreement on a framework for negotiation, an Agreement on Commodity Trade (ACT) which, like the GATT, would merely lay the ground-rules for subsequent 'rounds' of multilateral negotiation out of which everyone would expect to get some (but unequal) satisfaction but in which specific concessions would be contingent on general acceptance of a whole multi-commodity package. The UNCTAD approach, which produced the proposals for an Integrated Programme for stabilisation of commodity markets and a Common Fund for their management, makes the great mistake, according to Rangarajan, of confronting a 'basket' of demands by the less-developed countries (LDCs) with a harmonised set of responses by the developed countries. These resemble a sieve, because any proposal to which any country objects has been deleted. 'When the contents of the basket are dumped into the colander, nothing remains' (p. 310). The aggregation of each group's positions *before* negotiation starts makes an impasse inevitable and solutions merely symbolic. Instead, the demands of each country from a series of highly differentiated markets must first be disaggregated; and only reaggregated *after* negotiation to ensure that out of the whole package no one harbours serious disaffection. The ACT framework would, he claims, make sure that this reaggregation would take place so that there was no suspicion that the developed countries would be up to their old tricks of driving wedges in the Group of 77.

Unlike some other recent studies of commodity markets and their management,[1] Rangarajan tackles the basic issues of conflict and co-operation over the whole field rather than going from one commodity to the next. His melding of the political and economic variables determining the distribution of bargaining power in different kinds of market is superb. The differences between closed, preferential, free and oligopolistic markets and the role of substitution, stocks, speculation and forward dealing as they affect the determination of both the levels and the volatility of prices are admirably explained. The 'ability to hold on' is rightly identified as the main key to market power; and the blocking power of the American Congress as the major obstacle to any new scheme. It has to be worn down by persuasion or circumvented by diplomatic skill. The alternative scenario, Rangarajan argues, is already half-written: increasing autarky of regional blocs, mounting frustration in too many LDCs feeding the conviction that the whole system is designed by the rich to exploit the poor. Rangarajan disagrees. 'Where insensitivity and neglect can provide an explanation, attribution of premeditation is a superfluous luxury.'

London School of Economics SUSAN STRANGE

[1] For example, Zuhayr Mikdashi, *The International Politics of Natural Resources* (Ithaca, NY, London: Cornell University Press, 1976). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1977, p. 654, and Philip Connelly and Robert Perlman, *The Politics of Scarcity* (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1975). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1975, p. 400.

The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System. By Robert L. Rothstein. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1977. 384 pp. $20.60.*

MR. ROTHSTEIN promises a multi-dimensional approach to the North-South problem 'because the external policies of the developing countries and the problems and pressures they have created for the international system cannot be understood by concentrating on either the internal or external dimension: the interaction between the two is critical' (p. IX). But before demonstrating this esssential linkage, a large part of the book is devoted to definitions and to clarification of ideas. Thus the reader has to wade through already over-analysed and over-defined ground before the beginnings of the synthesis emerge. One is constantly promised that certain subjects will be treated in such-and-such later chapter while the interminable 'build-up' goes on. On reaching page 93, the reader is told that: 'Domestic change, however necessary, will be insufficient unless the external world makes a more sophisticated effort to help the developing countries. I discuss this in chapter 11.'

Nearly two hundred pages later, the view takes shape that 'no goal that entails impoverishing the already impoverished—no matter what potential benefits it promises—can be worth the cost. Two streams of thought come together here: practical doubts about what the international system can offer and how well the developing countries can respond and moral doubts about a set of priorities that values growth more than the immediate relief of suffering . . .' After which, examining the attitudes of ruling elites to different development doctrines, the author asks whether 'the implementation of these doctrines require policymaking capacities that do not and cannot exist in the context of underdevelopment?' (pp. 271–72). Finally, on page 378 we are told: 'No changes in the international system, however justified, are likely to mean much to many developing countries if these countries themselves do not make a more serious effort to deal with their own domestic problems . . .' In fact, 'The external changes, by themselves, might even be pernicious if they succeed only in deflecting attention from more fundamental domestic problems or if they enable corrupt and reactionary élites to buy time to stave off reform.'

There is a great deal of useful material here in chapters devoted to the external policies of developing countries, to non-alignment, to policy-making in the context of under-development, or to emerging new development strategies. There are also useful insights, like 'UNCTAD was a challenge to the leaders of the international system but a challenge to improve the terms for staying *within* the system' (p. 145). Yet next to what is original there is a disproportionate amount of the familiar. And the conclusion falls certainly into the second category: 'some élites . . . will understand the double imperative of change and will respond to it. Some will not understand it at all. And a great many are likely to waffle uncertainly between the dangers and the opportunities. If the developed countries are to avoid wasting scarce resources and supporting countries that have no moral claim on our support, making the right kind of decisions about whom we want to help will become an increasingly critical—and problematic—issue' (p. 378).

TIBOR MENDE

SECOND WORLD WAR, ITS ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH

Germany and Europe 1919–1939. By John Hiden. *London: Longman. 1977. 183 pp. Pb: £2·95.*

THIS book seeks to remedy the lack of any study in English of Germany's European policy throughout the period between 1919 and 1939. The Weimar Republic gets roughly as much attention as the Third Reich. The facts are not so much recorded as reflected on, in the light of wide reading among recent British, American, German and French writings; as is justifiable in view of its scale and purpose, the book makes little direct use of original documents. An opening chapter on the transition from war to peace is followed by one about the influence of internal politics on foreign affairs. Thereafter the primary division is by geographical areas—relations with Britain and France, with Russia, with East Europe, with Italy—each section being treated chronologically. A six-page conclusion discusses the similarities and differences between Hitler's foreign policy and those of his predecessors. Extensive references to the literature follow each chapter and there is a six-page bibliographical essay at the end. Three pages of relevant statistics and two maps complete a 'kit' which anyone coming more or less fresh to the subject will find of high practical value.

The outlook of the book is as judicious as the lay-out. The various sides of the many controversies are fairly summarised and a balance struck between them. Dr. Hiden seeks to set out other people's views rather than to propound new theories of his own. Indeed the merits of the book are also its limitations. Evidence has been efficiently condensed and ideas digested; a closely-woven text calls for close reading. There are few sentences which stick in the mind, no flashing shafts of illumination. What is more, the author has not yet mastered the use of the English language. He tends to write as he speaks ('This was a plus for the . . . revisionist cause' p. 117), which avoids pomposity but also results in too many passages needing to be read twice before they become clear ('It was not that surprising that . . . Ciano . . . was able to sign a . . . protocol' p. 150). Sentences are apt to change structure in the middle; words get repeated in the space of a single line.

Dr. Hiden should also have known better than subscribe to the legend that the Treaty of Versailles emphasised—or even referred to—'German war guilt'. There were *no* 'war guilt clauses' in the Treaty; there was *one* clause inserted unfortunately, but for technical reasons, largely on the initiative of Lord Lothian who became one of its foremost critics, which made Germany accept '*responsibility*' for 'causing all the loss and damage' resulting from 'the war imposed . . . by the aggression of Germany and her Allies'. Recent historical discussion has done more to bear out that diagnosis than to discredit it.

MICHAEL BALFOUR

Mussolini as Empire-Builder: Europe and Africa, 1932–36. By Esmonde M. Robertson. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 246 pp. £6·95. Pb: £2·95.*

THE author crams a wealth of diplomatic, political and military detail into this 190-page book. The primary focus of his study is Mussolini's ambitions in Europe and Africa between 1932 and 1936, but at the same time he

illuminates a wide range of interlocking European and colonial issues. The period was a crucial one in European interwar history: it saw the consolidation of the Nazi regime in Germany and the French government's increasingly desperate attempts to line up the British and Italian governments against potential German expansion. Mussolini had reason to fear Nazi designs on Austria, and was prepared to co-operate with France and Britain in Europe, but at a price—substantial concessions in East Africa. The British government, however, feared both for its imperial position and for the prestige of the League if Italy was allowed to absorb into its colonial empire the nominally sovereign Ethiopia. The British enraged the Italian government by their piecemeal attempts to conciliate Hitler who at the same time was busily trying to detach Italy from the French camp, and was also sending arms to Ethiopia to make sure that if armed conflict should break out, it would be long and indecisive, thus keeping Italian troops occupied well away from Europe and the Brenner pass. The French government found itself in the most painful dilemma. Developing close political and military links with Italy in the course of 1935, it tried desperately to seek a peaceful solution to the unfolding crisis by steering the British government away from economic sanctions and military conflict with Italy, and by trying to induce Mussolini to accept a compromise solution. Mussolini would not be deflected from military conquest—and as a prelude to armed invasion, he stirred up nationalist agitation in Egypt and Palestine. He was soon to lose his newly-acquired colonial possessions, but he had ensured that longer-established empires would also crumble.

All this and much more emerges from Mr. Robertson's fascinating study. It is not an easy book to digest—students seeking an introductory survey to Italian foreign policy in this period will find it far too complex for general use. But for those with some background knowledge of relations between Italy, France, Britain and Germany in the 1930s, the book is an extremely interesting and absorbing addition to existing accounts of Italian foreign policy objectives in the 1930s. It is meticulously researched, and its conclusions are based on a careful study of Italian, French, German and British diplomatic and government sources, as well as of a wide range of British and Italian secondary sources and learned articles.

University of Lancaster RUTH HENIG

The Goebbels Diaries: The Last Days. Edited by Hugh Trevor-Roper. Translated by Richard Barry. *London: Secker and Warburg. 1978. 368 pp. £7·50.*

The Weimar Era and Hitler 1918–1933: A Critical Bibliography. By Peter D. Stachura. *Oxford: Clio. 1978. 276 pp. £25·40.*

Two comments from Professor Trevor-Roper's Introduction sum up the interest and value of the latest segment of the Goebbels diaries to be published: 'Joseph Goebbels has been described as "the only really interesting man in the Third Reich beside Hitler"' (p. xv); and, 'he was a compulsive diarist' (p. xvii). The diary entries for February–April 1945 in this volume bear out these statements, for almost to the very end of the Third Reich's existence, the Minister of Propaganda continued to pour out (hopefully for a Nazi posterity) his comments, both shrewd and per-

nicious, on current events and the characters of the Nazi leaders, with a degree of intelligence and insight possessed by few if any of the regime's leading figures. And after all, Goebbels *was* an important figure in the regime, having tried to make himself indispensable to Hitler, the Party, and the government. No less a person than Goebbels himself recognised his own value. In December 1941 he informed a meeting at his ministry what this amounted to: his work in converting Nazism from a middle-class nationalist movement based on Munich into a socialist working-class party able to capture the industrial Rhineland; his capture of Berlin for the Party, thus preparing the way for the 'seizure of power'; it was he who had worked out the style and technique of the Party's public ceremonies and the mass demonstrations; and it was he who had created the 'myth' of the Führer and had given him the charisma which enabled him to be followed blindly by the people (p. xvi). Nor must it be forgotten that it was Goebbels who held the German nation together after the dark days of the defeat at Stalingrad.

The chief impression to emerge from the entries in this volume is the overwhelming sense of unreality and (necessary?) self-delusion of the Nazi leadership in its last days. Hitler and, especially, Goebbels clung desperately to the idea that a last-minute 'miracle' would save the Third Reich from defeat and extinction, and every sign or hint of disagreement between the Allies was carefully examined by Goebbels for the support it could give such hopes. Despite the reality of the inexorable tide of victory of the Allied armies—and almost a third to one half of each date entry is a report on the current military situation—statements abound on the theme of Germany being able to wriggle out of its political and military difficulties on the basis of a whole host of 'if onlys': 'we could soon deal with the Soviets if only we could put things right in the air' (p. 214). In fact, the failure of Goering and the Luftwaffe to defend Germany against the Allies, and the bitter attacks on them by Goebbels and German public opinion, emerge as one of several main themes developed throughout these diary entries. Others include constant criticism of the Wehrmacht and the generals, their lack of talent and inspiration, especially when compared to that possessed by the Führer. In this connection Goebbels makes this extremely interesting comment about the events of 1934: 'had Röhm been an upright solid personality, in all probability some hundred generals rather than some hundred SA leaders would have been shot on 30 June' (p. 248).

Another important theme concerns the worsening state of German morale, both military and civilian, with even Hitler coming in for his share of criticism by the public. Perhaps the most interesting thread running through the entries concerns Goebbels's own comments on Hitler. Even these tend to be critical sometimes, but given Goebbels's continuing loyalty to the Führer, it is criticism born out of exasperation at Hitler's seemingly increasing inability to act decisively at such a critical juncture of the war. After a long and somewhat frustrating discussion with Hitler on March 27, 1945, Goebbels has this to say: 'it is to be hoped that the Führer will not only grasp the fact correctly and say as much but also draw the correct conclusions. Here in my view lies the great difference between him and Frederick II; Frederick after all was so ruthless in his measures both against high and low that he frequently aroused hatred and disgust even among his troops and generals. After this talk with the Führer one

could say yet again: "Yes, you are right. Everything you say is right. But what are you doing about it?" ' (p. 251).

There is no denying the interest which the intellectual and radical Goebbels arouses, and from any point of view, let alone an historical one, it is to be regretted that events have allowed only sections of the diaries to be published intermittently. Previously, those for 1942–43 appeared in 1948 and those for 1923-26 in 1962.[1] Peter Stadelmayer notes that the German publishers of the present segment of the diaries have available copies of nearly 16,000 pages of the diaries from the years 1924 to 1945, together with other written material from Goebbels's papers. It is to be hoped that some day a comprehensive and systematic edition of this material will appear in print.

As it is, there are a number of references to Goebbels in the bibliography compiled by Peter Stachura. This is a useful work of reference which will enable students of the period quickly to find the key books, articles and dissertations on different aspects of the title subject which the author has chosen to divide into thirty different sections. It is a thematic, chronological, and critical bibliography containing references to works published between 1945 and 1975 for a period and a subject which can almost be said to be the Cinderella of many history courses. JOHN P. FOX

The Foundation of the League of Arab States: Wartime Diplomacy and Inter-Arab Politics 1941 to 1945. By Ahmed M. Gomaa. *London: Longman. 1977, 323 pp. £14·00.*

THE subtitle of this book is more descriptive than its title, for the work covers more ground than that title would suggest. Dr. Gomaa has investigated the circumstances in which the League of Arab States came to be founded in 1945, but at the same time he has provided much useful detail on inter-Arab affairs during the Second World War. The author admits that his work is based largely on British diplomatic archives for there were few such Arab records available to him, and for that aspect the memoirs and recollections of Arab statesmen had to serve instead of official papers.

It is argued that four major factors influenced the evolution of the League's Pact. These were the growth of Arab solidarity, largely because of the Palestine problem, the increasing role of Egypt in Arab affairs, the desire of some members of the British government to deal with the Arab world as one unit—particularly for wartime planning purposes—and finally the impetus which the Second World War gave both to a desire for economic co-operation and the ending of French political domination in the Levant.

The author is careful to point out that later critics of the Arab League have often failed to take account of its origins and that their denunciations are unrealistic unless they recognise that a loose association was all that could be expected in the political circumstances which then prevailed. Dr. Gomaa shows how Egypt's involvement in Arab affairs was slow and gradual and that only in Cairo was there anything approaching an honest

[1] New York: Doubleday; London: Hamish Hamilton. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

assessment of the many obstacles on the road to close inter-Arab co-operation. A shared culture, a common faith and geographical contiguity were not sufficient factors in themselves, for the vital elements of well-defined objectives and strong organisation were lacking. In a telling phrase the author writes: 'there was always an abundance of poets to extol the ideal, and a paucity of political thinkers to define it and to clarify all the issues involved' (p. 266). The book also shows how Arab unity meant different things to different men. Some rulers and politicians in the fertile crescent saw it as a means of enhancing their prestige, power and territory, and it is therefore not surprising that political co-operation proved to be an unobtainable goal.

This book was originally written as a D. Phil. thesis and presented at Oxford in 1973. It is perhaps a pity that the bibliography has not been brought up to date and it is surely unusual to list memoirs and monographs as primary sources. The eight translated documentary appendices which provide information on the way in which the Pact of the League was finally formulated are a useful addition to this interesting book.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London R. M. BURRELL

Fulfilment of a Mission: The Spears Mission to Syria and Lebanon 1941–1944. By Edward Spears. *London: Leo Cooper. 1977. 311 pp. £9·95.*

OF all the figures in the Gaullist demonology, few can rank higher than Major-General Spears, for it was his activities as head of the British mission to Syria and the Lebanon from 1941 to 1944 which convinced the Free French leader that, despite repeated protestations to the contrary, Britain was hell-bent not only upon evicting France from its rightful position in the Middle East, but also upon usurping it. But was this in fact the case? What was Spears really up to, and how far did his behaviour reflect the policy of the British government as opposed to his own maverick instincts?

The Public Records Act of 1968 notwithstanding, it has so far proved impossible to answer these questions because the crucial official documents —namely Spears's correspondence with his friend and patron, Winston Churchill—have remained closed to researchers. Indeed most of them will not be opened until 2017 at the earliest, by which time most of us will be past caring. The appearance of Spears's own account, which is based upon his diary and papers, was therefore awaited with considerable interest by historians who hoped that it might shed at least some light upon the problems involved.

Alas, the book is a great disappointment in this respect. Despite the statement in the blurb that it was written 'soon after the war', it is clear from the editorial note on page xi, that the book was barely completed at the time of Spears's death in January 1974 at the ripe old age of 87. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that the author's chronology is occasionally confused and his transcription of documents (where it can be checked against the originals) often riddled with error. More seriously, the book is sometimes deliberately misleading. In no instance is this more evident than in the author's account of his resignation at the end of 1944. If we are to believe him, he asked to be relieved, primarily because he

felt that the war was almost over and that he ought to 'return to [his] constituency in England in view of the General Election which was bound to follow victory' (p. 297). In reality, however, he was sacked. In September 1944 Churchill advised him that he only had two or three months left in the Levant before he must ask to be relieved. Spears asked for more time, but his request was denied and he was told that he must resign with effect from December 15, 1944. The Prime Minister, it appears, had become increasingly worried by Spears's almost pathological Francophobia and had finally acceded to Foreign Office pressure to remove him, pressure which Spears himself admits existed (p. 294). The account in the book simply follows the anodyne official communiqué issued at the time.[1]

But although it must be used with considerable caution, the book is still well worth reading. 'We shall remember him [Spears] always,' writes John Terraine in an excellent introduction which suffers only from excessive brevity, 'as one of the most admirable, elegant and lucid writers on military matters in our language, the heir of Napier, the peer of Slim' (p. x), and like everything which emanated from his pen, this book is superbly written. A malicious, but brilliant portrait of General 'Jumbo' Wilson sticks particularly in this reviewer's mind:

> He was an enormous, bald man, active for his size, unexpectedly so, like an outsize child's balloon rising into space at the lightest touch. He had the good fortune to resemble a benevolent owl, which ever since the days of Pallas Athene has conjured up the concept of wisdom. His broad middle was also an owlish characteristic. His nose, like a beak, was bracketed by dewlaps. Pouches, like billiard table pockets, seemed designed to catch his perfectly round eyes should they fall out. Feathers alone were missing. But his physical characteristics were not a reliable guide to his character, and I personally never located the benevolence his wide paunch seemed to proclaim (p. 89).

There are also some valuable insights into the attitudes of the principal protagonists in the drama of Anglo-Free-French relations. '"You think I am interested in England winning the war?"' General de Gaulle asked Spears during one particularly torrid interview in 1941. '"I am not. I am only interested in France's victory". "They are the same", I retorted. "Not at all", he answered, "not at all in my view"' (p. 121). A year later, Spears asked Churchill: '"What has been our most dangerous moment in the war so far?" and he answered without a moment's hesitation that this had undoubtedly been that the French might not have refused the offer made to them in June, 1940, of "the Act of Union", joining France and Britain in one unit, fusing them into a single nation. We were lucky indeed that the French had rescued us from the disaster which their acceptance would have been' (pp. 181-82). One could perhaps be forgiven for thinking that these two great statesmen of the twentieth century thoroughly deserved one another.

University of Leicester GEOFFREY WARNER

[1] I am greatly indebted for this information to Mr. Bruce Gaunson of the University of Hull. Mr. Gaunson is the first independent scholar to have access to the Spears papers and his forthcoming thesis should be the definitive study of Spears's role until the official papers are released.

The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941–1943. By Mark A. Stoler, *Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Westport Publications, London.) 244 pp. (Contributions in Military History 12.) £13·25.*

ONE of the many fascinations of history is the way in which each generation reinterprets the past, often to the extent of standing its predecessors' views upon their heads. In the case of the Second Front in the Second World War, it was argued in the 1950s by writers like Hanson Baldwin and Chester Wilmot that the American politico-military establishment had demonstrated considerable political naivety in insisting upon a cross-Channel invasion at the expense of British plans for operations in south-eastern Europe designed to forestall Soviet control of the area. Later historians, of course, have cast some doubt upon the reality or at any rate the extent of these British plans, but in this book, Mark Stoler attacks Baldwin and Wilmot from an unexpected direction. Far from being politically naive, he maintains, American military planning cannot be understood without reference to political considerations, and one of those considerations from 1943 onwards was a desire to prevent Soviet domination of postwar Europe. An early cross-Channel invasion, moreover, was seen as the best way of securing this objective.

The original attachment of the American army planners to a cross-Channel invasion in 1942 can be explained, Dr. Stoler believes, partly by bureaucratic considerations—a peripheral strategy would not achieve quick results and would therefore give added attraction to the 'Pacific alternative', which would in turn strengthen the position of the navy—and partly by the need to offer assistance to Russia, both in order to keep it in the war in Europe and as a quid pro quo for future help against Japan. President Roosevelt had the additional motive of wishing to offer the Russians something which would prevent them from insisting upon an agreement which would ratify the gains they had obtained under the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939.

In 1943, according to Dr. Stoler, the American military planners found fresh political reasons to justify their insistence upon an early cross-Channel invasion and their opposition to any further exploitation of developments in the Mediterranean. 'Most important', he writes, 'was the fear now expressed, often in terms quite similar to Kennan's 1947 "Containment" theory, over the combination of Russian victories and diplomatic truculence resulting from the postponement of the second front. This combination seemed to threaten either a separate peace or Soviet domination of the peace conference and postwar Europe. According to the planners, the only way to avoid this menace without negating either unconditional surrender or the goals expressed in 1942 was to establish a second front. The Soviets had demanded such an operation in return for continued co-operation both during and after the war. Furthermore, only a second front could enable the West to land enough troops in Europe to give it an effective bargaining position at the peace conference and block any Soviet attempts to dominate Europe without alienating Moscow before the war ended. An approach via the Balkans would immediately alienate the Soviets and was logistically incapable of defeating either them or the Germans. In short, the planners perceived the second front as an "umbrella" policy, capable of fulfilling all American goals and handling

any future possibility with the Russians. British Mediterranean strategy was rejected not because it was political, but because it was logistically unfeasible and attempted to fulfill British goals at the expense of those of the United States' (p. 163). These considerations, to which Roosevelt had been won over by mid-1943, explain both the American insistence at the Washington and Quebec conferences of that year that the cross-Channel invasion ('Overlord') must have priority over operations in the Mediterranean, and their support for the emergency 'Rankin' plan for large-scale entry into Europe in the event of a sudden German collapse.

Dr. Stoler's book is based upon thorough research in the American military archives, although some may feel that he occasionally builds too much upon limited evidence. This is particularly true in the case of his assessment of British policy, where he seems to accept contemporary American evaluations at their face value, despite the work of later historians who, unlike himself, have used the British documents. Nevertheless, the book is an important one, and should put an end once and for all to the myth of the apolitical American army in the Second World War.

University of Leicester GEOFFREY WARNER

The Race for Trieste. By Geoffrey Cox. *London: Kimber, 1977. 284 pp. £5·95.*

THE scramble for Trieste in 1945 was first military and then political. The Allies were fortunate in having as a spearhead one of the best of their formations, the superb 2nd New Zealand Division which had won its laurels in Greece, Crete, North Africa and Italy: and posterity is fortunate in that the division's intelligence officer was an outstanding journalist, later to be known as Sir Geoffrey Cox and as a pioneer of news in television. What his eye then captured his memory has retained for maturing experience to put in perspective.

The key question was whether, as the Germans collapsed, Alexander's armies could force their way out of their Italian strait-jacket and on past Venice to Trieste before Tito's advancing raggle-taggle forestalled them. Over this little local Berlin the Allies showed more determination than in Germany, so the major and most exciting part of Sir Geoffrey's narrative is a record of how his division just fought its way through in time. Some of this text will be familiar to readers of Sir Geoffrey's memoir, *The Road to Trieste* [1]: but for the military historian in particular this extended version is invaluable for its picture of a truly great division operating at the peak of its efficiency and self-assurance.

Yet the real significance of Trieste is political, and these implications could be sensed but not documented in 1947. In 1945 Tito's troops and the New Zealanders met in the city itself, and the problem was how to restore Trieste firmly to Italy without war. Working his way back through the papers, Sir Geoffrey sees the turning-point as May 11, 1945, the day on which a famous signal from Churchill crossed with Truman's equally remarkable Telegram No. 34. 'An iron curtain is drawn down on their front', Churchill warned. '. . . There seems little doubt that the whole of the region east of the line Lubeck-Trieste-Corfu will soon be completely in

[1] London: Heinemann. 1947.

their hands.' Truman was simultaneously signalling: 'I have come to the conclusion that we must decide now whether we should uphold the fundamental principles of territorial settlement by orderly process against force, intimidation or blackmail.' Though this was not precisely the first move in the cold war, Sir Geoffrey sees Truman's personal act of resolution at this point as the moment when he found himself capable of shifting from the Rooseveltian policy towards Russia and its dependants, that of a soft-shelled crab, to something with an armoured carapace. James Joyce's city became the basis for a different kind of word-game, diplomatic and deadly. Trieste survived as a Western outpost: but since its survival depended to an important degree on Russia's ultimate break with Tito, it might be said that the only criticism one can make of a beautifully constructed book is that Sir Geoffrey has not explored this aspect more fully.

RONALD LEWIN

The Marshall Plan Summer: An Eyewitness Report on Europe and the Russians in 1947. By Thomas A. Bailey. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1978. 246 pp. $10.95.*

THOMAS BAILEY was (and still is) a Professor of History at Stanford University, who was invited in 1947 to lecture at the National War College. As part of his preparation the College sent him on a visit to a number of European countries between June 12 and August 18, 1947. This book is based upon his journals of the time, fleshed out by some reference to memoirs and published documents and intertwined with general reflections from the point of view of hindsight. The result is distinctly mixed.

If Professor Bailey had restricted himself solely to presenting his journal, perhaps with explanatory notes, the contemporary nature of his account would have stood out much better, and the irritation engendered by his embellishments could have been avoided. It is one thing to present the 'Cold War consensus' of post-Truman Doctrine officialdom as the received and believed wisdom of the summer of 1947. As Bailey himself notes, 'The "party line" at the War College was that the Soviet Union, by its aggressive postwar designs and acts had forced the Cold War on the Western democracies' (p. 226). What officials and other opinion-makers were saying at the time is an important part of the historical record. However, this reviewer considers it inadequate, in the light of the mass of intervening research and writing, to reassert the 'party line' thirty years later as follows: 'Recently I consulted several Russian historians at Stanford University, including some who are specialising in the tsarist era. When I remarked that certain revisionists were placing the major blame for the coming of the Cold War on the United States, the response was "rubbish"' (p. 237).

Another irritant derives from the many inaccuracies in the 'historical background' embellishments. The French zone of Germany was not 'carved out of the larger zone already allocated to the Americans' (p. 49); the July bomb attack against Hitler is dated 1940 (p. 58); the Potsdam conference did not confirm the Yalta arrangements to divide Germany into four zones (p. 88); it is not 'categorically stated' in the Potsdam Protocol that 'It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria' (p. 156).

There does, however, remain merit to the book, although it is hard to see that it will be a major source, as there appears to be little that fundamentally alters one's view of the existing record. The merit lies in the often very vivid reminders of the state of Europe in the summer of 1947. The destruction, particularly of housing, and the lack of reconstruction is clearly evoked. Bodies are still being dug from the ruins of Berlin and Munich. The moral degeneration and cynicism symbolised by prostitution, the black market and the 'cigarette economies' comes sharply into focus. The sheer physical difficulties of education are brought out, epitomised by staff-pupil ratios of 1 to 60, and teachers and students fainting from hunger. Then there are the niggling little dislocations, such as the 'glue bottleneck' which prevented the procurement of non-Nazi text books (p. 63). This takes on added importance when one learns that German children were still using an arithmetic text book, which posed the question, 'If a Jewish shopkeeper asks 4·50 marks for a vase worth only 3·75 marks, by how much has he swindled his customer?' (p. 81).

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

WESTERN EUROPE

Planning in Europe. Edited by Jack Hayward and Olga A. Narkiewicz. *London: Croom Helm. 1978. 199 pp. £8·50.*

THE authors' view on planning is summed up in the statement that 'although planning may have suffered minor setbacks in the last few years it is the discipline of the future'. They are not deterred by the setbacks to national plans which occurred during the depression when planning may have been most needed. They want to plan on a European scale. Again they are undeterred by the experience of the European Communities in the West and Comecon in the East which, in their view, suffered from 'the failure . . . to effect economic fusion, despite a strong ideological commitment to fusion'. They are also undeterred by their own finding that the lack of reconciliation of regional interests within states makes it 'fruitless to attempt such reconciliation between states and between blocks'. Their hope is for a revamped UN Economic Commission for Europe. This is to overcome the difficulties which the West encountered through concentration on sectoral planning without a comprehensive overview of what it wanted, and which the East met through concentration on comprehensive planning which lost touch with realities. They want to take planning out of the sort of politics which pins its faith on nineteenth-century creeds of market forces or socialism. Instead there is to be concentration on improvements in the way of life, where economic growth and protection of the environment are to be each other's handmaidens.

If these conclusions do not seem to follow from all their case studies, the reason is that the latter are concerned with national planning in European states rather than with European-scale planning. Thus, there is a comparison of planning techniques in Britain and France. It points to the greater integration of planning into the government machine in France. But, in view of the chastening experience of the 1970s, it raises the question whether it was the growth of the French economy in the 1950s and 1960s that made planning possible rather than the other way round. Another

study points to more recent developments towards, but not quite to, a merger of planning with budgeting in France. There is not space to go into detail and least of all pass judgment on the authors' view that there has been a notable convergence of planning practice in Western and Eastern Europe. The case studies of Britain, France, Czechoslovakia and Poland provide some evidence in this direction, since the Western countries' plans had to be adjusted to certain overall needs of the two economies while Eastern ones had to work through sectors. Yet on the authors' showing, French planning techniques had only limited success in Britain while British macro-economic theories found only half-hearted acceptance in France. Given such difficulties in two relatively similar countries, the hope for success of continental planning may seem sanguine. It may be that all the old arguments for and against planning are still unresolved, and that thirty years of experience with national plans is that only continental planning might do the trick. But this argument is hardly advanced by the cursory dismissal of the international organisations we have as planning failures.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

The External Role of the European Community. By Gunnar Sjöstedt. *Farnborough: Saxon House. 1977. (Distrib. by Teakfield Ltd.) 273 pp. (Swedish Studies in International Relations 7.) £9·50.*

'THE basic objective of this report is to work out a procedure for the evaluation of the possible actor-character of the EEC' (p. 11). Mr. Sjöstedt in effect engages in an extended dialogue with Johann Galtung, starting with 'a criticism of Galtung's vision of Europe as a super-power' (p. 3). There follows a highly theoretical discussion of the 'actor capability' of the European Community, which is intended to construct a model which can fulfil both 'diagnostic' and 'predictive' functions.

The general reader will find this book exceptionally heavy going. The language is often awkward and the jargon thick. To his credit, the author is entirely honest about the difficulties of his task, searching, for example, for indicators of actor capability, quantifiable if possible, while honestly noting how often such indicators are 'in practice difficult to measure' (p. 41). At times his caution leads him to state the obvious in a rather laboured manner. 'It seems reasonable to assume that, generally speaking, the only kind of sub-actor within the Community which is capable of performing societal actor behaviour is the government of one or more of the member states' (p. 59).

His diagnostic conclusion 'that the Community according to the criteria used seems to be some sort of half-developed international actor' (p. 112) is properly cautious but not particularly novel, especially when reinforced by his sober admission that his model still leaves himself uncertain as to 'what an international actor really is' (p. 127). His predictive second section reflects both a similar caution and the by now well-known difficulties of predicting the future development of the European Community system. The concept of 'political will' re-emerges, though it is 'problematic to deal with and also somewhat controversial' (p. 172). The range of external and internal influences is noted, and the scenarios which emerge in the final chapter are not likely to surprise the observer of the European Community by their range or their generality.

The disappointment of this book is that it clearly reflects very extensive reading on the Community, and a high commitment to theoretical model-building, but that it succeeds neither in building a new theoretical framework nor in setting out clearly the external relations of the European Community and the way in which its external policy is made. One would not grasp easily the character of European political co-operation from his lengthy description in Chapter 5. The prospect of enlargement is treated in the course of a discussion on functional boundaries, while co-operation in military procurement is noted as one example of 'the pooling of creative resources' (p. 229). As a result, this book may contribute to a specialised Scandinavian debate, but it is unlikely to find a very wide readership amongst those who are studying the European Communities.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

Trade Unions as a Pressure Group in the European Community. By Emil Joseph Kirchner. *Farnborough: Saxon House. 1977. (Distrib. by Teakfield) 208 pp. £8·50.*

WITH the development of the European Economic Community it may seem natural that pressure groups should think of lobbying the supranational authority instead of, or in addition to, lobbying national governments. In the case of trade unions, this may seem particularly appropriate as many of the larger companies they have to deal with are multinationals. After describing the way in which European trade unions have organised themselves, this book sets out to describe the policies the unions have sought to pursue at the Community level and the success they have had.

If the results achieved have not been dramatic there are good reasons for this. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) comprises, as the author makes clear, a wide variety of interests. It includes organisations from countries that are outside the Community as well as those from the member states. Not even all the affiliated organisations from within the EEC are enthusiastic about proposals for closer integration—the British TUC being an obvious example.

In part at least, the development of trade union organisation at a European level has been a response to the strength of the employers' organisations. The ETUC has an apparent numerical strength, a constitution that allows majority decisions, and a declared objective of fighting the multinationals, but it has not developed a really effective organisation. Its resources are very much less than those of some of the affiliated national bodies. The author comments: '. . . a great deal of effort still needs to be made to establish a European trade union organisation which has the same competence for European questions as the national organisations do for national questions'. He would clearly seem to favour closer integration and the development of the supranational authority of the EEC. At the present time, however, policy-making is in the hands of ministers from the member states and important decisions still require unanimity. So long as this remains the case, it seems both likely and reasonable that national trade union organisations will continue to direct the major part of their lobbying at their own ministers.

The Commission can, nevertheless, take important initiatives and has considerable power in carrying out agreed policy. There is therefore a case

for lobbying at this level. This study of the way trade unions have gone about this task in relation to such topics as social security benefits for migrant workers, social security harmonisation in general, the development of the European Social Fund and the harmonisation of vocational training is therefore of considerable interest.

University of Dundee J. M. JACKSON

The British People: Their Voice in Europe. Report of an independent working party sponsored by the Hansard Society on the effects of membership of the European Community on British representative institutions. *Farnborough: Saxon House for the Hansard Society. 1977. 207 pp. £7·50.*

As part of the Hansard Society's programme on the future of parliamentary institutions in Europe, with finance from the Ford Foundation, a working party was set up under the chairmanship of Professor David Coombes in 1974 to examine the way in which British representative institutions were responding to the changed context within which they had to function after Britain joined the EEC. The enquiry sought to determine how successful the members of these institutions were in adjusting to this new environment where a multiplicity of pressure points existed from which influence could be brought to bear on the decision-making process. The elongation of that process would demand unflagging perseverance and a close knowledge of the mechanisms involved if public and private bodies were to make their influence felt in Brussels. Changes in the internal organisation of the institutions were likely to be necessary, as were new links with groups acting at the European level.

The study examines the adequacy of the response from the British Parliament and from approximately 350 national, regional and local groups representing social and economic interests. The problems that Parliament has had in trying to exercise some control over Community procedures, and the methods which have evolved for doing so, are considered in detail. There is also information on how groups such as the British Medical Association are active in European-level bodies, in this case the Standing Committee for Doctors of the EEC, studying the possibility of harmonisation and better co-ordination of their work.

As criticism continues of Parliament's ability to scrutinise effectively EEC legislation, it is not surprising that the report's general conclusion is 'that Parliament and local authorities seem to have been less adept in finding their way around the Community than organisations like the CBI, City institutions, the NFU and some of the professional associations' (p. 125). This, of course, is partly explained by the fact that some interests are more closely affected by Community policy and law, giving them added incentive to adapt, while others were ideologically opposed to membership and therefore less likely to respond positively in the early stages. Others again lacked the necessary funds or manpower to make their voices heard, indicating a problem for small organisations trying to operate at the European level.

The book will be of interest to both a general and a specialised audience. For the general audience, the report raises important questions about the effect of this new dimension, in which British institutions must operate, on

the functioning of representative democracy. One effect of membership which the report notes has been the increased need for a centralised view of national government policy, which could have the effect of strengthening central government at the expense of different interests and opinions within the country. This lends all the more weight to another theme of the enquiry, the need to supplement representation through national government with direct representation of groups and individuals through the various Community channels that are available. British central government could then find itself by-passed by regional and sectional interests going straight to Brussels. The question remains whether the final effect will be to make government more remote or more open to those interests. For the more specialised audience of students in European Community studies courses, the report's close examination of the inter-relationship between national and Community institutions will make it essential reading.

Chatham House J. STATLER

British Foreign Secretaries since 1945. By Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury. *Newton Abbot: David and Charles. 1977. 267 pp. £6·50.*

THERE are several reasons why this survey of postwar Foreign Secretaries seems likely to have only ephemeral value. First, the operation of the thirty-year rule means that access to the official records is now already possible for the first years of Ernest Bevin's tenure, rendering much that appears here open to question—a process which will obviously affect more and more of the volume with the passage of time. Secondly, it is the authors' misfortune that some of their subjects held office for so short a time as to be scarcely worthy of even the cursory essays they receive here. Herbert Morrison served for only eight months, as did Harold Macmillan; R. A. Butler lasted barely a year at the end of a long Parliament; and the unfortunate Patrick Gordon Walker was granted a mere three months, during the whole of which time, because of his lack of success with the electorate, he was denied the privilege of explaining his views in Parliament.

The value of the present volume thus rests entirely on the sketches of six figures: Bevin, Anthony Eden, Selwyn Lloyd, George Brown, Alec Douglas-Home and Michael Stewart. Inevitably, however, the last three, having held office during the last decade, cannot easily be judged with any sense of perspective. For, in addition to the problem of the thirty-year rule, the authors have had the additional difficulty that even published memoirs and diaries covering the period are almost non-existent. Hence there is undue reliance on what actually has appeared, such as the recollections of Lord Gore-Booth and the exceedingly opinionated diaries of Richard Crossman. The authors have attempted to supplement this lack of source material by interviewing a handful of surviving actors, including some of their subjects. But this was apparently not done in any systematic or serious fashion.

None of this is to say that sketches of these most recent Foreign Secretaries are wholly devoid of interest. Home emerges as having combined 'courtesy' and 'likeability' with a 'tough and penetrating mind' (pp. 152–53). And he proved able to serve without undue stress under men as different as Macmillan and Edward Heath. Brown is chiefly remembered, alas, for his indiscretions. The authors refer to 'doubts about

his temper and sobriety'. They continue: 'The problem . . . is to distinguish fact from fiction, especially when dealing with the innumerable anecdotes told by journalists, officials and other people . . .' (p. 205). Then, tantalisingly, they decline to repeat the anecdotes. Instead they make a valiant attempt to suggest that a just appraisal of Brown will be based on his allegedly solid but relatively unpublicised achievements. Their case—and Brown's—seems likely to remain non-proven until the opening of the archives when the lucidity and vision of his directives and minutes —if any—may surprise us all. Stewart, by contrast, may meanwhile have a rising reputation. For while ultimately loyal to a somewhat erratic prime minister, he had a mind of his own and much diligence. The authors seem to be justified in quoting Gore-Booth's judgment that he possessed 'a deep-seated idealism, a staunchness in difficult atmospheres (politically speaking) and a crisp, choice use of the English language' (p. 204). Yet interesting though these comments are, these essays on the Foreign Secretaries of the 1960s come nowhere near to constituting a rounded assessment of their contributions.

Rather more merit attaches to the surveys of the earlier Foreign Secretaries who served for any considerable period. The least interesting is probably that on Selwyn Lloyd who still remains overshadowed by his two dominating prime ministers. Perhaps the recent appearance of his memoirs will mark the beginning of some wider recognition of his own independent role at which some suggestive hints are made in the present volume. The essays on Bevin and Eden have a good deal more substance and repay careful scrutiny. The two men are presented in stark contrast: Bevin as a tough-minded realist with an outstanding claim to having been Britain's best postwar Foreign Secretary, Eden as a dated figure living largely in a world of illusions. This distinction is probably overdone and causes Lord Sherfield, in his introduction, to describe the assessment of Eden as 'unduly harsh' (p. 6).

The decline of British power is—or ought to be—the main theme suggested by this book. It is perhaps symbolic therefore that these academics from a respected university (Reading) should have been reduced by the publishing crisis to bringing out their work under such inappropriate auspices as David and Charles evidently constitutes. For this must have a good claim to being the most appallingly-produced academic work published in Great Britain in recent times. The layout is most unattractive, while printing errors abound on a scale that is scarcely credible. Just a few examples of misprints are: beutralise (p. 63), colinial (p. 63), fifficult (p. 89), blindered (p. 94), rorce (p. 94), stody (p. 99), consultine (p. 129), and deminished (p. 217). The footnotes do not always correspond to the text. Denis Healey is often, though not invariably, rechristened Dennis. And there is a mysterious claim that a number of Labour MPs in 1949 were supporters of the 'Harold Federalist cause in the Labour Party' (p. 233). Those responsible for designing the dust jacket have listed only nine of the ten Foreign Secretaries dealt with in the book, and the same error is repeated in the blurb, the unfortunate victim in each case, somehow fittingly, being Butler. The dust jacket also suggests that the book has three authors. But if the publishers could 'lose' one out of ten Foreign Secretaries, what certainty is there that there may not also have been a fourth author who has suffered a similar fate? If so, he may be congratulating himself on his good fortune.

Polytechnic of North London DAVID CARLTON

Power and Manoeuvrability: The International Implications of an Independent Scotland. Edited by Tony Carty and Alexander McCall Smith. *Edinburgh: Q Press. 1978. 185 pp. £6·95.*

SCOTTISH nationalists are thinking hard about the consequences of Scottish independence, despite the unlikelihood (as it now appears) of such an event occurring in the near future. It is perhaps a hallmark of the Scottish intellect that it prefers calculation to emotion. That is certainly a feature of this volume of essays on 'the international implications of an independent Scotland'. For here is no 'call to arms', but rather a sober analysis of the likely reactions of the international community to Scotland as a sovereign state, and the scope for 'power and manoeuvrability' of that state.

Stephen Maxwell, a former fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, presents a painstaking (38 pages) account of the political and strategic aspects. He finds few natural allies for Scotland, and recommends Scottish membership of Nato. Other contributors deal with international law and state succession, sales of Scottish land to foreigners, oil, trade, and money. Each author is clearly an expert in his field, and not an SNP party hack. In other words, the book has academic value as a 'model-building' exercise, and as a shrewd assessment of contemporary international affairs. It demonstrates that Scottish nationalists have competent thinkers in their midst, who can keep the independence debate going at a high level; perhaps at too high a level for most people in Scotland, who find it difficult to conceive of what would happen in an independent Scotland.

The reader of this book will also be somewhat bemused and uncertain. If there are so many checks to Scotland's freedom to act internationally, is the struggle for independence worth it? Scottish independence (if it comes) will affect international relations through the manner of its achievement, and the context of the power relations in the North Atlantic at the time. It is far too early to be writing books about that, and so this must ultimately be an 'academic exercise' in another, less flattering, sense.

University of Glasgow JAMES G. KELLAS

Who speaks for Europe? The Vision of Charles de Gaulle. By Lois Pattison de Ménil. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1977. 232 pp. £7·50.*

THERE are many books and articles about de Gaulle's foreign policy, but few of them deal in such detail with the European aspects and aspirations of the early Fifth Republic. De Gaulle's statesmanship is well known, but the history of his views on the European Community and the European idea are less well covered, and this is the object of Lois Pattison de Ménil's book.

The treatment of de Gaulle's European policy is historical. The author starts with a review of the origins of de Gaulle's foreign-policy view (' roots ') and discusses his wartime experience as background to the actual policies which he implemented. Much, perhaps overmuch, is made of the need to 'busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels' during and after the humiliations of the Algerian war, a factor which has not been overlooked. The crucial event is the Fouchet plan, the failure of which was bitterly attacked by de Gaulle in a somewhat uncomprehending manner, particularly since clumsy Gaullist manoeuvres were instrumental in sinking it.

Atlantic policy and Franco-German entente are also dealt with in some detail. De Gaulle developed an understanding with Adenauer (just as the latter was about to leave the political stage), but a Europe based on a Paris-Bonn axis and without Britain was regarded warily by the smaller powers. However, the book skims over the Gaullist notions of replacing the Atlantic alliance with a French-led Europe. This points to the major weakness in the thesis presented in this book. How can de Gaulle's European policy be explained if it is taken to include the ultimately unrealistic premise that the American connection could be replaced? None of the posturing that Gaullism went in for could cover up or get around the supreme material super-power dominance of the United States, nor could de Gaulle come to terms with the American defence of Europe.

Thus the book leaves the EEC as a less than supra-national set of institutions encompassing a Common Agricultural Policy very favourable to France as de Gaulle's main European policy achievements, but it does not really consider to what extent they were Gaullist accomplishments. For the Common Market, of course, the French withdrawal in 1965 was a major crisis and, spectacular as it was, this incident receives proper treatment in the book. The same cannot be said about French nuclear policy which is not made to fit into the overall scheme of things as seen—and acted out—by de Gaulle.

This is an interesting book and one which will be useful to those teaching French or comparative foreign policy as well as to those who want an alternative view of Gaullist European policy. However, the book must be supplemented in several respects by other studies and the main thrust of the argument, which is very much a justification of de Gaulle, is not as strongly supported as it could be.

University of Sussex DAVID SCOTT BELL

La Machine RPR. By Pierre Crisol and Jean-Yves Lhomeau. *Paris: Fayolle. 1977. 260 pp. Pb.*

THIS book, one of a series on political parties brought out by one of the newer French publishers for the general elections of March 1978, comes at an opportune moment. For these elections, which none could claim to have really won (although the Giscardians did less badly than the rest) showed the persistence of the ' Gaullist phenomenon ' with 22 per cent of first-ballot votes. Four years ago, however, the Presidency was lost by the Gaullists, and the polls gave them only 10 per cent of voting intentions. How the tide was turned, that is, how Jacques Chirac refurbished Gaullism, is the subject of this book. The authors, who are political journalists, have penetrated the wall of unfriendliness that normally greets researchers at the offices of the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR): they have obtained some useful material (and one or two confidences from senior figures) which they have used judiciously. The result is an account of the movement which is more a piece of investigative journalism than a profound political analysis; but within those limits the book is thorough and clear, if written at times in a rather breathless idiom.

It falls into two parts, the first dealing with the genesis of the new RPR from Chirac's assumption of the premiership in May 1974 to the elaborate inauguration ceremony in December 1976 ('Chirac's Nurem-

berg', as Poniatowski sarcastically put it). The second part outlines the movement's leaders, structures and ideology. Although much of Part I will be familiar to anyone who follows political developments closely, the authors do succeed in bringing out very well the novelty of the situation that has existed on the French Right since 1974—the confrontation between a Gaullism that refuses to die and an older Right that is unable to kill it off.

Part II is perhaps more interesting. The thumbnail sketches of the key figures at the top of the Chiraquian apparatus, especially that of the *éminence grise*, Pierre Juillet, are very well done, although too much space is devoted to a plethora of secondary figures, which results in some confusion. The tensions and ambiguities of Gaullism, which are those of any populist Right, are evoked: young militants, believing in the progressive rhetoric of the leaders and eager for change, versus *apparatchiks* and adepts of the client-system; neo-Poujadist deputies versus modernising *énarques*. Most of all, the chapters on the RPR's structures (finances, membership, propaganda and so on) bring up-to-date and solid information.

This, then, is a thorough and well-informed description of Gaullism today. What is lacking, of course, is a serious analysis of the movement, that is, an attempt to explain its contradictions and to place it historically within the French Right. But as stated above, this was never the authors' intention; for the moment, they have produced a useful piece of work that can be read with profit by anyone wishing to keep abreast of the current situation within an important part of the majority in France.

University of Reading DAVID HANLEY

Population and Society in Twentieth Century France. By Colin Dyer. *London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1978. 247 pp. £7·95. Pb: £3·95.*

A BOOK on the demography of France in this century which contains no original material might just have the use that people could quickly look up demographic information in its seventy tables. The tables, however, are hardly ever comprehensive, usually end in 1971, and it is not clear that the information they provide is in all cases definitive. For example, the numerous tables on immigration seem to be less accurate than those in Tapinos's recent study,[1] and the estimates of casualties in the Second World War have different versions, many of them better founded. Very few are likely to look up for scholarly purposes the author's general thoughts on French society and none are likely to look up the banal illustrations (' Any piece of gravelly open ground is liable to exploitation by players of *boules* or *pétanque*.') There are numerous errors or misprints which even include the date when Hitler became Chancellor, and that unpleasantly brutal organisation, the Croix de Feu, appears as the rather charmingly-named Croix de Jeu. The translations into English sometimes read like Arnold Bennett's attempts to give a French background to the *Old Wives' Tale*. Albert Lebrun declaims 'that it should have sufficed a few weeks of fighting to constrain the French army to lay down its arms, what a surprise', and Marshal Pétain begins a speech by saying, 'I have addressed myself'. These gentlemen

[1] G. Tapinos, *L'Immigration étrangère en France*, Institut national d'études démographiques, Travaux et documents, cahier no. 71, Paris, P.U.F. 1975.

appear because of a lengthy diversion which explains the French defeat in 1940 as a result of the high average age of the population. We are left to draw the obvious corollary that the higher number of four-year-olds played its part in the revival after 1945. 'Contraception', the author writes of the interwar years, 'had become an epidemic'. What has become an epidemic now is small glossy paperback books, like this one, on European 'society' intended for use as texts and which publishers presumably consider safer than publishing original research. If publishers will do nothing to check this epidemic, readers and librarians should.

UMIST, University of Manchester A. S. MILWARD

Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment. By Nicos P. Mouzelis. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 222 pp. £10·00.*

THE aim of this serious and scholarly book is to test the relevance of functionalist and neo-Marxist theories concerning the development problems of Third-World countries by seeing how well they fit the case of Greece. Eight essays, some theoretical and some analytical, written over a period of time and many previously published, are hardly the ideal formula for a successful book. But in this case it works well. The unifying strand which ties together on the one hand a discussion of the political behaviour of Greek and Bulgarian peasants in the interwar period with an analysis of the conceptual framework of Althusserian Marxism, and on the other a novel explanation of the rise and fall of the Colonels with a criticism of functionalism as passively portraying collective actors, is the strength of Dr. Mouzelis's convictions and the clarity with which he presents them. Each chapter has similar conclusions, reached from a different perspective, and the total effect is one of increasing depth of argument, albeit not necessarily of persuasion.

A central theme is that many Third-World problems arise from the misfit of Western culture and institutions in developing countries. In Greece, for instance, during the early nineteenth century, the wealthy *diaspora* merchants introduced parliamentary institutions to an agricultural society. Whereas in the West, as the Industrial Revolution expanded, these institutions allowed political parties 'to organise and express effectively broad class interests', in Greece 'parliamentarianism, implanted at a time when the capitalist mode of production was peripheral in the social formation, functioned in a very different manner' (p. 144). Dr. Mouzelis sees these institutions as ineffective means of redressing economic and social inequalities in Greece today, and a similar kind of disharmony between imported structures and indigenous conditions is evident, according to the author, in all developing countries where industrialisation has occurred in an enclave form, resulting in a 'technologically advanced, highly dynamic, foreign-controlled manufacturing sector not organically linked with the rest of the economy, so that the beneficial effects of its growth are not diffused . . . but transferred abroad' (p. 29).

It is difficult to accept this portrait of conditions in Greece as evidence for the relevance of general theories of development because so many of the sources which the author cites are obscure. Some are written in Greek, a number are unpublished theses and many would be hard to locate except in Athens. Such restricted access to data makes corroboration unlikely.

But it is not necessary to be interested either in empirical tests or in dependency theories to enjoy this book, for it is a small mine of fascinating historical gems. There is an intriguing description, for instance, of how the phylloxera blight ruined the French vineyards in the 1880s, which led to an enormous demand for Greek currants, which led to serious over-production, which led to a crisis, which led to national bankruptcy, which led to the creation of an international control commission of foreign bond holders which, 'for decades had a very important say in the public finances of the modern Greek state' (p. 20). The phylloxera, according to the Oxford dictionary, is a plant-louse.

The combination of minute historical detail and grandiose philosophical theory also works well. It would have worked even better if substantive notes had not been relegated to the end of the book.

Chatham House JUDITH GURNEY

Scandinavia at the Polls: Recent political trends in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Edited by Karl H. Cerny. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1977. 304 pp. Pb: $5.75.*

THIS collection of papers, originally presented in 1975 at an American Enterprise Institute-Georgetown University conference in Washington and since revised for publication, centres on the shifts in voting patterns—some of them dramatic—which occurred in the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish parliamentary elections of 1973. In addition to analysing these changes, which appeared to upset Scandinavia's long-standing tradition of stable party politics, an attempt is also made to gauge how far they can be related to a rejection of welfare policies. The contributions themselves range rather more widely than the title suggests in order to illuminate the part played by underlying socio-economic trends in the process of electoral change. Thus, analyses of the three 1973 elections are backed by studies of left-wing radicalism in Scandinavia, the extent of 'happiness' and 'discontent' in these welfare societies, the political role of the mass media, postwar economic changes and trade-union developments.

The main weakness of the book as a whole is that it exploits a pure coincidence—the simultaneous occurence of elections in the three countries under study. The detailed analyses of voting behaviour show just how far the electoral outcomes and the factors affecting them differed from one country to the other. The only thing they seem to have in common as a group is the fact of change—'the similar electoral trends . . . in 1973 cannot have originated from any common source', one author says (p. 71). Norway and Denmark, in fact, seem the most closely linked, since the issue of Common-Market membership had a significant impact in both these countries. But here we encounter a further shortcoming—the fact that attention concentrates on one single election. True, the Swedish and Danish material has been updated to include voting data from 1975 and 1976, but nothing is said about the remarkable way the Norwegian party system has reverted to its pre-1973 pattern in later elections. The lack of any common links undermines the effort to impose a unity on the book with the suggestion that the outcomes of the 1973 elections may represent a voter backlash against the welfare state. The contributors—some of whom seem faintly ill at ease with this loaded

approach—make it clear in their different ways that this is a hi complex issue and one which has a very different significance in of the three states under study. Opposition to welfarism seems, in fact have played a major role only in Denmark—always the least socialise the Scandinavian countries. But, this said, it is only fair to add that individual essays, for all their varying quality, provide much interes and valuable material for students of recent Scandinavian affairs and comparative politics in general. ROLF E. GOODERHA

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Soviet Union since the Fall of Khrushchev. 2nd edn. Edited by Ar Brown and Michael Kaser. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 351 pp. £1(Pb: £4·95.*

THE realisation that ten years had passed since the fall of Nikita Khrush prompted the original edition of this book, in which ten noted author in their fields reviewed developments in the Soviet Union since 1964 the basis of their contributions to a seminar series at St. Antony's Coll Oxford. This new edition has allowed each author to update his cha where necessary, and the editors have added two new concluding chap assessing political and economic developments respectively up to the pu cation of the draft Soviet Constitution in the summer of 1977. The ch of subjects to be covered in a symposium such as this is inevitably arbitrary one, and some might have wished to have seen greater atten paid to (for instance) education, law and the changing social struc than the editors thought appropriate. On the whole, however, there be no doubt that the volume does indeed provide the 'thorou informed, up-to-date survey of the changes which have taken place in USSR since Khrushchev's departure' which the Introduction promises, this new and (by today's standards) reasonably-priced edition should en that the volume receives the wide general and undergraduate readershi which its merits clearly entitle it.

The first chapter, by Alec Nove, points out that Soviet agricul has seen a steady rise in total output over the post-Khrushchev per despite some spectacular setbacks, but questions how far that impr ment can be sustained without major changes in the collective and st farm system. Philip Hanson, in a detailed contribution on technol imports, notes that the technological level of Soviet industry has rece an increasing amount of attention from the political leadership s about 1960, and suggests that the absorption of technology from the W though of limited importance outside a few relatively backward sect will continue to increase. Michael Kaser, in two more general chapt argues that the Soviet economy may be said to have been 'over-regul but under-managed' during the post-Khrushchev period (and indeed be it), despite a series of ostensible attempts to limit external interventio enterprise management. The gap in earnings between farmers and in trial workers and between both and white-collar staff has also been fal over the post-Khrushchev period, a clue, Kaser thinks, to the Brezh leadership's apparent basis of support among the ordinary Soviet pe

in whose name they rule. These egalitarian trends appear to have continued further over the past two or three years.

The remaining chapters take up social and political developments over the same period. David Holloway, in his chapter on foreign and defence policy, reviews the development of Soviet foreign policy and the question of detente (whose origins, he suggests, date back to the beginning of the 1960s); J. A. Newth contributes a detailed analysis of Soviet population changes; Michael Bordeaux looks at Soviet religious groups and the Soviet government's policy towards them over the post-Khrushchev period; and Martin Dewhirst documents the reimposition of more rigid controls in Soviet literature since the heady days of *Ivan Denisovitch* in 1962. Peter Frank, in a chapter on the changing composition of the Communist Party, points to a widening generational gap between a youngish rank and file and an increasingly elderly leadership; and Peter Reddaway, in a comprehensive survey of dissent and opposition, concludes that whatever the KGB may do, the gradual pluralisation and re-politicisation of Soviet society and the decline in the authority of the Party are likely to continue.

Finally, Archie Brown, in two concluding political assessments, both reviews the conclusions of preceding chapters and adds some perceptive comments of his own about the sources of stability and change in the contemporary USSR. It is noteworthy that the second of these concluding chapters, written for the present edition in 1977, places rather more emphasis upon the sources of instability in the political system than did the concluding chapter written for the original edition three years earlier. Two sources of instability in particular, Brown suggests, have become more acute in the intervening period: the nationalities question, particularly in Russia and Central Asia, and the economy, whose relatively indifferent performance in recent years may well have disappointed the expectations of many citizens in this connection. The forces of stability remain strong, Brown concludes, and no dramatic changes may be expected in the short term; but in the longer term tensions such as those indicated are 'likely to make progressively more difficult the conservative political management of Soviet society'. One can only add that developments since the completion of this book, in particular the further series of official price rises in the spring of 1978, have done nothing to weaken the force of such observations.

University of Glasgow STEPHEN WHITE

The Russian Mind. By Ronald Hingley. *London: Bodley Head. 1978. 248 pp. £5·50.*

THIS is an exceptionally comprehensive book and reflects Ronald Hingley's many-sided knowledge of Imperial and Soviet Russia. It is impossible to think of any aspect of the subject that he has not explored and considered with admirable fairness and balance in a typically unpedantic racy narrative. In his quest for light on the complex Russian persona, he investigates not only the more obvious psychological attitudes, but delves into many by-ways of Russian history, not to be found in run-of-the-mill history books. Much of this fringe material is quite fascinating, but occasionally, as in the lengthy exposition of *vranyo*, 'the national brand

of leg-pulling' (p. 77), the very volume of his information may become boring to all but the addicted reader.

Ronald Hingley's method of successively analysing the opposing characteristics, the polarity, in the Russian psyche presents a wide spectrum of insights into the subject. But it may also be somewhat bewildering. It is useful, however, to remember what the author says about the vexed problem of Russian-Soviet continuity: 'Here above all is an aspect of national psychology where a craving for precise outlines risks becoming unhelpful and counter-productive' (p. 217). Knowing the difficulties of drawing precise outlines, he is himself perforce satisfied with a 'creatively blurred formula'.

Nevertheless, there are significant leads through this puzzling maze of conflicting Russian national characteristics. 'Russia has presented its sons and daughters with features markedly different from those conditioning their Western brothers and sisters' (p. 33), he writes. Space, official regimentation, separate cultural and religious development, State authority, all have left their stamp on the national character, marking it out from that of other nationalities. Among peculiarly Russian traits that seem to emerge from this historical-cultural analysis are: vulnerability to revolution, 'an outstanding Russian trait' (p. 200); extremes of fanaticism, reached, for example, by the Old Believers and the nineteenth-century radicals; the primitive urge towards destructiveness; the phenomena of the Holy Fool and, at the other extreme, of a Rasputin; generosity of spirit together with elements of recklessness and exuberance, which are all commonly invoked by the word *razmakh* (roughly translated 'letting himself go') p. 43.

Although I was puzzled by the uninviting titles of some sections, such as 'Signalling Devices' and 'Display Postures' (borrowed presumably from current psychological jargon), I was delighted by the amount of information given on the significance of peculiarly Russian forms of address and expression, so abundantly found in English translations of Russian novels and largely incomprehensible to non-Russian students. Mr. Hingley's idiosyncratic verbal facility constantly enlivens his style and narrative. Occasionally, however, less apt or even tasteless 'coinages' appear. Thus, the communion host becomes 'an edible pellet' (p. 15), and there is, I think, something awry in such epithets as 'the octoroon Pushkin', 'a colonial Stalin', 'the supreme *vrango*-monger Khrushchev', even if they are not inaccurate *per se*. But these are small points, as are my few criticisms of the author's unsatisfactory habit in his bibliography of giving a secondary rather than the original source of a statement or event, and in particular of referring to one of his own books rather than to a primary source.

Finally, I am tempted to quote Mr. Hingley's words to any critics who may 'believe the investigation of national character to be mischievous and foredoomed since it must inevitably become bogged down in vague generalisations which can neither be proved nor disproved.' 'An attempt has been made to observe one simple rule of etiquette', he writes, 'never to assume in advance that an unknown citizen of Russia or any other country will necessarily exhibit even one characteristic, however minor, from among any amalgam which may be claimed as typical of the group as a whole' (pp. 24–25). VIOLET CONOLLY

Politics and the Soviet Union. By Mary McAuley. *Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1977. 352 pp. Pb: £1·50.*

THIS book makes good introductory reading to the subject of Soviet politics. The earlier chapters, comprising Parts I and II, are intended to provide a step-by-step account of the changing political and economic conditions under which the Soviet system came into existence and gradually matured. They culminate in a chapter on Stalinism. Part III then offers an analysis of the post-Stalin period up to the mid-1970s.

As the author herself points out (p. 12), Russian and Soviet experience is so rich that it is impossible to cover all the major questions in a single book. Fortunately, she succeeds in presenting a well-balanced picture unmarred by excursions into areas not necessary for an introductory text. Instead she provides a selection of relevant literature for those who wish to specialise. Similarly, the description of events and complex developments which make the subject so rich and exciting is regularly supplemented by analysis highlighting the hard choices faced by the Bolsheviks. Dr. McAuley wants to make her readers understand why events took the turn they did, and why alternatives seemed unworkable, and this she does in respect to all the major undercurrents and turning points (NEP, the gradual suppression of opposition outside and within the Party, industrialisation and collectivisation, Stalinism, etc.). An important asset of this book is that it places the subject of Soviet politics within a broad framework of politics and modern history in general and it shows how changing perceptions of Western democracies in the West often led to reappraisals in the narrower area of Soviet studies.

The chapters dealing with the post-Stalin period focus on the gradual loosening up of the Stalinist structures and on Khrushchev's search for alternative methods of rule. There is a useful description of the institutions by which the Soviet Union is governed, showing how the Party, executive and legislative sides of the government are all fused at the top in an 'inner core' of personnel (p. 210). In order to throw more explanatory light on the system as a whole, the chapter on Policies and Policy-making provides an illustration of how the system works in practice. It analyses the implementation of Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's policies in agriculture, industry and culture. Sadly, the formation and execution of foreign policy had to be omitted. But the socio-economic changes within society as a whole and within the Party structure and membership are described. In an Assessment the author succeeds in capturing the essence of the trap in which the elite is caught today: 'The political structures may make opposition difficult but they simultaneously deny the ruling group a social base' (p. 322). Nevertheless, one finds it hard to share her somewhat pessimistic conclusion that a dose of pluralism and economic reform would most likely lead to anarchy (pp. 324–25).

The purpose of this book is to raise questions rather than to answer them (p. 18) and it fulfils this task adequately. The underlying theorising is a counterblast to the widely held belief that the negative aspects of Soviet experience are in one way or another an inevitable consequence of the Bolsheviks' embrace of their revolutionary creed. I find the author's arguments unconvincing, although the importance of exposing the dilemmas faced by the Soviet leaders cannot be disputed.

Chatham House VLADIMIR SOBESLAVSKY

Privilege in the Soviet Union: A Study of Elite Life-Styles under Communism. By Mervyn Matthews. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1978. 197 pp. £6·95.*

DR. MATTHEWS has written a provocative book on a subject of perennial interest—it casts further light on the question of the nature and extent of inequality in the Soviet Union. Chapters 1 and 2 provide estimates of the number of recipients of elite salaries and the value of special benefits associated with them. Although updated, it basically presents material that has already appeared—in *Survey* and in the Nato colloquium on everyday life in the USSR.[1] Chapters 3 and 4 give an historical account of the development of specifically Soviet forms of privilege—at least so far as they can be traced in legislation—while the two final chapters contain a few remarks on mobility and attempt a comparison with other countries. These three parts are written on rather different levels; they have different strengths and weaknesses and merit separate consideration.

Although this is the third time that the material in Chapters 1 and 2 has appeared in print, Dr. Matthews's presentation still suffers from serious weaknesses: there is confusion between the concepts of wages, basic salaries and earnings (*e.g.*, on page 27 or in Table 1.2). He is cavalier about sources: sometimes they are cited in a way that permits his figures to be checked, sometimes they are distressingly vague; sometimes he asserts that there is evidence to support a particular statement without indicating what it is or where it can be found (for example, in his discussion of the *nomenklatura* system by which the party controls appointments). And there are too many stylistic inconsistencies in presentation: notes in tables wrongly referenced and so on; altogether the proof-reading and copy-editing leave much to be desired. (But perhaps this is a fault of the publisher and not the author.)

Chapters 3 and 4, by contrast, provide a fascinating account of early legislation and Soviet policy on income distribution, together with some material from the Stalin period. Much of this is new (or at least insufficiently known) and the author is to be congratulated for his diligence in collecting and collating it. But even here, perhaps in a misguided attempt to make the book more appealing to the non-specialist, the paucity of references undermines its value for academic purposes.

The last two chapters broach topics of great importance—social mobility in the Soviet Union and inter-system comparisons of privilege and inequality. But the discussion is altogether too superficial for my taste. Certainly one can sympathise with the author's frustration at the non-availability of necessary information; however, this is only part of the problem. Equally important, surely, is an adequate conceptual framework and this also is lacking; perhaps it cannot be expected in a mere fifty pages. What emerges is a mish-mash of comment and inadequately related facts.

There is, I think, a more general weakness. On a number of occasions Dr. Matthews suggests that social and economic differentiation is inevitable, and is necessary for the maintenance of social stability. He implies that there is a contradiction between the political imperatives recognised by the Soviet authorities and their egalitarian ideology. But he nowhere

[1] NATO Colloquium, 'Economic Aspects of Life in the USSR' (Brussels, Jan. 1975), pp. 131–158; *Survey*, Summer, 1975, Vol. 21, No. 3 (96), pp. 1–27.

develops these *obiter dicta* into an adequate theoretical framework capable of giving coherence to the empirical material he presents. Nor does he deal with the question of the extent to which Soviet sociologists or economists are aware of this latent contradiction and the ways they suggest that it can be solved. Yet, in the past ten to twenty years there have been a number of Soviet discussions of the conflict between incentives and 'need'; further, some authors have suggested that equality should be replaced by equality of opportunity as the primary objective of state policy. In so far as there is general acceptance of these arguments, some of Dr. Matthews's strictures are misplaced. Still, there is much to be learned from this little book and it should prove quite popular.

University of Essex A. N. D. McAuley

The Soviet Economic System. By Alec Nove. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1977. 399 pp. £10·50. Pb: £4·95.*

This book is outstandingly rich in its treatment of Soviet economic reality: the economy's structure and its metamorphosis over time; its organisation and mechanism and how these work on both the micro and macro levels; also in its discussion of problems, both solved and unsolved. The range of subjects being so wide, a short review cannot do much more than list the principal topics: planning; the central agencies and their tasks; 'centralized pluralism'; ministries and regional planning; industrial management and micro-economic problems; agriculture; investment and technical progress; prices in both theory and practice; labour and wages; trade unions; public finance; money and inflation; trade. Alternative designs for a socialist economy are discussed too.

By now mathematical orientation prevails in Soviet economics: it prevails in the intellectual climate and 'language' and it dominates in modelling economic life (some mathematical tools have penetrated into economic practice). This book is non-formalised throughout, which naturally widens its potential audience. Confined to 'literary' language (and indeed excellently readable) it can be easily understood, not only by any economist but also by non-economists as well.

Some people may be tempted to begin with the last chapter, entitled 'Assessment', which assesses Soviet economic achievement—a topic naturally fascinating to both specialist and non-specialist. The principal questions posed in this chapter are these. The Soviet Union has become a mighty industrial power, but in many respects it is still backward; are then the pockets of backwardness part of the cost of the economic strategy adopted? And next the thorny issue of criteria: by what standards does one measure the achievements? How can one compare the efficiency of the economic system and mechanism, bearing in mind the different levels of development, resource endowment, policy objectives, political culture, multiple inter-relationships of cause and effect, some of them 'systemic' and others not?

With such an array of factors affecting the assessment, and quite a few of them imponderable, the reader does not get unqualified answers; nor could he expect them. He does, however, receive a careful presentation and discussion of the issues and 'weighting-up' scales to be taken into

consideration in any attempt at forming a judgment. This presentation and discussion by Professor Nove is eminently balanced. But then nothing else could be expected from him.

The present book reworks, expands and updates Nove's book published a decade and half ago. Like its predecessor, it stands every chance of becoming one of the classics in the field.

London School of Economics ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

Soviet Foreign Trade: Purpose and Performance. By W. N. Turpin. *Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough, Hants.) 172 pp. £9·40.*

THIS is a well-written and thoughtful study. Its chief merit is that it sets out with unusual clarity the basic characteristics of the Soviet foreign trade system and their relationship to the domestic economic system, and illustrates the long-run stability of this organisational structure and its functions with a wealth of Soviet and Western material going back to the 1950s and, occasionally, to the interwar period. Turpin's concern with the underlying philosophy and systemic logic of the foreign trade system, and with the habits of thought of those who operate it, reflects his background as a long-serving State Department official—a background which also enables him to make some use of personal observation and declassified American Embassy despatches.

The focus of the study is on East-West trade, with relatively little attention to Comecon. The basic argument of the book is that the Soviet foreign trade system serves the Soviet leadership well by insulating the domestic economy from outside influences while enabling it to obtain certain desired imports from the capitalist world, and is unlikely to be fundamentally altered in the foreseeable future. The system's defects, notably the difficulty (in Turpin's view, the impossibility) of making efficient choices of the mix of goods traded, are not so great as to force changes. The trade system, Turpin argues, must be seen as a logical corollary of the centrally administered domestic economic system; the latter will not be fundamentally altered because, in the final analysis, it is linked with the mechanisms by which the leadership group retains its power.

The book is a revised doctoral dissertation. This, I suspect, accounts for its only weak section. Writers of Ph.D. theses in economics are compelled to demonstrate numeracy, even if the demonstration is irrelevant to the main purpose of the thesis. In the present case we have, in Chapter Four, an attempt at statistical testing of what Turpin calls 'conventional views' of the Soviet foreign trade system. These views are that the system tends, in comparison with a market system, to minimise economic dependence on the outside world, and that trade planning starts from import requirements. This part of the book adds little to our knowledge, since the statistical tests do not—as the author admits—yield very strong results. The point of this exercise is in any case open to doubt: the initial assertion in Chapter Two that alleged systemic tendencies to 'under-trading' and to 'planning from imports' have not previously been empirically tested, neglects the empirical work in F. L. Pryor's *The*

mmunist Foreign Trade System, Sandor Ausch's *Theory and Practice of* *1EA Cooperation* and C. W. Lawson's article in *Soviet Studies.*[1]

rhe strongest chapters of the book are those in which the author /elops his main contention. His presentation of the systemic logic of viet foreign-trade arrangements is clear, well-documented and largely rsuasive, though his conclusions for Western policy are more debatable. e notion that Soviet trade practices are an aberration that will tend be 'normalised' by greater contact with the West is, in Turpin's view, misconception typical of other similar misconceptions that lie behind ich recent Western policy. He argues that the monopoly arrangements d the pervasive national-interest controls built into the Soviet trade stem enable Russia to do well out of trade with the West. Since the est cannot as a rule get Soviet political concessions in return for these nefits, the Western nations should if possible impose a corresponding of block-interest or national-interest controls on all their economic ationships with Moscow.

This reviewer is inclined to agree with Turpin both about the logical herence and practical effectiveness of the Soviet trade system and about relative lack, on the Western side, of corresponding devices for infusing ding decisions with considerations of bloc or national interest. But even detente really is, economically, something of a one-way street, it should remembered that it is also a very small street, and that it is precisely Soviet economic system which helps to keep the flow of traffic small. However, even the reader who disagrees entirely with Turpin's con- isions will find this a stimulating book. Both the clarity of the writing d the breadth of the issues raised should recommend it to more than very specialist readership indicated by the title.

University of Birmingham PHILIP HANSON

ie **USSR.** By John C. Dewdney. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1976. 262 pp. (Studies in Industrial Geography 3) $19.50.*

is book looks in detail at the contemporary industrial geography of the viet Union. It is divided into three parts. The first introduces the reader the author's 'trilogy' of factors that have influenced Soviet industrial velopment—territory, population and resources. Part Two contains a ctor-by-sector description of the history and distributional changes of major industries in the Soviet Union and Part Three is a regional ography of industry. For the purposes of the latter section, the economic gions of the Soviet Union are divided into three groups—the European re, regions of recent growth and the less-developed regions.

The most important feature of Soviet industrial development to which wdney draws attention is the scale of the changes that have recently ken place in the industrial profile of the country. He points out that many people's minds Soviet industry is associated with iron and steel t that in reality the postwar years have witnessed a move away from is sector with the development of petroleum-based industries and con-

[1] London: Allen and Unwin, 1963 Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972. 'An Empirical alysis of the Structure and Stability of Communist Foreign Trade 1960–68', April 74, pp. 224–238.

sumer goods. Dewdney shows how Soviet industry has become increasingly more diversified in recent years and has begun to employ more sophisticated techniques. This, however, is the only interesting contribution the book makes to our knowledge of Soviet industry. For the most part Dewdney's effort is descriptive and lacking in any serious analysis of the patterns and tendencies observed. The author seems unprepared to commit himself on any issue, with the result that the final product appears as little more than a collection of, admittedly up-to-date, facts.

We are all used to an occasional dull read. However, in the case of *The USSR*, some of the omissions and points left undeveloped are a serious shortcoming, particularly in a book of this size and specialist interest. In the introduction Dewdney comments that any discussion of the Soviet economy inevitably poses the question of the extent to which achievements in the Soviet Union are the product of the economic and political system. Having drawn attention to the question, he thereafter avoids answering it. Thus in Part Two the growth and distribution of each sector of industry is discussed in the context of the trilogy of territory, population and resources but virtually no mention is made of policies, goals, strategies of development and the planning framework. Are we really expected to understand Soviet industrial location outside the context of the industrial location policy of the state? Dewdney apparently thinks we can. Similarly, in Part Three the industrial history and profile of a series of regions is described but no attempt is made to analyse this development in the context of regional and national economic aims.

Of the omissions in the book perhaps the most serious occurs in the author's treatment of resources. In the chapter on fuel and power, for example, he argues that at no time has any shortage of fuel and power hindered development. This may well be the case to date but recent reports have made it clear that the Soviet Union is beginning to suffer from an energy crisis brought about by the inefficient exploitation of resources and commitments to export. If, as he stated was an objective, the author was serious about giving some indication of the future prospects for Soviet industrial development, this important topic should surely have been given detailed consideration.

The book fails to focus on the important issues in the contemporary industrial geography of the Soviet Union and it adds little to our knowledge or understanding of this topic.

University of Leeds JUDITH PALLOT

Social Security and Medicine in the USSR: A Marxist Critique. By Vicente Navarro. *Lexington, Mass.: Heath. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough, Hants.) 149 pp. £9·40.*

The Organization of Soviet Medical Care. By Michael Ryan. *Oxford: Blackwell; London: Martin Robertson. 1978. 168pp. £7·95.*

ALTHOUGH both of these books have the same subject-matter, namely, Soviet medical care, they differ considerably. According to Navarro, an advocate of historical materialism, an analysis of Soviet medical care must start with an analysis of the economic, social and political forces that

mine the nature of Soviet society. In addition, this analysis must be istorical one.

oceeding from these two basic assumptions, Navarro opens his nination with a survey of medical care in Tsarist Russia and then ; with the development of Soviet medical care between the October olution and the present time. However, because of the space devoted to ical, ideological, economic and social factors, the end-product is rather ilanced. Medical care seems to occupy a secondary place in the inquiry, social security is mostly discussed at the level of general principles .

ll in all, the volume gives the impression that the main purpose behind vriting has been to distinguish between nationalisation and socialisation nedical care, to conclude that while Soviet medical care is nationalised not socialised, and to stress that socialisation of medical care means only the nationalisation of medical care and the democratisation of its tutions (workers' and community control), but also—and in the ion of the author more importantly—the massive transformation of population from passive recipients to active agents in the redefinition nedical care and its institutions.

one seeks systematic information on Soviet medical care and its probs without being caught in an ideological polemic, one should turn to n's study which focuses on the period from 1950 onwards, with parlar emphasis on more recent developments. Simultaneously, it attempts iraw some comparisons with the British National Health Service on grounds that the NHS also constitutes a responsibility of the state, is prehensive in its range of provisions, universal in coverage of persons free, or largely free, at time of use.

he book is divided into chapters dealing with the politico-administrative text, the finance of health care, medical and paramedical personnel, ialisation in medicine, out-patient services, hospital provision, and the :tions of the service. Among the issues discussed are those of inalities (between individual republics, urban and rural areas, and :rent categories of patients); the feminisation of the medical worke; placement, turnover, salaries and wasteful deployment of doctors; quality of the treatment; shortcomings in the supply of drugs and ical articles; sick-leave certification; and so on.

ne of the attractive features of the book is that, to an extent at least, icceeds in describing the actual functioning of Soviet medical care. To an example, a Soviet study undertaken in 1967–71 found that ufficient effectiveness' of orders despatched from regional level derived n the following causes: in 50·5 per cent of cases orders failed to reach r intended destination, in 8·2 per cent material-technical resources e insufficient to fulfil the order, in 6·8 per cent orders lacked concrete ructions, in 5·3 per cent orders repeated directives issued earlier, and like (pp. 13–14).

evertheless, Ryan is not able to present a complete picture of Soviet lical care for the simple reason that, as he himself emphasises, even c factual information cannot be obtained for certain areas of activity. imilar difficulty is encountered by students of the Soviet Union gener- , irrespective of the subject-matter of their research.

espite this handicap, the Soviet health service emerges as one that iodies and endorses a pattern of values imposed by the regime, which

the author does not hesitate to call totalitarian. Although indicators of health service development have shown a very substantial improvement since 1950, the record of the service does not entail a socialist commitment to the provision of optimum-quality care to each individual equally, exclusively on the basis of his or her medical needs. At the same time, the main health service is conceived essentially as a contribution towards national efficiency and economic growth.

St. Antony's College, Oxford J. L. PORKET

Kolyma: The Arctic Death Camps. By Robert Conquest. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 256 pp. £6·95.*

THIS book represents yet another example of the brilliant compilation work we have almost come to expect from Robert Conquest as of right. At the same time, it constitutes a clever piece of detailed 'empirical' research into labour camp conditions in Stalin's outermost Siberian domain—research not calculated to win him many friends among old-school Marxist 'theoretical' historians still harbouring illusions about the concrete horrors of Stalinism.

Inevitably, there are few accounts by survivors of the Kolyma gold-mining camp complex—people were simply not expected, and, in some categories, not intended to survive. Conquest faces up to the problem of knitting together the varied personal accounts which have appeared and succeeds remarkably well, with only a few small discontinuities interrupting the flow created by his linking narrative. In many ways the combined effect of the various memoirs is far more harrowing than the dull monotony of camp life portrayed in Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,* with the death camp of Serpantinka performing as a Soviet Auschwitz in an area where hunger and cold were every bit as effective as bullets in despatching at least three million souls on their journey to the great gold-mine in the sky.

The fact that the journey to Kolyma had to be accomplished partly by sea produced the curious effect of a hideously cold, twentieth-century version of deportation to Australia a century and more ago—and yet all within the same country. These voyages have enabled Conquest to tap material from one of the world's most effective naval intelligence units—Lloyd's of London—and so build up a picture of the duration and scale of the operation.

The only serious criticism of the book lies in its continuation of the mud-slinging dialogue with Professor Owen Lattimore—an American visitor to Kolyma in the 1940s—which rests uneasily in a book such as this and should perhaps have been confined to the columns of the press. A simple repetition of the material previously published in Conquest's *The Great Terror*[1] was sufficient condemnation of those who discarded the faculty of criticism on entering the portals of Sydney and Beatrice Webb's 'New Civilisation.'

University of Sheffield JULIAN BIRCH

[1] London: Macmillan, 1968. Revd. edn., 1973.

The Multinationals and East-West Relations: Towards Transideological Collaboration. By J. Wilczynski. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 235 pp. £10·00.*

THOSE of us who have not been following closely the more recent developments in the sphere of East-West relations might be forgiven for assuming from the title of this book that its central theme must be that of bitter hostility and friction between the multinational corporations and communist states. After all, is it not true that the Marxist doctrine sees giant corporations and big banks as the very core of capitalism and imperialism? And conversely, is it not the case that the socialist countries embody everything the multinationals hate and fear? But those acquainted with the realities of East-West detente will know that, as the sub-title suggests, Dr. Wilczynski's work deals with exactly the opposite: for a variety of reasons the pillars of capitalism are increasingly finding that their interests converge with the needs of the socialist countries so that commonsense urgently calls for the abandonment of artificially erected ideological barriers and fears. The socialist countries badly need Western technology and the multinationals, squeezed by persisting recession, require outlets for their goods and skills. In this the author sees the dawn of an age of 'transideological co-operation', between East and West, an age in which commercial matters are hermetically isolated from continuing ideological and political animosity.

Wilczynski first analyses the roots of past hostility. In part, it was due to the fact that the communist regimes as a rule expropriated the assets of foreign companies without adequate compensation (p. 2). The next chapter describes the 'amazing reversal of attitudes' evident since the early 1960s but well entrenched in the 1970s. The author rightly regards this as 'one of the most paradoxical cases of bilateral *volte-face* in recent history' (p. 18). The chapter also describes how the deals are made and the motives of the negotiators. The next chapters constitute a much needed empirically based exposition of this breath-taking story. They provide a vast amount of carefully researched and compiled data derived from Western as well as socialist sources. One learns what companies and countries are involved (China is included), and there is a typology of the relationships developed among the partners as well as an account of some of the largest schemes negotiated to date. One suspects that even industrialists and researchers specialising in the field are bound to learn new facts. In any case, the scope of current East-West co-operation and the variety of its forms seen in their totality cannot fail to impress. Some readers may be surprised to learn that the technology transfer is by no means a one-way street (p. 74), or they may be amazed by the extent of socialist commercial undertakings in the West. This is a book full of surprises and it guarantees to explode many diehard myths.

Although frictions stemming from different attitudes to business practice, generated by systemic differences, to some extent still persist (as the chapter on Conflicts and Safeguards illustrates) the overall conclusions cannot but be optimistic. The author provides a testimony to the power of common sense, but the might of those with vested interests in the preservation of ideological purity and mutual prejudice is not underestimated (p. 190).

The common denominator of this and previous works by Wilczynski[1] is their topicality, the vast amount of useful and well-organised data they make available, and a readable style unburdened by unnecessary theorising or politically-inspired value judgements. The subject of his latest work is very important and no one interested in East-West relations should miss it.

Chatham House VLADIMIR SOBESLAVSKY

The Foreign Policies of Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Determinants. Edited by James A. Kuhlman. *Leiden: Sijthoff. 1978. 302 pp. (East-West Perspectives 4) Fl. 54.00. $22.50.*

THE bulk of this book consists of papers read at a workshop at the University of South Carolina in 1970. Professor Kuhlman edited them with care, adding his own comparative introduction and four other essays to cover the whole of Eastern Europe. Throughout this work the American academics use the behavioural approach to international relations, elucidating the external-internal connection and in the predictive parts being very cautious. Still, this school of thought has become fairly sophisticated and despite certain simplifications can be a very stimulating type of academic analysis. The editor sets out his criteria and means of comparative enquiry and applies them to four American classics on international relations in Eastern Europe by Brzezinski, Triska, McNeal and Jamgotch (who is also the author of the penetrating analysis of Soviet foreign policy within the sub-system Comecon and Warsaw Pact).

The Soviet Union uses a whole range of strategic and tactical methods to maintain its hegemony in Eastern Europe and keep China in reasonable check. Despite the untypical military responses in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and on the Chinese border in 1969, the Russians now appear to be surer of their 'Eastern European' and 'Asian' borders and can risk detente with the United States (i.e. strategic agreement). All the other papers argue that in order to pursue what is now called the detente policy the Soviet Union cannot afford any upheaval within its own bloc. In the case of Czechoslovakia this means, according to Professor Pirage, that the country will return to the 1960s and face the possibility of an economic collapse.

East German, Hungarian and Polish foreign policies are also analysed in the socio-behaviourial manner by Professor Starrel and Dr. Mallinckrodt, Professor Vali and Professor Morrison respectively. Romanian foreign policy, the only exception to the pattern of conformity, is analysed by Professor Socianu, who presents us with the three stages of this unique policy between 1960 and 1970, and Professor Parlow then elucidates the internal connection of partial alignment. Professor Farkas's study of Yugoslav foreign policy is absorbing, while Dr Potter's concluding essay on innovation in East European foreign policy is very important, not only because it goes beyond 1970, but also because it contains grand historical correlations and detects innovatory determinants in foreign

[1] See, for example, *The Economics and Politics of East-West Trade* (London: Macmillan, 1969); *Socialist Economic Development and Reforms* (London: Macmillan, 1972). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1972, p. 685; *Technology in Comecon* (London: Macmillan, 1974). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1975, p. 430.

trade, defence spending and even in voting at the United Nations; these findings sometimes go against the predictive assertions of other essays. The proliferation of international treaties which the East European nations are concluding seems to counteract the constitutional amendment which they all passed (with the exception of Romania), namely, never to leave the socialist community.

This is an excellent academic volume on East European policies, carefully edited and beautifully printed; it is a pity that it contains many misprints which sometimes mar the narrative and even distort the meaning (Czecho-Slovak nationality problem becomes Czecho-Soviet . . .). As a part of the 'East-West Perspectives' series it greatly enriches our knowledge of Eastern Europe in the international context.

University of Manchester J. F. N. BRADLEY

Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia: The Meanings of its History. By Josef Korbel. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1977. 346 pp. $18.70.*

Poland in the Twentieth Century. By M. K. Dziewanowski. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1977. 309 pp. $18.70.*

JOSEF KORBEL was nine years old when the Czechoslovak Republic was proclaimed. During the Second World War he was an official of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry in exile, in London. Early in 1945 he left for Prague with Jan Masaryk who soon appointed him ambassador to Yugoslavia. In 1948 he settled in the United States and became professor of International Studies at the University of Denver. He published six books, the last being *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia* which he completed shortly before his death. It is an unromantic attempt to present a synthesis of modern Czechoslovak history 'neither without love nor with anger'.

Trying to define the Czech national character, Korbel calls to witness many Czech historians and writers, including Ferdinand Peroutka, a brilliant political essayist, who wrote in 1934 that the Czechs 'are not a nation of heroes but rather of shrewd lovers of life'. While in the Polish struggles for freedom there was much 'of flame, determination, desperation, pathos and excitement', the Czechs 'had chosen to negotiate for their rights in the chambers of the Vienna Parliament'. According to Korbel, the Czechs and Slovaks were by no means prepared for a confrontation with history when the First World War engulfed Europe. Even Thomas Masaryk, the founder of the Czechoslovak Republic, was ready to agree to seating a king of the Romanov dynasty on the Hradčany throne. The Russian Revolution killed that nineteenth-century idea, but the Czechs dared to proclaim their independence only when the Habsburg monarchy was dissolved.

When Hitler assumed power in Berlin, Edvard Beneš, the irremovable minister of foreign affairs, refused to regard the Third Reich as the implacable enemy of Czechoslovakia. He did not for a moment envisage the possibility of an alliance with Poland against the common danger. Korbel does not attempt to analyse Czechoslovak-Polish relations. He simply—and untruthfully—states that 'Poland, whose relations with Czechoslovakia had been strained for many years, was waiting behind the

scenes, hoping to join Germany in a play for its neighbor's territory' (p. 123). Korbel admits, however, that Beneš was 'not a leader', and that he ignored 'the mortal consequences of the capitulation'. Korbel concludes: 'In 1918 Czechoslovakia gained independence without firing a shot; twenty years later the nation lost it without firing a shot' (pp. 147–49). Beneš capitulated for the second time ten years later, delivering his country to Stalin.

M. K. Dziewanowski is now professor of history at Boston University. His publications include the history of *The Communist Party of Poland.*[1] His present book is the fruit of considerable research both in Poland and the United States. It starts with a brilliant summary of the eight-centuries long history of the Kingdom of Poland which at the end of the eighteenth century fell victim to Russo-German collusion. During the First World War, in which the partitioning powers fought in opposite camps, the Poles were lucky to have leaders who acted sensibly. Józef Piłsudski, head of the Camp of Independence, prophesied in 1912 that a European war was unavoidable, that 'Russia was bound to be beaten by Austria and Germany, and they in turn would be defeated by the Anglo-French (or Anglo-American-French) coalition' (p. 66). In 1914 Piłsudski's Legions fought Tsarist Russia, but when, after the March 1917 Revolution, the Russian provisional government proclaimed an independent Polish state, Piłsudski preferred internment in a German prison to continuing his collaboration with the Central Powers.

Piłsudski realised that the leadership of the Polish struggle for independence must now pass to Roman Dmowski, head of the National Democrats and president of the Polish National Committee in Paris. Before March 1917 Dmowski was unable to obtain from the British and French governments a firm pledge that the restoration of a united independent Poland would be an Allied war aim. But after the Russian proclamation, the situation changed radically and Poland was reborn on November 11, 1918—on the day of the German capitulation. That rebirth was confirmed in August 1920 by the Polish victory over the Red Russian army which—as Dziewanowski rightly states—'was not a marginal event'. It destroyed Lenin's strategic plan to bring the communist revolution into the heart of Europe, and ensured to the newly-restored or territorially-enlarged eastern and central European states two decades of independence.

Convinced that Germany would again embark on an aggressive foreign policy, Polish diplomats proposed in Paris the reinforcement of the Franco-Polish alliance of 1921 and in Prague the conclusion of the Polish-Czechoslovak military convention. Both efforts were unsuccessful. Dziewanowski summarises the history of these approaches (pp. 99–103) and shows how France 'aimed at a progressive loosening of the alliance' while Czechoslovakia rejected Polish suggestions In March 1933 Beneš informed Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, that 'Czechoslovakia would not make an alliance with Poland against Germany, because he thought it would be very dangerous to give Germany clear cause for fearing encirclement'. In fact, Beneš's attitude helped Hitler to destroy Czechoslovakia.

Dziewanowski considers that the communist government imposed on Poland after the Second World War was 'no worse' and 'perhaps better

[1] Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1959. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1960, p. 116. (2nd edn., 1976.)

than the Nazi occupation which threatened the very existence of Poland as a nation' (p. 106). He recognizes 'that as a result of the wartime as well as postwar changes, Poland became ethnically and religiously homogeneous as never before in its history' (p. 147), but he concludes that 'the people of Poland are far from happy in the role of vassals.'

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

Politics in Hungary. By Peter A. Toma and Ivan Volgyes. *San Francisco, Reading: Freeman. 1977. 188 pp. £9·60.*

PETER A. TOMA and Ivan Volgyes, two American political scientists of Hungarian origin, have produced a highly readable, carefully researched and well-informed book on Hungarian politics, a subject which has not received nearly as much attention as it deserves, largely no doubt because of the language barrier. The volume will be of interest to anyone concerned with developments in Eastern Europe and, above all, to teachers and students of courses on East European, or comparative communist, politics.

The first page of the preface raises some unfortunate doubts about the value of what is to follow. The authors state that they 'demonstrate' in the chapters which follow 'that the Hungarian political system is not independent of other political systems—especially the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries'. There is a danger that a number of readers will proceed no further, since it might be held that 'life itself' (to use one of the late Nikita Khrushchev's favourite phrases) has already amply demonstrated that fact. On the same page, the authors tell us that 'it is both difficult and unscientific to clearly differentiate . . . between the Hungarian political culture and that of the other Eastern European socialist cultures in the Soviet bloc'. But this statement rests upon a failure to make a necessary distinction between the official and the dominant political cultures within East European societies. Indeed, only two pages further on Toma and Volgyes say that their 'examination of the prevailing political culture discloses that what exists in Hungary today can scarcely be considered a Communist political culture'.

Following this uncertain start, Toma and Volgyes go on to produce numerous illuminating insights on state and society in Hungary and (especially) on the relationship between the two. Though they have much that is useful to say on political, institutional and personnel changes and on the policy-making process, the particular strength of the book lies in the contribution which it makes to the study of political socialisation and (the first page of the preface notwithstanding) Hungarian political culture.

The authors present a formidable body of evidence to show that alongside an intense attachment to 'Hungarianness' goes a low level of knowledge of the contemporary political system. A large-scale survey of students living in halls of residence found that only 15 per cent of them were extremely interested in politics and that over 55 per cent gave articles in political newspapers only an occasional cursory glance. Still lower levels of interest in, and knowledge of, politics were recorded among industrial workers. Yet these same Hungarians appreciate both the material advances and the gradual political and cultural relaxation which have marked the Kádár period in their history. Though cynicism appears to

be widespread, the present leadership—thanks mainly to Kádár—is accorded at least a partial popular legitimacy. As Toma and Volgyes aptly put it:

> Hungarians learned long ago not to believe in the 'perfectability of man', 'progress' and a 'better future'. Betrayed by history's false promises, and hopes held in vain, Hungarians have learned to accept what exists not as the best system, but as the best system possible within the framework of the existing balance of international power.

St. Antony's College, Oxford ARCHIE BROWN

Reflections on the Economic Development of Hungary 1967–1973. By Mátyás Timár. *Leiden: Sijthoff; Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. 1975. 219 pp. Fl. 48.00. $18.50.*

The Economic Mechanism in Hungary—How it works in 1976. By O. Gadó. Trans. by Gy. Hajdu. *Leiden: Sijthoff; Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. 1976. 203 pp. Fl. 25.00. $10.00.*

HUNGARIAN economic developments have attracted the interest and attention of Western economists for many years now, but most especially in the years since 1968. That year saw the introduction of a package of economic reforms which appear to set Hungary apart from its associates in the socialist bloc. These reforms, often referred to as the New Economic Mechanism, involved dismantling much of the traditional apparatus of central planning, and granting enterprises a substantial degree of independence in determining their own economic policy within the framework of a rather loosely specified national plan, constrained by the so-called economic regulators. The latter term refers to a range of fiscal measures —profits tax, capital charges, wages tax, special production taxes and subsidies, etc.—which affect the enterprise environment. Together with these changes, a reform of producer prices was simultaneously effected, as well as reforms in the sphere of foreign trade, thus beginning a move away from the system of multiple and often artificial exchange rates which frequently characterises socialist economies.

This summary of the Hungarian reforms prompts a number of questions: one has to ask, first, why such drastic reforms were introduced and what their aims are? Second, how effectively have the reforms solved Hungary's basic economic problems? And third, how has the experience of the New Economic Mechanism led to modifications in, and deviations from, the reformers' initial intentions? The two books under review, by O. Gadó and M. Timár respectively, attempt to provide answers to these questions, and as their titles suggest, Timár's book deals with the first two questions and Gadó's with the third, although there are some overlaps.

Timár's book falls into two parts. The first starts by explaining why reform was needed in the late 1960s: economic performance was sluggish and lagging behind the plans, while minor reforms made previously had neither substantial impact on performance nor much stability, soon being reversed or undermined by the pressures of current problems. Such failures led to the emergence of much more radical reform concepts in a series of amazingly vigorous policy debates, culminating in final proposals supported by party and government. This part then continues with a summary

of the main early experiences of the reform in various spheres of economic life, and a cautiously favourable overall assessment.

The second part treats more general issues, namely the objectives of development, development policy, living standard policy and further developments of the reforms. The discussion of objectives is extremely sketchy and superficial but the subsequent chapters are fascinating. For example, the chapter on development policy is very critical of the persistent imbalances and inefficiencies in the sphere of investment and explains how much more selective development, focusing on economic efficiency and export orientation, is attempting to remedy the deficiencies. Similarly, the last chapter makes clear that many remaining problems with the reforms result from a past tendency to underestimate the sheer difficulty of transforming the economic mechanism.

This theme is taken up in Gadó's book which provides some general background to the reforms, while explaining the most recent changes introduced in 1976, at the start of Hungary's fifth five-year plan (1976–80). Originally it was intended that the reforms would develop in the direction of increasing generality, in the sense that specific taxes, subsidies and so on would be eliminated, and all enterprises would basically face the same financial environment. What Gadó makes clear is that this is no longer the tendency; instead, the economic regulators are becoming more differentiated in line with the needs and conditions of individual enterprises. It is not yet certain how far this subverts the original concept of the New Economic Mechanism.

Both books are very welcome additions to the growing literature on the Hungarian reforms, especially as the authors have been actively involved in the whole process themselves, M. Timár being President of the Hungarian National Bank and O. Gadó having been Deputy President of the National Planning Office (now retired). Unfortunately, Gadó's book suffers in places from rather poor translation which has led to some extremely cumbersome sentences; on the plus side, however, it contains a most useful glossary of the main technical terms needed for an understanding of the Hungarian reforms. Finally, then, both books can be recommended to anyone concerned to understand what is going on in Hungary today.

University of Stirling P. G. HARE

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Superpower Intervention in the Middle East. By Peter Mangold. *London: Croom Helm. 1977. 209 pp. £7·50.*

Decade of Decisions: American Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967–1976. By William B. Quandt. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1978. 313 pp. £10·50.*

THESE two studies very largely cover common ground. Mr. Mangold has aimed at a broader view, but for a variety of reasons there is so much less to be said about Soviet than about American policy in the Middle East that the difference is not fundamental. More significant is the fact that Professor Quandt speaks in part from inside the policy-making

establishment, having worked on the staff of the National Security Council from 1972–74. (He has returned there since writing his book.)

Perhaps the strongest impression left on the reader is of the restraint which both super-powers have been obliged to exercise, not only because each has to be wary of the other and because they have had no positive objectives in common, but also because their worldwide as well as their local interests have demanded respect for the independence of the regional states. (The embarrassing consequences for the United States of the arms embargo on Turkey imposed by Congress after the invasion of Cyprus are a continuing reminder of this limitation.) Mr. Mangold points out that despite the presence of substantial American and Russian forces, principally at sea, there has been only one occasion since the Second World War on which they have been involved in combat, and then very briefly when in 1970 the Russians directly confronted the Israeli air force along the Suez ceasefire line.

The area has probably had a higher priority for Washington than for Moscow, and the aims of American policy have been more complex. Both authors summarise them in similar terms: to contain Soviet influence in the area; to ensure the security of Israel; to maintain the best relations possible with the Arab states, particularly with those disposed to co-operate in reducing Soviet influence and with the oil-producers. The fact that fidelity to the second aim has constantly impeded the pursuit of the other two is clearly perceived by the State Department. On the other hand, Nixon and Kissinger began by accepting the Israeli thesis that a strong Israel was a necessary buttress of American policy. Even after the war of 1973, when Sadat had transformed Egypt's relations with the United States and Kissinger was working for a second Sinai agreement, his thinking remained largely Israelocentric. Professor Quandt quotes from a summary record of Kissinger's remarks to the Israeli leaders after their rejection in March, 1975 of his first attempt at the second Sinai disengagement:

> This is a real tragedy . . . We've attempted to reconcile our support for you with our other interests in the Middle East . . . If we wanted the 1967 borders we could do it with all of world opinion behind us. The strategy was designed to protect you from this . . . I see pressure building up to force you back to the 1967 borders—compared to that ten kilometres is trivial. I'm not angry at you and I'm not asking you to change your position . . . It's tragic to see people dooming themselves to a course of unbelievable peril (p. 267).

On the rare occasions when the super-powers were in agreement they could exert their influence confidently and successfully. Thus the Security Council's resolution 338, calling for the end of the 1973 war and a subsequent Israeli withdrawal, was agreed between Washington and Moscow on October 21 and adopted by the Council next day despite Israel's pleas for delay. And three days later, when the communications of Egypt's Third Army were cut by the Israeli advance across its rear, the Israelis were firmly told that if they did not open a corridor to permit the resumption of supplies, this would be undertaken either by the Americans themselves or by the Russians with American acquiescence.

Recent as are the events dealt with in these two partially complementary studies, it is unlikely that they will be superseded for a long time.

HAROLD BEELEY

Land of the Arabs. By Abdel-Kader Hatem. *London: Longman. 1977. 323 pp. £15·00.*

THE author's purpose was to inform the rest of the world of the geography of Arab countries and replace as far as possible the often misguided notions and prejudices of Western peoples about the character of the Arabs and their lands. The publisher has provided a very elegantly printed and lavishly illustrated vehicle for the purpose and the book succeeds to some extent in informing the general reader about agricultural resources and development in the Arab Middle East.

One senses that the study has taken some time in publication in that the sources used are all pre-1972 except for entries on the Gulf states and some references to water use in arid lands.[1] The sources are also almost exclusively Western reference works and prepared by Western scholars and journalists. The author adds something of a new dimension, however, by bringing an Arab perspective to his description. He is quite justified in stressing the contribution of the Arab nation to the development of science and of agriculture in arid lands, but unfortunately in attempting such a broad geographical study he has apparently had to rely on non-Arab sources. Even in the treatment of his own country, Egypt, one does not feel that one is sharing the privileged insights which one might expect of an Egyptian on the fascinating problems of organising land and water in the Nile valley.

The comprehensiveness of the survey is useful in drawing attention to the areas of the Middle East and northern Africa which have a common Arab Islamic inheritance. The survey indicates the regions with special resource problems and comments briefly on some attempts to experiment with massive inputs of capital in those states with oil revenues. But in the space of 313 pages, and with only nine pages, for example, given to the richest, Saudi Arabia, the task of conveying a balanced picture of development is not successfully accomplished.

The section on Palestine is interesting in that it presents in a dignified way the Arab view of the occupied areas which form the most fertile part of what are regarded as Arab lands. It is perhaps in this section that the author best achieves his aim of informing the world of another view of the Land of the Arabs.

School of Oriental and African Studies J. A. ALLAN

Iraq: International Relations and National Development. By Edith and E. F. Penrose. *London: Benn; Boulder: Westview Press. 1978. 569 pp. £17·50.*

WESTERN critics sometimes waste their time deploring the political instability of the Arab world; they invent theories about the Arab character or the Moslem religion to account for the failure of Arab countries so far to achieve a functioning democracy or to build a successful capitalist economy. Their judgment of a particular Arab country tends to be unduly affected

[1] National Academy of Sciences, *More Water for Arid Lands* (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1974).

by the attitude of its government to global conflicts. For this reason Western judgments about Iraq have performed a series of spectacular somersaults since 1921. Yet the historical process has been continuous, and Iraq merely provides a special case, or an extravagant example, of the effects of the collapse of Turkish control of the Eastern Arab world, and of the misjudgments which characterised the settlement imposed by Britain and France, in competition, not co-operation, after the First World War. It was a settlement conceived in European interests: except in Iraq, it paid no attention at all to the wishes of the inhabitants. Even in Iraq, where George Antonius conceded that British promises to the Arabs had been substantially fulfilled, British benevolence met the wishes of only one section of the people. For the boundaries it laid down for Iraq included peoples whose loyalties were not just Arab, but divided by religion, race, and tribe. To most Iraqis in 1921 the word Iraq would have had little meaning and the notion of an Iraqi patriotism would have been incomprehensible. So the 'young hotheads and the Shi'ah obscurantists', the 'enthusiasts like Ja'far', 'the polished old statesmen like Sasun and scholars like Shukri', of whom Gertrude Bell wrote to her father in 1920, have refused to be 'roped together', and the visions she saw and the dreams she dreamed have inevitably remained unfulfilled.

Edith and E. F. Penrose show very clearly why these hopes were always lacking in reality and have carefully traced the course of their disappointment, both to the British and the Iraqis. Their work is divided into five parts of roughly equal length, and a final rather shorter section summarising their political and economic conclusions. Part One discusses the European rivalries which determined the establishment of the state and provides a short and sensible account of the underlying political attitudes of British and Iraqis, but not very much about the political events of the period before 1932. It also contains a clear account of the complexities of the transformation of the Turkish Petroleum Company into the Iraqi Petroleum Company. Part Two deals with the years of the monarchy and gives a cool and critical account of the 'Anglo-Iraqi War' of 1941. Part Three describes the 14th July Revolution and the Qasim period. Part Four covers the political events after Qasim's overthrow, and Part Five, the longest of the six parts, discusses economic policies after 1963. There is a slip of the pen on page 97 which needs correction in the next edition. Malcolm MacDonald was not the High Commissioner for Palestine in 1939; he was Colonial Secretary.

One of the many strengths of the book is the important place it gives to economic change: another is its cool and sensible judgments on individuals, such as Nuri Sa'id (pp. 123–24) or Qasim (pp. 288–92). Even Rashid Ali Gaylani is accorded the benefit of a valid comment on the failure of the British in 1941 'to place themselves in the position of Iraqi ministers' (p. 103). In their summing-up the authors admit that the enormous oil revenues have permitted a substantial increase in the standard of living 'especially, but not exclusively, in the cities'. But their main conclusion is pessimistic:

> for some years Iraq has been, and as we write these closing lines remains, in a state of arrested political development. Politics, in the constructive sense of free public debate and popular participation, is non-existent while the exercise of political power in government is autocratic, and has become increasingly ruthless, depending on the

> army, lacking the legitimacy either of tradition or of popular endorsement (p. 544).

While no one could dispute the facts here stated, this judgment perhaps accepts too easily the European assumption that the nation state, governed through some form of popular representation, is the ultimate stage of human political development, or at least that it is a necessary stage, and one which is already within the reach of a society like that of Iraq. It could be argued that the experience of Abdur Rahman Bazzaz in 1966, disappointing and tragic as it was, merely indicates that the popular support which Bazzaz enjoyed has not yet found a means of expression which will enable it to balance the control of the army by a group of officers. If the aims of these officers are as negative and destructive as the authors suggest, they will eventually destroy themselves. But it is not impossible to believe that the autocratic rule is itself a necessary stage in the evolution of politics in the Arab world, for this will not necessarily follow the same course as it has taken in Europe.

JOHN C. B. RICHMOND

Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq. By Rony Gabbay. *London: Croom Helm. 1978. 240 pp. £8·50.*

THIS study is concerned above all with the period from 1934, when the Iraqi Communist Party was set up, to February 1963 when the regime of General Qasim was overthrown in a bloody coup. The years from 1963 to the present are briefly referred to in an epilogue at the end of the volume. Faithful to his title, the author analyses the evolution of the Iraqi Communist Party, the progress of land reform and the role of the ICP within that reform. Whereas others have examined the growth of the ICP to some effect and Rony Gabbay has no significantly new analysis to offer in this area, on the matter of agrarian reform his study has original insights and evidence which should be prescribed reading for all concerned with agricultural development in Iraq. The third, and in a way central, element of this study is an assessment of the agrarian policies of the Iraqi Communist Party, containing a further new contribution to knowledge, especially for the years 1958–63 in Part Two of the volume.

A recurring theme is the stress under which the ICP operated for all but a few years of its existence. Rony Gabbay emphasises at every stage the degree of persecution of the party, the terrorising of individual party members and the paranoically clandestine nature of their activities. His theme, and ultimately his prime conclusion, is that the Communist Party in Iraq did not settle down to the task of producing a coherent policy for agriculture and agrarian reform since it was always overtaken by the need to preserve itself against persistent persecution and frequent attempts by its opponents to eradicate it entirely.

Yet the problems of survival did not prevent the ICP from elaborating programmes for industrial reform and for radical transformation of the oil sector, and in the light of this it is hard to sustain the argument, which the author tries to do, that the ICP genuinely wished to invest time and resources in formulating a new agricultural programme for the country. As Rony Gabbay acknowledges, the ICP tacitly recognised that its partners

in government in the period 1958 to late 1960 would never permit its close approach to the centres of power and that the party would therefore have to accept responsibility for the difficult and unimportant sectors of which agriculture was an outstanding example. Perhaps the lesson to be learned from this study is that the ICP was forced reluctantly into devising an agrarian policy while awaiting an opportunity to implement those programmes for urban areas, and for industry in particular, which were far closer to its ideological heart.

This examination of politics and agrarian policies in Iraq is in many ways provocative and is refreshingly original in its use of evidence and argument. It should be strongly recommended to all students of Iraq.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London KEITH McLACHLAN

Oil and Regional Development: Examples from Algeria and Tunisia. By Konrad Schliephake. Trans. by Merrill D. Lyew. *New York: Praeger, 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 203 pp. £12·20.*

THE research for this book was carried out while the author worked for the German Institute for African Studies, Hamburg, and the work was initially published in German in 1975. The study is based on detailed field research and facilities afforded by oil enterprises such as SONATRACH and the relevant ministries of Algeria and Tunisia. The method of approach to the subject is part-theoretical and part-regional, dealing both with micro- and macro-economics.

Schliephake takes as his starting point the theoretical work of the development school, such as Gunnar Myrdal's 'model of a cumulative causation chain' (pp. 3–4), and Myrdal's conclusion that balanced economic growth within an LDC (Less-Developed Country) is extremely difficult to achieve.[1] The main reason for this view, which tends to be borne out by Schliephake's work, (see pp. 31, 193–94), is that when economic development occurs in an LDC it is in effect a 'growth pole with spread effects.' Putting it in a different way, the polarisation factors within an LDC are stronger than the 'spread' factors up to and including central planning. In order to counteract the polarisation influences, the government of an LDC must use 'regionalisation of planning' as a fundamental principle of 'realistic and integrated development planning' (p. 4). In the case of the 'oil industry', a term which is best discarded in favour of the 'hydrocarbons industry' since natural gas and oil production, transport and processing are also involved, these polarisation factors are particularly strong because of the heavy concentration of investment (and to a lesser degree of personnel) required.

Schliephake's work brings out the rise in the importance of oil in world energy supplies from the 1960s to the 1970s: between 1960 and 1973 oil doubled to a level where it supplied 57 per cent of world energy, whereas coal fell to a level of 19 per cent. The rise in oil prices, particularly in 1973–74, had an important influence on planning possibilities within the two states considered in this study. Tunisia's four-year plan, 1973–76, for example, had assumed an inflow of foreign currency from the oil industry

[1] *Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions* (London: Duckworth, 1957). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1958, p. 361.

of 17·2 per cent; in the event, the inflow was 29·3 per cent (p. 26). Apart from increased financial gain, the requirement now is for the oil states to capitalise on their increased influence with foreign oil investors to ensure that other areas of oil technology, which can spearhead economic growth, such as crude oil processing, are carried out within, and not without, the oil-bearing states (p. 31). As Schliephake concludes, states such as Algeria and Tunisia would be well advised to use more natural gas for internal energy needs and sell the more easily transportable and higher-priced oil abroad. The stage has been set for effective and profitable developed country-LDC co-operation in industry in North Africa, and, given some degree of recovery of the international economy, Algeria and Tunisia will have a chance to feed capital into both agricultural and industrial growth. Schliephake's work is a useful contribution to knowledge of the hydrocarbons industry and to development studies generally.

M. J. GRIEVE

AFRICA

Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change. By Ali A. Mazrui. *London: Heinemann; Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1978. 310 pp. £8·50.*

The Foreign Policies of African States. Edited by Olajide Aluko. *London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1977. 243 pp. Pb: £4·50.*

A DIFFERENCE in approach is indicated in the very titles of these two books: in the one case, an analysis country by country and in the other, a synoptic view of the continent of Africa and its place in the world.

The themes of Ali Mazrui's book are mainly those already explored in his previous writings; racial identities; the eclectic assimilation of exogenous cultures and the possible resilience of traditional values; the strategy and tactics of non-alignment; the importance of resources, both spiritual and material. These themes are re-examined and re-focused as he moves from the particular to the general and from one realm of discourse to another, but always with this question in mind: what will be the contribution of Africans, and of Black Africans in particular, to the future of the human race? Aspirations and achievements are weighed in the balance. Opportunities and limitations are compared. Alliances and dependencies are evaluated, notably the interdependence of Blacks throughout the world and the interconnections between Black Africa, Arab Africa and Islamic Africa. The picture that Ali Mazrui paints is essentially allusive; the outlines are often sketched in without much detail: countries are personified (Gandhi and Nehru represent Asia, de Gaulle, France). It is rich in striking juxtapositions. Africa is said to be a market place for Japanese goods and Chinese ideas (p. 127). Shared profits in the Western world and a shared Prophet in the Moslem world are said to be persuasive factors in Arab economic behaviour (p. 151). The West's scientific ecological curiosity is contrasted with Africa's moral ecological concern (p. 262). Like Senghor, Ali Mazrui thinks in terms of intercontinental and inter-racial enrichment, with the emphasis, in Mazrui's case, on the role to be played by the Moslems of Black Africa, even if the momentum, for the moment, is still in the direction of a Euro-centric world culture.

The perspective of Olajide Aluko's book is quite different. It presents in seriatim the foreign policies of Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zaire. In an introductory chapter, the editor enumerates 'the determinants' of African foreign policy, with the emphasis on the nature of the economy, the colonial heritage, the ideology of ruling elites, domestic pressures, geography, the struggle in Southern Africa and super-power rivalries. The choice of countries is not explained; they are presented in strict alphabetical order and none of the 'determining factors' can be said to be highlighted by any particular country. One might, for instance, have included Lesotho and Botswana in order to analyse the importance of geography; or Somalia as well as Ethiopia and Kenya to illustrate the appeal that is made to conflicting principles, that of self-determination and that of historic frontiers. There is considerable diversity in the nature and value of the contributions. A bare four and a half pages are devoted to Egypt, 25 pages and 206 footnotes to Nigeria. An article first published in 1964 and barely revised has to do for Kenya. That on Ivory Coast reproduces the official ideology, that on Zambia is fashionably critical.

It would be invidious to compare two books so different in conception and structure. The many admirers of Ali Mazrui's fertile imagination will not fail to re-read him with renewed pleasure and stimulation. Those seeking guidance on the foreign policies of particular African states will be partially satisfied by Dr. Aluko's compilation.

London School of Economics S. K. PANTER-BRICK

The Black Homelands of South Africa: The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu. By Jeffrey Butler, Robert I. Rotberg and John Adams. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1977. 250 pp. (Perspectives on Southern Africa 21) £9·35.*

THIS is the latest offering in a distinguished series. All the more disappointing therefore that it is very much a work which has been sadly overtaken by events in what is, after all, a fast changing situation. The original study was completed late in 1973 for a seminar at the United States Department of State. Revision, expansion, updating and publication took four years, a quite unconscionable time given the swift moving events of Southern Africa. The preface (usually the last section to be written) is dated April 1976, with the result that the 'independence' of the Transkei only makes the flyleaf of the dust jacket, whilst the 'independence' of Bophuthatswana, one of the two main study areas, is, according to the book, only a twinkle in the eye of Lucas Mangope, whereas in fact it more or less coincided with the publication of the book late in 1977.

Tardiness of publication is a serious matter as the book does not set out to be a 'contemporary history' but rather 'a dispassionate, detailed critique of a policy which is central to any evaluation of modern South Africa'. Throughout it discusses the problems of some years ago as though they were on-going. Some remain as problems but others have been resolved or are so modified as to render the discussion quite out of date. The focus changes, even the homelands themselves change, as a

glance at a recent map placed alongside Map 1 in the book will immediately show.

The study is concentrated on two 'homelands', Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu, on the apparent grounds that the Transkei had already been studied by Gwendoline Carter and others in *South Africa's Transkei: the politics of domestic colonialism* [1] and that these were the two other largest homelands. Nevertheless the opening chapters give a detailed, accurate and very useful résumé of the evolution of the 'homelands' policy, including the complex 'legislative framework of separatism'.

Leadership in the 'homelands' is effectively handled to bring out the contrasts between Mangope and Buthelezi and to underline and explain the sheer difficulty of their positions as political leaders. But here one immediately runs into the 'time elapsed' problem, because over the last two years Buthelezi, in particular, has tried significantly to broaden his role, not always successfully. His part in the Natal strikes receives little attention and of course the whole work is pre-Soweto.

Economic development of the 'homelands' is looked at closely. Agriculture and industry are given full attention with a clear sensible analysis. In contrast, mining is given scant attention. This is a little strange in the case of Bophuthatswana where mining is likely to play a central role in the economy and sets that 'homeland' apart from virtually all the others. The extremely important territorial question is also passed over very briefly, perhaps because the team lacked a geographer.

The 'homelands' could become a nucleus of some power-sharing arrangement, or the core of some form of partition, and as such they may constitute 'a way station . . . on the road to a restructuring of South Africa'. It is a pity that the train has already left the station described far in the distance.

University of Sussex IEUAN L. GRIFFITHS

Southwest Africa/Namibia: Facts, attitudes, assessment, and prospects. By Gerhard Tötemeyer. *Randburg: Fokus Suid. 1977 (Distrib. in UK by Rex Collings, London.) 321 pp. £9·50.*

THIS book has an interesting background. Its author was expelled from South Africa's ruling Nationalist Party in 1976 because he argued from his research that no permanent political settlement was possible without the participation of the South West Africa People's Organisation. In view of the South African government's persistent and partly successful campaign to discredit SWAPO internationally, it is understandable that his academic work showing SWAPO's strength in Owambo, politically half of the country, was found embarrassing.

However, if this leads the reader to expect an exciting book with candid revelations of arguments within South Africa's ruling circles, he will be disappointed. What will surprise him is that the author was ever a member of the Nationalist Party, since his views seem impeccably liberal, though he is cautious and conservative in expressing them. This is a pity. One is left with the impression that most of this book could have been written by a diligent researcher without Dr. Tötemeyer's background as the son of a Lutheran missionary, or his understanding of Namibian politics.

[1] Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1967.

The book is not well constructed. It is divided into three unequal parts The first, facts, contains a brief description of the country, its resource and administration and a dry summary of the dispute over the territor between South Africa and the United Nations. More useful is the secon and largest part, over half of the book, which examines attitudes. Thi contains a lengthy guide to Namibia's numerous political parties an factions. There are extensive quotations of party programmes and proposals. This section also contains short but interesting contributions o the political situation from both black and white political leaders an from churchmen. However, the absence of an index, a poor bibliography and some inadequate referencing slightly detracts from the book's usefulness as a work of reference.

The final part is a reasonably judicious and still very relevant assessment of the prospects for Namibia. Dr. Tötemeyer discusses the international context of the conflict, but not in much depth. The stress h lays on the local roots of the conflict is a useful corrective to a tendenc in the West at present to overplay foreign involvement. On the othe hand, one feels that a fuller account of the international context woul justify a bleaker picture of future prospects than the author gives.

Few will disagree with his conclusion that 'ultimately, peace for Sout West Africa will depend very much on the willingness of the Whites t share in a new, binding nationalism—one which is not based on racia prejudices and the safeguarding of White political and economic privilege enjoyed until now' (p. 312). Even without the factor of foreign intervention, the prospect for such a transition seems remote.

Queen's University of Belfast A. B. GUELKE

The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970. By John J. Stremlau. *Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1977. 425 pp. £19·80. Pb: £7·80.*

THE Nigerian civil war was, as Dr. Stremlau entitles his concluding chapter, 'a Nigerian affair', in that each side sought to isolate the othe internationally. The federal government endeavoured to contain Biafra's appeal for international support and in this it was largely successful, thanks to an early demonstration of military superiority. Biafra, for its part, tried to undermine the support which the federal government enjoyed abroad, notably by accusations of genocide, but in this it had only limited success. True, there was, throughout the three years, almost continuous diplomatic activity and endless public debate, but none of it transformed the nature of the conflict. The military situation was always in the federal government's favour, once Biafra's thrust into the Mid-West had collapsed and Port Harcourt was lost. The hope placed on French arms arriving via Ivory Coast and Gabon, two of the African states to recognise Biafra, was illusory. As Dr. Stremlau states, it was 'belated and half-hearted' and seemed to many Biafrans 'cynically capricious' (p. 224). Similarly, the negotiating stance of the two sides remained irreconcilable, despite all the efforts of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), of Arnold Smith and of Haile Selassie to induce a negotiated settlement.

Dr. Stremlau contends that 'during the final two years of the conflict secession was not the real issue dividing the two sides'; for 'some form

of Biafran surrender was inevitable' (p. 142). That is, the argument was necessarily about some form of 'One Nigeria', a term that became a cliché 'sufficiently ambiguous' to be 'without prejudice to future constitutional arrangements'. But it would be a mistake to think that this made negotiations any easier. Ojukwu and Gowon had quite irreconcilable views on what could constitute 'One Nigeria', and the renunciation of secession on his own terms would not have been for Ojukwu a surrender but a vindication of his struggle. That is certainly how the two viewed the matter and no amount of outside influence could bridge the gap. Ojukwu had already rejected, before the outbreak of war, the quite favourable terms of Decree No. 8. Thereafter Gowon, having created the twelve states and established a commanding military superiority, had the bit between his teeth. There was no stopping him, for neither the OAU consultative committee nor any outside power was willing to deter him from achieving victory on his own terms. Indeed, as Dr. Stremlau rightly remarks, most African governments were impatient at the slow progress made by the federal forces. They 'sought clear evidence of Nigeria's determination to crush the secession quickly, preferably with a minimum of non-African involvement' (p. 255). And, adds Dr. Stremlau, there is 'no evidence to suggest that Lagos ever delayed a major military offensive in deference to foreign policy concerns' (p. 256). The military were delayed by rains, by logistical problems and by the loss of impetus once the 2nd Division moved from liberating the minority areas of the Eastern Region to trying to penetrate Ibo territory.

The general picture that Dr. Stremlau paints is, in most respects, already well known and widely accepted. Its value lies in the detailed corroboration that he provides from a wealth of sources to which he has been privileged to have access. These include official records of the OAU's abortive attempts to bring the two sides together and the briefs which each side prepared for every new round of diplomacy. A lot of other fascinating information comes from interviews with many of those involved in the conflict at the highest level, including both Ojukwu and Gowon. Particularly valuable is the informed analysis these provided of Biafra's tactics. The will to resist was first projected by stressing the fears of genocide and then, when this threat proved 'no longer credible and simply not true' (Biafra's director of propaganda p. 328), by stressing Biafra's ability to survive through self-reliance. It was an attempt to show that Biafra was something more than the helpless ward of international philanthropy, that it was still a force to be reckoned with.

Equally well informed is Dr. Stremlau's discussion of the dilemmas which faced those who supplied relief on humanitarian grounds but found themselves providing cover for arms supplies—because Ojukwu refused all but night flights. Their action undoubtedly prolonged the war and the suffering. Whether it contributed to the federal government's decision to practice a policy of reconciliation is debatable.

Dr. Stremlau begins and ends his book with a review of Nigeria's foreign policy. Again he has had the benefit of access to official records—of meetings of the Nigerian diplomatic corps, first in 1966 and again in June 1969. It is a most informative book, reasonably well indexed, and an essential work of reference for all interested in African international politics.

London School of Economics S. K. PANTER-BRICK

Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria. Edited by Keith Panter-Brick. *London: Cass. 1978. 375 pp. (Studies in Commonwealth Politics and History 5.) £11·00.*

Politics of the Sword: A Personal Memoir on Military Involvement in Ghana and of Problems of Military Government. By A. K. Ocran. *London: Rex Collings. 1978. 167 pp. £5·00: Pb: £2·25.*

IN many ways the cases of Nigeria and Ghana seem the two most interesting examples of military rule in Africa. This is partly because they are much better documented than others, a fact which is to a considerable degree attributable to the accessibility not only of information but of personalities to academic and other observers from outside. Exceptionally also, two of the participants in the original Ghana coup in 1966 have between them now written three books about their motives and experiences then. *Politics of the Sword* is Lieutenant General A. K. Ocran's second contribution to the literature on the subject: his first, *A Myth is Broken* [1] was a slim paperback account of the coup itself published ten years ago. He now provides an opportunity, albeit somewhat limited, to assess a participant's perception of the procedures and performance of a military government in office.

With typical efficiency, Keith Panter-Brick has not only managed to assemble an unusually strong team of contributors but, in a period of much less than three years from conception to publication, elicited from them what are in several cases significant additions to the study of civil-military relations generally. Their expertise on the subject of Nigeria is, however, all-pervasive and may for the less expert reader tend at times to obscure the wider validity of the conclusions drawn, which seems indeed not always to have been fully recognised by the authors themselves.

Martin Dent's attempt to see why 'Corrective Military Government is a distinct category' (p. 102) appears in this light, even though it leads him directly to the view that 'the NLC (in Ghana) should have adopted a more corrective approach rather than that of a military caretaker' (p. 103). This, incidentally, is a conclusion which in some ways General Ocran might be expected, in the light of direct personal experience, to share, but his emphasis is essentially on the need for the military to find means of restoring confidence in politicians. Even in Nigeria, as Martin Dent convincingly shows, the corrective aspect only became effectively dominant after the deposition of Yakubu Gowon.

Henry Bienen with Martin Fitton raises an even more fundamental question—the prominent role of civil servants in military regimes and the consequent false dichotomy which has been stoutly maintained between military and civilian rulers. The reliance of the soldiers on civil servants to administer has led to senior civil servants assimilating to themselves something of the role of the political ministers they earlier served.

A Nigerian trade union leader asked privately, after ten years, to sum up the achievement of military rule, replied succinctly: 'Power to the Civil Service'. Even though this particular enquiry is based on limited evidence from the Western Region/State in the period 1966–71, it almost inevitably ends by suggesting that military rule itself is a term which

[1] Harlow: Longmans, 1968.

needs re-defining. The essential criteria are: 'What kinds of decisions are made, by which groups and through which processes?' (p. 503).

It is not only in matters largely of academic analysis that this book offers original lines of thought. Somewhat ominously for the proclaimed return to civilian rule, Ian Campbell raises the contentious and unresolved issue of Nigerian army reorganisation which, if left to the incoming civilian government after 1979, could readily prove a political time bomb with a very short fuse. It is at points like these that one wishes that this well-equipped group of authors had taken it upon themselves to question whether a direct return to civilian rule can really work in the context of Nigeria: it is unfortunate but likely that in a few years time serious students will look back and say that a gradual civilianisation from an early stage would have been more likely to achieve a stable outcome. To suggest that there must be doubts about the competence of politicians to supervise the reorganisation of the armed forces (p. 95), touches the question at its sorest point.

Almost every chapter in *Soldiers and Oil*, whether it deals with constitutional reform or political economy, provides new insights into the performance and potential of military regimes. The fact that their conclusions are on the whole more positive than those of General Ocran is not entirely a reflection of the differences between Ghana and Nigeria. It is also an indication of the uncertainty which military men seem to feel about their own role in society: how far this is the result of a professional training which makes its products unsympathetic to the political reality of having to make choices between imperfect alternatives is a question on which both these books obliquely offer some valuable hints.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

Ethnic Minority Problems in Nigerian Politics: 1960–1965. By Ugbana Okpu. *Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell for Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. 1977. 189 pp. (Studia Historica Upsaliensis 88.) Pb: Sw. kr. 57·00.*

THIS book gives a clear account of the relationship between the agitation for new regions or states on the part of the smaller political parties in Nigeria, and the changing pattern of alliances and cleavages among the three parties representing the ethnic majorities in each region at the time of independence. The author shows that the smaller parties, led mostly by men who claimed to represent ethnic minorities, were by no means merely the political pawns of the three big parties: the politics was rather that of mutual manipulation.

In important respects, however, the book is disappointing. First, it provides us with no real theoretical insights and yet abounds with quasi-scientific symbols, definitions, diagrams with arrows, etc. These sections of the book are largely redundant, facile and irritating.

Second, Okpu claims to analyse the origin and nature of ethnic minority problems from the point of view of the minorities themselves (pp. 5–6); yet he does no such thing. Instead of examining the factors influencing the politicisation of ethnicity in plural societies which comprise unending and shifting hierarchies of 'minorities within minorities', the author merely asserts that ethnic minorities are politically self-conscious, stable and objectively definable groups (see pp. 10–14). Instead of interviewing

members of minority groups or even the political activists who claim to represent them, he relies solely on published party and governmental documents, as well as secondary sources. Instead of examining the relationship between the proclaimed goals of the political activists and the attitudes and goals of the masses, Okpu chooses to assume that 'the objective of the mass action and that of their party have always been identical' (p. 67); only the strategies or actions of the two may differ. Finally, rather than actually examining the relationship between ethnic minority problems and political instability, as he claims to do (p. 6), Okpu merely assumes as his theoretical premise that all major instances of political instability in Nigerian in this period arose fundamentally from one '(I)ncompatibility', i.e. the 'desire of ethnic minority groups to have their own states, and refusal of major political parties to create new states' (p. 9). In building everything around this one aspect of Nigerian politics, Okpu repeatedly overstates his case, most clearly in his assertion that the 1962 Western Region crisis arose because 'the basic issue which was tearing the (A.G.) party apart was whether it should be a strictly regional party protecting only Yoruba interests, or whether it should be a national party fulfilling the "yearnings" of ethnic minority groups' (pp. 93–4).

Despite these faults, the book does have utility in providing a historical background to the more recent and continuing agitation for new states in Nigeria.

University of Birmingham DAVID BROWN

ASIA

The Expansive Elite: District Politics and State Policy-Making in India. By Donald B. Rosenthal. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1978. 348 pp. £11·75.*

ALONE among state Chief Ministers removed to greater or lesser glory in the Indian central government, Y. B. Chavan succeeded in maintaining his state power base in Maharashtra. His uniquely dominant agricultural caste, the Marathas, number about 40 per cent of Maharashtra's population. Y. B. Chavan is their 'symbol of political achievement. As Defence Minister he boosted the Maratha self image, by the way he represented them as a martial people in the national cabinet, an image derived from Sivaji' (p. 34).

Y. B. Chavan's success in maintaining his state power base is usually attributed to his skill in managing factionalism, at every level, within the Congress Party. Donald B. Rosenthal says he did this by 'manipulating the extension of opportunities to ambitious men, through the interlocking institutions which integrated the political demands of village, taluka and district elites, with the ambitions of state and even national leaders' (p. 50). This process started during the Nehru era with public investment in the rural infrastructure and development work. Then the 'expansive elite' of country gentry and wealthier peasant farmers (mainly members of an expansive caste the Marathas) belonging to the Congress Party, were given the possibility of augmenting their wealth and power in the new institutions of rural local government. They were thus able to contend successfully with bureaucrats and influence and work with state party leaders.

The rural electorate was tied to Congress by a complex system of patron-client relationships, which Donald B. Rosenthal shows operating through the three public sectors of education, rural co-operation and Panchayat Raj. In the education sector politicians influence teacher recruitment and postings and the placing of contracts for the supply of services to schools. Fertilisers and other subsidised products are distributed through co-operatives some of which act as marketing and processing agencies. Most important are the politicians in co-operative bodies who decide which applicants shall receive loans. Through Panchayat Raj politicians decide which villages get electricity first, where health centres, schools and roads are to be built and where investments in community development are to be placed.

There is always a danger that district leaders of the co-operatives and Panchayat Raj may use their positions to challenge state leaders of the Congress Party, as Donald B. Rosenthal shows in his case studies of Kolapur and Poona districts. He says 'that somewhat greater diversity of caste backgrounds in Kolhapur and the differences in political socialisation experienced under the princely regime and in independent India may account for a slightly greater degree of conflict over ideology than among Poona politicians' (p. 321).

This book is a probing analysis of chosen aspects of the Maharashtrian political system. (Its only fault is that it contains material for more than one book and is too condensed.) He concludes that 'the use of public policy sectors proved a relatively ineffective instrument for inducing fundamental social change' (p. 323), and that 'the political system failed to play an effective role in substantially increasing national productivity and in redistributing the resources which had accrued to the few sectors of the economy that had prospered' (p. 323). Despite Congress rhetoric, one may doubt whether fundamental rural change was the aim of any Congress policy. During the Emergency and since the Janata Party came to power at the centre, the government has interfered little in the administration of the state services in Maharashtra. The power balance between the ruling elite and the rest of the rural population has remained unchanged.

Whether Y. B. Chavan can regain the ground in Maharashtra captured by the Janata Party and Congress (I) at this year's Legislative Assembly elections remains to be seen. Unlike Jagjivan Ram, Y. B. Chavan has not always been on the winning side and his control of Maharashtra may not only have been weakened, but be ending.

School of African and Oriental Studies, London HUGH GRAY

The Politics of Bhutan. By Leo E. Rose. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1977. 237 pp. £14·65.*

BHUTAN has been the subject of several monographs, but most lean heavily on the same few accounts by foreign observers, accounts which are themselves quite readily available—for example in the 1865 Calcutta edition which includes those by Pemberton, Bose and Eden. Professor Rose covers this ground again (leaving out most of the social and economic descriptions) but only in about a third of his book—an admirably concise and critical distillation. His most interesting innovation is his insistence on Bhutan's

political and religious independence from Tibet; and he shows how the 'state' of Bhutan is a creation of this century, implying a need seriously to question (as no other writers have) the foreign concepts of sovereignty and territoriality imposed on the area by the British. Readers mainly interested in the historical aspects will need to consult the works cited by Rose, or others he apparently has not seen.[1] The strength of Rose's work lies in the extent to which it is convincingly written from the Bhutanese point of view.

Rose goes on to describe in two finely-written and balanced chapters the reluctant weakening of Bhutan's isolation and the character of its political system. He is not blinkered by Western conceptions, and recognises the genuinely political character of Bhutan's 'elitist factionalism' (p. 115). Two further chapters on political institutions and administration are more prosaic though equally important: the book as a whole is invaluable as a record of Bhutan at an important stage of its development, by another foreign observer, one far more sympathetic, tactful and ready to learn than his nineteenth-century predecessors. The book also has lessons for the political scientists. Rose repeatedly demonstrates how Bhutan does not fit the usual models, contradicting ideas of elite conflict, for example, and showing Bhutan as a country experiencing what might be called marginal modernisation. The administration has widened the range of functions it performs for the people, but the people do not seem yet to have widened their expectations of the administration. Rose is too modest to suggest it, but his book invites rethinking of many generalisations about the politics of developing countries.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London PETER ROBB

China's Future: Foreign Policy and Economic Development in the Post-Mao Era. By Allan S. Whiting and Robert F. Dernberger. *New York: McGraw-Hill for the 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations. 1978. 212 pp. £6·70. Pb: £4·45.*

THE Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations acted wisely when they decided to add to their ambitious list of studies on 'functional problems', issued within the framework of their 1980s Project, a special volume on the People's Republic of China. So far, this is their only country study, though it is to be followed by one on the Soviet Union.

China's Future consists of two essays on the People's Republic of China's options in the 1980s in the spheres of foreign policy and domestic economic development. They were written respectively by Allen Whiting and Robert Dernberger, two prominent members of the American community of China-watchers and both associates of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan. Those who remember Allen Whiting as he observed anxiously, yet analysed with a cool head, the aberrations of the Cultural Revolution from his office in Garden Road on Victoria Island, will be right in reading his political assessment of the future with care and attention. Robert Dernberger's past writings on China's economy equally

[1] For example, Shantiswarup Gupta, *British Relations with Bhutan* (Jaipur: 1974), or Arabinda Deb, *Bhutan and India* (Calcutta: 1976).

qualify him to ponder over the fifteen years that lie ahead. Both authors know where to draw the line between projection and speculation. Allen Whiting sees ideology as the 'basic reference point from which the Chinese understand world affairs, set policy goals, and define the legitimate means of pursuing these goals' (p. 38). Yet, the major unresolved issue of Taiwan notwithstanding, the author expects practical considerations to dominate China's future political behaviour. Nevertheless, its claims to have unhindered access to its continental shelf as well as to the off-shore islands in the North, East and South China Seas could well lead to tension, if not to conflict, with other claimants to these largely uncharted areas suspected of containing hydrocarbons and minerals.

As in the sphere of foreign policy, so in matters of domestic economics, China's future cannot be projected with any degree of certainty on the strength of past records. These in any case vacillated between periods of consolidation and advance and of major crises. Professor Dernberger is well aware of the possibility of ideological differences within the present leadership erupting at any time. Indeed, the student of Chinese affairs is bound to detect, from time to time, certain differences in tone, if not of substance, between statements made by Chairman Hua and Vice-Premier Teng respectively. Professor Dernberger rightly sees the chief obstacle, and thus one of the areas of potential dispute, in the limitations imposed on the economy by the farm sector. He thinks that 'the single most important determinant of China's economic future over the next 15 years will be the ability to increase agricultural production by more than 2 per cent annually' (p. 126). By contrast, Chairman Hua aims at an annual growth rate of 5 per cent—an ambition which will almost certainly remain unfulfilled. Elsewhere in the economy the needs of defence, transport and chemical sectors are bound to compete for limited domestic investment funds and foreign exchange reserves.

All in all, the authors of this volume are far from optimistic in their assessment of China's future. Within and without the Middle Kingdom, their sober judgment deserves to be taken seriously.

St. Antony's College, Oxford W. KLATT

Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China. By Peter R. Moody. *Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 1977. 342 pp. $14.95.*

As Peter Moody correctly suggests, a study of opposition and dissent in the People's Republic of China has long been overdue. Certainly, developments both in China and on the international scene during the last couple of years have conspired to make this book extremely topical. The Tien An Men Incident of April 1976 when there was a large unofficial demonstration in the centre of Peking, the events following Mao Tse-tung's death, and the regime's emphasis on public security and public order in China since 1976, have all directed the attention of the outside observer to the patterns and resolution of conflict within that country. More generally, the concept of 'dissent' has once again become academically fashionable as a result of President Carter's stated preoccupation with issues of 'human rights'.

However, the topicality of Professor Moody's study should not blind the reader to its real worth. China has not suddenly ceased to be a conflictless, oppositionless state. It is our perceptions of China—or rather the prevailing

orthodoxy—that has changed. As the author demonstrates in an interesi and challenging way, neither the difficulties of studying opposition in Ch nor the refusal of certain active politicians (whether of the regime it or their major protagonists) to admit to a conflict model of Chinese poli since 1949 necessarily implies its absence. On the contrary, Moody arg that to ignore the interpretative uses of the conflict model is to provid necessarily unbalanced picture of Chinese politics. By the same toke conflict model of Chinese politics does not provide a total explanati but is a necessary perspective for the study of opposition since 1949.

The core of this work is four sections describing Chinese attitudes opposition, the handling of opposition, oppositional interests and finally, more specifically, oppositional movements. Each of these sections is w researched, full of fascinating detail and examples, which are placed i historical perspective stretching back well before the establishment of People's Republic and not just concentrating on the last ten years or For the student of contemporary China, the chapters on oppositio interests and opposition movements are the most intriguing. The vari social groups amongst both the rulers and the ruled, which are conside as potential sources of opposition, include the peasantry, workers, educa youth, the intelligentsia, the bureaucracy and the military. The tra formation of these potential oppositional interests into opposition is tl described in a chronological account of the four major opposition mo ments identified by Moody: namely, the liberal opposition of the Hund Flowers in 1957, the Marxian Confucian opposition of the years before Cultural Revolution, the radical opposition of the Cultural Revolut and the most recent Rational Modernist opposition which is in effect up-dated version of the Marxian Confucian tendency. The book clc with an interesting chapter about opposition in Taiwan.

The difficulties of studying opposition in China are legion and obvic 'Opposition' is by and large a dirty word to the regime, and access strictly limited. The result is that a study of opposition (and indeed Chin politics in general), even when seen from the under-side as in the auth discussion of social groups and opposition movements, tends to focus on rulers rather than the ruled. Within these limits, Professor Moody provided useful insights into Chinese politics and laid a solid foundat for further research.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne DAVID S. G. GOODMA

China's Economy: A Basic Guide. By Christopher Howe. *London: El 1978. 248 pp. £7·50.*

CONSIDERING the expense of a trip to China, it is amazing to see with h poor a briefing most visitors go and with how little factual informat they return. This applies in particular to those trying to gain a glim of the economic and social aspects of present-day life in the Peop Republic of China. Not that there is any shortage of literature on subject—but unhappily much of it is so one-sided that it tends only confirm the reader in his prejudices or to irritate him. Rarely does t kind of writing provide a balance between the hardships suffered and successes achieved by the Chinese people during the last three deca Neither does it give an inkling of the enormous tasks which lie ahead.

In producing this guide to China's economy, Christopher Howe has rendered a considerable service to the growing number of people curious about this country—still the most closed of modern societies. His volume fills a void which has been gaping—at least in Britain—since T. J. Hughes and D. E. T. Luard published nearly twenty years ago their account of *The Economic Development of Communist China 1949–1958*.[1] Prudently, Dr. Howe disposes of the historical aspects of his story in an introduction, sufficiently long to give the necessary background, yet brief enough to whet the reader's appetite for the main dish which is varied and palatable. Many a social scientist could benefit from Christopher Howe's crisp style and easy presentation, free from practically all jargon, and thus a real pleasure for anybody who has laboured through vast tomes of professional 'coding' open only to the cipher clerks among students of Chinese affairs.

In six chapters, amply annotated by notes and appendices, the author deals with all—or almost all—aspects of China's economic and social affairs, such as population and labour, organisation and planning, agriculture and industry, foreign trade, incomes, prices and living standards. In some of these areas the author is able to draw on his own previous research. Elsewhere he relies, understandably, on the large volume of information and analysis produced by the best of a growing community of China-watchers. Most of them have gained and improved their skills at some of America's distinguished universities, in the U.S. government departments concerned and in their many outposts throughout the world. The author is aware of the arguments which exist within the community of specialists, and he clearly states whose side he takes on issues where disagreements have not yet been resolved. He rightly relies a great deal on Robert Michael Field, perhaps the most experienced of America's official specialists in this sphere.

Even so, the discerning reader might have liked to find a little more about some of the counter-arguments put forward in America and elsewhere. This might have solved some puzzles that still remain. For example, since Dr. Howe accepts that China's population has passed the 900 million mark and he allows about one fifth of the total for urban dwellers, he is in fact saying—by implication—that in the last quarter of a century the rural working population has increased by 100 million people. Even allowing, say, 5 per cent for employment in new rural industries (p. 129) and a similar number in extended multi-cropping, this leaves an enormous amount of rural surplus labour in a country which claims to have no unemployment. Where are these people and what are they doing?

The acceptance of other scholars' findings has on occasion led the author to conclusions which he might have explored a little further. Thus, where he bases his assessment of the farming performance on the conventional view of the effects of irrigation water and nitrogen fertiliser, he tends to ignore the lack of potash and phosphates in the plant nutrient balance. As he rightly observes, 'a growing rural workforce continues to press on a limited area of cultivable land' (p. 21). In spite of a high rate of multi-cropping, diminishing returns are a real possibility. As to the intake of grain from domestic and foreign sources, this is at least 400 calories less than the 'supply' of grain per head per day, given at 2,287 calories in 1974 (p. 171). The difference is accounted for by waste, seed and feed,

[1] London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA. 1959. (2nd rev. edn. 1961.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1960, p. 548.

of which only a fraction enters the human stomach in the form of animal produce.

The author is right in stressing the highly volatile nature of China's foreign trade, dependent as it is on the uncertain availability of farm products on both sides of the trading accounts. In industry, perhaps some more weight might have been given to the inferior quality and heavy wastage in the case of such highly hydroscopic products as fertilisers and cement, where these are manufactured, stored and used under primitive conditions. These shortcoming do not diminish the value of local initiative and industrial enterprise in the cause of modernising backward rural areas, but they do reduce the rate of growth.

Finally, it is a matter of regret that—as in the previous symposium by Hughes and Luard—the national accounts and their composition have been treated in a rather cursory manner. Here, American claims, such as those by Arthur Ashbrook, one of the chief contributors to the last two reports of the Joint Congressional Committee on China, ought to be scrutinised rather than accepted without questioning. It may be hoped that a future edition of Dr. Howe's volume will deal with this important aspect of any economic analysis worth its name. In the meantime, a pocket edition of this guide should be put into the hands of any potential traveller to the People's Republic; for Christopher Howe is a friend of the Chinese people, though by no means an uncritical one. Expressions of such friendship ought to serve the understanding between countries of very different structures and philosophies better than any number of glossy travel brochures.

St. Antony's College, Oxford W. KLATT

Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic. By Maurice Meisner. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1978. 416 pp. £13·50. $24.70.*

Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese People. By Roger Howard. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1978. 412 pp. £6·95.*

MAO continues to attract the attention of good writers for much the same reason that Lenin does. The subjects are inspiring in each case and the background of the revolutions in which these two men emerged adds to the excitement of their lives. There is often little to add to what is already known but the narrative can bear restating many times over in the succeeding perspectives of passing time. Both these books provide readable accounts of the life of Mao, though each follows a different established line of writing.

Meisner follows Herbert Franz Schurmann closely and takes up mainly where he left off. Schurmann began writing *Ideology and Organisation in Communist China*[1] twenty years ago and confessed that it was only in the 1960s that it became clear that one needed to add the army to the government and party as one of the three modes of organisation of Chinese society. Meisner recognises this rather late in his study and shows how Mao was forced increasingly to rely on his popular basis of support in the army when he failed to hold on to the support of the party

[1] Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

bureaucracy. It is, of course, difficult to document the army's role because the army does not operate in the same public way as the party and government. The Lin Pao affair has also caused much concealment and confusion about the role of the army in published accounts.

Meisner is an historian who has already published an original account of the origins of Chinese Marxism, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*,[2] and writes with sympathy for the course of the Chinese revolution towards socialism. Howard lived and taught in China for four years and his clear narrative of Mao's life is more concerned with the early, formative years, continuing the treatment of the subject provided in such classics as Snow and Smedley with extensive quotations from them. In spite of these differences the two authors come to very much the same conclusions about the significance of Mao. Both suggest that in the final account he failed in his objective of building socialism on the basis of the mass line. Howard says that 'Mao's socialist vision is too advanced for China's present stage of economic development', but the 'masses of people will enter history when they own the means of production and have socialised human relations'. His concluding sentence is: 'When history begins for the people, Mao's life and work will be seen to have been an introduction to it, and the Chinese revolution a brief prologue'.

Meisner writes in a similar vein:

> the question that will determine the future course of China's social development is not simply whether Mao's successors will inherit his legacy, for as a socialist legacy it is politically deficient. The real question, at least in so far as the possibility of socialism is concerned, is whether new and future generations of Chinese will enrich and develop that legacy in a manner that will make China politically democratic and intellectually free. For the absence of political and intellectual freedom precludes the possibility that political power will take the form of 'the self-government of the producers', the only form that is both the essential condition of socialism and the essential precondition for its genuine emergence and development.

Until this stage is reached China is likely to remain merely in a limbo of post-capitalism in which a growing state bureaucracy controls the people, reduced to political apathy after the collapse of the Cultural Revolution. His concluding sentence is: 'If much of the Maoist era was guided by the principle of 'permanent revolution', it is likely, at least for the foreseeable future, that the post-Maoist era will be marked by the permanence of bureaucracy and its dominance over society'.

Current evidence would appear to support these views. The central committee of the party contains no member likely to be able to enrich the Mao legacy, and the theoretical journals for the past year are barren of new ideas. Nevertheless China is emerging from a long period of isolation in its relations with close neighbours. As a consequence, the stultifying concern of the leaders with the threat of war with the Soviet Union may pass, and the possibility of considerable public debate of domestic political issues may open up. It is now a quarter of a century since the first five-year plan was launched in China. The recently published admission by Mao at the time of the Cultural Revolution that the policy of the Great Leap

[2] Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Forward, which switched off the plan continuation, was a mistake, for which he was substantially to blame, may serve to confirm that the hard slog of economic advance in a very backward country can only be done successfully by organised methods in which the people have a limited creative role for some time to come. Meanwhile China will not lack for reminders from foreign scholars of the attractiveness of populist ideas.

University of Leicester MAURICE HOOKHAM

The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs. Edited by William J. Barnds. *New York: New York University Press. 1976. 216 pp. $15.00.*

THIS collection of essays was published before the advent of the Carter administration and the announcement of its intention to withdraw all American ground forces from the Republic of Korea. But they are no less timely for that, given the nature and range of issues discussed. Indeed, the scope of this volume and the quality of analysis displayed in its pages, makes it a valuable source for an understanding of the contemporary complexities of the Korean problem.

The point of entry of these essays is the change in global relationships which prompted an abortive dialogue between Pyongyang and Seoul, while the minds of the contributors were concentrated further by the end of the war in Indochina. The prime considerations are the policy alternatives for the United States, given its treaty obligations and a fear that the nature of the Park government could in time pose a greater threat to the political viability of South Korea than military pressures from the North. The dimensions of the subject are set out with clarity in an opening chapter by the editor. This is followed by chapters by Donald Zagoria and Young Kun Kim and by Robert Scalapino which deal with the relationships between North Korea and the major powers and those between the two governments of the divided country. These chapters read like opposite sides of the same coin in that they demonstrate a consensus about the nature of the competing regimes and the limited prospect of a resort to the military option by the North. The status quo is accepted as virtually unchangeable, although attempts at mitigation of conflict are advocated.

A contrasting view is provided by Gene Henderson who represents the Northern and Southern regimes as equally objectionable and also places major responsibility on the South for the impasse in the dialogue. If the reader is able to battle through Henderson's prose, then an interesting, if not necessarily convincing, alternative analysis is available. He argues that a unified independent Korea would serve the interests of the United States by removing a threat to peace and by enabling a more effective practice of balance-of-power policy in East Asia. He suggests that unification is possible through the approach which produced a two-Germanies solution, but admits that the outcome is more likely to be a Finland-type accommodation than his preferred Austrian model. A concluding chapter by William Barnds strikes a more sober and realistic note. Although he concerns himself with ways of reducing the American military establishment in South Korea, he does not envisage any prospect of accommodation between the two competing governments as long as their essential characteristics remain unchanged; nor does he contemplate the prospect of unification without war.

London School of Economics MICHAEL LEIFER

The Future of the Korean Peninsula. Edited by Young C. Kim and Abraham M. Halpern. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 193 pp. £11·55.*

THIS is a revised and augmented version for publication of the papers read at a conference in April 1975 under the auspices of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of the George Washington University.

An introduction surveys the internal situation and outlook of each of the two Koreas. This is followed by five papers which deal in more detail with the economies of North and South Korea, the latter naturally more fully than the former, the effects of detente on internal politics in South Korea, the authoritarian nature of the South Korean government and the opposition to it, and a summary of the internal politics of North Korea, chiefly as manifested in attitudes and policies towards South Korea. The remaining six papers deal with international aspects of the Korean situation. There are one each on Chinese and Japanese attitudes, two on Russian policies, and a Korean and an American view of the relations between South Korea and America.

The collection as a whole presents a balanced view of the 'problem' of Korea and possible 'solutions', both words being put into inverted commas by the editors themselves. It is one of several similar works published recently, all sound as descriptions of the Korean situation up to the time of publication. The title perhaps reflects the desperate need to find one that has not been used before, rather than indicating the contents at all precisely. It seems to have been the one consistent feature of reporting on Korea since 1945 that commentators have barely managed to keep abreast of events, and those who have lived close to Korea for very long still find no better attitude to adopt than that of keeping their fingers crossed.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London W. E. SKILLEND

The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan. Edited by Robert A Scalapino. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1977. 462 pp. £16·50.*

IT is scarcely surprising that the Pacific War should have had a profound impact on the Japanese attitude to world affairs. In an opinion poll taken in 1968, two out of three Japanese considered the war of 1941–45 to have been the most significant event in the previous century (p. 111). Japan enjoyed a history of almost unbroken success from 1868 to 1942 only to experience shattering, traumatic defeat in 1945, symbolised by the horrors of the atomic bomb. Japanese foreign policy has been essentially placid and acquiescent since the Second World War; Japan has been largely content to shelter under the umbrella of American protection. This situation has begun to change in the 1970s under the pressures of the American failure in Vietnam, the ensuing rapprochement with China engineered by Nixon and Kissinger, and the oil crisis of 1973. Japan was forced to embark upon a reappraisal which is still continuing and which is the theme of this collection of essays edited by Professor Scalapino.

Thirteen distinguished contributors have been assembled and their essays divided under the headings of decision making and the foreign-policy process; interests: public and private; economics and foreign policy; security issues; and a summary. Professor Reischauer observes in his foreword that Japan's

attitude to the other major industrialised nations should change—'Japan probably needs to develop a more positive attitude in its relations with these countries in place of its passive, reactive policies of the past, if the external economic environment is to remain healthy and favourable for Japan' (p. xvii). In addition, Japan must exercise care in its relations with the 'largely preindustrial countries, which are essential sources of raw materials for Japan and now form a large part of the international political environment' (p. xvii). Professor Reischauer thus neatly encapsulates the vital questions emerging from the diverse contributions.

The work concentrates principally upon Japan's policy since the early 1950s, with the emphasis on the near-contemporary period. However, an effort is made to place developments in a wider perspective, notably in the editor's concluding reflections which range from the Tokugawa era to the present. The most stimulating essays are provided by Professors Ogata, Watanabe, Curtis, Johnson and Scalapino. Mrs Ogata writes lucidly and penetratingly on the attitude of the business community to the normalisation of relations with Peking; business circles wished to improve relations with China 'and became increasingly attuned to the pro-Peking elements of the LDP, which by then had joined with the opposition parties and various pro-China groups in an all-out bid for the normalisation of relations with China' (p. 203). Mr. Watanabe assesses the attitude of public opinion to foreign affairs from 1964 to 1973. While greater caution has been shown by Japanese politicians since the treaty revision crisis of 1960, public opinion 'did not prevent the government from taking the action it deemed necessary' (pp. 144–45). Mr. Curtis discusses the complexities of the Tyumen Oil Development project and the implications for relations with Peking and Moscow. The importance of the four northern islands occupied by the Soviet Union is again underlined as inhibiting the improvement of relations with Moscow. Chalmers Johnson considers the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Japan's economic performance; the achievements and defects of MITI's international economic work are clearly assessed. Professor Scalapino concludes with a cogent summary in which he maintains that there are no simple solutions to Japan's dilemma and that 'incremental' rather than 'dramatic' change is the most suitable course for Japan to adopt in the near future. This is a valuable work offering many insights into the factors determining or affecting the formulation of Japanese foreign policy.

University of Manchester PETER LOWE

Japanese International Negotiating Style. By Michael Blaker. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1977. 253 pp. $18.75.*

IN this study of modern Japanese diplomacy Dr. Michael Blaker of the East Asia Institute, Columbia University, tries to blend political science and history by applying some of the newer concepts of political theory to established historical data in the hope of discovering new insights in Japanese political behaviour. To this end, he has studied eighteen sets of negotiations between Japan and a number of other countries, stretching from the Shimonoseki treaty with China in 1895 to the abortive negotiations before the Pearl Harbour tragedy. He does not report on these case studies one by one, but takes them as read, using them as illustrative material for his various theoretical arguments. Suffice it to say that Dr. Blaker leaves no

bt with the reader that he has probed very deeply into these cases and ıd them a mine of information on Japanese decision making and ɔtiating practice in the prewar period.
ıpan had its own peculiar negotiating style which was open to its own ıliar shortcomings. Dr. Blaker concludes:

> Under the Meiji constitution, Japanese leaders directed negotiations in a twilight zone of diplomatic-military rivalry where the avenues of policy command were often blurred, overlapping, or undefined. The process of decision-making that evolved under this constitutional instrument was one of "dissensus"—a word that expresses the pluralistic competition, bureaucratic cumbersomeness, and policy accountability of the system. These systemic features forced Japanese leaders to devise intricate coordination and linkage devices to formulate and execute national diplomatic and bargaining policy effectively [but they] were never enough to bring the system to function smoothly and speedily during bargaining (p. 214).

: of the consequences of Japan's cumbersome procedures was the culty which its diplomats experienced in commanding the trust of other otiators. Blaker argues that it is unwarranted to accuse Japanese omats of being devious and underhand: on the whole, they operated ıin their instructions and in conformity with public statements. Yet people e convinced abroad of 'perfidious Nippon': 'never has a nation been obsessed with securing international trust and yet been so universally trusted as Japan in the prewar period' (p. 224).
'his is an expert study which will be of great value for the specialist in tical theory and comparative politics, on the one hand, and in Japanese lies, on the other. The historian too will find much of interest in it, but is bound to feel that enough account has not been taken of Japan as a idly developing society. Can one set (say) the negotiating techniques of 5 alongside those of 1941 without taking account of the sweeping intering changes in Japanese society (and presumably also in the negotiating ıosphere)? That apart, this is a most commendable attempt to take a ;h look at an important aspect of Japan in the half-century down to 1941.

ndon School of Economics IAN NISH

NORTH AMERICA

chnology, World Politics and American Policy. By Victor Basiuk. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1977. 409 pp. $21.90.*

CTOR BASIUK has written a fascinating, provocative and encyclopaedic atise in a brave attempt to analyse 'the future impact of technology on ernational relations and societies' over the next seventy-five years. The iberately forward-looking focus gives his exhaustive analysis some of : quality of a science fiction novel as he explores the implications for the clear balance of the development of electro-optical weapons, and specules on the probability of effective international action in the environmental ld fifty years or so from now when it will be necessary to combat dangers ıerent in 'excess waste heat from industrial activities' (p. 319). The mense range of factual information presented, all of it made relevant to the ıin theme, ranges from 'much of Tokyo lacks sewers' (p. 125) to 'the

Soviet Union leads in development of magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) power' (p. 43).

Dr. Basiuk's thesis can be stated in four simple propositions. First, technology—defined as the 'totality of all man-made tools, physical and non-physical, intended to modify man's environment' (p. 8)—will make decision-making more complex. Second, technology will become much more influential in its impact on international relations relative to more deterministic geopolitical forces such as the distribution of economic and energy resources. Third, military technology, both nuclear and non-nuclear, is likely to strengthen and perpetuate the stalemate between the super-powers which has prevented war between them for the last three decades. Non-military technology, developed to solve energy problems or to make fuller use of marine resources, will become more and more important as a determinant of the world distribution of power. Fourth, because the impact of technology depends upon 'volitional' forces or 'organised human will', i.e. the varying abilities of states to further and make use of technological change, technology will inevitably have a highly differential effect upon international relations.

In his treatment of the critical 'volitional' dimensions of technological change Dr. Basiuk is forced to be highly speculative. Arguments rapidly degenerate into 'on the one hand . . . on the other hand' variety. Which states are best placed to take advantage of technological change? The United States possesses the advantage of large-scale companies and the disadvantage of hostile attitudes towards the ever-increasing need for governmental involvement implicit in the huge costs of technological change. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's advantages of 'central planning' and 'greater purposiveness' are offset by 'the potential handicap of getting bogged down in a bureaucratic maze'. The chapter on Western Europe sets out three technological futures: a technological-trends-resistant society; a functionally-oriented society; and political unity. The current lack of agreement regarding common energy, environment and fisheries policies does not suggest that the second or third scenarios are likely during the next decade. Basiuk's analysis of the American future raises a theme familiar to specialists in American politics: 'The United States is not likely to solve the problems and meet the challenges of the future unless it modifies its institutions and improves its decision-making processes' (p. 59). More interesting perhaps is the notion that, irrespective of type of government, advancing technology inevitably extends pluralism because it creates interests and interest groups leading to political stalemate and disjointed incrementalism.

This book is essential reading for students of international relations and students of post-industrial society. It raises many more questions than it answers. But Dr. Basiuk provides an indispensable framework for anyone who wishes to think about international relations in the next half-century.

University of Glasgow PETER FOTHERINGHAM

Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. By James R. Killian, Jr. *Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1977. 315 pp. £10·50.*

ON October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union scored a notable propaganda victory by orbiting the first artificial earth satellite, *Sputnik I*. The event trans-

ıed what had been relative complacency over the technological :riority of the United States, particularly in the nuclear arms race, to of near panic. The Russians had stolen a lead and might now be able to oit it to gain a decisive strategic advantage over the Americans. Edward er, who thrived on alarmism, when asked by a Congressional Committee t Americans might expect to find when they arrived on the moon, ied simply: 'The Russians'. All sorts of programmes, from outlandish pons systems to road construction were justified by such simple fears.

he initial response of the Eisenhower administration, which dismissed Soviet achievement as a gimmick, completely failed to appreciate the ic mood. Later the President made a shrewder move. He brought ing scientists into the upper reaches of government. This had the public tions advantage of appearing to mobilise the nation's scientific talent s to catch up with and forge ahead of the Soviet Union. It had a second ıntage, less appreciated at the time, of providing the President with an pendent and informed source of advice which would be able to evaluate numerous projects, often demanding quantum leaps in the 'state of the , which were being forwarded energetically by the military and the nce contractors in an effort to exploit the prevailing anxieties.

he value of the scientists to Eisenhower's attempts to resist the military-ıstrial clamour comes out clearly in this memoir by the man chosen by President to set up and lead this system of scientific advice. As President ⁄IIT, James Killian had had experience of dealing with scientists, though one himself, and had also chaired some important governmental com-.ees. The choice was a good one: Killian was a respected, discreet and ɔntroversial figure.

his book certainly reads as if written by a conscientious public servant. ɔvers the workings of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee and major issues that faced it, as well as Killian's other activities, including important Technological Capabilities Panel of 1954 which he chaired. as been designed as a work of historical record—facts have been checked ıout relying on memory and gossip has been excluded—and it is valuable that. However, since the leading scientists of this period have hardly ı silent on their activities, Killian is adding detail rather than revelations ˈgnificant new interpretations.

tham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

llers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. By Richard K. Betts. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1977. 292 pp. £10·50.*

s book concerns the military establishment of the United States and elationships with American civilian authorities. It is both a synthesising a seminal work; it sheds deeply entrenched myths and systematically ıvels complexity. It is indeed a fine and much needed addition to the ature on decision-making in the United States.

he more theoretically-oriented student of American foreign-policy lysis has frequently been frustrated by a lack of literature which attempts :ombine what Allison has called the organisational and governmental ˈeaucratic) models of decision-making. To a significant extent, Betts has :n a positive step towards synthesising the two. Rather than holding ınisational and bureaucratic variables as distinct and dichotomous con-.ts, he has breathed life into the models by showing the interplay on many

levels between the two. The author's approach is reflected in a statement drawn from his chapter on ' Professionalism, Position and Power ':

> Bureaucratic revisionists stress the antagonism between the President, responsible for ranking priorities and reconciling tradeoffs between competing interests, and parochial bureaucrats, unable to distinguish their partial organizational interests from the general national interest. The problem with this formulation is that it is both too bureaucratic, overemphasizing the parochialism of the (cabinet-level) officials, and not bureaucratic enough, glossing over the differences between political appointees and careerists in a department (p. 40).

Betts has also produced a seminal work, in the sense that he deals with military-civilian relationships beyond the conventional perspective of traditional administrative theory or bureaucratic revisionism. As the author states, ' Neither extreme is realistic because government has inconsistent interests. There is an inevitable tension between expertise and political control; to enshrine one is to corrupt the other, and government needs some measure of both ' (p. 51). The originality of this work is that Betts is convincingly able to go beyond the conventional theories and to approach the subject on a far more sophisticated analytical level, one that might be described as sensitive to the complexities of hierarchies and to the countervailing pressures of the political system.

Beyond the originality of Betts's approach is the questioning of certain well-established myths about American military-civilian relations. For example, in American policy since the Second World War the military would appear to have been extremely reticent about the application of force. Betts quotes a most telling statement by the former Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, that ' contrary to public impression—it was usually the military who had to hold back the sporadic and truculent impulses of political people and diplomats . . . ' (p. 37). This reflects Betts's own conclusion, after analysing thematically the role of the military from the Second World War to the end of the Vietnam era: ' But if past patterns persist, the military will still bear less of the blame for intervening where the country should not—or failing to intervene where it should—than will those in whom the Constitution vests responsibility ' (p. 212).

The book consists of ten sections, dealing with four major issues: the background of the American military establishment, with particular reference to members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the ways in which the military perceive options and conceive of policy; the military's interactions with their civilian counterparts; and the consequences of such military-civilian interaction. The book is rich in detail and examples, but is not concerned with historical chronology. For someone with an understanding of postwar American foreign policy and an interest in the decision-making process of the United States government, this book is invaluable.

University of Southern California RANDOLPH C. KENT

Vain Hopes, Grim Realities: The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War. By Robert Warren Stevens. *New York: New Viewpoints. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Croom Helm.) 229 pp. £5.00. $12.50.*

IN Professor Stevens's analysis, the ' classic economic blunders perpetrated [by the Johnson and Nixon] administrations during the peak fighting years

of the Vietnam War, 1965–1972 were interrelated but formally antithetical' (p. iii). Johnson accelerated a fast-moving economy; Nixon applied the brakes as it decelerated. The common reason for such contrary policies was the reluctance of both administrations to publicise (even recognise) the war's economic impact domestically and internationally. The paradoxical result is that the long-term dollar-costs of the war will vastly exceed comtemporaneous expenditures.

Such is the basic structure of this short if somewhat repetitious study. Professor Stevens, however, has other subsidiary concerns. Two may be instanced. One is to establish a more realistic procedure for costing the war as a proportion of Defense Department spending and total gross national product (GNP). Another is to vindicate (post-Keynesian) 'new economics' (Ch. 3). Stevens argues that such macro-economic management is not inherently inflationary (an inference unjustifiably drawn from the war). It was precisely because the Johnson administration overshot the 'performance gap' (encouraged demand beyond the capacity of the economy: see especially Figure 3–2, p. 44) that inflation occurred: while Nixon, committed to deflating through 'doctrinaire' monetarist policies, simply aggravated the original inflation while introducing recession ('stag-flation').

Stevens's perspective is not constant. He shows himself to be a political and economic liberal-pluralist. Nevertheless there are frequent references to concepts which make such a position problematical: the dominance of the 'defense-foreign policy establishment' (pp. 7, 14 and passim); the continued potency of 'cold-war' motivations (pp. 32–35, 163); Watergate as a logical, perhaps the inevitable, result of the 'credibility gap' fashioned by Johnson (pp. 88, 119). Even when Stevens examines components of the classic liberal-pluralist model (Congress vs. the Executive; the Treasury vs. the Pentagon) he reveals that power is not equally divided and mutually countervailing.

On a ledger-book basis Stevens estimates the aggregate costs of the war to approximate the 1969 GNP: $900 billion—a huge sum, far exceeding official calculations (Ch. 14, especially pp. 186 ff.). He implies that once the true costs are known, popular revulsion from the war will increase. But with the war formally over and the Americans withdrawn, what purpose would *such revulsion serve? Stevens does not say. The sources and structures of power identified by him are unconcerned with such economistic arguments (as he acknowledges): while the victims of inflation and recession (predominantly the old, poor, unemployed and minority groups) are depicted as* apolitical.

The fundamental question raised by this book goes unexamined (see especially p. 143; cf pp. 154–55): is 'defence' spending functional or dysfunctional to the American political economy? Stevens does not use this old but still valuable concept. Concentrating upon economy (narrowly defined, for all his social costings), he concludes that the war was dysfunctional. However, since the sources and inter-relationships of power in the United States have not significantly changed since the war (Watergate focusing public attention on the abuse not the fact of power), it may be more reasonable to conclude that even if on an 'opportunity cost' basis (p. 57) the Vietnam War was a loss, this has not adversely affected the particular relationships of economic, military and political power which constitute the dominant forms in today's United States.

University of Sussex MICHAEL DUNNE

LATIN AMERICA

Presidential Power in Latin American Politics. Edited by Thomas V. DiBacco. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, London.) 122 pp. £10·05.*

LIKE most anthologies this book is of uneven quality and value. The first two contributions, by Professors Robert J. Alexander and Robert H. Dix, are general and attempt to examine their subjects in relation to Latin America as a whole. The remaining four examine the situation in individual countries: Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela. The choice is odd; the inclusion of Argentina and Brazil would have immensely increased the value of the book. Costa Rica is of great interest in itself but in no way representative of Central America.

There are some curious contradictions. Professor Alexander casts doubts on the justice of the theory that Latin American politics are and always have been 'dominated by "personalism"' (p. 1), whereas Professor Kenneth J. Mijeski assumes it to be so in 'most American nations' (p. 63) and even in Costa Rica before 1948. Professor Alexander again speaks of 'the disappearance of the caudillo even in the smaller countries of Latin America by the middle of the twentieth century' (p. 6), whereas Professor John D. Martz tells us that two of the last four presidents of Venezuela 'reached the presidency as acknowledged caudillos of their respective parties' (p. 113). The exact meaning of many Spanish words sometimes escapes even the most dedicated scholars. Professor Kenneth F. Johnson asks us to 'Note the use of the qualifier "fatally"' (p. 48) in a translated quotation where the original Spanish must have been *fatalmente*; in the context this means, not 'fatally', but 'inevitably'. There are some other errors. For example, *coleqiado* for *colegiado* (p. 82), 'interpretive' (unless this is an American usage) (p. 96) and a puzzling 'wither' for 'whether' (p. 100).

But these are minor blemishes in a book devoted to a subject which deserves further study. The desire, and often the need, to check the power of the executive and the means of doing so, as also the balance between the executive and legislative branches of government, are not problems exclusive to Latin America. This book shows that Latin Americans have often found their own ways of attempting to solve them.

Most of the notes are grouped at the end of each contribution. There is a useful index. J. A. CAMACHO

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CORRESPONDENCE

From Professor William V. Wallace

Dear Editor,

On contentious subjects, considered over long periods, opinions obviously differ. But it is at the standard of the review which was accorded to my book *Czechoslovakia* in the January issue of *International Affairs* that I write to express my surprise. Among a number of points, I would especially like to raise the following, quoting your reviewer verbatim, and appending my comments.

1. 'British historians of Central and Eastern Europe have sometimes tended, particularly in the past, to view the successor states with somewhat rosy spectacles. Professor Wallace, in describing the major events of Czech history, and the politicians who were most involved in them, is *plus catholique que le pape*. All is for the best always, motives are pure, the decisions taken are correct, no blame can be apportioned.' Your reviewer may disagree with some of my assessments and conclusions. But her general condemnation ignores innumerable critical judgments such as my comments on the double-dealing of the Agrarians in 1938.

2(a). 'The three most influential politicians in Czech history, Masaryk, Beneš and Dubček, are portrayed as men who rightly hoped that avoidance of hostilities would produce situations which they could manipulate, and in spite of the fact that they clearly failed in their objectives, their own evaluation of their policies is accepted uncritically.' My book deals deliberately and explicitly with Czechoslovak, not Czech history; Masaryk was half-Slovak, Dubček entirely so. And during the First World War Masaryk exploited hostilities to help to create a Czechoslovak state that is still in existence.

2(b). 'The case for Beneš is made particularly strongly. His grave miscalculation of the extent of Anglo-French appeasement is glossed over, even though he knew both that the French were reneging on their military commitments to Poland, and that under Laval they had crushed the Eastern Locarno negotiations. In any case, by 1936 they had lost their leadership of Europe to the British, and the latter, as Professor Campbell Gregory has recently shown, had by as early as 1933 become antagonistic towards the Czechs and therefore less inclined to thwart German aims.' In this connection, two quotations may serve as examples of what my book actually says:

> 'The new situation was evident as early as March 1936, from that moment on French policy was decided more in London than in Paris.
>
> From the Czechoslovak point of view this was most unfortunate. In terms first of its independence and then of its security, France had usually led and Britain sometimes followed. For Britain to take the lead spelled danger. It had always resisted an eastern Locarno and was specifically opposed to a Russian alliance. Its commercial and strategic interests lay elsewhere than in eastern Europe. In so far as its press and public opinion were aware of individual countries in

> central Europe, there was more sympathy for dispossessed Magyars and more liaison with Polish aristocrats than there was identification with middle-class Czechoslovaks. On the other hand, Britain still had a reputation for international fair play; and even if it was tolerant towards Germany and ill-disposed towards alliances, it had entered the fray in 1914 with a rather similar record . . . Nothing was without hope' (pp. 198–99).
>
> 'In the uncharted sea of appeasement the one light he (Beneš) had thought he could rely on was the French treaty. Yet he had at least suspected that France's willingness to honour its obligation would depend on the attitude of Britain. He had not simply gone along with British wishes. He had argued the Czechoslovak case at length, not least with Runciman, and over and over again he had tried to relate Germany's threat to Britain's interests. [Jan] Masaryk had been assiduous in trying to muster support in London; and champions from the First World War, like [R. W.] Seton-Watson, had done their best to help. Nevertheless, on the morning of 21 September, he knew he had failed. It was no longer simply pressure; it was no longer just on behalf of Henlein; it was quite crudely an ultimatum on behalf of Hitler—and delivered as toughly by France as by Britain. He had been defeated not by his enemies but by his friends. . . . Unfortunately, Beneš overestimated Hitler and underestimated Chamberlain' (pp. 208–09).

It is perhaps worth adding that the excellent book your reviewer cites (and had earlier reviewed for *International Affairs*) does not go beyond 1933: and that it was written, not by a Professor Campbell Gregory, but by Professor Gregory Campbell.

Yours faithfully,

WILLIAM V. WALLACE

Dr. Lisanne Radice writes:

May I just take up one or two points in Professor Wallace's letter?

My earlier comments about *plus catholique que le pape* had nothing to do with internal politics but were aimed at the author's analysis of Czech foreign policy. To bring in the Agrarians is simply to misunderstand my point.

Masaryk had nothing to do with the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, and could therefore hardly have attempted to avoid them.

As to his third point—Professor Wallace is incorrect to state that the British 'had always resisted an eastern Locarno'. They had encouraged it—for their own ends. (See my doctoral thesis: 'The Eastern Pact 1933–35. A Last attempt at European Cooperation'. London University 1972.)

BOOKS REVIEWED, OCTOBER 1978